INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE 1978

Edited by
IPS Research and Documents Staff

THE LIBRARY

SING FARD UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM & MINERALS
DHAHRAN, 31261, SAUDI ARABIA


The Library
University of Petroleum & Minerals
Daharan, Saudi Arabia

INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES BEIRUT

KUWAIT UNIVERSITY KUWAIT The Institute for Palestine Studies is an independent non-profit Arab research organization not affiliated to any government, political party or group, devoted to a better understanding of the Palestine problem. Books in the Institute series are published in the interest of public information. They represent the free expression of their authors and do not necessarily indicate the judgement or opinions of the Institute.

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE,1978

Copyright ©, 1980, by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut All rights reserved, including rights to produce this book or any portion thereof in any form.



INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES
Anis Nsouli Street, Verdun—P.O. Box 11-7164
BEIRUT, LEBANON

INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

FOUNDED 1963

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Abdulwahab A. Abdulwasie

Minister of Pilgrimage and Endowments (Saudi Arabia)

Nejla Abu Izzeddin

Historian (Lebanon)

Omar A. Aggad

Industrialist and Businessman (Saudi Arabia)

Muhammad Mursi Ahmad

Former Minister of Higher Education (Egypt);

Former Rector of Cairo University (Cairo)

Sami Alami

Regional Manager, Arab Bank Ltd. (Beirut)

As'ad Al-As'ad

Assistant Secretary-General, League of Arab States (Tunis)

Issam Ashour (Treasurer)

Economist (Beirut)

Ahmad Baha El-Din

Author and Journalist (Cairo and Kuwait)

Saleh M. Bouassir¹

Minister of Information (Libya)

Lakhdar Brahimi

Algerian Ambassador

Wadad Cortas²

Principal, Ahliyah Girls' College (Beirut)

Burhan Dajani

Secretary-General, Union of Arab Chambers of Commerce,

Industry and Agriculture (Beirut)

Adib Daoudy

Political Advisor to the President of Syria

Pierre Eddé

Former Minister of Finance (Lebanon)

Ali Fakhro

Minister of Health (Bahrain)

Nabih A. Faris³

Professor, American University of Beirut

Maurice Gemayel⁴

Minister of Planning (Lebanon)

Abdlatif Y. Al-Hamad

Director-General, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development

Sa'dun Hammadi

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Iraq)

H.E. Charles Helou

Former President of the Republic of Lebanon

Said Himadeh

Former Minister of National Economy (Lebanon)

Deceased

¹ Saleh M. Bouassir, 1971-1973

³ Nàbih A. Faris 1963–1968

² Wadad Cortas 1963-1979

⁴ Maurice Gemayel 1963-1971

Adib Al-Jader

Engineer (Iraq)

Abdul-Muhsin Al-Kattan

Businessman (Beirut and Kuwait)

Issa G. Al-Kawari

Minister of Information (Qatar)

Walid Khalidi (Secretary)

Professor, Political Studies and Public Administration,

American University of Beirut

Ibrahim B. Legwell

Advocate (Libya)

Edmond Naim

Professor, Former President, Lebanese University (Beirut)

Hisham Nashabi

Dean of Education, Makassed Association (Beirut)

Edmond Rabbath

Lawyer, and Professor, Lebanese University (Beirut)

Taher Radwan

Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia at the League of Arab States (Tunis)

Farid Saad

Former Minister of Finance (Jordan)

Hasib Sabbagh

Chairman, Consolidated Contractors Group

(Beirut and Athens)

Mohieddin Saber

General-Director, Arab League Educational, Scientific and

Cultural Organization (Tunis)

Abdul Aziz Al-Hamad As-Saqr

Former Speaker of Parliament, President,

Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kuwait)

Fuad Sarrûf

Former Vice-President, American University of Beirut;

Former Chairman, UNESCO Executive Board (Beirut)

Ahmad Khalifa Al-Suweidi

Minister for Foreign Affairs (United Arab Emirates)

Shams Ed-Din El-Wakil

Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Egypt to UNESCO (Paris)

Abdul Hassan Zalzalah

Former Minister (Iraq)

Ambassador, Assistant Secretary-General, League of Arab States (Tunis)

Constantine K. Zurayk (Chairman)

Distinguished Professor Emeritus,

American University of Beirut



CONTENTS

PREFACE	Page
LIST OF SOURCES	
LIST OF DOCUMENTS	
DOCUMENTS UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL ARAB WORLD APPENDICES	171
 A. Egypt's Cabinet in 1978 B. Israel's Cabinet in 1978 C. Jordan's Cabinet in 1978 D. Syria's Cabinet in 1978 E. Palestine Liberation Organization, Executive Committee in 1978 F. Chronology 	627 628 629
INDEX	620



PREFACE

This is the twelfth annual volume of *International Documents on Palestine* published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and the University of Kuwait. The purpose of the series is to assemble in one volume major attitudes and policies relating to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict of the states and organizations directly and indirectly involved. The collection is divided into three sections: United Nations, International (including Israel), and Arab World.

The United Nations section contains the reports or parts of reports relevant to the Palestine question, as well as resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It should be noted that United Nations annual reports in this volume cover a period from the middle of 1977 to the middle of 1978; the second half of 1978 will be covered in the annual reports of 1979. A selection from the debate of the General Assembly's 33rd session on the question of Palestine has also been included in the United Nations section.

The documents contained in the International and Arab World sections have been selected from material originating from governments or groupings of states and their officials and, to a minor extent, from individuals and institutions which represent significant groups of opinion or which are actually or potentially involved in matters relating to the Palestine question. Such material includes treaties, joint communiqués, policy statements, speeches, parliamentary proceedings, interviews and resolutions adopted by conferences and congresses.

In considering items for selection, the editors have evaluated their significance in terms of policy regarding the subject or as a record of the events of the year.

On the ground the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon and the strong international condemnation of it dominate the early part of the year. Meetings between Egyptian and Israeli officials and the gradual emergence of the Confrontation and Steadfastness Front are documented. In the Autumn the two agreements signed between Egypt and Israel under US sponsorship at Camp David form a focal point, with broad coverage given to Arab reaction against and international doubts concerning them. The year ends with the registering of initial difficulties between the Camp David parties and the increasing isolation of President Sadat in the Arab arena.

The Camp David agreements, following the pattern for joint documents in the volume, appear in the International section, but the accompanying letters signed by the parties to the agreements are found in the section indicating their origin. Therefore, letters signed by President Carter and Prime Minister Begin are considered International, while President Sadat's letters come under the heading Arab World. Full and detailed cross-referencing facilitates the location of these documents.

In selection no attempt has been made to achieve full geographical representation. The distribution of documents among countries both in the International and Arab World sections reflects the editors' perceptions of those countries' involvement in, and influence on, events and developments during the year. A large number of countries are represented

only indirectly through resolutions and statements of regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity and the Conference of Non-aligned Countries.

The majority of documents in the Arab World section have been selected from the comprehensive documentary collection *Arab Documents on Palestine* published annually by the Institute in Arabic.

Documents in the International and the Arab World sections are arranged chronologically. When a specific date could not be ascertained, the formula of "early", "mid", or "late" added to the month has been used and the document placed in the approximate chronological sequence. Place is normally designated by city if it is indicated on the document, reliably reported or can safely be assumed; only UN documents carry no indication of place. Within the United Nations section documents are arranged with reference to the organization's internal structure and only within subsections are documents arranged chronologically.

When documents have been reproduced only in part this is indicated in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the word "excerpt (s)" after the title of the document.

The term "joint communiqué" has been used loosely and does not necessarily imply that the document concerned is a joint communiqué in the diplomatic sense.

In the case of documents issued originally in a language other than English, the material has either been translated especially for this volume, or English translations published by recognized journals or agencies of the country of origin have been used. In the latter case, the footnote simply states "English text," with no reference to the original language and the text is reprinted unchanged, in order to remain as faithful as possible to the original.

In documents translated for this volume, familiar Arabic names appear in a form common in the English language press; others are written in a form which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic as closely as possible. Abbreviations (e.g. PLO for Palestine Liberation Organization) in the text will be found in the index with a cross reference to the full name. Cabinet Lists (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israel and the PLO Executive Committee) and a short Chronology of events form the Appendices.

The Institute for Palestine Studies is pleased to express its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and its Secretary-general, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume. The Institute also extends its thanks to the libraries and various institutes in Beirut that have cooperated by providing information when requested, in particular the offices of the United Nations. We extend our special thanks to the IPS research staff whose patient labour made this volume possible: to Albert Nehr, Mary Onorato and Julie Peteet for surveying sources and compilation of International section documents; to Regina Sharif for preparing the United Nations section and for the preliminary selection of the International; to Fatima al-Mana and Shukri Hosni for their contribution to the Arab World section; to Anne Hilal for cross-referencing and copyediting; to David Butter for indexing the volume; and finally to Melly Ziadé for typing the extensive preparatory material and the final manuscript.

LIST OF SOURCES

Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their publisher when relevant and not obvious, and their place and frequency of publication.

101 P:	NT TO U.	1.1
Africa Diary	New Delhi	weekly
al-Ahram	Cairo	daily
al- $Akhbar$	Cairo	daily
Al Hamishmar	Tel Aviv	daily
(Mapam)		
al-Amal	Beirut	daily
(Phalangist Party)		
al-Amal	Tunis	daily
American Journal of International Law	Washington, D.C.	quarterly
al-Anba'	Rabat	daily
Arab Report and Record	London	twice a month
L'Arche	Paris	monthly
Asian Recorder	New Delhi	weekly
Australian Foreign Affairs Record	Canberra	monthly
(Foreign Ministry)		•
al-Baath	Damascus	daily
Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamts		•
der Bundesregierung	Bonn	irregular
(Office of Information, Federal Government)		
Bulletin of the Institute for Palestine Studies	Beirut	twice a month
Duttottin of the Institute for I account Studies	Donat	***************************************
Canada: Statements and Speeches	Ottawa	irregular
Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism	London	6 times a year
(Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with		, ,
the World Jewish Congress)		
	_	_
The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter	Geneva	quarterly
(World Council of Churches)		
Congressional Record	Washington, D. C.	daily
Current Digest of the Soviet Press	Columbus, Ohio	weekly
(American Association for the Advancement		
of Slavic Studies. Ohio State University)		*

Davar	Tel Aviv	daily
(Histadrut)		
Department of State Bulletin	Washington, D. C.	weekly
Deutscher Bundestag	Bonn	daily
Dis Politika Foreign Policy	Ankara	quarterly
Europa Archiv	Bonn	twice a month
L'Express	Paris	weekly
al-Fajr al-Jadid	Tripoli	daily
Filastin al-Thawra	Beirut	weekly
(Palestine Liberation Organization)	2011 41	Weekly
Flash	Damascus	monthly
Foreign Affairs	New York	quarterly
(Council on Foreign Affairs)	11011 1011	quarterry
Foreign Affairs Bulletin	East Berlin	3 times a month
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	2000 201111	
Foreign Affairs Record	New Delhi	monthly
(Indian Council for World Affairs)		<i></i>
France Pays-Arabes	Paris	monthly
France-Soir	Paris	daily
Free Palestine	London	monthly
		,
Granma	Havana	weekly
The Guardian Weekly	Manchester	weekly
		·
Haaretz	Tel Aviv	daily
al-Hadaf	Beirut	weekly
(PFLP)		
Hatzofeh	Tel Aviv	daily
(National Religious Party)		
al-Hawadith	Beirut	weekly
al-Hurriya	Beirut	weekly
(Communist Action Organization; DFLP)		
Ila al-Amam	Beirut	weekly
(PFLP-GC)		•
International Affairs	Moscow	monthly
(All Union Society)		•
International Herald Tribune	Paris	daily
International Perspectives	Ottawa	6 times a year
(Ministry of External Affairs)		

Israel at Peace	Tel Aviv	monthly
(Communist Party of Israel-MAKI)	Jerusalem	twice a month
Israel Digest	Jerusaiem	twice a month
(World Zionist Organization)	Tel Aviv	monthly
Israel Magazine	London	twice a week
Israeli Mirror	Haifa	twice a week
al-Ittihad	Hana	twice a week
(Communist Party of Israel-RAKAH)		
The Jerusalem Post	Jerusalem	daily
Jeune Afrique	Paris	weekly
Jewish Affairs	New York	6 times a year
(US Communist Party)		
Jewish Chronicle	London	weekly
Jewish Frontier	New York	monthly
(Labor Zionist Alliance)		
Jewish Observer and Middle East Review	London	weekly
Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin	New York	daily
Journal of Palestine Studies	Beirut	quarterly
(Institute for Palestine Studies)		• ,
al-Jumhuriyya	Baghdad	daily
Keesing's Contemporary Archives	Bath	weekly
Knesset Records	Jerusalem	daily
	o .	,
The Link	New York	bi-monthly
The Listener	London	weekly
(British Broadcasting Corporation)		
Maariv	Tel Aviv	daily
MAPAM Bulletin	Tel Aviv	quarterly
Merip Reports	Washington	10 per year
Middle East	London	monthly
Middle East Economic Survey		•
Middle East International	Keiriit	Weekiv
Witatte East International	Beirut London	weekly monthly
(Council for the Advancement of Arab-British	London	monthly
(Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding)		•
Understanding)	London	monthly
Understanding) Middle East Journal		•
Understanding) Middle East Journal (Middle East Institute)	London Washington, D. C.	monthly
Understanding) Middle East Journal (Middle East Institute) The Middle East Observer	London Washington, D. C. Washington	monthly quarterly weekly
Understanding) Middle East Journal (Middle East Institute)	London Washington, D. C.	monthly

Le Monde Moscow News (Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)	Paris Moscow	daily weekly
al-Murabit	Beirut	weekly
al-Nahar al-Nahar al-Arabi wal Dawli	Beirut Paris	daily weekly
National Jewish Monthly (B'nai B'rith)	Washington, D. C.	monthly
Near East Report (America-Israel Public Affairs Committee)	Washington, D. C.	weekly
New African New Outlook (Jewish-Arab Institute)	London Tel Aviv	monthly monthly
New Times New York Times New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review	Moscow New York Wellington	weekly daily monthly
(Foreign Ministry) Newsweek—international edition al-Nida Le Nouvel Observateur Novosti	New York Beirut Paris Beirut	weekly daily weekly daily
14th October Orient (Deutsches Orient-Institut)	Aden Hamburg	daily quarterly
L'Orient-Le Jour	Beirut	daily
Pakistan Horizon (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs)	Karachi	quarterly
Palestine Palestine Digest (Arab League Office)	Beirut Washington, D. C.	monthly monthly
Palestine Human Rights Bulletin Paris Match Peace Courier Peking Review La Politique étrangère de la France:	Washington, D.C. Paris Helsinki Peking	monthly weekly monthly weekly
Textes et documents (Foreign Ministry, France)	Paris	twice a year

Quick	Munich	weekly
al-Rai	Amman	daily
Rasd Idhaat Israel	Beirut	daily
Relazioni Internazionali	Milan	weekly
Review of International Affairs	Belgrade	twice a month
Revista de Politica International	Madrid	quarterly
Revue Romaine d'Etudes Internationales	Bucharest	quarterly
al-Riyad	Riyad	daily
Rose al-Yusuf	Cairo	weekly
Sabah al-Khayr	Beirut	weekly
(Parti Populaire Syrien)		
al-Safir	Beirut	daily
Sawt Filastin	Beirut	weekly
al-Sayyad	Beirut	weekly
al-Shaab	Algiers	daily
al-Sharq al-Awsat	Beirut	weekly
Shu'un Filastiniya	Beirut	monthly
(Palestine Liberation Organization)		
al-Siyasa	Kuwait	daily
Socialist Affairs	London	bi-monthly
Soviet-News	London	weekly
(Embassy of the USSR)		
Der Spiegel	Hamburg	weekly
Summary of World Broadcasts	London	daily
(British Broadcasting Corporation)		
The Sunday Times	London	weekly
Survey of Current Affairs	London	monthly
(Central Office of Information, UK)		
Survival	London	6 times a year
(International Institute for Strategic Studies)		
al-Talai	Damascus	weekly
(Saiqa)		
al-Thair	Beirut	weekly
(Arab Liberation Front)		
al-Thawra	Baghdad	daily
al-Thawra Mustamirra	Beirut	weekly
Time—internațional edition	New York	weekly
The Times	London	daily
$T. \mathcal{J}. Hebdo$	Paris	weekly
Tricontinental	Havana	monthly

UD-informasjon	Oslo	irregular
(Foreign Ministry, Norway)		•
al- $Uruba$	Qatar	daily
al-Usbu al-Arabi	Beirut	weekly
US News and World Report	Washington	weekly
USSR and Third World	London	8 times a year
(Central Asian Research Centre)		,
Wafa	Beirut	daily
(Palestine Liberation Organization)		
al-Watan	Beirut	weekly
(Lebanese National Movement)		
World Marxist Review Information Bulletin	Toronto	monthly
West Asia Diary	New Delhi	weekly
Yediot Aharonot	Tel Aviv	daily
Zo Haderekh	Tel Aviv	bi-weekly

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

UNITED NATIONS

Doc	No.	Page
	Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly	
1.	Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (excerpts). September 12, 1978	3
2.	Report of the Security Council: Questions Concerning the Middle East. December 4, 1978	4
3.	Report of the Commissioner General of UNRWA (Introduction). September 15, 1978	19
	Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly	
4.	Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. September 22, 1978	26
5.	Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. September 28, 1978	36
6.	Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. November 10, 1978	37
7.	Report of the Secretary-General regarding Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip. October 11, 1978	78
8.	Report of the Secretary-General on population and refugees displaced since 1967. October 12, 1978	80
9.	Report of the Secretary-General on the health needs of Palestine refugee children. October 17, 1978	82
10.	Report of the Secretary-General on offers of scholarships and grants for higher education for Palestine refugees. October 18, 1978	95
11.	Report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. November 2, 1978	95
12.	Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. November 13, 1978	98
	Special Reports Submitted to the Security Council	
13.	Report of the Secretary-General regarding the situation in the Middle East. October 17, 1978	99
	General Assembly Debate: the Palestine Question	
14.	General Assembly, 59th meeting; statement by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. November 27,	11.5
15.	General Assembly, 59th meeting; statement by the representative of the Palestine	115
16.	Liberation Organization. November 27, 1978	120 125

17.	General Assembly, 62nd meeting; statement by India. November 28, 1978	128
18.	General Assembly, 64th meeting; statement by Nigeria. November 29, 1978	129
19.	General Assembly, 64th meeting; statement by Sweden. November 29, 1978	132
20.	General Assembly, 65th meeting; statement by Israel. November 30, 1978	133
21.	General Assembly, 66th meeting; statement by Afghanistan. November 30, 1978	141
22.	General Assembly, 66th meeting; statement by China. November 30, 1978	142
23.	General Assembly, 66th meeting; statement by the Federal Republic of Germany. November 30, 1978	144
	Resolutions and Decisions	
Gener	al Assembly	
24.	General Assembly Resolution 33/28 reaffirming that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East without a just solution to the problem of Palestine based on the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. December 7, 1978	146
25.	General Assembly Resolution 33/29 condemning Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian territory and calling for a comprehensive settlement. December 7, 1978	148
26.	General Assembly Resolution 33/64 calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. December 14, 1978	149
27.	General Assembly Resolution 33/81 requesting effective action towards the health needs of Palestinian refugee children. December 15, 1978	149
28.	General Assembly Resolution 33/110 requesting the preparation of a report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people. December 18, 1978	150
29.	General Assembly Resolution 33/112 noting the problems faced by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and calling on all states to remedy the needs of the Agency. December 18, 1978	150
30.	General Assembly Resolution 33/113 deploring Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the Occupied Territories. December 18, 1978	150 153
31.	General Assembly Resolution 33/147 calling for the provision of assistance to the Palestinian people. December 20, 1978	156
Securi	ty Council	
32.	Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) calling on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory. March 19, 1978	156
33.	Security Council Resolution 429 (1978) extending the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 30 November 1978. May 31, 1978	157
34.	Security Council Resolution 438 (1978) extending the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) until 24 July 1979. October 23, 1978	157
35.	Security Council Resolution 441 (1978) renewing the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Force until 31 May 1979. November 30, 1978	157
Econor	nic and Social Council	
36.	Economic and Social Council Resolution 1978/24 requesting the Commission to pursue its efforts for the protection of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. May 5, 1978	158
	, ,	- 50

Commission on Human Rights

37.	Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1, A, B (XXXIV) expressing concern over the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine. February 14, 1978	158
38.	Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2 (XXXIV) affirming the right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation. February 14, 1978	161
39.	Commission on Human Rights Resolution 3 (XXXIV) affirming the right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation. February 14, 1978	161
Econon	nic Commission for Western Asia	
40.	Economic Commission for Western Asia Resolution 53 (V) urging the implementation of a study of the situation and potential of the Palestinian people. October 5, 1978	162
41.	Economic Commission for Western Asia Resolution 58 (V) calling for a census of the Palestinian Arab people. October 6, 1978	163
UNES	sco	
42.	UNESCO Executive Board Decision 104 EX/5.1 inviting the Director-General to take measures necessary for the implementation of 18C/Resolution 13.1 and 19C/Resolution 15.1 concerning educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories. May 1978	163
43.	Decision 104 EX/6.3 inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization to the twentieth session of the General Conference. May 1978	164
44.	Decision 104 EX/7.1.2 inviting the Director-General to strengthen and expand UNESCO's aid to refugees and recognized liberation movements. May 1978	164
45.	Decision 104 EX/7.1.6 inviting UNESCO's cooperation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and contribution to the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the social and economic	
46.	impact of the Israeli occuption. May 1978	165
10.	aid to refugees and national liberation movements including the Palestine Liberation Organization. November 24, 1978	165
47.	UNESCO General Conference Resolution 20C/14.1 inviting the Director-General to take all necessary measures for the implementation of 18C/Resolution 13.1 and 19C/Resolution 15.1 concerning educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories. November 27, 1978	166
48.	UNESCO General Conference Resolution 20C/7.6 condemning Israel for changing and Judaizing the historic and cultural configuration of Jerusalem. November 28, 1978	167
World	Health Organization	
49.	World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 31.38 calling for all efforts to be exerted for the improvement of the health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories including Palestine. May 23, 1978	169

INTERNATIONAL

50.	Report of the Socialist International fact-finding mission to the Middle East. January. 1978	173
51.	Press interview statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel rejecting self-determination for the Palestinians and any kind of negotiations with the PLO. Jerusalem, early January, 1978	184
52.	Statement by US President Carter asserting that resolution of the Palestine question in all its aspects and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories is a necessary prerequisite for peace in the Middle East. Aswan, January 4, 1978	187
53.	Report adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel criticizing Prime Minister Begin's proposal for Palestinian self-rule as a perpetuation of Israel's occupation of Palestinian land. Tel Aviv, January 5, 1978	187
54.	Press conference statements by US President Carter affirming that there are no differences between his position and that of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts). January 6, 1978	190
55.	Press interview statements by US National Security Advisor Brzezinski discussing the US position towards the Palestinians, the issue of resettling the Palestinian refugees and the need for a regional solution of this problem. Washington, January 8, 1978	192
56.	Speech by Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR expressing continuing Soviet support for a Geneva conference and accusing Egypt of dividing the Arab world. Moscow, January 12, 1978	.196
57.	Press conference statements by Prime Minister Callaghan of Britain discussing his talks with President Sadat of Egypt. Aswan, January 13, 1978	197
58.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of President Boumedienne of Algeria. Moscow, January 14, 1978	198
59.	Three-point agenda agreed by Egypt and Israel for the Political Committee talks in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, January 16, 1978	200
60.	Statement by US Secretary of State Vance to the opening session of the Political Committee maintaining that a Middle East peace settlement must include a solution to the Palestine problem. Jerusalem, January 17, 1978	200
61.	Statement issued by the Cabinet of Israel in response to Egypt's decision to withdraw from the Political Committee talks in Jerusalem. Jerusalem, January 18, 1978	201
62.	Press interview statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel explaining the difference of opinion between himself and President Sadat of Egypt regarding, in particular, the future of the West Bank. Jerusalem, January 18, 1978	201
63.	Statement from the White House expressing hope that recent exchanges of words between Egypt and Israel have ended and quiet negotiations can begin. Washington, January 23, 1978	203
64.	Speech by Prime Minister Begin of Israel to the Knesset discussing the "statement of principles" for Egypt-Israel peace negotiations. Jerusalem, January 23, 1978	204
65.	Statement by USSR Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ponomaryov discussing the US-USSR statement on the Middle East. Washington, January 26, 1978	205
66.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Indonesia of Vice-President Doronjski of Yugoslavia (excerpts). Djakarta, January 27, 1978	205
67.	Press interview statements by Labour Party member Eban of Israel outlining what he considers to be an acceptable formula on the Palestine question. Late January, 1978	205

68.	Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel expressing optimism as to the progress of the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks and the possibility of eventual Jordanian participation. Jerusalem, late January, 1978	206
69.	Press conference statements by US President Carter discussing the possible sale of arms to Egypt and his position on Israel's settlements in the occupied Arab lands. Washington,	207
70.	January 30, 1978	207
71.	Press release by the US Department of State listing official US objections to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Washington, February 1978	209
72.	Speech by USSR Prime Minister Kosygin expressing support for a reconvened Geneva conference with full PLO participation. Moscow, February 1, 1978	210
73.	Press interview statements by US National Security Advisor Brzezinski discussing the US role in the Middle East peace negotiating process (excerpts). Washington, early February, 1978	210
74.	Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Vance stating that Israeli settlements in occupied territories are contrary to international law and are an obstacle to peace, and discussing the US role in Lebanon. Washington, February 10, 1978	211
75.	Statement by Israel's Cabinet protesting remarks made by US Secretary of State Vance concerning the illegality of settlements in the Sinai. Jerusalem, February 12, 1978	214
76.	Statements by US Representative Findley (Rep.) recounting his discussions with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat and revealing the text of a message sent by the latter to US President Carter via Findley. Washington, February 14, 1978	215
77.	Television interview statements by US Secretary of State Vance discussing the proposed sale of arms to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Israel's settlements in the occupied territories and Egypt-Israel peace negotiations (excerpts). Washington, February 14, 1978	218
78.	Press interview statements by Deputy Speaker Rognoni of the Italian Senate warning against a separate peace between Egypt and Israel and discussing other questions concerning Middle East peace. Mid-February, 1978	223
79.	Speech by President Brezhnev of the USSR reiterating the three basic principles for a Middle East peace and calling for a return to the Geneva conference. Moscow,	225
80.	February 21, 1978	227
81.	Speech by Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng of China to the National People's Congress of China outlining his country's Middle East policy (excerpt). February 26, 1978	228
82.	Speech by Foreign Minister Owen of Britain discussing his country's policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict and affirming that the Palestinians must play a role in the Middle East talks. London, February 28, 1978	228
83.	Press interview statements by First Secretary Mitterand of the Socialist Party of France affirming that his party's Middle East policy is based on respect for Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Late February, 1978	233
84.	Press interview statement by President Tito of Yugoslavia criticizing Egypt's President Sadat for the latter's visit to Israel. Igalo, March 2, 1978	234
85.	Letter to US President Carter from 21 members of the US House International Relations Committee urging reevaluation of the proposed "package" sale of arms to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Washington, March 7, 1978	

86.	Press interview statements by President Kirchschlager of Austria discussing Austria's position vis-à-vis a Middle East settlement (excerpt). Amman, March 8, 1978	235
87.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat, Moscow, March 10, 1978	236
88.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the German Democratic Republic of a PLO delegation led by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat. Berlin, March 11, 1978	238
89.	Statement by US President Carter announcing that President Sadat has accepted the US proposals for resolving points of issue and that Prime Minister Begin has agreed to present proposals to his Cabinet for consideration. Cairo, March 13, 1978	239
90.	Speech by Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR stating that Egypt's quest for a separate peace has jeopardized possibilities of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and reaffirming support for a Geneva conference (excerpt). Moscow, mid-March, 1978	240
91.	Resolution adopted by the US House of Representatives condemning the PLO and the Palestinian commando raid into Israel. Washington, mid-March, 1978	240
92.	Statement issued by the Israeli army announcing the aims of its invasion of South Lebanon. March 15, 1978	241
93.	Press conference statements by Chief of Staff Gur of Israel stressing that the Israeli invasion will be confined to South Lebanon (excerpts). Tel Aviv, March 15, 1978	241
94.	Statement by US State Department spokesman Hodding Carter discussing the invasion of South Lebanon by Israel. Washington, March 16, 1978	242
95.	Statement by UN representative Troyanovsky of the USSR condemning Israel's invasion of South Lebanon. United Nations, March 19, 1978	243
96.	Statement by US Senator Abourezk (Dem.) condemning the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon. Washington, March 21, 1978	243
97.	Letter from US Representative McCloskey (Rep.) to US President Carter protesting the use of US-made cluster bombs (CBU's) by Israel in its invasion of South Lebanon. March 22, 1978	245
98.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister Chnoupek. Belgrade, March 23, 1978	245
99.	Press interview statements by Defence Minister Weizman of Israel justifying the extent and size of Israel's invasion of South Lebanon (excerpt). March 23, 1978	246
100.	Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba condemning Israel's invasion of South Lebanon. Havana, late March, 1978	249
101.	Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance affirming that the two problem areas in US-Israeli relations are the interpretation of UN resolution 242 and the question of settlements in the occupied territories (excerpts). Washington, March	
	24, 1978	249
102.	Memorandum from the White House listing those issues that are unresolved problems in the Middle East negotiations (excerpts). Washington, March 25, 1978	253
103.	Statement by Prime Minister Begin of Israel explaining his government's proposal for administrative self-rule for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Jerusalem, March 29, 1978	253
104.	Communiqué issued by the Palestine National Movement in Israel calling for a general strike in commemoration of the Day of the Land. Late March, 1978	256
105.	Speech to the Knesset by Labour Party Chairman Peres of Israel criticizing the settlement policy of Prime Minister Begin in the occupied territories (excerpt). Jerusalem,	2
	March 29 1978	257

106.	to invade Lebanon and denying allegations that he referred to Prime Minister Begin of Israel as unfit to lead his government in the present situation (excerpts). Brasilia, March 30, 1978	259
107.	Letter from US Secretary of State Vance to the Speaker of the House of Representatives regarding Israel's use of US weapons in the invasion of South Lebanon. Washington, April 5, 1978	260
108.	Speech by US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton outlining US policy in the Middle East. Atlanta, April 5, 1978	260
109.	Press interview statements by President Ceausescu of Rumania discussing Egypt-Israel negotiations, noting that the Palestine problem is the core issue in the Middle East conflict and expressing support for a Palestinian state. Bucharest, April 7, 1978	266
110.	Statement by the Political Committee of the Sattar League of Iran condemning Israel's invasion of South Lebanon and the presence of UN troops from Iran in Lebanon. April 7, 1978	269
111.	Amnesty International report on administrative detention in the Israeli-occupied	
112.	territories. London, April 7, 1978	270
113.	8, 1978	272
114.	of US-supplied anti-personnel weapons (excerpts). Washington, April 9, 1978 Press interview statements by the Shah of Iran supporting President Sadat's peace initiative with Israel, UN resolution 242 and Muslim sovereignty over Jerusalem (excerpt). Early April, 1978	273274
115.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Cuba of President Haile Mariam of Ethiopia (excerpts). Havana, April 23, 1978	274
116.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of King Husayn of Jordan to Yugoslavia. April 29, 1978	275
117.	Television interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Dayan discussing the future of the West Bank and Gaza. April 30, 1978	276
118.	Press interview statements by First Secretary Gierek of the Unified Workers' Party of Poland discussing the policy of renewing links with Israel. Early May, 1978	277
119.	Statement by US Secretary of State Vance to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discussing the proposed warplane sales to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt. Washington, May 3, 1978	277
120.	Declaration by US Senate Republican Conference on National Security and Foreign Affairs criticizing US Mideast policy and outlining the principles that should govern its conduct (excerpts). Washington, May 4, 1978	279
121.	Television statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel reiterating the risks of a Palestinian state and discussing the stalemate in Egypt-Israel peace negotiations and the proposed US sale of arms to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. May 7, 1978	280
122.	Speech by Senator Weicker (Rep.) to a conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) accusing the Carter Administration of deliberately pursuing a policy of confrontation with Israel, Washington, May 8, 1978	285
123.	Statements by Senator Ribicoff (Dem.) urging support for the proposed jet sales to Saudi Arabia to counteract the threat posed by the Soviet Union towards the Arabian Gulf (excerpts). Washington, May 15, 1978	285

124.	Communiqué issued by the ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-aligned Countries reaffirming that the Palestine question is the heart of the Middle East problem (excerpts). Havana, May 20, 1978	288
125.	Speech by Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany stating that peace can only come to the Middle East through an overall settlement and calling for Israel's adherence to UN resolutions concerning withdrawal from South Lebanon (excerpt). Bonn, June 7, 1978	291
126.	Statement by US Assistant Secretary of State Saunders to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East reviewing US policy in the Middle East since World War II. Washington, June 12, 1978	292
127.	Answers by the Cabinet of Israel to questions posed by the US regarding the future of the West Bank and Gaza following five years of Israeli "administrative autonomy" (excerpt). Jerusalem, June 17, 1978	298
128.	Statement by the government of Israel clarifying its proposal of self-rule for the West Bank and Gaza. Jerusalem, June 18, 1978	299
129.	Statement by the government of Israel rejecting Egypt's plans for the West Bank and Gaza. Jerusalem, June 25, 1978	299
130.	Press conference statement by US President Carter expressing disappointment at Israel's response to two questions posed by the US (excerpt). Washington, June 26, 1978	200
131.	Testimony by US Ambassador at Large for Middle East Peace Negotiations Atherton defining the US position on the PLO. Washington, June 28, 1978	299 300
132.	Statement by President Tito of Yugoslavia maintaining that one of the essential prerequisites for peace in the Middle East is Arab solidarity (excerpt). Belgrade, late June 1978	301
133.	Press interview statements by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria recognizing that the creation of a Palestinian state is indispensable towards the solution of the Middle East conflict. Vienna, early July, 1978	301
134.	Programme for a Middle East settlement drafted by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria and head of Socialist International Brandt of the GFR calling on Israel and Egypt to continue direct negotiations until a peace treaty is concluded. Vienna, July 10, 1978	302
135.	Resolution by the fifteenth summit meeting of the heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) supporting the rights of the Palestinian people and condemning the racist and expansionist policies of the state of Israel (excerpt). Khartum, July 12, 1978	303
136.	Declaration and press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance discussing the talks at Leeds Castle between Israel and Egypt and the progress of peace negotiations. Hollingbourne, July 19, 1978	303
137.	US Senate resolution added to the International Security Assistance Act calling for face-to-face negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. Washington, late July 1978	308
138.	Political declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries (excerpts). Belgrade, July 30, 1978	309
139.	Resolution on the question of Palestine adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries. Belgrade, July 30, 1978	313
140.	Resolution on permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries. Belgrade, July 30, 1978	316

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

141.	.Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries. Belgrade, July 30, 1978	316
142.	Press interview statements by former President Goldman of the World Jewish Congress expressing his belief that the West Bank and Gaza should not remain in Israeli hands and his willingness to meet with Arafat (excerpts). July, 1978	319
143.	Statement by the US White House announcing the acceptance by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin of President Carter's invitation to a meeting at Camp David. Washington, August 8, 1978	321
144.	Press interview statements by US President Carter outlining his hopes for the forth-coming summit at Camp David and the role he envisages for the United States in the talks. Washington, August 9, 1978	321
145.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of a Fatah Central Committee delegation to the USSR. Moscow, August 9, 1978	323
146.	Press interview statements by Italian Communist Party Member of Parliament Pajetta calling for a Middle East settlement based on UN resolution 242 (excerpt). August, 1978	323
147.	Press interview statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel speculating on the forth-coming Camp David talks and pointing out that in order for there to be peaceful relations a peace treaty is not essential if agreements are signed. Jerusalem, mid-August, 1978	325
148.	Speech made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Asad of Syria by President Scheel of the German Federal Republic asserting that peace in the Middle East is not possible without the participation of Syria. Bruhl, September 11, 1978	326
149.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Saudi Arabia of Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan (excerpt). September 12, 1978	328
150.	Resolution of the Inter-Parliamentary Union calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. Bonn, September 13, 1978	328
151.	Statement by US President Carter made in an exchange of remarks with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat at the signing of the Camp David agreements. Washington, September 17, 1978	329
152.	Statement by Prime Minister Begin of Israel made in an exchange of remarks with President Carter and President Sadat at the signing of the Camp David agreements. Washington, September 17, 1978	330
153.	Agreement between Egypt and Israel outlining a framework for peace in the Middle East. Washington, September 17, 1978	332
154.	Agreement between Egypt and Israel on the framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries. Washington, September 17, 1978	335
155.	Letter from Prime Minister Begin of Israel to US President Carter outlining Begin's proposed method of presenting the question of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset. September 17, 1978	336
156.	Letter from Prime Minister Begin of Israel to US President Carter reaffirming that Jerusalem is indivisible and capital of Israel. September 17, 1978	337
157.	Speech by President Carter before the US Congress following the signing of the Camp David agreements. Washington, September 18, 1978	337
158.	Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe of Japan supporting the Camp David agreements. September 18, 1978	340

159.	Statement by the foreign ministers of the European Economic Community supporting the results of the Camp David summit conference and describing them as a decisive step towards peace. Brussels, September 19, 1978	341
160.	Letter from Prime Minister Callaghan of the United Kingdom to US President Carter congratulating him on his success at Camp David. September 19, 1978	341
161.	Statement by President Giscard d'Estaing of France evaluating the Camp David agreements and declaring that peace in the Middle East must be based on resolutions 242	
162.	and 338. Paris, September 20, 1978	342 342
163.	Statement by Prime Minister Fraser of Australia declaring his support for the Camp David agreements. September 21, 1978	343
164.	Letter from US President Carter to President Sadat of Egypt discussing the issue of Israel's Sinai settlements. September 22, 1978	34 5
165.	Letter from US President Carter to Prime Minister Begin of Israel acknowledging receipt of the latter's letter. September 22, 1978	345
166.	Letter from US President Carter to President Sadat of Egypt stating that the US position on the status of Jerusalem remains unchanged, September 22, 1978	345
167.	Letter from US President Carter to Prime Minister Begin of Israel acknowledging Begin's definition of certain terms. September 22, 1978	346
168.	Speech by President Brezhnev of the USSR condemning the results of the Camp David summit and calling for an all-embracing settlement of the Middle East conflict (excerpts). Baku, Spetember 22, 1978	346
169.	Speech to the Knesset by Labour Party leader Peres of Israel voicing the party's position on Camp David. Jerusalem, September 25, 1978	347
170.	Statement by Foreign Minister de Silveira of Brazil before the plenary meeting of the 33rd session of the General Assembly (excerpt). United Nations, September 25, 1978	350
171.	Speech by Secretary of State of External Affairs Javieson of Canada expressing support for the negotiating process initiated by President Sadat (excerpt). September 26, 1978	350
172.	Statement by Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany before the plenary meeting of the 33rd session of the General Assembly (excerpt). United Nations, September 26, 1978	351
173.	Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR before the plenary meeting of the 33rd session of the General Assembly (excerpt). United Nations, September	
174.	26, 1978	352
175.	Statement by Foreign Minister Vajpayee of India reaffirming India's position that existing UN resolutions on the Middle East provide the framework for peace in the area. New Delhi, September 27, 1978	352 353
176.	Letter from US Defence Secretary Brown to Defence Minister Weizman of Israel pledging American assistance to Israel in building two military airbases in the Negev to replace those in Sinai. September 28, 1978	354
177.	Statement by US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Saunders testifying on the Camp David agreements. September 28, 1978	354
178.	Resolution adopted by the Bureau of the Socialist International welcoming recent efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict. Paris September 28, 1978.	358

179.	Statement by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) leader Yanez calling upon the Socialist International to invite the PLO as observer to its Vancouver Congress. Paris, September 28, 1978	358
180.	Press interview statements by US Ambassador to Lebanon Parker affirming that a US-PLO dialogue is possible if the PLO accepts UN resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist. Beirut, late September, 1978	360
181.	Press interview statements by Knesset Member Avneri (SHELI) of Israel discussing the domestic political situation inside Israel following the Camp David agreements. September, 1978	363
182.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of President Asad of Syria to the German Democratic Republic. Berlin, October 4, 1978	368
183.	Press conference statement by Foreign Minister Vajpayee of India listing the short-comings of the Camp David agreements. New Delhi, October 6, 1978	370
184.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of President Asad of Syria to the USSR (excerpts). Moscow, October 6, 1978	370
185.	Television interview statements by Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel reaffirming Israel's intention to continue aid to the Lebanese rightists. October 8, 1978	371
186.	Speech by US President Carter at the opening session of the peace treaty negotiations at Blair House. Washington, October 12, 1978	373
187.	Press interview statements by US Assistant Secretary of State Saunders discussing the US position on the repatriation of Palestinians in Lebanon and the relationship between the Palestine problem and the Lebanese crisis. October 13, 1978	374
188.	Replies made by the US in response to the questions of King Husayn of Jordan on the Camp David accords. October 16, 1978	375
189.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Moscow by President Boumedienne of Algeria. Moscow, October 19, 1978	377
190.	Communiqué issued by the Cabinet of Israel approving in principle the draft of the peace agreement with Egypt. October 25, 1978	378
191.	Press interview statements by Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee President Couve de Murville of France linking the political crisis in Lebanon to the Arab-Israeli conflict and stating that there can be no peace in the Middle East until an independent	
192.	Palestinian state is established. Paris, late October, 1978	379
194.	Chairman Arafat rejecting the Camp David agreements as inimical to the Arabs. Moscow, early November, 1978	381
193.	Press interview statements by Democratic Movement for Change leader Yadin of Israel discussing various aspects of the Camp David agreements. Early November, 1978.	382
194.	Draft agreement submitted by the US to Egyptian and Israeli delegations at Blair House negotiations in Washington regarding the peace treaty to be signed between Egypt and Israel. November 11, 1978	384
195.	Statement by leaders of communist and workers' parties and governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and the USSR condemning the policy of separate Egyptian-Israeli deals. Mid-November, 1978	386
196.	Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of President Ceausescu of Rumania to Yugoslavia (excerpt). November 17, 1978	387
197.	Message of solidarity from National Council President Zhikov of Bulgaria to PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat. Late November, 1978	387

198.	to PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat conveying greetings of solidarity to the Palestinian people. November 29, 1978	387
199.`	Statement by Foreign Minister Genscher of the German Federal Republic delineating his country's position vis-à-vis the Camp David agreements (excerpts). Bonn, November 30, 1978	388
200.	Letter to US President Carter from 16 members of the US Congress House International Relations Committee advocating a more active US role in the peace process and calling for US financial aid to enable Israel to withdraw from Sinai. Washington, early December, 1978	389
201.	Press conference statements by US Congressman Findley (Rep.) urging the US government to enter into discussions with the PLO (excerpt). Washington, December 1, 1978	390
202.	Speech by Secretary General Taraki of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan outlining Afghanistan's stand vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and separate agreements (excerpt). Moscow, December 5, 1978	391
203.	Press interview statements by Foreign Minister van der Klaauw of the Netherlands reaffirming the EEC's conviction that a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem must be based on UN resolutions 242 and 338 and on the necessity for a homeland for the Palestinian people. Damascus, early December, 1978	392
204.	Final communiqué issued by the NATO Ministerial Meeting (excerpts). Brussels, December 6, 1978	393
205.	Final communiqué of the fourth session of the General Committee of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (excerpt). Damascus, December 11, 1978	394
206.	Communiqué issued by the Cabinet of Israel rejecting Egypt's proposed amendments to the draft treaty between Israel and Egypt. Jerusalem, December 15, 1978	395
207.	Television interview statements by US Secretary of State Vance clarifying some of the issues involved in the Camp David agreements that were discussed with Israeli and Egyptian leaders (excerpts). December 17, 1978	396
208.	Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin of Israel discussing Egypt's proposals for a peace treaty. Jerusalem, December 19, 1978	398
209.	Press interview statements by Chairman of the World Labour Zionist Movement Allon criticizing the Israeli government's handling of negotiations with Egypt (excerpt). December 1978	402

ARAB WORLD

210.	Address to the Palestinian people by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat on the 13th anniversary of the outbreak of the Palestinian revolution (excerpts). Beirut, January 1, 1978	407
211.	Press interview statements by King Husayn of Jordan discussing the representativity of the PLO and the consequences for the area if peace negotiations fail. Tehran, January 1, 1978	409
212.	Statement by the Foreign Relations, Arab Affairs and National Security Committees of the People's Assembly of Egypt listing the dismantling of Israeli settlements in Arab territory, full Israeli withdrawal from the 1967–occupied territories, and self-determination for the Palestinians as essential elements in a just peace (excerpt). Cairo, January 3, 1978	413
213.	Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria discussing the initiative of President Sadat of Egypt and the prospects for peace with Israel. Damascus, January 4, 1978	414
214.	Declaration of principles submitted by Egypt's delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli Political Committee. Jerusalem, January 16, 1978	418
215.	Statement by the government of Egypt announcing the recall to Cairo of Foreign Minister Kamil and the breaking off of the negotiations by the Egyptian-Israeli Political Committee. Cairo, January 18, 1978	418
216.	Speech by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf (Abu Ayyad) reaffirming Palestinian insistence on an independent state, rejection of settlement and the PLO attitude towards the USSR (excerpts). Beirut, January 22, 1978	419
217.	Statement by the PLO Executive Committee spokesman rejecting President Sadat's scheme and all other "schemes for liquidation." Beirut, January 26, 1978	421
218.	Statement issued by the summit conference of the states of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation (excerpt). Algiers, February 4, 1978	422
219.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt discussing political developments subsequent to his initiative seeking to establish peace in the Middle East (excerpts). Washington, February 6, 1978	424
220.	Statement by the PLO Central Committee affirming its unanimous adoption of the resolutions of the Tripoli and Algiers Steadfastness summit conferences and discussing developments following the Camp David agreements. Damascus, February 12, 1978	427
221.	Press interview statements by Information Minister Iskandar Ahmad of Syria discussing Syria-Palestine relations and opposition to the peace initiative of President Sadat of Egypt. Damascus, mid-February, 1978	428
222.	Press interview statements by President Qadhafi of Libya expressing his attitude towards President Sadat of Egypt's peace initiative with Israel. Tripoli, mid-February, 1978	430
223.	Statements by President Asad of Syria praising USSR policy in the Middle East and rejecting capitulationism. Moscow, February 21, 1978	434
224.	Press interview statements by General Secretary Bikdash of the Communist Party of Syria analysing the balance of forces in the Middle East after the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel (excerpt). February 22, 1978	435
225.	Statement addressed by the Communist Party of Egypt to the national forces discussing the principles of the struggle to be followed so that Egypt can be spared the consequences of President Sadat's current policy (excerpts). Mid-February, 1978	437
226.	Communiqué by the Saudi Royal Council condemning the Israeli attack on Southern Lebanon. Riyad, March 15, 1978.	438

227.	Press conference statements by Foreign Minister Butrus of Lebanon discussing the measures being taken by Lebanon to counter Israel's attack on the South (excerpt). Beirut, March 15, 1978	438
228.	Speech by Foreign Minister Kamil of Egypt describing the objectives of Israel's attack on South Lebanon as an attempt to occupy it and to exterminate the Palestinian people. Cairo, March 19, 1978	439
229.	Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria asserting that Israel's invasion of South Lebanon was preconceived and that he would not object to UN troops in the South should that be the desire of Lebanon. March 19, 1978	445
230.	Communiqué issued by the National Movement of Lebanon calling for vigilance in the fight to defend South Lebanon from occupation by Israel. Beirut, March 19, 1978	44:
231.	Statement issued by foreign and defence ministers of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front condemning Israel's attack against Lebanese territory and calling for Israel's complete withdrawal. Damascus, March 21, 1978	444
232.	Speech by President Sarkis of Lebanon before the Lebanese Council of Ministers expressing the hope that the presence of UN forces in the South will enable Lebanon to regain its sovereignty over the area (excerpt). Beirut, March 23, 1978	445
233.	Statement by West Bank Mayors and representatives of trades unions and federations condemning the Israeli attack against South Lebanon and reaffirming their solidarity with the PLO. West Bank, March 25, 1978	445
2 34.	Speech by President Boumedienne of Algeria stating that President Sadat did not visit Jerusalem to solve the Palestine question but to regain Sinai for Egypt (excerpt). Algiers, March 25, 1978	440
235.	Statement by the Arab League Council calling for a mobilization of Arab pressure against Israel's invasion of South Lebanon. Cairo, March 28, 1978	448
236.	Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat discussing Israel's invasion of South Lebanon. Late March, 1978	449
237.	Press interview statements by "Sons of the Village" representative Kiwan describing the aims of his organization as defending Palestinian land, asserting Palestinian identity and creating a Palestinian mass movement capable of dealing with national issues. London, April 1978	450
238.	Speech by Defence Minister Tlass of Syria listing the objectives of Israel in invading South Lebanon. Damascus, April 17, 1978	45
239.	Statement by a PLO official spokesman on the visit of UN Secretary-General Waldheim to PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat. Beirut, April 17, 1978	45.
240.	Communiqué issued following a meeting of information ministers of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front countries reaffirming their support for the Palestinian struggle and their opposition to the initiative of Egypt's President Sadat (excerpt). Algiers, April 18, 1978	45.
241.	Press interview statements by former Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt discussing why the peace initiative by President Sadat of Egypt failed. Cairo, mid-April, 1978	45
242.	Statement issued following a meeting held by communist and labour parties in the Arab countries to discuss the current political situation (excerpts). Mid-April, 1978	45
243.	Press interview statements by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia denying that his country has a secret oil agreement with the US and warning that the oil weapon is not	1C
	one to be used lightly (excerpt). Riyad, late April, 1978	460

244.	Statement by a PLO official spokesman describing the remarks made by US President Carter rejecting a Palestinian state as inimical to the Palestinians. Beirut, May 2, 1978	462
245.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the prospects for peace with Israel (excerpts). Shubra al-Khaima, May 2, 1978	462
2 46 .	Letter from the PLO Higher Political Committee in Lebanon to the UNRWA Commissioner General in the Middle East condemning UNRWA's decision to transfer its headquarters to Vienna. Beirut, May 4, 1978	464
247.	Statement by the permanent secretariat of the Arab People's Congress of Libya insisting that armed struggle is the only road to the liberation of Palestine. Tripoli, May 14, 1978	465
248.	Memorandum submitted by five organizations of the Palestine resistance movement to the Central Committee of Fatah on the principal problems in the field of a united Palestinian attitude. Beirut, May 18, 1978	466
2 49 .	Statement by the PLO Central Council calling for unity among the Palestinians, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon under UNIFIL supervision, and support for the Confrontation and Steadfastness Front on the part of Arab states. Damascus, May 21, 1978	468
250.	Communiqué by the Political Council of the Lebanese National Movement accusing the government of Lebanon of prejudice in favour of the Lebanese Front. Beirut, May 23, 1978	470
251.	PLO statement issued following talks between PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon expressing the PLO's determination to facilitate the task of UNIFIL (excerpt). Beirut, May 24, 1978	471
252.	Joint communiqué issued following the visit of Colonel Qadhafi of Libya to Algeria (excerpts). Algiers, June 6, 1978	471
253.	Message from PLO member Safadi to the Commissioner General of UNRWA opposing the decision to move UNRWA headquarters from Beirut to Vienna. Beirut, June 23, 1978	472
254.	Press interview statements by King Hasan II of Morocco discussing the situation in the Middle East and his country's role in arranging the Sadat-Begin meeting. Late June, 1978	472
2 55.	Peace proposals submitted by the government of Egypt listing the procedure for Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the consequent security arrangements. July 5, 1978	473
256.	Address to the nation by President Sarkis of Lebanon explaining his reasons for offering his resignation and the conditions on which he withdrew it (excerpts). Baabda, July 15, 1978	473
2 57 .	Communiqué issued by the PLO Central Council criticizing the plan by Egypt's President Sadat to give the West Bank to Jordan and Gaza to Egypt. Damascus, July 20, 1978	475
258.	Press interview statements by Minister of Information Iskandar Ahmad of Syria placing responsibility for the deteriorating security situation in Lebanon on the US and Israel, their aim being to force Syria to accept compromises in its national goals (excerpts). August, 1978	476
259.	Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt declaring his acceptance of Israel in the region and discussing some of his differences with Prime Minister Begin of Israel, Fuschl Castle (Salzburg), mid-July, 1978	477

260.	Letter from Defence Minister Gamasi of Egypt to Defence Minister Weizman of Israel requesting Israel's representatives at the Israeli-Egyptian military talks to leave Egypt. July 26, 1978	480
261.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt explaining recent developments in the Egyptian-Israeli talks (excerpts). Alexandria, late July, 1978	480
262.	Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Kamil of Egypt demanding that Israel give up its claim to occupied Arab territory. Early August, 1978	484
263.	Press interview statements by Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon criticizing the US for not supporting the Lebanese government in its attempts to send troops to South Lebanon. August 18, 1978	485
264.	Press interview statements by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia describing the forth-coming Camp David meeting as decisive and asserting that the Arabs can give no further concessions (excerpts). Ta'if, late August, 1978	489
265.	Communiqué by the PLO Central Council outlining the need for Palestinian national unity and condemning the planned Camp David summit meeting. Damascus, August 1971	490
266.	23, 1978	490
267.	Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Butros Ghali of Egypt stressing the importance of the Camp David summit. Cairo, September 1, 1978	493
268.	Statement by President Sadat of Egypt commending American interest in maintaining peace in the Middle East. Andrews Air Force Base, September 5, 1978	495
269.	Memorandum from UN Representative Tueni of Lebanon to the UN Security Council asserting that UNIFIL has been unable to carry out its task in South Lebanon because of Israeli occupation. United Nations, September 5, 1978	495
270.	Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria criticizing President Sadat's peace initiative and the Camp David meeting, and reaffirming that peace can only be discussed on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Bonn, early September 1978	497
2 7 1.	Statement by President Sadat of Egypt made in an exchange of remarks with Prime Minister Begin and President Carter at the signing of the Camp David agreements. Washington, September 17, 1978	502
272.	Letter from President Sadat of Egypt to US President Carter reaffirming Egypt's position on Israeli settlements in the Sinai. September 17, 1978	502
273.	Letter fom President Sadat of Egypt to US President Carter announcing his intention of assuming the Arab role in the negotiations on the West Bank. September 17, 1978	503
274.	Letter from President Sadat of Egypt to US President Carter stating his position regarding the status of Jerusalem. September 17, 1978	503
275.	Statement by the PLO Executive Committee considering the Camp David agreements as a total surrender on the part of Egypt of Palestinian and Arab rights and calling on the Palestinian people to express their utter rejection of the agreements. Beirut, September 18, 1978	503
276.	Statement by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine calling on the Egyptian people to overthrow their regime and asserting a long-term people's war is the only way to liberate the whole of Palestine. September 19, 1978	505
277.	Press statement by Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon pointing to the necessity for Arab solidarity to confront any developments that might occur as a consequence of the Camp David agreements (excerpt). Beirut, September 19, 1978	506

278.	Statement by the Saudi Council of Ministers considering that the Camp David formula	
270.	will not lead to peace since it ignores certain crucial points of issue. Riyad, September 19, 1978	506
279.	Statement by the government of Jordan stressing that Jordan has no legal or moral obligations under the Camp David agreements and that any final solution must specify the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (excerpt). Amman, September 19, 1978	507
280.	Statement by Mayor Khalaf of Ramallah attacking the Camp David agreements as being a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and as leaving the future of the Palestinians unresolved. September 20, 1978	508
281.	Statement by Deputy Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Marzuq of Kuwait affirming his country's commitment to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences and, in reference to the Camp David agreements, that Arab solidarity within the framework of a joint strategy is the only way to recover Arab rights. Kuwait, September 20, 1978	509
282.	Speech made by President Asad of Syria at the opening of the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states (excerpt). Damascus, September 20, 1978	509
283.	Speech by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat at the opening of the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states (excerpt). Damascus, September 20, 1978	511
284.	Statement by the government of Tunisia reaffirming its position that UN resolution 181 of 1947 and the Rabat Arab summit resolutions are the basis of any Middle East settlement. Tunis, September 21, 1978	512
285.	Statement by the Council of Ministers of the United Arab Emirates expressing the view that the Camp David agreements do not provide for a just and final settlement to the Mideast problem and that the Arab summit meetings of Algiers and Rabat provide the basis of the UAE position. Dubai, September 21, 1978	513
286.	Statement by the Cabinet of the Yemen Arab Republic asserting that the Camp David agreements ignore the basic Arab cause and are not in conformity with UN resolutions. Sanaa, September 21, 1978	513
287.	Message to the nation by President Sarkis of Lebanon on the second anniversary of his taking office (excerpts). Beirut, September 22, 1978	513
288.	Declaration of the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states establishing a National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation. Damascus, September	514
289.	23, 1978	514 516
290.	Memorandum submitted by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states analysing the implications of the Camp David agreements for different Arab forces (excerpt). Damascus, late September, 1978	
291.	Statement by the National Progressive Unionist Grouping of Egypt analysing the Camp David agreements and outlining various means to combat them (excerpts). Cairo, September 25, 1978	519 520
292.	Statement by Saiqa indicting the Camp David agreements for ignoring Palestinian rights (excerpts). Damascus, late September, 1978.	526
293.	Statement by the official spokesman for the foreign ministry of the Sultanate of Oman denying that the results of the Camp David meeting are entirely negative. Muscat, September 25, 1978	
	Depression 20, 10/0	527

294.	Call by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat to the Arab and Islamic worlds warning of the dangers to Palestine and Jerusalem involved in the Camp David agreements. Beirut, September 26, 1978	528
295.	Statements by representatives of social, syndical and commercial organizations in Jerusalem condemning the Camp David agreements as a violation of all Arab summit resolutions and the Arab League Charter (excerpts). Jerusalem, September 28, 1978	529
296.	Statement by the government of Qatar declaring that the Camp David agreements do not constitute a proper basis for a comprehensive settlement (excerpt). Qatar, September 28, 1978	530
297.	Statement by the government of Bahrain reaffirming its support for the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences (excerpt). Bahrain, late September, 1978	531
298.	Television interview statements by King Husayn of Jordan discussing the questions which he has put to the US concerning the Camp David accords. Amman, late September, 1978	532
299.	Press interview statements by DFLP Secretary-general Hawatmah calling for the protection of the right of the PLO to represent the Palestinian people and an alliance with the Soviet Union to confront the Camp David agreements. Beirut, late September, 1978	536
300.	Communiqué issued by West Bank and Gaza leaders rejecting the Camp David agreements and reaffirming their commitment to the PLO. Jerusalem, October 1, 1978	537
301.	Memorandum submitted to President Sadat of Egypt by the members of the Revolutionary Council of July 23 criticizing the Camp David agreements as an attack on Arab unity and Arab summit resolutions and the Arab League Charter (excerpts). Cairo, October 1, 1978	538
302.	Statement by the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq submitting certain proposals for consideration by Arab forces opposed to the Camp David agreements. Baghdad, October 1, 1978	540
303.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt to the People's Assembly explaining the results of the Camp David agreements (excerpts). Cairo, October 2, 1978	541
304.	Statement by Fatah's Central Committee declaring its total rejection of the Camp David agreements and calling for the implementation of all Steadfastness Front resolutions and alliances with the socialist countries to combat the agreements (excerpts). Beirut, October 4, 1978	551
305.	Statement by the National Command of the Baath Party of Syria describing the October war as the beginning of the defeat of Zionist strategy and both the war in Lebanon and the Camp David agreements as attempts to halt the process of defeat (excerpts). Da-	550
306.	mascus, October 5, 1978	552555
307.	Communiqué issued by the PLO Executive Committee rejecting self-rule proposals for the West Bank and Gaza and calling for national unity. Damascus, October 9, 1978	556
308.	Statement by King Husayn of Jordan deploring the fact that if talks between Israel and Egypt on the West Bank and Gaza are inconclusive, the Camp David agreements still allow for a peace treaty to be signed (excerpts). Amman, October 10, 1978	557 ⁻
309.	Questions submitted by the government of Jordan to the US government regarding certain detailed aspects of its policy to establish peace in the Middle East as laid down in the Camp David agreements. Amman, October 16, 1978	560

310.	Closing statement issued by the Beit al-Din conference of Arab foreign ministers discussing the composition and financing of the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon. Beit al-Din, October 17, 1978	561
311.	Resolutions of the municipal and village councils and social economic organizations of the Gaza Strip listing the reasons for their rejection of the Camp David agreements. Gaza, October 16–18, 1978	562
31 2.	Statement by the Presidency of Sudan expressing its support for a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and its unwillingness to criticize the Egyptian initiative. Khartum, October 20, 1978	563
313.	Radio interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat reiterating his rejection of Security Council resolution 242 but his acceptance of the US-Soviet communiqué of October 1977. October 24, 1978	564
314.	Charter for joint national action between Syria and Iraq. Baghdad, October 26, 1978	567
315.	Speech by President Asad of Syria following the signing of the charter for joint national action between his country and Iraq. Baghdad, October 26, 1978	568
316.	Television interview statements by President Asad of Syria describing his country's agreement with Iraq as a defence agreement and the proposed autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza as an attempt to incorporate the territories into Israel (excerpts). Damascus, October 28, 1978	569
317.	Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf (Abu Iyyad) discussing the visit of PLO Central Committee Chairman Arafat to the Soviet Union. Late October, 1978	572
318.	Statement by Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon at the opening session of the Arab foreign ministers summit conference (excerpts). Baghdad, October 30, 1978	580
319.	Working paper submitted by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi to the Arab foreign ministers' summit conference. Baghdad, October 30, 1978	582
320.	Speech by Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia at the Arab foreign ministers summit conference. Baghdad, October 31, 1978	583
321.	Speech by President Bakr of Iraq at the opening of the ninth Arab summit conference. Baghdad, November 2, 1978	584
322.	Speech by King Husayn of Jordan at the ninth Arab summit conference (excerpts). Baghdad, November 3, 1978	588
3 23.	Speech by Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan armed forces Colonel Jabir at the ninth Arab summit conference. Baghdad, November 4, 1978	589
324.	Speech by President Sarkis of Lebanon at the ninth Arab summit conference (excerpts). Baghdad, November 4, 1978	591
325.	Letter from President Bakr of Iraq to President Sadat of Egypt calling on him to abandon the Camp David agreements. Baghdad, November 4, 1978	592
326.	Final statement issued by the ninth Arab summit conference reaffirming the responsibilities of the Arab nation in the struggle for the recovery of Arab rights, in the light of the signing of the Camp David agreements. Baghdad, November 5, 1978	592
327.	Press conference statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat commenting on the Soviet-PLO joint communiqué and expressing satisfaction with the results of the ninth Arab summit conference (excerpts). Baghdad, November 7, 1978	594
328.	Message by three West Bank Mayors to the Council for the Advencement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) explaining their rejection of the Camp David agree-	
	ments (excerpt). November 7, 1978	595

329.	Statement by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia asserting that the basic issues to be discussed at the ninth Arab summit conference were those of Jerusalem and of the Arabs of Palestine. Riyad, November 7, 1978	596
330.	Speech by President Sadat of Egypt asserting that the Baghdad Arab summit will in no way affect Egypt's negotiations with Israel despite current difficulties in the talks (excerpts). Cairo, November 16, 1978	598
331.	Press interview statements by Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon affirming that the ninth Arab summit conference had adopted all Lebanon's demands and describing the abortive joint Arab delegation's mission to Cairo (excerpts). Beirut, mid-November, 1978	599
332.	Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Sabah of Kuwait reaffirming that no one Arab country is entitled to take individual decisions concerning the Palestinian cause and expressing the hope that Egypt will return to Arab ranks. Kuwait, mid-November, 1978	601
333.	Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt stressing that the main difference between Israel and Egypt is the question of linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza (excerpts). Cairo, mid-November,	602
334.	Press interview statements by King Hasan II of Morocco stressing that President Sadat of Egypt is not seeking a separate peace with Israel and declaring his support for the Camp David agreements in terms of their final aims (excerpts). Washington, mid-November, 1978	603
335.	Statement by Prime Minister Khalil of Egypt to the People's Assembly asserting that his country will not sign a separate peace with Israel (excerpts). Cairo, November 25, 1978	605
336.	Press interview statements by President Sarkis of Lebanon discussing the role of UNIFIL, defining coexistence between the communities as a solution for Lebanon, and asserting that there is now more equilibrium in the army than there was two years ago. Beirut, November 27, 1978	605
337.	Joint communiqué issued following talks between Prime Minister Badran of Jordan and Palestine National Council Chairman Fahum. Amman, November 29, 1978	609
338.	Speech by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria at the opening of the fourth session of the Euro-Arab dialogue (excerpts). Damascus, December 9, 1978	610
339.	Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat describing the Camp David agreements as offering a new slavery to the Palestinian people, citing the UN resolutions as a basis for negotiation and discussing a possible reconciliation with Jordan. Beirut, December 3, 1978	611
340.	Statement by the Palestinian trade union movement in the occupied territories rejecting the Camp David agreements and calling for practical steps to be implemented against them. December 12, 1978	615
341.	Resolutions and recommendations of the Popular Congresses as formulated by the General Popular Congress of Libya at its fourth regular session (excerpts). Tripoli, December 12, 1978	616
342.	Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi pointing out that many European states expressed reservations regarding the Camp David agreements and that the Baghdad summit has shown the world that the Arabs reject Camp David. Beirut, December 13, 1978	616
343.	Statement by the Conference of Communist Workers' Parties of the Arab Countries stressing that the danger of the Camp David agreements lies in the establishment of an Israel-US-Egyptian alliance against Arab and African liberation movements (excerpts).	618

United Nations

Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

1

Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization $(excerpts)^1$

September 12, 1978

The organs of the United Nations, the Secretary-General and his staff, and various Governments and groups of Governments have continued their efforts to make progress on the main political problems where the Organization has specific responsibilities. These include especially the Middle East, the problems of southern Africa, and Cyprus.

In the Middle East, despite all efforts and some new elements, real peace still eludes us. Last year most efforts to make progress were connected in one way or another with a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. In November 1977, however, President Sadat's historic visit to Israel provided a new approach. It remains to be seen what will finally come of the current attempt to break the prevailing impasse.

I remain convinced, however, that whatever developments may emerge, it will in the end be essential for all the parties concerned in the Middle East to be brought together again in a joint effort to find a way forward to a just and lasting settlement. I have made various suggestions in this regard and I shall not fail to do anything in my power to help the parties concerned to overcome the present stalemate. To this end I have kept close contact with the leaders in the region and the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference.

The Middle East situation, for a mixture of compelling reasons, vitally affects not only international peace and security, but the interests of the world community as a whole. However formidable the difficulties, we cannot afford to relax for a moment the attempt to find a peaceful way forward. It bears repeating that in the Middle

East time is not in favour of peaceful developments. Nothing could demonstrate this point more clearly than the events in Lebanon, a country which has literally been torn apart by the stresses and strains imposed by the Middle East conflict.

In March of this year, the United Nations became even more closely involved in that agonized region of the world when, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon the Security Council decided to dispatch a United Nations peace-keeping force to the area. Later in this report I shall deal in more detail with the experiences and the lessons of this extremely challenging operation. I shall confine myself here to saving that in the face of enormous difficulties the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon has been successful in fulfilling much of its mandate. The completion of its task, however, will depend not only on a drastic improvement in the overall situation in Lebanon, but also on the prospects of an improvement in the Middle East situation as a whole. Naturally it also depends on the cooperation of all the parties concerned in the problem.

The all too precise agony of Lebanon, and the general apprehensions of the world at large, demand in their different ways that the United Nations live up to its responsibilities in the Middle East. At the risk of being misunderstood, I wish to say that, if there is to be any hope of a solution, all parties to the Middle East conflict need to abandon many preconceived ideas and ingrained attitudes, that all must make a serious effort to appreciate the difficulties of their adversaries, and that all must make an attempt to come to terms with the very harsh, and often unjust, realities of this most difficult of all international problems. To the outside observer the irony of the Middle East is that this historic region, which has given so much to our civilization and which is still a great and diverse reservoir of human talent, has also become a grave danger to the rest of the world. We must together find some means of liberating the Middle East and all humanity from a nightmare that has lasted far too long.

¹ Part III of Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1977–15 June 1978, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 (UN doc. A/33/1), pp. 6-7.

9

Report of the Security Council: Questions Concerning the Middle East²

December 4, 1978

PART I

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAIN-TENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Chapter 1

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST

- A. The situation in the Middle East
- 1. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

Extension of the mandate of UNEF until 24 October 1978

- (i) Report of the Secretary-General dated 17 October 1977
- 6. As the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was due to expire on 24 October 1977, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 17 October (S/12416) on the activities of the Force for the period from 19 October 1976 to 17 October 1977.
- 7. In that report, the Secretary-General observed that since his report of 18 October 1976 (S/12212), the functions and responsibilities of UNEF had not changed, the situation in the area had remained stable and the Force had continued efficiently to discharge its mandate. With the consent of the Security Council, Major-General Rais Abin had been appointed Commander of UNEF. He and the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, had continued the practice of separate meetings with the military authorities of Egypt and Israel concerning the implementation of the terms of reference of the Force and the inspections carried out by UNEF in the areas of limited forces and

armaments; in addition, the Chief Co-ordinator had maintained contact with the parties at the ministerial level on important issues.

- 8. With regard to the implementation of the Security Council resolution 338 (1973)³, the Secretary-General noted that intensive efforts had been made at various levels to promote an early resumption of the negotiating process aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the area, as called for in that resolution and as described in his report to the Council of 28 February 1977 (S/12290 and Corr. 1) and in a further report submitted to the General Assembly on 3 October 1977 and circulated to the members of the Council in document S/12417.
- 9. The Secretary-General emphasized that the situation in the area would be unstable and increasingly dangerous unless and until a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem could be reached. In conclusion, the Secretary-General, taking into account the relevant factors involved and considering the continued presence of UNEF in the area to be essential, recommended the extension of the mandate for one year.
 - (ii) Consideration at the 2035th meeting (21 October 1977)
- 10. At its 2035th meeting on 21 October, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The situation in the Middle East:

"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/12416)."

11. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/12419) which had been drawn up during consultations among the members of the Council, who had agreed that statements on should be made after the vote. Additionally, the President made the following complementary statement (S/PV.2035) on behalf of the Council regarding the draft resolution:

Under the provisions of operative paragraph 1c, the Security Council would request the Secretary-General to submit by 24 October 1978 a report on the developments in the situation and on the steps taken to implement Council resolution 338 (1973). Members of the Council have asked me to make it clear that, should developments occur which would lead the Secretary-General to consider it appropriate to report to the Council at an earlier

² Part I, Chapter 1 of Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1977–15 June 1978, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 2 (UN doc. A/33/2), pp. 7–37.

³ Doc. 34 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

date they would of course expect him to do so, and that he will continue his efforts to assist the early resumption of the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

The President added that he had been asked by the delegations of China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to say that they would not participate in the vote on the draft resolution and that, as a result, they did not subscribe to the agreed statement which he had just read.

12. The Secretary-General made a statement.

Decision: At the 2035th meeting on 21 October 1977, the draft resolution (S|12419) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 416 (1977). Two members (China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) did not participate in the voting.

13. Resolution 416 (1977) reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October, 340 (1973) of 25 October and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, 346 (1974) of 8 April and 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974, 368 (1975) of 17 April, 371 (1975) of 24 July and 378 (1975) of 23 October 1975, and 396 (1976) of 22 October 1976,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/12416),

Having noted the developments in the situation in the Middle East, (S/12417),

Recalling the Secretary-General's view that any relaxation of the search for a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be dangerous and his hope that urgent efforts would be undertaken by all concerned to tackle the Middle East problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at the comprehensive settlement called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973),

Noting that the Secretary-General recommends the extension of the mandate of the Force for one year,

- 1. Decides:
- (a) To call upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);
- (b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of one year, that is, until 24 October 1978;
- (c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and on the steps taken to implement resolution 338 (1973);
- 2. Expresses its confidence that the Force will be maintained with minimum efficiency and economy.
- 14. Following the vote, the Council heard statements by the representatives of China, Benin,

the United States, Canada, the USSR, Romania, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Venezuela, Panama, Mauritius and Pakistan, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of India.

2. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

- (a) Extension of the mandate of UNDOF until 31 May 1978
- Report of the Secretary-General dated 23 November 1977
- 15. As the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was due to expire on 30 November, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 23 November (S/12453), giving an account of the activities of the Force during the period from 24 May to 23 November 1977. The Secretary-General stated that UNDOF had continued to perform its functions effectively, with the co-operation of the parties. He further observed that during the period under review, the situation in the area had remained quiet, except for the incident mentioned in paragraph 21 of his report.
- 16. Concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973), the Secretary-General repeated that intensive efforts towards a just and durable settlement were continuing at various levels. He hoped that they would contribute to an early resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference.
- 17. The Secretary-General noted that the prevailing quiet in the Israel-Syria sector should not obscure the fact that the main elements of the Middle East problem remained unresolved and that the situation in the area would continue to be unstable and dangerous unless real progress could soon be made towards a just and durable settlement of the problem in all its aspects.
- 18. The Secretary-General considered the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential in the prevailing circumstances and recommended that the mandate of UNDOF be extended for a further period of six months until 31 May 1978.

- (ii) Consideration at the 2051st meeting (30 November 1977)
- 19. At its 2051st meeting on 30 November, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The situation in the Middle East:

"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12453)."

- 20. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/12459) which had been prepared during consultations among the members of the Council.
- 21. The Secretary-General made a statement, informing the Council that since the circulation of his report, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had agreed to the extension of the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months and that the Government of Israel had also conveyed its agreement.

Decision: At the 2051st meeting on 30 November 1977, the draft resolution (S|12459) was adopted by 12 votes to none as resolution 420 (1977). Three members (Benin, China and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) did not participate in the voting.

22. Resolution 420 (1977) reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12453),

Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the urgent need to continue and intensify such efforts,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

Decides:

- (a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;
- (b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1978;
- (c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).
- 23. In accordance with the agreement reached in consultations, the President made the following complementary statement (S/12460) on behalf of the Council regarding resolution 420 (1977);

As is known, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

- (S/12453) states in paragraph 32 that 'the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector should not obscure the fact that the main elements of the Middle East problem remain unresolved and that the situation in the area will continue to be unstable and dangerous unless real progress can soon be made towards a just and durable settlement of the problem in all its aspects'. This statement of the Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security Council.
- 24. The President further noted that he had been asked by the delegations of Benin, China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to state that as they had not participated in the vote on the resolution, they took the same position with regard to the statement he had just read.
- 25. Thereafter, statements were made by the representatives of China, the USSR, the United States, Venezuela, Romania, Mauritius, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Pakistan, Benin, India and the Federal Republic of Germany, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

(b) Communication received in April 1978

26. In a letter dated 17 April 1978 (S/12650), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic charged that Israeli elements had infiltrated through the zone disengaging the forces in the Golan Heights in late March and had planted booby-trap mines, with a receiver-transmitter radio set connected to the telephone cable between Damascus and Amman, near the main highway that linked the town of Deraa with Damascus. Syrian experts had reported that the set was equipped with nuclear cells manufactured in the United States and operating through radio-active substances whose use for military purposes was prohibited because of their damaging effect on human life.

(c) Extension of the mandate of UNDOF until 30 November 1978

- (i) Report of the Secretary-General dated 17 May 1978
- 27. As the mandate of UNDOF was due to expire on 31 May, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 17 May (S/12710), giving an account of the activities of the Force during the period from 30 November 1977 to 17 May 1978. The Secretary-General stated that UNDOF had continued to perform its function effectively, with

the co-operation of the parties, and that during the period under review the situation in the Israel-Syria sector had remained quiet and there had been no incidents of a serious nature.

- 28. The Secretary-General also noted that efforts to promote an early resumption of the negotiating process aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East had continued at various levels.
- 29. The Secretary-General stated that the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector was basically precarious, that the main elements of the Middle East problem remained unresolved and that the situation in the area as a whole would continue to be unstable and dangerous unless real progress could soon be made towards a just and durable settlement of the problem in all its aspects. He stressed that it was important and urgent that a determined effort be made to achieve progress in the search for such a settlement and, as a first step to that end, to promote an early resumption of the negotiating process in accordance with resolution 338 (1973).
- 30. In the prevailing circumstances, the Secretary-General considered the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential and therefore recommended that the Security Council should extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months until 30 November 1978. He added that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had given its assent to the proposed extension and that the Government of Israel had also expressed its agreement.
- (ii) Consideration at the 2079th meeting (31 May 1978)
- 31. At its 2079th meeting on 31 May, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection;

"The situation in the Middle East;

"Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12710)."

32. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/12721) before the Council.

Decision: At the 2079th meeting on 31 May 1978, the draft resolution (S|12721) was adopted by 14 votes to none as resolution 429 (1978). One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

- 33. Resolution 429 (1978) reads as follows: [The Resolution is printed as doc. 28 below.]
 - 34. The President made the following com-

plementary statement (S/12724) on behalf of the Council regarding resolution 429 (1978);

As is known, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12710) states in paragraph 36 that "the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector is, however, basically precarious. The main elements of the Middle East problem remain unresolved and the situation in the area as a whole will continue to be unstable and dangerous unless real progress can soon be made towards a just and durable settlement of the problem in all its aspects". This statement of the Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security Council.

- 35. The President added that he had been asked by the delegation of China to state that, as it had not participated in the vote on the resolution, it took the same position with regard to the statement he had just read on behalf of the members of the Council.
- 36. Thereafter, statements were made by the representatives of China, Kuwait, Czechoslovakia, Canada, the USSR, Bolivia, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Gabon, Nigeria, India and France, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Venezuela.

3. Developments in the Israel-Lebanon sector

- (a) Reports of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization on the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector
- 37. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to be the subject of periodic reports on the status of the cease-fire in the sector submitted by the Chief of Staff on the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). From 16 June 1977 to 15 March 1978, the Chief of Staff issued monthly reports, assessing the frequency of incidents in the sector, the number of incidents of firing across or of crossing of the armistice demarcation line as reported by UNTSO observation posts, the frequency of jet flights over Lebanese territory, the complaints submitted by the parties and the results of UNTSO investigations. These reports were issued as addenda 40 to 53 to document S/11663.
- 38. The Chief of Staff reported that Israeli forces personnel had continued to occupy six positions on the Lebanese side of the armistice

demarcation line in the period between June 1977 and February 1978.

- 39. In the months of June and July 1977, according to the reports (S/11663/Add.40 and 41), ground and air activity had increased, with 37 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, 5 crossing violations and 27 reported overflights by Israeli jets. One naval violation by Israel had been observed during July.
- 40. In reports covering the months of August and September (S/11663/Add. 42 and 45), it was indicated that ground activity had increased significantly along the entire armistice demarcation line and remained at a high level. There had been 137 cases of firing across the line, 4 crossing violations and 30 reported overflights by Israeli aircraft. On 20 and 23 September, the Chief of Staff submitted two special reports (S/11663/Add. 43 and 44) concerning intensified fighting between de facto forces in the area of El Khiam and ground activity along the entire armistice demarcation line and the line between Lebanese territory and Israel-occupied Syrian territory. On 26 September, a general cease-fire in the region of Southern Lebanon had been reached in agreement with all the parties.
- 41. In reports covering the months of October and November (S/11663/Add. 46 and 49), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO indicated that ground and air activity had been at a low level, with 10 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line and 37 overflights by Israeli jet aircraft. However, events from 5 to 13 November had been the subject of two special reports (S/11663/Add. 47 and 48), in which it was indicated that violations of the general cease-fire had increased in intensity and number in Southern Lebanon. The Secretary-General expressed his concern at the continuing escalation of tension and violence in the Israel-Lebanon sector and reiterated his appeal to all parties to exercise restraint and to co-operate with efforts to re-establish peaceful conditions in the
- 42. In reports covering the months of December 1977 and January and February 1978 (S/11663/Add. 50–52), it was observed that all types of activity had been at a moderate level. There had been 5 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, 43 crossing violations and 38 reported overflights by Israel jet aircraft during that period. UNTSO operations in Lebanon continued to be

- hindered by incidents with *de facto* forces, involving vehicle hijackings, denial of freedom of movement, forced entry into observation posts, mined roads and shooting at the immediate vicinity of observation posts, mostly in areas assumed to be controlled by the Christian *de facto* forces.
- 43. On 15 March (S/11663/Add.53), the Chief of Staff reported that early that morning United Nations military observers had noted that a tank force of unknown size coming from the south had passed the frontier heading north. In addition, mortar and artillery fire initiated from Israeli territory, as well as Israeli air attacks, had been reported by United Nations observation posts. The Israeli Defence Forces had issued a statement, announcing that it had begun a mopping-up operation along the Lebanese frontier. According to UNTSO, the Israeli forces had launched a military operation with ground and armoured forces, supported by naval vessels and jet aircraft using shells and bombs. United Nations military observers had been evacuated from some posts and their buildings destroyed.
- 44. No further reports were received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector after 15 March.
- (b) Communications received between November 1977 and 16 March 1978 and requests for a meeting
- 45. In a letter dated 10 November 1977 (S/12443), the representative of Lebanon charged that between 5 and 9' November, Israeli forces had sunk a fishing boat inside Lebanese territorial waters, shelled the town of Tyre and several villages in Southern Lebanon, inflicting a number of casualties, and bombarded several other Lebanese towns, leaving at least 60 Lebanese civilians dead and 120 injured.
- 46. In a letter dated 11 November (S/1244), the representative of Israel charged that PLO had launched eight rocket attacks across the Israeli border from Southern Lebanon from the end of September to the beginning of November, and that in the preceding 10 days, PLO attacks against Christians in Southern Lebanon and the Israeli town of Nahariya had been intensified. He stated that as a result of those attacks, Israel had had no alternative but to strike, with a view to preventing further escalation of violence, and had carried out aerial bombardment of six localities on 9

November.

- 47. By a letter dated 14 November (S/12446), the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group, transmitted a letter dated 10 November from the Permanent Observer of PLO concerning the Israeli attack on 9 November against a number of peaceful towns, villages and refugee camps in southern Lebanon.
- 48. In a letter dated 15 November (S/12448), the representative of Lebanon noted that a document not originating from the Government of Lebanon concerning the events on the southern frontier of Lebanon had been circulated to the members of the Security Council and stated that that document represented a deliberate interference in a matter pertaining exclusively to Lebanese sovereignty.
- 49. By a letter dated 10 January 1978 (S/12521), the representative of Lebanon transmitted excerpts from an address made by the President of Lebanon on 6 January concerning Lebanon's official position on the solutions under consideration regarding the Middle East crisis and the Palestinian question.
- 50. In a letter dated 13 March (S/12598), the representative of Israel charged that on 11 March a PLO squad had killed 37 Israeli civilians and wounded 76 in attacks on the Haifa-Tel Aviv highway.
- 51. In letters dated 15 March (S/12600 and S/12602) addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General, the representative of Lebanon charged that at midnight on 14/15 March, a massive number of Israeli troops had invaded Lebanon along the Lebanese frontiers from several axes; Israeli patrol vessels had penetrated Lebanese territorial waters, and Israeli warplanes were continuing to fly in Lebanese air space and bombard the area, causing many casualties and enormous property damage. The Lebanese Government was convinced that the only solution to the problem would lie in putting an end to Israeli aggression and in Israel's withdrawing its forces from Lebanon.
- 52. By a note issued on 16 March (S/12604), the President of the Security Council circulated the text of a letter dated 16 March from the Secretary-General, in which he drew the attention of members of the Council to a number of communications relating to the situation in Lebanon which he had received suggesting action by the

- Secretary-General and the Security Council. The Secretary-General observed that he had already been in touch with a number of the representatives most directly concerned and that he stood ready to lend any assistance in helping to overcome the difficulties. He also noted that until a comprehensive peace settlement was reached that met the legitimate aspirations of all the Governments and peoples of the area, the cycle of violence was likely to continue. The Secretary-General observed that in the Lebanese context or in the wider context of a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. which was a priority objective as far as international peace and security were concerned, he was ready to help in any possible way. He had drawn the Council's attention to the communications and expressed his concern because of the implications of developments in the Middle East for the future of world peace.
- 53. The following communications were annexed to the Secretary-General's letter; (a) a note verbale dated 15 March from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in which he cited a telegram from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of his Government; (b) a note verbale dated 15 March from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, transmitting the text of a statement by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of his Government; (c) a letter dated 14 March from the Permanent Observer of PLO, who transmitted a message from the Executive Committee of PLO: (d) a letter dated 15 March from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States; (e) a letter dated 15 March from the representative of Algeria, transmitting the text of a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.
- 54. In a letter dated 17 March (S/12606), the representative of Lebanon requested the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council, pursuant to his letter of 15 March (S/12600).
- 55. In a letter dated 17 March (S/12607), the representative of Israel also requested the President of the Security Council to convene a meeting of the Council to consider the acts of terror and violence against Israeli civilians being perpetrated from Lebanese territory, as referred to in his letter of 13 March (S/12598).

- (c) Consideration at the 2071st to 2074th meetings (17-19 March 1978)
- 56. At its 2071st meeting on 17 March, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 17 March 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12606). Letter dated 17 March 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12607).

- 57. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Yemen, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President then informed the Council of a letter dated 17 March (S/12608) from the representative of Kuwait, requesting that the representatives of PLO should be invited to participate in the debate, in accordance with the Council's previous practice. He added that that proposal had not been made pursuant to rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, but that if approved by the Council, the invitation to participate in the debate would confer on PLO the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State when it was invited to participate pursuant to rule 37.
- 58. The representative of the United States made a statement.

Decision: At the 2071st meeting on 17 March 1978, the proposal was adopted by 10 votes to 1 (United States), with 4 abstentions (Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom).

- 59. The President also informed the Council of a proposal made during consultations that the representative of PLO should be seated at the Council table for the duration of the Council's deliberations on the item.
- 60. The representative of the United States made a further statement.

Decision: The proposal was adopted by 10 votes to 1 (United States), with 4 abstentions (Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom).

61. The Council then began its discussion of the question, hearing statements by the representatives of Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and

- Kuwait, as well as by the representative of PLO. The representative of Kuwait made a further statement.
- 62. At the 2072nd meeting on 18 March, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Viet Nam, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.
- 63. The Council continued its discussion, hearing statements by the representatives of Egypt, Kuwait, France, Nigeria, Viet Nam, Yemen and Lebanon.
- 64. At the 2073rd meeting on 18 March, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of the Sudan, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council continued its consideration of the question inscribed on the agenda. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/12610) submitted by the United States. Thereafter, statements were made by the representatives of Canada, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, India and the USSR.
- 65. At its 2074th meeting on 19 March, the Council continued its consideration of the item. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Mongolia, Pakistan, Qatar and Iraq, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.
- 66. Before the vote on the draft resolution (S/12610), it was agreed that statements would be made following the voting. The representatives of China, Gabon, the USSR, Bolivia and Mauritius made statements in explanation of vote before the vote.

Decision: At the 2074th meeting on 19 March 1978, the United States draft resolution (S/12610) was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, USSR), as resolution 425 (1978). One member (China) did not participate in the voting. 67. Resolution 425 (1978) reads as follows:

The Security Council

Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/12600 and S/12606) and from the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/12607),

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and Israel,

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

- 1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
- 2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
- 3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations;
- 4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.
- 68. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, France, the United States and Venezuela, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United Kingdom. A statement was then made by the Secretary-General. The discussion continued with statements by the representatives of China, the Sudan, Mongolia, Israel, Pakistan, Qatar, Iraq, India, Jordan and Lebanon, as well as by the representative of PLO.
- (d) Report of the Secretary-General dated 19 March 1978 on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978)
- 69. In pursuance of resolution 425 (1978) concerning the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report dated 19 March (S/12611), in which he outlined the terms of reference of the Force, general considerations related to its effective functioning, a proposed plan of action and the estimated cost and method of financing it.
- (e) Consideration at the 2075th meeting (19 March 1978)
- 70. At its 2075th meeting on 19 March, the Security Council continued its discussion and included the following item in its agenda without objection:

The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 17 March 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12606) Letter dated 17 March 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12607) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) (S/12611).

- 71. The President drew the attention of the Council to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) (S/12611) and to the draft resolution (S/12612) submitted by the President of the Council in his capacity as the representative of the United Kingdom.
- 72. The representatives of China and the USSR made statements in explanation of vote before the vote.

Decision: At the 2075th meeting on 19 March 1978, the United Kingdom draft resolution (S|12612) was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, USSR), as resolution 426 (1978). One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

73. Resolution 426 (1978) reads as follows:

The Security Council,

- 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) contained in document S/12611 dated 19 March 1978;
- 2. Decides that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides.
- 74. The representatives of Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, the United States, France and Canada made statements following the vote. A statement was made by the Secretary-General. Further statements were made by the representative of Lebanon and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United Kingdom.
- (f) Communications and reports of the Secretary-General submitted up to 1 May 1978
- 75. In a letter dated 21 March (S/12616), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council about his contacts with a number of Governments in all the different geographical regions concerning the provision of contingents for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and stated that he had received offers of one contingent from Nepal and another from Norway. The Government of France had also offered a contingent

which was available for immediate service. The Government of Iran had consented to the temporary use of a detachment from its contingent already in the Middle East. The Secretary-General further informed the members of the Council of his intention, subject to the usual consultations, to proceed with the arrangements he had outlined.

76. In a letter dated 22 March (S/12618), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had considered his letter (S/12616) in informal consultations on 21 March and had agreed with the proposals contained therein. China, not having participated in the voting on resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), had dissociated itself from the matter.

77. In a progress report dated 23 March (S/12620), the Secretary-General stated that he had appointed Major-General E. A. Erskine, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Interim Commander of UNIFIL. He reported further that Iranian, Swedish and Canadian contingents had been transferred to UNIFIL from UNDOF and UNEF and that he had accepted the offers of the French, Nepalese and Norwegian Governments to provide contingents totalling 1,350 for UNIFIL.

78. In accordance with the Secretary-General's instructions Lieutenant-General E. Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, had had contacts with all the parties concerned on the steps to be taken for the speedy implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and on the arrangements to facilitate the return of the displaced persons who had fled Southern Lebanon during the military operations.

79. In a progress report dated 2 April (S/12620/Add. 1), the Secretary-General informed the Council of the strength, composition and deployment of UNIFIL as of that date, as well as arrangements for the arrival of the Nepalese and Norwegian contingents. Senegal had agreed to provide a battalion of about 600 men, and France and Norway had agreed to provide the necessary logistic elements. The Secretary-General stated that he had maintained contact with Lebanese and Israeli Governments and with PLO, with a view to the rapid implementation of resolution 425 (1978), especially in respect of the cease-fire and withdrawal of the Israeli forces. According to Major-General Erskine, the situation in the

area had remained generally quiet, although there had been a number of firing incidents.

80. In a progress report dated 8 April (S/12620/Add. 2), the Secretary-General informed the Council of the strength, composition and deployment of the Force as of that date.

81. With regard to the general situation in Southern Lebanon the Secretary-General reported the situation generally quiet, with certain local exceptions. In the western sector, considerable tension, with occasional exchanges of fire, had continued to prevail, and in the eastern section there had been repeated exchanges of fire, mainly involving Christian de facto armed elements south of the Litani River and PLO armed elements north of the river. The Secretary-General also described the contacts he and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East had had with the parties, with a view to the speedy implementation of resolution 425 (1978), especially in respect of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

82. In a letter dated 10 April (S/12641), the Secretary-General recalled that the Government of Senegal had agreed to provide a contingent for UNIFIL and expressed his intention to proceed with arrangements for it to arrive in the area at the earliest possible moment. He noted that the Governments of France and Norway had agreed to share responsibility for logistic support for the Force. Details of those proposals had been provided in his progress reports of 2 and 8 April (S/12620/Add. 1 and 2). He also informed the Council of his intention to appoint Major-General Erskine, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Commander of the Force, subject to the consent of the Council.

83. In a letter dated 12 April (S/12642), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had considered the matter in consultations and had agreed with the proposals contained in his letter (S/12641). China had dissociated itself from the matter, not having participated in the voting on resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

84. In a progress report dated 17 April (S/12620/Add.3), the Secretary-General informed the Council that according to reports submitted by UNIFIL, the general situation in Southern Lebanon had remained quiet and there had been no serious incidents. On 11 and 14 April, Israeli forces had withdrawn from two areas east and

south of the Litani River under the plan submitted to Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo on 6 April, and their positions had been taken over by troops of the Norwegian battalion. Traffic of returning refugees had continued heavy throughout the area. The Secretary-General set out the strength, composition and deployment of the Force as of 17 April and described the continuing contacts of Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo with all the parties concerned with regard to the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and the further withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Secretary-General indicated that he would visit the area from 17 to 19 April to meet with the parties concerned at the highest level, as well as with Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo and Major-General Erskine and the UNIFIL contingents in the area of operations.

85. In a letter dated 19 April (S/12657), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council, on completion of his visit to the area, about the state of affairs concerning the implementation of resolution 425 (1978), especially in relation to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. He had had extensive talks with the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Lebanon, with Mr. Arafat, and with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister of Israel. He had been assured of the firm intention of Israel to withdraw completely from Lebanese territory and indicated that Israel had proposed that that withdrawal take place in two phases. Israel Defence Forces would be completely withdrawn from a central area by 30 April, followed by withdrawal from a belt along the armistice demarcation line in the south and to the north which would be arranged in the near future.

86. In a letter dated 25 April (S/12666), the Secretary-General informed the Council that when the Senegalese battalion and the remainder of the logistic units arrived by the end of April, UNIFIL would have a total strength of about 3,500, excluding the Iranian and Swedish companies on temporary assignment with UNIFIL.

87. The Government of Nigeria had also agreed to make a battalion available for service with UNIFIL, which it was his intention to accept, subject to the usual consultations. Inclusion of the Nigerian battalion would bring the Force to the total "in the order of 4,000" authorized by the Security Council. He indicated that he would report to the Council in the near future regarding

the possible need to increase the strength of the Force to 6,000.

88. In a letter dated 26 April (S/12667), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that he had consulted the members of the Council regarding his letter dated 25 April (S/12666) and that they agreed with the proposal concerning the Nigerian contingent contained therein. China, not having participated in the voting on resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), had dissociated itself from the matter.

89. In a letter dated 1 May (S/12675), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that both the Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo, and the Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major-General Erskine, had reported to him that in view of the very difficult conditions on the ground, and in the light of the experience so far acquired, they felt strongly that the total strength of the Force should be brought to about 6,000. During his visit to the area, the Secretary-General had observed the delicacy and difficulty of the tasks of UNIFIL, which had to operate over extensive areas in rugged terrain and in dangerous situations. He considered it necessary to increase the strength of UNIFIL to the level of about 6,000 if the Force was to be in a position to carry out the tasks entrusted to it effectively, and he so recommended to the Council. He added that the Governments of Fiji, Iran and Ireland had indicated that they would each be prepared to make a battalion available for service with UNIFIL and that if the Council should agree to the proposed increase in the Force, he intended to seek additional contingents from those Governments.

(g) Consideration at the 2076th meeting (3 May 1978)

90. At its 2076th meeting on 3 May, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The situation in the Middle East:

"Letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/12675)."

91. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/12679) sponsored by Bolivia and India and announced that Mauritius had become an additional sponsor.

Decision: At the 2076th meeting on 3 May 1978,

the three-Power draft resolution (S|12679) was adopted by 12 votes to none, with two abstentions (Czechoslovakia, USSR), as resolution 427 (1978). One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

92. Resolution 427 (1978) reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/12675),

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978,

- 1. Approves the increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon requested by the Secretary-General from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops;
- 2. Takes note of the withdrawal of Israeli forces that has taken place so far;
- 3. Calls upon Israel to complete its withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without any further delay;
- 4. Deplores the attacks on the United Nations Force that have occurred and demands full respect for the United Nations Force from all parties in Lebanon.
- 93. Following the vote, the Secretary-General made a statement. Statements were also made by the representatives of China, the United Kingdom, Kuwait, Czechoslovakia, Gabon, the USSR, the United States, Mauritius, Canada, India, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Bolivia and Nigeria, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Venezuela.

(h) Reports of the Secretary-General submitted between 3 May and 16 June 1978

94. On 5 May, the Secretary-General submitted a progress report on UNIFIL (S/12620/Add.4), in which he informed the Council that according to reports submitted by UNIFIL, the situation had remained stable in the central and western sectors but that tension had increased significantly in the Tyre area. On 30 April, the third phase of the withdrawal of Israeli forces had taken place, and the positions vacated had been taken over by UNIFIL units. Following the adoption of resolution 427 (1978), the Secretary-General had accepted the offers of Fiji, Iran and Ireland to provide a battalion each for service with UNIFIL. With the completion of the third phase of Israeli withdrawal, the Secretary-General added, UNIFIL was deployed in a much more extensive area, extending roughly from the Litani River in the north to a line running about 18 kilometres

from the river in the western and central sectors and about 2 to 7 kilometres in the eastern area. After indicating the deployment of the Force as of 5 May, the Secretary-General described a number of serious incidents that had occurred in the Tyre area at the beginning of the month during which six UNIFIL soldiers had been killed and a number wounded. An urgent message had been addressed to the Chairman of PLO, asking him to take all possible measures to avoid the risk of confrontation with UNIFIL, and the Chairman had given assurances of his co-operation in attempting to resolve the situation. United Nations troops, the Secretary-General stressed, were provided only with weapons of a defensive character and were authorized to use force only in self-defence when attacked or when attempts were made to prevent them from performing their duties under the Security Council's mandate. Accordingly, he had appealed to all the Governments and other parties concerned to extend all possible support and co-operation to UNIFIL.

95. In a further progress report on UNIFIL (S/12620/Add.5), submitted on 13 June, the Secretary-General stated that the fourth and last phase of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon had taken place on that date and had been completed according to schedule. The strength of the Force was then 6,100, the deployment of which the Secretary-General described. At his request, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Guyer, had visited the area from 19 to 24 May to discuss certain problems with the parties concerning the implementation of resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) which required urgent clarification. Mr. Guyer had been informed of the decision of the Government of Israel to withdraw its forces completely from Lebanon by 13 June. The President of Lebanon had emphasized to Mr. Guyer that the objective of UNIFIL was to assist ultimately in the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon, which presupposed both total withdrawal of Israeli forces and prevention of armed elements not under the command of the Lebanese Government from infiltrating into or undertaking hostile activities in the UNIFIL area of operations. Mr. Arafat had confirmed that pursuant to the PLO commitment to co-operate fully with UNIFIL, it would not initiate hostile acts against Israel from

Southern Lebanon and would refrain from infiltrating armed elements into the UNIFIL area of operations. The Secretary-General set out the position taken by the Lebanese Government pending the full establishment of Lebanese authority in the UNIFIL area, and discussions were taking place, with a view to working out practical arrangements for the Force's deployment and the fulfilment of its mission. By 1700 hours on 13 June, the Commander of UNIFIL had confirmed to the Secretary-General that the Israeli forces had completely withdrawn from Southern Lebanon. Five of the positions evacuated had been taken over by UNIFIL, and discussions were continuing on practical arrangements for deployment in additional positions. The first part of the mandate entrusted to UNIFIL had thus been fulfilled, and the second phase had begun in the entire area of operations.

(i) Other communications received before 16 June 1978

96. By a letter dated 17 March 1978 (S/12609), the representative of Sri Lanka transmitted the text of a communiqué issued by the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, condemning the act of aggression by Israel against Lebanon.

97. In a letter dated 20 March (S/12614), the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People charged that the Israeli invasion in Southern Lebanon had been directed mainly against the Palestinians. The Committee supported the Security Council's request that Israel should immediately cease its military action against the territorial integrity of Lebanon and withdraw its forces without delay from all Lebanese territory, and considered it imperative that the Council should take more energetic and determined action to bring about the urgent establishment of peace in the Middle East.

98. By a letter dated 20 March (S/12615), the representative of Mongolia transmitted a text of a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia concerning Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

99. By a letter dated 13 June (S/12736), the representative of Israel transmitted a letter to the Secretary-General from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, stating that the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon had been

completed on 13 June. The Foreign Minister stated that in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, members of PLO had returned to the area and that UNIFIL was permitting the transit of supplies to them. He charged that some units of UNIFIL treated the PLO elements with indulgence and even co-operated with them, having official PLO liaison officers in touch with UNIFIL. The Foreign Minister charged further that the situation was not only in violation of the Secretary-General's statement made at the meeting at Jerusalem but also boded ill for the future.

100. By a letter dated 14 June (S/12738) to the representative of Israel, the Secretary-General transmitted his reply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel. The Secretary-General expressed surprise at the allegations made in the letter of the Foreign Minister (S/12736) and, referring to his report to the Security Council (S/12620/Add.5), stated that there were PLO liaison officers with UNIFIL, as well as liaison officers of all parties concerned. He noted that PLO had undertaken to co-operate with UNIFIL in the implementation of resolution 425 (1978). The Secretary-General expressed his assurance that UNIFIL would continue to discharge in good faith its responsibilities under resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). Its task, the Secretary-General stressed, had not been facilitated by the Israeli decision not to turn over control of the remainder of the area of operations to UNIFIL, and he was trying to deal satisfactorily with the consequences of that development in co-operation with the Lebanese Government.

4. Communications and reports concerning other aspects of the situation in the Middle East

101. By a letter dated 31 August 1977 (S/12392), the representative of Israel transmitted the text of a statement issued after a meeting of the Palestine Central Council held at Damascus on 25 and 26 August which, he stated demonstrated once again that that grouping of Arab terrorists could not be a partner to any steps leading to a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.

102. In pursuance of paragraph 7 of General

⁴ Doc. 267 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Assembly resolution 31/61⁵ of 9 December 1976, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/12417) to the Security Council on 18 October 1977, in which he pointed out that the implementation of resolution 31/61 was closely related to that of resolution 31/62⁶ calling for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations and the Co-Chairmanship of the United States and the USSR not later than the end of March 1977. The Secretary-General observed that the obstacles in the way of reconvening the Geneva Conference could not be overcome by purely procedural means, as changes of attitude on all sides were necessary.

103. The Secretary-General also referred in his report to the fighting between *de facto* forces which had flared up again in Southern Lebanon and noted that a deterioration of that situation might have considerable implications in the wider context of the Middle East problem.

104. In conclusion, the Secretary-General expressed his hope that it would prove possible to bring about an early resumption of the negotiations as a first step towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. He stressed that if it were not to happen, the world would be facing a major international crisis in the not too distant future.

105. In a letter dated 8 December (S/12478), the representative of Egypt referred to the letter dated 5 December 1977 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (A/32/411), transmitting the text of the "Tripoli Declaration", and set forth the position of Egypt with regard to that Declaration.

106. By a letter dated 8 December (S/12486), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 32/208 of 25 November 1977 entitled "The situation in the Middle East" and drew particular attention to paragraph 5, in which the General Assembly had requested the Security Council to take all necessary measures for the implementation of relevant resolutions of the United Nations and achievement of a comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace

in the region.

107. By a letter dated 4 January 1978 (S/12517), the representative of Sri Lanka, as Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, transmitted the text of a communiqué issued by the Co-ordinating Bureau concerning the assassination of the representative of PLO in London.

108. In a letter dated 27 January (S/12545), the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the speech made on 21 January in which the President of Egypt had stated that Egypt was requesting arms because of its great responsibilities to all of Africa and said that the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya considered the implications of that statement a threat to the peace and security of the African continent.

109. By a letter dated 15 February (S/12562), the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya transmitted the text of a letter from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in his capacity as Chairman of the thirtieth session of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, concerning the decision of the South African Government to give Israel a large loan and other forms of co-operation.

110. In a letter dated 6 June (S/12730), the representative of Israel charged that on 2 June a public bus had been blown up in Jerusalem, killing five Israeli children and a young visitor. He added that an organization called General Command for the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces had published a statement at Beirut, taking responsibility for that act.

B. The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights

1. Communications to the Security Council received between July and October 1977

111. In a letter dated 28 July 1977 (S/12377), the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People expressed his concern regarding the decision of the Israeli Government to establish three Israeli settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan. That decision, he stated, constituted a violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August

⁵ Doc. 20 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

⁶ Doc. 21 in ibid.

⁷ Doc. 322 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁸ Doc. 24 in ibid.

1949, and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

112. In a letter dated 13 September (S/12399), the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People requested, on behalf of the Committee, that a meeting of the Security Council should be convened before the General Assembly considered item 30 of its provisional agenda entitled "Question of Palestine", in order that the Committee might submit its conclusions concerning the discussion in the Council to the Assembly.

113. By a letter dated 30 September (S/12410), the representative of Sri Lanka, in his capacity as Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, transmitted the text of the Declaration on the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine in the light of recent developments, adopted on that date by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of non-aligned countries.

2. Consideration at the 2041st meeting (27 October 1977)

114. At its 2041st meeting on 27 October, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights:

"Letter dated 13 September 1977 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the President of the Security Council (S/12399)."

115. The President, with the consent of the Council, extended an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The President also drew attention to the request of the representative of Senegal that the representative of PLO should be invited to participate in the debate on the item. He added that the proposal was not being put forward under rule 37 or 39, but, if approved by the Council, it would confer on PLO the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State when it was invited to participate in the debate under rule 37.

116. The representative of the United States made a statement concerning the proposal.

Decision: At the 2041st meeting on 27 October

1977, the proposal was adopted by 10 votes to 1 (United States), with 4 abstentions (Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom).

117. In accordance with the Council's decision, the representative of PLO was invited to participate in the debate.

118. The President, with the consent of the Council, also invited the representative of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

119. The Council then began its consideration of the item and heard statements by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and by the representatives of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pakistan, Romania, the USSR, China, Venezuela, Panama, Benin and Mauritius, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of India.

120. The President then announced that the members of the Council had agreed to adjourn the debate for the time being.

3. Subsequent communications to the Council

121. By a letter dated 13 January 1978 (S/ 12534), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 32/40 A9 of 2 December 1977, concerning the question of Palestine, and drew particular attention to paragraphs 3 and 4, in which the Assembly had noted with satisfaction that all members of the Council who had participated in the discussion at the 2041st meeting of the Council on 27 October 1977 had reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in the area could not be established without the achievement, in particular, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. The Assembly had further urged the Council to take a decision as soon as possible on the recommendations endorsed by the Assembly in its resolution 31/2010 as a basis for the solution of the problem of Palestine.

122. In a letter dated 18 January (S/12531), the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise

⁹ Doc. 26 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹⁰ Doc. 19 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People drew attention to the fundamental principles relating to the question contained in the Committee's report to the General Assembly, which should be applied in any effort to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

C. The situation in occupied Arab territories

123. By a letter dated 30 June 1977 (S/12356), the representative of the Sudan, in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of June, requested the circulation of a text of an article entitled "Israel tortures Arab prisoners" and a related editorial that had appeared in *The Sunday Times* (London) on 19 June.

124. In a letter dated 28 July (S/12377), the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People expressed concern over a decision taken by the Prime Minister of Israel on 25 July, approving the establishment of three Israeli settlements on the occupied West Bank on the Jordan.

125. By a letter dated 29 July (S/12376), the representative of Oman, in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of July, drew attention to the decision of Israel to establish three Jewish settlements in occupied Arab territory and recalled the terms of the consensus statement adopted by the Security Council on 11 November 1976 at its 1969th meeting.

126. By a note verbale dated 10 August (S/12378), the representative of Jordan referred to General Assembly resolution 31/110 of 16 December 1976 entitled "Living conditions of the Palestinian people" and enclosed a report prepared by his Government on the situation in the occupied part of Jerusalem.

127. By a note dated 11 August (S/12379), the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 1 (XXXIII) entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East", adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its 1390th meeting on 15 February 1977.

128. By a note verbale dated 17 August (S/12384), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted the text of an official declaration issued by a spokesman of his Government concerning the recent announcement by the Israeli Government that Israeli laws and regulations

would be imposed on the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

129. By a letter dated 19 August (S/12382), the representative of Egypt requested the circulation of a statement made by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt concerning the latest illegal and aggressive Israeli measures in the occupied Arab territories, which, he declared, constituted a dangerous escalation in the situation in violation of Israel's international obligations.

130. In a letter dated 19 August (S/12386), the representative of Iraq, in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of August, charged that the enforcement of Israeli laws in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip was a flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter, the Geneva Conventions and all relevant United Nations resolutions. He forwarded a message to the Secretary-General from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, asking his interveniton to put an end to such aggressive actions by Israel.

131. By a letter dated 26 August (S/12388), the representative of Cyprus transmitted the text of a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus concerning Israel's new arbitrary and unlawful act on the West Bank of the Jordan.

132. By a letter dated 6 September (S/12396), the representative of Jordan transmitted the text of a document entitled "Memorandum issued by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Jordan concerning the consequences of the decision taken by the Government of Israel in regard to the equalization of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, as far as services are concerned, with the inhabitants of Israel".

133. By a letter dated 30 September (S/12410), the representative of Sri Lanka transmitted the text of a declaration¹¹ that had been adopted on the same day at an extraordinary meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, in New York, on the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine, in the light of recent developments, especially with regard to the extension of Israeli laws to and the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories.

134. By a note verbale dated 20 October

¹¹ Doc. 157 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

(S/12428), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted the text of a telegram addressed to the Secretary-General by Moslem and Christian religious leaders in Jordan, requesting his intervention on behalf of Archbishop Capucci.

136. On 30 December (S/12512), the Secretary-General submitted a report in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 32/5 of 28 October¹² regarding the contacts he had made and the reply received from the Government of Israel relevant to the implementation of that resolution, which was entitled "Recent illegal Israeli measures in the occupied Arab territories designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories in contravention of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of Israel's international obligations under the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and of United Nations resolutions, and obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

136. By a letter dated 9 February 1978 (S/12563), the representative of Kuwait transmitted the text of a letter dated 6 February addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Observer of PLO concerning Israel's decision to convert three new military installations on the West Bank into permanent civilian settlements.

137. By a note verbale dated 21 February (S/12575), the representative of Jordan transmitted the text of a memorandum from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jordan, seeking efforts by the United Nations to secure the cessation of Israeli diggings, sequestrations and demolitions which, it was charged, were threatening four Arab quarters adjacent to the Western Wall of the Haram Esh-Sharif Sanctuary.

138. In a letter dated 11 April (S/12640), the representative of Morocco charged that Israel, in carrying out its policy of judaization of the Holy City of Jerusalem, intended to destroy two historic monuments situated near the west wall of the Aqsa Mosque, part of the Moroccan waqf foundations, by constructing a road through those historic monuments.

139. By a note verbale dated 12 April (S/12669), the representative of Jordan transmitted a document entitled "Communication from the Government of Jordan concerning new Israeli attempts

to evacuate and demolish the Zawiyah of Abu-Median al-Ghouth, adjacent to the Al Aqsa Mosque at Jerusalem".

140. In a letter dated 31 May (S/12725), the representative of Israel denied the charges contained in the communications from Jordan dated 21 February (S/12575) and 12 April (S/12669) and in the Moroccan letter dated 11 April (S/12640) and stated that the diggings cited in those documents had been conducted at a distance of 20 metres from the site in question and would not cause it any injury.

3

Report of the Commissioner General of UNRWA (Introduction)¹³

September 15, 1978

INTRODUCTION

A. General

- 1. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has existed as a temporary agency of the United Nations since 1950. Its mandate is renewed periodically by the General Assembly. The current mandate expires on 30 June 1981.
- 2. The raison d'être of UNRWA is to provide services to Palestine refugees, that is, persons or the descendants of persons whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of that conflict, lost both their homes and their means of livelihood. No precise census of the Palestinian people has been taken, but those among them with refugee status must represent a substantial part of the total.
- 3. It is clear that the refugee problem has dimensions which go far beyond the purely humanitarian. The General Assembly annually

¹² Doc. 22 in *ibid*.

¹³ Introduction to Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1977-30 June 1978, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third session, Supplement No. 13 (UN doc. A/33/13), pp. 1-9.

¹⁴ For a list of the pertinent resolutions, see annex II. [not included here. ed.]

[[]This and following notes are part of the document unless otherwise indicated. ed.]

recommends the return of the refugees to their original homes or the receipt of compensation in lieu thereof. The political significance of the mass displacement of human beings, particularly when the right of return and the right to restoration of their property are acknowledged by the international community, is obvious. The Agency's mandate, however, does not extend to all the ramifications of the problem. It is concerned with only a part of the problem, the provision of services to Palestine refugees pending a general settlement in the Near East, although it is keenly aware of the essentially political nature of the problem when considered in all of its aspects.

4. Of the persons who fall under the established definition of Palestine refugees, 1,757,269 are registered with the Agency. The registrations are distributed in the Agency's area of operations as follows:

Lebanon	211,902
Syrian Arab Republic	198,435
East Jordan	682,561
West Bank*	310,268
Gaza Strip*	354,103

^{*} The West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip have been under military occupation by the Government of Israel since June 1967.

These figures do not necessarily represent the actual population of Palestine refugees in their places of registration. The refugees move and do not always inform the Agency; there is no inducement to provide this information unless they are receiving services. The registration figures, however, are believed at least to approximate Palestine refugee populations in the various fields.

5. Not all refugees are eligible to receive services and, in the case of rations, even when they are potentially eligible, they may not be authorized to receive them. Eligibility for different services varies. Since one of the services is education, the maximum number of refugees who could even in theory receive all services is limited to the school population of about 307,000, or approximately 17.5 per cent of the total number of registered refugees. Since a substantial number of school children do not receive rations because of the ration ceiling, the actual percentage of refugees receiving all services is considerably less

than 17.5 per cent. The services being provided, as they have evolved over the past 28 years, are not of the nature of a dole for the permanently destitute. On the contrary, they are directed towards establishing and maintaining levels of health, education and relief for a large part of the Palestinian people that help to make them productive, socially useful human beings who contribute to society rather than impose a burden on it. The activities of UNRWA are one of the clearest practical examples of what international co-operation can achieve in pursuit of the United Nations goal of improving the human condition.

6. In the popular mind, refugees are associated with camps and the services provided them are generally thought of as being confined to emergency relief assistance like temporary shelter, food and clothing. It is not surprising, therefore, that UNRWA is often thought of as an agency that manages camps and is primarily concerned with purely relief activities. Both are misconceptions.

- 7. Only 35.5 per cent of the registered refugees live in camps and, even for that minority, the Agency is not a camp administrator nor does it police or otherwise control the camps. The Agency provides services to eligible registered refugees, whether they are in camps or not. The Agency provides virtually all of the services directly to the refugees, not through Governments, although it deals with Governments on matters of mutual interest affecting the Agency's activities. The Governments in the area of operations have reported that they provide assistance separately to refugees costing almost \$80 million a year (see annex I, table 18).
- 8. The Agency provides three services: education, health care and relief. It has its own school system, its own systems to procure and distribute rations and its own clinics and health centres. Through these means, it provides the kinds of services directly to Palestine refugees that are normally provided by education, health and welfare ministries of Governments. Its activities are institutionalized and continuing. It has quasigovernmental functions.
- 9. To perform these functions it is organized in a manner similar to the foreign-aid agencies of Governments, except that its field offices actually distribute the aid directly to the recipients. UNRWA headquarters, with about 365 staff, is comparable to a supervisory, planning and bud-

geting central aid office in a capital (in process of relocating from Beirut to Vienna and Amman). The five field offices, with about 16,000 staff (in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, east Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza), are the operational arms of the Agency—it is they who actually provide the education, health care and relief services to the Palestine refugees. The Agency also has three small liaison offices at New York, Geneva and Cairo. The Geneva office will be abolished in 1979 and its functions taken over by the Vienna branch of headquarters.

B. Agency programmes

- 10. The Agency's programmes are summarized below (employee figures do not include the 1,943 employees in common services):
- (a) Education and training services, provided by approximately 10,975 employees (mostly teachers) at a total annual cost, including a share of common Agency costs, of \$65.4 million in 1977 and \$76.8 million in 1978 (estimated), which include:
- (i) The general education programme, under which about 307,000 refugee children receive elementary and preparatory education in 617 UNRWA/UNESCO schools;
- (ii) The vocational and teacher-training programme, under which 4,540 trainees are trained at eight UNRWA training centres;
- (iii) A programme of subsidization of secondary education, under which some 7,000 refugee pupils are assisted, by means of book allowances or cash grants, in their education at government or private secondary schools;
- (iv) A university scholarship programme under which 339 young refugee men and women are educated at universities in Arab countries;
- (v) A modest programme of pre-school and youth and women's activities and adult training in crafts;
- (vi) Participation by the Agency in the financing and staffing of a regional Institute of Education, through which teachers appointed to posts in UNRWA/UNESCO schools receive in-service professional and other kinds of training. The Institute also provides extension services (without UNRWA participation) to government educational systems in the Near East.
- (b) Health services, provided by 3,080 employees at a total annual cost, including a share of common

costs, of \$20 million in 1977 and \$22.6 million in 1978 (estimated). Health services include:

- (i) Medical services, available to approximately 1,500,000 refugees at the Agency's own 99 clinics and health centres and at government and private hospitals. The Agency subsidizes the private hospitals and, when government hospitals provide services to refugee patients, the Agency either subsidizes the hospitals or reimburses the patients;
- (ii) Mostly in support of its preventive medical services, provision of supplementary food for some 123,000 refugees in vulnerable categories, for example, young children and expectant and nursing mothers;
 - (iii) Environmental sanitation in refugee camps.
- (c) Relief services, provided by 471 employees at a total annual cost, including a share of common costs, of \$32.6 million in 1977 and \$33.9 million in 1978 (estimated), through which the Agency provides:
- (i) Monthly basic rations of flour, sugar and oil to about 831,000 refugees;
 - (ii) Assistance in shelter repairs;
 - (iii) Special hardship assistance.

The ration rolls (and records of eligibility for other services) change constantly, of course, depending upon such considerations as income, presence in the area, births and deaths. This information, to the extent that it is available to the Agency, is computerized. Deletions and additions to ration rolls are made each month based on computer printouts. Some 1,386,000 names have been added to ration eligibility rolls since 1950 and about 966,000 names have been deleted. Of the approximately 1,377,000 refugees registered for rations, as pointed out above, only 831,000 actually receive them, because of ration ceilings. The difference is made up of some 546,000 children (of any age, up to 25) of refugees whose names are added to the list of those authorized actually to receive rations only as names are deleted from the list.

C. Financing the programmes

The financial position, July 1977 to June 1978

11. About 95 per cent of the income of UNRWA comes from voluntary contributions by Governments. The United Nations, certain specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations contribute the remaining 5 per cent.

12. As has been the case for several years, contributions in 1977 did not provide income sufficient to meet all budgeted expenditures. Consequently, once again, services to the refugees were reduced (principally the flour component of the basic ration), some capital costs were deferred and working capital was drawn down. In total, in 1977, the discrepancy between current income and the expenditures required to maintain services to the refugees was approximately \$10 million. Each year this discrepancy grows, reflecting the fact that, while income increases each year, costs increase at a higher rate. The effect of this trend on services to the refugees will be more pronounced in the future because the Agency no longer has sufficient working capital to draw on to cover any substantial part of the chronic deficit.

13. In the early months of 1978 the regular review of budget assumptions and income expectations was undertaken. As at early March, budgeted expenditures were estimated at \$139.8 million and expected income at about \$113 million, leaving a projected deficit of \$26.8 million. A list of budgeted expenditures totalling approximately the amount of the deficit was drawn up and approval of disbursements to meet them was suspended. These not-yet-approved items were listed by order of priority, with the three years of the preparatory cycle of education for the period 31 July to 31 December heading the list. The flour component of the basic ration was reduced from 10 kg to 6.7 kg per month per recipient, beginning in February, and the restoration of the one third reduction was placed well down the priority listing. Special contributions were then solicited to permit approval of the items on the list. As at 30 June 1978, although there had been increases and decreases in specific budgeted expenditures—mainly because of avoidance of flour purchases, less than full compensation for cost-of-living increases for staff, emergency assistance to refugees displaced by the Israeli military activities in Lebanon, and the relocation of headquarters to Vienna and Amman-there was virtually no net change in the total, which remained at \$139.8 million. Meanwhile, pledged or expected income rose to \$126 million and the deficit was reduced to \$13.8 million. As of the end of the reporting period, it appeared that the preparatory cycle of education could continue through the year and at least some of the other

suspended expenditures could be approved, although the Agency could not be sure because, given the unsatisfactory method of financing, the amount of income to be received in 1978 will not be known until September at the earliest. If further additional contributions are not received for 1978, the Agency will have to eliminate the rest of the deficit almost entirely by reducing budgeted expenditures. Such reductions will, of course, mean that the level and quality of services to the refugees will decline by comparison with past years. The Agency has no alternative but to manage its finances in this way. It intends to follow the practice of establishing as early as possible each year a list of suspended budgeted expenditures equal to the deficit and moving them from the non-approved to the approved category only as pledges of additional income are received.

Budget for 1979

14. Chapter II below contains the Agency's proposed budget for 1979 totalling \$151.8 million as compared with the adjusted budget of \$139.8 million for 1978 and actual expenditure in 1977 of approximately \$126.8 million (after the reductions and cost deferrals mentioned above).

D. Special problems

Insufficient and unpredictable income

15. The defects of the thoroughly unsatisfactory method by which income is provided to UNRWA were described in detail in paragraphs 13 to 16 of last year's report and the Agency's proposals for correcting them to the extent possible were set forth in paragraphs 17 to 22. Income provision continues to be quite unsatisfactory. As a result of the introduction of the new procedure, however, the situation has improved somewhat, at least in the sense that major contributors have been made aware of the adverse effect on provision of services to refugees of holding contributions at fixed levels year after year, and several major contributiors have provided the Agency with information about future intentions which helps considerably in planning. The most encouraging aspect of the response is that the combined effect of action by a number of contributors has been to give the Agency a firmer basis for projecting income earlier in the year, thus tending to obviate crisis financing under the threat of total suspension of activities

during the year. The procedure has not so far increased the rate of growth of income substantially, added any major new contributors nor changed the pattern of sources of income. On balance, the procedure has been successful enough to warrant its continuance with some modifications as suggested by contributors. Application of the procedure has confirmed the fact that the Agency can expect each-year a substantial discrepancy between income and gross financial needs.

Situation in Lebanon

16. During the reporting period 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978, armed conflict between the various militias in Lebanon and interventions by the Arab Deterrent Forces were very limited but, at the end of the period as at the beginning, 15 much still remained to be done to assure the personal security of individuals, including the refugees and UNRWA staff.

17. The major disruption of the period was the displacement of Palestine refugees by the Israeli military action in Lebanon in March. During the period in which the Israeli troops were advancing to the Litani River, about 67,000 of the 206,000 registered Palestine refugees in Lebanon were displaced to some degree, and for several weeks the Agency provided emergency assistance in the form of food, clothing, blankets and some shelter to the most seriously affected, about 45,000 in all. Damage estimated at \$310,000 was suffered in the three refugee camps south of the Litani-Rashidieh, Buss, and Burj el-Shemali. The refugees still living in Damour¹⁶ awaiting the construction of the new camp at Bayssarieh once again fled. By the end of the period, virtually all displaced refugees had returned to their homes. displaced Palestine refugees congregated around Sidon. However, a few thousand (mostly from Damour) fled to Beirut and large numbers of displaced Lebanese fled to the city. The combined influx greatly exacerbated the already tenuous security situation in the city. (For further details, see paras. 403-405.)

18. Some Governments and non-governmental organizations took the initiative in offering donations in cash and kind to the Agency to permit it to provide emergency assistance to the displaced

¹⁵ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/32/13 and Corr. 1 and 2), para. 23.

16 Ibid., para. 24.

refugees and, when the Agency issued an appeal for donations to complete the task, more money was forthcoming than was needed.

Relocation of headquarters

19. In November 1977, all headquarters offices returned to Beirut from Vienna and Amman, where they had been temporarily located since January 1976. Unfortunately, conditions in Beirut in the early months of 1978 created operational difficulties which led to a decision in mid-April to relocate headquarters. Consultations were begun with the Syrian and Jordanian Governments late in April and with the Austrian Government at the beginning of May. The purpose of the consultations was to explore the possibility of relocating headquarters in Damascus or Amman or, if neither could provide all of the necessary office space and satisfy other requirements for all of headquarters, of relocating in Vienna staff whose functions require no particular location and in Amman staff who operate most effectively when posted in the Agency's area of operations.

20. The requirements of the Agency with respect to size and location of rent-free office space, related facilities, and freedom of movement of staff were described in general terms in the initial consultations and in precise detail in writing early in May. All Governments were informed that the need to relocate was urgent and that the accommodation and facilities to be offered therefore had to be actually available. The Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan were informed that the Government of Austria was assumed to be in a position to respond quickly and, if the priority accorded to remaining in the area were to be given practical expression, it was anticipated that the Agency's requirements would have to be met in either Damascus or Amman within four to six weeks. In fact, the Government of Austria was in a position to meet the requirements within less than four weeks, but acceptance of the Austrian offer was delayed so as to give the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan more time. Late in May they were informed of the Austrian offer and, in view of the situation in Beirut, of the Agency's intention to accept it on 8 June unless the requirements could be met in the area by that time, that is, by the end of the six-week period initially forecast. In response, the Jordanian Government, at the end of May, offered office accommodation much smaller in size than had

been specified. A few days later, when stating that it had not been possible to find 6,000 square metres of completed office accommodation, the Government of Jordan offered space in buildings under construction and requested that consideration be given to delaying the move of headquarters until suitable accommodation had been completed and was available. The completion dates for these buildings, by the most optimistic estimates, were two to three months hence (and, upon subsequent detailed examination, the areas of the building offered were found to be insufficient). The Agency was unwilling to delay its move from Beirut to an uncertain date in the future at least several months hence. There was no detailed discussion of anticipated problems with regard to facilities and other requirements, since the basic requirement—6,000 square metres of net useable, actually available space-could not be met.

21. On 9 June, the offer of the Government of Austria was formally accepted and, subsequently, the Agency, with the assistance of the Jordanian Government, was able to rent enough office space in Amman to accommodate the part of headquarters staff it had as a minimum wanted to locate there from the outset, plus some additional staff. There will thus be two headquarters offices one at Vienna and one in Amman. When he is not travelling elsewhere, the Commissioner-General will henceforth divide his time among Vienna, Amman and New York, instead of between Beirut and New York as in the past. By the end of the reporting period, contracts had been or were being negotiated in the two headquarters locations, the packing of household effects had begun, some dependents had left Beirut and a schedule for the phased movement of staff to Vienna and Amman had been drawn up. It was expected that the move to Vienna would be completed by late July or early August and the move to Amman about a week later.

22. The Agency would like to express its appreciation to the Governments of Austria, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan for their efforts to assist the Agency. It would have preferred to relocate all of headquarters in the area of operations and regrets that it was not feasible to do so. However, on the basis of past experience, it is clear that, with headquarters organized and located as it will be when the move has been completed,

it will be in a position to function more effectively than it has been able to do for several years and, consequently, to serve refugee interests better. More time will be available for travel in the area of operations by headquarters senior personnel and a more equitable division of their time in dealing with matters of concern to the five field offices in the area will now be possible. Communications between headquarters and the field offices will improve. The Commissioner-General will maintain an office in Amman for use by him and other senior officials as a base when in the area, as well as conference facilities for meetings of the Advisory Commission, the General Cabinet and the Administration/Staff Union Working Group. The five field offices, with their combined staffs of over 16,000, will continue, as they have in the past, to provide all services possible to the refugees within the limits imposed by insufficient income. In so far as the provision of services is affected by the organization and location of the approximately 365 staff members in headquarters, any change will be in the direction of improvement through greater efficiency.

23. The unavoidable costs of relocation will be substantial, even taking into account costs that will be avoided by not remaining in Beirut or relocating entirely in the area of operations. The additional net non-recurrent (one-time) expenditure for the year 1978 may be as high as \$1.1 million, with additional net expenditure to meet recurrent costs of about \$1.4 million (part year only) for a total additional cost in 1978 of about \$2.5 million (of which about \$535,000 would be recoverable from the United Nations, UNESCO and WHO). By comparison, if all of headquarters could have moved to Amman, additional net nonrecurrent expenditure would have been about \$2.1 million and additional net recurrent expenditure about \$400,000 for a total of about \$2.5 million (of which about \$575,000 would have been recoverable). On the basis of these figures, total additional costs incurred in 1978 because of removal to Vienna and Amman are virtually the same as the costs would have been of removal to Amman only.

24. Provision would also have to be made for the costs of returning Palestinian local staff to Beirut upon their completion of service in future years. Comparison of the estimated future onetime costs for the two locations (Vienna-Amman as against Amman only) shows that there would be very little difference, namely \$735,000 non-recurrent for Vienna-Amman, as against \$785,000 for Amman only. These one-time costs would not be incurred in a single year, but would be spread over future years as staff members retired.

25. For 1979, the additional recurrent costs of operating out of two locations (Vienna and Amman), in comparison with Beirut, are estimated at \$3.2 million, of which approximately \$2.65 million would have to be met out of UNRWA funds, and the balance of about \$550,000 recovered from the United Nations regular budget, UNESCO and WHO.

Problems relating to staff and premises

26. There were additional cases of arrest, detention and interference with duty travel of UNRWA staff members, as well as cases affecting Agency premises.

E. Conclusion

27. As UNRWA Commissioners-General have been emphasizing for years in their annual reports, the most critical problem faced by the Agency is its uncertain and inadequate financing. The Agency can only do what is possible with the resources made available to it by the Member States. They have been unwilling for the past several years to provide resources adequate to maintain services to the refugees at previous levels. The time is rapidly approaching when the implications of that fact will have to be assessed and the Agency be given guidance by the international community on the nature and level of services the community wishes to provide.

Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

4

Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People¹⁷

September 22, 1978

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

22 September 1978

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for submission to the General Assembly in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 32/40 A.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) MÉDOUNE FALL
Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise
of the Inalienable Rights of
the Palestinian People

His Excellency Mr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General of the United Nations

I. INTRODUCTION

- 1. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, originally composed of 20 members, was established by the General Assembly in resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975. The first report of the Committee was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. ¹⁸
- 2. In its resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Committee and endorsed the recommendations

contained therein as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine. Subsequently, by its decision 31/318 of 22 December 1976, the General Assembly enlarged the membership of the Committee by the addition of three new members.

- 3. In its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session, 19 after having thoroughly analysed the comments made on the recommendations, and taking into account current events in the region, the Committee unanimously reaffirmed the validity of its recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly. It agreed that the date suggested for the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from territories occupied in 1967, although now passed, should be retained for its symbolic significance and as a timely reminder of the urgency of a peaceful solution under the auspices of the United Nations. It stressed also that an intensification of efforts was necessary to implement those recommendations with the minimum delay, and that the various sectors of the United Nations system should act in concert to promote their implementation by peaceful means.
- 4. In its resolution 32/40 A of 2 December 1977, adopted by 100 votes to 12 with 29 abstentions, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Committee and endorsed its recommendations as contained in paragraphs 43 and 44 of its report. The General Assembly also gave the Committee a new mandate.

II. MANDATE OF THE COMMITTEE

5. The mandate was specified in paragraph 7 of resolution 32/40 A and paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 (c) of resolution 32/40 B. In paragraph 7 of resolution 32/40 A, the General Assembly authorized the Committee to continue to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations, to send delegations or representatives to international conferences where it considered such representation to be appropriate, and to report to the Assembly at its thirty-third session.

¹⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 35 (UN doc. A/33/35), excluding list of contents.

¹⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/31/35). [This and following notes are part of the document unless otherwise indicated. ed.]

¹⁹ Ibid., Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/32/35).

- 6. In paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 32/40 B the General Assembly authorized the Committee to provide the necessary guidelines to the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, established in accordance with the terms of that resolution, in the preparation of studies and publications relating to: (i) the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people; (ii) relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations; (iii) the activities of the Committee and other United Nations organs, in order to promote the attainment of those rights.
- 7. In paragraph 1 (c) of resolution 32/40 B, the General Assembly requested that the Special Unit should organize, in consultation with the Committee, commencing in 1978, annual observance of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.

III. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

A. Election of officers

8. At its 26th meeting, on 10 January 1978, the Committee unanimously re-elected the following officers:

Chairman: Mr. Médoune Fall (Senegal)
Vice-Chairman: Mr. Ricardo Alarcón Quesada
(Cuba)

Mr. Mir Abdul Wahab Siddiq (Afghanistan)

(Afghanista Rapporteur: Mr. Victor J. Gauci (Malta)

At the 31st meeting, on 14 June 1978, Mr. Raūl Roa Kouri (Cuba) was unanimously elected Vice-Chairman in place of Mr. Ricardo Alarcón Quesada (Cuba) who had left New York on another assignment for his country.

B. Participation in the work of the Committee

- 9. The Committee reconfirmed that those States Members of the United Nations and Permanent Observers to the United Nations which wished to participate in the work of the Committee as observers could do so, and it welcomed in that capacity Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, the Syrian Arab Republic, the League of Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which continued in 1978 to participate in the work of the Committee.
- 10. At its request, Viet Nam also participated in the work of the Committee as an observer.

C. Establishment of a Task Force

11. The Committee unanimously decided that the Task Force established by it in 1977 should continue to function in order to facilitate the work of the Committee by: (a) keeping up to date with events which affect the work of the Committee and suggesting to the Committee action which it could usefully undertake, and (b) assisting the Committee in any other specific assignment related to its work. The following were reappointed members of the Task Force: Malta (Chairman), Afghanistan, Cuba, Guinea, Guyana, India, Senegal, Tunisia and, as representatives of the people directly concerned, the Palestine Liberation Organization.

IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE

A. Efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations in accordance with paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 32/40 A

- 1. Contacts with the Security Council and consideration of possible action.
- 12. In September 1977, after it had submitted its report to the General Assembly, the Committee authorized its Chairman to undertake the necessary consultations with the President of the Security Council with a view to convening at a suitable date a meeting of the Council on the question of Palestine. The Committee felt that this meeting should take place before the question of Palestine was taken up by the General Assembly at the thirty-second session. Accordingly, on 13 September 1977, the Chairman of the Committee addressed a letter²⁰ to the President of the Security Council and commenced the necessary consultations.
- 13. The Security Council considered the question of Palestine at its 2041st meeting, on 27 October 1977. Those representatives who participated in the discussion supported the recommendations made by the Committee and endorsed by the General Assembly. At the conclusion of the discussion, the President of the Council announced that after prior consultation with members of the Council it had been agreed that the debate on this item should be adjourned for the present and that the next meeting would be fixed after consultations among members.

²⁰ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-second year, Supplement for July, August and September 1977, document S/12399.

- 14. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 32/40 A, the General Assembly noted with satisfaction that, during the consideration of the report of the Committee by the Security Council on 27 October 1977, all members of the Council who participated in the discussion had reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East could not be established without the achievement, in particular, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. In paragraph 4 of that resolution, the General Assembly urged the Security Council to take as soon as possible a decision on the recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/20. The Security Council is accordingly still seized of the question of Palestine and the Committee's recommendations.
- 15. It was strongly felt that there was a need for the Committee to restate its support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and to bring to the attention of the President of the Security Council, the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, the two-Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and all States directly concerned with the Palestinian question those points within its mandate which the Committee considered essential for a Middle East Settlement.
- 16. On 18 January the Chairman accordingly addressed letters to the President of the Security Council (A/33/55, annex III),²¹ the President of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly (A/33/55, annex II), the Secretary-General (A/33/54), the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference—the Permanent Representative of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—and to the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic (A/33/55, annexes IV and V) recalling the following important principles:
- (a) The question of Palestine is at the heart of the problem of the Middle East and no solution to that problem can be envisaged without taking into account the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;
 - (b) The implementation of the inalienable rights
- ²¹ For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978, document S/12531.

- of the Palestinian people of returning to their homes and property, of exercising their right of self-determination and independence and national sovereignty will contribute to a final solution of the Middle East crisis;
- (c) The participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing with all other parties on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3375 (XXX) is indispensable to all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which take place under the auspices of the United Nations;
- (d) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the consequent obligation for Israel to withdraw completely and quickly from all territory so occupied.
- 17. At the same time the Chairman recalled the fact that the Palestine National Council, at its meeting in Cairo in March 1977, had decided to consider the recommendations of the Committee endorsed by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session as a positive step towards the realization of the aspirations of the Palestinian people and their rights of return, self-determination and to independence and national sovereignty. The Palestine National Council had also declared that any agreement affecting the rights of the Palestinian people and concluded in its absence would be regarded as null and void. The Chairman added that the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations had, on instructions from the Executive Chairman of the Organization, reaffirmed that decision in the Committee.
- 18. In the light of tragic events which took place subsequently in Lebanon and the adoption of resolution 425 (1978) by the Security Council on 19 March 1978, the Committee authorized its Chairman to address the President of the Security Council unanimously associating itself with those provisions of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) which called upon Israel to cease immediately its military action against the territorial integrity of Lebanon and to withdraw forthwith all its forces from Lebanese territory. It felt also that it was imperative that the Security Council should take more energetic action to bring about the urgent establishment of peace in the Middle East through a positive response to the General Assembly's recommendations on

the question of Palestine. In his letter dated 20 March 1978,²² the Chairman also expressed his certainty that many innocent lives could have been spared if the Security Council had exercised its responsibilities and had made a positive contribution to the efforts aimed at advancing a settlement of the question of Palestine.

2. Review of events relating to the Middle East question

19. In reviewing events which had taken place on the Middle East question, initiated during the later months of 1978 and on which details of results have now been made public, the Committee felt that it should recall the detailed and phased recommendations which it had made on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, which the General Assembly had already endorsed, as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine, in two successive sessions. These recommendations are contained as an annex to the report and are summarized in paragraphs 16 and 58.

20. The Committee deems it necessary to stress once again, in particular, that the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, is indispensable to a just and lasting settlement of the question of Palestine, which is at the heart of the Middle East conflict.

3. Action relating to recommendations of the Committee taken by other organizations

21. The Committee noted that the Ninth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Dakar in April 1978, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting at Khartoum in July 1978 and the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at Belgrade in July 1978, had all strongly reaffirmed their support for the struggle to restore the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and had called upon the Security Council to act on the Committee's recommendations. The Committee noted also that the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination meeting at Geneva from 14 to 25 August 1978 had in its Declaration expressed its grave concern over the continuing situation in the Middle East and had deplored Israel's refusal to comply with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. That

Conference had proclaimed its solidarity with the Palestinian people in its struggle for liberation and against racial discrimination and had voiced the hope that the Palestinian people would soon have the opportunity to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination.

4. Reaction to developments in the occupied territories

22. Referring to the reported reply of the Government of Israel to the Government of the United States of America in June 1978 concerning the future of the occupied territories, and to the clarification given by Mr. Moshe Dayan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel quoted in the New York Times of 20 June 1978, the Chairman of the Committee addressed a letter (A/33/154) to the Secretary-General expressing the view that the Israeli Foreign Minister's clarification that "the plan for autonomy in the occupied territories would be permanent and not a transitional phase to a separate Palestinian homeland" confirmed that Israel had no intention of honouring the resolutions of the United Nations which opposed the occupation of territories by force and recognized the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people affirmed by the General Assembly. He pointed out also that the clarification constituted a violation of the principle of self-determination and that it was clear that all the assurances given by the Israeli Government concerning the territories occupied in 1967 had been aimed at enabling Israel to evade its responsibilities and its obligations with respect to the United Nations and its Charter.

23. In March 1978, the Secretary-General drew the attention of the Committee to some petitions addressed to him by prominent Palestinians in the occupied territories. The Committee was convinced on the basis of the signatures appended to these documents that they represented the true sentiments and aspirations of the Palestinian people, irrespective of their place of residence. The Committee addressed a letter to the Secretary-General emphasizing the main elements put forth in those documents and requested that the letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly (A/33/165). The main elements were:

(a) The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and as such not only had the full right but

²² Ibid., document S/12614.

was duty bound to express the views and attitudes of the Palestinian people;

- (b) The rights of the Palestinian people as affirmed by various United Nations resolutions were not subject to bargaining;
- (c) Palestinians in the occupied territories rejected any solution, regardless of its origin, which did not contain a clear recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to establish their own independent national state.
- 24. On 17 August 1978 on the instruction of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, its Permanent Observer brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Committee that, on 15 August 1978, Palestinian prisoners and detainees in the occupied territories had begun a hunger strike to protest against their harsh and inhuman treatment by the occupation authorities. Quoting several examples of such ill treatment, the Permanent Observer urged the Chairman to take immediate and appropriate action to support the demands put forward by the prisoners, namely, that they be treated as prisoners of war and be given adequate medical care.
- 25. The Chairman of the Committee accordingly addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (A/33-218-S/12820) on 22 August 1978 requesting that appropriate action be taken by him to ensure that the demands put forward by the prisoners are accorded due attention. Similar letters were addressed also to the President of the Security Council and to the President of the Commission on Human Rights.

5. Attendance at conferences

- 26. In accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 32/40 A which, *inter alia*, authorized the Committee to send delegations or representatives to international conferences where such representation would be considered by it to be appropriate, the Committee decided to accept invitations and to send representatives to several important conferences during 1978.
- 27. The Committee was represented at the World Conference for the Eradication of Racism organized by the World Peace Council in Basel from 18 to 21 May; the workshop organized by the Palestine Human Rights Campaign in Washington, D.C., on 21 May; the Week of Solidarity with the Anti-Imperialist Forces in the Middle

- East in Their Struggle for Peace and Social Progress, organized by the Solidarity Committee of the German Democratic Republic at Berlin from 5 to 11 June 1978 and the United Nations Conference to Combat Racism, held at Geneva from 14 to 25 August 1978.
- 28. The Committee was of the view that such attendance was of extreme importance in furthering the aims and objectives of the Committee and in fulfilling its mandate.
- 29. The opportunity was invariably taken of addressing these conferences and making known the work and recommendations of the Committee. Those who represented the Committee at these conferences reported that they were also able to establish contact with several international nongovernmental organizations which also participated in these conferences. They found that there was evidently a considerable amount of understanding of and sympathy for the problem of the Palestinian people.
- 30. The Chairman also informed the Committee that he had had the opportunity to describe the Committee's work at a meeting in Jeddah of the Committee on Jerusalem of the Islamic Conference. Following his statement, it had been decided that a letter would be sent to the Committee for the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People thanking its members and commending them on their work.

6. Other action taken by the Committee

- 31. At the first meeting of the Committee in 1978, the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization conveyed to the Committee the greetings of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Chairman Yasser Arafat, reaffirming his support for the recommendations contained in the Committee's report and endorsed by the General Assembly. The Chairman of the Committee accordingly sent a message (A/33/55, annex I) to Chairman Yasser Arafat thanking him for his message of good wishes and assuring him once more of the Committee's solidarity with the just cause of the Palestinian people and of its inalienable rights.
- 32. A message of greetings and good wishes was also sent by the Chairman of the Committee to the President of the Commission on Human Rights at the commencement of the thirty-fourth

session of the Commission. In that message the Chairman expressed the Committee's interest in the deliberations on the question of the violation of human rights in the occupied territories, including Palestine, and the certainty that such discussions would draw once more the attention of all States and world public opinion to the General Assembly's recommendations concerning the implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

33. The Committee noted that the Commission on Human Rights had adopted four important resolutions dealing with the violations of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine, and the right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation. It noted also that the Economic and Social Council subsequently adopted resolution 1978/24 by which, having considered the report of the Commission on Human Rights on its thirtyfourth session, it took note of the decisions of the Commission concerning the violation by Israel of human rights in the occupied territories; commended the Commission for its vigilance and its decisions on the protection of human rights in the occupied Arab territoties, including Palestine; and requested the Commission to pursue its efforts for the protection of human rights in the occupied territories, including Palestine, and to continue to take appropriate measures in this respect.

34. On 22 April 1978, the Chairman of the Committee addressed (see A/S-8/PV.3) the eighth special session of the General Assembly convened to consider the financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. In that statement he declared that the aim of Israel's invasion of Lebanon was the physical and moral destruction of the Palestinian people and breaking the will of a whole people. He declared that the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People believed that the presence of United Nations forces should not be misused to solidify injustices and pursue a policy of oppression and occupation. On the contrary, it should impel the United Nations and particularly the Security Council to seek a lasting solution to the problem of Southern Lebanon; that problem could be solved only in the context of an over-all settlement making it possible for the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights which had been

recognized by the United Nations since 1947.

35. He recalled that the Committee had prepared recommendations that could not only enable the Palestinian people to exercise their rights but also assist in finding a solution to the Middle East conflict. Those recommendations had been endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. The National Council of Palestine, the supreme body of the Palestinian people, had also approved them. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to implement them because of the immobility of the Security Council which had not yet taken a position on the question. He asserted the Committee's belief that the present situation allowed for no further delay, that it was imperative for the Security Council to act in a more decisive way to bring about a just and lasting settlement to the Middle East question. Otherwise a new cycle of violations and destruction could not only endanger international peace and security but also jeopardize any chances for a peaceful settlement. In the Committee's opinion a positive response to those recommendations would be an important step towards eliminating the danger of conflict in the Middle East, promoting a just and lasting peace and finally devoting large United Nations funds to profitable tasks, tasks more useful to the international community as a whole.

36. The Rapporteur of the Committee, addressing the special session of the General Assembly on the same day (see A/S-8/PV.2), maintained that the real issue before the Assembly was the fate of a dispossessed people who from time immorial had worked hard, peaceably and with warm attachment to the land where they were born and in which they had toiled. It was high time that all members of the organization lived up to their responsibilities in accordance with the Charter. A just and lasting solution of the crisis in the Middle East was inconceivable except on the basis of Israel's unconditional and complete withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied since 1967 and recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to a State of their own, as well as the right of all the countries of the region to independence and security. Referring to the recommendations of the Committee, he reminded the Assembly that a prescription for peace had been drawn up and had won the endorsement of the international community and that

endorsement had been reaffirmed a second time after more concentrated consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

- 37. The Committee decided that it might follow up on the initiative it had taken in 1977 by inquiring of the competent bodies of the United Nations what action they had taken in pursuance of paragraph 5 of resolution 32/40 A which urged them to take necessary action, as appropriate, in accordance with the Committee's recommended programme of implementation.
- 38. In accordance with this decision the Chairman addressed a letter to the Secretary-General inquiring what the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) might be able to do as preparatory work to implement the Committee's recommendations.
- 39. In his reply the Commissioner General of UNRWA indicated that, given the funds and the mandate, UNRWA would be competent to assume responsibility for the short-term logistical aspects of the return of any or all of the 311,000 (including natural increase since 1967) registered Palestinian refugees displaced as a result of the 1967 hostilities and now in east Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic. Given both a proper mandate and adequate funds UNRWA could also handle the movement of an estimated 210,000 (including natural increase) other Palestinians displaced as a result of the 1967 hostilities and now in east Jordan.
- 40. With the co-operation of the Governments concerned, UNRWA was capable at short notice of providing, within its operational area, transport, a temporary staging centre or centres with feeding arrangements, clinics, a potable water supply and environmental sanitation, and control of identification of registered Palestine refugees. The Agency could not provide permanent housing or the kind of institutionalized education and health care it now provided the Palestine refugees, even if funds were available, unless adequate land for housing and installations were made available and 18 months' to two years' advance notice of resettlement were given to permit the necessary construction.
- 41. As for the second phase of the Committee's programme which deals with "the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967", the 1.7 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA were all in this category,

- assuming that those refugees displaced in 1967 would return, in the first phase, to the places outside Israel from which they were displaced.
- 42. Appropriately provided with authority and funds, UNRWA was capable of playing a role in this also, with regard to:
 - (a) The identification of registered refugees;
 - (b) Transport;
 - (c) Overnight shelter, if required;
 - (d) Emergency feeding;
 - (e) Emergency medical care.
- 43. Most of the services could be provided for non-registered refugees if UNRWA were authorized to do so.
- 44. While UNRWA could render substantial short-term assistance to facilitate the return of refugees, in the event of a mass movement back to Palestine, the important considerations for the refugees were less likely to be what they will need in the short term but rather such fundamental concerns as jobs, permanent housing, education, and other social services of a continuing nature. Presumably these would be the responsibility of whatever governmental authority would then have control of the territory to which the refugees return.
- 45. In summary, given the authority, the funds and the co-operation of the Governments concerned UNRWA could be capable of providing the assistance referred to by the Committee, promptly, efficiently and economically.
- 46. The Conciliation Commission for Palestine in its reply referred the Committee to its reports to the thirty-first and thirty-second sessions of the General Assembly.
 - B. Action taken in accordance with paragraph 1 (a) of General Assembly resolution 32/40 B²³
- 47. The Committee noted that in compliance with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 32/40 B the Secretary-General had established within the Secretariat a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights which would prepare, under the guidance of the Committee, studies and publications relating to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and the activities of the Committee and

²³ Doc. 26 in International Documents on Palestine 1977. [ed. note.]

other United Nations organs in order to promote the attainment of those rights. The Special Unit was also to promote for such studies and publications maximum publicity through all appropriate means. Paragraph 2 of that resolution requested the Secretary-General to ensure the full co-operation of the Office of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks.

48. In carrying out its mandate in accordance with this resolution the Committee suggested to the Special Unit several themes on which it might prepare studies during 1978. These were the right of return and how it should be applied and implemented in the case of the rights of the Palestinian people; the right of self-determination referred to in resolution 3236 (XXIX); the evolution and origins of the Palestinian problem, in particular how it had originally come before the United Nations and a critical and analytical study of all relevant resolutions on the question of Palestine which would be intended for specialists on the Palestinian question.

49. On the question of Bulletins which were to be issued by the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, the Committee suggested that they should deal with relevant current events including those involving violations of rights in the occupied territories and should cover important statements and events in the region.

50. It noted that the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat had issued a pamphlet entitled "the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People" which covered the work of the Committee from its inception in 1976 to June 1978.

51. The Committee participated also in drawing up the scenario for the film being produced by the Office of Public Information and made its suggestions and comments on what the perspectives, accuracy and objectivity of the film should be. It is expected that the film will be ready for screening on 29 November 1978, when the United Nations commemorates the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.

C. Action taken in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of General Assembly resolution 32/40 B

52. The Special Unit on Palestinian Rights was requested by paragraph 1 (c) of resolution 32/40 B

to organize, in consultation with the Committee, commencing in 1978, annual observance of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.

53. In laying down the guidelines for the observance of that Day the Committee recommended that Solidarity Day should be observed in New York by the holding of a special meeting of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to which all Member States should be invited and at which statements may be made by those whom the Committee considered should be invited to do so. Selected international non-governmental organizations were to be invited as well. Messages received from Heads of States or Governments would be read out at the meeting. The film produced by the Office of Public Information would have its premiere on that occasion and literature produced by the Special Unit, including a special issue of the Bulletin, would be distributed at the meeting. In addition, an exhibition of photographs and posters were to be arranged in the Visitor's Lounge of the United Nations Secretariat building during the week commencing Monday, 27 November 1978.

54. The Committee also requested the Secretary-General to draw the attention of all Member States, specialized agencies and other United Nations organs to the International Day of Solidarity and to inquire in what manner they intend to commemorate the Day. The Secretary-General was also requested to instruct the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva to organize a special meeting in Geneva to commemorate the Day, to screen the film and to arrange an exhibition of photographs and posters. It is expected that many Governments, with the assistance of United Nations information centres, will observe the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People in an appropriate manner.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

55. In the light of actual developments in the Middle East, the Committee unanimously decided to reiterate the validity of the recommendations it had made to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, which the Assembly has already en-

dorsed. These recommendations are annexed to the present report, their validity undiminished by the passage of time. The Committee agreed that, now more than ever, the symbolic significance of the date suggested for the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from territories occupied in 1967 required that it be retained as a reminder of the urgency of a peaceful solution under the auspices of the United Nations particularly on the basis of resolutions unanimously adopted but not yet implemented. The Committee stresses that events over the past year have again indicated the urgency of a solution. Indeed, the Committee feels that, had a start been made on the implementation of the recommendations, conflict in the area might have been avoided.

- 56. The Committee considered that a continuation of its efforts would contribute to a wider understanding of the just causes of the Palestinian people and hence to the implementation of its recommendations, especially if the various sectors of the United Nations system continued to act in concert to promote their implementation by peaceful means.
- 57. The Committee was of the opinion that positive action by the Security Council on the recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly could create the necessary conditions for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
- 58. The Committee recommends that the General Assembly should urge the Security Council to be guided constantly by the basic principles relating to the problem of Palestine within the Middle East situation. These principles are:
- (a) The question of Palestine is at the heart of the problem of the Middle East and consequently no solution to the Middle East problem could be envisaged without taking into account the rights of the Palestinian people;
- (b) The realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and to self-determination, independence and national sovereignty would contribute to a solution of the crisis in the Middle East;
- (c) The participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing with all other parties on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3375 (XXXX) is indispensable in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East undertaken under the auspices of the United

Nations.

(d) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the obligation which devolved on Israel to withdraw completely and quickly from all territory so occupied.

ANNEX²⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ENDORSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-FIRST SESSION

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES

- 59. The question of Palestine is at the heart of the Middle East problem, and, consequently, the Committee stresses its belief that no solution in the Middle East can be envisaged which does not fully take into account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.
- 60. The legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and property and to achieve self-determination, national independence and sovereignty are endorsed by the Committee in the conviction that the full implementation of these rights will contribute decisively to a comprehensive and final settlement of the Middle East crisis.
- 61. The participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3375 (XXX) is indispensable in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations.
- 62. The Committee recalls the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and stresses the consequent obligation for complete and speedy evacuation of any territory so occupied.
- 63. The Committee considers that it is the duty and the responsibility of all concerned to enable the Palestinians to exercise their inalienable rights.
- 64. The Committee recommends an expanded and more influential role by the United Nations and its organs in promoting a just solution to the

²⁴ Previously issued as annex I of Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/32/35).

question of Palestine and in the implementation of such a solution. The Security Council, in particular, should take appropriate action to facilitate the exercise by the Palestinians of their right to their homes, lands and property. The Committee, furthermore, urges the Security Council to promote action towards a just solution, taking into account all the powers conferred on it by the Charter of the United Nations.

65. It is with this perspective in view and on the basis of the numerous resolutions of the United Nations, after due consideration of all the facts, proposals and suggestions advanced in the course of its deliberations, that the Committee submits its recommendations on the modalities for the implementation of the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

II. THE RIGHT OF RETURN

- 66. The natural and inalienable right of Palestinians to return to their homes is recognized by resolution 194 (III), which the General Assembly has reaffirmed almost every year since its adoption. This right was also unanimously recognized by the Security Council in its resolution 237 (1967); the time for the urgent implementation of these resolutions is long overdue.
- 67. Without prejudice to the right of all Palestinians to return to their homes, lands and property, the Committee considers that the programme of implementation, of the exercise of this right may be carried out in two phases:

 Phase one
- 68. The first phase involves the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced as a result of the war of June 1967. The Committee recommends that:
- (i) The Security Council should request the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) and that such implementation should not be related to any other condition;
- (ii) The resources of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and/or of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, suitably financed and mandated, may be employed to assist in the solution of any logistical problems involved in the resettlement of those returning to their homes. These agencies could also assist, in co-operation with the host countries and the

Palestine Liberation Organization, in the identification of the displaced Palestinians.

Phase two

- 69. The second phase deals with the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967. The Committee recommends that:
- (i) While the first phase is being implemented, the United Nations in co-operation with the States directly involved, and the Palestine Liberation Organization as the interim representative of the Palestinian entity, should proceed to make the necessary arrangements to enable Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967 to exercise their right to return to their homes and property, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly General Assembly resolution 194 (III);
- (ii) Palestinians not choosing to return to their homes should be paid just and equitable compensation as provided for in resolution 194 (III).

III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINA-TION, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY

- 70. The Palestinian people has the inherent right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty in Palestine. The Committee considers that the evacuation of the territories occupied by force and in violation of the principles of the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations is a *conditio sine qua non* for the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights of Palestinians to their homes and property and with the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity, the Palestinian people will be able to exercise its rights to self-determination and to decide its form of government without external interference.
- 71. The Committee also feels that the United Nations has an historical duty and responsibility to render all assistance necessary to promote the economic development and prosperity of the Palestinian entity.
- 72. To these ends, the Committee recommends that:
- (a) A time-table should be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal by Israeli occupation forces from those areas occupied in 1967; such withdrawal should be completed no later than 1 June 1977;

- (b) The Security Council may need to provide temporary peace-keeping forces in order to facilitate the process of withdrawal;
- (c) Israel should be requested by the Security Council to desist from the establishment of new settlements and to withdraw during this period from settlements established since 1967 in the occupied territories. Arab property and all essential services in these areas should be maintained intact;
- (d) Israel should also be requested to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to declare, pending its speedy withdrawal from these territories, its recognition of the applicability of that Convention;
- (e) The evacuated territories, with all property and services intact, should be taken over by the United Nations, which with the co-operation of the League of Arab States, will subsequently hand over these evacuated areas to the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people;
- (f) The United Nations should, if necessary, assist in establishing communications between Gaza and the West Bank;
- (g) As soon as the independent Palestinian entity has been established, the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved and the Palestinian entity, should, taking into account General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), make further arrangements for the full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the resolution of outstanding problems and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, in accordance with all relevant United Nations resolutions;
- (h) The United Nations should provide the economic and technical assistance necessary for the consolidation of the Palestinian entity.

5

Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine²⁵

September 28, 1978

1. In paragraph 4 of resolution 32/90 A of 13

25 UN doc. A/33/276.

- December 1977, the General Assembly noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1978. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.
- 2. It should be recalled that in its twenty-fourth²⁶ and twenty-fifth²⁷ reports, covering the periods from 24 December 1965 to 30 September 1966 and from 1 October 1966 to 30 September 1967, the Commission responded to similar requests which the General Assembly had made in its resolutions 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966. In those reports the Commission noted that examination of various ways in which it might be possible to intensify its efforts with any prospect of advancing matters towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) had compelled the conclusion that all the ways envisaged presupposed substantial changes in the situation.
- 3. There is no need to emphasize that, as already stated in the preceding reports, the events which have occurred since then in the area concerned have further complicated an already very complex situation. As far as the Commission is concerned, the circumstances which unfortunately have limited its possibilities of action have remained up to now essentially unchanged.
- 4. Noting, however, that the diplomatic activity directed towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has been resumed, the Commission expresses the most sincere hope that the situation in the region will improve in the near future, thus enabling it to carry forward its work in accordance with its mandate as defined by General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.

²⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 32, document A/6451.

²⁷ Ibid., Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 34, document A/6846.

6

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories 28

November 10, 1978

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the attached report, which was submitted to him, in accordance with Assembly resolutions 32/91 B,

paragraph 5, and 32/91 C, paragraphs 9 and 10, of 13 December 1977, by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL	0 1
I. INTRODUCTION	1 - 13
II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK	14 - 22
III. MANDATE	23 - 27
IV. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE	28-91
regard to the occupied territories	37-57
and practices of the Government of Israel with regard to the occupied territories	58-88
C. Evidence relating to the day-to-day situation of the civilians in the occupied territories.	89–91
V. SPECIAL REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS IN DETENTION	92-125
A. Information on prison conditions B. Allegations of ill-treatment	99-109 110-125
VI. CONCLUSIONS	126-134
VII. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT.	135

ANNEXES

- I. Map showing Israeli settlements in the territories occupied in June 1967
- II. Medical certificates relating to Mr. Soleiman Madi

²⁸ UN doc. A/33/356.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

10 November 1978

Sir,

The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories has the honour to transmit to you the attached report, its tenth, formulated in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII), 3240 A and C (XXIX), 3525 A and C (XXX), 31/106 C and D and 32/91 B and C.

The report of the Special Committee follows the same pattern as that in previous years. It contains a representative cross-section of the information received by the Special Committee since the adoption of its last report on 17 October This information was obtained in the absence of the co-operation of the Government of Israel which continues to constitute a serious hardship in the work of the Special Committee. It has been possible to follow the situation of the civilians in the occupied territories very closely by monitoring the situation in these territories. The Special Committee relied on information gathered from a plurality of sources such as the oral and written testimony of persons having first-hand experience of the situation of civilians in the occupied territories, reports of pronouncements of responsible persons in the Israeli Government, information submitted to it by Governments and non-governmental bodies and unedited film material of events in the occupied territories. The Special Committee made efforts to strengthen contacts with responsible persons in the occupied territories with a view to receiving information on the human rights situation in their areas: paid notices were inserted in a number of local newspapers informing the general public of the Special Committee's mandate and indicating that it would consider information on the situation in the occupied territories.

The information received by the Special Committee is analysed in section IV. Samples are given of this information, which falls into two categories, namely, that which concerns the policy of the Government of Israel of settlements and

annexation and that which concerns the situation of civilians as a consequence of the occupation. Samples are also given, on information received, of the pattern of the incidents occurring in the occupied territories and their consequences in the form of arrests, trials and releases.

Section V of this report contains the special report requested by the General Assembly on the treatment of civilians in detention. It consists of information on prison conditions and a number of cases of alleged ill-treatment of detainees.

Section VI contains the conclusions reached by the Special Committee based on the analysis of the information contained in sections IV and V. In it, the Special Committee finds that the Government of Israel persists in its policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories to the detriment of the human rights of the civilian population. The Special Committee has noted recent unequivocal statements by the Prime Minister and other members of the Government of Israel which prove that such a policy exists and that its application is being accelerated. The Special Committee took note of reports concerning the future of the Egyptian territory occupied by Israel in June 1967. Furthermore, the Special Committee considers it most regrettable that the Government of Israel is perpetuating the occupa-tion of the other territories and is intensifying its efforts aimed at their annexation. In these circumstances, the Special Committee feels that the international community is put before its responsibilities more than in previous years and consequently that it should, in the interests of peace and human rights, act to end the military occupation of all the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.

Accept, Sir, on behalf of the members of the Special Committee and on my behalf, the assurances of our highest consideration.

(Signed) BORUT BOHTE (Yugoslavia) Chairman of the

Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices
Affecting the Human Rights of the Population
of the Occupied Territories

His Excellency Mr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General of the United Nations New York

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968.29 By that resolution, the General Assembly decided to establish the Special Committee, composed of three Member States; requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee; requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, to cooperate with it and to facilitate its work; requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter; and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task.

2. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee; Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. The Government of Sri Lanka appointed Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Mr. Borut Bohte, Professor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and Member of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Somalia appointed Mr. A. A. Farah, and subsequently Mr. H. Nur-Elmi, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. On 26 April 1974, the President of the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session informed the Secretary-General that Somalia had decided to withdraw from the Special Committee and that, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), he had appointed Senegal a member of the Special Committee. On 30 April 1974, the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that his Government had appointed Mr. Keba M'Baye, Chief Justice of Senegal (Premier Président de la Cour suprême du Sénégal), as its representative on the Special Committee. On 21 September 1976, the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka

3. On 26 April 1977, the Government of Sri Lanka informed the Secretary-General that it had appointed Mr. I. B. Fonseka, Deputy Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. On 8 July 1977 the Government of Senegal informed the Special Committee that Mr. Keba M'Baye had resigned from the Special Committee and nominated in his stead Mr. Ousmane Goundiam, Procureur général près la Cour suprême, as its representative on the Special Committee.

4. On 20 July 1978, the Government of Sri Lanka informed the Secretary-General that it had appointed Mr. B. J. Fernando, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. By a note verbale dated 28 September 1978, the Government of Sri Lanka designated Mr. K. Breckenridge to attend the meetings of the Special Committee at Geneva from 9 to 13 October 1978.

5. On 5 October 1970, the Special Committee submitted its first report³⁰ in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969. The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 744th to 751st meetings, from 7 to 11 December 1970. On 15 December 1970, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee³¹ and adopted resolulution 2727 (XXV).

6. On 17 September 1971, the Special Committee submitted its second report (A/8389 and Corr. 1 and 2), prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV). On 10 December 1971, the Special Committee sub-

to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe had resigned from the Special Committee upon his election as President of the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. On 18 February 1977, the Government of Sri Lanka informed the Secretary-General that Mr. V. L. B. Mendis, Sri Lanka High Commissioner to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, would serve on the Special Committee at the meetings at Geneva from 22 February to 1 March 1977.

²⁹ Doc. 256 in International Documents on Palestine 1968.

³⁰ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, agenda item 101, document A/8089. [orig. note.]

³¹ Ibid., Annexes, agenda item 101, document A/8237. [orig. note.]

mitted a third report (A/8389/Add. 1 and Add. 1/Corr. 1 and 2) containing information which had become available after the completion of its second report. These reports were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 798th to 803rd meetings, from 13 to 16 December 1971. On 20 December 1971, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Political Committee³² and adopted resolution 2851 (XXVI).

7. On 25 September 1972, the Special Committee submitted its fourth report (A/8828) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV) and 2851 (XXVI). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 849th to 855th meetings, from 30 November to 7 December 1972. On 15 December 1972, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee³³ and adopted resolution 3005 (XXVII).

8. On 15 October 1973, the Special Committee submitted its fifth report (A/9148) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI) and 3005 (XXVII). On 20 November 1973, the Special Committee submitted a supplement to its fifth report (A/9148/Add.1). The report and its supplement were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 890th and 892nd to 897th meetings, from 19 to 26 November 1973. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9237) submitted pursuant to Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII). On 7 December 1973, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee34 and adopted resolutions 3092 A and B (XXVIII).

9. On 25 October 1974, the Special Committee submitted its sixth report (A/9817) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII) and 3092 B (XXVIII). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 927th to 932nd meetings, from 6 to 12 November 1974. In addition, the Special Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9843) submitted pursuant to Assembly resolu-

tion 3092 B (XXVIII). On 29 November 1974, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee³⁵ and adopted resolutions 3240 A to C (XXIX).

10. On 13 October 1975, the Special Committee submitted its seventh report (A/10272) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII) and 3240 A and C (XXIX). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 985th to 991st meetings, from 26 November to 5 December 1975. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/10370) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 3240 A and C (XXIX). On 15 December 1975, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee³⁶ and adopted resolutions 3525 A to D (XXX).

11. On 17 September 1976, the Special Committee submitted its eighth report (A/31/218) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII), 3240 A and C (XXIX), and 3525 A and C (XXX). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at the 17th to 19th, 22nd to 26th and 28th to 32nd meetings of the thirty-first session, from 10 November to 6 December 1976. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the reports of the Secretary-General (A/31/ 235 and Add. 1 and 2 and A/31/302), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 3525 A, C and D (XXX). On 16 December 1976, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 31/106 A to D.37

12. On 17 October 1977, the Special Committee submitted its ninth report (A/32/284) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII), 3240 A and C (XXIX), 3525 A and C (XXX) and 31/106 C and D. The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at the 23rd, 24th, 26th to

³² Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda item 40, document A/8630. [orig. note.]

³³ Ibid., Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 42, document A/8950. [orig. note.]

³⁴ Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes, agenda item 45, document A/9374. [orig. note.]

³⁵ Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 40, document A/9872.

³⁶ Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 52, document A/10461.

³⁷ Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 55, document A/31/399.

34th and 36th meetings of the thirty-second session from 14 to 30 November 1977. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/32/308), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 31/106 C. On 13 December 1977, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 32/91 A to C.38

13. The present report has been prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII), 3240 A and C (XXIX), 3525 A and C (XXX), 31/106 C and D and 32/91 B and C.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

14. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure contained in its first report to the Secretary-General.³⁹

15. The Special Committee held meetings from 13 to 17 March 1978 at Geneva. The Committee elected Mr. Borut Bohte (Yugoslavia) as its Chairman. At these meetings the Committee reviewed its mandate consequent upon the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 32/91 B and C and decided on the organization of its work for the year. It decided to continue its system of monitoring information on the occupied territories and to hold periodic meetings to analyse policies and practices in the occupied territories. It decided, with reference to paragraph 10 of Assembly resolution 32/91 C, to pay special attention to information on treatment of civilians in detention and, for that purpose, decided that individual case histories should be compiled; the special report requested by the General Assembly in that resolution would be included as a distinct part of its main report. The Committee reviewed information on the occupied territories which had become available since 17 October 1977, the date of the adoption of its last report (A/32/284); in that context, it decided that it should be kept informed separately on those situations or incidents which might require its special attention. The Committee examined the arrangements announced by the Israeli authorities concerning visits by delegates

of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to persons in detention. It held consultations with the expert who had been engaged for the purpose of carrying out the survey requested by the General Assembly in resolutions 3525 C (XXX) and 31/106 D, and with a representative of the Syrian Arab Republic on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/91 B. The Committee also examined communications received from Governments and individuals containing information on the situation in the occupied territories. It heard the testimony of Miss Fatma Barnawi, a Palestinian, who had been released after 10 years' imprisonment in the occupied territories. The Committee decided to address itself to the Governments concerned and to persons in the occupied territories whose experience and knowledge of certain facts were considered relevant to its mandate. It decided that the Mayors of Nablus, Hebron, Jericho and Ramallah should be invited to make submissions and possibly to appear before it. In the same context, it decided that paid notices be inserted in the local Israeli and Arab press, recalling the existence of the Special Committee and inviting persons with personal knowledge and experience of events in the occupied territories to communicate with it.

16. On 14 March 1978, letters were sent to the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic and to the Palestine Liberation Organization referring to General Assembly resolution 32/91 C and requesting information relative to the mandate of the Special Committee. Several reports were received from the Governments, from the League of Arab States and from the Palestine Liberation Organization transmitting information on the situation in the occupied territories.

17. On 14 March 1978, a letter was sent to the Secretary-General stating, *inter alia*:

At its series of meetings held at Geneva from 13 to 17 March 1978, the Special Committee examined the above-mentioned resolution of the General Assembly and took note of the statements made by the representatives of Israel.

During these meetings, the Special Committee examined information received by it since 17 October 1977, the date of the adoption of its last report, including information concerning the situation prevailing in the occupied territories in recent weeks.

The Special Committee is of the view that the situation of civilians in the occupied territories continues to give

³⁸ Ibid., Thirty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 57, document A/32/407.

³⁹ Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, agenda item 101, document A/8089, annex III.

cause for concern. This applies also to those civilians who are in detention. Information reaching the Special Committee indicates that treatment of detainees, in spite of recent changes, regarding the arrangements for visits by delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross, remains serious. The Special Committee feels similar anxiety regarding other civilians not in detention, who are now in their twelfth year of military occupation or forced exile from their homes.

In this context, the Special Committee considers that it would be appropriate, in spite of the statement made by the representatives of Israel at the last session of the General Assembly, to attempt once again to obtain the co-operation of the Government of Israel to enable the Special Committee to visit the occupied territories to carry out an on-the-spot investigation.

18. On 6 April 1978, the Secretary-General informed the Special Committee that the Israeli Mission to the United Nations had reaffirmed that its position remained unchanged.

19. On 23 March 1978, the Special Committee addressed the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva in connexion with the implementation of resolution 32/9140 as follows:

The Chairman of the Special Committee wishes to express his appreciation for the kind co-operation extended by his Excellency during the exchange of views that took place on 16 March 1978 at the 231st meeting of the Special Committee.

At that meeting it was indicated to his Excellency that, prior to proceeding to the survey requested by the General Assembly, the Special Committee would need to have a clear definition of those aspects of the destruction of Quneitra that have yet to be assessed in accordance with operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the above-mentioned resolution. The Special Committee is of the view that, as a first step towards this definition it would be useful to receive from his Excellency's Government a statement of the nature, extent and value of those aspects of the damage to Quneitra that are still deemed as requiring survey.

20. The Special Committee held a second series of meetings at United Nations Headquarters, New York, from 5 to 9 June 1978. At these meetings the Committee reviewed information that had become available since its March meetings and examined a number of communications received from Governments and private sources. It examined a number of cases of alleged ill-

treatment of detainees. It also heard the testimony of Mr. Issa Askar. It decided to follow up certain cases that had been brought to its attention and to request additional information on a number of allegations contained in communications received by it. It examined the information received from the Mayors of the occupied territories. The Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah were away from the occupied territories and the Mayors of Hebron and Jericho informed the Committee that they could not appear before it abroad but were prepared to testify in the occupied territory. On 30 June 1978 the Committee sent the following letter to the four mayors:

In spite of repeated efforts, the Special Committee does not have access to the occupied territories, the Government of Israel reconfirmed its refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee most recently on 6 April 1978. It, therefore, remains necessary for the Special Committee to inform itself in the best manner possible of the situation persisting in the occupied territories; it feels that persons holding public office such as yourself could communicate information on the situation in the occupied territories which would be useful to the Special Committee in the execution of its mandate. For these reasons, the Special Committee decided that its invitation to you should remain open.

The Special Committee, in applying its mandate, recognizes the military occupation as a temporary situation. It considers as its mandate the safeguarding of the human rights of the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territories both as individuals and as a community. It, therefore, follows developments affecting the safety and well-being of their person and property in an effort to protect them until such time as the military occupation comes to an end. The Special Committee realizes the difficulties that surround the situation caused by the Israeli occupation of your area, by the lack of co-operation by the Government of Israel with the Special Committee and by its refusal to allow it access to and freedom to operate in occupied territories. In spite of this it has been the wish of the General Assembly of the United Nations that the Special Committee continue with its work to follow the situation in the occupied territories and to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

In this context, the Special Committee would be interested in receiving information not only on the general situation prevailing in your area but also information on specific events and situations as, for example, the recent developments taking place in your area. In addition the Special Committee would be interested in receiving information on the treatment of civilians including the reaction of Israeli military personnel to

⁴⁰ Doc. 27 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

manifestations against military occupation, prison conditions, and trials of persons from your region. The Special Committee would also benefit from receiving information on any situation that develops affecting the civilian population.

This information could be communicated by yoursell orally, or in writing or by a person or persons on your behalf.

The Special Committee wishes to reassure you that the situation of the civilians in the occupied territories remains the subject of its attention and that it shall continue to do its utmost to ensure to the extent possible the protection of their rights until the end of the military occupation.

- 21. The Special Committee held a third series of meetings from 9 to 13 October 1978 at Geneva. At these meetings it reviewed information that had become available since its June meetings. It examined a number of cases of alleged ill-treatment of detainees and a number of reports on conditions in Israeli prisons. It viewed unedited films shot in the occupied territories relating to its mandate. It also examined information received in response to its requests for additional information on cases examined by it at its June meetings.
- 22. The Special Committee met again at United Nations Headquarters from 6 to 10 November 1978. At these meetings the Special Committee reviewed information on the occupied territories that had become available since its October meetings and heard the testimony of Mr. Abed El Assaly who had been invited by the Committee to appear before it. The Committee considered and adopted its report to the Secretary-General as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 32/91 C.⁴¹

III. MANDATE

- 23. The General Assembly, in its resolution 2443 (XXIII) entitled "Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories", decided to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States.
- 24. The mandate of the Special Committee, as set out in the above resolution, was to "investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories".

⁴¹ Doc. 27 in *ibid*.

- 25. In interpreting its mandate, the Special Committee determined, in its first report, that:
- (a) The territories to be considered as occupied territories referred to the areas under Israeli occupation, namely, the Golan Heights, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Following the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces of 18 January 1974 and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974, the demarcation of the areas under occupation were altered as indicated in the maps attached to those agreements;
- (b) The persons covered by resolution 2443 (XXIII) and therefore the subject of the investigation of the Special Committee were the civilian population residing in the areas occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 and those persons normally resident in the areas that were under occupation but who had left those areas because of the hostilities. However, the Committee noted that resolution 2443 (XXIII) referred to the "population", without any qualification as to any segment of the inhabitants in the occupied territories;
- (c) The "human rights" of the population of the occupied territories consisted of two elements, namely, those rights which the Security Council referred to as "essential and inalienable human rights" in its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and, secondly, those rights which found their basis in the protection afforded by international law in particular circumstances such as occupation and, in the case of prisoners of war, capture. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII), the Special Committee was also required to investigate allegations concerning the exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories; the pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories; and the interference in the freedom of worship in the Holy Places of the occupied territories;
- (d) The "policies" and "practices" affecting human rights that came within the scope of investigation by the Special Committee referred, in the case of "policies", to any course of action consciously adopted and pursued by the Government of Israel as part of its declared or undeclared intent; while "practices" referred to those actions which, irrespective of whether or not they were in

implementation of a policy, reflected a pattern of behaviour on the part of the Israeli authorities towards the Arab population of the occupied areas.

- 26. Since its inception the Special Committee has relied on the following international instruments in interpreting and carrying out its mandate:
 - (a) The Charter of the United Nations;
- $\langle b \rangle$ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- (c) The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;⁴²
- (d) The Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949;⁴³
- (e) The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, of 14 May 1954;⁴⁴
- (f) The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.⁴⁵
- 27. The Special Committee has also relied on those resolutions relevant to the situation of civilians in the occupied territories adopted by United Nations organs, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights, as well as the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization and the International Labour Organization.

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

28. In this section, the Special Committee gives a breakdown of the information received by it from 17 October 1977 to the date of the adoption of the present report. It constitutes evidence of policies and practices followed by the Government of Israel in the occupied territories. Though by no means exhaustive, it extends over the entire period covered by the report and is a representative cross-section of the information received by the

⁴² United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287. [orig. note.]

43 Ibid., No. 972, p. 135. [orig. note.].
 44 Ibid., vol. 249, No. 3511, p. 215. [orig. note.]

⁴⁵ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915). [orig. note.]

- Special Committee. The main purpose of this section is to reflect, as completely as possible, the reality facing the civilian population of the occupied territories.
- 29. The Special Committee has continued to monitor events in the occupied territories in the best available manner in the absence of the cooperation of the Government of Israel. It has done so by:
- (a) Hearing the testimony of persons with first-hand knowledge of the situation of civilians in the occupied territories;
- (b) Examining reports in the Israeli press of pronouncements by responsible persons in the Israeli Government;
- (c) Following reports appearing in other news media, including the Arab language press and other sectors of the international press;
- (d) Examining reports submitted to it by Governments and non-governmental bodies on the situation in the occupied territories;
- (e) Viewing unedited film material of events in the occupied territories.
- 30. The Special Committee heard the testimony of Miss Fatma Barnawi during its meetings from 13 to 17 March 1978 (reproduced as documents A/AC.145/RT.94, 95 and 96). During its meetings from 5 to 9 June 1978, the Committee heard the testimony of Mr. Issa Askar (reproduced as document A/AC.145/RT.97). During its meetings from 6 to 10 November 1978 the Committee heard the testimony of Mr. El Assaly (reproduced as documents A/AC.145/RT.246, 247, 248 and 251).
- 31. In addition, the Special Committee received reports from the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic containing information on the situation in the occupied territories. It also received reports from the Womens International Democratic Federation, the Committee for the Defence of Palestinian Human Rights under Israeli occupation and from several individuals in the occupied territories and in other areas. The Committee took note of several expressions of concern that reached it on various aspects of the situation of the civilians of the occupied territories, in particular the plight of persons held in prison.
- 32. In the following paragraphs, the Special Committee gives examples of the kind of information that it has received and which, in its view,

constitutes relevant evidence illustrative of the policies and practices followed by Israel in the occupied territories. In general it may be stated that this evidence can be classified under two categories:

- (a) That which relates to the policies and practices followed by the Government of Israel with regard to the occupied territories as such;
- (b) That which concerns the situation of the civilians in the occupied territories as a result of the state of military occupation.
- 33. As regards the policies and practices with regard to the occupied territories, this evidence consists of a number of statements by members of the Government of Israel and by other persons in responsible positions which, together, reflect the Government's policies. In the same context, this evidence is supplemented by information reflecting the activities and measures undertaken to implement these policies.
- 34. As regards the information concerning the situation of the civilians as a result of the occupation, this consists of reports of incidents that have occurred in the occupied territories during the period covered by the present report, and arrests of groups of civilians, their trials and, where applicable, their releases.
- 35. The information received by the Special Committee relevant to the treatment of civilians who are under detention and information describing prison conditions in general are covered in the special report appearing in section V below.
- 36. The information is assessed in section VI below, where the Special Committee formulates the conclusions reached by it based on the analysis contained in the present section.
- A. Evidence relating to policies and practices followed by the Government of Israel with regard to the occupied territories.
- 37. The information reproduced in the following paragraphs is given in the form of summarized versions of the reports cited:
- 38. The Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Sharon, stated that priority would be given to the development of established settlements rather than to the creation of new settlements. (*Jerusalem Post*, 11 November 1977)
- 39. Mr. Sharon told the press on 28 November 1977 that about one fifth of the Agriculture Ministry's development budget for the coming fiscal

year would be used for the establishment of new settlements. (*Jerusalem Post*, 29 November 1977)

- 40. Mr. Tzipori, Deputy Minister of Defence, said that top priority was given to the Golan in the Government's budget, and that two new settlements were to be established shortly. (*Ma'ariv*, 20 December 1977)
- 41. Plans to double the population of the settlements in and around the Rafah area were announced on 2 January 1978 at a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive by Mr. Ra'anan Weitz, head of the Agency's Settlement Department. (Jerusalem Post, 3 January 1978; Asha'b, 4 January 1978)
- 42. The World Zionist Organization presented a plan to the Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon, calling for 510 new families to settle in the Rafah Salient, both in existing settlements and in new ones. (Jerusalem Post, 9 January 1978)
- 43. The Jewish Agency's Settlement Department, dealing with establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories, submitted a plan providing for the creation of 57 new settlements to the Twenty-ninth Zionist Congress; the settlements are to be created within the next four years, including some in the occupied territories. In addition, another plan is being elaborated for the creation of 14 new settlements in the Jordan Valley. (*Ha'aretz*, 20 and 27 February 1978)
- 44. Mr. Weizman, Minister of Defence, expressed support for the creation of civilian centres with tens of thousands of inhabitants in each, as distinct from settlements with a population of several dozen families or less. Mr. Weizman was quoted as being in favour of strengthening and thickening the following settlements: Gi'von (north-east of Jerusalem), which should have a population of 5,000 families; Maaleh-Adumim (east of Jerusalem), with 7,000 families; and the Etzion bloc (south of Jerusalem), with 8,000 families. According to the report, Mr. Weizman was of the view that other big urban centres should be created on the northern West Bank, namely: Haris, with 14,000 families; Karney-Shomron, with 2,000 families; and Naby-Saleh, with 2,000 families. All three are located west of Nablus. According to Mr. Weizman "the creation of big urban centres such as these could ward off political difficulties, since the sites have been approved by the Government, and civil nuclei already live there". (Ha'aretz, 13 March 1978)

- 45. Mr. Sharon, speaking as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, said it "intends to spend 180 million Israel pounds, a third of the settlement budget, on new sites in Judea and Samaria". (*Jerusalem Post*, 6 March 1978)
- 46. The World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the Jewish Agency asked for a greater voice in the Government's decisions on where to build new settlements. According to WZO, "the final decision must continue to be the responsibility of the Government, but its partners must be seriously consulted and not just expected to implement cabinet decisions". "The Jewish Agency is currently responsible for carrying out settlement policy within the 'green line', and WZO for settlement in the Administered Territories. Their representatives sit jointly with the Government's settlement officials in a special committee, with each partner sending 10 members". (Jerusalem Post, 15 March 1978)
- 47. The Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Sharon, announced, during a statement to settlers in Ofra, that 30 settlements were to be established in 1978 "throughout the country". The Minister referred to progress achieved in the implementation of the settlement policy and quoted the examples of Sanur, where settlers now lived, Shomron, near Sebastia, currently housing 40 families; Kaddum, which had remained an illegal settlement for so long and which now had 64 housing units with an additional 70 under construction, the new settlements at Karney-Shomron and Haris, where 200 flats were under construction, Tapuah, which was ready to receive new settlers, and Beit-El, where the ground had been prepared for the establishment of a permanent settlement. In addition, Mr. Sharon disclosed that a new settlement, called Maaleh-Nahal, had been established at Silat-Ad-Dhahr. The choice of the location of this settlement, according to Mr. Sharon, was determined by reasons of State security. Mr. Sharon referred briefly to a recent phenomenon, of an influx of Bedouins from the Mt. Hebron area and the coastal plain in Sinai. who squatted on lands earmarked for settlement. and said that this had reached a level of thousands of people—"we evacuate them" he said. (Ma'ariv. 29 June 1978)
- 48. The Ministerial Committee on Settlement received a plan giving details of settlement in the

- Jordan Valley. The plan includes the construction of a water-way from the "Sea of Galilee to the southern Jordan Valley and the construction of a road from northern Jerusalem, running parallel to the hills of Samaria". The plan involves the creation of 33 settlements in four years on the eastern side of the Samaria hills, at a cost of approximately one third of a billion dollars (£I 5 billion). (Al Hamishmar, 6 July 1978)
- 49. The Gush-Emunim movement had published a master plan to increase the number of Jewish settlers on the West Bank to 100,000 during the next three years; it proposed the establishment of 32 new settlements and the expansion of the existing ones to create the nucleus for the settlement of 750,000 Jews by the turn of the century. The plan was delivered to Government Ministers from whom support for the plan's implementation was expected. A spokesman for the Chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, Mr. Sharon, commented that the Minister was not likely to have anything to say on the plan since "The Minister had his own (plan) and that is what is being implemented". The report gave details of the long-range Gush-Emunim plan which envisaged the creation of two cities (in Kiryat-Arba and in the Haris area), four towns placed in the north, centre and south of the West Bank, 20 suburban quarters around Jerusalem, and 25 clusters of villages. The plan was presented to the Prime Minister on 10 July 1978. (Jerusalem Post, 7 and 11 July 1978)
- 50. The heads of the Settlement Department addressed a letter to the Ministers of Finance, Housing and Agriculture requesting a \$38 million (£I 700 million) supplement to the budget for the establishment of settlements on either side of the 1949 cease-fire line; without such a supplement the decisions of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement could not be executed. In the existing budget approximately \$0.6 billion (£I 2.5 billion) were earmarked for new settlements and the extension of existing ones. Additional allocations had been made from the budget of the Housing Ministry, \$40 million (£I 830 million) and \$30 million (£I 600 million) from the Ministry of Agriculture. Over \$2 million (£I 37 million) of the reserve budget had been allocated to the Yamit area settlements. (Al Hamishmar, 12 July 1978)
- 51. Mr. R. Weitz, Head of the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization, acting

in his personal capacity, presented a master plan to Mr. Begin which envisaged the establishment of a Palestinian Arab State in Judea and Samaria and gave details on its proposed materialization. Mr. Weitz laid down the following conditions for the acceptability of a Palestinian State on the West Bank: the increase of Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley from 21 to 38 in five years; the doubling of the Rafah area settlements by 1983 from 13 to 27; the creation of 102 rural settlements with 9,900 families (nearly half to be inside the occupied territories) within five years; and the increase of the urban population in 30 selected areas such as Jerusalem and in 13 "development towns" in special need of strengthening. (Jerusalem Post, 27 August 1978)

- 52. Mr. Sharon, the Minister of Agriculture, stated during his tour of Israeli settlements on the West Bank, that the Government's "Settlement Programme" was "not to touch the large Arab concentrations but to establish Jewish populated strips" between the Mediterranean and Jordan and to encircle Jerusalem with Jewish settlements in order "to ensure Jerusalem's Jewishness even at the expense of the development of Jerusalem". Mr. Sharon considered this vital "since some 40,000 Arabs have moved from rural areas in Judea and Samaria to East Jerusalem and its region". (Jerusalem Post, 8 August 1978; Ma'ariv, 8 August 1978)
- 53. Mr. Begin stated at a meeting with members of the "Ein-Vered" Group (members of collective agricultural settlements affiliated to the Labour Party, who are partisans of settling "in all parts of Israel") that diplomatic moves would not halt settlement, but that the timing of settlement would be decided by the Government at its discretion. (Ha'aretz, 31 August 1978; Jerusalem Post, 31 August 1978)
- 54. The Foreign Minister, Mr. M. Dayan, stated on 25 September 1978 that "there wasn't even the slightest fear that this Government would agree to remove even one settlement from Judea and Samaria or from the Gaza District". (*Ha'aretz*, 26 September 1978)
- 55. Mr. Sharon announced on 5 October 1978 that the Government was to start setting up more settlements in the Jordan Valley once the three-month period following the signature of the Camp David accords was over. Mr. Sharon stressed that the Jordan Valley settlements would not be evacuated and said he had no doubt that Jews

would not be under Arab sovereignty. He promised that the Government would start creating new settlements, in addition to expanding and consolidating the existing ones, and that the budget for the consolidation of the Jewish settlement in the Jordan Valley would be increased. (Ma'ariv, 6 October 1978)

- 56. In the course of the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Dayan, stated on 9 October 1978; "The Israeli settlements in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district are there as of right. It is inconceivable to us that Jews should be prohibited from settling and living in Judaea and Samaria, which are the heart of our homeland." (A/33/PV. 26, p. 42)
- 57. The Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, stated on 31 October 1978 that "the Jewish people's right to settle in all parts of the land of Israel is inalienable. This right has been carried out in the past, and will be in the future". (Jerusalem Post, 31 October 1978)
- B. Evidence reflecting the activities and measures undertaken to implement the policies and practices of the Government of Israel with regard to the occupied territories.
- 58. The settlement of Kassrout was established in the Latroun area, near the site of the village of Emmaus (totally demolished in July 1967), El Mandrasa. (*Asha'b*, 10 October 1977)
- 59. On 9 November 1977, the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, headed by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Sharon, approved the construction of a "cross-Samaria axis", to link the Dan Bloc to Maaleh-Efraim and to expand the regional centre of the Etzion bloc. (*Ha'aretz*, 10 November 1977)
- 60. It was reported that the Ministries of Agriculture, Construction and Housing, and Industry, Commerce and Tourism were to move offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. (*Jerusalem Post*, 24 November 1977)
- 61. On l December 1977, two groups of Israeli settlers moved into two Israeli army camps on the West Bank; Beit Horon and Gi'von. Beit Horon settlement is situated on the lands of the village of Beit-Hour El Fawqi. Most of the settlers are employed by the military industries (Israel Aircraft Industries and El Al). Gi'von settlement

is situated on the lands of the village of Al-Jib. The families were expected to settle within the next three weeks, and a kindergarten was to be opened after the Hanukka holidays (in January). The two settlements were peopled by new immigrants from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and had been established in implementation of a government decision taken two months ago-after an arrangement between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Agriculture and the leaders of the "Emunim bloc" allowing the Gush Emunim to set up several settlements in army camps, on the West Bank, within the limit of the current fiscal year. (Ha'aretz' 1-2 December 1977; Ferusalem Post, 2 December 1977; Al Ouds. 2 December 1977; Yediot Aharonot, 1 December 1977; Al-Hamishmar, 2 December 1977)

- 62. The settlement of Kfar Ruth was inaugurated on 11 December 1977 by a ceremony on a hilltop near the site where the settlers were living. Kfar Ruth was a moshav (semi-co-operative settlement), established in the former no man's land between Israel and Jordan. The settlers would grow flowers and vegetables for export. The settlement was part of a plan approved by the former Government. (Davar, 11 December 1977; Jerusalem Post, 12 December 1977)
- 63. Seven Arab families were evicted from the Latrun area, with their flocks, in order to "safeguard the natural surroundings". (Al Fajr, 15 December 1977)
- 64. The settlers of Karney-Shomron moved, during the first week of January 1978, to their permanent camp, south of Alon-Moreh. (*Ha'aretz*, 3–6 January 1978)
- 65. On 19 January 1978, Housing Ministry workers started preparing an area east of Qaddum to set up 60 prefabricated houses by April 1978. Workers of the Public Works Department started building a road to Qaddum. (*Ma'ariv*, 15 January 1978)
- 66. A group of immigrants from France (30 families) had been authorized to settle beyond the "green line" in an area called Rotem, near Fatzael in the Jordan Valley. (*Ma'ariv*, 20 January 1978)
- 67. During the first week of January 1978, two groups of settlers moved into a new Nahal outpost called Sal'it. The settlement was planned to become a civilian co-operative village (based on growing flowers for export and creating elec-

tronics, and plastic industries). (Ma'ariv, 25 January 1978)

- 68. A ceremony for the inauguration of Katzrin was held on 23 January 1978. It was attended by several official Israeli personalities, among them the Minister of Housing and Construction, Mr. Gideon Pat, who stated: "The Golan Heights is today a *de facto* part of Israel, and one day it will also be recognized *de jure* as such", and by the new "Joint Committee" of the Golan Heights. Katzrin was planned to be a "major settlement on the Golan... (whose) industry and services will play a role in the daily life of Galilee as well". (*Ha'aretz*, 22–24 January 1978; *Jerusalem Post*, 24 January 1978)
- 69. A settlers' group moved on 15 February 1978 into its new settlement site on the Nablus-Qalqilya road. According to a Defence Ministry source "17 or 18 families moved from camp Kaddum, where they had been living since October 1977". (*Jerusalem Post*, 12–16 February 1978).
- 70. A group of 20 Gush-Emunim settlers moved to Haris settlement (situated east of Mes'ha, some 15 kilometres beyond the 1949 armistice line) at the beginning of February 1978. This advance group was preparing the infrastructure for the permanent settlement. (*Jerusalem Post*, 2–9 and 10 February 1978; *Ha'aretz*, 13 February 1978)
- 71. Two hundred housing units were under construction at Ofira, the Israeli settlement on the southern tip of the Sinai peninsula, in addition to the 300 already completed. A decision had been taken to construct a further 100 units after the 200 were completed. (*Ma'ariv*, 13 April 1978)
- 72. Sources in the Prime Minister's office had confirmed that the operational decisions with regard to the creation of settlements in the territories had been transferred, since 16 April 1978, from the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, headed by Mr. Sharon, to the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs, headed by the Prime Minister. These "operational decisions" included the date of settling and the enlargement of existing settlements. (Ha'aretz, 19, 20 and 21 April 1978; Jerusalem Post, 20 April 1978)
- 73. A provisional settlement, situated in the Tulkarem area, was officially inaugurated by the Minister of Education and Culture, Mr. Hammer, on 25 April 1978. It was defined by the Government as a military outpost and not as a civilian settlement. (The *Ha'aretz* correspondent comments

that in fact it was built as a civilian settlement to all intents and purposes, for the place is not attached to any army camp.) The present site was temporary; the permanent site was situated nearby on the two hills known as Abu Kornein (the two horns) which gave the settlement its name. (Ma'ariv, 26 April 1978; Asha'b, 26 April 1978; Ha'aretz, 26 April 1978; Jerusalem Post, 24 April 1978)

74. Land preparation works started at Tapuah settlement in the Northern West Bank, situated 12 kilometres south of Nablus, on the Nablus-Ramallah road. According to one report in *Ha'aretz*, "the military outpost of Tapuah, in Samaria, is to become civilian at the end of this month or the beginning of next month". (*Ha'aretz*, 16 May 1978; *Jerusalem Post*, 16 May 1978; *Ha'aretz*, 15 and 16 May 1978; *Asha'b*, 17 and 22 May 1978)

75. According to the Jerusalem Post "civilian contractors have started to prepare an interim settlement site for the Gush Emunim's Beit-El settlement nucleus, outside the army camp in which they now live", and the site has been levelled and prefabricated houses have been brought to it. (Jerusalem Post, 12 May 1978)

76. Fourteen enterprises with 137 workers are already operating in the new industrial zone of Maaleh Adumim (half way between Jerusalem and Jericho). The number of workers is to reach between six and seven hundred within the next six months, according to Mr. Hurvitz, the Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism. Until now about £I 50 million has been invested in the zone by the Jerusalem Economic Corporation which is planning to invest a further £I 40 million during the current fiscal year. Of the 2,400 dunams in the settlement area, 530 already have factories built on them. (Jerusalem Post, 23 May 1978; Asha'b, 23 May 1978)

77. Nine hundred and fifty prefabricated houses have been ordered by the Israeli Government for the use of the West Bank settlements. (*Asha'b*, 17 May 1978)

78. The Ministry of Housing and Construction budget £I 80 million (\$4 million) on provisional construction in new settlements of the northern region of the West Bank from a global provision of £I 170 million (\$8.5 million) earmarked for settlements. £I 53 million (approximately \$2.5 million) is to be spent by the Zionist Federation

Settlement Department on procuring settlers for the settlements at Salit, Reyhan and Tapuah. The rest of the budget is to be spent on maintenance of the outposts established in the Rafah Salient. (*Ha'aretz*, 6 June 1978)

79. Three hundred and twenty housing units of various sizes are under construction in new settlements in the northern region of the West Bank. This statement is attributed to "settlement sources". These units are destined for the settlements of Qaddum (70 units), Tekoa (20 units), Beit-Horon (45 units), Sanur (45 units), Beit-El (45 units), Tapuah (5 units), and Nabey-Saleh (45 units). (Ma'ariv, 13 June 1978)

80. According to another report the budget for the establishment of new settlements forms part of the development budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and totals £I 415 million (\$20.7 million), the budget for new settlements is divided as follows; Golan Heights—£I 81 million (\$4 million); Jordan Valley—£I 69 million (\$3.4 million); Rafah Approaches (Gaza Strip)—£I 95 million (\$4.7 million); and £I 28 million (\$1 million) in "ground works". (Al Hamishmar, 13 June 1978).

81. Two hundred and fifty acres of land, seized in 1976 for security purposes, form part of an area currently being prepared for the establishment of a new settlement called Yafit, located in the central area of the Jordan Valley, near the settlement of Argaman. (Al Hamishmar, 13 June 1978)

82. The Chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, Mr. Sharon, announced on 3 July 1978 that the first stage of the Government's plan for settling Jews on the northern West Bank had been completed and the Government was moving to double the Jewish population there to 1,000 families within a year. The present Government had established 15 settlements on the West Bank in addition to those established under the previous Government. The Minister was speaking at the settlement of Karney-Shomron where, according to the Minister, 100 housing units were to be added to the existing 38. The second stage of the settlement plan's implementation should be achieved smoothly and he expected little trouble when the third stage was implemented, i.e., when the settlers moved to permanent sites. According to the Minister the settlements had been located "partly to out-flank the 300,000 Arabs who straddle the former armistice line"

near Netanya and Tulkarm. In addition to the strip of settlements stretching from North to South in Samaria, other settlements had been established along planned East-West routes: one route existed from Peta-Tikva, through Elkana (the new name of the settlement at Mash'a), Haris and Tapuah to Maaleh-Efraim, and a second route from the Hadera region through the settlements at Sanur and Maaleh-Nahal (formerly known as Silat-E-Dahar) to the northern part of the Jordan Rift. The Minister added that 120 families were to move into the Haris settlement by September and another 80 families by December. (*Jerusalem Post*, 4 July 1978; *Al Hamishmar*, 4 July 1978; *Al Quds*, 4 July 1978)

83. The Ministerial Committee on Settlement had approved the establishment of a town in the Maaleh-Adumin area, 11 kilometres from the centre of Jerusalem. The permanent site for the settlement was also chosen 4 kilometres east of the present location. The Housing Ministry had approved 5,000 housing units and preparation for the work was to get under way by November with construction of the first 1,000 flats starting during the first half of 1979. The new town was to be built on land expropriated in 1974 after a Government decision to establish an industrial zone there. (*Ha'aretz*, 6 July 1978)

84. With reference to the case of Mohammed Burkan, it was reported that the High Court of Justice had dismissed the petition by Mr. Burkan to allow him to purchase an apartment in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. Mr. Burkan and his family had been evicted from the site some years earlier and he had applied to purchase an apartment on his expropriated property. In dismissing the petition, the Court emphasized that restricting the Jewish Quarter to Jews did not constitute prejudice; any discrimination against Jordanian citizens is "legitimate and justified by political and security considerations in view of the atrocities perpetrated by Jordan in the Old City between 1948 and 1967". (Jerusalem Post, 5 and 7 July 1978; Ha'aretz, 18 July 1978)

85. The first settlers were to arrive in Maaleh-Efraim (mid-way between the north shore of the Dead Sea and the Sea of Galilee, 30 kilometres north of Jericho) on 12 July 1978. Five hundred housing units had been prepared and 75 were under construction. The settlement would have

2,000 flats in its final stage. In addition, a number of public buildings had also been completed. Maaleh-Efraim was to develop into an urban centre to provide services to the entire Jordan Valley area. (*Ma'ariv*, 9 July 1978; *Jerusalem Post*, 13 July 1978; *Ha'aretz*, 13 July 1978, *Davar*, 13 July 1978; *Zu Haderekh*, 19 July 1978, *Al Quds* 13 July 1978)

86. In January 1978, the Government decided that the Haris settlement, south-west of Nablus, currently a military camp, should become the biggest city in the area, with 50,000 inhabitants and covering an area of 5,000 dunams (500 square kilometres). Work was being carried out simultaneously on both temporary and permanent construction, including a three-storey school on the permanent site, and 80 units had been completed while 40 others remained under construction. The first 47 settlers' families, members of a Gush-Emunim nucleus of new immigrants from the USSR, had recently taken over permanent houses, although it was expected that the families would number 200 in the near future. (Ma'ariv, 8 August 1978; Jerusalem Post, 8 August 1978; Davar, 17 August 1978; Ha'aretz, 17 August 1978; Jerusalem Post, 17 and 18 August 1978; Ha'aretz, 18 August 1978; Asha'b, 18 August 1978).

87. The dedication ceremony for the Kibbutz Ortal, in the Golan Heights, was held on 4 September 1978. (Jerusalem Post, 5 September 1978)

88. According to another report, a new settlement was to be established in the Golan Heights during the three-month settlement freeze pledged by Mr. Begin. During the following week the Government was to start strengthening settlements on the West Bank, "since the undertaking to avoid settlement related only to new settlements". The report quotes the Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, as stating that "it must be made clear that Israel would act vigorously to strengthen settlements in Judea and Samaria as well as in the Golan Heights". Only by expanding the existing settlements and maintaining the Israeli military presence agreed upon in the Camp David talks. would Israel be able to ensure a "strong grasp" of those areas. (Ma'ariv, 27 September 1978)

- C. Evidence relating to the day-to-day situation of the civilians in the occupied territories.
- 89. Reproduced below is a representative crosssection of reports of incidents occuring in the

occupied territories during the period covered by this report, showing the date, place and type of incident, and giving the source of the reports in chronological order (table 1). This is followed by a cross-section of reports of arrests of groups of 10 or more civilians and of trials and releases (tables 2-5). The Special Committee has followed information on arrests, trials and releases of civilians as reported in the press. It is in possession of detailed lists of such reports; however for the purposes of this report, the Special Committee has limited itself to information of arrests of groups of 10 or more civilians and to tables showing frequency of trials and releases. The terminology used in the following tables is that found in the press reports and does not necessarily

reflect the views of the Special Committee.46

90. In view of the conclusion reached by the Special Committee in its previous reports that the military occupation constitutes in itself a violation of the human rights of the civilians of the occupied territories, it considers that information on incidents (and their reprecussions) directly attributable to the military occupation would be relevant to an examination of the human rights of the civilian population.

91. The reports listed below are descriptive of the current situation of the human rights of the civilian population. The Special Committee gives its evaluation of their effect on these human rights in section VI below.

Table 1. Representative cross-section of reports of incidents

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
14 September 1977	Nablus	Explosive charge went off in the town's main square. Border guards arriving at the square were stoned by youths	M. 15 September 1977
11 September 1977	Nablus	Two molotov cocktails thrown at the guard's hut of the old Military Government building, opposite the Town Hall	M. 15 September 1977
3 October 1977	Jerusalem	Bomb explosion at the central bus station	JP. 3 October 1977
5 October 1977	Silwad	Riot of Arab students against the settlement policy	JP. 6 October 1977
8 October 1977	Jerusalem	Grenade explosion at the Baptist church	JP. 11 October 1977
15 October 1977	Old City of Jerusalem	Two bomb explosions	JP. 16 October 1977 IT

⁴⁶ The following abbreviations of names of newspapers are used in the tables hereunder.

M. MA'ARIV

H. HA'ARETZ

JP. JERUSALEM POST

ASH. ASHA'B

ALQ. AL QUDS

AFP. Agence France Presse ITIM. Israel news service

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
2 November 1977	Nablus	Partial business strike, pupils' demonstrations, leaflets (signed by FATH) distributed, calling for protest against new settle- ments and annexation of the territories	H. 3 November 1977
2 November 1977	Ramallah	Partial school strike	H. 3 November 1977
2 November 1977	Bir-Zeit	Partial strike at the Bir-Zeit College	H. 3 November 1977
4 November 1977	Jerusalem	Bomb explosion in an Egged bus	JP. 6 November 1977
4 November 1977	Jerusalem	Bomb explosion near soldiers' hitchhiking station on the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road	JP. 6 November 1977
11 November 1977	Nablus	Hand grenade thrown at an Army patrol circulating in the town's main street dur- ing the night	M. 13 November 1977 Le Monde, 12 November 1977
13 November 1977	Jerusalem (Christian quarter)	Bomb explosion blew out floor of a house	JP. 14 November 1977
13 November 1977	Near the village of Idna, west of Hebron-El-Khalil	Egged bus ambushed and shot at	JP. 14 November 1977 H. 14 November 1977
17 November 1977	Nablus	Students marched in the streets during class-hours singing anti-President Sadat songs	M. 18 November 1977
3 December 1977	Jerusalem (David Street, Old City)	Bomb explosion	Le Monde, 6 December 1977 AFP.
3 December 1977	Nablus	Violent student demonstrations and riots	M. 4 December 1977 H. 4 December 1977
11 December 1977	Nablus	Leaflets calling for a strike on 14 December 1977 distributed	Davar, 12 December 1977
14 December 1977	Bir-Zeit	Student demonstration following a call for a general strike	H. 15 December 1977
14 December 1977	Nablus	School disturbances-15 arrests	H. 15 December 1977
18 December 1977	Jerusalem (Bethlehem road)	Grenade explosion	JP. 19 December 1977
24 December 1977	Bethlehem (in Manger Square near the Church of the Nativity)	Explosion of a hand-grenade	JP. 25 December 1977 Yediot Aharonot, 25 December 1977

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Type	Sources
25 December 1977	Jerusalem (Keren Kayemet Street)	Bomb explosion	Yediot Aharonot, 26 December 1977
26 December 1977	Ramallah area	Murder of Hamdi El-Kadi, 40 (from Houssan village, near Bethlehem), Deputy Director of the Education Office of Ramallah	JP. 27 December 1977 Davar, 27 December 1977 Yediot Aharonot, 27 December 1977 H. 27 December 1977 M. 27 December 1977
"several weeks earlier"	Ramallah area	Murder of Selim Jamil, 23	H. 27 December 1977
25 December 1977	Jerusalem (outside the Rehavia high school)	Explosive charge went off	JP. 2 January 1978 <i>Yediot Aharonot</i> 2 January 1978
27 December 1977	Jerusalem (Santadriya quarter)	Bomb explosion in an Egged bus	JP. 2 January 1978 Yediot Aharnot, 2 January 1978
31 December 1977	Bethlehem	Explosive charge went off outside the local courthouse	JP. 2 January 1978 Yediot Aharonot, 2 January 1978
1 January 1978	Jerusalem (near King David Hotel)	Explosive charge defused before explosion	JP. 2 January 1978 Yediot Aharonot, 2 January 1978
2 January 1978	Hebron-El-Khalil	Explosive charge went off near a taxi station	H. 3 January 1978
4 January 1978	East Jerusalem	Small bomb discovered outside of Bank Hapoalim, in A-Zahara Street	JP. 5 January 1978
7 January 1978	Nablus (near the Balata refugee camp)	Border police patrol attacked by a group of rioters	M. 8 January 1978
7 January 1978	Nablus	Tourist coach stoned by rioters	M. 8 January 1978
7 January 1978	Ramallah (Teacher's training school)	Student demonstration against President Sadat's peace initiative	Yediot Aharonot, 8 January 1978
		The Teacher's training school was closed for 21 days by the Israeli authorities following these incidents	
8 January 1978	Jerusalem	Hand-grenade explosion in bus terminus	ASH. 9 January 1978 JP. 9 January 1978 ALQ. 9 January 1978
9 January 1978	Jerusalem (Neve Yaacov quarter)	Bomb defused	JP. 10 January 1978 ALQ. 10 January 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Type	Sources
15 January 1978	Jerusalem	Explosion in an Egged bus	ALQ. 16 January 1978 ASH. 16 January 1978 JP. 16 January 1978
23 January 1978	Northern Jerusalem Shoufat refugee camp)	Sabotage charge went off in the hands of a young Arab, 23	H. 26 January 1978
25 January 1978	Northern Jerusalem (Shmuel Hanavi quarter)	Explosive charge went off	H. 26 January 1978
27 January 1978	Nablus	Youths demonstrated in protest against the new settlement operations in the territories	H. 29 January 1978 <i>Le Monde</i> , 29–30 January 1978
		Israeli cars and security vehicles stoned; tyres burned	
29 January 1978	Between Naby-Saleh and Kafr Ein	Murder of a "Dan" busdriver	H. 30 and 31 January 1978
		Curfew imposed on the villages of the Ramallah area	M. 30 and 31 January 1978
2 February 1978	Hebron-El-Khalil	Bomb explosion at the central taxi station	JP. 3 February 1978
3 February 1978	Jerusalem (at the Police Head- quarters-Russian compound)	Bomb explosion	JP. 5 February 1978
5 February 1978	Nablus	Student demonstrations Partial business strike Israeli cars stoned Tyres burned	H. 6 February 1978
6 and 7 February 1978	Nablus	Student demonstrations against settlements and in support of PLO and the Algiers Conference	H. 8 February 1978 Yediot Aharonot, 6 February 1978 Zu Haderekh, 8 February 1978
8 February 1978	Ramallah	Murder of Abdul Nur Khalil Janhu, 54, a local businessman. Denounced by the PLO as an "agent collaborating with the Zionist authorities"	JP. 9 February 1978 H. 10 February 1978 H. 12 February 1978 H. 13 February 1978 H. 16 February 1978 H. 26 February 1978 Le Monde, 13 February 1978 ASH. 9 February 1978 Yediot Aharonot, 9 February 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
10 February 1978	Jerusalem (in a super- market on Agron Street)	Explosive charge went off	ALQ. 11 February 1978
13 February 1978	Jerusalem (near an army transport station in the south of the city)	Explosive charge dismantled	ALQ, 14 February 1978
15 February 1978	Jerusalem ´´	Bomb explosion in an Egged bus	Herald Tribune, 16 February 1978 Le Monde, 16 February 1978 Agence Telegraphique Juive, 16 February 1978
16 February 1978	Jerusalem (at a Zionist Youth farm)	Explosion of a charge, material damage, no injuries	ALQ. 17 February 1978
19 February 1978	Jerusalem (Hebrew University)	Explosion of a charge Another charge discovered and dismantled	H. 20 February 1978 M. 27 February 1978
25 February 1978	Gaza (on railway line linking Gaza to Rafah)	Explosive charge went off	ASH. 26 February 1978
1 March 1978	Northern Ramallah (near Ramoun village)	Explosives discovered	ALQ. 2 March 1978
3 March 1978	Jenin (in the Martyrs' Square in the town town centre)	Explosive charge discovered and defused	ASH. 4 March 1978 ALQ. 5 March 1978
4 March 1978	Jerusalem (Ramat Eshkol)	Explosive charge went off under a car	ALQ. 5 March 1978 ASH. 5 March 1978
10 March 1978	Adna area (no man's land between the West Bank and Israel)	Bomb explosion	ALQ, 11 March 1978
16 March 1978	East Jerusalem- Beit Hanina, Shu'fat, Temple Mount and Old City	Students' riots and demonstrations, Tyres burned Anti-Zionist placards waved, vehicles stoned	M. 17 March 1978 JP. 17 March 1978 M. 19 March 1978
16 March 1978	Ramallah	Riots Students attempted to block the main road	M. 17 March 1978 JP. 17 March 1978 M. 19 March 1978
16 March 1978	Nablus	Students burned tyres and stoned vehicles	M. 17 March 1978 JP. 17 March 1978 M. 19 March 1978 JP. 19 March 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
16 March 1978	Tulkarem	Students demonstrated and threw stones	M and JP. 17 March 1978 M and JP. 19 March 1978
16 March 1978	Beit Jala	Riots	M and JP. 17 March 1978 M and JP. 19 March 1978
16 March 1978	Hebron-El-Khalil	Secondary school students rioted, burned tyres and hurled stones at the border police	M. 17 March 1978 JP. 47 March 1978 M. 19 March 1978 JP. 19 March 1978
16 March 1978	Jericho	Riots in the town's main streets	M. 17 March 1978 JP. 17 March 1978 M and JP. 19 March 1978
17 March 1978	Gaza Strip (Jabaliya camp)	Demonstrations	M. 17 March 1978 JP. 17 March 1978 M. 19 March 1978 JP. 19 March 1978 ASH. 20 March 1978
17-18 March 1978	Nablus	Student demonstrations	M. 19 March 1978
19 March 1978	Gaza	Student demonstrations, vehicles stoned	M. 19 March 1978
19 March 1978	Khan Yunis	Student demonstrations, Israeli vehicles stoned	M. 20 March 1978 JP. 20 March 1978
19 March 1978	Dahiriya (Hebron-El- Khalil area)	Student riot, Israeli cars stoned	M. 20 March 1978 JP. 20 March 1978
19 March 1978	East Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron-El- Khalil, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Jericho, Gaza Strip	Disturbances continued	JP. 20 March 1978 M. 20 March 1978
20 March 1978	East Jerusalem, Khan Yunis, Gaza, Ram- allah, Hebron-El- Khalil, Bethlehem)	Demonstrations continued and two-hour business strike	M. 21 March 1978 JP. 21 March 1978 JP. 22 March 1978
20 March 1978	Jerusalem (Talpiot quarter)	Explosive charge discovered and defused	JP. 21 March 1978
20 March 1978	On the road between Hebron-El-Khalil and Ein Jadda (in front of a branch of the POALIM Bank, a workers' bank)	Explosive charge discovered and defused	ALQ. 21 March 1978 ASH. 22 March 1978
22 March 1978	Deir Abu Mashal	"Dan" Co-operative bus ambushed and set on fire	M. 23 March 1978 JP. 23 March 1978 ASH. 23 March 1978
23 March 1978	Jerusalem (Atarot/ Kalandiya Airport)	Explosive charge discovered and dismantled	JP. 24 March 1978 ASH. 24 March 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
25 March 1978	Ramallah	Three explosive charges discovered and defused	ASH. 26 March 1978
end of March 1978	Jerusalem (French Hill)	Car set on fire	H. 30 March 1978 ALQ. 31 March 1978
30 March 1978	Nablus	Student demonstrations, partial business strike	M. 30 March 1978 H. 31 March 1978
30 March 1978	Tulkarem	Student demonstrations, partial business strike	M. 30 March 1978 H. 31 March 1978
30 March 1978	Ramallah	Student demonstrations, partial business strike	M. 30 March 1978 H. 31 March 1978
1 April 1978	Jerusalem (between the Amud Gate and the Saphira Gate)	Bomb discovered and dismantled	ASH. 2 April 1978
2 April 1978	Jerusalem (Hebrew University)	Explosive charge discovered and dismantled	ASH. 3 April 1978 ALQ. 3 April 1978 H. 4 April 1978
6 April 1978	Nablus	Attempt by students to demonstrate, security forces stoned by students	JP. 6 April 1978 JP. 7 April 1978 H. 7 April 1978
6 April 1978	El Balata refugee camp	Disturbances	H. 7 April 1978 JP. 7 April 1978
9 April 1978	East Jerusalem (near the Rockefeller) Museum)	Egged bus stoned by secondary school pupils	H. 10 April 1978
11 A pril 1978	Jerusalem (Old City citadel)	Small charge exploded	JP. 12 April 1978 ASH. 13 April 1978
14 April 1978	Jerusalem (French Hill)	Attempt at setting fire to a car	ALQ. 17 April 1978
16 April 1978	Qalandya refugee camp (near Jerusa- lem)	Molotov cocktail tossed into an Egged bus	JP. 16 April 1978 JP. 17 April 1978 ALQ. 17 April 1978 H. 18 April 1978 ASH. 17 April 1978
17 April 1978	Nablus	Student demonstrations, student strike, partial business strike	JP. 18 April 1978 H. 18 April 1978
7 April 1978	Jenin	Student demonstrations	JP. 18 April 1978 H. 18 April 1978
17 April 1978	Salfit area (halfway between Nablus and Ramallah)	Egged bus set on fire	ASH. 17 April 1978 H. 18 April 1978
18 April 1978	Jenin '	A young man from Burkin village killed by a pursuing army patrol after ignoring instructions to halt	JP. 19 April 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
20 April 1978	Jerusalem (Gilo suburb)	Sabotage charge discovered	H. 21 April 1978 ALQ, 21 April 1978 ASH. 21 April 1978
20 April 1978	Jerusalem (Mt. Scopus)	Car set on fire	H. 21 April 1978 JP. 21 April 1978 ALQ, 21 April 1978
22 April 1978	Nablus	Molotov cocktail thrown at military vehicle in the town centre	JP. 24 April 1978 ALQ. 24 April 1978
24 April 1978	Jerusalem (Jaber Mukhaber village, near East Talpiot)	Two Molotov cocktails thrown at a bus	JP. 25 April 1978
24 April 1978	Jacob's well (east of of Nablus)	Explosive charge went off	ASH. 25 April 1978
26 April 1978	Nablus (Clock Tower Square)	Hand-grenade thrown into a tourist bus	ALQ. 27 April 1978 ASH. 27 April 1978 JP. 27 April 1978 H. 27 April 1978 H. 30 April 1978 M. 30 April 1978 ASH. 30 April 1978
			ALQ. 30 April 1978
28 April 1978	Near Wadi Tufha (Nablus area)	Road blocked with stones by by unidentified persons	M. 30 April 1978
Late April	Ramallah (girls' school)	Tear-gas thrown by soldiers into a classroom full of students	M. 4 May 1978
2 M ay 1978	Jerusalem (French Hill)	Car set on fire	JP. 3 May 1978 <i>Davar</i> , 3 May 1978
4 May 1978	Jerusalem (Binyenei Ha'ooma)	Explosive charge went off in empty bus	JP. 5 May 1978 Al Hamishmar, 5 May 1978 Davar, 5 May 1978
6 Ma y 1978	Northern Jerusalem (Rassco Quarter)	Two Katyusha rockets landed and exploded in court yard of a house	JP. 7 May 1978 JP. 8 May 1978 H. 9 May 1978 JP. 9 May 1978 <i>Yediot Aharonot</i> , 8 May 1978
8 May 1978	Nablus	Incendiary bottle hurled at an Egged bus	M. 9 May 1978
11 May 1978	Ramallah	Explosive charge discovered and dismantled	ASH. 12 May 1978 ALQ. 12 May 1978 JP. 12 May 1978 <i>Yediot Aharonot</i> , 12 May 1978
11 May 1978	Dahisha refugee camp (near Bethlehem)	Student demonstrations	Yediot Aharonot, 12 May 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
1 3 M ay 1978	Nablus (near the employment office)	Explosive charge discovered and dismantled	ASH. 14 May 1978 ALQ. 14 May 1978 H. 14 May 1978 JP. 14 May 1978 Yediot Aharonot, 14 May 1978
13 May 1978	Nablus	Booby-trapped bomb discovered near a car in the town centre and detonated	M. 14 May 1978
13 May 1978	Nablus (main square)	Bomb discovered and detonated	M. 14 May 1978
13 May 1978	Qabalan village (near Tulkarem)	Attempt to set fire to the the employment office	M. 14 May 1978
13 May 1978	near Nazalat-Issa village (Samaria)	Egged bus transporting workers from the West Bank to Jerusalem stoned	M. 14 May 1978
15 May 1978	East Jerusalem	Riots and demonstrations marking the anniversary of Independence Day	M. 16 May 1978
15 May 1978	Nablus	Partial business and student strikes	H. 16 May 1978
15 May 1978	Ramallah	Partial business and student strikes	
16 May 1978	Beit-Jala	Car of a local inhabitant set on fire	H. 17 May 1978
17 May 1978	Izimut village (near Nablus)	Sabotage charges and weapons discovered	ASH. 17 May 1978 H. 18 May 1978 ASH. 25 May 1978 ASH. 26 May 1978
18 May 1978	Nablus	Incendiary bottle thrown at a civilian car	H. 18 May 1978 ASH. 21 May 1978
19 May 1978	Jordan Valley	Two boys killed by explosion of suspicious object	H. 21 May 1978
21 May 1978	El Askar refugee camp (near Nablus)	Curfew imposed after incendiary bottles were thrown at cars (lifted on 23 May)	ASH. 22 May 1978 H. 22 May 1978 ASH. 24 May 1978
24 May 1978	El Askar refugee camp	Curfew reimposed after new incendiary bottle incident	ALQ. 25 May 1978 ASH. 25 May 1978
End of May	East Jerusalem (Rockefeller Museum junction)	Several Israeli soldiers attacked and stoned by Arab youths	H. 1 June 1978
1 June 1978	Ramallah (El Manara quarter, in a garden)	Explosive charge set off	ALQ. 2 June 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
2 June 1978	Jerusalem (Bayit Vegan quarter)	Bomb explosion in a bus	JP. 4 June 1978 ALQ. 4 June 1978 H. 5 June 1978
5 June 1978	Nablus	General business strike	H. 6 June 1978
6 June 1978	Near Shuqba village (on the Ramallah- Lydda road)	"Dan" bus set on fire by three armed men	M. 6 June 1978 JP. 7 June 1978 ITIM 7 June 1978
11 June 1978	Tammun village (north-east of Nablus)	Bomb explosion in the doorway of the house of former village Mukhtar	M. 12 June 1978 JP. 12 June 1978
11 June 1978	Nablus (at the local employment office)	Incendiary bottle thrown	M. 12 June 1978
12 June 1978	Jerusalem	Home-made bomb found in in a bus	ALQ. 13 June 1978 JP. 13 June 1978
15 June 1978	East Jerusalem (outside the Holy Land Hotel on El Rashid Street)	Bomb exploded under an empty tourist bus	JP. 16 June 1978 ALQ. 16 June 1978 ASH. 16 June 1978 Al Hamishmar, 16 June 1978
1-7 10-0	D I 1 /		Davar, 16 June 1978
17 June 1978	East Jerusalem (near El Eizariya Church)	Sabotage charge exploded	M. 18 June 1978
24 June 1978	Nablus (Fayssal Street, near the employ- ment office and Leumi Bank)	Bomb discovered and dismantled	ASH. 25 June 1978 ALQ. 25 June 1978
25 June 1978	Hebron-El-Khalil (near the Leumi Bank)	Explosive charge went off	ALQ. 26 June 1978
26 June 1978	Jerusalem (Mahane Yehuda)	Explosive charge went off	ASH. 26 June 1978
29 June 1978	Jerusalem (Mahane Yehuda's open-air market)	Bomb went off	JP. 30 June 1978 ALQ, 30 June 1978 Al Hamishmar, 30 June 1978
4 July 1978	Nablus	Two bombs discovered at the same spot, one at 1.30 a.m. and another at noon	ALQ. 5 July 1978
6 July 1978	Nablus	One bomb discovered	ALQ, 7 July 1978
13 July 1978	Nablus	Three bombs found in centre of Nablus	ASH. 14 July 1978 <i>Al Fajr</i> , 14 July 1978
14 Jul y 1978	Latrun-Ramallah road	Booby-trapped car found near check-point	JP. 16 July 1978 H. 16 July 1978
18 July 1978	Bethlehem	Bomb exploded	ASH. 19 July 1978
22 July 1978	Kafr-Sir (near Tulkarm)	Bomb exploded in the hands of a 14-year-old-boy	JP. 23 July 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Type	Sources
30 July 1978	East Jerusalem (Gilo)	Mortar shell exploded in olive grove	JP. 31 July 1978
4 August 1978	Hebron-El-Khalil (near the Leumi Bank)	Bomb explosion	JP. 6 August 1978 M. 6 August 1978 <i>Davar</i> , 6 August 1978
10 August 1978	East Jerusalem (Musrara quarter)	Border Police jeep stoned by Arab youths	H. 13 August 1978
12 August 1978	Jerusalem (Mount of Olives)	Bomb explosion	JP. 13 August 1978 ASH. 13 August 1978 ALQ. 13 August 1978 H. 14 August 1978
12 August 1978	Jerusalem (Jaffa Gate)	Bomb discovered and dismantled	JP. 13 August 1978 ASH. 13 August 1978 ALQ. 13 August 1978
14 August 1978	Jerusalem (at a soldiers' hitch-hiking station on the Hebron road)	Sabotage charge exploded	H. 15 August 1978 ALQ. 15 August 1978 ASH. 15 August 1978 H. 16 August 1978
20 August 1978	Nablus (El Balata refugee camp)	Border Police patrol attacked with an incendiary bottle	JP. 20 August 1978 M. 21 August 1978
22 August 1978	Jerusalem (Old City)	Small home-made bomb discovered and dismantled	JP. 23 August 1978
23 August 1978	Gaza (Seje'iya quarter	Explosive charge went off	JP. 24 August 1978 JP. 27 August 1978
23 August 1978	Kiryat Arba	Katyusha rocket fired	H. 25 August 1978 ASH. 25 August 1978
23 August 1978	Jerusalem (Talpiot-East)	Explosion under a bus	H. 25 August 1978 ALQ. 25 August 1978 ASH. 25 August 1978
25 August 1978	Jerusalem (Mount of Olives, near the Panorama Hotel and Southern District Police Station)	Explosion charge discovered and dismantled	JP. 27 August 1978
26 August 1978	Jenin (outside the Labour Exchange)	Mortar bomb attached to a timing device discovered and dismantled	JP. 27 August 1978
27 August 1978	Jerusalem	Explosion of a medium- sized bomb	JP. 28 August 1978
28 August 1978	El Balata refugee camp (near Nablus)	Molotov cocktail thrown at a Border Police patrol	JP. 29 August 1978 H. 29 August 1978
30 August 1978	Jenin (Education Ministry Building)	Explosive charge went off	H. 30 August 1978 ASH. 31 August 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
30 August 1978	Jerusalem (Atarot/ Maaleh-Adumim road	Sabotage charge went off near a water pipe	H. 31 August 1978 ASH. 31 August 1978
31 August 1978	Nablus	Hand-grenade thrown at the Leumi Bank	M. 31 August 1978 ASH. 31 August 1978
1 September 1978	Jerusalem (Old City, outside the Hospice Hospital)	Small bomb exploded	JP. 3 September 1978 H. 3 September 1978
1 September 1978	Nablus (near Jacob's Well)	Incendiary bottle and stones thrown at border policemen	H. 3 September 1978 H. 4 September 1978
6 September 1978	Jerusalem (Bethelehem road)	Terrorist bomb planted near a propane gas depot	ALQ, 6 September 1978 JP. 8 September 1978
6 September 1978	East Jerusalem (near the Dolphin Restaurant)	Molotov cocktail thrown at an Israeli vehicle	ALQ, 6 September 1978 JP. 10 September 1978
7 September 1978	Qalandiya suburb (north of Jerusalem)	Unidentified blazing object thrown at a group of soldiers	M. 8 September 1978
8 September 1978	East Jerusalem	Incendiary bottle thrown at an Israeli car	H. 10 September 1978
8 September 1978	Ramallah (Clock Square)	Bomb explosion	H. 10 September 1978
9 September 1978	Hebron-El-Khalil	Local inhabitant killed by an explosion	ALQ, 9 September 1978
10 September 1978	Mt. Hebron area (near Kharasq and Dura villages)	Two vehicles (one an Arab taxi) stoned	H. 12 September 1978
13 September 1978	Jerusalem (near the Rockefeller Museum)	Hand-grenade discovered and dismantled	H. 14 September 1978
13 September 1978	Tulkarm	Explosive charge found near the local labour office and dismantled	ASH. 14 September 1978
13 September 1978	Jewish National Fund pine grove east of Nur El Shams refugee camp	Pine grove set on fire (fourth attempt in two weeks to set grove on fire)	H. 17 September 1978
14 September 1978	Qalqilya (on the Kfar Saba road)	Bomb explosion	ASH. 15 September 1978 ALQ, 15 September 1978
15 September 1978	Jerusalem	Five explosive charges discovered and dismantled	H. 17 September 1978
17 September 1978	Jerusalem Old City (Rehov David)	Sabotage charge exploded injuring seven people	H. 17 September 1978 JP. 17 September 1978 ALQ, 17 September 1978

Table 1 (continued)

Date	Place	Туре	Sources
18 September 1978	El Bireh (near the the Old Mosque)	Hand-grenade exploded in a bus transporting Israeli soldiers	ASH. 19 September 1978 ALG. 19 September 1978
20 September 1978	Beit Hanun (Northern Gaza Strip)	Schoolboys rioted and burned tyres on the road	H. 21 September 1978
20 September 1978	Halhul, Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, Bethle- hem and other West Bank cities	Disturbances, demonstrations and student strikes, partial business strikes	JP. 21 September 1978 H. 21 September 1978 H. 22 September 1978 ASH. 22 September 1978 H. 26 September 1978
22 September 1978	Jerusalem (inside the the Jaffa Gate)	Bomb discovered and dismantled	JP. 24 September 1978 H. 24 September 1978
22 September 1978	Jenin (near the Leumi Bank)	Two incendiary bottles discovered and dismantled	M. 24 September 1978 H. 25 September 1978
28 September 1978	Jerusalem (city centre)	Explosive charge went off	ASH. 29 September 1978
30 September 1978	Rafah	Explosive charge discovered in a van and dismantled	H. 1 October 1978 JP. 1 October 1978
30 September 1978	Hebron-El-Khalil (near the Central Post Office	Explosive charge discovered and detonated	H. 1 October 1978 ASH. 1 October 1978
1 October 1978	Jerusalem (Jaffa Street, near the Central Post Office)	Explosive charge went off	ALQ, 2 October 1978
1 October 1978	Dura (near Hebron- El-Khalil)	Arson at the West Bank Labour Exchange	JP. 4 October 1978 H. 4 October 1978
1 October 1978	Nablus (main Nablus- Qalandiya road)	Youths demonstrated; road blocked with stones	H. 4 October 1978 JP. 4 October 1978
3 October 1978	Southern Gaza shore	Explosive charge discovered near a Bedouin tent and detonated	ALQ, 4 October 1978
5 October 1978	Jerusalem (Hebron road, near a soldiers' hitch-hiking station)	Bomb discovered and detonated	JP. 6 October 1978

Table 2: Representative cross-section of reports of arrests of groups of 10 or more individuals

Number	From	Cause	Source
31 persons	El Bireh (near Ramallah) Asira el-Shamaliya (near Nablus) Yaabed (near Jenin)	Laying explosive at a soldiers' post at Beit-Hanina (north of Jerusalem) Possessing ammunition and sabotage material Laying explosives, on two occasions, at the house of a local resident suspected of collaborating with the Israeli authorities	JP. 12 October 1977 H. 12 October 1977
46 Arabs, "members of 6 terrorist cells"	Judaea and Samaria	Membership of FATH Carrying out a number of sabotage acts in the past two years	M. 14 November 1977 JP. 14 November 1977
"several terrorist cells" comprising 30 members,	Khan Yunis and Rafah	Membership of FATH and PFLP Possessing weapons and explosives	H. 24 November 1977 JP. 24 November 1977
14 students	Nablus	Demonstrating and rioting Distributing leaflets Stoning Israeli vehicles	M. 4 December 1977 H. 4 December 1977
31 persons	West Bank and Jordan Valley	Organized in 5 "cells" affiliated to an illegal organization	Davar, 3 January 1978 JP. 4 January 1978 H. 4 January 1978
Several persons	Beit Fajar	Obstructing the building of a power station in the village	Al Fajr, 5 January 1978
Several persons	Nablus and El-Balata refugee camp	Stoning cars and demonstrating	ALQ, 9 January 1978
37 students	Nablus	Demonstrating against the establishment of settlements	JP, H and ALQ. 7 February 1978
45 persons, members of 7 cells	Nablus, El Azareya and Ramallah	Membership of FATH, DPF [DFLP] and El-Saika Receiving military training Possessing explosives, weapons and pamphlets Planting explosives in Kfar Saba on 18 January 1978	ASH, JP and H. 8 February 1978 Agence télégraphique juive 9 February 1978
11 persons (including 6 youths and 2 of the major merchants of the town)	Nablus	Smuggling explosives and weapons through Haifa Harbour, arriving from Cyprus Membership of FATH	ASH, JP and H. 6 February 1978 Al Hamishmar, and Davar 6 February 1978 Agence télégraphique juive 7 February 1978

Table 2 (continued)

$\mathcal{N}umber$	From	Cause	Sources
11 persons	Nablus	Inciting to demonstrate and to strike during latest incidents	Zu Haderekh 8 February 1978 Yediot Aharonot, 12 February 1978, ASH. 13 February 1978
20 persons	West Bank	Suspected of hostile terrorist activity following the explosion of a charge in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem on 19 February 1978	H and M. 21 February 1978 H and M. 27 February 1978
Several persons	Ramallah refugee camp	Arrested for investigation following Janhu's murder	Al Hamishmar and H. 10 February 1978
Several persons	Jerusalem	Following the explosion of a charge in a supermarket on Argon Street on 10 February 1978	ALQ, 11 February 1978
Several arrests	Jerusalem	Following the explosion of a charge at a Zionist Youth farm on 17 February 1978	ALQ. 17 February 1978
30 persons	Several from the Bethlehem area	Following the Jerusalem Hebrew University explosion on 19 February 1978	ASH. 1 March 1978
10 youths	Al Askar refugee camp	Suspected of stoning Israeli soldiers	ASH. 9 March 1978
19 "members of a terror cell of Nayef Ha- watmeh's PDF" [DFLP]	Nablus and Jenin	Inciting to join terror organizations Having received military training in the USSR	M. 17 March 1978
90 youths	Various towns in Samaria	Demonstrating and inciting to riot	M. 20 March 1978
45 persons, members of 7 cells	West Bank	Suspected of training in sabotage and carrying out several sabotage acts	JP, ALQ, ASH, H and M. 28 March 1978 (see article by Y. Tzuriel)
Several persons	Deir Abu Mashal	Suspected of setting a "Dan" bus on fire	ASH. 24 March 1978
10 youths	Nablus	"Security reasons" Membership of the Palestinian Students Association	M. 4 April 1978
40 youths 30 persons, organized in 5 cells	Salfit West Bank	? ?	? JP, H, ASH, ALQ and M. 20 April 1978

Table 2 (continued)

Number	From	Cause	Source
40 persons	Nablus and surrounding area	For interrogation following the bombing of a German tourist bus on 26 April 1978	H, ALQ and ASH. 27 April 1978 ASH. 30 April 1978
11 persons, members of a cell	Qalandiya refugee camp (north of Jerusalem)	Throwing incendiary bottles at an army jeep on 11 April 1978 and at a bus transporting soldiers on 16 April 1978	H, JP, ASH and ALQ. 27 April 1978
Several persons	Ramallah	On suspicion of shooting a local policeman on 10 May 1978	ASH. 12 May 1978
Several persons	West Bank	Preventive arrests Suspicion of possible incitement towards 15th May (Israel's Independence Day)	H. 15 May 1978
Several persons	Nablus	Vast campaign of arrests after the discovery of a booby- trapped object near a car in the town centre and the attack on a bus transporting workers	ASH. 15 May 1978
12 sabotage cells	1 cell (13 persons) from Azmut village near Nablus 1 cell from the Nablus area Location of the other cells not given	Several acts of sabotage	JP, H and ASH. 18 May 1978 ALQ, 19 May 1978
Several persons	Nablus	Suspected of taking part in recent explosions	ASH. 26 May 1978
15 persons	East Jerusalem (Sur- Bahir village)	Suspected of stoning an Egged Bus on the Sur-Bahir road on 2 June 1978	H. 5 June 1978 <i>Al Ittihad</i> , 6 June 1978 <i>Al Fajr</i> , 14 June 1978
13 persons	Nablus area	Membership of terrorist cells Possessing weapons	M. 5 June 1978
11 persons	Nablus	Throwing an incendiary bottle at the local employment bureau on 11 June 1978	M. 12 June 1978 Al Fajr, 13 June 1978
Several persons	Bethlehem	Arrested following an explosion in a gas station in Al-Ayzariya on the Jerusalem-Jericho road	<i>Al Fajr</i> , 18 June 1978
A number of persons	Ramallah/El-Bireh area	Arrested following an explosion on a bus in Manara (between Ramallah and El-Bireh)	<i>Al Fajr</i> , 2 June 1978
Several persons, members of a cell	Jerusalem area	Arrested following an explosion in a bus in West Jerusalem on 2 June 1978, killing 6 and wounding 19	Al Fajr, 3 June 1978 ALQ, 8 June 1978

Table 2 (continued)

Number	From	Cause	Source
29 persons	Gaza strip	Suspected of being terrorists Trained at PFLP camps	JP, H and <i>Davar</i> , 25 July 1978
15 persons	Jerusalem area	Suspected of causing 2 bomb explosions in the Abu Tor quarter on 20 August 1978	JP. 22 August 1978 ASH. 23 August 1978
5 terrorist cells, dozens of terrorists	West Bank	Participating in sabotage acts Possessing arms and explosives Planning to plant a bomb in Yad Eliahu (Tel Aviv)	M, JP and ASH. 8 August 1978 Davar, 8 August 1978
Dozens of youths	Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah	Membership of terror organizations	M. 31 July 1978
40 persons	Nablus	Possessing arms and ammunition Held for questioning after a hand-grenade was thrown at the Leumi Bank	H. 2 August 1978 M. 31 August 1978
40 persons	Qalqiliya	Arrested following an explosion at a coffee house in the town centre on 13 September 1978	M. 14 September 1978 ALQ. 15 September 1978
30 persons	Jerusalem area	Arrested after an explosion on 17 September 1978 in a crowded alley in the Old City of Jerusalem	H. 17 September 1978
Several persons	Ramallah	Arrested after a bomb explosion on 9 September 1978	H. 10 S eptember 1978
Several persons	Jerusalem	Arrested after a hand-grenade was discovered and dismantled near the Rockefeller Museum on 13 September 1978	ASH. 14 September 1978
Several youths	Beit Amrien (Nablus area)	Membership of a FATH cell Intending to plant a sabotage charge in a Tel-Aviv bus the day after their arrest Possessing explosives and sabotage material	ASH and H. 22 September 1978
12 persons	Nablus	Membership of a FATH cell Participating in small-scale terrorist activities such as distributing seditious pamphlets Throwing Molotov cocktails	JP, ALQ and M. 24 September 1978

Table 3. Number of trials by military tribunal recorded by the Special Committee during the period from November 1977 to October 1978

Military tribunal	Number of trials
El-Khalil-Hebron	54
Gaza	110
Jenin	61
Lod	83
Nablus	283
Ramallah	293
Tulkarem	58
Unspecified location	93

Table 4. Number of trials recorded by the Special Committee by month (November 1977-October 1978)

Month	Number of trials
November 1977	15
December 1977	57
January 1978	70
February 1978	26
March 1978	224
April 1978	124 (including 2 acquittals)
May 1978	104 (including 2 acquittals)
June 1978	78
July 1978	81 (including 3 acquittals)
August 1978	41
September 1978	49
October 1978	66

Table 5. Number of reported releases recorded by the Special Committee by month (November 1977–October 1978)

	/
Month	Number of reported releases
November 1977	2047
December 1977	7
January 1978	
February 1978	36
March 1978	73
April 1978	75
May 1978	46
June 1978	30
July 1978	7
August 1978	2
September 1978	11
October 1978	9

⁴⁷ In addition a report referring to an unspecified number of persons was recorded during this month. [orig. note:]

V. SPECIAL REPORT ON THE TREAT-MENT OF CIVILIANS IN DETENTION

92. At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/91 C48 by which it renewed the mandate of the Special Committee, requesting it to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, to consult as appropriate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter. By the same resolution the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to continue to investigate the treatment of civilians in detention in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and to submit to the Secretary-General a special report on that subject as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter.

93. At its meetings from 13 to 17 March 1978, the Special Committee decided that, in carrying out its mandate, special attention would be given to information on the treatment of civilians in detention and that the special report requested by the General Assembly would be included in its main report submitted under Assembly resolution 32/91 C.

94. Since its establishment, the Special Committee has examined information on the treatment of civilians in detention and its findings are reflected in the reports it has submitted on its activities to date. In its last report (A/32/284),49 the Committee analysed information on treatment of civilians in detention in Section IV and gave a summary of the information that it had received on this subject during the period covered by that report. The Committee gave its assessment of this information in Section VI (Conclusions) of the same report. It referred to the caution that it had exercised in the past in expressing its views on the subject of torture of detainees. It had stated then that "the indication that cases of torture have occurred and continue to occur are very strong and the international community cannot afford to connive at a continuation of such an abhorrent practice". It stated that the arrangements for protecting prisoners against ill-

⁴⁸ Doc. 27 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁴⁹ Doc. 8 in *ibid*.

treatment and torture were totally ineffective and provided no protection to prisoners. The Committee urged a total revision of existing procedures and renewed efforts at securing new and more effective arrangements.

95. During 1977, attention in the international press was focused on the question of ill-treatment of detainees in the occupied territories. The Special Committee had received oral and written testimony of a number of persons who had had direct experience of cases of ill-treatment or who had studied the question in depth. It had invited persons from all shades of opinion to testify before it to enable it to assess the truth and the extent to which this phenomenon prevailed in the occupied territories. Reports of worsening prison conditions were supplemented by the outbreak of disturbances in certain prisons and widespread hunger strikes, notably that by prisoners held at Ashkelon.

96. Subsequent to the adoption of its last report, the Special Committee took note of announcements made on 6 December 1977 by the spokesman for the Israeli Army to the effect that arrangements for visits by ICRC delegates to prisoners under interrogation were to be improved. According to this information, subsequently confirmed by the ICRC, delegates would be allowed to visit detainees under interrogation within 14 days (as distinct from 30 days under the prior arrangement) of their arrest; the purpose of such visits was to enable the ICRC delegation to ascertain the state of health of the detainee. The statement by the spokesman of the Israeli Army reads as follows:

Israel recently informed the International Committee of the Red Cross of a substantial extension of the arrange-gements for visits by ICRC delegates to security detainees in the territories. According to the new arrangements, the military government authorities will notify the ICRC of the arrest of security detainees within fourteen days of the arrest of the security detainees and an ICRC delegate will be entitled to visit without witnesses every such detainee within that period in order to ascertain he detainee's health.

After the visit, if the ICRC delegate so requests, the detainee may promptly be examined without witnesses by a Red Cross physician.

Agreement has been reached as to visits in special circumstances within less than fourteen days from the arrest. (A/32/429)

The statement by the ICRC reads as follows:

For visits by ICRC delegates to security detainees, the military authorities proposed a new procedure: They will notify the ICRC of the arrest of security detainees within fourteen days of the arrest and ICRC delegates will be entitled to visit without witnesses every such detainee—including those under interrogation—within that period. The visiting delegate will enquire mainly into the detainee's health condition. If necessary a follow-up visit may be made by an ICRC doctor. (ICRC Bulletin No. 23 of 7 December 1977).

97. During the period covered by this report, the Special Committee continued to receive information on the conditions of prisons in general and of allegations of ill-treatment of individual prisoners. The Special Committee took cognizance of 34 cases of alleged ill-treatment and received information on conditions existing in the prisons at Kfar Yona, Damoun, Shatta, Beer-Sheba, Tulkarm, Ramallah and Ashkelon. As in the past, the Special Committee, deprived of access to the territories and therefore to the prisons concerned, relied on information gathered from other sources. It received extensive information on prison conditions and treatment of detainees from Miss Fatma Barnawi who appeared before the Special Committee at its March series of meetings, following her release from 10 years' imprisonment and her expulsion. In addition, the Committee heard the testimony of Mr. Abed El Assaly, a lawyer with experience in trials of civilians accused of security offences. His testimony follows that of the other lawyers heard in previous years by the Committee. Information furnished by Mr. Assaly, follows from his first-hand experience and professional contact with his clients, provides the Committee with an insight into the human rights situation of persons accused of security offences. The Committee also benefited from reports and statements made by prisoners themselves and communicated to it by third parties. On the basis of the sum total of the information reaching it, and taking into account its past experience, the Committee is able to make certain observations. Among these observations, it notes that the number of allegations of ill-treatment remains high despite the introduction of the reduced interrogation period without ICRC visits.

98. The following is a cross-section of the information received by the Special Committee on the treatment of civilians in detention:

A. Information on prison conditions

99. On 11 September 1977, a report in *Ha'aretz* stated that prisoners at Nablus prison held a strike in protest against bad conditions. The prisoners refused to work and to receive relatives' visits. A demonstration was held by relatives outside the prison which was dispersed by the Israeli Army.

100. On 18 November 1977, Ha'aretz published an article by Mr. D. Margulit giving an account, inter alia, of a visit to Ramallah prison, where "over-crowding is still serious"; according to this report administrative detainees were all held in one cell but detainees did not complain much about the situation in the prison itself. On the other hand, several prisoners complained bitterly about torture during their interrogation. The report adds that Israeli security officials dismissed the allegations as groundless.

101. A report published in *Ha'aretz* on 3 February 1978 by Mr. Y. Kotler on Ramle prison describes over-crowding in this prison as "unbearable... there is no place to be alone". The reporter knows that "everybody is studying, is improving his knowledge, is advancing towards the liberation of his homeland".

102. On 14 February 1978, *Asha'b* reported that several prisoners from Nablus prison had been transferred to Tulkarm prison because "the prison was full".

103. A number of reports appearing in the press and other information reaching the Special Committee reveal that a strike by detainees in Beer-Sheba and Tulkarm prisons started in March 1978. This strike continued until October in Beer-Sheba and at the time of the adoption of this report is still continuing in Tulkarm.

104. In Al Ittihad, on 11 and 28 July 1978, prisoners in Ramallah were reported to be on strike for the second consecutive month. They were protesting against ill-treatment and the prohibition of reading material in the Ramallah prison. Relatives were not permitted to visit them during the strike.

105. According to Asha'b, on 20 July 1978, the Commissioner of Prisons, Mr. H. Levy, was reported as having stated during a meeting attended by the Interior Minister and prison governors that the rapid increase in the number of prisoners in Israel and the failure to build new prisons led

to shocking conditions due to over-crowding.

106. The Special Committee examined a memorandum submitted by Mrs. F. Langer on 28 July 1978, based on evidence given to her by several of her clients on adverse prison conditions prevailing in the prisons at Kfar Yona (from where, since then, all inmates have been moved), Damoun, Shatta, Beer-Sheba, Tulkarm, Ramallah and Ashkelon.

107. The Special Committee received a report by Mrs. Lea Tsemel on conditions at Beer-Sheba prison in September 1978, based on information communicated by prisoners held there. According to these reports, measures were being taken in reprisal against prisoners who had been on strike since March 1978. The allegation is made that Arab security prisoners are discriminated against in favour of Jewish criminal prisoners. The prisoners' demands include adequate medical care and an extension of the present one-hour walk per day.


108. In her testimony before the Special Committee (from 15 to 17 March 1978), Miss Fatma Barnawi gave a detailed description of the conditions of detention in Ramle prison (the women's wing is known as Neve Tirza), where she had served a 10-year prison term (she was arrested and imprisoned in October 1967 and released on 10 November 1977). According to these descriptions, Ramle prison is seriously over-crowded (a cell 3 by 4 metres large is shared by six detainees); the Arab women security detainees are held together with Jewish women who are "common criminals". Miss Barnawi described the difficulties in relations between the two categories of detainees. Arab detainees do not have the same prison conditions as Jewish detainees; working conditions are different, as are facilities for visits by relatives, study and access to reading material. Security detainees are punished severely when they refuse to undertake certain work imposed on them (such as sewing military uniforms); the punishment consists mostly of the suspension from classes and of visits of relatives; harsher treatment is inflicted by the prison authorities following complaints by inmates to journalists. Requests to meet ICRC delegates are not always granted. Strikes were staged as a result of these conditions. These strikes usually resulted in the transfer of the leaders to other prisons (Rasmiya Odeh was transferred in that context to Gaza prison).


109. Miss Barnawi gave details about several of her fellow inmates who were suffering from poor health and from inadequate medical attention. She referred in particular to the cases of: Maryam El Shahshir, Rasmiya Odeh, Aiysha Odeh, Aida Saad, Rabi'a Abu Shehade, Afifa Bennura, Sayid Abd Elli, Zakya Shammut, Therèse Asaba and Ni'mat Mohammad El Helwat.

B. Allegations of ill-treatment

- 110. On 11 December 1977, the Jerusalem Post noted a report by Amnesty International which referred to 22 cases of Arab prisoners and one Jewish prisoner who were alleged to have been ill-treated and which Amnesty International had requested the Israeli Government to investigate.
- 111. On 21 December 1977, a report in Zu Haderekh stated that Rasmiya Odeh, serving a life sentence at Neve Tirza prison since 28 February 1969, was being subjected to "additional punishment" since the allegations about her torture were published in the Sunday Times of London on 19 June 1977.
- 112. Asha'b, on 16 January 1978, referred to a petition to the High Court of Justice by Mrs. Langer alleging that Israeli police had attacked four prisoners at Ashkelon while they were on strike.
- 113. Mrs. Raymonda Tawil, arrested on 23 March and held until 7 May 1978 for "security reasons", is reported in *Ha'aretz* on 6 April 1978, to have complained of being kept in solitary confinement at the Russian Compound in Jerusalem and that she was insulted and threatened with being beaten by her interrogators.
- 114. According to Al Fajr on 20 March 1978, Khalil Sharaa from Nablus, described as "old and sick" was imprisoned at Nablus because he could not afford the £I 3,000 (\$150) fine to which he had been sentenced by the Military Court. He was expected to be released after the deputy mayor of Nablus paid the fine on his behalf.
- 115. According to several reports appearing in the Israeli press and other information reaching the Special Committee, a group of boys from Qalandiya refugee camp, arrested and charged with attacking a military vehicle, were allegedly tortured by police during interrogation. On 16 May 1978 (i.e. approximately four weeks after their arrest) they were visited by their lawyer

- Mr. A. El Assaly, who attested to marks of illtreatment on Ibrahim Khalil Abdel Mauti, 13½, Youssef Abdel Jafer Mohammad Abdel Rahman, 14, Mohammed Fakhri Ali Abu-El-Rub, 13½, and Khaled Mohammed Mustafa, 14. Arraigned in a military tribunal, their trial was moved to a Jerusalem Juvenile Court after a successful plea to the High Court of Justice of non-competence of military tribunals on minors. Mr. El Assaly stated that the boys had been coerced into making confessions by the severe treatment they had suffered.
- 116. On 26 July 1978, Zu Haderekh reported that four persons had alleged that they were subjected to torture while under interrogation. They are: F. Abdul Kader Al-Barguti, Hassan Shawli Al-Barguti, Naif Sabah Al-Barguti and Abdul Jawad Yussef Al-Baz.
- 117. In addition to the above, the Special Committee examined allegations of ill-treatment of a number of individuals. The Committee established case histories and followed up information on each one seeking its verification and corroboration. Among these cases, the Special Committee considers that the ones reproduced in the following paragraphs deserve special attention.
- 118. Mr. Abd El Rahman El-Asafra, 42, arrested on 13 December 1975, sentenced to six years' imprisonment on 11 May 1977. Last known place of detention: Hebron prison. Allegations: Severe ill-treatment during interrogation including beating, immersion in hot water followed by exposure in cold weather, two months' solitary confinement. In addition it is alleged that his wife was arrested 10 days after giving birth and detained for four days; his son, aged 10½ years, was arrested and detained for 25 days and illtreated while being interrogated. Mr. El-Asafra has been blind since the age of 12, and is reported to have undergone surgery on two occasions (in the hospitals at Ramle prison and at Sarafand) on the genitals, subsequent to the treatment received during his interrogation.
- 119. Mr. Ahmed Husmi El-Batch, 32, arrested on 4 March 1976, sentenced on 31 July 1976 to seven years' imprisonment and a suspended prison term of three years. Allegations: Mr. El-Batch was subjected to severe physical ill-treatment during interrogation, mainly through beating and other forms of physical abuse. His interrogation is reported to have lasted one month.





120. Mr. Soleiman Madi, 50, not arrested but called for interrogation on 21 February and on 1, 22 and 26 March 1978. Allegations: Prolonged ill-treatment during first round of questioning on 21 February 1978, including beating on head, feet and buttocks. The Special Committee is in possession of two medical certificates drawn up on 23 and 24 February 1978 attesting to the injuries apparent on the body of Mr. Madi, as well as a perforated eardrum (see annex II). The Special Committee has received a photograph of the wounds on Mr. Madi attested to by his lawyer, Mrs. Felicia Langer. In the course of his testimony before the Special Committee Mr. El Assaly communicated further details on the case of Mr. Madi. In particular, he described the physical state of Mr. Madi as he had witnessed it immediately after his interrogation.

121. Mr. Mohammad Hamed Nimr Sobran, 33, arrested on 13 June 1977, interrogated at the Russian Compound in Jerusalem. Last known place of detention: Ramallah prison. Allegations: Severe beating during interrogation. Mr. Sobran was treated at the Hadassa hospital between 22 and 26 June 1977. An administrative detainee since 13 June 1977, Mr. Sobran had completed an 18-month sentence in 1976.

122. Mr. Mohammad Ata Soleiman Akel, 56, arrested on 24 November 1975, sentenced on 9 September 1976 to three and a half years' imprisonment. Last known place of detention: Nablus prison. Allegations: Ill-treatment during interrogation, principally by severe beatings. Mr. Akel is reported to suffer from cancer and is said to have undergone surgery in 1954 and 1971.

123. Ibrahim Diab Hathe, 21, arrested on 20 February 1978, not charged but held in administrative detention since 17 April 1978. Last known place of detention: Bethlehem prison. Allegations: Ill-treated during interrogation by four persons, mainly by exposure to an extremely cold shower for several hours while his head was covered with a sack; this took place in a small room somewhere in Bethlehem prison.

124. Mr. Bader Ad Daana, 27, arrested on 16 September 1968, sentenced on 1 March 1970 to 22 years' imprisonment. Last known place of detention: Ramle prison. Allegations: Inadequate medical attention in spite of severe illness. Mr. Daana was in normal health at the time of his arrest but developed symptoms of mental illness

early in 1972. An order *nisi* was issued on 18 July 1978 against the Minister of Police and the Prisons Commissioner calling upon them to explain why Mr. Daana should not be transferred to a mental hospital.

125. Miss Ayisha Odeh, 30, arrested in 1969 and sentenced in March 1969 to life imprisonment (three forced labour sentences plus 10 years). Last known place of detention: Gaza prison since 13 July 1977. Allegations: Severe ill-treatment including sexual assault and prolonged lack of medical attention. Miss Odeh has been punished together with other inmates of Ramle prison, for staging a strike against poor prison conditions and ill-treatment by the authorities. In her testimony before the Special Committee, Mrs. Barnawi communicated further details on the case of Miss Odeh, particularly her ill-treatment and lack of medical attention as witnessed by her during her own imprisonment.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

126. The information gathered by the Special Committee during the period covered by this report is reflected in the preceding two sections. In this, the concluding section, the Committee assesses this information in the light of its mandate.

127. In general, the Special Committee has not noted any significant changes in the human rights situation of the civilian population of the occupied territories from that recorded in previous years and reflected in its past nine reports.

128. The Government of Israel continues to implement a policy of settlement and annexation of the occupied territories. Recent unequivocal statements by the Prime Minister and other members of the Government of Israel prove that such a policy exists and that its application is being accelerated. The Special Committee took note of reports concerning the future of the Egyptian territory occupied by Israel in June 1967. Furthermore, the Special Committee considers it most regrettable that the Government of Israel is perpetuating the occupation of the other territories and is intensifying its efforts aimed at their annexation. In section IV above, the Special Committee has given a representative cross-section of information showing beyond any doubt the Israeli Government's stated aim to retain the other occupied territories. The Special Committee has

noted in past reports that the Government of Israel bases its policy of annexation and settlement on the so-called "homeland" doctrine, that is, that the territories occupied in June 1967 form part of the Jewish homeland. The Special Committee considers that, regardless of the political aspects of the Middle East situation, the Government of Israel, by following such a policy, is denying the Palestinian people their fundamental right to self-determination. The restitution of the Palestinian people's fundamental rights is therefore contingent upon the end of the military occupation. By the same token, the Government of Israel should not persist in denying the right to return to the civilians who fled the territories during and immediately after the June 1967 hostilities. Rather than safeguard the rights of the people under their military occupation, the Government of Israel claims that its settlements in these territories are established as of right. In a statement made in the General Assembly on 9 October 1978, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Dayan, stated that "the Israeli settlements in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district are there as of right. It is inconceivable to us that Jews should be prohibited from settling and living in Judaea and Samaria, which are the heart of our homeland" (A/33/PV.26, p. 42). Again, on 31 October 1978, the Jerusalem Post reported a statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, according to which, "the Jewish people's right to settle in all parts of the land of Israel is inalienable. This right has been carried out in the past, and will be in the future". In the circumstances, the Special Committee cannot but conclude that the Government of Israel consciously follows a policy which is in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention.⁵⁰ in particular, article 47 which prohibits annexation, of territories under military occupation by the occupying Power and article 49 which prohibits the transfer of citizens of the occupying Power into the occupied territories. The Special Committee notes that this policy is implemented largely through the financial support of the Jewish National Fund whose purpose it is "to make the land of Israel the inalienable property of Jewish people" (J.N.F. Questions and Answers, published by the Jewish National Fund, London). Thus,

the Special Committee notes that measures continue to be taken in the occupied territories designed to consolidate their annexation. The map attached to this report (annex I) illustrates the extent to which settlements have been established by the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories in pursuance of this policy.

129. The Special Committee has stated, from its very first report, that the fundamental violation of human rights lies in the very fact of occupation. This is itself the direct cause of a day-to-day pattern affecting the life and liberty of the civilians in the occupied territories. Their life is marked with a pattern of incidents involving various forms of violence and repercussions of these incidents. The number of arrests recorded by the Special Committee during the period covered by the report amounts to 1,192. This is but a minimum figure since it is based on reports in the Israeli press which is subject to censorship. To this number must be added those cases that go unreported and several other reports which refer to the arrest of "several" or "dozens" or "a large number" of persons (the Committee observed over 20 such reports during the year). The same considerations apply to the information concerning incidents: 319 specific reports of incidents were recorded by the Committee. Several of these arrests and trials are the consequence of the incidents referred to, although a large proportion of the trials reported concerned non-violent offences. The pressure caused by the large number of arrests on the military tribunals is evidenced by the fact that a second tribunal has been established in Nablus to reduce the large number of outstanding trials. Compared to the figures for arrests and trials (1,035 recorded by the Special Committee), the record of releases is relatively small (316 persons, including 73 on religious holidays but not including 300 secondary school students who were arrested during demonstrations in March 1978 and subsequently released). The Special Committee notes that during the period covered by this report, 34 persons were still incarcerated without charges, by virtue of administrative order.

130. The policies and practices followed by the Government of Israel with regard to the population are complementary to those followed by the Government of Israel with regard to the establishment of settlements in these territories. These

⁵⁰ United Nations. Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287. [orig. note.]

policies and practices are reflected in the measures taken by Israeli authorities with regard to civilians. These measures, purportedly taken in an effort to maintain order, fit more logically into the general context of the Israeli "homeland" policy, since their main purpose is to demoralize the civilian population by putting it before the constant reality of being a people under military subjugation. The Special Committee has noted several instances which would confirm this view. For example, the Committee has noted the practice in military courts of ordering the payment of fines or the serving of imprisonment sentences on parents for security offences committed by their minor children and for which the children have been tried and convicted. This is contrary to articles 33 and 67 of the fourth Geneva Convention which provide for the principle of individual responsibility (article 33) and that the penalty should be proportionate to the offence. The vast range of security offences of which a civilian of the occupied territories may find himself guilty is a reflection of the arbitrary nature of the military orders which purport to lay down the law governing his conduct. For example, the Special Committee notes that several persons are charged and convicted of the offence of "membership of an illegal organization" or acts of a non-violent nature. Vague military orders lend themselves to a wide interpretation and render the average civilian inhabitant of the occupied territories liable to prosecution before the military tribunal. Such vague offences are usually accompanied by equally imprecise provisions as regards punishment. For example, a civilian may be sentenced to up to seven years' imprisonment for "membership of an illegal organization". Civilians are still subject to arbitrary measures such as reprisals on their property even when they are only suspects. In its annual report for 1977, the International Committee of the Red Cross stated: "The destruction of a number of houses, all of them on the West Bank. were reported to the ICRC in 1977. These cases consisted in the destruction of three houses, three shops, the wall of one house, one apartment and two rooms. The ICRC reiterated its request to the Israeli authorities that they desist from such measures, which are contrary to article 53 of the fourth Convention". The same applies to the treatment of civilians at large; for example, at Ramallah, Beit Jala and other towns, the behaviour of Israeli

troops purporting to control student manifestations against the occupation resulted in serious injuries to several youngsters. Indeed, as a consequence of the Beit Jala incidents the Defence Minister dismissed the military Commander of the West Bank for allegedly abetting the falsification of reports on the behaviour of the Israeli troops in an effort to hide the reality.

131. The Special Committee noted that the Government of Israel continues to adopt other measures that reflect its policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories. Examples of such measures are contained in reports of expropriation of property by various methods, such as the arbitrary resort to reasons of military security for the purposes of the establishment of settlements, as has been the case in the El-Bireh area and several parts of the northern West Bank. Another example of such measures is reflected in the exploitation of the natural resources of the occupied territories, such as that of the petroleum resources of the Sinai and that of the water-table of the northern West Bank from which the occupying Power currently takes more than half of its water requirements.

132. The Special Committee is of the view that the policy of the Government of Israel referred to in the preceding paragraphs has provoked a pattern of resistance on the part of the civilian population. The frequency of the occurrence of incidents, amply illustrated in section IV C, reflects the civilian population's determination to oppose this Israeli policy and to assert its right to self-determination. The resistance thus manifested produces an ever-increasing prison population. In section V, the Special Committee sets out the information received by it on prison conditions and on the treatment of detainees. This information shows that prison conditions in general have continued to deteriorize; there is no evidence. on the other hand, of efforts at improvement. The periodic expressions of concern by which certain Israeli officials acknowledge the adverse prison conditions (reflected in sect. V) have not resulted in any measures being taken to improve them. Reports continue to reach the Special Committee of serious over-crowding and lack of adequate medical attention.

133. The testimony of Mr. Abed El-Assaly, based on his first-hand experience as counsel for civilians accused of security offences, confirms the

allegations that persons under interrogation are ill-treated and that no adequate remedies exist to safeguard such persons from abuse. The revision of the arrangements for ICRC delegates to visit persons under interrogation, announced on 6 December 1977 has not brought any significant diminution in the serious allegations of ill treatment of detainees.

134. In the circumstances, the Special Committee cannot but express its profound concern at the continuation of the military occupation and continued deprivation of human rights of the civilian population. The Committee would appeal once more to the international community, through the General Assembly, to assume its responsibilities to end the occupation, thereby safeguarding the most fundamental of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Pending the early termination of the occupation, the Committee recommends that a suitable mechanism be established to safeguard the human rights of the civilian population who have been exposed for such a long time to military occupation. In this context the Committee would refer to the proposal made by it since its first report.⁵¹ In addition,

and in view of the serious deterioration in the situation of detainees, the Committee would urge the General Assembly to ensure that a mechanism similar to that suggested by ICRC of establishing commissions of inquiry be set up (ICRC Press Release No. 1303 of 19 September 1977).

VII. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

135. The present report was approved and signed by the Special Committee on 10 November 1978 in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure.

(Signed) B. Bohte (Yugoslavia) B. J. Fernando (Sri Lanka) O. Goundiam (Senegal)

ANNEX II

Medical certificates relating to Mr. Soleiman Madi

A

Dr. Jihad Salih Aunallah, Specialist in General Surgery, F.R.C.S. (Edinburgh), M.B.B.Ch. (Cairo)

Tel: Clinic 570

Residence 2655

Nablus, P.O.B. 322

Patient's name: Soleiman Hussein Soleiman MADI

From: Salfit

Date: 23 February 1978

To whom it may concern:

The above-mentioned is suffering from abrasions and serious congestion of the epidermis and the muscles of the upper back, shoulders and buttocks, as a result of blows inflicted with a hard object.

The patient requires home rest for two weeks and treatment.

(Signed) JIHAD AUNALLAH

R

Dr. Jamal Abdul Karim Abu Hijleh, Oto-rhinolaryngologist

Tel: 1588

Nablus

Patient's name: Soleiman Hussein Soleiman MADI

From: Salfit Age: 49 years

Date: 24 February 1978

⁵¹ The Special Committee, in each of its reports, has recommended:

[&]quot;(a) That the States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

[&]quot;(b) That suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination; and

[&]quot;(c) That a neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement."

Under this arrangement, the State or States or international organization so nominated might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

[&]quot;(a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of other applicable international instruments:

[&]quot;(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

[&]quot;(c) To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work." [orig. note.]

From an examination of the ears of the abovementioned patient, I found that the left ear had been exposed to pressure resulting from something resembling a blow or from a direct blow on the ear. This resulted in a laceration of the eardrum and its distinct perforation, with traces of blood on the sides of this perforation.

I prescribe treatment and rest for a period of two weeks and also a re-examination.

(Signed) Jamal Abdul Karim Abu Hijleh

7

Report of the Secretary-General regarding Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip⁵²

October 11, 1978

- 1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 32/90 C of 13 December 1977, concerning Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report to it at its thirty-third session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 1 of the resolution. In paragraph 1 of the resolution the Assembly called once more upon Israel (a) to take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation and (b) to desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters.
- 2. By a note verbale dated 15 March 1978, addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General drew attention to his reporting responsibility under paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 32/90 C and requested the Government of Israel to forward to him, as soon as possible, any relevant information on the implementation of the respective provisions of the resolution.
 - 3. By a note verbale dated 15 September 1978,

the Permanent Representative of Israel conveyed to the Secretary-General his Government's comments on resolution 32/90 C, which, as in previous reports on this matter, are reproduced verbatim below:

The Government of Israel wishes to draw attention to the stable security situation prevailing in the Gaza District, and also to the vast amelioration in the economic and social condition of the refugees there.

This situation continues as a direct result of the measures taken in 1971 by the Israel authorities against Arab terrorism, which had been rife in the Gaza District until then and which, for the most part, struck at and grievously harmed the local population.

It is necessary to give some indication of the economic progress achieved since 1967 among refugees and non-refugees alike, since only against this background can the totally misguided nature of the resolution in question be fully evaluated.

In the first five years after 1967, the GNP of the Gaza District rose at an annual average of 18 per cent in real terms. During the next five years, the annual growth rate slackened somewhat to a still impressive average of 8 to 9 per cent. Hence, the aggregate advances in the GNP over the period have been considerable by any standards. This can be translated into simple day-to-day terms. For example, the area of private building-starts rose from 17,000 square metres in 1969 to 250,000 metres in 1976. In 1972, only 6 per cent of the households possessed refrigerators; in 1977, 29 per cent had them. In 1972, 8 per cent of the households possessed television sets; by 1976 the number had jumped to 42 per cent. In 1972, only 2 per cent of the households possessed private cars, as compared with 5 per cent in 1976.

Underpinning this encouraging economic climate is the fact that there continues to be virtually no unemployment in the Gaza District. Of the area's labour force, which numbers approximately 80,000, about one-third—both refugees and non-refugees—have sought and found work in Israel. A recent study shows that 85 per cent of these workers have been at their jobs for over four years, indicating a high degree of labour stability. The wages they earn, equal to those of Israeli workers, have consistently risen at a faster pace than the cost of living, enabling them to achieve a standard of living never before enjoyed by them.

With the aim of alleviating the social condition of the refugees, the Israel authorities have over the last few years completed a number of housing projects outside the camps. These allow refugees to move out of their unsatisfactory shelters in the camps into relatively spacious and well-appointed homes of their own (between 750 and 850 square feet of floor space) at modest cost and on favourable terms. More recently, the authorities, in the light of their experience to date, have favoured projects designed to encourage the refugees to build

their new homes by themselves. This is made possible by providing the refugees with plots of land prepared for building, together with a cash grant, so that the family can build a home to its own specifications.

Having benefited from the economic progress described above, not insignificant numbers of refugees have chosen to take advantage of these opportunities. By the end of August of this year, 790 refugee families, mainly from the camp at Khan Yunis, had been accommodated in the housing project at el-Amal. One thousand families had found new homes in the Sheikh Radwan "A" project, and 922 families from the Rafah camp had moved into the new housing project nearby.

In addition, plans are well in hand for further housing schemes. The Sheikh Radwan "B" project will have room for 1,200 families, of whom 300 will move in within the current year. Similarly, 120 families have already paid the first instalment for the purchase of their building plots at another housing project near Rafah.

In other words, for the first time since 1948, refugees in the Gaza District have been given the possibility of moving out of the squalid conditions of the camps into decent housing, equipped with all the amenities normally available in modern dwellings. Indeed, Israel has been the first country in the Middle East to lend a real hand to the refugees and assist them, through land and monetary grants, in rehabilitation and the improvement of their social standards.

Israel can have no part in any attempt to perpetuate the untold misery which has prevailed in the refugee camps. It will abide by its policy of offering the refugees houses outside the camps. Moreover, it will not adopt the frivolous course advocated in resolution 32/90 C, and will not evict any refugees living in new homes, which have been purchased with their own money and, in a growing number of cases, been built with their own hands.

In the process of moving out of the camps, the formal status of the individuals concerned as refugees entitled to the services of UNRWA is not affected. Israel, therefore, rejects the mischievous suggestions reflected in the resolution in question, at a time when refugees are being enabled, without pressure or coercion, to move to far superior accommodations than they have ever known, and when the refugees themselves are eager to take advantage of this opportunity to better their lives.

It is enough to see the economic and social progress attained by all the Arab population, including refugees, in the areas administered by Israel, in order to recognize resolution 32/90 C for what it is: namely, a hollow piece of Arab political warfare, stemming from a fear that Israel may go far towards solving the refugee problem in the Gaza District and in the other areas, and thus deprive the Arab States—which for thirty years have done little or nothing for the refugees—of a sordid propaganda tool to deploy against Israel.

- 4. The following information concerning Israel's compliance with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 32/90 C is based on reports received from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.
- 5. In the year under review there were no cases of punitive demolition of refugee shelters in the Gaza Strip. The Agency has, however, not yet secured any settlement in respect of its claim for compensation for refugee shelters demolished on punitive grounds in former years.⁵³
- 6. It will be recalled that in 1973 a survey was conducted jointly by the Agency and the Israeli occupying authorities in order to establish the facts regarding the condition of those families affected by the July-August 1971 demolitions.⁵⁴ The survey covered 942 families selected on the basis of preliminary surveys made by the Agency of the conditions at the time of the 2,554 families affected by the 1971 demolitions. The joint survey established that 706 of the 942 families were inadequately housed; of those 706 families, 266 were considered to be serious hardship cases, leaving 440 families recorded as inadequately housed.
- 7. In paragraph 12 of last year's report, reference was made to the offer made by the Israeli authorities of free housing in a housing project near Khan Yunis to refugee families still on the hardship list established by the joint survey of 1973. The offer was extended not only to the families on the hardship list which had still not acquired housing, but

⁵³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 53, document A/31/240, para. 6 and ibid., Thirty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 55, documents A/32/264 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1, para. 5. [orig. note.]

⁵⁴ In July-August 1971, the Israeli occupying authorities demolished a number of shelters in the Jabalia, Beach and Rafah camps, the stated purpose being to construct access roads within the camps. These demolitions affected 2,554 refugee families comprising 15,855 persons; a total of 7,729 shelter rooms were demolished. The developments in regard to the rehousing of these families are referred to in the Commissioner-General's report to the Secretary-General, which was transmitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session (A/8383 and Add. 1), and in the Secretary-General's reports to the Assembly at its twenty-seventh session (Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 40, document A/8814), its twenty-eighth session (A/9155). its twenty-ninth session (ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 38, document A/9740), its thirtieth session (ibid., Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 54, document A/10253), its thirty-first session (ibid., Thirty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 53, document A/31/240) and its thirty-second session (ibid., Thirty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 55, documents A/32/264 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1). [orig. note.]

also to those 110 families which had already purchased houses at subsidized rates in another housing project. In all, a total of 20 families of those which had not acquired housing accepted the offer; of the others, a total of 178 families declined the offer.

- 8. The Agency has continued to bring to the notice of the Israeli authorities the need to provide satisfactory housing for those of the 2,554 families affected by the 1971 demolitions which are still in need. The Israeli authorities, without commitment as to a possible solution, agreed that this matter would be discussed after the rehousing of the 266 families on the hardship list. The Field Director in the Gaza Strip wrote to the authorities asking that the matter be taken up, since the cases of 266 families on the hardship list have been dealt with (see para. 7 above), and proposed that a joint survey be made of the accommodation of families concerned. The Israeli authorities have replied orally indicating to the Agency's Field Office Director that they are not prepared to participate in a joint survey. As a next step the Agency will, therefore, make its own assessment of the condition of the 440 families referred to in paragraph 6.
- 9. Generally, the Israeli occupying authorities require that refugees who decide to purchase new housing demolish their camp shelters. In practice, in all but two cases the shelters were demolished by the refugee families. In those two cases, the vacated shelters were handed over by the Israeli authorities to refugees whose shelters had been demolished on the instructions of the authorities.
- 10. In the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978, a total of 565 families, comprising 3,470 persons, moved from their shelters in the Rafah, Khan Yunis, Deir El Balah, Jabalia and Beach camps to new housing (against payment) in one of the housing projects established by the Israeli authorities; 38 other refugee families, comprising 255 persons, purchased plots of land in a housing project on the terms that they would construct houses conforming to one of the several available standard designs. They have since constructed and moved into new housing. A total of about 200 plots of land have been purchased to date. A total of 984 shelter rooms were demolished in the camps in this connexion.
- 11. Two new housing projects are being developed. One (Beit Lahia) is near Jabalia and

plots of land are being offered for sale to Jabalia camp residents. Twenty four families are now constructing their houses. The other project (Tel Al Sultan) is near Rafah camp and plots of land for housing construction are being offered for sale to Rafah Camp residents and to Rafah local residents.

12. With reference to the comments of the Government of Israel as set out in paragraph 3 above, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA has noted that the references to "squalid conditions of the camps" and "untold misery prevailing in the refugee camps" were also included in the comments made by the Government of Israel last year (A/32/264, para. 3). The Commissioner-General has reiterated the observation he made in that report (A/32/264, para. 14 (b)) that such references are more generalized than is warranted by the facts.

9

Report of the Secretary-General on population and refugees displaced since 1967⁵⁵

October 12, 1978

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of paragraph 4 of its resolution 32/90 E of 13 December 1977, concerning population and refugees displaced since 1967, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to report to it at its thirty-third session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 3 of the resolution. In paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Assembly reiterated its call upon Israel (a) to take immediate steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants and (b) to desist from all measures that obstructed the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories. In paragraphs 1 and 2, the Assembly reaffirmed the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and deplored the continued refusal of the Israeli authorities to take

⁵⁵ UN doc. A/33/286.

steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants.

- 2. By a note verbale dated 15 March 1978 addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General drew attention to his reporting responsibility under paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 32/90 E and requested the Government of Israel to forward to him, as soon as possible, any relevant information on the implementation of the respective provisions of the resolution.
- 3. By a note verbale dated 15 September 1978, the Permanent Representative of Israel conveyed to the Secretary-General his Government's comments on resolution 32/90 E which, as in previous reports on this matter, are reproduced verbatim below:

The Government of Israel has pursued a consistent policy vis-à-vis the persons who left the area of hostilities as a result of the war instigated by Arab Governments in 1967.

Israel has been fully conscious of and has given due weight to the humanitarian aspects of the problem. It has accordingly made special arrangements for the reunification of families and the amelioration of hardship cases among residents of the areas administered by Israel since 1967 and refugees alike. It has also continued its liberal policy of 'open bridges' across the ceasefire lines, which has permitted in the past year the movement of about one million incoming and outgoing residents of those areas and visitors from the neighbouring Arab countries.

At the same time, given its responsibility for the security of its own citizens, as well as for the safety and wellbeing of the population in Judea, Samaria and the District of Gaza, the Government of Israel has been guided by certain security considerations. In particular, it has been mindful of the undisguised attempts of the organization known as the PLO to exploit for its own nefarious purposes Israel's 'open bridges' policy.

As is well known, the organization in question, which deals in indiscriminate terror against both Arabs and Jews, is committed to the destruction of the State of Israel. That objective was reaffirmed in 1977 by the central bodies of the said organization, and has been proclaimed openly by it since then, despite the efforts in progress to achieve a genuine and lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

Over the years, the situation has been exacerbated by the actions of certain Arab Governments which have also tried to abuse the freedom of movement into the administered areas and Israel proper with a view to assisting the infiltration of Arab terrorists, arms and explosives.

These subversive activities have inevitably placed

serious limitations on the return of persons displaced in 1967. Nonetheless, through a balanced policy based on both humanitarian and security considerations, the Government of Israel has facilitated the family reunion of significant numbers of the persons concerned. In the decade from 1967 to 1977, 47,558 persons were permitted to rejoin their families in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Over the past year, the special arrangements for family reunion and hardship cases have been maintained, and the co-operation of the local Arab authorities in this respect has continued.

4. In connexion with paragraph 3 (a) of General Assembly resolution 32/90 E, the Secretary-General has obtained from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA the information available to him on the return of refugees registered with the Agency. As indicated in earlier reports,56 the Agency is not involved in any arrangements for the return of refugees; nor is it involved in any arrangements for the return of displaced persons, none of whom are registered as refugees. Its information is based on requests by returning registered refugees for transfer of rations to the areas to which they have returned and subsequent correction of Agency records. The Agency would not necessarily be aware of the return of any registered refugees who did not request the provision of rations or services but believes they would be very few in number. So far as is known to the Agency, 204 displaced registered refugees returned from east Jordan to the West Bank and 29 from east Jordan to the Gaza Strip between 1 July 1977 and 30 June 1978. It should be noted that some of these may not be displaced registered refugees, but rather members of the family of a displaced registered refugee who accompanied him on his return or joined him there, but who were not themselves displaced in 1967. In the same period, 18 displaced registered refugees returned to the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Thus, taking into account the estimate given in paragraph 4 of last year's report, the number of displaced registered refugees who are known by the Agency to have returned to the occupied territories since June 1967 is about 9,250.

⁵⁶ A/9156, para. 5; Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 38, document A/9740, para. 4; ibid., Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 54, document A/10253, para. 4; ibid., Thirty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 53, document A/31/240, para. 4; and ibid., Thirty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 55, document A/32/263, para. 4. [orig. note.]

The Agency is unable to estimate the total number of displaced inhabitants who have returned. It keeps records only of registered refugees and, as pointed out above, even those records, particularly with respect to location of registered refugees, may be incomplete.

9

Report of the Secretary-General on the health needs of Palestine refugee children⁵⁷ October 17, 1978

- 1. By resolution 32/111 of 15 December 1977, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the Governments of host countries and with relevant United Nations bodies, to undertake a sample survey to ascertain the needs of Palestinian children in refugee camps with a view to averting adverse effects on their health.
- 2. In connexion with the implementation of the resolution, the Secretary-General consulted the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, who informed him that UNRWA,
- in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Governments of host countries, regularly carried out nutrition surveys of Palestine refugee children registered with the Agency as part of its routine health activities. It was agreed that the results of a survey of this kind to be made in 1978 would be made available by UNRWA to the Secretary-General for presentation to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.
- 3. The survey, which is annexed to the present report, was carried out during the first half of 1978 by WHO experts attached to UNRWA.

ANNEX

Survey of the nutritional state of Palestine refugee children registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	Paragraphs
I.	INTRODUCTION	1-5
II.	NUTRITION SURVEYS	6–9
III.	CLINICAL FINDINGS	10–11
IV.	BIOCHEMICAL FINDINGS	12
V.	GROWTH PATTERNS	13–15
VI.	PREVALENCE OF MALNUTRITION	16–22
VII.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	23–26
Appen	dix. Statistical tables	

⁵⁷ UN doc. A/33/181.

I. INTRODUCTION

- 1. In accordance with its mandate the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provides relief, education and health services to more than 1.7 million registered refugees of whom approximately one third live in camps.
- 2. Some 1,562,000 registered refugees are eligible for UNRWA health services and an estimated number of 656,000 of them are children under the age of 15 of whom 232,700 live in camps (71,400 in east Jordan, 30,000 in the West Bank, 66,300 in Gaza, 42,400 in Lebanon and 22,600 in the Syrian Arab Republic).
- 3. As part of its relief programme, UNRWA issues monthly basic dry rations consisting of flour, rice, sugar, oil or fat in amounts calculated to provide 1,500 calories and 42 grams protein per day to about 823,500 beneficiaries. The basic ration is not intended to cover the total nutritional requirements of its recipients but to assist the most needy ones in meeting these requirements by complementing the food commodities they can purchase. Sometimes alterations in the composition of the basic ration issues are necessary to make the best use of donated food commodities. Also the flour component cannot always be issued in full for lack of funds. Because of the ceiling (about 800,000) maintained on the number of ration recipients, potentially eligible infants and small children usually do not receive basic rations but they are, however, eligible for full medical services which include milk distribution and supplementary feeding. They also share in the benefit of the basic monthly rations of other members of the family. Virtually all the infants and small children included in this survey belong to this category.
- 4. Since 1950, upon the recommendation of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Agency decided to develop a supplementary feeding programme for the protection of the most vulnerable groups. This programme includes milk distribution to children and the preparation of daily hot meals for infants, preschool and school children.
- 5. UNRWA also developed an extensive network of maternal and child health services which quickly gained great popularity among intended

beneficiaries. Through its 84 natal and infant health clinics and a school health programme for the 300,000 Palestine refugee children in UNRWA/UNESCO schools, it has been possible to ensure close and continuous medical surveillance of the refugee children eligible for UNRWA assistance.

II. NUTRITION SURVEYS

- 6. At UNRWA's request, FAO and WHO experts performed from 1950 to 1954 annual nutrition surveys of short duration on Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA. In 1958 and 1959, limited complementary studies were conducted by UNRWA. In 1961 and 1962 comprehensive surveys were carried out on representative samples of the military, civilian and refugee segments of the population of Lebanon and Jordan, at the request of these Governments, by the United States Inter-Departmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defence (ICNND). Such comprehensive surveys are beyond the Agency's financial means, but limited investigations were conducted in 1968 and 1970, with the assistance of WHO and the American University of Beirut respectively, for the purpose of evaluating the impact of the 1967 war on the nutritional state of the refugees who as a result of the conflict were displaced for a second time.
- 7. The results of the first surveys had fortunately dissipated the most fearful apprehensions: in spite of the unfavourable living conditions of the refugees, no gross deterioration had taken place and their over-all nutritional status was found to be definitely better than expected; all other successive investigations persistently corroborated these initial findings. They revealed little evidence of malnutrition among adults and school children, while a relatively widespread prevalence of moderate protein energy deficiency was, however, noted among infants and small children.
- 8. The recent nutrition surveys which the Agency decided to carry out with the collaboration of WHO in autumn 1974 and in spring 1975 and 1978 have therefore focused on the population groups already identified as the most vulnerable: children below four years of age, pregnant women and lactating mothers. Five complementary methods were employed: (a) clinical examinations for detection of specific deficiency signs and appraisal

of the general nutritional state of the individuals, (b) anthropometrical measurements of weight and height (length), (c) biochemical determination of haemoglobin levels, (d) interviews with mothers for identification of current feeding practices and (e) analysis of individual health records of children found affected with frank malnutrition. Great efforts were made in order to ascertain the representativeness of the samples randomly taken from among children and mothers registered at UNRWA Maternal and Child Health centres (MCH centres) and the survey teams stayed at a particular location until at least 80 per cent of the individuals included in the sample had been examined. During these three successive surveys a total of 9,986 children and 4,393 mothers were clinically examined and subjected to anthropometrical measurements, and individuals constituting the subsample subjected to biochemical tests. The findings are summarized in this report.

9. Attempts have been made to analyse and interpret their results in the context of the baseline information collected through continuous medical monitoring of the children attending MCH centres and school health services and in the light of knowledge already acquired from previous nutritional investigations.

III. CLINICAL FINDINGS

- 10. No overt cases of protein-energy malnutrition oedema or of severe marasmus were found, though cases of moderate marasmus are seen in the clinics. Clinical signs suggestive of deficiencies in specific vitamins and minerals were found with varying frequency.
- 11. Vitamin A deficiency signs were not seen except for two cases with Bitot spots, a sign the significance of which is doubtful. With the exception of Lebanon, there was practically no clinical evidence of active rickets in any of the fields. Deficiency signs like angular stomatitis, raw tongue, atrophic or hypertrophic papillar and pale tongue were found in 6.6 per cent of the children in Gaza but were rare in the other fields. They may be ascribed to deficiency of several vitamins of the B group or of iron. Mottled teeth indicating a high intake of fluorine were found in a certain percentage of the children in Gaza (annex, table A).

IV. BIOCHEMICAL FINDINGS

12. Haemoglobin determinations in children up to 36 months of age indicate the existence of some degree of anaemia in all age groups examined. Mean haemoglobin concentrations are throughout between 100 g/l and 110 g/l which is indicative of the existence of anaemia in a population. Overall, there may have been a slight improvement in the situation since 1974 but the problem as such has persisted. Although present field methods for haemoglobin determination are too unreliable to allow precise statements on prevalence of anaemia in the different operational fields, tests in 1978 showed that about one quarter of the children have haemoglobin values below 100 g/l, ranging from 0 per cent in the Syrian Arab Republic to 60 per cent in Lebanon. However, the available results give reason for concern and call for further investigation and a review of the presently applied preventive measures.

V. GROWTH PATTERNS

- 13. The mean birth weights of 3.33 kg for boys and 3.22 kg for girls are comparable to values in Europe and North America. The percentage of babies with birth weights below 2,500 grams is equal or even lower than in affluent industrialized countries. Similarly, lengths, head circumferences and chest circumferences give no indication of impaired foetal growth.
- 14. During the first year of life, average weights and lengths follow closely the "Harvard Standard" for about six to eight months. Thereafter, heights and weights become increasingly lower. There is little consistent difference between the various fields in 1978. Since 1974, no significant change seems to have occurred in the mean weights and heights from birth to 36 months; however, a marked improvement is observed in relation to similar data collected in 1963.
- 15. In east Jordan, it was possible to compare the weights and heights with those of the autochotonous population. A previous study (ICNND and ICNJ, 1963) had found a similar pattern of growth in refugee and autochotonous children. This similarity can still be observed in 1975 and 1978, when growth data collected by UNRWA are compared with the results of the study in 1975 by S.S. Hijazi of the University of Jordan. The growth and development of the refugee children

in east Jordan can thus be taken to be not different from that of the general population in that country and consequently the marked improvement in the refugee children is also seen among non-refugee children.

VI. PREVALENCE OF MALNUTRITION

16. Beyond the observation of overt pathology in clinical cases the prevalence of protein-energy malnutrition in children is commonly assessed by considering growth in terms of the development of body weight and body length. Traditionally the classification of Gomez is applied which assesses malnutrition by the body weight attained at a certain age compared to the weight of well-nourished children of the same age. In the populations surveyed there were only isolated cases of "severe malnutrition". Therefore pooled data for severe and moderate malnutrition degrees are shown in table B of the annex.

17. A more recent classification suggested by Waterlow and others makes a distinction between "wasted" or thin children, by relating the weight of a child to that of a well-nourished child of the same height, and those that are "stunted" or short for their age. Table C of the annex gives the percentages of "wasted" children who must be considered as presently undernourished, and also the percentages of "stunted" children, who are small in comparison with the children of the "Harvard Standard" but are not necessarily malnourished.

18. The percentage of abnormally thin children decreases with age and the percentage of abnormally short children increases with age and after 12 months exceeds the number of thin children. With our present state of knowledge it is not possible to state whether the stunted growth of these children has wholly or partly nutritional causes and is a result of chronic or early malnutrition. Therefore for the purposes of this report the prevalence of wasting is used as an expression of malnutrition.

19. As shown in table D of the annex, prevalence of wasting in the east Jordan and Gaza fields are similar. There is an apparent improvement from 1974 to 1975 in both areas, and no significant change from 1975 to 1978. However, while the surveys in 1975 and 1978 were carried out in spring, the survey in 1974 had been conducted in

autumn and coincided with the sharp seasonal increase in diarrhoeal diseases in this age group observed in UNRWA clinics in the third quarter of each year: as figure 4 in the annex shows a similar though less marked peak occurs at the same time in the number of children seen who are underweight for their age indicating the important role of diarrhoeal diseases as a cause of malnutrition (other infectious diseases also have adverse effects on the nutritional state of children).

Comparison between UNRWA operational fields

20. In the 1978 survey, data were collected in all operational fields of UNRWA. In addition to east Jordan and Gaza, there is thus information available also from the West Bank, Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex, table E). Percentages for east Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank show little variation, though wasting during the first 12 months seems to be slightly higher in West Bank children. In Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, the pattern is definitely different, but some caution may be called for because of the relatively small samples examined. Nevertheless, there is a clearly higher prevalence of wasting during the first six months of life in the children in Lebanon, possibly a reflection of the continued civil disturbances during the last years. In the Syrian Arab Republic, where little wasting was found in the first two years of life, there is a high prevalence of wasting during the third year while no stunting is observed.

Comparison with other child populations

21. Interpretation of the meaning of the reported data requires comparison with similar data from an affluent population. Following the procedure now routinely used by the United States Public Health Service in appraisals of the nutritional status of children in different population groups, the existence of malnutrition can be assumed if more than 5 per cent of children have weights relative to their heights below the fifth centile of the reference population. Applied to the 1975 data from east Jordan and Gaza this procedure gave the following results:

Age years	Jordan	Gaza	United States of America* 5 states
0	6.6	7.5	5.4
1	8.9	6.6	6.1
2	5.5	3.0	3.8
			(2-5 yrs)

* "Nutrition Surveillance" (September 1975) published by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service Centre for Disease Control.

22. The figures from east Jordan and Gaza, though on the whole somewhat higher than the expected 5 per cent, are in the same order of magnitude as (average) data from five states of the United States of America in which nutritional surveillance is practised. Therefore, and because of the similarity of the height and weight data of the refugee and of the general population in Jordan (see para. 15 above), it can be deduced that malnutrition among refugee children is mild and does not present a problem of alarming magnitude.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

23. The surveys conducted in 1974, 1975 and 1978 showed a satisfactory general nutritional state of the UNRWA-assisted refugee children. This is substantiated by the absence of severe nutritional failure among infants and small children, known to represent the most vulnerable groups of the refugee population, and by the negligible occurrence among them of specific clinical deficiency signs.

24. The main nutritional problem among Palestine refugee children is a mild to moderate protein-energy malnutrition which is relatively widespread during the weaning period, i.e. when the child is in transition between total breast

feeding and complete weaning. The essential feature appears to be that this malnutrition is secondary to gastro-intestinal disturbances generally of infectious origin.

25. When compared to similar data derived from a non-refugee population living in the same area (Hijazi, Jordan 1975) as well as data from the United States (as published by the United States Public Health Service, 1975), the UNRWA nutrition survey findings indicate that malnutrition among refugee children does not present a problem of alarming magnitude and that the same problem exists to a very similar extent among the nonrefugee population of the age groups concerned. In Jordan in particular both groups of children (namely, Jordanian nationals and Palestine refugees) follow a strikingly similar pattern of growth. Furthermore, the data collected during the recent surveys when compared with the results of the nutrition survey conducted in 1963 demonstrate that during the past decade both refugee and non-refugee children have realized a marked improvement in their growth pattern which must be assumed to be due to a significant rise in their general nutritional state.

26. Another important finding has been a relatively high proportion of infants and small children with moderate-low levels of haemoglobin which reflect the presence of widely spread iron deficiency anaemia. While roughly one fourth of the children below three years of age appear to enjoy satisfactory high level of haemoglobin, half of them are maintaining only a precarious marginal level while the remaining one fourth are definitely anaemic. The size of the problem is therefore quire manageable but the present situation definitively calls for remedial action. The condition seems slightly worse in Lebanon, a probable sequel of the perturbation which the refugee population had to endure during the past vears.

in

APPENDIX

Statistical tables

CONTENTS

Summary of clinical findings per 100 examined in 1978

Table B	Moderate and severe malnutrition degrees (Gomez classification "Harvard Standard")
Table C	"Wasting" and "stunting"
Table D	Percentage of "wasted" children, by age group in Jordan and Gaza in 1974, 1975 and 1978
Table E	Percentage of 'wasted" children, by age group, in different UNRWA operational fields i
	1978
Table F	Comparison of 1975 data with USA data
Figure 1	Average weight curves of refugee and non-refugee children in Jordan in 1963 and 1975:
_	(a) boys and (b) girls

Figure 2 Wasting and stunting in 1978 in UNRWA operational fields Figure 3 Haemoglobin levels by survey year and field

Table A

Figure 4 Diarrhoeal disease and frank malnutrition. Recorded occurrence at UNRWA MCH-clinics among children up to 3 Years.

Table A

Summary of clinical findings per 100 examined in 1978

Clinical signs suggestive of	Jordan	Gaza	West Bank	Syrian Arab Republic	Lebanon
Vitamin A deficiency	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deficiency of B vitamins, or iron	0.6	6.6	2.3	0.5	0.3
Rickets (active)	0.0	0.7	0.4	0.7	4.1
Fluorisis (12–36 months)	0.2	3.8	0.3	0.0	2.0

Table B

Moderate and severe malnutrition degrees
(Gomez classification "Harvard Standard")
All fields, 1978

Table C
"Wasting" and "stunting"
All fields, 1978

Age, months	Per cent	Age	%	%
0-5	11.4	Months	Wasted	Stunted
6-11	7.2	0-5	5.7	7.3
12-17	11.2	6 - 11	4.4	5.7
18-23	9.0	12-17	3.2	14.0
24-29	6.5	18-23	2.6	19.6
30-35	4.9	24 - 35	2.7	18.0

Table D

Percentage of "wasted" children, by age group in Jordan and Gaza in 1974, 1975 and 1978

Age Months	1974	Jordan 1975	1978	1974	Gaza 1975	1978
0-5	18.2	6.6	3.6	9.8	4.6	5.0
6-11	11.6	4.3	5.7	10.2	3.4	2.6
12 - 17	$9.\overline{2}$	2.6	2.6	9.5	2.0	3.1
18 - 23	8.1	2.1	2.0	6.2	2.5	1.8
24 - 36	3.6	1.0	8.0	2.6	0.0	0.6

Table E

Percentage of "wasted" children, by age group, in different UNRWA operational fields in 1978

Months	Jordan	Gaza	West Bank	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic	All fields
0-5	3.6	5.0	6.2	13.6	8.1	5.7
6 - 11	5.7	2.6	7.0	4.9	1.2	4.4
12 - 17	2.6	3.1	1.2	6.0	5.0	3.2
18 - 23	2.0	1.8	2.0	4.0	7.8	2.6
24 - 35	8.0	0.6	0.0	3.6	26.1	2.7

Table F

Comparison of 1975 data with United States of America data⁵⁸

Height for age (both sexes)

(percentage below 5th centile of United States reference population)

Years	Jordan	Gaza	Both	United States of America 5 states
1 1 2	22.1 41.4 36.3	7.3 29.1 36.1	13.3 34.6 36.2	13.0 15.2 10.5 (2–5 years)


⁵⁸ Centre for Disease Control: "Nutrition Surveillance" (September 1975) by United States Department of Health Education and Welfare, Public Health Service. [orig. note.]


Weight for age (both sexes) (percentage low)

Years	Jordan	Gaza	Both	United States of America 5 states
1	14.5	9.0	11.3	7.8
1	30.2	21.9	25.6	7.8
2	20.7	18.5	19.3	5.3
				(2-5 years)


Weight for height (both sexes)


Years	Jordan	Gaza	Both	United States of America 5 states
1	6.6	7.5	7.1	5.4
1	8.9	6.6	7.7	6.1
2	5.5	3.0	3.9	3.8
				(2-5 years)





mme: 11N doc A/33/181





10

Report of the Secretary-General on offers of scholarships and grants for higher education for Palestine refugees⁵⁹

October 18, 1978

- 1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 32/90 F of 13 December 1977. By that resolution the Assembly appealed to all States to make special allocations, scholarships and grants to Palestine refugees and invited relevant United Nations agencies to consider the inclusion, within their respective spheres of competence, of assistance for higher education for Palestine refugee students. The Assembly requested the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to act as recipient and trustee for such special allocations and scholarships and to award them to qualified Palestine refugee candidates. The Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its thirty-third session on the implementation of the resolution.
- 2. The resolution was transmitted to all States and to the specialized agencies on 23 March and 12 May 1978, respectively. In addition, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA addressed a special appeal to all States on 31 May 1978.
- 3. Eight Member States, namely, Egypt, Germany, Federal Republic of, Kuwait, Poland, the Sudan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, have informed the Commissioner-General of UNRWA that they are already providing scholarships for higher education to Palestinians. Another, Denmark, has advised that it has scholarships available for foreign students and for which Palestine refugee students may apply.
- 4. Three specialized agencies, namely, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation and the International Telecommunication Union have informed the Commissioner-General of UNRWA that, independently of resolution 32/90 F, discussions have already been held with representatives of Palestinian organizations about the

provision of assistance to Palestinians to pursue higher education and technical studies by means of fellowships within these agencies' technical assistance programmes. One agency, UNESCO, referred to its long-standing involvement with UNRWA projects, one of which is UNESCO's regular provision of fellowships to UNRWA Palestinian staff for specialized training of which, for 1978, 17 were approved and 11 granted. Two of the agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, indicated that the request for assistance had been noted for consideration. In addition, a communication was received through the Chairman of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA from the Universal Postal Union, advising that, in implementation of Economic and Social Council resolution 2100 (LXIII) of 3 August 1977, UPU envisaged organizing courses for Palestine refugees at the Higher Arab Postal Institute in Damascus and offering one or two scholarships for this or a similar course of training in postal services.

5. The Commissioner-General has advised the Secretary-General that UNRWA will make available to prospective candidates whatever information it receives about scholarships offered by States and specialized agencies for which Palestine refugee students might be eligible. It also stands ready to carry out the functions assigned to it by the General Assembly of acting as the recipient and trustee of special allocations and scholarships whenever such funds and scholarships are made available to it.

11

Report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories⁶⁰

November 2, 1978

1. In its resolution 32/171 of 19 December 1977, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant

⁵⁹ UN doc. A/33/287.

⁶⁰ UN Doc. A/33/354. The resolution is printed as doc. 30 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

United Nations organs and specialized agencies, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA), to prepare and submit to the Assembly at its thirty-third session a comprehensive and analytical report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. It further requested the Secretary-General in preparing the report to consult and co-operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people.

- 2. The resolution followed and expanded the scope of General Assembly resolution 31/110 of 16 December 1976, on the same subject. Pursuant to resolution 31/110, the Secretary-General submitted a report (A/32/228) to the Assembly at its thirty-second session. It may be recalled that the representative of the Secretary-General explained that, because the Secretary-General had no independent sources of information, the report consisted of replies and pertinent excerpts from documentary material submitted by the countries concerned as well as the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies in response to the Secretary-General's request for information on the subject-matter of the report.
- 3. The General Assembly at its thirty-second session, after considering the report submitted by the Secretary-General, expressed the view that there was need for further analysis in order to meet fully the objectives of resolution 31/110.
- 4. In view of the broad scope of the report now requested by the General Assembly, and recognizing the difficult constraints of time and place under which the report would have to be prepared, the Secretary-General decided to submit a report based on an impartial expert analysis of the social and economic impact.
- 5. In order to discharge the task requested of him in the resolution and to ensure a balanced expert view, the Secretary-General planned to utilize the services of a team of three consultants, comprising a physical planner, an economist and a sociologist. It was envisaged that the consultants, accompanied by an official of UNRWA or ECWA, would visit the countries concerned, including particularly the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities of June 1967,

in order to provide a first-hand account of the social and economic impact.

- 6. The Secretary-General also decided to request the Government of Israel and the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization to make available such information as they might have and to co-operate in providing and obtaining other information as needed. Available written material would have to be supplemented through personal interviews and other direct inquiries in the field. In that connexion, the Secretary-General intended that the consultants should also visit the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization, UNRWA and ECWA in Beirut.
- 7. At an early stage, the Secretariat undertook the selection of candidates in each of the three fields of expertise, paying particular attention, in view of the nature of the assignment and the time available to complete it, to the professional competence and relevant experience of the candidates under consideration. Three candidates suitable for the task and available to undertake the assignment at that time were tentatively selected.
- 8. The Secretary-General sent a note verbale dated 9 May 1978 to the Permanent Representative of Israel, drawing attention to the resolution and requesting such information as might be available on the subject-matter of the report requested by the General Assembly. The note requested that the information be provided by 30 June 1978. In informing the Permanent Representative of Israel of his intention to send to the occupied territories a mission comprising the consultants accompanied by an official of UNRWA or ECWA, the Secretary-General requested that the Israeli authorities extend to the mission the necessary assistance and co-operation. In particular, the Permanent Representative of Israel was informed that the proposed visit by the consultants to the occupied territories was of special importance for the performance of their tasks. A reply was requested by 31 May 1978.
- 9. The Permanent Representative of Israel, in a note verbale dated 31 May 1978, expressed concern regarding the tenor of the resolution. However, he stated that his Government would be ready to supply the Secretary-General with information germane to the matter. Subsequently, certain materials were transmitted to the Sec-

retariat by the Permanent Mission of Israel. The note verbale from the Permanent Representative made no reference to the Secretary-General's request that the consultants, accompanied by an official of UNRWA or ECWA, be given free access to, and freedom of movement in, the occupied territories in connexion with the preparation of the report.

- 10. The Secretary-General reiterated his request in a note verbale dated 27 July 1978. In a reply dated 18 August 1978, the Permanent Mission of Israel noted that the reports and impressions of many visitors to the territories administered by Israel since 1967, including, *inter alia*, economists, sociologists and health and labour experts, fully illustrated the improvement in living conditions of the Palestinians in those territories, and it therefore deemed the sending of a mission of experts unnecessary.
- 11. In a note to the Permanent Mission of Israel dated 11 September 1978, the Secretary-General stated that he considered the visit to the occupied territories essential if he were to be able to submit an independent and objective report to the General Assembly based on a first-hand account of the social and economic impact. In that connexion, the Secretary-General expressed the hope that the Government of Israel might extend to the consultants the necessary co-operation and facilities to gather the relevant information in the occupied territories.
- 12. On 9 May 1978, the Secretary-General also addressed notes verbales to the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, drawing attention to the resolution and requesting such information as might be made available on the subject-matter of the report requested by the General Assembly. The note requested that the information be provided by 30 June 1978. The Secretary-General also informed the Permanent Representatives of the three countries of his intention to send a mission, comprising the three consultants accompanied by an official of UNRWA or ECWA, to their countries, with the request that the necessary assistance and cooperation be extended to the consultants. The Governments were requested to reply by 31 May
- 13. In a note verbale dated 26 May 1978, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that his Government welcomed

the team of consultants for the preparation of the report and that the competent authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic would extend to the consultants all possible assistance and co-operation.

- 14. The Permanent Representative of Egypt, in a note verbale dated 30 May 1978, stated that the Egyptian authorities welcomed a visit by the consultants, accompanied by an official of UNRWA or ECWA, in regard to the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General.
- 15. The Permanent Representative of Jordan, in a note verbale dated 17 July 1978, informed the Secretary-General of his Government's readiness to provide all possible assistance and co-operation to the proposed team of experts. He further informed the Secretary-General that a committee was being formed, consisting of representatives of the Central Bank of Jordan, the National Council for Planning, the Royal Society for Scientific Research and the Executive Office for the Affairs of the Occupied Territories, to prepare a report on the conditions of the refugees.
- 16. No reference was made in the replies of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic to the request for information relevant to the subject-matter of the report.
- 17. Also on 9 May 1978, the Secretary-General sent a note verbale to the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, drawing attention to the resolution and requesting such information as might be available on the subjectmatter of the report requested by the General Assembly.
- 18. The Secretary-General, in a note verbale dated 5 September 1978, again drew the attention of the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the resolution and reiterated his request for information germane to the subjectmatter of the report. No reply to the Secretary-General's note verbale of 9 May 1978 to the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization has been received as of the date of this interim report.
- 19. Meanwhile, after consultation with the Executive Secretary of ECWA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Beirut, it was decided that in view of the situation prevailing in Beirut the mission should not proceed to the area at this time.
- 20. In the light of the circumstances referred to above, it has not been possible, despite every

effort to do so, to prepare the full report called for by resolution 32/171 in time for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. The Secretary-General hopes that a full report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories will be prepared and submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

12

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories⁶¹

November 13, 1978

Report of the Secretary-General

- 1. At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 32/91 B and C of 13 December 1977 concerning the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. In paragraph 11 of resolution 32/91 C, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General:
- (a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories, with a view to investigating the Israeli policies and practices referred to in the resolution;
- (b) To continue to make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;
- (c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat and, where necessary, to reprint those reports of the Special Committee which are no longer available.
- 2. The present report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 11 (d) of resolution 32/91 C.

- 3. The Secretary-General continued, as in previous years, to provide the facilities required by the Special Committee. In response to the request addressed to him by the General Assembly in paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 32/91 C, the services of an additional staff member and of staff on temporary assistance were made available to assist the Special Committee.
- 4. In response to paragraph 11 (c) of General Assembly resolution 32/91 C, the Office of Public Information undertook the action outlined in the following paragraphs to ensure the widest possible dissemination of the report of the Special Committee.
- 5. The proceedings of the Special Committee were given full coverage by press releases.
- 6. The January 1978 issue of the monthly *UN Chronicle* carried an article of approximately one-and-a-half pages on the action taken by the General Assembly on 13 December 1977 on the basis of the report of the Special Committee.
- 7. The report and proceedings of the Special Committee were covered in the Weekly News Summary. The coverage was broadcast in 15 languages. In addition, the radio news magazine The Week at the United Nations covered the subject extensively. Programmes for broadcast in the Middle East and North African regions placed special emphasis on this subject.
- 8. As in the previous year, the Information Centres Service drew the attention of the Directors of the 58 information centres to the report of the Special Committee and requested that this report be given the widest publicity. The information centres also distributed to non-governmental organizations, government ministries, educational institutions, the information media and the public various information materials produced by the Office of Public Information.
- 9. Relevant documentation of the Special Committee was made available to representatives of non-governmental organizations. The Public Inquiries Unit continued to provide the report on request. In addition, the report of the Special Committee was included in special packets of information material on the activities of the United Nations related to the Middle East question.

⁶¹ UN doc. A/33/369. The resolution is printed as doc. 27 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Report Submitted to the Security Council

13

Report of the Secretary-General regarding the situation in the Middle East⁶² October 17, 1978

Report of the Secretary-General

CONTENTS

	P	'aragraphs
I.	INTRODUCTION	1 - 3
II.	STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE	4-27
III.	SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES	28 - 43
IV.	PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM	44-50
V.	PALESTINIAN RIGHTS	51 - 60
VI	SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT	61 - 99

I. INTRODUCTION

- 1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 32/20 of 25 November 1977, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its thirty-third session a comprehensive report covering the developments in the Middle East in all their aspects. A summary of that resolution appears in paragraph 91 of section VI below.
- 2. It may be recalled that, on 18 May 1973, the Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report to the Security Council (S/10929) in which he gave an account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations since June 1967 to deal with the various aspects of the situation in the Middle East. A similar pattern is followed in the present report. Emphasis is given to the search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and to the status of the cease-fire which has a direct

bearing on the efforts towards such a settlement. The other aspects of the Middle East problem are dealt with more briefly since they will be the subject of separate reports to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session in pursuance of the relevant decisions of the Assembly.

3. The present report is based mainly on information available in United Nations documents. In view of the decisions of the General Assembly on the control and limitation of United Nations documentation, reference will be made to the comprehensive report of 18 May 1973⁶³ and to other reports of the Secretary-General and official United Nations documents concerning the Middle East, whenever appropriate, in order to avoid duplication.

II. STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

4. The status of the cease-fire in the Middle East up to May 1973 is described in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 to the Security Council (S/10929, paras. 3–13). There was only one United Nations peace-keeping opera-

⁶² UN doc. S/12896. The resolution is printed as doc. 24 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁶³ Doc. 8 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

tion in the area at that time, namely, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). Its main activities were to carry out three cease-fire observation operations established in pursuance of the Security Council, one in the Israel-Syria sector (Security Council resolution 235 (1967) of 9 June 1967), another in the Egypt-Israel or Suez Canal sector (consensus approved by the Security Council on 10 July 1967) and a third one in the Israel-Lebanon sector (consensus of the Security Council of 19 April 1972).

A. Establishment of UNEF

5. On 6 October 1973, hostilities broke again in the Egypt-Israel and Israel-Syria sectors. On 22 October the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (1973) in which it called for an immediate cease-fire, called upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and decided that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The next day, as fighting continued in the Egypt-Israel sector, the Council adopted resolution 339 (1973)64 by which it confirmed its call for an immediate cease-fire and requested the Secretary-General to take measures for the immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces. In pursuance of this resolution, UNTSO observers were dispatched to the battle zone, but fighting continued (S/7930/Add. 2219).

6. On 25 October the Security Council met again and adopted resolution 340 (1973)⁶⁵ in which it demanded that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973, decided to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council and requested the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the

steps taken to this effect.

7. On 26 October the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report (S/11052/Rev. 1) in which he set forth the terms of reference of UNEF, the general considerations and guidelines for the functioning of the Force and the steps he proposed to take in order to set up the Force without delay. The next day the Security Council, by its resolution 341 (1973), approved the report of the Secretary-General and decided that UNEF should be established for an initial period of six months, subject to extension.

8. Shortly after the adoption of this resolution the first elements of UNEF arrived in the area of operations, and following their arrival tension subsided, and the cease-fire was restored. The situation in the Egypt-Israel sector has remained generally quiet since then. An account of the establishment and the activities of UNEF is contained in the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the subject (S/11248 and Add. 1–7, S/11536 and Add. 1, S/11670 and Corr. 1 and 2, S/11758, S/11849, S/12212 and S/12416).

9. The mandate of the Force has been extended as necessary by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Secretary-General and with the agreement of the parties concerned. The last extension of UNEF, as decided by the Security Council in its resolution 416 (1977)⁶⁶ of 21 October 1977, was for a further period of one year, until 24 October 1978. The general terms of reference of UNEF remain as contained in the Secretary-General's report mentioned in paragraph 7 above, but the tasks of the Force were expanded in the light of subsequent agreements concluded between the parties (see paras. 67-76 below). The present task of the Force is essentially to supervise the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975. In this connexion, the Force mans and controls a buffer zone between the Egyptian and Israeli forces, inspects areas of limited forces and armaments on both sides of the buffer zone and supervises the demilitarized character of the Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar oil fields area.

10. The total strength of UNEF was initially to be in the order of 7,000, and this level was reached by January 1974. Later, as the situation in the Egypt-Israel sector quieted down, the

⁶⁴ Doc. 35 in ibid.

⁶⁵ Doc. 36 in ibid.

⁶⁶ Doc. 32 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

strength of the Force was gradually reduced. At present, the Force is composed of seven contingents, from Australia, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Poland and Sweden, and has a strength of about 4,300. It may be mentioned for the record that four contingents which participated in UNEF at its early stages were withdrawn at the request of their Governments, the Irish contingent in May 1974, the Nepalese in August 1974, the Panamanian in November 1974 and the Senegalese in June 1976. Two other contingents, from Austria and Peru, were transferred to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force together with parts of the Canadian and Polish logistic components when that Force was established in May 1974.

11. Following the establishment of UNEF, the cease-fire observation operation carried out by UNTSO was discontinued, and UNTSO observers assigned to the area are now assisting UNEF in the performance of its tasks.

B. Establishment of UNDOF

12. Towards the end of the hostilities of October 1973, the Israeli forces moved forward of the 1967 cease-fire lines in the Israel-Syria sector and occupied a salient around the village of Sassa, some 40 kilometres west of Damascus. Following the adoption of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the cease-fire arrangements were adjusted to the new situation and some of the UNTSO observers were redeployed around the new forward defended localities of the opposing forces (S/11057, para. 9). With these adjustments the cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Syria sector continued. There was no further forward movement of troops, but the cease-fire was marred by many firing incidents, mainly in the Sassa Salient, during the early months of 1974 (see reports of the Secretary-General in the S/11057/Add. series).

13. As described in paragraph 73 below, an agreement on the disengagement of the Israeli and Syrian forces was concluded on 31 May 1974. This Agreement and its Protocol provided essentially for the strict observance of the ceasefire, a partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces on the Golan Heights, the redeployment of the Israeli and Syrian forces along agreed lines, the establishment of an area of separation between those two lines and of areas of limitation in armaments

and forces on both sides of the area of separation. The provisions of the Agreement were to be supervised by a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

14. On 31 May, after being informed by the Secretary-General of the signing of the Agreement, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974)⁶⁷ in which it decided to set up immediately under its authority the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect. The Force was established for an initial period of six months, subject to extension by the Security Council.

15. UNTSO observers in the Israel-Syria sector were immediately assigned to the new Force and were soon joined by contingents transferred from UNEF. The cease-fire became effective upon the conclusion of the disengagement agreement. The area has remained generally quiet since then. The establishment and the activities of the Force are outlined in the reports of the Secretary-General on the subject (S/11310 and Add. 1–4, S/11563 and Add. 1, S/12083 and Add. 1, S/12235, S/12453 and S/12710).

16. The mandate of UNDOF has been extended as necessary by the Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, in much the same way as for UNEF. The last extension was for a period of six months, until 30 November 1978, in accordance with Security Council resoluresolution 429 (1978)⁶⁸ of 31 May 1978.

17. As stipulated in the Agreement on disengagement of forces between Israel and Syria, the strength of UNDOF has been maintained around 1,250. The Force, which is composed of personnel from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, consists of four national contingents and 90 observers detailed from UNTSO. Originally the four contingents were the Austrian and Peruvian infantry battalions and the Canadian and Polish logistic elements detached from UNEF. Later, in July 1975, the Peruvian contingent was withdrawn at the request of its Government and replaced by an Iranian contingent.

18. The UNTSO cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Syria sector was discontinued

⁶⁷ Doc. 32 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

⁶⁸ Doc. 33 below.

after the establishment of UNDOF and, as indicated above, 90 observers were incorporated into UNDOF.

19. With the establishment of UNDOF, the United Nations had two peace-keeping forces and one observer mission in the Middle East. Consequently, the Secretary-General felt that it would be desirable to establish a co-ordinating mechanism for the activities and administration of those operations, and in August 1975, with the agreement of the Security Council (S/11808), he appointed Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo as Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East.

C. Establishment of UNIFIL

20. The cease-fire observation operation set up by UNTSO in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to function until March 1978. Following the outbreak of the Lebanese crisis in 1975, the UNTSO area of operations in southern Lebanon came under the control of various de facto forces, and this situation often made the UNTSO operation very difficult. Nevertheless, UNTSO observers continued to man the five observation posts in southern Lebanon as well as their forward headquarters at Nagoura as best they could under exceptionally difficult conditions, and they continued to observe and report on the observance of the cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon along the armistice demarcation line (see reports of the Secretary-General on the S/11663/Add/ Series).

21. In a letter dated 13 March addressed to the Secretary General (A/33/64-S/12598), the Permanent Representative of Israel complained about an incident in Israel on 11 March, which resulted in 37 civilians dead and 76 others wounded and for which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had claimed responsibility. On 15 March the Israeli forces invaded Lebanon and by 19 March they had occupied all territory south of the Litani River except for a pocket around the city of Tyre.

22. On 19 March the Security Council adopted resolution 425 (1978) in which it called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and to withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory, decided to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations Interim Force for

southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations, and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 24 hours on the implementation of that resolution.

23. On the same day, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council (S/ 12611) setting forth the terms of reference of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the general considerations and guidelines for the functioning of the Force and a proposed plan of action. The general considerations and guidelines proposed by the Secretary-General are similar to those applied to UNEF and UNDOF. The Secretary-General envisaged the task of UNIFIL as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force would confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this was achieved, it would establish and maintain an area of operation as defined. In this connexion, it would supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. Later on the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 426 (1978) by which it approved the report of the Secretary-General and decided that UNIFIL should be established for an initial period of six months, subject to extension.

24. The authorized strength of UNIFIL was initially set at 4,000. Subsequently, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council decided to increase it to 6,000 (Security Council resolution 427 (1978) of 3 May 1978). As at the beginning of September 1978, the Force was composed of contingents from Canada, Fiji, France, Iran, Ireland, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway and Senegal and had a total strength of about 5,900.

25. The establishment and activities of UNIFIL have been described in the reports submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on this subject (S/12620 and Add. 1–5 and S/12845). As indicated in his periodic report of 13 September

1978 (S/12845), the Israeli forces completed their withdrawal from Lebanese territory on 13 June 1978, but the fact that they handed over control of the border area to Lebanese *de facto* armed groups, rather than to UNIFIL, has continued to make impossible the full deployment of the Force and the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in the whole area of operation. Thus, while UNIFIL has made good initial progress, much remains to be done before the task entrusted to UNIFIL by the Security Council is fulfilled.

26. After considering the report of the Secretary-General, the Security Council decided, by its resolution 434 (1978) of 18 September 1978, to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of four months, until 19 January 1979.

27. Before concluding this section; a reference should be made to a recent development which is not directly related to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. On 6 October 1978, the Security Council adopted resolution 436 (1978) in which the Council, after noting the deteriorating situation in Beirut and its surroundings and the appeal made on 4 October by the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, called upon all those involved in hostilities in Lebanon to put an end to acts of violence and observe scrupulously an immediate and effective cease-fire and cessation of hostilities so that internal peace and national reconciliation could be restored, based on the preservation of Lebanese unity, territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty. In the same resolution the Council also called upon all involved to permit units of the International Committee of the Red Cross into the area of conflict to evacuate the wounded and provide humanitarian assistance, and supported the Secretary-General in his efforts and requested him to continue these efforts to bring about a durable cease-fire. One day earlier the Secretary-General had asked Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan to undertake a humanitarian mission to the area with a view to extending the Secretary-General's good offices to facilitate the cessation of hostilities.

III. SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

28. The efforts undertaken by the United Nations concerning the situation in the occupied territories and the question of Jerusalem from June 1967 until May 1973 have been described

in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 (S/10929, paras, 14–34).

29. The mandate of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories has been renewed by the General Assembly at every session since 1973, and the Special Committee has continued to report yearly to the Assembly on the situation in the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem.

30. The General Assembly, at its thirty-second session, after considering the report of the Special Committee (A/32/284)⁶⁹ adopted three resolutions on 13 December 1977. By resolution 32/91 A, it reaffirmed that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,70 was applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and called again upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention. By resolution 32/91 B,71 it condemned "the massive deliberate destruction of Quneitra perpetrated during the Israeli occupation and prior to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that city in 1974". By resolution 32/91 C, it condemned certain Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and demanded that Israel desist forthwith from those policies and practices.

31. At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly will have before it reports of the Special Committee concerning Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, the destruction of Quneitra and the treatment of civilians in detention in the occupied territories and a report of the Secretary-General concerning the facilities made available to the Special Committee to carry out its tasks and to ensure the widest circulation of information regarding its activities and findings.

32. The General Assembly has also given special attention to three problems relating to the situation in the occupied territories, namely, the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the question of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the living conditions of the Palestinian people.

33. At its thirty-second session, the General

⁶⁹ Doc. 8 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁷⁰ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287. [orig. note.]

⁷¹ Doc. 27 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Assembly decided to include in its agenda an additional item entitled "Recent illegal Israeli measures in the occupied Arab territories designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories in contravention of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of Israel's international obligations under the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and of United Nations resolutions, and obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East".

34. After considering the item at its 47th to 52nd plenary meetings, the General Assembly, on 28 October 1977, adopted resolution 32/5,⁷² in which it deplored the Israeli activities listed in the item, called upon Israel to desist from such action and requested the Secretary-General to undertake urgent contacts with the Government of Israel to ensure the prompt implementation of the resolution and to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

35. In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General addressed an appropriate request to the Permanent Representative of Israel to which the latter replied that the position and views of his Government had been explained in detail in his interventions during the debate of the General Assembly on the item. The Secretary-General conveyed this reply to the General Assembly and the Security Council in his report of 30 December 1977 (A/32/498-S/12512).

36. The General Assembly also considered the question of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in occupied territories and the question of the living conditions of the Palestinians in occupied territories at its thirty-second session. By its resolution 32/161 of 19 December 1977, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the first of these subjects (A/32/204), reaffirmed that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities in the occupied Arab territories were illegal, and called upon Israel immediately to desist forthwith from all such measures. By its resolution 32/171, it requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its thirty-third session a comprehensive and analytic report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation

on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.

37. The Security Council examined questions relating to the situation in the occupied territories on several occasions. By a letter dated 19 March 1976 (S/12017), the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Pakistan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied territories. The Security Council met from 22 to 25 March, but no decision could be adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member (S/PV. 1893–1899).

38. In a letter dated 3 May 1976 (S/12066) the representative of Egypt drew the attention of the Security Council to developments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which were "a pitiful result of the continuation of Israeli occupation as well as an outright affirmation of the Palestinian people's refusal of the Israeli terrorist practices", and he requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continued deterioration of the situation.

39. The Security Council held seven meetings on this item between 4 and 26 May (S/PV. 1916–1922). At the close of the debate on 26 May, the President declared that, after consulting all the members of the Security Council, the majority of the members agreed on the following:

Grave anxiety was expressed over the present situation in the occupied Arab territories; concern was also expressed about the well-being of the population of those territories. The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The occupying Power was therefore asked strictly to respect the provisions of that text and to refrain from and rescind any measure which would violate them. In this connexion, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories, which are such as to modify their demographic composition or geographical character, and in particular the establishment of settlements, were deplored. These measures, which cannot prejudge the outcome of the efforts to achieve peace, constitute an obstacle to peace. The Security Council should continue to follow the situation closely.

40. In a letter dated 20 October 1976 (S/12218), the Permanent Representative of Egypt requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider the dangerous and explosive situation in the occupied Arab territories resulting from continuing repres-

⁷² Doc. 22 in ibid.

sive measures by Israel against the inhabitants of those territories.

- 41. The Security Council held four meetings on this item between 1 and 11 November 1976. At the conclusion of the debate, the President of the Security Council stated, after consulting all the members, that the Council had agreed on the following:
- (1) To express its grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation;
- (2) Reaffirmation of its call upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the territories and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;
- (3) Its reaffirmation that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Therefore, the occupying Power is called upon once again to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from any measure that violates them. In this regard, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature and particularly the establishment of settlements are accordingly strongly deplored. Such measures which have no legal validity and cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace constitute an obstacle to peace;
- (4) It considers once more that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon and the transfer of populations which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem, are invalid and cannot change that status, and urgently calls upon Israel once more to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem. In this connexion the Council deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967;
- (5) Its recognition that any act of profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security.
- 42. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has continued to give attention to the question of human rights in the occupied territories. Most recently, it adopted resolutions 1 A and B (XXIV) entitled "Question of the viola-

- tion of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine". Those resolutions, which condemned Israeli policies and practices along lines similar to those of General Assembly resolution 32/91 mentioned above, were brought to the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council by the Secretary-General at the request of the Commission by a note dated 29 June 1978 (A/33/161-S/12758).
- 43. Since the General Assembly last discussed the matter, the situation in the occupied territories has been the subject of a number of communications addressed to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General and circulated as official documents of the United Nations (S/12563, A/33/60-S/12575, A/33/78-S/12640, A/33/88-S/12669, A/33/116-S/12725, A/33/151, A/33/153-S/12752, A/33/164-S/12762, A/33/165, A/33/175-S/12767, A/33/184-S/12777, A/33/203-S/12805, A/33/204-S/12806, A/33/206, A/33/211-S/12816, A/33/218-S/12820, A/33/230-S/12838, A/33/233-S/12844).

IV. PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

- 44. The Palestine refugee problem and the United Nations effort to assist the refugees up to May 1973 were dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 (S/10929, paras. 35–42).
- 45. The General Assembly has continued to review annually the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on the basis of the reports submitted by the Commissioner-General of the Agency. Following its consideration of the Commissioner-General's report⁷³ at its thirtysecond session, the Assembly, by resolution 32/90 A of 13 December 1977, reiterated its gratitude to the Agency in providing essential services for the Palestine refugees and, after noting with deep regret that the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of serious concern, extended the Agency's mandate until 30 June 1981. The Assembly took this action without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), calling for repatriation or compensation of the refugees, which it noted with

⁷³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/32/13). [orig. note.]

regret had not been effected. The Assembly also noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requested it to continue its work towards that objective.

46. The problem of financing UNRWA's operations has been a matter of increasing concern to the General Assembly. UNRWA's funding is derived almost entirely from voluntary contributions, mainly from Governments, and for many years it has experienced difficulty in securing the financial support necessary to maintain its services. In its resolution 32/90 A, the Assembly noted with profound concern that the level of income available to UNRWA was still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements and called upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet UNRWA's needs. In particular, it urged non-contributing Governments to contribute regularly and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions. In a related decision, in resolution 32/90 D, the Assembly extended for another year the mandate of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and requested it to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, to assist in assuring the Agency's financial security.

47. The General Assembly has continued to give attention to the population and refugees displaced as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. In its resolution 32/90 B, it endorsed the efforts of UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance to those persons. After considering a report of the Secretary-General on the matter (A/32/263), the Assembly adopted resolution 32/90 E, it reaffirmed the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and called once more upon Israel (a) to take immediate steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants and (b) to desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories.

48. The situation of Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip has been of special concern to the General Assembly since 1971 when the Commissioner-General reported (A/8383 and Add. 1) that,

as a result of operations carried out by the Israeli military authorities, large numbers of shelters in refugee camps had been demolished and approximately 15,000 refugees had been removed. At its thirty-second session, after considering the reports of the Secretary-General on this subject (A/32/264 and Add. 1), the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/90 E, in which it called once more on Israel (a) to take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they had been removed and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation and (b) to desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters.

49. At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly also directed attention to two new questions concerning Palestine refugees. By resolution 32/90 F, it appealed to all States to make special allocations of scholarships and grants to Palestine refugees and requested UNRWA to act as recipient and to make awards to qualified Palestinian refugee candidates. By resolution 32/111 on the health needs of Palestinian refugee children, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with Governments of host countries and with relevant United Nations bodies, to undertake a sample survey to ascertain the needs of Palestinian children in refugee camps with a view to averting adverse effects on their health.

50. In addition to the annual report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA,⁷⁴ the Assembly will have before it at its thirty-third session reports of the Secretary-General on the return of refugees to their camps in the Gaza Strip and the provision of shelters for them (A/33/285), on the return of the displaced inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 (A/33/286), on the allocation of scholarships and grants to Palestinian refugees (A/33/287) and on the health needs of Palestinian refugee children (A/33/181), a report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/33/276) as well as a report to be submitted by the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA.

V. PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

51. In its consideration of the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the General Assembly adopt-

⁷⁴ Ibid., Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/33/13). [orig. note.]

ed, in 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1973, resolutions in which it recognized that the problem arose from the denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that the full respect for those rights was indispensable for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East (resolutions 2535 B (XXIV), 2672 C (XXV), 2792 (XXVI), 2963 E (XXVII) and 3089 D (XXVIII)).

52. In 1974, at its twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly included the item "Question of Palestine" in its agenda at the request of 56 States Members. In an explanatory memorandum attached to the request, the sponsors of the item stated that, although the General Assembly had been continuously seized with the question of Palestine since 1947, it had not at any time considered the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine as a separate item. It was therefore deemed incumbent upon the Assembly to consider the question of Palestine in its true and proper form, particularly as the General Assembly had in recent years recognized and reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

53. During that session, three resolutions were adopted on the question of Palestine. On 14 October 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3210 (XXIX), in which it invited the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in its deliberations on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings. On 22 November 1974, by resolution 3236 (XXIX), the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including the right of national independence and sovereignty and the right to return to their homes and properties from which they had been displaced and uprooted, emphasized that full respect for and the realization of the rights of the Palestinian people were indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine and requested the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the PLO on all matters concerning the question of Palestine. On the same day, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 3237 (XXIX), by which it invited the PLO to participate in the capacity of Observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and of all international conferences convened under its auspices.

54. In accordance with the request contained in resolution 3236 (XXIX), contacts with the PLO were established and members of the Secretariat met with representatives of the PLO as the occasion required. Following the adoption of resolution 3237 (XXIX), the PLO appointed Permanent Observers to the United Nations, both in New York and Geneva. The observers of the PLO have since attended meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other United Nations bodies on various occasions.

55. At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 by which, among other things, it requested the Security Council to consider and adopt the necessary resolutions and measures in order to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights and called for the invitation of PLO in all deliberations on the Middle East held under the auspices of the United Nations. On the same day, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3376 (XXX) by which it decided to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, composed of twenty Member States (by resolution 31/318 of of 22 December 1976, the General Assembly raised the number of members to 23) and entrusted it with the task of recommending to the General Assembly a programme of implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People was requested to submit its report and recommendations not later than 1 June 1976 to the Secretary-General, who was to transmit it to the Security Council for its consideration.

56. In June 1976 the Committee submitted its report requested by General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) (S/12090).

57. The Security Council considered the report of the Committee during seven meetings, between 18 and 29 June 1976, but no resolution could be adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member (S/PV.1928, 1933–1938). On 21 July the Committee, taking note of the Security Council's action, reaffirmed its recommendations and submitted its report to the General Assembly.⁷⁵

58. At its thirty-first session, the General Assembly, by resolution 31/20 of 29 November

⁷⁵ Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/31/35). [orig. note.]

1976, endorsed the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, urged the Security Council to consider these recommendations once again and authorized the Committee to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations. In pursuance of Assembly resolution 31/20, the Security Council met on 27 October 1977 to consider the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights, but it decided to adjourn the debate on this item (S/PV.2041).

59. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in its report to the General Assembly⁷⁶ at its thirtysecond session, stated that it had unanimously decided to reaffirm the validity of its recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. The Assembly endorsed the report of the Committee and adopted two resolutions. By its resolution 32/40 A, it urged the Security Council to take, as soon as possible, a decision on the recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/20 as a basis for the solution of the problem of Palestine. By its resolution 32/40 B, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat of the United Nations a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, which would "prepare... studies and publications relating to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people" and "promote maximum publicity for such studies and publications". In accordance with that resolution, the Secretary-General established the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights at the beginning of 1978.

60. Since the General Assembly last discussed the matter, the rights of the Palestinian people have been the subject of a number of communications addressed to the Secretary-General and circulated as United Nations official documents (A/33/54, A/33/118, A/33/151, A/33/154, A/33/165, A/33/206). The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People has submitted a further report to the General Assembly for its consideration at its thirty-third session.⁷⁷

VI. SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

A. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

- 61. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East after the June 1967 hostilities was highlighted by the adoption of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, within the framework of that resolution.
- 62. Resolution 242 (1967), which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council, defined the principles and requirements for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The efforts of Ambassador Jarring to promote agreement among the parties have been described in detail in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 (S/10929, paras. 45–67, 70–72, 99–108). It is sufficient to recall here that in May 1973 the parties continued to maintain irreconcilable positions and thus the basic deadlock in the search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict persisted.
- 63. The report of the Secretary-General was considered by the Security Council from 6 to 15 June 1973. The debate was adjourned on the understanding that the Council would resume its examination of the situation in the Middle East at a later date.
- 64. In August 1973 the Secretary-General, after meeting with his Special Representative in Geneva, paid a visit to the Middle East to discuss the situation with the Government concerned and to determine in what way the United Nations and he as the Secretary-General might be helpful in the search for a peaceful settlement. In the introduction to the annual report to the General Assembly submitted during the same month,78 the Secretary-General stated that, despite all the efforts made by him and his Special Representative and the recent deliberations of the Security Council, a peaceful settlement in the Middle East remained elusive. The Secretary-General went on to point out that "time is not on our side in this highly explosive situation".78

⁷⁶ Ibid., Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/32/35). [orig. note.]

⁷⁷ Ibid., Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/33/35). [orig. note.]

⁷⁸ Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/9001/Add. 1). [orig. note.]

B. Hostilities of October 1973 and adoption of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

65. As stated earlier, hostilities broke out again in the Middle East in October 1973. On 22 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (1973) in which, after calling for an immediate cease-fire, the Council called upon all the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and decided that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The subsequent decisions of the Security Council, including the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Egypt-Israel sector, have been dealt with earlier in this report (see paras. 5-11 above).

66. Following the establishment of the Emergency Force and the cessation of hostilities in the area, the Secretary of State of the United States of America launched an initiative to bring about agreements on a disengagement of forces, first between Egypt and Israel, and later between Israel and Syria. In the event, four agreements were concluded between November 1973 and September 1975. In each case, an agreement in principle was achieved through indirect negotiations between the parties, conducted with the assistance of the Secretary of State, and then the detailed implementation of the agreement was worked out in direct discussions between the military representatives of the parties under the auspices of the United Nations.

C. Six-point agreement of 11 November 1973

67. On 9 November the Secretary of State of the United States informed the Secretary-General (S/11091) that the Governments of Egypt and Israel were prepared to accept a six-point agreement under which the two parties would scrupulously observe the cease-fire and would immediately begin discussions to settle the question of the return of forces to the positions that they had occupied on 22 October 1973 in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations. The Secretary of State also indicated that the parties

would hold a meeting under the auspices of the the Commander of UNEF to sign this agreement and to provide for its implementation.

68. On 11 November, the six-point agreement was signed by the military representatives of Egypt and Israel and by the Commander of UNEF, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, as witness, at a meeting held at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. Discussions on the implementation of the agreement began immediately thereafter under the auspices of the United Nations, and on 14 November the parties reached an accord providing for an exchange of prisoners of war, the supply of the Egyptian Third Army by United Nations convoys and the replacement of Israeli checkpoints by UNEF checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road. Further discussions were held during November for the purpose of bringing about a disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces (S/11056/Add. 4-6).

D. The Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East

69. In December 1973, there were diplomatic contacts under the auspices of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, aimed at the convening of a peace conference on the Middle East in Geneva. On 15 December, the Security Council held a private meeting to discuss the arrangements for the proposed conference and adopted a resolution 344 (1973), in which, after noting that a peace conference on the Middle East situation was to begin shortly in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations, the Council expressed its confidence that the Secretary-General would play a full and effective role in the Conference, and that he would preside over its proceedings. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed of the developments in the negotiations at the Geneva Conference and to provide all the necessary assistance and facilities for the work of the Conference.

70. By identical letters dated 18 December 1973 (S/11161), the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America informed the Secretary-General that agreement had been reached among the parties to the Middle East dispute to participate in the Peace Conference under the auspices of the United Nations and under the co-chairman-

ship of the USSR and the United States.

71. The Peace Conference on the Middle East was convened in Geneva by the Secretary-General on 21 December 1973. The Conference, in which the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America were represented, held three meetings, over which the Secretary-General presided. The Conference agreed to continue its work through the setting up of a military working group as well as of other working groups as needed. The Military Working Group was to start discussing forthwith the question of disengagement of forces. The working groups were to report to the Conference, which was to continue at the ambassadorial level, and the Conference at the foreign ministers' level was to convene in Geneva as needed in the light of developments (see S/ 11169). The Secretary-General appointed Mr. Roberto Guyer, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, as his Personal Representative to the Conference.

E. Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 18 January 1974

72. The discussions held by the Military Working Group under the chairmanship of the Commander of UNEF in late December 1973 and early January 1974 led to an agreement on the disengagement of forces between Egypt and Israel. It was signed on 18 January 1974 at kilometre marker 101 by the military representatives of Egypt and Israel and by General Siilasvuo as witness (S/11056/ Add. 8). The Agreement provided essentially for a limited withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east, for the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai, leaving between them a zone of disengagement where UNEF was to be stationed. and for the establishment of areas of limited armaments and forces on both sides of the zone of disengagement to be inspected by UNEF (S/11198 and Add. 1).

F. Agreement between Israel and Syria of 31 May 1974

73. In May 1974, negotiations took place towards a disengagement of forces between Israel and Syria. The agreement was signed on 31 May 1974 by the military representatives of Israel and Syria and by the Commander of UNEF as witness at a meeting of the Egypt-Israel Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference on the

Middle East, in which the representatives of the Co-Chairman of the Conference also participated. In addition to the redeployment of the Israeli and Syrian forces in accordance with arrangements similar to those applied in the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of 18 January 1974, the Israeli-Syrian Agreement also provided for the return of the Syrian civilian administration to the area of separation and the supervision by a United Nations force of the demilitarized character of that area.

74. On 31 May 1974, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) by which it welcomed the agreement on disengagement between Israel and Syria, negotiated in implementation of its resolution 338 (1973), and decided to set up the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (see paras. 12–19 above).

G. Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975

75. In August and September 1975, new negotiations were held under the auspices of the Secretary of State of the United States towards the conclusion of a second agreement between Egypt and Israel. It was signed in Geneva on 4 September 1975 by the representatives of Egypt and Israel and witnessed by General Siilasvuo, now Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East (S/11818/ Add. 2). The agreement provided essentially for a further withdrawal of Israeli forces to a line east of the Gidi and Mitla Passes and from the oil fields of Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar on the coastline of the Gulf of Suez, the establishment of a larger buffer zone controlled by UNEF and the return of Egyptian civilian administration to the oil fields, whose demilitarized character was to be supervised by UNEF. On the same day the military representatives of Egypt and Israel formally accepted a proposal by the Secretary of the United States, which provided for the establishment of an early warning system in the UNEF buffer zone to be manned separately by the United States and each of the two parties.

76. The detailed arrangements for the implementation of the above agreement were worked out by the Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference and laid down in a Protocol to the agreement, which was signed by the representatives of the two parties and witnessed by General Siilasvuo (S/11818/Add.5). In his report to the

Security Council, dated 17 October 1975 (S/11849), the Secretary-General outlined the implications of the agreement for the operation of UNEF in the Egypt-Israel sector. The Security Council considered the report of the Secretary-General, and by its resolution 378 (1975) of 23 October 1975 decided to renew the mandate of UNEF for a period of one year. The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General by a note verbale dated 30 December 1976 that the Agreement of September 1975 was concluded on a separate basis and actually circumvented the Geneva Peace Conference; consequently the USSR could not bear any responsibility for the implications of the agreement, including the financing of additional expenses of UNEF resulting from it.

H. Efforts to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference

77. The agreements between Egypt and Israel of 18 January 1974 and of 4 September 1975, as well as the agreement between Israel and Syria of 31 May 1974, contained clauses stating in varying terms that the parties did not consider them as final peace agreements but as steps towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, as called for by Security Council resolution 338 (1973). In his periodic reports on the activities of UNEF and UNDOF, which were submitted to the Security Council before the expiry of the mandates of those Forces, the Secretary-General expressed the view that, although the areas of operations of the two Forces were quiet, the situation in the Middle East as a whole was unstable and would remain so unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be reached. The Security Council, in renewing the mandates of the two Forces, expressed its concurrence with this view and called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973).

78. In 1975, at its thirtieth session, the General Assembly considered both the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East. In its resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 on the question of Palestine, which has already been mentioned earlier in this report (see para. 55 above), it requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to secure the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate

in the work of the Geneva Peace Conference.

79. Later at the same session, the General Assembly considered the situation in the Middle East and on 5 December 1975 adopted resolution 3414 (XXX) whereby it requested the Security Council to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and within the framework of the United Nations.

80. In pursuance of the request contained in General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), the Secretary-General on 19 November 1975 addressed identical letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, to bring the resolution to their attention. He also requested the Co-Chairmen to keep him informed of any action they might take in relation to the resolution. In his reply to the Secretary-General dated 9 January 1976 (A/31/44-S/11931), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR advocated the speediest possible resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference with the full and equal participation of the representatives of the PLO.

81. Shortly after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), the Security Council met to consider the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). In its resolution 381 (1975) of 30 November 1975 on the renewal of the mandate of UNDOF, the Council also decided to reconvene on 12 January 1976 in order to continue the debate on the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question. In accordance with its decision of 30 November 1975, the Security Council discussed the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question, in a series of 10 meetings in January 1976, but no resolution could be adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member (S/PV.1870–1879). At the end of the Security Council debate, on 26 January 1976, the Secretary-General made a statement in which he noted that the discussions of the Council had emphasized the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East

problem and had reaffirmed the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries and announced his intention to undertake a new initiative.

82. In identical letters addressed to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on 27 January 1976, the Secretary-General requested them to let him know their thinking on ways of making progress towards a solution of the Middle East problem. In his reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed the view that the only reliable way to achieve agreement on all the questions involved in a settlement was the resumption, after careful preparation, of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of all those directly concerned, including the PLO and the Co-Chairmen of the Conference. The Secretary of State of the United States of America took the position that the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference should be carefully prepared and he proposed a preparatory conference of those that had participated so far in the negotiations.

83. As a follow-up to the communications addressed to the Co-Chairmen, the Secretary-General requested his Personal Representative for the Peace Conference on the Middle East, Under-Secretary-General Roberto E. Guyer, to undertake an exploratory mission to the Middle East. During that mission, which took place from 25 February to 2 March 1976, and the subsequent talks which Mr. Guyer held in Moscow and Washington, a number of issues were discussed, including the question of the participation of the PLO in peace efforts.

84. Following Mr. Guyer's exploratory mission, the Secretary-General addressed, on 1 April 1976, identical aide-mémoires to the parties concerned, including the PLO, requesting their views as to the action which might be taken by the United Nations in order to break the impasse in the peace efforts.

85. As described in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 October 1976 (A/31/270-S/12210), all the parties welcomed his initiative. Egypt, Jordan and Syria reiterated their demand for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967. They further underlined the urgency of a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem. Egypt stated that

it wanted the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to reactivate the negotiating process, which should focus on the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference with the full participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Soviet Union affirmed that the most appropriate forum for working out a solution to the Middle East problem was the Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of all directly concerned parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Co-Chairmen of the Conference. The United States emphasized that it was their intention actively to pursue contacts with the parties in efforts to bring about an agreement which would end the state of war in the Middle East as soon as the situation in Lebanon had improved. Israel, in its reply, emphasized that it favoured the reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference with the original participants.

86. In the same report the Secretary-General observed that, while there was general agreement on the necessity of resuming negotiations for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem, there were still important differences of view among the parties concerned, which had to be resolved before the negotiating process could be usefully resumed.

87. During its thirty-first session, on 9 December 1976, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/61 on the situation in the Middle East, in which it requested the Security Council to take effective measures for the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council and the Assembly. It also requested the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference of its resolution and to submit a report on its implementation to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. On the same day, the General Assembly further adopted resolution 31/62 concerning the Peace Conference on the Middle East. In that resolution, the General Assembly called for the early convening of the Geneva Peace Conference not later than the end of March 1977, requested the Secretary-General to resume contacts with all the parties to the conflict and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference in accordance with his initiative of April 1967, with a view to convening the Peace Conference, and to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of his contacts and on the situation in the Middle East no later than 1 March

1977. The General Assembly further requested the Security Council to convene, subsequent to the submission of the Secretary-General's report, in order to consider the situation in the area and to promote the process towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area.

88. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 31/62, the Secretary-General held initial consultations with the representatives of the parties and of the two Co-Chairmen. In February 1977 he travelled to the Middle East, where he held extensive consultations with leaders of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, as well as with the Chairman of the PLO. On 28 Feburary 1977, he submitted a detailed report to the Security Council (S/12290 and Corr. 1), in which he described the positions of the parties with regard to the questions of participation, timing, terms of reference, agenda, and organization of the work of the Peace Conference. He also reported the views of the two Co-Chairmen on the modalities for reconvening the Geneva Conference. From his consultations, the Secretary-General concluded that, while all concerned were earnestly desirous of moving towards a negotiated settlement, a determined effort was necessary to overcome the lack of confidence and the mutual distrust and fears of all the parties as to the consequences of making compromises and concessions. He stated that although the main elements of the Middle East problem remained intractable, there was an increasing consciousness in the area that an opportunity existed at the time to resume negotiations in a meaningful way, and he warned that, if this opportunity were not seized, there were grave dangers that the situation would deteriorate once again.

89. On 25, 28 and 29 March 1977, the Security Council considered the situation in the Middle East in the light of the Secretary-General's report, but it adjourned the debate without adopting a resolution (S/PV.1993, 1995 and 1997).

90. In the following months, efforts were made at various levels to reach agreement on the modalities for resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference. On 1 October 1977 the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and the United States, as Co-Chairmen of the Conference, issued a joint declaration in which they outlined their common position on substantive as well as procedural questions con-

nected with the search for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem. In particular, they expressed their belief that the only right and effective way for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety was negotiation within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, specially convened for this purpose, with the participation in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict, including those of the Palestinian people. The next day, the Secretary-General issued a statement welcoming the joint declaration.

91. The General Assembly considered again the situation in the Middle East during its thirtysecond session. On 25 November 1977 it adopted resolution 32/20 in which, among other things, it reaffirmed that "a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region can live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, cannot be achieved without Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights;" called anew "for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization;" urged "the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problems and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations."

I. Initiative of the President of Egypt

92. A new element was introduced into the Middle East situation on 9 November 1977, when President Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt announced that he was prepared to go to Israel in order to achieve progress towards a peaceful settlement. He was subsequently invited by the Government of Israel and travelled to Jerusalem on 19 November 1977 for a two-day visit. After his return to Cairo, President Sadat invited the parties to the Middle East conflict, including the PLO, as well

as the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East and the Secretary-General, to talks in Cairo to prepare for a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference. This invitation was accepted by Israel and the United States. On 29 November, the Secretary-General designated the Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, to be present at the meeting in Cairo. At the same time, noting that it was apparent that the meeting in Cairo would not be attended by all those invited and having in mind the urgent need for an early convening of the Geneva Peace Conference, the Secretary-General suggested that consideration be given to the holding of a preparatory meeting at United Nations Headquarters, or any other generally agreed venue, of all those invited to the Cairo meeting.

93. By a letter dated 5 December 1977 (A/32/411), the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya conveyed to the Secretary-General the text of a declaration issued by the representatives of Algeria, Democratic Yemen, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO at the conclusion of their summit conference from 2 to 5 December 1977 at Tripoli. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 8 December 1977 (A/32/419-S/12478), the Chargé d'Affaires of Egypt responded to this declaration.

94. The Cairo Conference convened on 14 December 1977. After several meetings the Conference recessed to await the result of a summit meeting between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, scheduled to be held at Ismailia on 25 and 26 December. At the conclusion of that meeting, it was decided to establish two working groups at the ministerial level—a political committee in Jerusalem, and a military committee in Cairo. Thereupon, the Cairo Conference

adjourned sine die.

95. The Military Working Committee began its work on 11 January 1978 and the Political Working Committee on 17 January. The Egyptian delegation withdrew from that Committee on 18 January. Shortly thereafter, the Military Working Committee also became inactive.

96. Subsequently, the Government of the United States undertook an effort to reactivate direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel. This led to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel and the Secretary of State of the United States at Leeds Castle near London from 17 to 19 July 1978, and, later on, from 5 to 17 September, to a summit conference between the President of Egypt, the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the United States at Camp David near Washington.

97. At the conclusion of the Camp David conference the President of the United States informed the Secretary-General that the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel had concluded two agreements, one on a framework for peace in the Middle East and the other on a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

98. In their statements in the general debate of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, a number of speakers have commented on these agreements. In a letter dated 27 September to the Secretary-General, the Chairman of the PLO expressed his views on the agreements.

99. I have not received any additional official information on the subject from the parties concerned and therefore do not feel I am in a position to put forward any considered views at this stage, except to express my earnest hope that urgent efforts will be pursued by all concerned until a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be fully achieved.

General Assembly Debate: The Palestine Question

14

General Assembly, 59th meeting; statement by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People⁷⁹

November 27, 1978

MR. Fall (Senegal), Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (interpretation from French): When, during the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, I concluded my presentation of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, ⁸⁰ I suggested that the General Assembly should take that opportunity once again to appeal to the Security Council to approve without delay the recommendations which had been transmitted to it by the Committee and to consider them as a basis for the settlement of the question of Palestine.

As is known, the General Assembly, in its attempts to restore the rights of the Palestinian people, defined those rights and adopted a programme for their implementation pursuant to the proposals submitted to it by the Committee for the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

The implementation of that programme requires the active support and assistance of the Security Council. Unfortunately, that body has been incapable of acting as yet because of the attitude taken by certain countries, and I say "certain countries" advisedly, because when the Council had to consider for the second time the programme for the implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people most of the members of the Council that spoke at the time once again reiterated their support for it. Since then, the Committee's recommendations have remained before the Security Council without any decision having been taken on them, because of the opposi-

tion of certain Western members of the Security Council, particularly certain permanent members which have the right of veto.

The very unconstructive attitude of those members of the Council is particularly difficult to understand since the Committee's recommendations are all based on United Nations resolutions which have been adopted either by the General Assembly or by the Security Council .

The members of the Committee, as well as their Chairman, aware of the fact that the paralysis of the Security Council was creating a dangerous situation for peace in the Middle East, and that it was the fate of an entire people that was at stake, endeavoured to establish a dialogue with the delegations members of the Security Council which were hostile to the recommendations of the Committee, in order to dispel their fears and to help them to understand the principles on which the work and the purposes of the Committee were based.

Unfortunately, it must be confessed that those States never made the necessary effort to take an impartial view of our work. They continued to obstruct the successful completion of the work of the Committee, on the grounds that they had not voted in favour of the resolution which originally created it, although they stated that they all recognized the national rights of the Palestinian people.

This selective approach to the resolutions of the United Nations, of course, cannot but encourage Israel's failure to implement those resolutions. Therefore those States, without wishing it, are really responsible for the longevity of the Committee, because they refuse to give it any opportunity to discharge its mandate, while at the same time complaining about its existence.

Therefore, it is necessary for the General Assembly, if it wants its recommendations on the question of Palestine to be put into effect, to take steps to put an end to this obstruction by the Security Council. I shall return later to this problem.

The relations of the Committee with the other

⁷⁹ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 59. pp. 2-17.

⁸⁰ Doc. 4 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

bodies of the United Nations have fortunately been much more positive than with the Security Council. This is true of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, of which the Committee asked what work it could do to make possible the implementation of the recommendations of the Committee regarding the return of the Palestine refugees to their homes. The response of the Agency, which can be found in the Committee's report in paragraphs 39 to 45, shows that the return of the refugees is quite possible and that the only obstacles are of a political nature.

Furthermore, in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 32/40 B, the Secretary-General established within the United Nations Secretariat a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights.

In this connexion, I must congratulate the Secretary-General and his colleagues on the understanding and objectivity they demonstrated in the process of setting up this Special Unit.

The Special Unit, during the first year of its existence, has carried out a considerable amount of work in trying to disseminate objective information about the Palestinian question. The Unit has thus published studies and bulletins and has also contributed to the preparation of a film on the rights of the Palestinians.

The Special Unit also prepared, under the direction of the Committee, the holding of a Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people, which is an event of tremendous importance in the history of the question of Palestine in the United Nations. Our Assembly should be particularly associated with the celebration of this Day of Solidarity, since the United Nations bears a large measure of responsibility in the tragedy which is at present being experienced by the Palestinian people.

All the activities of the Special Unit, which have been carried out by highly qualified international civil servants, honest and devoted to their work, have made it possible to give the lie to the false accusations of those who do not wish to hear anything said about the rights of the Palestinian people. Those detractors, who sometimes use as arguments threats, blackmail and attempts at sabotage, have balked at no means to discredit the Special Unit. But the Special Unit, faithful to the directives of the Committee, has not allowed itself to be intimidated and has produced valuable

work, on the basis of the principles, resolutions and decisions of the United Nations. Since this is a body of the United Nations, its concern has always been to give objective information to the public and to carry out research on the question of Palestine, in order that that can be seen as it truly is and in its true context. This is something which those who criticize the Special Unit cannot appreciate, because their essential role is rather to prevent at all costs any expression of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, as defined by the General Assembly.

But the Special Unit, under the guidance of the Committee, will not allow itself to be distracted from the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly and will attempt effectively to promote the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, pursuant to resolution 181 (II), 194 (III) and 3236 (XXIX) of the General Assembly.

The attention of the Committee regarding the situation prevailing in the occupied Arab territories has been constantly kept alert by the aggressive acts of Israel and its efforts to deny the rights of the Palestinian people, and equally its violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

First, the Committee received a petition from eminent Palestinian personalities in the occupied territories. In that petition the latter reaffirmed the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representative of the people of Palestine, and their refusal of any attempt at a solution which would deny the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the creation of their own national State. This petition provides further proof that the Palestinian people is a great people, and that it would be neither realistic nor fair to decide its fate without consulting it, even less in a way which would be against its interests.

The Committee, which is convinced that this petition conveys the sentiments and aspirations of the Palestinians, wherever they reside, requested the Secretary-General to distribute as an official document of the General Assembly a letter which contains its main elements.

The Committee had another subject of concern, which was equally serious, in the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. In a statement made before this Assembly on 21 April 1978, I laid particular emphasis on the fact that the prime objective of

Israel in this particular circumstance was physically and morally to destroy the Palestinian people. The invasion of south Lebanon was only the most cynical and brutal phase of an entire plan to break the will of the Palestinian people to preserve their identity, if not an episode in the process of seeking a "final solution" to the Palestinian problem. On the same occasion, I drew attention to the dangers of the situation, calling on the Security Council to act in a more resolute way in order to bring about a just and lasting settlement of the question of the Middle East.

The implementation of the decisions taken in this connexion by the Security Council has always been thwarted by the action of heads of armed bands, protected by the Israeli authorities. Personally, I am always thunderstruck at the impertinent pretensions of those who pose as defenders of the Christians in Lebanon while in Jerusalem they deliberately violate the Holy Places of Christianity and in Palestine arrest and torture Arab priests and Arab Christians.

Furthermore, the Committee has on several occasions had before it cases of ill treatment inflicted by the Israeli occupying authorities on Palestinian prisoners. The Committee, while employing every means to put an end to these acts, has witnessed once again the deleterious effects of the prolonged occupation by Israel of the Arab territories.

That occupation, which is taking on the character of colonization pure and simple, is contrary to resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council which, *inter alia*, is based on the principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force.

In this connexion, the Committee was given occasion for further concern when the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated on 9 October 1978 before the General Assembly:

"The Israeli settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district are there as of right. It is inconceivable to us that Jews should be prohibited from settling and living in Judea and Samaria, which are the heart of our homeland".81

If, therefore, Israel considers the West Bank of the Jordan as its homeland, it is very easy to understand why its Government refuses to undertake to withdraw from that territory and, on the contrary, does everything it can to strengthen its colonies of Jewish settlements. Thus, Israel has Thirty years ago on 17 September 1948 Count Bernadotte, the President of the International Red Cross and United Nations Mediator in the Middle East, was assassinated by Zionist terrorists of the Stern group. On the very day of that odious assassination the United Nations, which at that time had its headquarters in the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, had just received the report of its Mediator, in which he stated:

"...no settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he had been dislodged..." (A/648, chapter V, para. 6)

That declaration formed the basis of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), which our Committee is requesting be implemented.

Our Committee was also much disquieted when it heard the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hebrew State before this Assembly in connexion with the Holy City of Jerusalem. According to him:

"For us, the City of Jerusalem is the one and only eternal capital of Israel. We have not and we shall never have any other capital city, whether or not others recognize it as such." (A/33/PV. 26, p. 43)

The Holy City of Jerusalem comprises the Holy Places of three revered religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which together have more than 1,200 million adherents. And now the Jews, who number less than 1.5 per cent of those believers wish to arrogate to themselves the right of exclusive control over that sacred city. Fortunately, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel himself recognized that the others—meaning by that the rest of the international community—did not in fact recognize Israel's claims.

Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that this is a very cavalier manner of placing the rights of conquest above the inalienable rights of peoples. For how long must the international community tolerate this language of triumphant force and arrogance?

In order to show that even the opinions of their friends, members of the Security Council, count for nothing, the Israeli leaders are now

arrogated to itself the sovereign right of settling in the lands of others, while refusing the Palestinian refugees the right of return to their own homelands

⁸¹ UN doc. A/33/PV. 26, p. 42. [orig. note.]

transferring a number of important ministries to east Jerusalem, hoping thus to present the international community with an irreversible situation.

Those who have provided support for Israel almost unconditionally should realize that the methods and the claims of their protegé are a long-term threat to their true interests.

The language of *faits accomplis*, together with a total disregard of the rights of other peoples, can only lead to resentment, to hatred and, finally, to a war which will end inevitably in a victory for the forces of justice. It is therefore high time, since the hour has now come for efforts and action, to make Tel Aviv understand that peace and security can only be founded on respect for the rights of others, on equity and on respect for the elementary principles of morality and contemporary international law.

But it appears that some would like to appease their consciences by making the Palestinian people pay for the crimes of which the European countries were the instigators or in which they were accomplices. The past sufferings of the Jewish people cannot be absolved by the present martyrdom of the Palestinian people.

A number of attempts to settle the question of the Middle East have been made quite recently. Our Committee which has been attentively following those endeavours, is not in principle opposed to any efforts designed to settle the question of the Middle East peacefully. We consider, nevertheless, that such an attempt, if it is to yield results which are satisfactory to all, should not only take account of the rights of all parties concerned, as defined in the Charter and in all the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations, but also make it possible for all interested parties to participate.

Turning more specifically now to the question of the settlement of the Palestinian question, the Committee felt it necessary to recall the following principles: (a) the question of Palestine is at the heart of the Middle East situation and consequently we cannot envisage any solution in this area which does not take full account of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people; (b) the full attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable right to return to their homes, repossess their goods and accede to self-determination, independence and national sovereignty will prove to be a decisive factor in bringing about a final global settlement of the Middle East crisis; (c) the

inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force and the consequent obligation for Israel to evacuate fully and swiftly all occupied territories in accordance with resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council; (d) the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is the legitimate representative of the people of Palestine, on an equal footing with all other parties on the basis of General Assembly resolution 32/36 (XXIX) and resolution 33/75 (XXX) is indispensable in any efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations.

These principles so defined have been made known to all parties to the corflict, including Israel, and to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The operation carried out by the Israeli army in Lebanon has transformed the Palestine Liberation Organization into a full partner in any agreement reached in that region. That is a fact, and those who assert the contrary are harbouring illusions. Those are not my words; they were spoken by General Mordechai Gur, the former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, when commenting on the situation in south Lebanon in an interview published on 31 March 1978 in the Israeli daily *Ma'ariv*. We would like to make it clear that General Gur, who only left his position on 31 March, was still Chief of Staff during the Israeli operations in south Lebanon.

The Committee was heartened in its position on the settlement of the Palestinian question by the support which the fifteenth summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity⁸² and the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of non-aligned countries⁸³ reaffirmed in connexion with their recommendations, which means that the position of the Committee is widely held and has been supported by practically all the countries of the Middle East.

At the conclusion of the present debate I should like on behalf of the Committee to call upon all States to reaffirm their support for the recommendations of the General Assembly regarding the exercise of the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. This will confirm the faithfulness

⁸² See doc. 135 below.

⁸³ See docs. 138 to 141 below.

of the General Assembly to the task which it has assigned itself: I refer to the recovery by the Palestinian people of their inalienable and fundamental national rights.

Another matter which should be dealt with as a matter of priority by the Assembly is that of breaking the deadlock that the paralysis of the Security Council represents in progress in regard to the rights of the Palestinian people.

The General Assembly has already made it clearly understood that it would like its recommendations to be implemented. For that to be done, the Security Council will have to take a decision on the matter. So far this has been impossible because of the use or threat of use of the right of veto. However, there can be no doubt that, if those who enjoy the right of veto continue to demonstrate a hostile and partisan attitude towards the recommendations of the General Assembly instead of proceeding to consider them objectively, the General Assembly must find some other way of making progress in this matter. The immobilizing of the Security Council by a minority when international peace and security are threatened requires that the General Assembly shoulder its responsibilities.

In this connexion the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries, having noted the incapacity of the Security Council, have proposed the convening of a special session on the question of Palestine. Nevertheless, it is our hope that those few permanent members of the Security Council that up to now have been hostile to the Committee will demonstrate a more flexible attitude and will show more openness of mind towards the recommendations of the Committee. In that way they would be able to show, if not their impartiality, at least their desire not to consider only the rights of Israel. This preoccupation has for a long time prevented an objective approach to the question of Palestine.

Those who denigrate our Committee have blamed us for not taking account of the rights of Israel in the recommendations we have submitted for approval by the General Assembly. We have replied to them that the mandate of the Committee is limited and does not extend to that area, adding that the rights of Israel do not need any defenders because today Israel not only enjoys its rights but even goes beyond them, whereas the people of Palestine are constantly frustrated in their

attempts to gain what belongs to them by right.

After four wars of conquest Israel has more than quintupled the area of the land it controls. The 14,400 square kilometres allocated to it under the Partition Plan of 1947 have now become 80,000. These are specific facts which are easy to check and not merely elements of propaganda in favour of any particular party.

Therefore, if those States which are so concerned with the defence of just causes are sincerely disquieted and concerned about the rights of the Palestinian people as they have frequently said, why do they refuse to give positive consideration to the recommendations of the General Assembly in this connexion? Why do they associate themselves with campaigns of slander against the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People when they know that that Committee is advocating neither the destruction of Israel nor the violation of any resolutions of the United Nations? Why have they no trust and confidence in the capacity of the General Assembly to identify sound directives on the settlement of the Palestinian question? Ignoring the General Assembly might lead to sham solutions based on faits accomplis and contempt for the rights of the people of Palestine.

There can be no doubt that in the Middle East peace cannot be just if its establishment requires the destruction of one party concerned in the conflict—in this case the Palestinian people; nor can it be durable if it is imposed by brute force and permanent oppression. Therefore we venture to express the hope that all the Members of our Organization will be able to resist brute force and power and return to more democratic positions, taking more account of the clearly expressed will of the General Assembly. Only then can we hope to do something useful, since it will be something that is just and lasting.

15

General Assembly, 59th meeting; statement by the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization⁸⁴

November 27, 1978

Mr. Qaddoumi (Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)) (interpretation from Arabic): First of all, I should like to express our appreciation and gratitude to the Chairman and members of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for the valuable efforts they made. I wish also to commend the report presented by Mr. Fall of Senegal for its objectivity and comprehensiveness. I wish also to express my gratitude to Mr. Gauci for his introduction of the Committee's report.

I should also like warmly to congratulate you, Mr. President and to associate myself with those who have preceded me in expressing our unlimited confidence in your wisdom, your integrity and your wise guidance of our deliberations which will benefit our proceedings. May I express through you to the friendly people and Government of Colombia the warmest congratulations of our people and to wish you progress, success and prosperity.

I should also like to pay a tribute to Mr. Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations and to praise his tireless efforts in discharging the great humanitarian mission of the United Nations and in holding aloft the banner of justice and peace.

For more than 30 years, which is approximately the age of our Organization, the question of Palestine has consistently been on the agenda of the General Assembly in order that a solution may be found that will bring to an end the tragedy of the Palestinian Arab people, a people which has suffered from the greatest political crime to which our contemporary society has been a witness. Their lands have been despoiled, their national identity destroyed and half their people expelled, losing all human rights, starting with their identity and ranging all the way to their sovereignty and destiny.

In this same week in 1947, this Assembly adopted a resolution on the partition of Palestine into two States; one Jewish, one Arab. Although this recommendation was unjust, its first part was implemented. The Jewish State came into being by force of arms and occupied an area exceeding that recommended by the General Assembly to the extent of 60 per cent of the lands that had been assigned to the Palestinian Arab State.

Some years later, the Jewish State occupied what remained of the land of Palestine, which has been under the yoke of Israeli occupation in its entirety since 1967.

The United States Government was one of those that accepted the partition of Palestine, and thus the sovereignty of both the Palestinians and the Israelis. At a later date, that same Government supported the right of the refugees of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland or to receive compensation, and in the same month as that in which the partition had been decided on, we witnessed a serious development at Camp David⁸⁵ whereby our right to self-determination and national independence, rights that the United Nations representing the international community had acknowledged as ours, were ignored. Those rights have been reaffirmed at every session since 1974. This same Assembly, desirous of ensuring the exercise of those rights, set up a Committee of 23 members to strive for their implementation. The Committee made great efforts and drew up a detailed time-table which was approved by this Assembly at its last regular session. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) then assessed the report of the Committee and found in it positive and practical measures which assist our people in finding a way out of the deadlock of the Palestinian problem.

Our National Council, which is the highest legislative authority as far as the Palestinian political entity is concerned, reacted favourably to the sincere international efforts intended to ensure a just peace. I repeat, our National Council at its session held in Cairo in March 1977, 86 endorsed General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX)87 which affirms the will of the international community to recognize the legality and the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to return and to self-determination, the right to national independence and

⁸⁴ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 59, pp. 27-52.

⁸⁵ See docs. 153 and 154 below.

⁸⁶ Doc. 229 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁸⁷ Doc. 22 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

sovereignty and to the establishment of its own State in Palestine.

During the same session our Council approved the participation of the PLO on a footing of equality with the other parties concerned as an indispensable principle in all forums and conferences dealing with the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It goes without saving that this decision of the PLO is a most important contribution to efforts designed to ensure the establishment of peace and security in our region within the context of international legality and reflects the devotion of our people to the problem of a just and lasting peace, its faith in its solution, as well as the importance of that solution for all mankind, and this, obviously, within the framework of the exercise of our legitimate rights.

How can our people not believe in peace when it has suffered ceaselessly from all the scourges of war and their corollaries, namely, devastation, ruin, death and bloodshed?

A factor which contributed to give a serious tone to the peace efforts made by the General Assembly of the United Nations was the publication on 1 October 1977 of the joint Soviet-American communiqué⁸⁸ which, on behalf of the two super-Powers, affirmed the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and announced that the two super-Powers were determined to convene a peace conference before the end of that year. Our delegation was one of the first to welcome the joint communiqué of the two super-Powers which bear major responsibility for peace in the world, because we saw in that communiqué positive indications of the search for a just solution to the Palestinian problem.

I have given an outline of the situation as it was then, of the international determination to act justly and the manner in which the international community envisaged dealing with the problem of Palestine and the Middle East crisis. But what has happened since in comparison to what happened last year?

First of all, the American Administration went back on the joint Soviet-American communiqué even before the ink on it had dried. That aroused severe disappointment in the international community regarding the credibility of the American Secondly, three days after the publication of that joint communiqué from this very podium in this General Assembly the President of the United States of America spoke about Israel saying that he had defended its existence during four major wars, but forgetting or disregarding who had started those wars, who was the aggressor and who were the victims of aggression.

We do not ask the President of the United States to do more than he is able to do, but when referring to the Palestinian people could he not have said that that people had been deprived of its homeland, Palestine, for 30 years? In that way his statement would have been compatible with what he said in March 1977 regarding the need to find a homeland for the Palestinians and consistent with what he said about the need to respect human rights.

Thirdly, so that they might be totally free from any obligation under the terms of the joint Soviet-American communiqué, a first and then a second working document was published which omitted any reference to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and tried to get around the principle of the representation of the Palestinian people when only a few months had elapsed since the President of the United States had made a declaration recognizing that the Palestine Liberation Organization represented an essential part of the Palestinian people.

Fourthly, when the United States Administration found itself unable to live up to its responsibilities regarding the legitimate rights mentioned in the joint Soviet-American communiqué, and having withdrawn from every obligation assumed therein, President Sadat visited occupied Jerusalem with American encouragement in order to destroy the foundations of an equitable settlement, that settlement which your august Assembly has always sought to strengthen and to implement.

Fifthly, with the protection, encouragement and guidance of the United States Government, a bilateral agreement was concluded at Camp David between Egypt and Israel. Inasmuch as the Camp David agreement implied an insidious, planned attempt to alter the facts for world and American public opinion by presenting that agreement as the greatest achievement of American foreign policy and as a great victory for the cause

position. Doubts then arose about Washington's intentions regarding the Middle East.

⁸⁸ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

of peace in the Middle East, it behoves the Palestine Liberation Organization, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within and outside the occupied lands, to make clear to the Assembly, objectively and in detail, our rejection of that agreement and our determination not to accept it or its consequences. Our reasons are as follows.

First of all, the agreement makes no mention of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people defined by the United Nations General Assembly, which, at every session since 1974, has reiterated the necessity of respecting those rights—namely, the right to self-determination enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the right of return which the American delegation proposed individually and has reaffirmed every year since 1949, and the right to national independence which was approved by the United States Government in 1947 when it voted in favour of the partition of Palestine.

Moreover, the Camp David agreement ignored the PLO, although our people had declared its total support for this organization recognized by all Arab countries at the 1974 Summit Conference in Rabat as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, recognized by the United Nations as representing the Palestinian people, and also invited by this Organization to participate in its work as an observer, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX). Furthermore, the PLO is a full-fledged member of the Arab League, the Islamic Conference Organization, the non-aligned movement and of most world organizations.

To sweeten the pill of the Camp David accords and mislead people into believing that they dealt with the core of the struggle being waged in the Middle East—the Palestinian problem itself—the Camp David participants found a formula for autonomy for the occupied Palestinian lands, to mollify what they call the population of the West Bank and of the Gaza Strip, thus classifying our people into distinct groups. In that way it might be said that each group has a unique problem and a unique solution.

Thus the parties to the Camp David talks expressly violated international law represented by the United Nations and by its resolutions which affirm the need for the entire Palestinian people, within and outside the occupied Palestinian territory, to exercise its right to self-determination,

to return to its homeland, and to enjoy national independence.

It would seem that to the participants in the Camp David talks we are still under-age as a people, and that we need a guardian and a protector, despite the fact that we have been fighting for 60 years side by side with a number of other countries in the world which have become independent and are now represented here at the United Nations.

The Camp David agreement failed to mention any obligation regarding the city of Jerusalem, even though the Security Council, a few years ago, rejected all measures taken by Israel to annex Jerusalem and eliminate its Arab, religious and historical character and to profane its sacred values.

The Camp David agreement, moreover, did not make it mandatory for Israel to remove its settlements from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories. If we take into account the fiveyear transition period which is to lead to socalled autonomy, which, incidentally, represents the maximum concession to our aspirations under the Camp David agreement, it is apparent that that agreement would enable Israel to continue to Judaize the occupied Arab territories and to entrench its civil and military presence therein by establishing new settlements and enlarging existing ones. Israeli leaders declare as much daily when they refer to the West Bank as "Judaea and Samaria", and to Jerusalem as: "the one and only eternal capital of Israel" (A/33/PV.26, p. 43-45), and as: "the heart and soul of the Jewish people" (ibid., p. 46), as did the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs when addressing the General Assembly at the beginning of this session.

Furthermore, the Camp David agreement sanctioned Israeli military presence in the occupied territories and, instead of insisting on the withdrawal of its occupation forces, conferred legality on their continued presence, while merely redeploying them and reducing their numbers. In that way, Israel reserves its right to continue to occupy our land and to establish settlements on it, to rob it of its Arab character, and to inflict the Israeli policy of repression, terrorism and expulsion on all those struggling against its racist, expansionist designs. Thus Israel defies the most important principles of the United Nations Charter and resolutions which forbid the annexation of the

territories of others through the use of force.

That all those accords were concluded at Camp David without consultation of the Palestinian people and without their assent or participation was obviously and clearly manifested in their texts.

It happens that today there are divergencies between the Governments of Egypt and Israel on what is called the linkage between the agreements on Sinai and the West Bank, so that if the agreements are concluded Israel will present itself as having made new concessions, to the benefit of Egypt's position. Whether or not there is any linkage, our rejection of the Camp David accords rests essentially on the approach taken and the content, not on the modalities of implementation.

The Palestine Liberation Organization considers the Camp David accords as bilateral agreements between Egypt and Israel which in no way constitute a framework propitious for the attainment of a just and lasting peace in our area. That position is not taken by the Palestine Liberation Organization alone; it is a stand taken also by Arab countries and many international organizations.

Internationally our people—all categories, groupings and organizations in the places where they are concentrated, mainly in occupied Palestinian lands—have expressed their rejection of the accords by every available means: either by organizing demonstrations, strikes and popular congresses or by submitting petitions, some of which form part of United Nations documentation.

Even at the level of political contacts made by Americans sent to occupied Palestine, our people has expressed its opinion in a manner which in no way differs from that of the Palestine Liberation Organization; it has also expressed its support of and dedication to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The method of trying to separate our people in the occupied Arab lands and the exiled Palestine Liberation Organization and to dilute our international personality and present the Camp David results as the maximum that can be obtained has had the effect of reaffirming and proving that our people, because of its experience in the struggle against the plots hatched in the past and of its years of struggle and defiance, is capable of bringing about the failure of any attempt to separate our leaders from our people or deny the unity of our people and our right to self-deter-

mination and the exercise of sovereignty and independence in our own homeland, Palestine.

At the Arab level, the Arabs firmly believe that peace must be established. They realize the dangers threatening them as a result of the signing of the Camp David accords. Syria has taken a justified stand against the accords, particularly since a part of its territory is still occupied by Israel. Similarly, Jordan has refused to endorse the Camp David accords, despite the repeated appeals addressed to it. The Government of Lebanon too has expressed its apprehension at and disapproval of the Camp David accords, which ignore the fate of millions of Palestinians living in Lebanon. While Lebanon has suffered and is still suffering, after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, from Israeli occupation in the southern part of its territory, it too has shown itself to be in solidarity with the Palestinian people in their struggle for their right to return to their homeland and not to live outside it.

An Arab summit Conference was held in Baghdad89 which reaffirmed the refusal of the Arab States to accept the Camp David accords and their consequences. That Conference reaffirmed the dedication of the participants to the rights of the Palestinian people and expressed their determination to support its struggle under the aegis of its sole legitimate representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization, both within and outside the occupied Palestinian homeland. The Baghdad Conference was a success and is the best proof that, as regards the problem of Palestine and the rights of its people, all Arabs are constituted into a single rank, mobilizing their potential and their energies in the service of the supreme national interests of the Palestinian people.

In this connexion, I cannot fail to express the feeling of pain of all participants in the summit Conference at the fact that Egypt alone among the Arab countries did not participate, despite the fact that it had borne the major responsibility in the Arab-Israeli conflict for 30 years.

If the signing of the bilateral Egypt-Israeli accords removes Egypt from the circle of the Arab-Israeli struggle—a major loss for the Arab group that cannot be underestimated—the Baghdad Summit Conference and, before that, the Syrian-Iraqi

⁸⁹ See docs, 318-327 below.

plan of action represent a measure of compensation and reflect our will to continue our national struggle, so that the purposes of the Arab nation may be assured, including all the rights of the Palestinian people.

I should also like to say that the Baghdad Conference revealed Arab unanimity in rejecting the Camp David accords and showed how isolated is the policy of Egypt in the Arab world and how American policy in the Middle East has failed.

Internationally, the Camp David accords were a defiance and violation of the principles and methods adopted by the international community to achieve a just peace. The Government of the United States of America was among the countries committed to employing those methods so as to achieve peace, when it signed a joint Soviet-United States communiqué⁹⁰ on 1 October 1977.

How can one place a just peace on a sound foundation in the absence of the parties concerned and in the absence of the Soviet Union? Likewise. it will have been noticed that during the general debate on policy matters at this session most States Members have expressed disquiet concerning the Camp David accords or disapproval or rejection of them because they constitute a step backwards and they are not a propitious framework for a just and lasting peace in our region. Those accords simply heighten tension in the region by introducing elements which are a threat to international peace and security. In a few words, I would say that representatives understand our position when we, as the Palestine Liberation Organization, question whether the Camp David accords have brought us nearer to peace or nearer to war. Being aware of our responsibilities, we declare from this rostrum, to those who are concerned and interested in international peace, that the Camp David conference was an inivitation to war and not to peace, because it has placed a thorn in the heart of the Arab world by isolating Egypt from its Arab brethren and it has maintained unchanged the essence of the conflict without bringing a just solution. This in itself creates new dangers, the consequences of which will spill over from the immediate region.

We can make this general categorical judgement in the light of our past experience: the General Assembly must bear in mind that the creation of

Israel in 1948 has cost our region 30 years of war, bloodshed, trials and tribulations, deprivation and death. Now we are convinced that the Camp David accords have brought the region to the threshold of further long years of war. To make this clear, it will suffice to remind the General Assembly that Menachem Begin declared after the signing of the Camp David accords that the accords have said "no" to the Palestinian people, to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to a referendum in the occupied Palestine territories. He therefore recognized that the Camp David accords constitute a violation and a patent contravention of all United Nations resolutions regarding the question of Palestine and the inalienable national rights of our fighting people, and, in particular, a violation of the report of the Special Committee aimed at enabling our people to exercise their inalienable rights, in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 of that report (A/33/35).

The developments which we have described, from the time of President Sadat's visit to occupied Jerusalem up to the Camp David accords and their follow-up, that is to say, an Israeli-Egyptian bilateral agreement, are all paving the way for the further consolidation by Israel of its occupation and its confiscation of Palestinian and Arab lands. before acting against the Palestinian combatants, casting them into prison or places of detention, destroying their villages, making them disappear, redeploying the Jewish population and encouraging the emigration of Palestinians from the occupied Palestinian lands. This must be viewed, therefore, as a master blow by President Carter carried out most adroitly at Camp David. What is developing is rather a plan to impose an American hegemonistic policy on our region by dividing it, parcelling it out, in accordance with the imperialist mentality which dominated the nineenth century and is now bringing back to life a policy of alliances and military zones. This is reflected in Senator Jackson's proposal for an Israeli-Egyptian military alliance to protect imperialist interests in the Middle East and in Africa against the Soviet Union. This is a threat to the policy of international détente and is therefore unacceptable today to the smallest and weakest people.

What then is to be said of the Arab nation with such vast potential due to its strategic situation and energy resources? It is from this point of view that we warn all States that we are on the

⁹⁰ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

threshold of a new stage, which the General Assembly has always attempted to avoid and is still trying to forestall by means of guarantees, the more so since the Middle East region might be the scene for outbreaks which could spread to other parts of the world because of incitement and provocation by the Government of the United States of America.

Our Palestinian people, despite whatever Zionist and imperialist forces combine against it and whoever may join those forces, can never accept that the exile to which we have been condemned should be eternal, nor can we accept the perpetuation of the occupation of our lands. We shall lift on high our banner until our national rights can be exercised in our own Palestinian homeland.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization believes that this international Organization continues to be the most suitable framework for the establishment of a just peace in our region.

We launch an appeal to the General Assembly to redouble its efforts to realize the ideal so dear to us. We hope that this General Assembly will stand firm and will exercise pressure, so that we may find a way out of the spiral in which the imperialists and Zionist forces would like us to be trapped.

The relevant United Nations resolutions are there, as is the will to implement them. These resolutions must now go beyond the stage of mere adoption and must be applied. If our international Organization is not able to affirm its existence and to serve as a substitute forum for Camp David with a view to finding an equitable solution of the Palestinian problem, the only other remaining forum will be the battlefield, a battlefield which may extend beyond the geographical area of the Middle East.

We have stated our opposition at length to the destructive and aggressive approach followed at Camp David because we are convinced that the United Nations offers the best forum and the best means for finding a proper solution. Under your guidance, Mr. Chairman, we trust that the United Nations will assume its responsibilities before it is too late and before the doors to peace are closed. 16

General Assembly, 62nd meeting; statement by Romania⁹¹

November 28, 1978

Mr. Marinescu (Romania) (interpretation from French): The question that we are now discussing in the General Assembly is of rare importance, for we are dealing with the inalienable right of a people to decide its own future and to lead an autonomous existence; we are dealing with a situation in a very important region, the Middle East, which seriously affects the international political climate and the interests of peace, détente and general security. That is the reason for the exceptional character of the problem of Palestine.

It is clear that no people can resign itself to a situation that prevents it from exercising its fundamental rights and fulfilling its legitimate aspirations to its own State, where it can live as it wishes to live.

The affirmation of the Palestinian people as a distinct national entity and its widespread recognition at the international level, including the United Nations, have given the Palestinian question the dimensions and scope that are decisive for the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. That is why a just solution to this question is henceforth vital to any workable settlement of all the problems of the Middle East.

One of the main goals of the United Nations is to promote the right of all peoples to self-determination. The United Nations therefore has the responsibility to promote as actively as possible recognition by all States of the national rights of the Palestinian people. It was that major responsibility that constituted the political and legal basis for the establishment by the General Assembly of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. It was on that basis also that recommendations to ensure the enjoyment of those rights were formulated and adopted. In those recommendations the General Assembly used as its premise the fact that the question of Palestine is an essential part of the problem of the Middle East and that, consequently, a lasting settlement of the situation there can be achieved only if due account is taken of

⁹¹ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 62, pp. 41 47.

the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

Romania was among the first countries to stress that the national rights of the Palestinian people could be fully exercised only within the framework of an independent State. Only thus will it be possible for the Palestinian nation to organize its own life freely, to dedicate the best of its efforts to economic and social development, to establish and develop co-operative relations with all States, in its own interest and in the interest of peace, security and international détente.

My country has clearly spoken to that effect at all times here at the United Nations, including the occasions on which it has spoken as a member of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, as well as in other international forums; it is in that context, also, that it has established ties of friendship and solidarity with the Palestinian people and for many years now has recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole representative of that people.

Everyone knows the constructive position of principle actively supported by Romania concerning the course to follow in order to settle the Middle East conflict. Since the beginning of the 1967 war, my country has been stressing that the only way to solve all the problems of the Middle East is not armed confrontation—which tends to become more and more ruinous for the parties to the conflict and more and more dangerous to international peace and security—but, rather, the political way: direct negotiations between the parties concerned. The basic principles of an effective and wise settlement of the problems of the Middle East have been clearly stated many times in the official position adopted by my country and in statements by the President of Romania.

One of the basic, essential conditions for the peaceful settlement of the conflict is Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. At same time, if peace is to be achieved in the area, it is of the utmost importance that a just solution be found to the problem of the Palestinian people and that that people's right to self-determination and to the establishment of its own independent national State be ensured. That is indeed the corner-stone of any lasting solution; without it, it will not be possible to put an end to the deep-seated contradictions and the state of tension in the Middle East or to ensure the territorial integrity,

independence, sovereignty, security and tranquillity of the States in the area.

In view of that position of principle, the Romanian delegation wishes to stress again the need to work resolutely, to spare no effort to solve the problem of the Palestinian people—an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. To continue to ignore the aspirations and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people could only slow down the process of peaceful settlement, prolong the conflict and lead to new bloodshed, endangering the peace and security of the area and of the world.

It is our deeply held conviction that a just solution to the Palestinian question is in the interest of all States, including Israel, because the security and independence of that State can be ensured only to the extent that it recognizes and respects the rights of other peoples. Israel must understand that its own security is closely linked to the unconditional guarantee of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, the realization of that people's aspirations to live in complete freedom, in the context of its own national State.

The participation of all interested parties in the negotiations to settle international disputes is a basic premise for the achievement of solutions and agreements that are effective and generally accepted. That is an axiom of contemporary international law. In the particularly complex situation in the Middle East, the Palestinian people is undoubtedly such a directly interested party. Thus, the participation of that people, through its legitimate, recognized representatives, in negotiations to solve the problems of the Middle East is an essential precondition for the establishment of lasting peace in the area. The legitimate, recognized representative of the Palestinian people is the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which has the authority to speak and make valid commitments on behalf of the Palestinian people. I take this occasion to express once again our feelings of friendship to the head of the delegation of the PLO, Mr. Farouk Qaddoumi, and to tell him how pleased we are that he is participating in this important debate.

It is more than clear that there is still a very complex and tense situation in the Middle East. That situation is, without doubt, the result of the continued occupation by Israel of Arab territories and the lack of recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. In those conditions, we are convinced that activities towards the achievement of an over-all political solution to the problem of the Middle East must be stepped up.

As President Nicolae Ceausescu stressed once again, in an interview he gave a few days ago to the Syrian daily *Al Saura*:

Romania envisages an over-all solution as involving Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the 1967 war, as well as the solution of the problem of the Palestinian people, on the basis of its right to self-determination, including the establishment of its own independent State. At the same time, the achievement of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East requires that the independence and territorial integrity of all the States of the region be ensured and that relations of co-operation and good-neighbourliness with those States be developed.

As we have already said, Romania has spoken out and continues to speak out in favour of the settlement of the Middle-East conflict by means of peaceful negotiation among all the interested parties. Faithful to that position, Romania feels that all negotiations are a positive element, in so far as they contribute, on the basis of the principles set forth, to an over-all solution of the conflict.

In the situation created by the Camp David talks, which my country sees as part of the process towards a global solution, we believe that we must act to find a way to ensure the participation of all countries and parties interested in an overall settlement of the conflict. We feel that to this end it is particularly necessary to strengthen the co-operation and solidarity of all the interested Arab states.

My country believes that in order to achieve an appropriate over-all solution it is particularly important to organize, under the aegis and with the active participation of the United Nations, an international meeting, either by reconvening the Geneva Conference or by some other means, in which all interested countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, must take part.

We are firmly convinced that the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people and the creation of an independent Palestinian State would be in the true interest, present and, in particular, long-term, of all States in the Middle East, because it is only by satisfying the legitimate aspiration of the Palestinian people to have their own country, like all other peoples in the world, that we can possibly ensure peace and security in that area.

Tomorrow, for the first time, in the United Nations we shall be celebrating the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. This important event, decided on by the General Assembly at its regular session last year, is intended to draw the attention of the world public to the urgent need for recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people and the peaceful settlement of the Middle East situation as a whole. We believe that this will be an excellent opportunity to make an urgent appeal to the political will and wisdom of States, particularly those that hold the key to progress towards peace in the Middle East, urging them to move out of the present impasse and tackle the Palestinian question in a new and realistic spirit.

We believe that now it is more than ever necessary to intensify the efforts of all States and all peoples and all forces in the area to reach a final over-all settlement of the problems in the Middle East. All the peoples in the area would undoubtedly benefit from such a settlement, because it would enable them to dedicate their human and material resources to speeding up their economic and social development. It would also be in the interest of all the countries in the world, because the final settlement of this conflict would have a very great influence on the international climate as a whole and would remove once and for all a serious source of tension and confrontation which has more than once endangered international peace and security.

Romania for its part intends to contribute in the future, to the best of its ability, to any constructive efforts to put an end to the conflict in the Middle East and establish a just and lasting peace in that area of the world.

17

General Assembly, 62nd meeting; statement by India⁹²

November 28, 1979

Mr. Rai (India) (spoke in Hindi: English text furnished by the delegation): The question of Palestine, which is before the General Assembly, is one which concerns the tragic history of a people with an ancient identity, an uncertain present and an unknown future. It is useful to recall how and why this question was brought before the United Nations so that we may consider ways and means of settling it peacefully and with justice.

The struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for independence began during the Ottoman rule. When that empire went the way of all empires, Palestine came to be placed under British administration according to a Mandate of the League of Nations. The Palestine Mandate fell under the "A" category of mandated territories, which included Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, all of which are now sovereign Member States of the United Nations.

Catagory "A" mandated territories were recognized as having a distinct political individuality—namely, that in 1919 they had already reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations could be provisionally recognized. The only reason that Palestine did not follow Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in attaining the status of political independence was the so-called Balfour Declaration, which provided for the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people consistent with the rights of the Arab inhabitants. That particular obligation having been fulfilled by the establishment of Israel, there could no longer be any legal barrier to the independence of Palestine.

My second submission is that until Palestine becomes independent, the United Nations has the role of a trustee and is responsible for the protection of the rights of the Palestinian people. When the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, Turkey divested itself of all rights over Palestine, and those rights did not pass to the British Government as the mandatory Power. Under the Mandate, the British Government had no power to dispose of Palestine; on the contrary, the predominant element in the Mandate was that of trusteeship for the inhabitants of Palestine. Indeed, it was the duty of the mandatory Power to assist them to independence, as was the case in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

The international trusteeship system of the United Nations as set out in Chapter XII of the Charter, as it made clear in Article 77, it applied to the territories under the mandate of the former League of Nations. The reason the British Government did not place Palestine under this trusteeship system was that it was more than ripe for independence. When the question of Palestine was brought to the United Nations by the British Government, it was surely to discuss the attainment of Palestinian independence.

Therefore, it is my submission that until the goal of independence is achieved, the United Nations remains the trustee of the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and to a nation-State of their own. Their rights cannot be extinguished by the United Nations, for they have been endowed with the quality of inalienability.

The history of the Palestine question, the partition of that country, its subsequent occupation and the various conflicts are too well known to be recalled. But I have chosen to recall the earlier history of this question in order to establish the fact that the right to independence of the Palestinian people is well founded in international as well as natural law. The consequences of the partition of Palestine based on confusion between religion and nationalism still remain with us and are at the root of peace and security in the Middle East. No peace settlement in the Middle East will be viable unless it includes a just solution of the Palestine question.

Since the United Nations was responsible for the partition of Palestine, it continues to bear a special responsibility for restoring to the Palestinian Arab people their national rights. The Charter of the United Nations provides the necessary procedures and powers to enable those people to fulfil their national aspirations by establishing a nation-State in their own homeland, with due respect for the security of other States in that region. The General Assembly has adopted several resolutions reaffirming the inalienable rights of the

 $^{^{92}}$ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 62, pp. 53–57.

Hans Kelsen, the noted authority on international law, had this to say on Palestine:

"When the British Government withdrew from Palestine, that territory was in a legal situation of statelessness until the new State of Israel was established and recognized by other States. But that part of Palestine, which is not under the control of Israel legally, will remain a stateless territory until a recognized Government is established there."

In order to facilitate the attainment of such a goal, the first step is to secure the withdrawal of Israel from areas occupied by it since 1967, for only therafter will the Palestinian Arab people be able freely to exercise their national and human rights. The occupation of Arab territory during a conflict has now become so prolonged as to assume the character of colonial rule. This situation is even more intolerable because of the fact that the occupied territory is morally under international trusteeship. The longer the occupation, the more explosive the situation. Military occupation confers on the occupying Power no right to alter the status of the areas, or to change their demographic character, or to administer them as if they were its territories.

My delegation is a member of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. That Committee has done good work to publicize the problem and to suggest a pragmatic programme of action. However, ultimately it is the Security Council and the General Assembly that will have to find a just solution, with the co-operation of the big Powers. Above all, the United Nations must always keep in mind its role as trustee of the rights of the Palestinian people, and it should not permit the destruction of those rights or of the identity of that people and their homeland.

Nowadays the United Nations is rightly preoccupied with the promotion of respect for human rights everywhere. The question of Palestine is a test case for the United Nations. Bertrand Russell said, "To invoke the horror of the past to justify the horror of the present in Palestine is gross hypocrisy." And the father of the Indian nation, Mahatma Gandhi, said: "Numbers are not crucial to any struggle; strength and purpose are." The strength and purpose of the Palestinian people are invincible, because they are just.

18

General Assembly, 64th meeting; statement by Nigeria⁹³

November 29, 1978

Mr. Harriman (Nigeria): From the Balfour Declaration in 1917 to the peak of the Palestinian nationalist revolt of 1936–1939 in Palestine, and from the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 to the fourth war in October 1973, one fact sticks out a mile and remains immutable: the conflict in the Middle East has been, and will always be until the day it is settled, a struggle by the Arab people for their national rights of statehood, independence, self-determination, freedom and dignity.

These rights have been recognized, in principle, since the turn of the century—and this was especially the case at the Paris Peace Conference following the end of the First World War—as being the inalienable rights of any and every people inhabiting the face of the globe.

My delegation is profoundly struck by the very hard fact that the struggle in Palestine has spanned over 60 years, yet the issue remains frustratingly unresolved. One could go through a long list of previous attempts to solve this problem and still find it shockingly true that the White Papers and Peel Commissions of the Mandate era failed as totally and completely as did the Count Folke Bernadotte mission. The problem has stubbornly resisted any solution in spite of a preponderant quantum of United Nations resolutions, a welter of American mediation efforts and four devastating wars.

During all these years the most crucial and persistent of stumbling blocks in the search for peace in the Middle East, in the view of my delegation, has been the insistence since 1917 by one people in Palestine that it wished to be independent only at the cost of denying another people its independence. We are confronted equally by the nagging problem posed to the international community by the very same people, which wish to have a State in Palestine only at the cost of keeping the Arab Palestinians stateless, and by the fact that the same people wish to be free and sovereign only at the cost of subjugating its Palestinian neighbours.

Israel's insistence on these impossible and his-

⁹³ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 64, pp. 32-42.

torically untenable conditions has never wavered. Consequently from the outset two opposed and opposing forces have been pitted against each other in perpetual and fierce confrontation, and a chasm has been created between them that is very distinct to this day. So long as this dichotomy exists between Israel and the dispossessed Palestinian, Arabs, creating occupiers and occupied, and so long as the Palestinian Arabs are denied the right to explore freely their sense of statehood we will have, by the compelling laws of nature, politics, and history, two forces in constant conflict. This, in a nutshell, has been the sad, but explosive fact of life in Palestine, since 1948, and very starkly and glaringly since 1967.

Israelis may endeavour to overshadow this by constantly justifying their current reprehensible policies of occupation by invoking Israel's so-called security needs. Indeed, they have harped on such slogans as "biblical Israel" as part of an ongoing emotional build-up calculated to sustain the sympathy of their Western friends aroused first by the degradations and atrocities suffered by them under the Nazis. And they may keep the world occupied with side issues relating to "recognition", United Nations peace-keeping forces, security guarantees, and so on. But the basic facts at the core of the conflict speak for themselves as eloquently today as they have done all these years. The two main issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute—that is to say, the national issue of Palestinian rights and the regional issue of the presence of foreign settler occupation forces on Arab lands-remain unsolved and unresolved because of Israeli intransigence and military arrogance.

The question of Palestine had all along been discussed within the wider context of the situation in the Middle East at the United Nations from its very inception. If the General Assembly, in its wisdom, decided to discuss this issue as a separate item in 1974, to grant the Palestine Liberation Organization observer status within the United Nations, and to create, within one year, a Special Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, it was in recognition of the central position of the Palestinian question in the continuing crisis in the Middle East.

Though the United Nations agreed to admit Israel as a Member State to this international

body, it made that admission contingent on Israel's compliance with the United Nations resolution of that year calling for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees expelled from their homes. Israel then signed the Lausanne Protocol, pledging to adhere to the United Nations request. We now know, of course, that Israel reneged on its pledge, as it subsequently was to renege on other pledges signed by it as a Member State of this Organization. What Israel does not realize—or, if it does, it is implacably insensitive to in its wider implications—is the fact that by its persistent defiance of United Nations resolutions it is indirectly casting doubt on the legality of its own admission and its claims to any statehood of its own.

It is not my intention to go into the substance of the policies of persecution and repression which have come to characterize the Israeli military administration in the occupied Arab lands. But one aspect of such reprehensible policies is already fast compounding the bitterness of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation forces—and rightly so. This is the callous systematic eviction of Palestinians from their homes and land, cutting them off from their sources of livelihood and, by one stroke, transforming them into refugees in their homeland.

The confiscation of Arab land and property dates back to the earliest days of the foundation of the Jewish State. Under the so-called Absentee Property Law, all lands and properties belonging to Palestinians who were fleeing the area of conflict in the first Arab-Israeli war and who temporarily sought refuge in the surrounding countries were seized and taken over by the usurping State. This blatant land grab was not confined to "absentees" but, by virtue of a hastily introduced series of laws, even to "present absentees". This category included Palestinians who were very much present in the country, and did not leave in 1948, but who happened to be absent from their towns, villages and farms on a certain date.

The recent declarations and actions of the Government of Israel have, unfortunately, not mitigated the expansionist impression created by Israel. In this connexion, the statements made by Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Foreign Minister, here in the General Assembly during the current session and another made by Prime Minister Begin last month to the effect that Israel has an omnipresent right to settle anywhere in the oc-

cupied territories are cases in point.

The confiscation of the Arab property deserted by Palestinians fleeing from the cross-fire during the Middle East wars has gone on apace, just as Israel's brazen refusal to dismantle existing settlements has stiffened. The occupation of vast areas of the West Bank and Gaza—since renamed Judaea and Samaria—in flagrant violation of all known norms of legal and constitutional propriety, has further strengthened our conviction of the existence of an Israeli grand design of expansion into all possible Arab territory. The strategy is to create as many facts on the ground as possible to pave the way for an acquiescence by the international community in such blatant acquisition of territory by force and aggression in our day.

The cumulative effect of these illegal activities in the occupied territories is the aggravation of the continuing hardship of the Arab population. We have yet to see one single Palestinian Arab in these territories who has not been touched by Israeli expansionist policies or whose life has not been adversely affected by Israeli military occupation.

But, then, the unjust seizure of their lands and the socio-economic disaster unleashed on the Arabs by such acts on the part of the occupation forces and authorities are but one facet of the unfolding Palestinian tragedy. Arabs have been subjected to arbitrary arrests and held for long periods without charge by the occupation authorities. As mere suspects, they have been tortured during interrogation and have suffered even worse physical disabilities after their incarceration. The plight of the Palestinian Arab is one that would have touched even a heart made of stone. It is therefore incomprehensible that Jews who were themselves victims of the greatest pogrom of recent times, unleashed by the Nazi racist extremism, should now be seen as the tough conquerors and occupation authorities in part of the Middle East.

My delegation welcomes all initiatives in the direction of peace, but whatever we do, we should be clear in our minds as to the nature of the final objective and goals we set for ourselves in our search for a solution of the Palestinian problem.

For the purpose of clarity my delegation would like to reiterate some of the fundamental principles relating to the question of Palestine, as adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. Among the most important of those principles we

should like to recall the following. First, the question of Palestine is at the heart of the Middle East problem and, consequently, no solution in the Middle East can be envisaged which does not fully take into account the interests of all the Palestinian people. Secondly, the full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and property and to achieve self-determination, national independence and sovereignty will contribute decisively to a comprehensive and final settlement of the Middle East crisis. Thirdly, the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the reppresentative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3375 (XXX), is indispensable in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations. And, fourthly, the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and, consequently, Israel is obliged completely and speedily to evacuate any territory so acquired.

The United Nations has an abiding responsibility to ensure that any solution of the Palestinian question takes those fundamental issues into account, if it is to avoid a distorted peace which will merely achieve a limited respite today only to pave the way for a more serious conflagration tomorrow.

In this connexion, the Security Council, as mankind's custodian of international peace and security, should as a matter of urgency demand the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) and that such implementation should not be related to any other condition. The resources of the International Committee of the Red Cross and/or those of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) may be mobilized to assist in the solution of any logistical problems involved in the resettlement of those returning to their homes. Those agencies could also assist, in co-operation with the host countries and the PLO, in the identification of displaced Palestinians. However, Palestinians who choose not to return to their homes should be paid just and equitable compensation, as provided for in resolution 194 (III). And in order to set the stage for genuine reconciliation between the parties to the current conflict, Israel must be advised, in its own interest, that it must abide scrupulously by the provisions

of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to declare, pending its speedy withdrawal from those occupied territories, its recognition of the applicability of that Convention.

For our part, Nigeria will continue to support the legitimate demands of the Palestinians for the exercise of their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence within secure and recognized borders of their own, like those of other States in the region. Israel should realize that its own security is directly linked to the security and the inviolability of the territorial integrity of its neighbours. Above all, it must co-operate in the creation of a homeland for the Palestinian Arabs, since that is the only way the legacy of bitterness left by the unorthodox manner of its own creation can be effectively removed.

My Government is aware of ongoing negotiations in Washington. We have observed with satisfaction that Egypt, which could very easily have achieved a bilateral peace treaty with Israel, continues to be preoccupied with a more realistic linkage between the particular and the general and crucial aspects of an over-all settlement in the Middle East. It is our hope that Israel will not lose the opportunity that is provided for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East—and that of course must be one that gets to the core of the problem, that is, self-determination and a homeland for the Palestinians under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

19

General Assembly, 64th meeting; statement by Sweden⁹⁴

November 29, 1978

MR. THUNBORG (Sweden): There are, in our view, two essential elements that must be included and guaranteed in a comprehensive and viable settlement of the Middle East conflict: one is Israel's right of existence; the other is the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

The Palestinian problem is central to the whole Middle East conflict. It is not possible to envisage

a lasting peace in the West Bank and Gaza or a total settlement in the region—in particular in Lebanon—as long as the Palestinian question remains unsolved. Furthermore, the Palestinian problem remains the crucial difficulty in the ongoing peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt. We sincerely hope that those negotiations will soon result in a treaty which would constitute a first step leading to a comprehensive and lasting solution of the Middle East question in all its aspects.

We have long expressed the view that the basis for such a solution must be Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973),⁹⁵ and that the principles established in those two resolutions must be supplemented with a recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people and of their right to determine their own future, including their right to express their national identity within the framework of a State of their own living in peace with Israel. Essential elements of a solution would be the recognition by the Palestinian people of Israel's right to existence, as well as Israel's recognition of the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination.

The Palestinian Arabs must be given the opportunity of participating in agreements which affect their future and the undertakings which they are to fulfil. In our view, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is the most representative spokesman of the Palestinian Arabs. This does not mean that we accept without reservation all the political aims and methods of that organization. We want strongly to emphasize that a settlement of the Middle East conflict must be achieved through peaceful means and not through violence. We hope that all parties involved in the conflict will show restraint and statesmanship.

There are many stumbling-blocks on the road towards a real peace. One of the most serious is the Israeli settlements policy in the occupied territories, a policy which has been declared illegal by the United Nations on several occasions. Yesterday, in one of the committees, my delegation voted for a resolution condemning that policy. We urge Israel to reconsider its settlements policy, which undoubtedly constitutes one of the gravest obstacles to a comprehensive solution.

Sweden is well aware of the historical back-

 $^{^{94}}$ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 64, pp. 42–45. $\ ^{\circ}$

⁹⁵ Doc. 34 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

ground to the situation of the Jewish people and to the creation of the State of Israel. We are also aware that the problem of the Palestinian people can be solved only through recognition of their right to self-determination and their right to live in a State of their own in peace, side by side with Israel. Those are the crucial elements in the achievement of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, a settlement that would end the sufferings of the peoples of that region and create solid conditions for peace and stability. That would be an important contribution to peace in the world as a whole.

20

General Assembly, 65th meeting; statement by Israel⁹⁶

November 30, 1978

Mr. Blum (Israel): The nations of the Middle East stand today at a crucial turning point in their history. For the first time in 30 years of conflict and warfare, they have the opportunity to break out of a seemingly endless and intractable cycle of violence, destruction and suffering, and to embrace a new era of peace and co-operation.

The present session of the General Assembly began less than two days after the conclusion of the Camp David accords.⁹⁷ We are still in the midst of this ongoing peace process. Those who have exploited unrest and conflict in the Middle East in the past and who cannot now reconcile themselves to the prospects for peace, are, predictably, trying to sabotage the peace talks. Indeed, they are attempting to subvert this forum, which is dedicated through the Charter of our Organization to peace and security, and to turn it to their own destructive ends in the days ahead.

For 12 months now, since the historic meeting in Jerusalem between the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel, the attention of the world has been riveted on the difficult but determined efforts of Egypt and Israel to resolve the issues that divide us—in Jerusalem, 98 in Cairo, 99

in Ismailia, 100 in Leeds Castle, 101 in Camp David and in Washington. We have witnessed dramatic breakthroughs and a willingness to compromise. Slowly and painstakingly, we have seen a real and positive movement towards peace.

During the same 12 months, how has this Assembly contributed to the peace process? What serious efforts are being made by the General Assembly to extend the negotiations to the other parties in the conflict? How will history assess the role of the United Nations, at this vital turning point, in living up to its Charter directive to promote international peace and security?

The answers to these questions are painfully and tragically obvious. Instead of advocating constructive compromises that take the interests of all parties into account, the General Assembly has continued to encourage the most extreme, onesided and unrealistic expectations. Instead of advocating negotiations between the parties themselves, as required by Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the Assembly has endorsed—and is being asked once again to endorse-recommendations designed to bypass the negotiating process. Instead of dialogue, it has preferred diatribe. Instead of peace and co-operation it has encouraged terror and violence. In short, rather than working to bring us closer to a peace agreement, powerful forces within the General Assembly have done everything within their ability to obstruct and delav a settlement.

While this negativism has characterized the General Assembly's approach on most aspects of the Middle East conflict, it has been particularly true in relation to the issue of the Palestinian Arabs, for in that area the policy of the Assembly has been directly inspired over the past years by the so-called PLO. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the policy of the General Assembly on the matter before us closely reflects that of the PLO. Because the PLO rejects Security Council resolutions 242 (1967)¹⁰² and 338 (1973),¹⁰³ the General Assembly has chosen to avoid reference to those resolutions when addressing itself to the issue before us. Because the PLO rejects the existence of the State of Israel, General Assembly resolutions on the subject not only ignore Israel's

⁹⁶ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 65, pp. 7–35.

⁹⁷ Docs. 153 and 154 below.

⁹⁸ See docs. 180 to 184, 301 and 303 to 305 in International Docucuments on Palestine 1977.

⁹⁹ See docs. 194 and 326 in ibid.

¹⁰⁰ See docs, 199 to 201 in ibid.

¹⁰¹ See doc. 136 below.

¹⁰² Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹⁰³ Doc. 34 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

existence, but, in fact, violate the sovereign rights of a Member State of the United Nations. Because the PLO sees the establishment of a West Bank-Gaza State as only the first step towards PLO control over all of the former mandated Palestine, including Israel, the so-called Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People adopts precisely the same two-stage policy, which is then promptly accepted by the General Assembly. Because the PLO rejects Camp David, the rejectionists within the Arab world and beyond equally attack the peace-making process. And because the PLO rejects a negotiated settlement, the very word "negotiation" is taboo for the purposes of this debate.

Given the composition of the Palestine Committee, none of this is particularly surprising: 19 of its 23 members do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, and some of them do not even recognize its right to exist.

From the outset the observer for the so-called PLO has dominated the proceedings of the Committee; hence its recommendations formulated in 1976 are little more than a recension in United Nations jargon of the PLO's criminal design for the liquidation of Israel.

Perhaps one of the few aspects of PLO policy not yet adopted by the General Assembly is the planting of bombs in buses and supermarkets. And even there, in its absolute refusal to condemn PLO acts of murder and terror, the General Assembly's silent acquiescence amounts to a tacit endorsement of that abhorrent practice.

The United Nations has never had an international day of solidarity with the victims of international terrorism. Yet, it has seen fit to celebrate its solidarity with the terrorists themselves. It is activities of this kind that have brought the prestige of the United Nations to what must be an all-time low and that threaten to erode whatever little moral authority the United Nations may still possess.

But the travesty transcends the proceedings of the General Assembly. Lest the Secretariat of the world Organization retain its impartiality, the PLO moved last year to subvert it. As a result, the automatic majority in the General Assembly created, in effect, an official PLO office and propaganda outlet in the Secretariat. Sponsored and financed by the Member States of the United Nations, the newly-established so-called Special Unit on Palestinian Rights is at present engaged in preparing and disseminating, under PLO guidance, a series of bulletins, pseudo-scientific studies, films, pamphlets and exhibitions propagating the PLO's criminal designs.

All this hostile activity is being financed from the United Nations budget, even though Member States which furnish over 60 per cent of the budget opposed the creation of the Special Unit. There can be little doubt that we are witness to the abuse of the Organization's means and machinery for aims that are clearly in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The ultimate irony is surely what took place yesterday. Because the PLO deemed 29 November, the anniversary of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 1947, 104 the most appropriate day to harness the United Nations to its propaganda effort, the General Assembly accordingly fell in with that perverse idea.

After 31 years, memories of the events following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 seem to have dimmed. Certain quarters, including States Members of the United Nations, wilfully ignore the fact that all the States members of the Arab League in 1947 categorically rejected General Assembly resolution 181 (II). Those States formally reserved their complete freedom of action and then set out to destroy that resolution by the illegal use of force from the moment of its adoption. On 5 March 1948, on 1 April 1948 and again on 17 April 1948 the Security Council appealed for an end to the acts of violence in Palestine. The Arabs. within and without Palestine, openly defied those resolutions.

The acts of violence perpetrated in Palestine with the active assistance of the neighbouring Arab States reached such proportions that on 16 February 1948 the United Nations Palestine Commission, in its first special report to the Security Council, bluntly notified the Council that:

"Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged there." (S/676, section I, para. 3 C).

Similarly, in its report dated 10 April 1948

¹⁰⁴ See George J. Tomeh, ed., United Nations Resolutions on Palestine, 1947-1974, p. 4. (IPS, 1975).

to the General Assembly at its second special session, the same Commission advised the Assembly that:

"Arab opposition to the Plan of the Assembly has taken the form of organized efforts by strong Arab elements, both inside and outside of Palestine, to prevent its implementation and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including repeated armed incursions into Palestinian territory." (A/532, p. 10)

With the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine on 14 May 1948 the armies of seven Arab States illegally crossed the international boundaries of mandated Palestine, in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and in breach of general international law. Thereafter, the Arab States refused to comply with subsequent cease-fire resolutions and appeals of the Security Council and the United Nations Mediator.

In the face of this unabating Arab defiance, the Security Council, on 15 July 1948, taking into consideration that "the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator and of the Security Council, in its resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948" (resolution 54 (1948)), determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter. Action under Chapter VII of the Charter was also contemplated against those States members of the Arab League.

None the less, Arab violence against the fledgling State of Israel persisted. While this aggression was successful in destroying General Assembly resolution 181 (II), it failed in its other avowed purpose—namely, that of crushing the Jewish State. The fact that the Arab States failed in their armed aggression aimed at destroying Israel does not legitimize their violation of international law. At the same time, that armed aggression precludes their invoking in any form the benefits of a General Assembly resolution which they both rejected and destroyed by force of arms.

The United Nations documentation of these historical events is unequivocal. It makes a mockery of the Palestine Committee's immodest celebration yesterday.

Now, I would not object so strenuously to all these activities if they were called by their real name and if deception were not such an integral part of the process.

While echoing the PLO programme, the Palestine Committee declared to last year's session of the General Assembly that it had "already demonstrated its impartiality" and was therefore "well-placed to clarify or even to influence the position of the participants".

Indeed the claim to impartiality is ridiculous when taken in the context of the resolution which established the Committee-that is, resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975-and which identified the Committee from the beginning with the PLO's view of the issue. If the General Assémbly refused to acknowledge the connexion openly, the PLO did not hesitate to do so. Three days after the adoption of the resolution setting up the Palestine Committee, PLO members detonated explosives in Jerusalem's Zion Square which killed six youngsters aged from 15 to 17, and wounded dozens of others. A week later PLO terrorists murdered three theological students in a religious school at Ramat Hagshimim. Lest the connexion with the General Assembly's action be overlooked, the "Palestine Corner" on Radio Damascus announced on 20 November 1975:

"The fedayeen take one copy of the resolutions adopted at the United Nations, mix them with TNT and blow up Zion Square... or one of our other occupied squares or streets."

That is the true mandate of the Palestine Committee, and that is the meaning of the Committee's reports and recommendations.

In the three years since its establishment, the thrust of the Committee's work has changed not one iota. In sharp contrast to the initiative and imagination displayed by Egypt and Israel, the Committee and the General Assembly have continued to churn out one-sided and repetitive resolutions and reports endorsing the most extreme views. A former Permanent Representative of the United States, Governor William Scranton, described the Committee's first report in 1976 as "unfair," "senseless" and "totally devoid of balance, with conclusions that are unworkable and recommendations which prejudge the outcome of negotiations" (A/31/PV. 76, p. 36). In the light of recent developments, that reaction is truer today than ever before. The Committee's work has changed in only one respect: its veneer of alleged impartiality has become more subtle in the last year. This has been particularly true since it transferred its propaganda function to the Palestine Unit and, by extension,

to the United Nations Secretariat itself. Thus, for example, the first so-called scholarly study prepared by that Unit was issued earlier this month. Entitled "The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem", it bears the official stamp and emblem of the United Nations. Had the title read, "The Origins of the Palestine Problem: The PLO Version", I would have had no objection, except concerning the blatant misuse of United Nations funds to publicize the views of a terrorist organization bent on the destruction of a Member State of the United Nations. But to disseminate a partisan and highly selective concoction of halftruths and distortions under the guise of an impartial and scholarly study is the height of intellectual hypocrisy and dishonesty. By a process of subtle semantic double-talk, by careful omissions and by a devious misuse of words and phrases, the document is liable to deceive those without independent sources of information and those who do not care to do their own research.

Let me give just one example of this insidious process of deception which characterizes this whole document. At the end of the first part of the publication, ostensibly dealing with the period of the Palestine Mandate, there appear a number of maps. The one map that is conspicuously absent is the official map of the Palestine Mandate, which until 1946 included Trans-Jordan on the East Bank of the Jordan River. The map was omitted because it does not fit into the PLO's own scheme, as it would show too clearly that a Palestinian Arab State has already been in existence for 32 years on more than three quarters of the territory of mandated Palestine-that is, the State now called "Jordan." That embarrassment is eliminated in this purportedly scholarly and impartial publication by the simple expedient of eliminating the map.

That is just one example. In fact, every page and every paragraph contains another subtle omission, another half-truth, another misleading statement camouflaged by a subtle semantic distortion. Israel maintains that the history of international conflicts, and particularly those with complex historical origins, can be properly written only by objective historians who enjoy complete academic freedom. The practice of writing and rewriting history according to the transient interests of a political body is of course characteristic of certain régimes. It is most regrettable that the

United Nations has now been drawn into that pattern.

That is the policy to which the General Assembly has been harnessed. That is the policy which we are now being asked to reaffirm and re-endorse. Let us at least be honest enough to recognize it for what it is and to call it by its true name. Since a majority of the General Assembly is prepared to fall in line behind the PLO and to glorify its leaders, it behoves us to take a closer look at that murderous organization's aims and activities.

For years now Israel has been drawing attention to the so-called "Palestinian National Covenant" of 1964, as amended in 1968 and repeatedly reaffirmed by the PLO since then. We continue to do so because that document remains the basic document of the PLO. Article 19 of the document declares that

"...the establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and void, whatever time has elapsed...". (S/11932, annex).

Article 20 of the PLO Covenant goes on to assert that

"The claim of a historical or spiritual tie between Jews and Palestine does not tally with historical realities...".(*Ibid*)

In other words, the PLO rejects 4,000 years of Jewish and world history. Everything else follows logically. Article 15 of the document grotesquely defines it as a "national duty... to purge the Zionist presence from Palestine" (*Ibid*).

Those are not abstract declarations, but specific directives. Thus Articles 9 and 10 of the Covenant, which declare that "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine" and that "Fedayeen action forms the nucleus of the popular Palestinian war of liberation", (*Ibid.*), fully explains the PLO's terroristic practices.

Thus, when two bombs exploded under a tourist bus and near a Jerusalem gas station on the eve of the Camp David summit conference, the PLO took official responsibility for the blasts. When a bomb killed four innocent civilians and wounded 40 others on a bus little more than a week ago, Yasser Arafat's own Al-Fatah proudly claimed responsibility for the cowardly attack, perpetrated by its own admission with a view to demonstrating its rejection of the current peace talks. Last June the PLO murdered six people on a Jerusalem bus and in August injured 49 others by planting a bomb in a Tel Aviv outdoor vegetable market.

And, of course, none of us has forgotten Al-Fatah's brutal massacre of 37 civilians on the Tel Aviv-Haifa highway earlier this year. But to detail every PLO terror act would take all day. The grim statistics do not reflect the agony of each man, woman and child murdered by the PLO. A recent study showed that the PLO terrorists have been responsible in Israel and elsewhere for the deaths of 1,131 people in the last decade—an average of one murder every three days; the wounding or maining of 2,471 more; and the detention of 2,755 as hostages.

The so-called PLO had had no inhibitions about violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of many States Members of the United Nations and has shown little respect for the niceties of law, order and public security in those countries. It has been able to do this primarily because it enjoys the active support of known Arab Governments which not only provide the said organization with ample finance, training facilities, arms, intelligence, logistic support, documentation, means of escape and safe passage, but also put at its disposal their diplomatic privileges and immunities abroad. This unique situation has enabled the organization in question to become the linchpin of the "terrorist international", which is plaguing society throughout the world today, since it can service and supply the needs of other terrorist groups in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, all of which can, for example, train openly on PLO bases and plan and practise terrorist attacks without let or hindrance.

The grave threat to international security which is created in this way is further exacerbated by the encouragement which the PLO and its accomplices derive from the favourable attitudes and virtual immunity from censure that they benefit from here in the United Nations.

Most recently, PLO terrorism has been used to intimidate Palestinian Arabs willing to coexist peacefully with Israel. After President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem last year, the so-called Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, one of the constituent members under the PLO umbrella, swore to assassinate any Palestinian Arab who accepted President Sadat's invitation to the Cairo Conference in December of last year. The PLO made good its threat. Its information agency, WAFA, announced on 26 December that orders had been issued "to liquidate a number of agents"

and boasted that it had already killed Hamdi Kadi, who was in charge of education in Ramallah. The same day the PLO observer at the United Nations publicly justified the murder, telling NBC news:

"The newspapers and collaborators with the forces of occupation are executed. They are not assassinated. So this man must have been executed because of his collaboration with the forces of occupation." Asked by the disbelieving NBC interviewer whether he actually condoned what had been done, Mr. Terzi replied: "Those who collaborate with the enemy should be executed, yes."

In its desperate attempt to sabotage any peace agreement, the PLO has escalated its campaign of initimidation. Other Palestinian Arabs have been assassinated, like Abd Al-Nur Janho, a Christian Arab merchant in Ramallah who rejected the PLO because, in his words, "We must live together. Hatred helps no one." He and others like him have been the victims of PLO hatred. The PLO's message to the residents of the territories is clear. Kadi, Janho and others have become symbols of fear, allowing the PLO to claim that Palestinian Arabs reject any settlement with Israel. Sometimes, however, even PLO terror cannot quell a silent protest. As Janho's son, Khalil, reported to New York Times correspondent Flora Lewis:

"When my father was killed, Khalaf (the mayor of Ramallah) told me there wouldn't be three people at his funeral. Well, it was the biggest funeral ever seen on the West Bank. There were cars half-way to Jerusalem."

Here, at the United Nations, the PLO does not reveal its true colours. Intent on cultivating a false image of moderation, it has mastered the art of double-talk in order to maintain an aura of respectability. But we in the Middle East hear the radio broadcasts that emanate daily from Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad. On the PLO broadcasting station which calls itself the "Voice of Palestine", we have heard Yasser Arafat, in passing out a new class from a terrorist training course, declare that "these fighters are the people who will reach Jerusalem and Jaffa". For those who are perhaps unfamiliar with the geography of the region, the "Palestine Corner" on Damascus Radio recently explained:

"Israel does not exist in the Arab nation, and there is no Zionist State in the Arab homeland. Only the Arabs have Palestine from Nazareth to Rafah and from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River."

Faithful to its goal of establishing a PLO-dominated State over the entire territory of the former Palestine Mandate, including Israel, the PLO in its 10-point platform of 1974 has devised the "phased political programme" which is also known as the "two or three-stage policy". The essence of this programme was described by none other than Farouq Qaddoumi, who explained in Newsweek magazine of 14 March 1977:

"There are two (initial) phases to our return: the first phase to the 1967 lines, and the second to the 1948 lines... The third stage is the democratic State of Palestine. So we are fighting for these three stages."

Asked if the PLO has become more moderate, Mr. Qaddoumi replied:

"By moderation we mean we are ready... to establish a State on a part of our territory. In the past we said, No, on all of it, immediately, a democratic State of Palestine. How we say, no, this can be implemented in three stages. That is moderation."

So as to avoid the impression that things may have changed in the intervening period, let me quote Ibrahim Sousse, the PLO representative in Paris, in a radio interview on "Europe 1", in Paris, on 5 September 1978:

"This is our formula for peace. I am going to repeat it on your station so that everyone listening knows exactly what the PLO wants...

"Our goal is to establish an independent, sovereign Palestinian State on every inch of Palestinian territory evacuated by Israeli forces. I repeat: on every inch of Palestinian soil evacuated by Israeli forces...

"This means that the PLO will acknowledge or accept the establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza as one of the stages towards an envisaged independent Palestinian State in all of Palestine."

We who live in the Middle East, who hear and read the PLO's own statements there and who have witnessed the mangled bodies of women and children being pulled from buses and stores bombed by the PLO, cannot be misled.

When I say "we in the Middle East", I am

When I say "we in the Middle East", I am referring not only to Israel. Indeed, the damage which the terrorists have inflicted on us is dwarfed

by the havoc they have wrought in the territories of our neighbours.

Jordan is certainly aware of Yasser Arafat's declaration in 1974 that:

"Jordan is ours, Palestine is ours, and we shall build our national entity on the whole of this land after having freed it of both the Zionist presence and the reactionary traitor presence",—that is, King Hussein.

Indeed, point 5 of the 10 points approved by the PLO Council in June 1974 calls in effect, for a struggle against the Jordanian régime. That this was not idle rhetoric had already been demonstrated in the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo in November 1971. King Hussein did not hesitate to call the PLO "criminals" when they thereatened to tear his country apart. Nor has he forgotten the PLO's attempt to subvert his régime in 1970. Only last month, the German newspaper, *Munchner Merkur*, quoted King Hussein, who had the following to say about the PLO:

"The PLO as the sole representative of the people of Palestine? Ridiculous! How can half a dozen splintered organizations—partly ruled by criminals who quarrel among themselves about radical ideologies—make such a claim? What they call representation, or war of liberation, is nothing but terror."

But the General Assembly's memory is selective. Now that Syria once again patronizes the PLO this body can conveniently forget Tel al-Zatar and the pitched battles between the Syrians and the PLO during the Lebanese civil war. It can forget President Assad's statement on Damascus Radio, when PLO terrorists attacked the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus:

"We condemn this act of terror, committed by a gang of traitors and criminals. We refuse to bargain with them."

And the Assembly can forget the article by Syria's Defence Minister, General Mustafa T'lass in *Tishrin*, the official Syrian Army newspaper, where he bitterly attacked the PLO:

"My Palestinian comrades, the Moslems of Lebanon have begun to hate you because you are interfering in their daily life and their personal liberty. What, then, is the aim of your liberation? Is your sublime target the massacre of Lebanon? Or perhaps your grand design was to slaughter the residents of the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus?

You are mistaken, Palestinian comrades, because you arouse nothing but disgust among all honest Arab citizens."

But perhaps the greatest tragedy of all caused by the PLO is that which befell the people of Lebanon. Whatever the current political accommodations of Jordan and Syria, the Lebanese are still today suffering from the havoc wrought by the PLO. Perhaps the Assembly could ignore, for two full years, the pleas and statements emanating from Lebanese leaders in Beirut as their country was torn apart limb from limb. But when the Lebanese Ambassador to the United Nations himself described his country's plight in this very hall just two years ago, could we afford to forget so easily? Since yesterday's ceremony implied just such forgetfulness, and since none of the speeches glorifying the PLO in this building recall that plight, I feel obliged to remind Members of the words of Ambassador Ghorra of Lebanon in October 1976:

"...Lebanon's tragedy should be a warning—and indeed a stern one—that the security, nay the survival of Member States cannot be viewed with lethargy and indifference. Furthermore, we believe that small States should draw the proper conclusion and realize that they must be ever more vigilant and efficient in protecting their higher interests and national rights. They must principally rely on their national means to safeguard their independence and sovereignty". (A/31/PV.~32, p.~36)

About the PLO, Ambassador Ghorra had the following to say:

"...the origins of the tragic... events in Lebanon... are to be found in the Arab rivalries and the assaults perpetrated by Palestinians against... Lebanon and... its people...". There has been "constant Palestinian intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon and intolerable encroachment on its sovereignty...". In 1973 "President Franjieh... denounced the illegal occupation of parts of Lebanese territory by Palestinian elements..." (ibid., pp. 38–41)

The Palestinians "increased the influx of arms into Lebanon.... They transformed most of the refugee camps, if not all, into military bastions... common-law criminals fleeing from Lebanese justice found shelter and protection in the camps.... Those camps became, in fact, centres for the training of mercenaries sent and financed by some

other Arab States.... Palestinian elements belonging to various... organizations resorted to kidnapping of Lebanese and sometimes foreigners, holding them prisoner, questioning them, torturing them and sometimes even killing them.... They committed all sorts of crimes in Lebanon.... They smuggled goods.... They went so far as to demand 'protection' money.... It is difficult to enumerate all the illegal activities committed by those Palestinian elements..." (ibid., p. 42)

"Whatever grievances the Lebanese had amongst themselves or in their relationship with their Government, the Palestinians had neither the right nor the justification to become a party to any internal dispute...". There are—this was said two years ago—"50,000 dead, 100,000 injured; 1,000,000 Lebanese refugees in Syria, the Arab world, Europe and America.... All that could not be justified by any objective of the Palestinian revolution...". (ibid., p. 43–45)

"...it became apparent that the Palestinians had designs of becoming a major factor in the battle for political power in Lebanon. They openly allied themselves, and continue to do so at this very hour, with one group of Lebanese against another..' (ibid., pp. 42–45)

If I have dwelt at some length on the policy programme of the so-called PLO, it is because that is the policy and programme which the General Assembly is once again being asked to endorse and accept. But I cannot conclude without stating that there is an alternative. It is an alternative with which every Member State here is familiar and which gives the Palestinian Arabs, for the first time in their history, the opportunity to govern themselves through their freely elected representatives, while at the same time giving the citizens of Israel the peace and security to which they are entitled.

We have said before and we repeat here that it has never been the wish of Israel to exercise control over the lives and activities of the Arab inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

We want to live as equals with the Arab inhabitants of that area. We want to live with them, not to replace them, but at the same time we do not regard ourselves as foreigners in those areas.

Under the agreement for the framework for peace in the Middle East, signed at Camp David, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn from Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district once a self-governing authority is freely elected by their inhabitants. The Israel defence forces will be redeployed in those areas, and maintained for security purposes. The final status of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza and their relationship with their neighbours will be negotiated during a period of five years following the establishment of the self-governing authority. By taking part in these negotiations, the Palestinian Arabs will participate in the determination of their own future.

Unfortunately, there are those, in the Arab world and beyond, known as "rejectionists", whose determination to defeat the peace process was proclaimed before the ink had dried on the Camp David accords. Members of the United Nations therefore have a choice that has never been clearer: to play a constructive role in encouraging the peace process in the months ahead, or to ally themselves with the shrill spokesmen of "rejection" whose undisguised aim is to keep the Middle East in constant turmoil.

By avoiding intemperate accusations and ill-considered resolutions in the current General Assembly session, the United Nations could throw its weight behind the most dramatic and important breakthrough in 30 years of Middle East peace efforts and thereby live up to its Charter that is dedicated to the advancement of international peace and security. The Assembly should encourage those of our neighbours who have so far refused to do so to join the negotiating process and engage in a constructive dialogue with Israel with the aim of resolving the difficult issues which separate us.

For its own part, Israel stands ready to negotiate peace treaties with all its neighbours. The current negotiations towards the first Arab-Israel peace treaty mark the first historic step towards a comprehensive peace in the entire Middle East.

I cannot conclude this statement without making some effort to set the historical record straight, for countless distortions of fact and history have been uttered, in many cases with complete cynicism by those who should know better, in the course of this debate. Much has been claimed in the name of Palestinian Arabs. There has been a conspicuous absence of recognition of the Jewish people's inalienable right to the Land of Israel and its rights to self-determination and national

independence.

The circumstances in which the Jewish people, its independence crushed 19 centuries ago and large numbers of its sons driven into exile, maintained and preserved its connexion with that Land are among the most remarkable facts in the history of mankind. For 18 centuries the Zionist passion—the longing for Zion, the dream of the restoration, and the ordering of Jewish life and thought to prepare for the return—pulsed in the Jewish people. That passion finally gave birth to the practical and political organizations which, amid the storms of the twentieth century, launched the mass movement for the return to Zion and for restored Jewish national independence.

The Jews were never a people without a homeland. Having been robbed of their land, Jews never ceased to give expression to their anguish at their deprivation and to pray for and to demand its return. Throughout the nearly two millenia of dispersion, the Land of Israel remained the focus of the Jewish national culture. Every single day in all those 70 generations, Jews gave voice to their attachment to Zion.

In their daily prayers, they turned towards Jerusalem, the heart and soul of the Jewish people, the one and only eternal capital of Israel.

The consciousness of the Jew that the Land of Israel was his country was not a theoretical exercise, or an article of theology or a sophisticated political outlook. It was in a sense all of these and it was a pervasive and inextricable element in the very warp and woof of his daily life. Jewish prayers, Jewish literature are saturated with the love and the longing for the sense of belonging to the Land of Israel. For every Jew-in his home on family occasions, in his daily customs on weekdays and on the Sabbath, when he said grace over meals, when he got married, when he built his house, when he said his words of comfort to mourners,—the context was always his exile, his hope and belief in the return to Zion and the reconstruction of his homeland. He carried Eretz Israel—the Land of Israel—with him wherever he went. Jewish festivals remained tuned to the circumstances and conditions of the Jewish homeland. Whether Jews remained in warm Italy or Spain, whether they found homes in cold eastern Europe, whether they found their way to North America or came to live in the southern hemisphere where the seasons are reversed, they always celebrated the spring and autumn and winter of the Land of Israel. They prayed for dew in May and for rain in October.

Widely unknown, its significance certainly long ungrasped, is the no less awesome fact that throughout the 18 centuries between the fall of the Second Jewish Commonwealth and the beginnings of the Third, in our time, the tenacity of Jewish attachment to the Land of Israel found continuous expression in the country itself. It was long believed, and still is, even in some presumably knowledgeable quarters, that throughout those centuries there were no Jews in the Holy Land. The popular conception has been that all the Jews who survived the destruction of Jewish statehood in the year 70 Common Era went into exile and that their descendants began coming back only 1,800 years later. This is not a fact. One of the most astonishing elements in the history of the Jewish peopleand of its land-is the continuity, in the face of the circumstances, of Jewish life in that country. The Jewish people has kept faith with its land and the land in turn has kept faith with the Jewish people.

There was a time when this fundamental truth was acknowledged also by the Arabs themselves. Thus, for example, on 23 March 1918, there appeared in the Mecca newspaper Al-Qibla an article written or inspired by Sherif Hussein, the leader of the Arab national movement at that time. That article was written two months after Hussein had been officially informed of the British Government's Balfour Declaration promising the Jewish people a national home in Palestine, and these are the words of that article:

The resources of the country—that is, Palestine are still virgin soil and will be developed by the Jewish immigrants. One of the most amazing things until recent times was that the Palestinian used to leave his country, wandering over the high seas in every direction. His native soil could not retain its hold on him... At the same time, we have seen the Jews from foreign countries streaming to Palestine from Russia, Germany, Austria, Spain, America. The cause of causes could not escape those who had the gift of a deeper insight. They knew that the country was for its original sons, for all their differences, a sacred and beloved homeland. in the original Arabic li-abna'ihal-asliyin -The return of these exiles to their homeland will prove materially and spiritually an experimental school for their brethren who are with them in the fields, factories, trades, and in all things connected with toil and labour. Times may have changed, but the historic truth is immutable.

21

General Assembly, 66th meeting; statement by Afghanistan¹⁰⁵

November 30, 1978

Mr. Siddle (Afghanistan): The question of Palestine came before the General Assembly shortly after the Second World War. The United Nations proposed the partition of Palestine into two independent States, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish, with Jerusalem internationalized. This plan did not bring peace to Palestine, and the violent situation spread and became the Middle East war, to be halted only by United Nations action. One of the two States envisaged in the partition plan proclaimed its independence as Israel, and in a succession of wars expanded its territorial control to all of Palestine. Thus the Palestinian Arab State, as envisaged in the partition plan, was never created. The Palestinian people have struggled for their usurped rights ever since. The struggle for the rights of the Palestinian people has since widened into the Middle East dispute between the Arab States and

Since 1948 there have been four wars, causing human and material suffering, particularly in Palestine and the Arab States. Millions of Palestinians have been forced into exile, engaging the United Nations in a continuing search for a solution to a problem that is potentially a major source of danger to world peace and security.

Unfortunately, much has been said about the rights of the Palestinian people, but little has been done to mitigate their plight. For a long time the Palestinian question was considered a refugee problem, and consequently the efforts of the international community were directed more towards its amelioration than towards its solution. Consequently, the issue of Palestine was not dealt with adequately within the context of the Middle East problem.

By adopting resolution 3236 (XXIX), 106 the

¹⁰⁵ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 66, pp. 12 -16.

¹⁰⁶ Doc. 22 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

United Nations General Assembly redressed an injustice, by determining that the restoration of the national rights of the people of Palestine is a prerequisite for the achievement of a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem. In resolution 3376 (XXX),107 the General Assembly established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, of which Afghanistan is a member. That Committee was the first United Nations body to elaborate and define these rights and adopt a programme for their implementation in a comprehensive manner. It is not my intention to go into detail regarding the report of the Committee, as its other reports have been considered in the General Assembly during its past two sessions, and the views of my delegation have been reflected in detail. However, I should like to restate the report's basic principles and elements, which meet with the full approval of my delegation.

First, the question of Palestine is the core of the Middle East crisis; no just and durable peace will be attained without fully taking into consideration the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Secondly, the undeniable right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and property and to achieve self-determination, independence and national sovereignty, as well as their right to establish their own State, must be guaranteed. Thirdly, the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible, and Israel has the consequent obligation to withdraw from all the territories it has occupied as a result of its aggressions. Fourthly, there must be participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine, on an equal basis with all the other parties, in any efforts to solve the Middle East problem.

The recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People have been endorsed by the General Assembly. The implementation of its programme needs the full support of the Security Council, which, unfortunately, has thus far been unable to endorse this programme, because of the attitude and position taken by some Western members of the Security Council, including certain permanent members.

On behalf of my delegation, I should like to

appeal to the members of the Security Council to approve without further delay the recommendations of the Committee and to adopt them as a basis for the settlement of the question of Palestine, and consequently the question of the Middle East as a whole. Many attempts have been made to settle the question of the Middle East, and my country is not in principle opposed to any efforts designed to settle the question by peaceful means. Nevertheless, we consider that such an attempt, in order to achieve results satisfactory to all, not only should take into consideration the rights of all parties concerned but should make it possible for all the interested parties to take part.

My delegation is of the view that no collusive and partial agreements and understandings, without the participation of all the parties concerned, can lead to a durable peace in the Middle East, and it is on this basis that my delegation supports the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in any efforts for the attainment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and the restoration of the inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people.

22

General Assembly, 66th meeting; statement by China¹⁰⁸

November 30, 1978

Mr. Pi (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Thirty years have elapsed since the outbreak of the first Middle East war in 1948. Over the past three decades, the Arab and Palestine people have firmly opposed Israeli Zionist aggression and expansion and persevered in the just struggle to regain the national rights of the Palestinian people and recover the occupied Arab territories. Carrying forward their revolutionary tradition of combating imperialism and aggression and displaying a fighting spirit of dauntlessness, they have won the sympathy and support of the Chinese people and the people of the whole world. Since 1965, the Palestinian people led by the Palestine Liberation Organization have carried on the armed struggle under most difficult and complex condi-

¹⁰⁷ Doc. 14 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

¹⁰⁸ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 66, pp. 2–6.

tions and, fearing no sacrifice, fighting valiantly and advancing wave upon wave, they have withstood severe tests and repeatedly dealt heavy blows at the Israeli Zionists. The question of Palestine is a component of the question of the Middle East as a whole. The Arab and Palestinian people who are engaged in this just struggle constitute an important force in the current great struggle of the world people to fight aggression and super-Power hegemonism and to win and safeguard national independence. They have won broad international support, whereas the Israeli Zionists have become ever more isolated. So long as the Arab and Palestinian people persevere in unity and struggle and make sustained and redoubled efforts, the situation will surely develop in a direction more favourable to the Arab and Palestinian people and unfavourable to the Israeli Zionists. This is an irresistible historical trend.

Over the past 30 years, the Israeli Zionists have carried out wanton aggression and expansion and occupied the whole of Palestine and large tracts of Arab land. As a result, more than one million Palestinian people were driven out and became destitute and homeless. Thousands upon thousands of Arab and Palestinian people lost their lives and property. The Israeli Zionists have been strongly condemned by the people of the world for their aggression, expansion and atrocities. Year after year the United Nations has considered the question of Palestine and adopted many resolutions on it, but the question remains unsolved. Obstinately clinging to their policies of aggression and expansion, the Israeli Zionists have refused to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people and to withdraw from the large tracts of occupied Arab territories, and are setting up and expanding Jewish settlements on the occupied lands, raising one obstacle after another to the settlement of the Middle East question. Last March, the Israeli Zionists launched another flagrant armed invasion of southern Lebanon, attacking the camps of the Palestinian armed forces, brutally slaughtering the inhabitants and ravaging the villages there. The facts show that the Israeli Zionists, aggressive in nature and impenitent in their behaviour, have kept on committing new crimes against the Arab and Palestinian people.

Why should the Israeli Zionists dare to be so arrogant and intransigent in making themselves

the enemy of the one hundred million and more Arab and Palestinian people? The root cause lies in the backing and abetment of the super-Powers, which have emboldened the Israeli Zionists. Motivated by their respective global strategic needs, both super-Powers want to make use of the Israeli Zionists in their intense rivalry over the Middle East, in which each of them is employing different tactics of its own. One super-Power has been fostering Israel over a long period. Sometimes, it appears as a "mediator", but in fact its aim remains one and the same, that is, to use Israel for its intervention in the Middle East. It is obvious that the Israeli Zionists could not have become so rampant without the large amount of annual "military and economic aid" from this super-Power, which shields and backs Israel and inflates its arrogance on every occasion. While chanting "support" for the national liberation struggle of the Arab and Palestinian people, the other super-Power harbours ulterior motives in its doings. It has given a blood transfusion to Israel by sending a steady flow of manpower to it. On the other hand, styling itself the "natural ally" of the Arab people, it tries hard to control certain Arab States under the signboard of "friendship" and "aid". It is sowing dissension and stirring up trouble among them by widening their differences to undermine their unity and weaken their strength. In a word, what it has in mind is not at all the interests of the Arab and Palestinian people, but how to bring by every possible means the just struggle of the Arab and Palestinian people into the orbit of its rivalry for world hegemony. That is why despite its intense rivalry with the other super-Power in the Middle East, it is actually giving direct and indirect backing and abetment to the Israeli Zionists as well. However, the Arab and Palestinian people have discerning eyes. One Arab State after another determinedly abrogated the so-called "friendship treaty" with this super-Power, expelled its "advisers" and "experts", recovered the military bases occupied by it, thus dealing powerful counter-blows to this super-

The deeds of the two super-Powers have aroused the Arab and Palestinian people to higher vigilance and greater unity in carrying forward their struggle by combining it more closely with that of the world people against aggression and super-Power hegemonism.

The recovery of lost territories and the restoration of national rights are a perfectly just cause which all the Arab and Palestinian people have valiantly fought for. The truth is on their side, and the people of the whole world sympathize with and support them. The experience of struggle shows that adherence to this orientation will provide a solid basis for unity and more powerful struggle and, therefore, assurance of victory. We are fully convinced that the Arab and Palestinian people, who share identical fundamental interests, will overcome outside interference, eliminate their temporary internal differences, get further united, persist in struggle and finally realize their national aspirations. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, unswervingly support them in their just struggle against imperialism, hegemonism and Israeli Zionism, for the recovery of their lost territories and the restoration of their national rights. We are firmly opposed to super-Power rivalry, intervention and expansion in the Middle East. We strongly condemn Israeli Zionism for its policies of aggression and expansion, and we determinedly will have nothing to do with it. Although the struggle of the Arab and Palestinian people is protracted and complex and they are vet to encounter more difficulties and twists and turns, we are sure they will surmount all obstacles and win final victory in their struggle to recover the lost territories and regain their national rights, so long as they strengthen their unity, persevere in struggle and keep on frustrating the super-Powers' intrigues and machinations.

23

General Assembly, 66th meeting; statement by the Federal Republic of Germany¹⁰⁹ November 30, 1978

MR. Von Wechmar (Federal Republic of Germany): The nine member States of the European Community, on behalf of which I am now speaking, have repeatedly stressed the importance they attach to the question under review. They have done so not only in the debates of the General Assembly, but also in statements outside this Assembly. Our declarations of November 1973 and

of June 1977 are examples of this preoccupation. They reflect the common conviction of the Nine that the Palestinian problem is a crucial one in the Middle East conflict. It is therefore inescapably linked to a solution of the Middle East conflict as a whole.

The Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany again stressed in his statement on behalf of the Nine in this year's general debate that such an over-all solution should be founded on the principles which the Nine set out in their London declaration of 29 June 1977, namely:

...the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967; respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; and the recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. (A/33) PV. 8, p. 61.)

The Nine have consistently stressed that all these aspects must be taken together.

Within the indivisible framework of these principles the Foreign Minister of my country, in his statement on behalf of the Nine, made it quite clear that an over-all Middle East settlement will only be possible if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact. The Nine have repeatedly added that this would have to take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.

While calling on Israel to recognize these legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, the Nine have at the same time insisted on the necessity for the Arab side, including the Palestinian people, to recognize Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders. The Nine have noted in this respect with satisfaction that Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) have been accepted by both Israel and its neighbours. This is indeed a basis for any meaningful and successful peace-making process.

The Nine have carefully followed the events that have occurred since the last General Assembly and especially the courageous initiative of President Sadat and the Camp David conference. These

 $^{^{109}}$ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/33/PV. 66, pp. 71–72.

¹¹⁰ Doc. 120 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

events have, in the view of the Nine, renewed hope for a settlement of the bitter Middle East conflict which has caused so much human suffering in the area and has threatened world security for the past 30 years. It is in this framework that the Nine have paid a tribute to the achievements of the participants in the Camp David conference. In view of the peace efforts now under way, the Nine continue to hope that the result of the Camp David summit will prove to have been an important step on the path to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement. It is only natural in this context that in the ongoing peace efforts the question of Israel's recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people should have become a crucial issue. If such an over-all peace settlement is to be achieved, the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an

appropriate manner to be worked out in consultations between all the parties concerned.

With regard to the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I should like to recall once again the reservations expressed on this subject on previous occasions by the Nine. As for the Committee's recommendations, we reiterate our belief that they suffer from the same fundamental lack of balance as the resolution that created the Committee.

Let me terminate this statement by repeating the appeal of the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany in the general debate on behalf of the Nine, that no obstacle should be placed in the way of movement towards a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement in the Middle East.

Resolutions and Decisions

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

24

General Assembly Resolution 33/28 reaffirming that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East without a just solution to the problem of Palestine based on the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people¹¹¹

December 7, 1978

Α

The General Assembly,

Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, 3375 (XXX) and 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 31/20 of 24 November 1976 and 32/40 A and B of 2 December 1977.

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

- 1. Expresses its grave concern that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security;
- 2. Reaffirms that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, inter alia, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
 - 3. Calls once more for the invitation of the Pal-

estine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate, on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties;

- 4. Declares that the validity of agreements purporting to solve the problem of Palestine requires that they be within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and its resolutions on the basis of the full attainment and exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization;
- 5. Endorses the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People as contained in paragraphs 55 to 58 of its report;
- 6. Expresses its regret and concern that the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20 and 32/40 A have not been implemented;
- 7. Notes with regret that the Security Council has not taken the action it was urged to take by the General Assembly in paragraph 4 of its resolution 32/40 A;
- 8. Once again urges the Security Council to consider and take as soon as possible a decision on the recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20 and 32/40A and in the present resolution;
- 9. Authorizes and requests the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in the event that the Security Council fails to consider or to take a decision on those recommendations by 1 June 1979, to consider that situation and to make the suggestions it deems appropriate;
- 10. Decides to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session.

Part A: 97 to 19, with 25 abstentions Part B: 103 to 14, with 29 abstentions Part C: 97 to 17, with 26 abstentions See Appendix F for voting details.

¹¹¹ UN doc. A/RES/33/28. Adopted at the Assembly's 73rd plenary meeting by the following votes:

В

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 31/20 of 24 November 1976 and 32/40 A and B of 2 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

- 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;
- 2. Requests the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to keep the situation relating to the question of Palestine under review and to report and make suggestions to the General Assembly or to the Security Council, as may be appropriate;
- 3. Authorizes the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to continue to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations, to send delegations or representatives to international conferences where such representation would be considered by it to be appropriate, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and thereafter;
- 4. Requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, to co-operate fully with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and to make available to the Committee, at its request, the relevant information and documentation which the Commission has at its disposal;
- 5. Decides to circulate the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to all the competent bodies of the United Nations and urges them to take necessary action, as appropriate, in accordance with the Committee's programme of implementation.
- 6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks, including summary records of its meetings.

 \mathbf{C}

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/40 B of 2 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

Noting, in particular, the information contained in paragraphs 47 to 54 of that report,

- 1. Takes note of the establishment, within the Secretariat of the United Nations, of a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in accordance with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 32/40 B;
- 2. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights continues to discharge the tasks assigned to it in paragraph 1 of resolution 32/40 B in consultation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and under its guidance;
- 3. Further requests the Secretary-General to consider, in consultation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the strengthening and the possible reorganization and renaming of the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights;
- 4. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full co-operation of the Office of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks;
- 5. *Invites* all Governments and organizations to lend their co-operation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the performance of their tasks.

General Assembly Resolution 33/29 condemning Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian territory and calling for a comprehensive settlement¹¹²

December 7, 1978

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975, 31/61 of 9 December 1976, 32/20 of 25 November 1977 and 33/28 of 7 December 1978,

Taking into account the decisions of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978, concerning the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine,

Deeply concerned that the Arab territories occupied since 1967 have continued, for more than eleven years, to be under illegal Israeli occupation and that the Palestinian people, after three decades, is still deprived of the exercise of its inalienable national rights,

Reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that all territories thus occupied must be returned,

Reaffirming also the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

Convinced that the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

1. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated resolutions of the United Nations;

2. Declares that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem must be based on a comprehensive solution, under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into account all aspects of the Arab—Israeli conflict, in particular the attainment by the Palestinian people of all its inalienable national rights and the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;

3. Reaffirms that until Israel withdraws from all Palestinian and other Arab territories, and until the Palestinian people attains and exercises its inalienable national rights, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, will not be achieved;

4. Calls anew for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975;

5. *Urges* the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problems and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations;

6. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures in order to ensure the implementation of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, including General Assembly resolution 33/28 and the present resolution, and to facilitate the achievement of such a comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East;

8. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a comprehensive report covering, in all their aspects, the developments in the Middle East.

¹¹² UN doc. A/RES/33/20. Adopted at the Assembly's 73rd meeting by 100 votes to 4, with 33 abstentions. See Appendix F for voting details.

General Assembly Resolution 33/64 calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weaponfree zone in the region of the Middle East¹¹³ December 14, 1978

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolution 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it recognized that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoyed wide support in the region,

Bearing in mind its resolution 31/71 of 10 December 1976, in which it expressed the conviction that progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance the cause of peace in the region and in the world,

Considering its resolution 32/82 of 12 December 1977, in which it expressed conviction that the development of nuclear capability would further complicate the situation and immensely damage the efforts to create an atmosphere of confidence in the Middle East,

Guided by its relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recognizing that the establishment of a nuclearweapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

- 1. Urges all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- 2. *Invites* these countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare

solemnly that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices;

- 3. Calls upon these countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
- 4. Further invites these countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare, consistent with paragraph 63 d of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, their support for the establishing of such a zone in the region and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;
- 5. Reaffirms again its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote these objectives;
- 6. Renews its invitation to the Secretary-General to continue to explore the possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East:
- 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East."

27

General Assembly Resolution 33/81 requesting effective action towards the health needs of Palestinian refugee children¹¹⁴

December 15, 1978

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolution 212 (III) of 19 November 1948 on assistance to Palestine refugees,

Recalling its resolution 32/111 of 15 December 1977 on the health needs of Palestinian refugee children.

¹¹³ UN doc. A/RES/33/64. Adopted at the Assembly's 84th plenary meeting by 138 votes to none, with one abstention. See Appendix F for voting details.

¹¹⁴ UN doc. A/RES/33/81. Adopted at the 85th plenary meeting without vote.

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution 1978/40 of 1 August 1978 on the International Year of the Child,

- 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on the health needs of Palestine refugee children, and to the host Governments, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the World Health Organization for conducting the survey on this question;
- 2. Requests Member States and the agencies concerned, in particular the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund, to co-operate with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in taking effective action to remedy the basic deficiencies identified in the annex to the report of the Secretary-General;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under constant review and report his findings to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

28

General Assembly Resolution 33/110 requesting the preparation of a report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people¹¹⁵

December 18, 1978

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, 1976, and the relevant recommendations for national action adopted by Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held at Vancouver from 31 May to 11 June 1976,

Recalling also resolution 3, entitled "Living conditions of the Palestinians in occupied territories" contained in the recommendations for international co-operation adopted by the Conference, and Economic and Social Council resolutions 2026 (LXI) of 4 August 1976 and 2100 (LXIII) of 3 August 1977,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 31/110 of 16 December 1976 and 32/171 of 19 December 1977,

- 1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories and notes that it has not been possible to prepare the full report called for in General Assembly resolution 32/171 in time for submission to the Assembly at its thirty-third session;
- 2. Requests, therefore, the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Economic Commission for Western Asia and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a comprehensive and analytical report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories;
- 3. Also requests the Secretary-General, in preparing the above-mentioned report, to consult and co-operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people;
- 4. Urges all States to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report.

29

General Assembly Resolution 33/112 noting the problems faced by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and calling on all states to remedy the needs of the Agency¹¹⁶ December 18, 1978

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/90 A of 13 December 1977 and all previous resolutions referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 Decem-

¹¹⁵ UN doc. A/RES/33/110. Adopted at the Assembly's 87th plenary meeting by 109 votes to 2, with 24 abstentions. See Appendix F for voting details.

¹¹⁶ UN doc. A/RES/33/112. Adopted at the Assembly's 87th plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 136 to none, with 2 abstentions

Part B: Adopted by consensus

Part C: 136 to none, with 2 abstentions

Part D: Adopted by consensus

Part E: 136 to one, with 4 abstentions

Part F: 115 to 4, with 22 abstentions See Appendix F for voting details.

ber 1948,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978,

- 1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;
- 2. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-General and to all the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, recognizing that the Agency is doing all it can within the limits of available resources, and also expresses its thanks to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;
- 3. Notes with regret that part of the headquarters of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East has been relocated outside of the area of its activity and requests that the headquarters be reconsolidated within the area of its operations as soon as practicable:
- 4. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of the paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1979;
- 5. Directs attention to the continuing seriousness of the financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the report of the Commissioner-General;
- 6. Notes with profound concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions, this increased level of income to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements in the present

year, and that, at presently foreseen levels of giving, deficits will recur each year;

7. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the report of the Commissioner-General, and therefore urges noncontributing Governments to contribute regularly and contributing Governments to consider increasing their regular contributions.

F

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/90 B of 13 December 1977 and all previous resolutions referred to therein.

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978,

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

- 1. Reaffirms its resolution 32/90 B and all previous resolutions referred to therein;
- 2. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;
- 3. Strongly appeals to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

 \mathbf{C}

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 212 (III) of 19 November 1948 on assistance to Palestine refugees,

Recalling also its resolution 32/90 F of 13 December 1977,

Cognizant of the fact that the Palestine refugees have, for the last three decades, lost their lands and means of livelihood;

Having examined with appreciation the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 32/90 F.

Noting that less than one per thousand of the Palestinian refugee students has the chance to continue higher education, including vocational training,

Noting also that over the past five years the number of scholarships offered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East has dwindled to half of what it was because of the Agency's regular budgetary difficulties,

- 1. Expresses its regret that the response to the appeal contained in resolution 32/90 F, as reported by the Secretary-General, has not been commensurate with the needs of the Palestine refugees for higher education and vocational training;
- 2. Appeals to all States to make special allocations, scholarships and grants to Palestinian refugees, in addition to their contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- 3. *Invites* relevant United Nations agencies, including the United Nations University to consider the inclusion, within their respective spheres of competence, of assistance for higher education for the Palestinian refugee students;
- 4. Appeals to all States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to contribute generously to Palestinian universities in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, as well as to offer scholarships to Palestinian refugee students in those universities;
- 5. Requests the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to act as recipient and trustee for such special allocations and scholarships and to award them to qualified Palestinian refugee candidates;
- 6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

D

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, 2791 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3090 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3330 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, 3419 D (XXX) of 8 December 1975, 31/15 C of 23 November 1976 and 32/90 D of 13 December 1977;

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Taking into account the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978,

Gravely concerned at the critical financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which has already reduced the essential minimum services being provided to the Palestine refugees and which threatens even greater reductions in the future,

Emphasizing the urgent need for extraordinary efforts in order to maintain, at least at their present minimum level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

- 1. Commends the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its efforts to assist in ensuring the Agency's financial security;
- 2. Notes with approval the report of the Working Group;
- 3. Requests the Working Group to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of one year;
- 4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

Е

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2792 C (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 C (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, 3419 C (XXX) of 8 December 1975, 31/15 E of 23 November 1976 and 32/90 C of 13 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978, and the report of the Secretary-General of 11 October 1978,

- 1. Calls once more upon Israel:
- (a) To take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation;
- (b) To desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters;
- 2. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report to the General Assembly by the opening of its thirty-fourth session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 1 above.

F

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 C and D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, 3419 C (XXX) of 8 December 1975, 31/15 D of 23 November 1976 and 32/90 E of 13 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978, and the report of the Secretary-General of 12 October 1978,

- 1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of all the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes or former places of residence in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and declares that any attempt to restrict, or to attach conditions to, the free exercise of the right of return by any displaced person is inconsistent with that inalienable right and inadmissible;
- 2. Deplores the continued refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;
 - 3. Calls once more upon Israel;
- (a) To take immediate steps for the return of all the displaced inhabitants;
- (b) To desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report to the General Assembly by the opening of the thirty-fourth session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 3 above.

30

General Assembly Resolution 33/113 deploring Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the Occupied Territories¹¹⁷

December 18, 1978

Α

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3240 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, 3525 B (XXX) of 15 December 1975, 31/106 B of 16 December 1976 and 32/91 A of 13 December 1977.

Considering that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments and rules of inter-

¹¹⁷ UN doc. A/RES/33/113. Adopted at the Assembly's 87th plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 140 to one, with one abstention Part B: 139 to one with one abstention Part C: 97 to 3 with 38 abstentions See Appendix F for voting details.

national law is among the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Noting that Israel and those Arab States whose territories have been occupied by Israel since June 1967 are parties to that Convention,

Taking into account that States parties to that Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

- 1. Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
- 2. Strongly deplores the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to the territories it has occupied since 1967;
- 3. Calls again upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention in all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
- 4. Urges once more all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

F

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/5 of 28 October 1977, Expressing grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and the measures and actions taken by the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, and designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories,

Considering that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967,

1. Determines that all such measures and actions taken by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

- 2. Strongly deplores the persistence of Israel in carrying out such measures, in particular the establishment of settlements in the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories;
- 3. Calls upon Israel to comply strictly with its international obligations in accordance with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
- 4. Calls once more upon the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, to desist forthwith from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature or demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
- 5. *Urges* all States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to respect and to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with its provisions in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

 \mathbf{C}

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,

Recalling all its resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 32/91 B and C of 13 December 1977, as well as those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations organs concerned and by the specialized agencies,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, which contains, inter alia, public statements made by leaders of the Government of Israel,

1. Commends the Special Committee to Investi-Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it

by the General Assembly and for its thoroughness and impartiality;

- 2. Deplores the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
- 3. Calls again upon Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
- 4. Deplores the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War and other applicable international instruments, and condemns in particular those violations which that Convention designates as "grave breaches" thereof;
- 5. Condemns the following Israeli policies and practices;
- (a) Annexation of parts of the occupied territories:
- (b) Establishment of new Israeli settlements and expansion of the existing settlements on private and public Arab lands and transfer of an alien population thereto;
- (c) Evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and denial of their right to return;
- (d) Confiscation and expropriation of private and public Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
 - (e) Destruction and demolition of Arab houses;
- (f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;
- (g) Ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention;
- (h) Pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
- (i) Interference with religious freedoms and practices as well as family rights and customs;
- (j) Illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;
- 6. Reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are null and void, and that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population

- and new immigrants in the occupied territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions;
- 7. *Demands* that Israel desist forthwith from the policies and practices referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
- 8. Reiterates its call upon all States, in particular those States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in accordance with article 1 of that Convention, and upon international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including those in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization or any of the other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
- 9. Requests the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;
- 10. Requests the Special Committee to continue to investigate the treatment of civilians in detention in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967;
 - 11. Requests the Secretary-General:
- (a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories, with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
- (b) To continue to make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;
- (c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat and, where necessary, to reprint those reports of the Special Committee which are no longer available;

- (d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the tasks entrusted to him in the present paragraph;
- 12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

General Assembly Resolution 33/147 calling for the provision of assistance to the Palestinian people¹¹⁸

December 20, 1978

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974,

Recalling also Economic and Social Council resolutions 1978 (LIX) of 31 July 1975, 2026 (LXI) of 4 August 1976 and 2100 (LXIII) of 3 August 1977,

Taking into consideration the reports of the Secretary-General on assistance to the Palestinian people,

Taking note of the report of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme on its twenty-fifth session and of the response of the Administrator,

- 1. Endorses the resolutions of the Economic and Social Council concerning assistance to the Palestinian people;
- 2. Calls upon the United Nations Development Programme, in consultation with the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nation system to intensify these efforts, in coordination with the Economic Commission for Western Asia, to implement the relevant resolutions of the Economic and Social Council in order to improve the social and economic needs and by establishing concrete projects to that end, without prejudice to the sovereignty of the respective Arab host countries, and to provide adequate funds for that purpose.

Security Council 119

32

Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) calling on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory¹²⁰

March 19, 1978

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

- 1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
- 2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
- 3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States.
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.

¹¹⁸ UN doc. A/RES/33/147. Adopted at the Assembly's plenary meeting by 102 votes to 5 with 35 abstentions. See Appendix F for voting details.

¹¹⁹ Members of the Security Council in 1978 were Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany (Federal Republic of), India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela.

¹²⁰ UN Security Council, Official Records: Thirty-third Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1978, p.5. Adopted at the Council's 2074th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslavakia, USSR).

Security Council Resolution 429 (1978) extending the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 30 November 1978¹²¹

May 31, 1978

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,

Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the urgent need to continue and intensify such efforts,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area;

Decides:

- (a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973:
- (b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 30 November 1978;
- (c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and on the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

34

Security Council Resolution 438 (1978) extending the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) until 24 July 1979¹²²

October 23, 1978

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October, 340 (1973) of 25 October and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, 346 (1974) of 8 April and 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974, 368 (1975) of 17 April, 371 (1975) of 24 July and 378 (1975) of 23 October 1975, 396 (1976) of 22 October 1976

and 416 (1977) of 21 October 1977.

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force,

Recalling the Secretary-General's view that the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be unstable and potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached, and his hope that urgent efforts will be pursued by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973),

- 1. Decides to renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of nine months, that is, until 24 July 1979;
- 2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and on the steps taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973);
- 3. Expresses its confidence that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy.

35

Security Council Resolution 441 (1978) renewing the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Force until 31 May 1979¹²³

November 30, 1978

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,

Decides:

- (a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;
- (b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1979;
- (c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the development in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

¹²¹ UN Security Council, Official Records: Thirty-third Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1978, p. 6. Adopted at the Council's 2079th meeting by 14 votes to none; China did not participate in the voting.

¹²² Security Council, Official Records: Thirty-third year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1978, pp. 7,8. Adopted at the Council's 2091st meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions; China did not participate in the voting, Czechoslovakia and the USSR abstained.

¹²³ UN Security Council, Official Records: Thirty-third Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1978, p. 5. Adopted at the Council's 2101st meeting by 14 votes to none; China did not participate in the voting.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

36

Economic and Social Council Resolution 1978/24 requesting the Commission to pursue its efforts for the protection of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine¹²⁴

May 5, 1978

The Economic and Social Council,

Having considered the report of the Commission on Human Rights on its thirty-fourth session,

Taking note of the decisions of the Commission concerning the violation by Israel of human rights in the occupied Arab territories,

- 1. Commends the Commission on Human Rights for its vigilance and its decisions for the protection of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine;
- 2. Requests the Commission to pursue its efforts for the protection of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine, and to continue to take the appropriate measures in this respect.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

37

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1, A, B (XXXIV) expressing concern over the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine¹²⁵

February 14, 1978

The Commission on Human Rights,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva

124 Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1978, Supplement No. 4 (E/1978/34). Adopted at the Council's 15th plenary meeting.

Part A: 23 to 2 with 7 abstentions Part B: Adopted without vote Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and of other relevant conventions and regulations,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 32/5, 32/14, 32/20, 32/40, 32/42, 32/90, 32/91, 32/122, 32/161 and 32/171.

Taking into account that the General Assembly has, in resolution 31/20, recalled its resolution 3376 (XXX), in which it expressed grave concern that no progress has been achieved towards:

- (a) The exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty,
- (b) The exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted,

Taking into consideration that the General Assembly has adopted resolution 3314 (XXIX), which defines as an act of aggression the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof.

Recalling the statement adopted by the Security Council at its 1969th meeting, on 11 November 1976, by which the Council, inter alia, expressed its grave anxiety and concern over the serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation,

Taking note of the reports of the United Nations organs, specialized agencies and international humanitarian organizations on the situation of the occupied Arab territories and their inhabitants,

Taking into account the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, which contained, inter alia, public statements made by leaders of the Government of Israel, indicating Israel's determination to pursue and consolidate its expansionist and annexationist policies,

Noting with deep concern the fears expressed by the Special Committee "that the situation of civilians in the occupied territories, especially the situation of the detainees which has been shown during recent months to be a matter of particular concern, may deteriorate still further in the near

¹²⁵ Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirty-fourth Session (6 February-10 March 1978) Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 1978 Supplement No. 4, pp. 100-104. Adopted at the Commission's 1440th meeting by the following votes:

future" and its statement that "The international community must assume its responsibilities to ensure the protection of the fundamental rights of civilians in the occupied territories,

Greatly alarmed by the continuation of the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by Israel in the occupied Arab territories, particularly the measures aiming at annexation, as well as the continuing establishment of settlers' colonies, mass destruction of homes, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, expropriation of properties and imposition of economic and fiscal measures aimed at the exploitation of the population of the occupied territories;

- 1. Expresses its grave anxiety and concern over the deteriorating serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation and aggression, in particular:
- (a) The intensification of the establishment of settlers' colonies.
- (b) The continued and increasing use of arbitrary detention, torture, ill-treatment and cruel treatment of Arab detainees and prisoners;
- 2. Calls upon Israel to take immediate steps for the return of the Palestinians and the other displaced inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories to their homes;
- 3. Declares that Israel's grave breaches of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are war crimes and an affront to humanity:
- 4. Condemns the following Israeli policies and practices:
- (a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;
- (b) The establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of an alien population thereto;
- (c) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the denial of their right to return:
- (d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
- (e) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses:
 - (f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and

- ill-treatment of the Arab population;
- (g) The ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention;
- (h) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
- (i) The interference with religious freedoms and practices as well as family rights and customs;
- (j) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories:
- 5. Further condemns administrative and legislative measures by the Israeli authorities to encourage, promote and expand the establishment of settlers' colonies in the occupied territories, which further demonstrate Israel's determination to annex those territories;
- 6. Reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are null and void, and that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new settlers in the occupied territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions;
- 7. Demands that Israel desist forthwith from the policies and practices referred to in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 above:
- 8. *Demands* that Israel cease forthwith all acts of torture and ill-treatment of Arab detainees and prisoners;
- 9. Calls upon Israel to release all Arabs detained or imprisoned as a result of their struggle for self-determination and the liberation of their territories, and to accord to them, pending their release, the protection envisaged in the relevant provisions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war;
- 10. Renews its request to the Secretary-General to collect all relevant information concerning detainees, such as their number, identity, place and duration of detention, and to make this information available to the Commission at its thirty-fifth session:
- 11. Condemns once more the massive deliberate destruction of Quneitra perpetrated during Israeli occupation and prior to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that city in 1974, and considers this act a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

Time of War:

- 12. Reiterates its call upon all States, in particular the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in accordance with article 4 of that Convention, and upon international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid taking any action or extending any aid which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization or any of the other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
- 13. Calls upon Israel to report, through the Secretary-General, to the Commission at its thirty-fifth session on the implementation of paragraphs 2, 7, 8 and 9 above;
- 14. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, the specialized agencies, the regional intergovernmental organizations and the international humanitarian organizations and to give it the widest possible publicity, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its thirty-fifth session;
- 15. Decides to place on the provisional agenda of the thirty-fifth session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine", and requests the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Commission all United Nations reports appearing between sessions of the Commission that deal with the situation of the civilians of these territories.

P

The Commission on Human Rights,

Recalling its resolution 1 B (XXXIII) and General Assembly resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) and 32/91 A,

Bearing in mind that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the parties to the conflict,

Recalling resolution 10, on the application of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 in the occupied territories in the Middle East, of the Twenty-third International Conference of the Red Cross held in Bucharest in October 1977.

Taking into account that States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances,

- 1. Expresses its deep concern at the consequences of Israel's refusal to apply fully and effectively the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in all its provisions to all the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
- 2. Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
- 3. Strongly deplores the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to the territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
- 4. Calls upon Israel to abide by and respect the obligation arising from the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments and rules of international law, in particular the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in all the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
- 5. Urges once more all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
- 6. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, the specialized agencies, the regional intergovernmental organizations, the international humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations.

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2 (XXXIV) affirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination 126

February 14, 1978

The Commission on Human Rights,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 3236 (XXIX), 32/14, 32/20, 32/40 and 32/42,

Recognizing that the Palestinian people are entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant United Nations resolutions,

Recalling further Economic and Social Council resolutions 1865 (LVI) and 1866 (LVI),

Reaffirming its resolutions 3 (XXXI) and 6 (XXXI),

Bearing in mind the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (A/32/35),

Expressing its grave concern that the Palestinian people have been prevented by force from enjoying their inalienable rights, in particular their right to self-determination,

- 1. Affirms the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination without external interference and the establishment of a fully independent and sovereign State in Palestine;
- 2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return in the exercise of their right to self-determination;
- 3. Recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain their rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- 4. Urges all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people through their representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization, in its struggle to restore its rights in accordance with the Charter;
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission on Human Rights and to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities the reports, studies and publications prepared by the Special

Unit on Palestinian Rights, which was established by General Assembly resolution 32/40 B.

39

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 3 (XXXIV) affirming the right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation¹²⁷

February 14, 1978

The Commission on Human Rights,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, concerning the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the importance of its implementation,

Recalling also its resolutions 3 (XXXI) of 11 February 1975 and 9 (XXXII) of 5 March 1976,

Mindful of the different resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the recruitment and employment of mercenaries against national liberation movements and sovereign States, particularly resolutions 2465 (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2708 (XXV) of 14 December 1970 and 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.

Taking into account General Assembly resolution 32/14 of 7 November 1977,

Noting with interest the Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, held at Maputo in 1977, and the declaration adopted by the World Conference for Action against *Apartheid*, held at Lagos in August 1977.

Welcoming the declaration adopted by the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference, held at Cairo in March 1977, on this question,

Stressing the importance of the effective realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, national sovereignty and territorial integrity and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples as imperatives for the enjoyment of human rights,

Expressing its profound indignation at the continued and serious violations of the human rights of the peoples still under colonial or alien domination

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 104-105. Adopted at the Commission's 1440th meeting by 25 votes to 3 with 4 abstentions.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp. 105-107. Adopted at the Commission's 1440th meeting by 24 votes to 3 with 5 abstentions.

or foreign occupation, the continuation of the illegal occupation of Namibia and South Africa's attempts to dismember its territory, the perpetuation of the racist minority régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa and the denial to the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights,

- 1. Calls upon all States to implement the resolutions of the United Nations regarding the right to self-determination of peoples under colonial domination or foreign occupation;
- 2. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for independence, territorial integrity and liberation from colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle;
- 3. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the peoples of Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, of the Palestinian people and of all peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without external interference;
- 4. Condemns the practice of using mercenaries against national liberation movements and sovereign States as a criminal act and the mercenaries themselves as criminals, and calls upon the Governments of all countries to enact legislation declaring the recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries in their territory and their transit through it to be punishable offences and prohibiting their nationals from serving as mercenaries, and to inform the Commission of the legislation enacted to that effect;
- 5. Condemns in particular the policy of those countries which, in disregard of the wishes of the major part of the international community as expressed in numerous United Nations resolutions, maintain political, economic, military or sporting relations with the racist régimes in southern Africa and elsewhere, thereby encouraging them to persist in their suppression of the aspirations of peoples to self-determination and independence;
- 6. Censures all government policies which do not recognize in practice the right to self-determination and independence of all peoples still under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation, notably the peoples of southern Africa and the Palestinian people, and draws attention to the grave responsibility incurred by the authors and promoters of those policies in the eyes of the community of nations and world public opinion;

- 7. Expresses its appreciation for the material and other forms of assistance which the peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation continue to receive from Governments, United Nations agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and requests the maximization of this assistance;
- 8. Decides to continue giving the question "The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation" priority consideration at its thirty-fifth session.

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA

40

Economic Commission for Western Asia Resolution 53 (V) urging the implementation of a study of the situation and potential of the Palestinian people¹²⁸

October 5, 1978

The Economic Commission for Western Asia,

Recalling its unanimous resolution 27 (III) of 14 May 1976, which requested the Executive Secretary to make arrangements to carry out a study of the economic and social situation and potential of the Palestinian Arab people, and

Taking note of the progress report (E/ECWA/ 59/Add. 4) on the implementation of this resolution,

- 1. *Urges* the Executive Secretary to intensify the efforts to implement this resolution in the shortest time possible;
- 2. Requests the Executive Secretary to take the necessary measures to reallocate the balance of the United Nations' contribution to the study;
- 3. Requests the Executive Secretary to submit a report to the sixth session embodying his proposals for obtaining the supplementary funds necessary for completing the study.

¹²⁸ Report of the Economic Commission for Western Asia to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. (UN doc. E/ECWA/72). Adopted at the 9th meeting.

Economic Commission for Western Asia Resolution 58 (V) calling for a census of the Palestine Arab people¹²⁹

October 6, 1978

The Economic Commission for Western Asia,

Referring to the recommendations, emanating from successive regional meetings, concerning the need for conducting a census of the Palestine Arab People,

Recalling its unanimous resolution 28 (III) of 14 May 1976 which urged the United Nations Fund for Population Activities to furnish the material support for beginning implementation of this project before the end of 1976, and which called upon the Executive Secretary to take all necessary steps, in close co-operation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, for beginning the population census operations as soon as possible after the meeting of the preparatory committee to be held in 1976,

Taking note of the preparations undertaken by the Executive Secretary in this regard,

Noting with appreciation the project devoted to this subject submitted by the Executive Secretary in March 1978 to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities.

- 1. Expresses its disappointment that the United Nations Fund for Population Activities has not yet given its agreement;
- 2. Strongly urges the United Nations Fund for Population Activities to provide the necessary finances for the requirements and the operations of the census of the Palestine Arab People, so as to secure implementation of the resolution of the Commission and its project in this regard;
- 3. Calls upon member States, especially those States which host large numbers of the Palestine Arab People on their territory, to offer all the facilities that could assist ECWA in successfully implementing this project;
- 4. Calls upon the Executive Secretary to followup the implementation of this resolution in cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

UNESCO Executive Board

42

UNESCO Executive Board Decision 104 EX/5.1.5 inviting the Director-General to take measures necessary for the implementation of 18 C/Resolution 13.1 and 19 C/Resolution 15.1 concerning educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories 130 May 1978

The Executive Board,

- 1. Having examined the report submitted by the Director-General, which includes reports by members of the mission on the educational and cultural situation in the Arab territories occupied by Israel,
- 2. Highly appreciates the intensive efforts made by the Director-General since the eighteenth session of the General Conference, and the results so far accomplished;
- 3. *Notes* that the mission was unable to carry out its task with respect to Jerusalem;
- 4. Approves with thanks the Director-General's recommendations elaborated in document 104 EX/52 Add.;
- 5. *Invites* the Director-General to take all the necessary measures in order to secure the full implementation of the letter and spirit of 18 C/Resolution 13.1 and 19 C/Resolution 15.1 as well as of the recommendations referred to in paragraph 4 above:
- 6. *Invites* the Director-General to submit a further comprehensive and analytical report, with any further recommendations he deems necessary and appropriate, to the twentieth session of the General Conference;
- 7. Decides to include this question, as a separate item, in the provisional agenda of the twentieth session of the General Conference.

¹³⁰ UNESCO, Executive Board, Decisions adopted by the Executive Board at its 104th Session (Paris, 24 April-9 June 1978), p. 27.

Decision 104 EX/6.3 inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization to the twentieth session of the General Conference¹³¹

May 1978

The Executive Board,

- 1. Having examined document 104 EX/34,
- 2. Takes note of the notifications to be addressed by the Director-General to Member States and Associate Members in accordance with paragraph 1 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference:
- 3. Takes note of the invitations to be sent by the Director-General to intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Rule 6, including the Federation of Arab Research Councils;
- 4. Decides, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Rule 6, that the following States shall be invited to send observers to the twentieth session of the General Conference: Bahamas, Bhutan, Botswana, Republic of Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Nauru, Democratic Republic of Sao Tomé and Principe, Tonga, Western Samoa;
- 5. *Includes* the African liberation movements recognized by OAU in the list provided for under paragraph 5 of Rule 6 and takes note of the invitations which the Director-General will address to them, in accordance with that paragraph;
- 6. Includes the Palestine Liberation Organization, recognized by the League of Arab States, in the list provided for under paragraph 6 of Rule 6 and takes note of the invitation which the Director-General will address to it, in accordance with that paragraph;
- 7. Takes note of the invitations which the Director-General will send to the international non-governmental organizations approved for consultative arrangements, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure.

44

Decision 104 EX/7.1.2 inviting the Director-General to strengthen and expand UNESCO aid to refugees and recognized liberation movements¹³²

May 1978

The Executive Board,

- 1. Noting United Nations General Assembly resolution 32/105B proclaiming the year beginning 21 March 1978 as the International Anti-Apartheid Year,
- 2. Recalling paragraph 7 of decision 6.1 adopted by the Executive Board at its 103rd session, which invited the Director-General to take the necessary steps for appropriate Unesco participation in the observance of the Anti-Apartheid Year, if designated, in co-operation with the United Nations and in particular with the Special Committee against Apartheid,
- 3. Notes with satisfaction the close co-operation established between Unesco and the Special Committee in the achievement of the United Nations objectives for the Year and, in particular, the financial support given by the Special Committee to Unesco's programme of activities for the Year;
- 4. Stresses the important part Unesco can play, by its studies and its information activities, in exposing the inhumanity of the system of apartheid, in mobilizing world opinion against it and in analyzing the socio-economic and cultural causes which create other situations for separate development;
- 5. Endorses the proposals of the Director-General for Unesco participation in Anti-Apartheid Year;
- 6. Invites the Director-General to strengthen and expand Unesco's activities against apartheid during the 1979–1980 biennium, in particular by increasing aid to refugees and the recognized liberation movements and by developing suitable curriculum materials for all levels of education.

Decision 104 EX/7.1.6 inviting UNESCO's cooperation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and contribution to the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation¹³³

May 1978

The Executive Board,

- 1. Having taken note of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly,
- 2. Noting that the Director-General has contributed, within Unesco's fields of competence, to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, submitted to the thirty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/32/228).
- 3. Invites the Director-General to continue to contribute, within Unesco's fields of competence, to the report to be submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General, in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions, to the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, and to contribute, within Unesco's fields of competence, in the ways he deems most appropriate, to the work of the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

UNESCO

General Conference

46

UNESCO General Conference Resolution 20 C/1.4 inviting member states to contribute aid to refugees and national liberation movements including the Palestine Liberation Organization¹³⁴

November 24, 1978

The General Conference,

Recalling the terms of resolutions 12.1, 15.1 and 1.142 adopted at its nineteenth session, concern-

ing respectively Unesco's contribution to peace and its tasks with respect to the promotion of human rights and the elimination of colonialism and racialism; educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories; and the financing of the education programme for Palestine refugees in the Near East jointly operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and Unesco and the Funds-in-Trust administered by Unesco for education programmes operated in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity,

- 1. Invites Member States:
- (a) to contribute to the financing of the education programme for Palestine refugees in the Near East jointly operated by UNRWA and Unesco;
- (b) to contribute to the Funds-in-Trust administrated by Unesco for the financing of education programmes operated in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States for refugees and peoples fighting for their independence, for human dignity and human rights, and against apartheid and all other forms of colonialism, racialism, oppression or foreign domination;
- 2. Authorizes the Director-General to undertake activities contributing to the achievement of Objective 1.4 (Development of activities to aid refugees and national liberation movements in the fields of Unesco's competence) and corresponding to the following themes:

'School and out-of-school education of refugees and candidates sponsored by national liberation movements and organizations recognized by the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States'

'Specialized training of qualified personnel' 'Respect for cultural identity',

and in particular to continue to develop and intensify activities within the fields of Unesco's competence to aid African liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and the Palestine Liberation Organization recognized by the League of Arab States, and to co-operate with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the education programme for Palestine refugees in the Near East, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with other United Nations bodies and regional intergovernmental institutions concerned with rendering educational services to

¹³³ Ibid., p. 44.

¹³⁴ UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 20th Session, 24 October-28 November, 1978, Volume 1, Resolutions, p. 27. Adopted at the Conference's 34th plenary meeting.

refugees and liberation movements and organizations.

47

UNESCO General Conference Resolution 20 C/14.1 inviting the Director-General to take all necessary measures for the implementation of 18C/Resolution 13.1 and 19C/Resolution 15.1 concerning educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories ¹³⁵

November 27, 1978

The General Conference,

Considering that in its resolution 13.1 which it adopted at its eighteenth session, after examining document 18C/16 entitled 'Report by the Director-General on the Situation of the National Education and the Cultural Life of Peoples in the Occupied Arab Territories', the General Conference:

- 1. Invites the Director-General to exercise full supervision of the operation of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories, and to co-operate with the Arab States concerned and with the Palestine Liberation Organization with a view to providing the populations in the occupied Arab territories with every means of enjoying their rights to education and culture so as to preserve their national identity;
- 2. Urgently appeals to Israel to refrain from any act that has the effect of hindering the populations of the occupied Arab territories in the exercise of their rights to national education and cultural life, and invites it to allow the Director-General of Unesco to carry out the task referred to in the foregoing paragraph,

Considering that in resolution 15.1, which it adopted at its nineteenth session, after examining document 19C/13, the General Conference:

- 1. Invites the Director-General to implement as soon as possible his decision to send a fact-finding mission to the Arab territories occupied by Israel, whose terms of reference would be:
 - (a) to collect on-the-spot information on:
 - (i) the general conditions under which the right to education is ensured and instruction provided in the occupied Arab territories, with particular reference to curriculum content; the nature, origin and content of the textbooks used; the numbers, origin, situation and qualifications of teachers; the number and state of educational

- premises, together with the school enrolment trend:
- (ii) conditions of cultural life and, in particular, cultural and artistic means of expression and self-fulfilment ensured for the populations of these territories; freedom in the matter of religious instruction and access to places of worship; freedom of access to external sources of culture and, in particular, to varied sources of information;
- (iii) generally speaking, all factors permitting an assessment of the extent to which the populations of the occupied territories enjoy their natural right to an education and culture which accord with their national identity;
- (b) to study and submit suggestions on activities that Unesco might undertake, in its fields of competence, to assist the populations concerned;
- 2. Makes a final urgent appeal to Israel finally to co-operate in normalizing this situation and in so doing cease to incur general disapproval for its intolerable defiance of the community of nations;
- 3. Invites the Director-General to follow and supervise very closely the operation of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories, obtaining as much information as possible, particularly
- (a) from the Palestine Liberation Organization,
- (b) from the Arab States concerned,
- (c) from the Israeli occupation authorities,

with a view to guaranteeing the populations of the occupied Arab territories their rights to education and cultural life in such a way as to preserve their national identity,

Considering that in decision 5.1.5 which it adopted at its 104th session, after examining the report submitted by the Director-General, which included the reports of the members of the mission and the recommendations formulated by the Director-General in the light of those reports, the Executive Board:

- 3. Notes that the mission was unable to carry out its task with respect to Jerusalem;
- 4. Approves with thanks the Director-General's recommendations elaborated in document 104 EX/52 Add.;
- 5. Invites the Director-General to take all the necessary measures in order to secure the full implementation of the letter and spirit of 18C/Resolution 13.1 and 19C/Resolution 15.1 as well as of the recommendations referred to in paragraph 4 above,

Reaffirming that access to national education and culture is one of the fundamental human rights which are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Constitution of Unesco.

Recalling that the military occupation of territories by foreign troops represents a permanent threat to peace and human rights,

Condemning as contrary to human rights and fundamental freedoms all violations, resulting from Israeli occupation, of the rights of the populations living in all the occupied Arab territories to national education and cultural life, and particularly the policy of systematic cultural assimilation,

Having taken note of the report (20C/113) submitted by the Director-General containing the reports of the members of the fact-finding mission on the educational and cultural situation in the Arab territories occupied by Israel,

1. Warmly thanks the Director-General for the intensive efforts he has made since the eighteenth session of the General Conference;

2. Regrets that the mission was not in a position to carry out its task with respect to Jerusalem;

3. Also expresses its severe disapproval of the Israeli authorities' statement that they will not comply with the resolutions adopted by Unesco since the eighteenth session of the General Conference;

4. Approves with gratitude the recommendations formulated by the Director-General in his above-mentioned report;

5. Reaffirms resolutions 18C/13.1 and 19C/15.1 and invites the Director-General to take all the necessary measures to secure the complete and effective implementation of the letter and spirit of these resolutions and of the recommendations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph;

6. Requests the Director-General to send a further mission to occupied Arab Jerusalem in order to perform the task which the previous mission was unable to carry out;

7. Requests the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 108th session on the action taken to give effect to this resolution. UNESCO General Conference Resolution 20 C/7.6 condemning Israel for changing and Judaizing the historic and cultural configuration of Jerusalem¹³⁶

November 28, 1978

The General Conference,

Considering the importance of the role played by Unesco, in accordance with its Constitution, in the protection and preservation of the world heritage of monuments of historic or scientific value.

Considering the exceptional importance of the cultural property in the Old City of Jerusalem, not only to the countries directly concerned but to all humanity, on account of its unique cultural, historical and religious value,

Recalling Article 32 of the Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations, adopted by the General Conference at its ninth session (New Delhi, 1956), which stipulates that, in the event of armed conflict, any Member State occupying the territory of another State should refrain from carrying out archaeological excavations in the occupied territory,

Considering that Israel, taking advantage of its military occupation of the territory, has unilaterally and in defiance of all accepted laws, taken upon itself to alter the configuration and status of the City of Jerusalem,

Considering that such a situation, resulting from an act of force which offends the conscience of the international community as a whole, jeopardizes the chances of restoring the peace for which it is Unesco's task to work, and has incurred the reprobation of the community of nations,

Considering that in its resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967, and 32/5 of 28 October 1977, the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed that the changes undertaken by Israel in the City of Jerusalem are unlawful, and called upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist from taking any action which would alter the status of Ierusalem,

Considering that the United Nations Security Council noted, in its resolutions 252 (1968) of

¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 97-98. Adopted at the 37th meeting.

21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, that the measures taken by Israel which tend to change the status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status, and called upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it and in future to refrain from all action likely to alter the status of Jerusalem,

Recalling that since the fifteenth session of the General Conference (1968) Unesco has urgently called on Israel to desist from any archaeological excavations in the City of Jerusalem and from any alteration of its features or its cultural and historical character, particularly with regard to Christian and Islamic religious sites (15C/Resolution 3.342 and 3.343, 82 EX/Decision 4.4.2, 83 EX/Decision 4.3.1, 88 EX/Decision 4.3.1, 89 EX/Decision 4.4.1, 17C/Resolution 3.422, 18C/Resolution 3.427 and 19C/Resolution 4.129),

Bearing in mind that, at its seventeenth session, the General Conference, in resolution 3.422,

- (a) noted 'that Israel persists in not complying with the relevant resolutions and that its attitude prevents this Organization from undertaking the mission which is incumbent upon it under the terms of the Constitution',
- (b) invited 'the Director-General to continue his efforts to establish the effective presence of Unesco in the City of Jerusalem and thus make possible the actual implementation of the resolutions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board for that purpose,'

Considering that it is most legitimately that, on the basis of these very clear resolutions, reiterated with a constant patience dictated by the need to preserve peace, and in compliance with the letter and spirit of the aforementioned resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, the General Conference of Unesco, at its eighteenth session, after recalling and reaffirming the relevant resolutions it had previously adopted, in resolution 3.427 'condemns Israel for its attitude which is contradictory to the aims of the Organization as stated in its Constitution by its persistence in altering the historical features of the City of Jerusalem and by undertaking excavations which constitute a danger to its monuments, subsequent to its illegal occupation of this city' and 'invites the Director-General to withhold assistance from Israel in the fields of education, science and culture until such time as it scrupulously respects the aforementioned resolutions and decisions',

Considering that the lifting of the restrictions which the Director-General was thus invited to apply depends solely upon the will of Israel,

Considering that this challenge, which is intolerable for the dignity of the other Member States, prevents the Organization from properly discharging the mission laid upon it by its Consitution.

Affirming solemnly the right of every people not to be deprived of the significant evidence of its past on the pretext of searching for vestiges of another culture,

Considering that Member States as a whole can but deplore and, as the United Nations General Assembly did in its resolution 3525 (XXX) of 15 December 1975, 'condemn... the following Israeli policies and practices: the annexation of parts of the occupied territories;... the destruction and demolition of Arab houses;... the pillaging of archaeological and cultural property...,'

Noting, in the light of the report of the Director-General contained in document 20C/19 Add., that Israel has not changed its attitude with regard to the aforementioned resolutions of the United Nations and of Unesco, and that it has not undertaken to desist finally from undertaking excavations,

Guided by the previous decisions adopted by the General Conference since its fourteenth session (14C/Resolution 11, 15C/Resolution 9.12 and 9.14, 16C/Resolution 8, 17C/Resolution 10.1, 18C/Resolution 3.427 and 19C/Resolution 4.129),

- 1. Warmly thanks the Director-General for his efforts with a view to the implementation of resolution 4.129 adopted by the General Conference at its nineteenth session.
- 2. Reaffirms the aforementioned resolutions adopted by the General Conference of Unesco concerning Jerusalem, particularly 18C/Resolution 3.427, and insists that they be put into effect;
- 3. Condemns the Israeli occupying authorities for having infringed the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and by Unesco, and for having continued, from the beginning of the occupation until the present, to change and Judaize the historic and cultural configuration of Jerusalem,
- 4. Issues an urgent and firm appeal to Israel to desist forthwith and finally from continuing the excavations unlawfully undertaken and from taking steps which are altering the character and status

of the City of Jerusalem;

5. Requests the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at its 107th session on the implementation of this resolution.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

49

World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 31.38 calling for all efforts to be exerted for the improvement of the health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories including Palestine¹³⁷

May 23, 1978

The Thirty-first World Health Assembly,

Recalling resolution WHA 30.37, adopted on 18 May 1977, and previous resolutions concerning health conditions of refugees and displaced persons, and relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights;

Acting in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments:

Pursuant to the provisions of the Geneva conventions, and in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;

Taking note of the principles set forth in the Constitution of the World Health Organization, particularly the principle that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security, and aware of its responsibility for ensuring proper health conditions for all peoples, particularly those peoples suffering from exceptional situations, especially foreign occupation and settler colonialism;

Having considered the Report of the Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East, including Palestine;

Bearing in mind that the Special Committee of Experts was unable to fully determine the health conditions of the inhabitants of those territories due to the brevity of its visit to the region and to the lack of statistics and data on the services

available there;

Convinced that the occupation of territories by force gravely affects the health, social, psychological, mental and physical conditions of the population under occupation and that this can be only rectified by the complete and immediate termination of the occupation;

Decides:

- 1. to express its thanks to the Special Committee of Experts for its efforts at this stage;
- 2. that the Committee continue its task as defined by resolution WHA 26.56 by virtue of which it was established and subsequent resolutions and pursue its study of the health conditions of the Arab inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;

II

Taking note of the report of the Director-General on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons of the Arab population in the occupied territories, including Palestine;

- 1. Expresses its appreciation of the efforts of the Director-General for the implementation of resolution WHA 30.37, and requests that he continue his collaboration with the Palestine Liberation Organization in providing all necessary assistance to the Palestine people;
- 2. Requests the Director-General to continue to provide the necessary funds to improve the health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories, and to ensure the disbursement of the aforementioned funds under the direct supervision of the World Health Organization, through its representatives in the occupied Arab territories:
- 3. Calls upon the Director-General of the World Health Organization to exert all efforts in order to improve the health conditions of the Arab inhabitants in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine, in accordance with the findings of the Special Committee of Experts and its recommendations, that he make use of voluntary contributions from Governments, governmental and non-governmental organizations and individuals for this purpose, and that he seek assistance in this respect from Arab organizations working in this field inside the occupied Arab territories without any intervention by the occupying authorities;

¹³⁷ Resolution supplied, on request, by WHO.

III

- 1. Expresses its deep concern at the poor health and psychological conditions suffered by the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;
- 2. Condemns the inhuman practices to which Arab prisoners and detainees are subjected in Israeli prisons, resulting in the deterioration of their health, psychological and mental conditions;
 3. Condemns Israel for its refusal to implement
- 3. Condemns Israel for its refusal to implement World Health Assembly resolutions calling upon it to allow refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes;
- 4. Condemns Israel for its refusal to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
- 5. Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories and from requisitioning and confiscating Arab lands for the establishment of these settlements, as the establishment of these settlements deprives the inhabitants of the occupied territories of their rights to their land and property and the enjoyment of their natural resources, thereby affecting the health, psychological and social conditions of those inhabitants;
- 6. Considers that the persistence of Israeli occupying authorities in their arbitrary practices affecting the physical, social and psychological

health conditions of the Arab inhabitants, changing the structure of the occupied Arab territories is a matter that necessitates Member States to consider the application of the measures stipulated in the Constitution of the World Health Organization;

IV

Denouncing the military Order 745 of 4 January 1978 issued by the Israeli Military Commander of the West Bank Zone, concerning the practising and the licensing of medical and health professions in the West Bank of the occupied Arab territories, thus further changing the legal structure of the institutions of the accepted territories, in particular;

- (a) granting, withholding or withdrawing licences, contrary to existing and accepted professional rules:
- (b) forcing the migration of Arab medical and health personnel, and imposing restrictive conditions on the inhabitants as regards the practice of the medical and health professions;

Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from changing the legal status of medical and health professions in the occupied Arab territories, and to immediately nullify the aforementioned military Order and any other similar orders.

International



Report of the Socialist International factfinding mission to the Middle East¹ January, 1978

The proposal to send a fact-finding mission of the International to the Arab countries had found the unanimous agreement at the Party Leaders' Conference held in London on November 11, 1973. Golda Meir, the representative of the Israeli Labour Party, did not raise objections.

The explicit purpose of the fact-finding mission was the attempt to find out to what extent there exist preconditions for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From the outset there should be no doubt among the Arab participants in these talks that the Socialist International was not only proceeding with the consent of the Israeli Labour Party but in complete loyalty to that party. Developments during these four years were highly unsteady and changing. During the early stages of this mission, immediately after the October War, only President Sadat showed a relative willingness for conciliation, while at the same time being quite explicit about the fact that the ultimate goal, "peace in our times", would be illusory. The maximum result feasible would be a state of non-belligerency. Other Arab leaders were more irreconcilable.

During the past four years, there has been a total change. Today most Arab governments support a peaceful solution under certain circumstances. A few, like the governments of Iraq and Libya, still continue to hold to a negative posture. President Boumedienne's position, which could almost be called a doctrine, subscribes to the view that those Arab states which are not immediate neighbours of Israel should not be opposed to a solution which is acceptable to the Arab neighbours

of Israel. It may be assumed that this Boumedienne Doctrine, as we would like to call it, will eventually be accepted by all Arab states. The question arising in this context is therefore the following:

What is the framework within which a peaceful solution can be searched for and, eventually, found? After many long discussions with almost all leading personalities in the Arab world we have come to the conclusion that the following points must be taken into account.

- (1) Peace, in one form or another—and this could also mean some kind of peaceful co-existence— can only be found if Israel is prepared to return to the border of 1967. This is all the more important since this demand, according to the Arab view and to the original partition plan, implies an essential concession: de facto the Arab states silently accept the revision of the partition plan of 1947.²
- (2) In the Arab view, the establishment of a Palestinian state, in one or another form, is the obvious precondition for any peaceful solution; its territory is understood to include the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I would like to leave open, for the time being, the question of the feasibility of negotiations on territorial concessions or temporary zones of demilitarization.
- (3) An agreement about the return of the territories taken from Syria and Egypt, possibly by means of a relevant calendar of operations.
- (4) In case that there will be Israeli settlements in the areas returned, the need arises for an agreement about their status as well as about the areas of Arab settlements in Israel, the content of which would probably have to be more specific than those which were originally developed in connection with the plan of partition.
- (5) An agreement about a return of a certain number of Palestinian refugees. In this context I have the feeling that the Arab side knows quite clearly that the number envisaged would be of a more symbolic nature.

¹ The mission took place in three stages in 1974, 1975 and 1976 under the leadership of Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, whose introduction forms an integral part of the report. English text, *Socialist Affairs* (London), XXVIII, 1, (January/February, 1978), pp. 6–12.

² See General Assembly Resolution no. 181 in George J. Tomeh (ed.) United Nations Resolution on Palestine and The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Beirut: IPS, 1975).

It is not the task of this report to present detailed suggestions for a solution; it is only possible to indicate a framework and the general direction where there is the potential for peaceful development. The question is too complex and too much burdened with resentments. It will, therefore, require prolonged and tedious negotiations, beyond the primary framework indicated, which will be similarly complicated as the ones about the Austrian State Treaty.

According to the Arab view, normalization of relations can only be expected after a number of years. First of all, the peace settlement would have to prove and strengthen itself and bring about a gradual change in the state of mind of both sides. The Israeli side occasionally expresses the opinion that normalization has to come first and that this could then be the precondition for a peaceful solution.

Recent history has presented us with concrete examples for both alternatives. I believe that, if both states do exist side by side, the necessity for a process of normalization with each other will arise very quickly: the lack of natural resources would force Israel and an eventual Palestinian state, probably also Jordan, into it. Given a change of mind, even a very organic co-operation with regard to economic questions could develop very rapidly.

Concerning the question of Jerusalem, I would be the last one who would want to minimize this problem. I am nevertheless of the opinion that, as soon as a solution has been found for the main problem, it will be possible to find one for Jerusalem too. The case of Rome, which now is the capital of Italy as well as the centre of the Roman Catholic Church, could serve as a historic example. In this context, it is worth noting that, as far as I know, the position of the King of Jordan as the Protector of the Holy Places in Jerusalem has been untouched, even by the Rabat Conference.

A question arising in this context is the one concerning the genuine nature of peaceful intentions on the Arab side. I am quite conscious of the fact that, under the existing conditions of prevailing distrust, on both sides, any remark to this point will scarcely meet with approval. On the basis of detailed and very unemotional talks, I have reached the conclusion that the reasons put forth by the Arab side to explain their new and changed attitude are quite plausible. Ac-

cording to my information, which might be incomplete, the Arab states along the front with Israel have spent at least ten billion dollars for purposes of armament. This represents a gigantic amount for relatively small and altogether poor countries, which they are not able to raise by themselves but which—and this is generally known—must be financed by the rich Arab states. But these states are also slowly beginning to feel this burden as oppressive. All the more so, since these states themselves need additional funds to finance their own internal and military projects.

Egypt, as the largest Arab state, is a country with so many economic and social problems that their solution can only be approached in a tangible way, immediately recognizable for large segments of her population, when the resources presently being used for purposes of war are utilized for the accomplishment of peaceful tasks. If this is not the case, Egypt will become a fountainhead for social unrest and, as a consequence, possibly an area for communist or crypto-communist movements. This fact may be one of the reasons why, above all, progressive democracy-oriented Arab circles, who envisage a solution for the social problems of Egypt through reforms, have come to the conclusion that peace is a necessary precondition for such a development. However, if peace cannot be attained, the escalation of nationalist emotions combined with an ever-increasing number of war-like confrontations, will be the unavoidable consequence. War will then become for Egypt, as during Nasser's time, more than a means to fight Israel; it becomes a social safety valve. To break this vicious circle of poverty, war and hatred is, according to my view, the historical endeavour of Sadat. If it fails, the consequences will be incalculable.

There is enormous wealth amassed in the Arab states. It consists of the revenues from their only raw material, oil. The rich states, therefore, have a considerable desire for peace and are arriving more and more at a very realistic assessment of the dangers actually confronting these states. The leaders of these countries must therefore logically come to the conclusion that, if the Israelis and the Palestinians are able to find a solution which strongly reduces the risks of war in this region and possibly could even bring about a vision of peace, there are more dangerous enemies than Israel. I therefore do not have any doubt that these countries

will supply large amounts of financial assistance to a newly created Palestinian state in order to contribute to its prosperity.

In some instances it was even pointed out to me that, in the long run, a contribution of Israel towards the economic and social development of the region is counted on. To develop this point more deeply at the present time, when our task above all is to reduce mutual distrust, would give this report an aspect of politico-romanticism.

To those who argue that the reasons mentioned by me are not recognized by the Palestinians and their leadership and that it is they who primarily count, I would like to quote parts of relevant statements by Palestinians put at my disposal:

"The explosive Palestinian parameter with its inherent and automatic built-in capacity to destabilise the situation in the Middle East, will unavoidably trigger another round of military confrontation with untold damage to the protagonists themselves as well as to world interests at large. Based upon this premise, it is clear that the only way to peace and stability in the Middle East is through the recognition and implementation of Palestinian legitimate national rights.

"Very briefly, it can be stated that for the return of the West Bank, Gaza Sector, the Himma and Auja enclaves, a status of non-belligerency can be established between the future sovereign State of Palestine and the State of Israel. But for a full state of peace to take place, other issues will have to be settled, the most important of which is the Israeli acceptance and implementation of the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their original homes, if they wished to do so or to be compensated if they freely elected not to return."

"The (1977) resolution of the Palestinian National Council (PNC)³ called for the establishment of a national Palestinian state and did not refer to a secular democratic state...

"The resolution spelled out for the first time what we mean by Palestinian national rights, a point of constant criticism by friend and foe alike. Article 11 delineated them as: the right of return, self-determination and the establishment of a national Palestinian state. For those familiar with political forms of expression the communiqué expresses a clear acceptance of a peaceful evolution.

"To differentiate the position of its supporters it should be said that they are again divided into two tendencies. The first tendency is persistently in favour of the creation of a Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and therewith considers the conflict as ended. This state shall be the homeland of the Palestinians: if not all of them can actually live there, then in a hypothetical way: what Israel represents for the Iews. The future of this state is considered bright by this tendency; like that of all states in the region. They see the relations with Israel as an evolutionary process which can be found in the course of history. In short, this tendency would acquiesce in the solution attained and will strive to further the development of their state within the framework of the regional conditions.

"The second tendency agrees to the peaceful solution out of realistic political considerations. For they understood that under the local and international conditions prevailing at present no other solution would be possible. They do not perceive this step—creation of their state—at all as a final solution. On the contrary, they see it as a way to attain a calmer situation which would open new possibilities for peaceful confrontation. This tendency watches the evolution of Israel and her many-fold social and national problems. They proceed further in their internal discussions and analysis and ascertain that without war, the state of Israel will not have a very long life-span for the following reasons:

- "(1) Definitely established, secure frontiers will eliminate an important foundation for the creation of that state: the argument that Israel can be a home for all Jews. For there is not enough space.
- "(2) When the Jews have the possibility to live in their state—Israel—securely and without menace, then the motivation for world Jewry constantly to support Israel financially will cease. That will have the effect that the state of Israel and her citizens shape their life in a normal way, like all other states of the region. This means, at the same time, that the messianic character of that state ceases.
- "(3) A peace settlement and the cessation of the messianic character will lead to a resurgence of the national and social problems of that state, for example the discrimination against oriental Jews in Israel. This situation will then be used by the Arabs to persuade the oriental Jews with

³ Doc. 229 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

generous financial help to return to their Arab countries of origin. This possibility is already practised. Through intercession of the PLO with some Arab countries it was possible to persuade 500 Israeli families to return to their Arab homelands with appropriate financial help for the start.

"(4) If this process takes place as described—so this tendency believes—then the Israelis finally will live as a strong minority in their country. It is furthermore counted upon that the Arab population in Israel will gradually become as large as the Israeli.

"Once this situation is reached Israel with finally no more be an obstacle to the Arab striving for unity, neither nationally nor geographically. As stated initially, the struggle of the Arabs for independence and for the creation of a "United Arab State" was frustrated because of two reasons:

"(1) the British government did not keep its promises and agreements;

"(2) a heterogeneous state—Israel—was created which separates the Arab Orient from Arab North Africa. These two reasons or obstacles will be surmounted—as the second tendency analyses—by neutralizing the state of Israel."

If a Palestinian state in the envisaged area, West Bank and Gaza Strip, does come into existence, this newly created state will pose overwhelming problems for its government. Such a state will be unable to direct its attention towards anything but internal tasks for a very long time. Even if this state could be armed with the aid of others, it will find itself, in view of the military experience and the military potential of Israel and its army, in a hopeless position and each attempt to look for war-like confrontations with Israel would necessarily lead to a terrible counter-strike which in its effect would go far beyond anything that the Arab side could oppose to it. At any rate, an organized state consisting of the regions presently occupied by Israel would constitute for the whole Arab world a far more vulnerable area with regard to military retaliation measures than is the case with territories occupied by Israel. If such a Palestinian state is created, one of the logical consequences would be the successive dissolution of the refugee camps. They were primarily meant to be a para-state which would enable the Palestinian leadership to fulfil some quasi-governmental functions such as education of children in Palestinian schools, military recruitment for Al Fatah, creation

of political institutions, generation of a spirit of resistance and development of their aggressive tendencies. These camps constitute an alien element within the Arab states and, in the case of Lebanon, have proven themselves to be dangerous liabilities for the host country. Their dissolution will be supported by the host countries, in particular, and it is also the declared intention of the PLO to liquidate these camps.

It would be foolish to deny that there still exist radical groups which are not satisfied with a solution along these lines and which would continue their struggle. But we have been plausibly assured that the great majority of the Palestinians would eventually accept a solution found by Arafat and his collaborators, and those not prepared to accept this solution will suffer the fate of all extremist groups.

We also should not neglect the argument based on international law that Israel's existence derives from a resolution of the United Nations from 1947 and that at that time it was the expressed will of the United Nations to create an Israeli and a Palestinian state.

The UN General Assembly's resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1974, read in part:

"Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces for the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948."

It remains the duty of member states of the United Nations to work for the implementation of this resolution, even if in a modified form.

From my discussions with leading personalities of the Soviet Union I know that they feel themselves committed to this resolution, in content as well as in principle. The then representative of the Soviet Union at the UN at the time (the present Minister of Foreign Affairs), Mr Gromyko, presented the position of his country in the 125th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on November 26, 1947, as follows:

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as everyone knows, has had no direct material or other interests in Palestine; it is interested in the question of Palestine because it is a member of the United Nations and because it is a great power that bears, just as do other great powers,

a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace. These facts determine the stand taken by the Government of the USSR on the question of Palestine...

"When the question of the future of Palestine was under discussion at the special session of the General Assembly, the Government of the USSR pointed to the two most acceptable solutions of this question. The first was the creation of a single democratic Arab-Jewish state in which Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal rights. In case that solution were to prove unworkable because of Arab and Jewish insistence that, in view of the deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations, they would be unable to live together, the Government of the USSR through its delegation at the Assembly, pointed to the second solution, which was to partition Palestine into two free, independent and democratic states—an Arab and a Jewish one."

I also gained the impression, that the Soviet government is prepared to accept modifications of the former UN-solution if they derive from agreements by the parties concerned, for example through a Geneva Conference.

Finally, I believe that such a solution, which appears to me to be the only one with a chance of success, can be secured politically and militarily so that we may reach a state of affairs which is at least more durable than this precarious state of tension which exists at present.

If we do not succeed in this venture there will be dramatic changes in the Arab states. The enormous resources available to the Arab world will necessarily be used for military purposes and, in the course of the next decades, increasingly better armed armies will threaten Israel. No amount of counter-force, even if it is militarily extremely successful and devastating, will bring about a definitive change in favour of Israel but will only increase the general danger of war. And the price to be paid in blood by the Israeli people will rise constantly. For the very reason that European socialists are committed to the state of Israel, they can only, in my view, support a peaceful solution reached through a process of negotiations. Even taking into account the full extent of the feeling of responsibility with regard to Israel, we should not fail to see that the movement of democratic socialism would drift into an intolerable situation if the price would be the antagonizing of the Arab world. It is therefore the task of the Socialist International to do everything in its power to work for a peaceful solution which guarantees the acceptance of the right to live for the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. I am deeply convinced that there will be no insurmountable difficulties—if Israel, on her part, is prepared to recognize the Palestinian people and its right to live—in the way of the Palestinians withdrawing the declaration which calls for the destruction of Israel. Nobody wants to take the first step, but it would not be difficult to find a technical procedure according to which both parties will have to deposit their intentions in a recognizable way with a third party. The latter assumes to make public these declarations of intent in case of the peace settlement, in which case the public confirmation by both parties will naturally have to be given simultaneously.

In conclusion, with regard to the question whether a new Palestinian state should be part of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation or should develop outside of it, this appears to be, in our view, not an unsolvable problem if it is made clear in advance that this Palestinian state will be created on the territory of Western Jordan and the Gaza Strip. Under this promise it is entirely feasible, at least it appears to me, that there could be a confederation between Jordan and Palestine before the signing of a peace treaty. Today already, it seems to be clear that such a confederation would be possible after the creation of the state of Palestine and the signing of a peace treaty. This question should not pose insurmountable difficulties.

I do not deny that I consider the problem of the Middle East as a crucial question for peace in the world in this phase of our history and, if we were successful in bringing about a peaceful solution, peace would be a historical accomplishment of such magnitude which has been denied to humanity for centuries and I think that, for the first time, the prospects do exist. If rapprochement were possible—the idea of peace would have gained a great, universally visible victory, and the Socialist International would have contributed its share.

At this very moment it seems to me to be of utmost importance that we know our obligation and work in this spirit. No other political movement in democratic Europe can do it.

I therefore propose, as a practical step, that the Socialist International organizes without delay, especially in view of the development in Israel to the right, a roundtable conference with prominent representatives of the Israeli labour movement and of the other member parties. This conference should be considered as the beginning of a series of meetings to be planned over a short period. The objection which will be raised—I can hear it already—is that such a thing has to be well prepared. My reply, based on practical experience of several decades, is simply this: if a confrontation is prepared at length and takes place only then, one does not really need it any more. At present, however, to meet is more important than a forseeable result.

The Palestinians

The disputed question which we cannot, and do not want to, answer in our report is the question of the number of Palestinians living in the Arab countries. The Israelis apparently do not focus their attention on this question and they would like to restrict themselves numerically to the Palestinians living in the Israeli sphere of influence. There exists the widely held view—which is, incidentally, shared by large parts of the democratic world—that it is the task of the Arab states to take care, through assimilation, of the Palestinians living outside the state and sphere of influence of Israel, including the occupied territories. This appears to be, in our view, a first serious error of judgement. The fact, for instance, that an Arab of Palestinian extraction holds an important job in the oil industry of Saudi Arabia, or that another one is employed in the Kuwaiti Ministry of Planning, should not lead to the conclusion that the question of their national identity has now been solved through assimilation; this to us appears to be an error which leads to serious consequences. This problem is even more relevant with regard to the millions of Palestinian refugees who have found some kind of work. The Palestinians, since they are strangers, have experienced, as they themselves have pointed out, a certain animosity in many of their host countries. The problem is aggravated by the fact that many of them are highly qualified workers, technicians and professionals. In some Arab countries they are mostly working in areas which make them members of the upper classes. In the conservative countries, where they are most urgently needed as part of the work force, they are often considered to be progressive, anti-monarchist, even inclined towards communism.

With regard to their republican sentiments, it seems that the deep hatred of the Palestinians for King Hussein, which derives from the well known events of the past, plays a certain role and is transferred to any monarch who closely cooperates with King Hussein. The position, formerly also often supported by our Israeli comrades, that there is no Palestinian nation appears to us, whatever the historical arguments may be, to have been superseded by the facts. Recent history teaches us that a spirit of nationalism, once it springs into existence, represents a force which in the long run can not be ignored.

There exists today—and this has been proven by the elections in the occupied territories—a deep Palestinian nationalism in many parts of the Arab world. In any event, there have been hundreds of thousands of Palestinians outside of Israel who years ago have renounced all common bonds with Jordan. In view of these developments we think it is therefore wishful thinking to believe that Jordan and King Hussein can in any way be of assistance in the resolution of this conflict. Incidentally, King Hussein has specifically precluded this possibility in his discussions with us. But it is still feasible that, due to the fact that such a large part of the population of Jordan consists of Palestinians, certain solutions could be found, i.e. the establishment of a confederation between an independent Palestinian state and Jordan. The establishment of such a confederation is presently envisaged for the time after the creation of a Palestinian state.

In this aspect, the Palestinians have clearly succeeded in establishing their political and national views in the entire pan-Arab world. And it is highly advisable not to harbour any illusions with regard to these facts. These positions have been expressed with equal determination by the King of Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia as well as by the leading personalities in the conservative gulf states. Similar views have been expressed by King Hassan in his discussions with us during the month of March 1975. It may be true that the unity shown by the Arab world

in Rabat4 was only on the surface; with regard to one question it appears to be very real: today the right of the Palestinians to speak for themselves cannot be denied. No Arab state could speak for them against their will. We deliberately are very cautious in our formulations since we do not want to hurt anyone, since we do not want to deny our respect for the accomplishments which may be observed in Jordan. It seems therefore all the more important and necessary to us to point out that the hope, which is still kept alive in some chancelleries, that a final solution can be found with the help of King Hussein, is nothing but an illusion. We consider this observation to be one of the most important results of our factfinding mission.

The Influence of the Palestinians

Everywhere where nationalist Arab movements execute governmental functions, Palestinians play a very important role, not only as experts but as politicians as well. In all meetings which we held in these countries, there were Palestinians represented in these groups.

In all Arab states, the Palestinians therefore have at their disposal influential pressure groups which should not be underestimated, especially in the Gulf states. There was a visible expression of relief when our delegation, during the visit to Kuwait, expressed its willingness to also meet with representatives of the PLO. Simply our willingness to do so has led to a total change of the cool, even hostile, climate which had prevailed up to that moment. During the ensuing meeting with representative spokesmen of the Palestinians it was pointed out to us that they had built up Kuwait, a position which we thought to have been a little arrogant.

In many of these states, the Palestinians have at their disposal the only existing organization—usually with hundreds of thousands of members. This influence of the Palestinians, on the other hand, is a continuous source of their irritation since they cannot estimate what kind of reactions could be caused by the fact of their dominance. A typical example were the events in Jordan and also the present events in Lebanon.

This is one of the reasons why each Palestinian

feels the need to bear a passport of his homeland. Even if many of them, above all those who have built up a good career for themselves, do not intend to immediately return to this yet-to-be-established state, all of them, in the final analysis, want their own homeland which they want to create for themselves. This is the explanation why the demand for the creation of a "little Palestine" has found such a positive resonance also with the Palestinians living outside the areas which are supposed to constitute the new state. We would not exclude the possibility that this is also a source of irritation for the Palestinians who are living in these areas.

The PLO

The importance of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians was emphasized in all Arab states. Maybe it was possible to hear in Syria that there exist also other Palestinian organizations, and to be told in Libya that other Palestinian organizations will take over from the PLO if the PLO "betrays" the interest of the Palestinians. Today there are in fact probably nine Palestinian organizations but there is no doubt that Al Fatah, which was founded as a military movement in 1962, is the most important one. The politically most important organization is the PLO. In the course of a few years it has gained such a degree of recognition with the Palestinians living outside of Israel, a fact which is apparently not known well enough. No matter how one looks at the role of the organization, it is the PLO which has created a Palestinian national consciousness. And it is also the PLO which presents itself as a structured political organization with a high degree of internal democracy. The largest and most influential organization within the PLO is Al Fatah, which is organized along military lines. Al Fatah in turn is led mainly by the Palestinian intelligentsia, which primarily occupies itself with military tasks. This is a somewhat similar process to the one that could be observed in Israel, where people from civilian walks of life temporarily make themselves available for military duties because of the pressing national problems. Within the PLO there is also a financially very strong group of Palestinians who have gained their wealth through their work, mainly in the rich Arab states. This observation appears to us to be of importance since it enables us to draw conclusions about the ideological posture of

⁴ Sec docs. 302, 303, 307-309 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

the PLO. It is not a movement of social revolutionaries; it is to a not inconsiderable extent nationalist-conservative.

We therefore do not agree with the sometimes expressed apprehension that the PLO is an organization prone to be influenced by communism. The class forces within the PLO, by their very nature, are not communist or anti-market economy, although this does not preclude that one is asking for the support of the Soviet Union in the pursuit of national aspirations.

We should also not overlook the fact that, for the last couple of years, Al Fatah bears responsibility for the refugee camps and that this, again and again, leads to conflicts with the governments in the countries in which these refugee camps are located. This was one of the factors which caused Al Fatah to take a more realistic position. Al Fatah knows full well that it bears responsibility for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who live in the refugee camps, but that it was, as of now, not able to produce one single square foot of Palestinian homeland. This, on the one side, has forced Al Fatah to intensify again and again its military efforts with the ultimate goal of creating a well-equipped regular army-independent of the interests of other Arab countries—but also has, on the other hand, given birth to the idea to get a territory on which a Palestinian state may be established. We think that this is one of the reasons why a policy of moderation has begun to develop among the influential circles within Al Fatah and that, within the PLO, there are even the beginnings of the idea that the reality of the state of Israel will have to be taken into account. While in 1974, during our talks with Arafat and his colleagues, the differences were clearly visible, and while they were at that time not ready to accept a solution brought about by the creation of a Palestinian state on the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, except possibly as a short-term settlement, Arafat now holds the position to be seen from his address to the United Nations:

"Why therefore should I not dream and hope? For is not revolution the making real of dreams and hopes? So let us work together that my dreams may be fulfilled, that I may return with my people out of exile: there in Palestine to live with this Jewish freedom fighter and his partners, with this Arab priest and his brothers, in one

democratic state where Christian, Jew and Moslem live in justice, fraternity and progress."5

We would also not want to deny ourselves the opportunity to emphasize that other organizations—for example As Saika, which is close to the Syrian Baath Party and therefore to the Syrian government-have some influence on the formulation of policy within the PLO. The present crisis in Lebanon points at inner tensions which it is not our present task to discuss and where we do not have any relevant concrete facts at our disposal. In this context it should be mentioned, though, that one of the organizations, which is considered to be the most radical one, the organization of Dr Habbash, has publicly recognized the Israelis as a people with its own nationality, which is evident from a document circulated at the National Council of the Palestinians. This organization supports the idea of the coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis instead of one between Moslems. Christians and Jews. In any case, we were informed, by persons who are rather close to us politically, that this organization, because of its "socialist programme" has no influence within the PLO, but hopes to gain influence among the Palestinian people. But it is a fact, without any doubt, that the overwhelming majority of all Arab governments supports the PLO.

Presently there are 105 nations who recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in one way or another. We may assume that it is only a question of-very little-time until most of the industrialized countries will also follow this tendency. We think that it is quite clear from numerous discussions that the PLO, due to the worldwide recognition which it has found during the last months, has now irrevocably decided to shed its terrorist image which it had in many countries in Europe and the world. In Arab circles, with the exception of Libya and Iraq, there is recognition of the fact that terrorism has driven the PLO into some kind of political isolation. Because of the reasons mentioned above we have come to the conclusion that a denial of the existence of the PLO by socialist parties would not only be ineffective but would also create feelings of a new hostility in the Arab world against the social democratic movement.

⁵ See doc. 9 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

We know about the great difficulties of our Israeli comrades who take the position that under no circumstances should there be negotiations with the PLO. We think it is not our task to give advice to our Israeli comrades, but we have raised the question again and again with our Arab contacts and have found, at least with regard to one question, an important readiness to negotiate. Everywhere where we raised this question we were told that, for the beginning, the task of representing the Palestinians could very well be turned over to Arab military institutions. Apperently it was thought that it might be easier for the Israeli participants to stick to negotiation models which already exist. In this context, the second highest, although fictitious, institution of the Arab world was specifically mentioned, the United Arab High Command. We only mention this example—we have never thought of offering our good services—because it leads us to the conclusion that the Arab side would like to find a quick solution for this question. It is felt that the problem of Palestine is an extremely heavy burden because, as long as it exists, it has to be considered to be the primary problem even though there are quite different problems arising for many Arab states.

Some Problems of the Arab World

The discrepancy between the unimaginable wealth of the upper class which controls the oil wells and the great mass—we specifically do not want to say of their own people but of all those working in these countries—is striking. These are, in many instances, millions of foreigners, Arabs as well as non-Arabs, ranging from Egyptians to Sudanese, from Pakistanis to Kurds. A new proletariat is growing, and it is an unsolved question how it can be organized along political and trade union lines. This problem will present itself with great urgency if and when there will be normal conditions in this region.

The process of industrialization, even accumulation of capital, is running its course in the rich oil countries without an extreme exploitation of the working people. On the contrary, the new proletariat in these countries belongs to a relatively well-off group of the population. The process of industrialization is mostly conducted by European technicians and supervisors. But this process has its numerous limits, and we may assume that the

largest part of the investments generated by the revenues derived from oil will be transferred to the industrial nations of Europe and North America. It is correct that there are gigantic amounts of dollars stacked away in the many funds and banks of the Arab oil countries, with the exception of Iraq and Algeria. But they will seek their own opportunities for investment, and even today the recycling of petrodollars does not pose a serious problem. This in turn will lead to a commitment of Arab capital interests in Europe which can be barely envisaged at this time. Considering the situation of the balances of payments of most European nations, we will see the development of a degree of interdependence which would be worthy of special attention. In any event, this problem indicates a strong desire for stability in the rich Arab states and leads to the distinct hope of terminating the state of war with Israel; but naturally under the condition that a compromise solution between Israel and the Palestinians can be found.

Another problem which preoccupies the attention of the rich states is their security. The desire for security is particularly pronounced in the Gulf states, in Kuwait and in Saudi Arabia. And it should be noted briefly that these states definitely do not consider Israel as the primary threat to their security—if Israel would set the preconditions for the termination of the state of war by retreating from the territories occupied in 1967—but by other states and developments. We do not want to be more specific here, which, in view of the well-known geographic situation, is not necessary.

One problem, which apparently preoccupies the moderate Arab statesmen to a very high degree, seems to be developments in Africa and in this context, above all, the military intervention of Cuba in Angola. It was pointed out to us that such influences may already be observed in South Yemen. All these examples should show us why there is a readiness in the Arab world to come to a solution of the problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Our Arab sources in North Africa have told us that their original worry, the Israelis and the Palestinians could not live together, was unfounded since it has been shown again and again that especially Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals would be very well suited for just such a develop-

ment. And finally, our most open-minded Arab sources even expressed the view that it would be just this very task which should be given particular attention by the Israelis and Palestinians on the one hand and Israelis and Arabs in general on the other. This surely means that Israel will have to be prepared to relinquish her extreme Zionist conceptions but could, in exchange, add a new and mutually beneficial chapter to the history of the centuries-old relationship between Jews and Arabs. In this context there were strong hints with regard to the high level of Israel's technological and scientific development. One of the partners in our discussions, an Arab statesman known all over the world, expressed his opinion that the problem of South Africa could only be finally solved if South Africa accepted the fact that it exists within an African environment and more strongly takes into account developments in Africa, without having to give up South Africa's European characteristics. Similar developments were predicted for the next decades with regard to Israel -she would have to accept that Israel was created within an Arab area and, although keeping all aspects of her identity, would have to integrate herself into this area, a process greatly facilitated by the fact that the Arab states are becoming more and more European themselves.

Israel would be totally unchallenged in her existence as soon as she accepts the fact that she has to take into account developments in the Arab world and if she adjusts her future political aspirations to this area. We are fully aware of the fact that, in our report, we present a particular emphasis with regard to the Arab-Israeli question; but we feel that on the basis of our talks and experiences we are not only justified in such a posture but that we have a moral obligation to do so.

Return of the Occupied Territories

A phenomenon which in our opinion is particularly worthy of note: in our talks with President Sadat in 1974 he expressed the view that the most which could be accomplished through long negotiations would be the end of belligerency. To make peace, that would be the task of future generations. This is not the case any more. Most Arab statesmen believe that presently Israel—and we only report on their views—apparently has no interest in making peace. They even believe that the end of belligerency would have come had there been

a stronger institutionalization of the negotiations in Geneva, since it is the mandate of the Geneva negotiations to create peace. This changed posture appears to us to be of some consequence, just like the demand for a return to the borders of 1967, which already implies a recognition of the existence of the state of Israel within those borders. But there can be no doubt that no Arab state, even the states not directly involved, can withdraw the demand that all the land conquered in the war of 1967 will have to be returned. In our discussions, there have been no indications whatsoever that there exists a readiness to talk about revisions with regard to territory—although minor ones need not necessarily be totally precluded.

Every Arab statesman will support the position of President Sadat who said, during a press conference in Vienna, that he could not relinquish one inch of soil. But what we feel is feasible would be negotiations about the time-table of such a return of territory and of the confidence-building measures which would have to be an integral part. We are not enough versed in these questions in order to make concrete proposals, but already the agreements which have been signed during the last two years have shown us that several possibilities exist. We have not gained the impression that the Geneva Conference—if it were possible to proceed along these lines—represents the only way for a solution but we believe that, at present, there cannot be any other practical peacesupporting measures than a resumption of the Geneva Conference, its institutionalization over a longer period of time, in order to make it possible to return to the conference table again and again, also in situations of crisis. There are examples in recent history that permanent conferences of this kind have had no positive effect; but there are also examples which prove that conferences of long duration can bring about results, i.e. the negotiations about the Austrian State Treaty. In all probability, there will be a long series of detailed negotiations preceeding any peaceful solution.

Whatever our experiences with negotiations may have been, democratic socialists simply can not deprive themselves of the basic trust in negotiations between states.

We think that especially at the present time, most of Arab statesmen to whom we have talked are our partners in discussion in the truest sense of the word. At any rate, we have not been able to find absolute, final and even natural deadly enmity between Arabs and Israelis.

In this context it would be tempting to go into an analysis of the question how many "hereditary enmities" there existed between European nations in our older and more recent history.

We feel obliged to point out in our report that Arab self-confidence is not only based on the millions of dollars which derive from oil, as is widely assumed in Europe and America. In fact, there has been the genuine beginning of a national awakening, which dates back a long time, and which, among other things, has had as its consequence that the oil companies have been taken away from the multinational corporations.

In the Arab world, the national revolution had begun long before the oil crisis. It may be that the control over this gigantic wealth has accelerated this process. The Arabs were, before they were condemned to a state of ahistorical life for many centuries-centuries of rule by the Turks, a few decades of European colonial rule have brought about this ahistorical state—the generators of a tremendous culture and civilization, and it should be noted that, in particular, members of the Jewish faith, fully allowed to develop their potential, have greatly contributed to this culture. But it is completely natural that the rise of Arab nationalism orients itself to a high degree towards a glorious cultural past. The impressive accomplishments which may be observed in Israel find their counterpart in a newly arising creativity which has been submerged for centuries. The fact, we believe, should make the Arab world a natural partner for cooperation with Europe, and we have left no doubt in our discussions that the establishment of peace in this region and a new relationship between Arabs and Israelis would be a substantial precondition for such a development. Certainly, material incentives will have more effect in this instance—the urgent necessity for a supply of oil and similar developments. In addition, we would like to point out in this context the fact of the strong inclinations of the Arab world toward Black Africa. There is no question that the great efforts in the field of development assistance do play a quite considerable role. The figures give us a very clear picture.

National Geographic reported in October 1975: "Last year, following Kuwait's lead, OPEC nations pledged 17 billion [dollars] to developing countries (the industrial nations committed 11.3 billion)."

We were given another assignment as well: We were asked to look into the question to what extent the Arab states show a desire to cooperate with democratic Europe. On the basis of the discussions which we have held we finally came to the conclusion that the nations of Eastern Europe, in spite of everything, have found a strong foothold in the Arab world; and that, for example, the Soviet Union acts on a perfectly "ideology-free" basis. As an example we would point to the fact that the Soviet Union is one of the largest trade partners of the Moroccan monarchy. On the basis of our discussions we have come to the conclusion that the Arab states will not follow the example of Egypt with regard to relationships with the Soviet Union. In the meantime, even Egypt is trying to work out a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. Only one thing is certain, that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries do not enjoy a dominating ideological influence in the Arab world, at least as long as there is no new war. Only such a war would immediately increase the willingness to visibly intensify military cooperation. In our opinion it is very feasible that Syria, which presently maintains close political, financial and economic ties with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, will simultaneously maintain a close and intimate relationship with the Soviet Union. With regard to economic cooperation with democratic Europe, we would like to note that it would have to be primarily based on a more enlightened policy by the European Economic Community. In addition, we should work for constructive contacts between the International Energy Agency within OECD on the one hand and OPEC on the other. In this case, economic talks between OECD and Arab organizations along similar lines would be useful. There is certainly the necessary readiness for such contacts on the Arab side.

Chances for Cooperation with SI

The changed statutes of the Socialist International now permit a much more enlightened posture vis-à-vis nationalist Arab parties. But we think it would be an even more practical and useful development if we could convince ourselves that social democratic parties, if and when they establish contacts with other political forces in other continents, need not simultaneously enter into fully-fledged fraternity—which, incidentally,

has not been demanded by our partners. We think there is also need for a less emotional posture within the Socialist International. What these forces want, and we have seen this quite clearly. is to be liberated from the apparently inescapable alternative of having to make a choice either for "capitalist America" or for "communist Russia". Social democracy and democratic socialism really present themselves here as a third force. During the last year, it was not least due to the factfinding mission of the Socialist International that leading politicians of the Arab countries have shown a basic change in their attitude towards us. We think that the established procedure of bilateral contacts of the member parties of the Socialist International is useful; but we should not overlook the fact that a rapprochement between Arab parties and the Socialist International could represent a substantial precondition for a new situation of dialogue between the Arab parties and the Israeli Labour Party.

In this context we should not overlook a vital fact: the strong affinity which Arab politicians who have lived and studied in Europe feel towards the workers' movement in Europe. We are here faced with a moral aspect to which we on our side have not given sufficient attention.

Final Remarks

We do not want to overestimate the importance of the work of this fact-finding mission of the Socialist International. But the fact that it was considered necessary to accord the delegation a large degree of attention with regard to politics, journalism and protocol is proof that its importance was considered to be quite great. That it was possible, in each and every one of the countries visited, to hold discussions which lasted on the average from 4 to 7 hours, proves the thoroughness with which we dealt with the pressing problems. That we were treated not only with exceptional politeness but with great friendliness—we are even tempted to say, genuine warm friendliness—shows how useful the mission has been, and that, finally, there was acceptance of the fact that the Socialist International and the socialist parties are determined to give unswerving loyalty to the works' [sic] movement of Israel but nevertheless want to be informed about developments in the Arab world, which not only gives proof of the realistic perspective of the influential statesmen of the

Arab world but also of their desire to establish contacts with us. We therefore believe that the efforts to reach a peaceful solution of the bloody confrontation would today be more sensible than during any other time in the history of this conflict and would have more chances of success than at any time during the proceeding [sic] thirty years. But there is need for a considerable measure of courage to support such a programme vis-à-vis one's own people.

We reached the conclusion that economic cooperation between Europe and the Arab world, in the interest of both parties concerned, should not only be developed along the traditional forms of commercial relationships but that there is need for a far more systematic attitude of partnership. And we finally are of the opinion that, as volatile as the political conditions in this part of the world may be, it is worthwhile to establish contacts with suitable partners because in this way social democratic, that is to say democratic socialist thought, could find a wider field of application.

All this must justify the interest of the Socialist International in an opening towards the Arab world; this was, after all, the starting point in the decision of London and the mandate for the delegation.

51

Press interview statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel rejecting self-determination for the Palestinians and any kind of negotiations with the PLO⁶

Jerusalem, early January, 1978

Q. Are there any conditions under which you could accept the principle of Palestinian self-determination? What if it were exercised gradually, and the decision about independent statehood left for the future?

A. The people of Israel could not accept such terms. The concept of self-determination has helped many nations in their struggle for freedom, and it helped the creation of the Jewish state. But self-determination does not mean the right to

⁶ Interview conducted by Milan J. Kubic; partial text, Newsweek (New York—International edition), January 16, 1978, pp. 12–13. [The notes in parentheses are part of the Newsweek text. ed.]

independence by fractions of nations. For instance, there are 6 million Mexicans in Texas and New Mexico who speak a different language and are part of the Mexican nation. Does that give them a right to create an independent state on U.S. territory? Nobody would make such a suggestion. The French give us advice about self-determination, but they don't give it to the Corsicans. The Iraqis don't give it to the Kurds. The Palestinian Arabs are 1 per cent of the great Arab nation, whose selfdetermination is expressed in the existence of 21 sovereign states. It is hypocrisy and misuse of the term "self-determination" to say that it should apply to 1 per cent of a people. The fair arrangement for the Palestinian Arabs is to have autonomy which will not threaten the security of the Palestinian Jews. This is the only fair and positive solution. There is no other.

- Q, But Egypt says that the Palestinian right to self-determination is non-negotiable. How will you deal with that?
- A. So far we have not received the Egyptian proposals, but we'll discuss them, as equals, in the political committee. But it should be known in advance that we will not accept the term "Palestinian state" or "self-determination" both of which mean the same.
- Q. What about the language used by President Carter in Aswan? He spoke about the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians and said they should "participate in the determination of their own future."
- A. "Legitimate right" in our interpretation is the right to autonomy. As for participating in "the determination of their own future", I understand that it means the participation of appropriate representatives of the Palestinian Arabs in the negotiations. We accept such participation. This is how I understand the words used by President Carter, and we shall stand on such an interpretation and ask that it be made unequivocally clear that it does not mean anything else.
- Q. Do you regard King Hussein as sufficiently strong to undertake negotiations for the future of the West Bank? Is there some way he could be induced to enter the peace process?
- A. I am no judge of anybody else's strength. But of course King Hussein should join... in the peacemaking process. I invited him. If he wants me to visit him, or meet him in a neutral

territory, I will gladly do so. But as for inducing him to join our peace effort, I don't think we should look for, say, a separate action. The invitation stands.

- Q, King Hussein has taken a very negative view of your peace plan. Are you satisfied that this is his final position?
- A. I take a very negative position on his negative position. My plan [is] the first proposal ever for [Palestinian] self-rule dealing with all aspects of life. If King Hussein says he doesn't find anything positive in it, perhaps it is just a form of speech.
- Q. Your proposals specifically leave open the question of sovereignty for the West Bank and Gaza. How long do you propose to leave this question unresolved?
- A. The Egyptians do not have any right to the Gaza district, which they conquered in 1948. Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] were invaded and seized by King Abdullah's Arab Legion. There is a great rule in international law that you cannot derive a right from a wrong. On the other hand, our right to sovereignty in these areas of the land of Israel is obvious. It is our land. It belongs to the Jewish people. However, we know that there are other claims. So we have reached the logical conclusion of leaving the question of sovereignty open. In the meantime, let us concentrate on building the foundations for peaceful relations... After five years, all of the provisions including the sovereignty question—will be subject to review.
- Q, During the past week, Israel has opened a new settlement on the West Bank and begun building several others in Sinai. Given the Arab sensitivities, aren't you concerned that these moves could be detrimental to the peace talks?
- A. How could they be? Our proposals include the right of the Jews to acquire land and settle in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We have a perfect, unqualified right to settle in any part of the land, and we stand by this right. It is no obstacle whatsoever to the peace process. As for Sinai, we stated in our proposal for a peace treaty with Egypt that our settlements in the Rafiah salient will stay there, protected by the Israel Defence Force. It is completely natural that we now want to strengthen these settlements.

- Q. Will these settlements be in a U.N. buffer zone, or will they be under Egyptian flag?
- A. We have a proposal on this which will be discussed both in the military and the political committee.
- Q. Is it true Israel will try to negotiate an exchange of part of the Negev for the Rafiah salient, so the settlements could remain under Israeli sovereignty?
 - A. There is no basis for such reports.
- Q. Would you favor the removal of the Sinai settlements rather than leaving them under Egyptian sovereignty?
- A. We're not ready to take out any settlements...
 [They] are there to stay.
- Q, Would your autonomy plan permit free political activity, including the Communists? Would you allow the existence of a party that would clearly represent the PLO?
- A. Of course there will be freedom of political activity. Communists operate in our country, and are members of the Parliament. President Sadat met them when he was in Jerusalem. As for a party clearly representing the PLO, it would clearly be banned, because we will not permit an organization bent on the destruction of Israel. The PLO is the basest organization in history except for the Nazis... They should be outcasts, outside the pale of human civilization. I've made a study of these organizations, but I didn't find anything as base as the PLO.
- Q, Do you see any way of moderating the PLO, or rendering it ineffective?
- A. I don't give a thought to the PLO. It doesn't interest me.
- Q. Has President Carter tried to exert pressure of any kind on the state of Israel since President Sadat started his peace initiative last November?
- A. American pressure is simply inconceivable. Our plan was declared fair [by President Carter] and no pressure can be exerted against it to turn it into an unfair plan. I can tell you there has been no pressure, and I don't believe there will be any pressure.
- Q. Do you regard Syrian President Assad as hopelessly intransigent, or do you have a plan for bringing him into the negotiations?
 - A. I invited President Assad to join our peace

efforts, but so far he has declined. If he agrees to enter negotiations, we shall again bring up proposals and hear counterproposals, and start the talks. But there will be no initiative on our part regarding Syria until he decides to join the negotiations.

Q. Has the peace process moved fast enough?

A. I think it's been fast enough, but we should be patient. Let us hope that [the negotiations] will be finished in several months, but I would not guarantee it. Every side wants to deal with details, not only general declarations. As far as we're concerned, our life is at stake, and the existence of future generations.

Q. Do you actually hope to sign a peace treaty with Egypt?

A. We shall not suggest it. We don't want to embarrass President Sadat, who said he wants a comprehensive peace settlement, and so do we. If Egypt came to the conclusion that the rest of our neighbors don't want to join the negotiations, and if it then was willing to sign a separate peace treaty—not as the end of a peace process, but as its beginning—we would not deny such a possibility. But it should be an Egyptian initiative. Objectively, there would be nothing wrong with such a process. In 1949, for instance, Jordan and Egypt signed the armistice agreements many months ahead of Syria.

Q, How do you feel when members of your own party vote against your peace plan?

- A. Of the 45 Likud members [of the Israeli Knesset], only two voted against and one abstained, so that the support was overwhelming. But it hurts me to have to debate even with only two of my friends... But I am fully convinced that we're on the right road, so I will pursue this policy, even in disagreement with my best friends. As the French say, c'est la vie.
- Q. Do you think the peace process is irreversible by now?
- A. Yes. Ultimately we must reach an agreement. There may be difficulties on the road, but the Egyptian people cry for peace, and so do the people of Israel. Since the governments of the two countries feel the same way, I don't doubt the outcome. There will be peace.

Statement by US President Carter asserting that resolution of the Palestine question in all its aspects and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories is a necessary prerequisite for peace in the Middle East⁷

Aswan, January 4, 1978

It is an honor and a pleasure for us to be in this great country, led by such a strong and courageous man.

Mr. President, your bold initiative in seeking peace has aroused the admiration of the entire world. One of my most valued possessions is the warm, personal relationship which binds me and President Sadat together and which exemplifies the friendship and the common purpose of the people of Egypt and the people of the United States of America.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace initiative must succeed, while still guarding the sacred and historic principles held by the nations who have suffered so much in this region. There is no good reason why accommodation cannot be reached.

In my own private discussions with both Arab and Israeli leaders, I have been deeply impressed by the unanimous desire for peace. My presence here today is a direct result of the courageous initiative which President Sadat undertook in his recent trip to Jerusalem.⁸

The negotiating process will continue in the near future. We fully support this effort, and we intend to play an active role in the work of the Political Committee of Cairo, which will soon reconvene in Jerusalem.

We believe that there are certain principles, fundamentally, which must be observed before a just and a comprehensive peace can be achieved.

First, true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to the peace. Peace means more than just an end to belligerency.

Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.

Third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.

Some flexibility is always needed to insure successful negotiations and the resolution of conflicting views. We know that the mark of greatness among leaders is to consider carefully the views of others and the greater benefits that can result among the people of all nations which can come from a successful search for peace.

Mr. President, our consultations this morning have reconfirmed our common commitment to the fundamentals which will, with God's help, make 1978 the year for permanent peace in the Middle East.

53

Report adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel criticizing Prime Minister Begin's proposal for Palestinian self-rule as a perpetuation of Israel's occupation of Palestinian land⁹

Tel Aviv, January 5, 1978

The CPI Central Committee notes with satisfaction that the political changes wrought in recent years prove that the peoples of Israel and Egypt and other Arab countries are interested in achieving peace, liquidating the Israeli-Arab conflict and settling the Palestine problem. At the same time our party's prediction to the effect that the Begin government's policy, far from leading to peace, could plunge our people into the abyss of a new war, has been confirmed.

The Begin government program, which envisages "autonomy of the Arabs living on Israeli soil" (!) in conditions of Israeli military and political domination is not a program of peace, but a program of perpetuating Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, with Israel's sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip considered as an indisputable fact. It is a colonialist program that denies the very existence of the Arab people of Palestine, not to speak of their legitimate right

Made at the conclusion of talks with President Sadat of Egypt; Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2011 (February 1978), pp. 11–12.

⁸ See docs. 301, 303-305 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁹ English text, World Marxist Review Information Bulletin (Toronto), V, 16 (March 15, 1978), pp. 13-17.

to self-determination and to setting up their own independent state along with the State of Israel.

The Begin government expresses—though with numerous reservations—a readiness to return the Sinai peninsula to Egypt on condition that Egypt agrees to the preservation of Israeli military and civilian power in the Gaza strip and on the West Bank. This is designed to eschew the national presence and legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs.

The Begin government is not seeking an allembracing, just and permanent peace, but a deal with President Sadat of Egypt under the aegis of U.S. imperialism so as to reach a separate agreement with Egypt to the detriment of the Palestinian problem and the Geneva peace conference.

The CPI Central Committee holds that any agreement which ignores the existence of the Arab people of Palestine, their natural right to self-determination and to create an independent state along with Israel, not only is not a peace agreement, but represents a deal that is essentially designed to prolong the present Middle East crisis with the consequent threat to peace in the Middle East and throughout the world.

The Palestinian Arabs' right to self-determination and to setting up an independent state, just as the right of the Jewish people of Israel to self-determination and to setting up their own independent state was recognized by the decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947.¹⁰ The denial by former Israeli governments and, particularly by the present one, of the very existence of the Arab people of Palestine and their right to state independence—that is the basis of the Middle East crisis. Experience shows that basically the Israeli-Arab conflict stems from the non-implementation of the right of the Arab people of Palestine to set up their own independent state and from the unresolved Palestine problem.

Sadat's statement at the conclusion of the recent visit of U.S. President Carter to Egypt which noted the coincidence of views of both sides on denial of the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and to setting up their own independent state; his statement to the effect that he hoped King Hussein would be considered the

representative of the Palestinian people, and his head-on attack against the Palestine Liberation Organization all attest to the Egyptian President's departure from his declared political course of supporting the right of the Palestinian Arabs to independent statehood. It evidences also that the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations under U.S. auspices are not aimed at achieving an all-embracing just and lasting peace, but at concluding separate, partial agreements that will sow discord between the Arab states and within the Arab national movement, leave unsettled the Israeli-Arab political conflict and the Palestine problem and maintain a situation that is characterized by instability and insecurity.

Today it is clearer than ever that the measures initiated by Sadat's visit to Israel are designed to frustrate international efforts for an all-embracing settlement and establishment of a just and firm peace in the Middle East; their aim is to prevent convocation of the Geneva peace conference. It was envisaged, in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. statement of October 1977,11 to hold this conference in December of that year. It was also envisaged that the conference would proceed under the supervision of the UN and the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States of America and that a delegation of Israel and a joint Arab delegation including the Palestine Liberation Organization representing the Palestinian Arabs, would take part in its work.

However, the U.S. government in collusion with the Egyptian and Israeli authorities blocked the renewal of the Geneva peace conference. This confirms the fact that the U.S. imperialists are not interested in the establishment of a just and lasting Middle East peace. They would like to prolong the occupation and the Israeli-Arab conflict in order to consolidate their positions in the Middle East in the interests of the U.S. arms manufacturers and oil magnates, to the detriment of the independence and security of the peoples.

The CC CPI alerts the peoples of the dangerous machinations of U.S. imperialism, Israeli and Arab reaction, whose aim is to prevent the establishment of an all-embracing just and lasting Middle East peace.

The joint onslaught of imperialism, Israeli and

¹⁰ UN General Assembly Resolution No. 181 in George J. Tomeh (ed.) *United Nations Resolutions on Palestine 1947-1974* (Beirut: IPS, 1975).

¹¹ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Arab reaction against the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and to setting up their own independent state is clearly discerned in the attacks against the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arabs. Official representatives of the PLO have repeatedly declared that the PLO would agree to peaceful coexistence with Israel providing Israel withdraws from all the Arab territories it occupied in June 1967, and that an independent Palestinian state is set up along with the state of Israel and that they mutually recognize each other. Therefore, whoever seeks to destroy the PLO is out to deprive the Palestinian Arabs of the possibility of setting up their own independent state along with Israel. which undermines the cause of peace and the freedom of the peoples. The statement of the new "architect" of U.S. policy Brzezinski on saying "farewell" to the PLO, the attempts of the Israeli occupation authorities and Egyptian President Sadat to appoint Palestinian "representatives" who would represent no one but themselves is simply part of the plot against an all-embracing just peace, against a final and realistic settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict and of the Palestine problem.

The CPI Central Committee condemns the revolting crime against the PLO representative in Britain, Said Hamami, 12 who fell victim to the enemies of the Palestinian Arabs, the enemies of peace and the independence of the peoples. The CC CPI expresses solidarity with the just struggle of the Palestine Arabs against the occupation, for a just and lasting Middle East peace, and creation of a Palestine state along with the State of Israel.

The Central Committee reaffirms that peace between Israel and the Arab countries is possible. All the Arab countries neighboring on Israel, as well as the PLO have repeatedly declared their readiness for peace on a basis that is just for everyone concerned. A just and lasting Middle East peace can be attained on the following basis:

- —Israel's withdrawal to the borders existing prior to June 5, 1967;
- —respect for the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination and creation of an independent state along with the State of Israel, a just solution to the problem of the Palestinian

refugees in accordance with UN decisions;

- —respect for the independence and territorial sovereignty of the State of Israel and the Arab states:
- —ensuring Israel along with other states equal shipping rights in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran.

The peace agreements must be in the form of a treaty.

Effective international guarantees must be established with the participation of the United States of America, the Soviet Union and other countries to ensure implementation of these agreements.

Demilitarized zones must be established and other measures of security must be determined on a mutual basis.

The way to achieve a just and stable peace has been and remains resumption of the work of the Geneva peace conference with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the PLO, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and United States of America.

The Central Committee highly assesses the principled and consistent peace policy of the Soviet Union in relation to the Middle East. The Soviet Union is exerting enormous efforts to prevent the outbreak of a new war in the region, and to establish a just and stable peace that would ensure respect for the legitimate rights of all peoples and states of our region, including Israel and the Arab people of Palestine.

The New Year eve statement by Leonid Brezhnev, President of the USSR Supreme Soviet and CC CPSU General Secretary, on the Middle East reflects a genuine concern for peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Brezhnev's words to the effect that peace in the Middle East must be built on the basis of "the right to an independent existence and security for all states directly involved in the conflict; both the Arab states bordering on Israel and the State of Israel itself" demolishes the anti-Soviet fabrications spread by Israel, Egypt and the anti-Soviet propaganda centers in the USA and other countries.

The Soviet Union's insistence that within the framework of the peace agreement Israel must withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, that it must respect the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and to setting up an

¹² Said Hamami was assassinated in London on January 4, 1978.

independent state is a just demand that fully corresponds to the relevent UN decisions, the proposals of the champions of peace in Israel and throughout the world.

The CPI Central Committee calls on all political circles and public figures in Israel who want a just and stable peace to be vigilant, not to be deceived by the maneuvering of the Begin government, which claims to seek peace but in actual fact is working against it, advancing demands for the military and political domination of Israel over the Palestinian lands—on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—and denies the very existence of the Arab people of Palestine and their national rights.

The Begin government's decision to continue building new colonial settlements on all occupied Arab territories is an outright challenge to the Arab peoples, world public opinion and the Israeli peace forces.

The construction of new settlements in the Rafah region, Sharm al-Sheikh, on the territory of the Jordanian depression and other occupied territories reaffirms that all the Begin government's talk about peace is simply designed to disguise the policy of annexation and war.

Peace is possible. To achieve it a fundamental change in official Israeli policy is required. First of all, it is essential to recognize the Arab people of Palestine and their right to self-determination and to setting up their own independent national state along with Israel. The Israeli peace forces can advance the cause of peace by joint struggle against the policy of the Begin government, by fighting for a just peace for everyone that is based on political realism, and for reconvening the Geneva peace conference. It is the only way leading to an all-embracing just and stable peace in the interests of all peoples of the region and throughout the world.

54

Press conference statements by US President Carter affirming that there are no differences between his position and that of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)¹³

January 6, 1978

I believe that we made some progress in the Middle East. So far as I know, there are no differences that separate us from Sadat, for instance. We reemphasized the same basic principles that we proposed 6 or 8 months ago to the Arab and the Israeli leaders. In this respect, the trip was successful.

A. I read the news reports after my statement at Aswan, and Begin expressed approval of what I said. There is a fairly good agreement between Begin and Sadat on matters concerning the definition of peace.

Sadat told me that when he met in April with me in Washington and I outlined the three basic principles, one was complete peace between Egypt and Israel—open borders, diplomatic recognition, ambassadorial exchange, free trade, tourist and student and cultural exchanges. And he told me it would never happen in his lifetime, which he did—he told me that in April.

He told me the other morning in Aswan that he was completely wrong, that not only was he well accepted in Israel but he was a hero when he came back to Egypt, that when the Israeli negotiators came to Cairo, that they were emembraced and the Egyptians wept. And he said to me, "My people were far ahead of me, and what you proposed in April that I thought was never possible has already proven to be possible." That's one aspect.

The withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank, with minor exceptions on the western boundary, is a principle that we espoused back in February or March publicly. And I think this is still an acceptable approach to the Arabs, although publicly I wouldn't expect them to

¹³ The press conference took place aboard Air Force One on return from a visit to Europe, South Asia and the Middle East. Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVIII, 2011 (February 1978), pp. 17–19.

espouse it now because it violates, in effect, the statements in Rabat.¹⁴ They are able and, obviously, willing to speak for themselves. But this is something we've been very clear on.

The other question, the resolution of the Palestinian problem, I think, can be resolved with an interim solution for a joint administration. I don't want to be definitive about it, but possibilities including Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Palestinians, perhaps the United Nations for a period of time, specifically outlined ahead of time, and then the right of the Palestinians to decide their own future between whether they should continue that kind of administration or affiliate with Jordan—those are the kinds of principles that we have described very clearly and in writing beginning 8 months ago.

The details are going to be a problem. But on those expressions of principle, I don't know of any differences that separate me and Sadat.

Q, Do you call that self-determination?

A. Yes, I don't think it's—I have never thought and do not think that it's advisable for us, for the Middle Eastern countries, or for the world to have an independent Palestinian nation located between Israel and Jordan. I think they would be a target of subversion. I think there would be a concentrated influence, perhaps, exerted there by some of the more radical other leaders of the world. And I think that that Palestinian entity or homeland ought to be tied in at the least in a very strong federation or confederation with Jordan.

But now I want to say that's our preference. And if Israel and Jordan and the Palestinians and Egypt should work out something different, we would not object. But that's our position. And we made it very clear from the very beginning of my Administration to the Israelis and the Arabs that that's our preference.

Q. Can you be more specific—maybe you don't want to be—on what you mean when you say Palestinians have the right to participate in their own self-determination?

A. I don't really want to spell out in any more detail what the procedure ought to be. Dayan

and Kamel will be meeting in Jerusalem on the 15th of January. Cy Vance will be there. We'll offer our good offices.

My own preference is that the Israelis and Egyptians negotiate that interim procedure with a final referendum themselves. We'll try to find some compromise between them. I think if we can evolve an acceptable set of principles, then it would be much easier for King Hussein and, perhaps later on, the Syrians to join in the discussions. I did not try to convince Hussein to participate now.

I feel and he feels also that Sadat is adequately representing the Arab position. And I think Sadat, in an almost unique way, not only has the trust of his own people and the rest of the world but also, to a substantial degree, the trust of the Israeli citizens.

All of us feel for now, until Sadat specifically requests it, that Hussein should stay out of the direct negotiations. The Shah will be supportive, the Saudis were very encouraging about the future, and Hussein, and we agree completely.

And so, I think that the present posture is a good one. But exactly how the vote should be handled or when or what the options might be offered to the Palestinians, I don't want to say. I don't know.

- Q, Can I also ask you, do you think that as a result of your visit there, that Sadat's position with the hard-line critics of the Arab world has been improved and that he's strengthened his hand as a result of this?
- A. I don't think I would be violating any confidence to say that all the Arab leaders with whom I met said they support Sadat unequivocally. Now, the feeling of Syria is something that I can't assess. I didn't happen to talk to Asad lately, but the feeling of Iraq and Libya and the more radical Arabs is obvious. They don't want peace to prevail. They don't want a settlement to be reached. They don't want the Geneva conference to be concluded. And many of them still have as a unique purpose the destruction of Israel.

I don't think that Asad or King Hussein or Sadat or the Saudis—the ones with whom I've talked—I don't think any of them feel that way. I think they all are perfectly willing to accept Israel now as a permanent entity in the Middle East, living in peace.

. . .

¹⁴ See docs. 302, 303, 307-309 in International Documents on Palestine 1974, and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Press interview statements by US National Security Advisor Brzezinski discussing the US position towards the Palestinians, the issue of resettling the Palestinian refugees and the need for a regional solution of this problem¹⁵

Washington, January 8, 1978

- Q. Mr. Brzezinski, President Carter says there is an identity of views between the United States and the government of Egypt; President Sadat says almost the same thing about an identity of views. Is there a similar identity of views, for lack of a better word, with Prime Minister Begin and the government of Israel?
- A. Yes, I think so. I think what they're talking about, essentially, is an identity of views regarding the broad outlines of an eventual accommodation, and particularly an identity of views regarding the general approach towards a negotiating process.
- Q. Mr. Brzezinski, President Sadat said last week that he and the President of the United States, Mr. Carter, have agreed on the next steps to be taken. Is there a similar agreement with the government of Israel on what the steps are and how to go about proceeding?
- A. Yes, I would say essentially that is the case. These next steps are, in the main, procedural; that is to say, we expect the Secretary of State to be attending the meeting in Jerusalem, ¹⁶ which is to be held in slightly more than a week from now, and that meeting itself will address itself to the larger issues, both of substance and procedure.
- Q. Mr. Brzezinski, there are reports that Israel may expand its settlements in the Sinai. Would that be a show of lack of good faith on the part of Israel in the negotiations if that happened?
- A. Well, to be perfectly frank, I don't think necessarily it would be a sign of bad faith. I think it might be a sign of poor judgement, in the sense that the creation of such settlements at this stage, if in fact they are to be created—and there is some uncertainty on this matter—might complicate the negotiating process. I understand this issue is being considered very seriously

by the Israeli government, and I'm sure it will show both good judgement and the good faith that we traditionally expect and have had from it.

- Q. When you talked a moment ago about an identity of views on the broad principles, I assume that one of those principles has to concern the future of the Palestinian people. Are you suggesting that there is an agreement on Palestinian self-determination that Prime Minister Begin accepts?
- A. No, I said that there was an underlying agreement on the broad outlines and the basic issues involved in a settlement. That is to say today, after really one year of very intense efforts, largely by President Carter himself, the parties concerned have come to accept the notion that the central issues in the dispute, which have to be resolved, are the issues of a comprehensive peace, a binding peace, a genuine peace; secondly, the relationship between territorial arrangements and security arrangements; and thirdly, a resolution of the Palestinian issue. If you just think where we were a year ago with regard to these issues, and where we are today, the progress has been really remarkable. This has truly been a year of the Middle East, and a year of striking progress, progress which culminated, we all know, in the historic Jerusalem visit, but that progress itself has involved both substance and procedure.
- Q. Right. Now, on the question of self-determination, is it the American position now, based upon what President Carter said in his last interview, that the U.S. now supports limited self-determination for the Palestinians?
- A. The President, after his meeting in Aswan with President Sadat, a meeting which was preceded by intensive consultations with the Saudi leadership in Riyadh, with King Hussein, and the Shah in Tehran, stated that the Palestinian issue, to be resolved, has to be resolved in all of its aspects, and that arrangements have to be found to enable the Palestinian people to participate in the determination of their future. Now, we use these words very deliberately—participate in the determination of their future. Determination—they have a role to play in shaping their future. Participate means that others are involved also, and these others are, of course, Jordan and Israel.

¹⁵ Interview conducted by George Herman, Marvin Kalb and Helen Thomas and broadcast on CBS's "Face the Nation," January 8, 1978; excerpted from the text supplied, on request, by the US embassy, Beirut.

¹⁶ See doc. 60 below.

- Q, So that is a form of limited self-determination. They are involved in a process themselves but do not have total control over it.
- A. I don't want to use the word limited, because that could create a misunderstanding as to what is involved. What is involved is an effort to make it possible for the parties directly affected to participate in the determination of the arrangements that will eventually resolve the Palestinian issue. This means finding an arrangement which gives moderate Palestinians a sense of identity, an entity with which they can be associated, but also arrangements which take fully into account the legitimate interests both of Israel and of Jordan.
- Q. Dr. Brzezinski, President Carter said that Begin and Sadat agree in principle that there are no differences separating them. He said that he agrees with Sadat and so forth. So what's the problem?
- A. Well, the problem is that even as you agree in principle on the nature of the issues to be resolved, and even if you agree on the shadowy outlines of an eventual settlement, all of the difficult steps towards reaching that settlement, all of the very many specific issues to be resolved—procedural, substantive, transitional as well as permanent—are enormously complicated and very painful, and this means that there will be a complicated, complex, frequently painful negotiating process still ahead of us.
- Q. Well, does that mean that the President will get an agreement on a set of principles at the start of the political meetings which he apparently wants?
- A. It might be useful to begin that way, indeed, because if we could get a more explicit articulation of the underlying principles on which the process and the substance of the resolution will be based, this in itself will move the negotiating process forward.
- Q, But do you have a feeling that Israel will go for that?
- A. I think Israel is approaching the whole process with good will and a sense of responsibility. I know that Prime Minister Begin has talked to President Sadat about the question of a broad statement of principles. It's not easy to resolve because everyone knows that such a statement sets in motion certain things, and puts them in a certain direction. But I think we're moving that way.

- Q, Let me ask you about that, to quote you as nearly as I can, complicated, frequently painful process of negotiating still ahead of us; is that something that can be accomplished in a year? I remember how long it took us to negotiate Vietnam in Paris, and various things of that sort. Can this difficult, painful negotiation be solved in one year?
- A. I think only a fool would fix himself so precisely to a date or a time span. My guess would be—
- Q, Well, the President has said, as you know, that he hopes it will be in '78.
- A. My guess will be that '78 will mark very significant progress, perhaps the resolution of some aspects of the problem; but it's quite possible that the whole negotiating process, until the final resolution of all issues, might take us well beyond '78. And I don't think that is important in itself. If you think of this conflict, of the dimensions of the human tragedy involved, of the complications political and moral, of the last 30 years of struggle; whether its resolution now takes one year or two years is unimportant. Seventy-seven was a year of giant progress, really significant progress, and I think historians will say that this was the year which set in motion the genuine comprehensive settlement. And whether '78 or '79 is the year of the resolution ultimately is, I think, less important.
- Q. Mr. Brzezinski, you talked a moment ago about moderate Palestinians, and I'm sure that you used the term deliberately as well; and you also are quoted in a Paris Match article as saying, "and now, bye-bye PLO." Is that to suggest that in your concept at this point the PLO really has no effective role to play in the negotiations?
- A. In that Paris Match discussion—I use the word discussion advisedly—I was talking to a very good friend of mine, Marc Ullman, who is a very responsible, very serious European writer. I was recording what I was saying; he as far as I remember was not taking notes on what I was saying. What I did say was that it seemed to me that the PLO, by maintaining an intransigent position, had put itself outside of the negotiating framework, and whether in that context I then added—and so, it's bye-bye PLO—or not, I honestly don't remember. But the thrust of my remark was that the PLO took itself out of the negotiating framework. For the ultimate resolution of the

Palestinian issue, moderate Palestinians will have to be involved. Where they come from is to be determined, but what is important is that they be moderate. What does moderate mean? Moderate means that they be willing to participate in the negotiating process on the basis of the same premises as the others, and that means above all else 242¹⁷ and 338,¹⁸ in addition to whatever progress in the meantime is made.

- Q. So you don't define the PLO now as among the moderate Palestinians, do you?
- A. I don't think I should be in the business of defining anybody. They define themselves by acts and their postures. If they're willing to participate—
- Q. No, I understand, but we are quoting—we are quoting you at this point from this article—
- Q. And the President at a news conference, said a solution—
- Q. The President, in effect, said that they have ruled themselves out. And effectively, at this point, are you both not saying that the PLO is not moderate and therefore is out of this process at this time?
- A. Well, we know that the PLO is not in the process. We know that it isn't in the process because it hasn't taken a moderate position. So those are just facts; that's not a matter of us characterizing it.
- Q. Then the place to go from those facts, as you put them, is can there be a successful peace agreement in the area that neglects totally the PLO?
- A. I think a successful resolution of the Palestinian question will require the participation in it of moderate Palestinians.

Q: Only?

- A. Moderate Palestinians. Now, those moderate Palestinians can come from a variety of sources. What is important is their attitude toward the negotiating process, and towards their acceptance of a permanent peace, that peace which is comprehensive and binding.
- Q. Dr. Brzezinski, why is it that none of the socalled peace plans take in some two million Palestinian refugees, mainly in Lebanon and so forth? What happens to them?

A. Well, when we say that the Palestinian problem has to be resolved in all of its aspects, we also take into account the reality of the refugee problem; this is a really staggering problem, in size, in the scale of human suffering, in the difficulties of its resolution. If the solution, the peace solution, entails some Palestinian entity on the West Bank and on the Gaza Strip, preferably related to Jordan, then the question of the refugees may be in part solved by that reality, namely that presumably there will be some resettlement of those who wish to return to the West Bank and the Gaza through settlement in these two areas. But when you say two millions, you immediately indicate the limitations of that solution. They cannot all be accommodated, every single one of them, on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and therefore the problem in some dimensions is also a regional one, and I would assume that one of the elements of a settlement eventually will be also some regional development plan, a plan which will make it easier for the growing and expanding economies of the countries directly affected to resolve this problem which has social, human, political dimensions.

Q. On another area here—

- Q. Before you change, Marvin, let me just—Pm not quite sure I got an answer to my question before. I got a reply, but Pm not sure I got an answer to whether you think an effective peace can be worked out in the Middle East without the PLO.
- A. Well, you got an answer; may be it wasn't a satisfactory answer. As I said before, I don't think we ought to be in the position of characterizing whether the PLO is or is not included in the process. Ability to relate oneself to a negotiating process depends on the parties concerned, on their state of mind, on their willingness to accept certain binding prescription that everyone else accepts. It's a matter of attitude and relationship; it's not a matter of us defining it.
- Q, But if the PLO objects, and rejects whatever peace agreement may be reached, will there be peace, or will there still be a state of war?
- A. If they reject a reasonable arrangement that's fair, that's decent, that's responsive to the political, strategic, and I hasten to add, moral dimensions to the problem, then I'm sure moderate Palestinians will accept it.

¹⁷ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹⁸ Doc. 34 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

- Q, Well, who's doing the judging? You're going to judge whether it's fair, and so forth.
- A. No, I think that [for] it to be fair it will have to be accepted, also, by moderate Palestinians, and there are a great many moderate Palestinians who realize—
- Q, Well, where are they? Why haven't they participated so far?
- A. They are on the West Bank. Because at this stage, arrangements haven't really been made for their participation, and the issue hasn't yet come to a head, but it is inconceivable to me that a large group of people who have suffered so much, who have so much at stake in this issue, would deliberately and totally abstract themselves from a negotiating process, the purpose of which, in part, is the creation of conditions that are more responsive to the legitimate rights that they have, which we respect, and which we have explicitly recognized.
- Q, Is one of their legitimate rights to set up an independent home?
- A. I don't think the United States, and, after all, I'm an official of the U.S. Government, ought to be in a position of stating precisely what is the nature of all of their political rights, but the President has stated that we feel that one element of the resolution of the issue ought to be an arrangement whereby the Palestinians have a homeland, or an entity the full political complexion of which, and its relationships to other states, is to be defined in the negotiating process.
- Q. That's true sir, but the legitimate rights—if there is agreement between the President and Mr. Sadat, and you've talked about legitimate rights, isn't there an obligation to define these rights? Implicitly, all of the Arab leaders have said, that among the legitimate rights, is the right to set up an independent home, and that includes President Sadat.
- A. They have stated it, and to some extent, this is both a matter of genuine commitment on their part, to some extent, and they also need a beginning on the negotiating process. We are not a directly affected party. We are, after all, not a belligerent in the Middle Eastern issue, and therefore, it doesn't behoove us, at this stage, to be going on record precisely on one particular aspect of the many issues that will be negotiated. If you ask me this, then why shouldn't someone

ask me also, what is our view precisely on what ought to be the territorial lines?

Q, What is our view?

A. Well, we have stated it in general terms—namely, that we believe that there should be a return from territories occupied in '67; more, to mutually accept it and secure frontiers.

Q. Including East Jerusalem?

A. Again, that's an issue for which arrangements will have to be found. As we all know, this is an issue which is not just strategical-political. It is a deeply emotional religious issue, but with good will I think we will find a solution, whereby the city is undivided—the city is undivided, accessible to all, with proper arrangements, not only for religious, but political sensitivities of the parties concerned.

Q, A city undivided—meaning a unified city?

- A. A city undivided means a city not partitioned, not partitioned physically, but a city in which, perhaps, arrangements can be contrived that are responsive to the religious and political sensitivities of the parties concerned.
- Q. Do you believe that Prime Minister Begin has the domestic political strength, at this point, to make significant further concessions—and I ask that because one of his closest advisers, Schmuel Katz, recently resigned on the assumption that Mr. Begin has been going too far?
- A. You know, at one time General De Gaulle had some of his very close friends disassociate themselves from him, too. I find in Begin a remarkable combination of qualities. He's definitely a deeply committed person, and to him Samaria and Judea are living realities of the Jewish tradition. I find in him the embodiment of the suffering of his people. I find in him the qualities of a courageous fighter, and I sense in him also the makings of a statesman, a person who seized the opportunity to create permanent peace for his people, and that opportunity may in some respects be in conflict with these other qualities which I've mentioned—in addition, in conflict with the views of some of his associates. I have the feeling that Begin will be an historical figure, and, just as Sadat rose above the animosities and the smallness of some of his associates, so will Begin.

Q. There is a report in the Washington Post today that Egypt may go for a separate peace, with the details to be worked out later on, on other negotiating points. Is that your reading?

A. I don't think so, and in the course of the presidential trip, we had ample opportunity to discuss this problem, not only with President Sadat, not only with the other Middle Eastern leaders, but also with President Giscard, for example, and the prevailing view is that President Sadat is generally committed to his getting a comprehensive peace settlement, that he sees here an historical opportunity to resolve a conflict which has been destructive for the Middle East as a whole, and from which it would be difficult for Egypt to extract itself alone. Thus, I'm inclined to feel that both Sadat and Begin are genuine in seeking a way towards a solution that will be genuinely comprehensive.

56

Speech by Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR expressing continuing Soviet support for a Geneva conference and accusing Egypt of dividing the Arab world¹⁹

Moscow, January 12, 1978

We regard the arrival in Moscow of Comrade Boumedienne, President of Algeria and chairman of the Revolutionary Council, as continuing the fruitful political contacts between the leaders of our states.

Permit me, Comrade President, to welcome you warmly on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership and personally on behalf of Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the central committee of our Communist Party and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Soviet-Algerian friendship originated and became the firm foundation of our fruitful co-operation for the simple reason that the peoples of the Soviet Union and Algeria are united by profound fraternal solidarity in the struggle against imperialism and for peace, national independence and social progress.

Comrade Boumedienne, you have just made a

big tour of countries of the Middle East and have had the opportunity to make a first-hand study of the situation in the area which is causing growing concern among all progressive and peace-loving forces. As is known, the present worsening of the situation is caused by the fact the Egyptian leaders have taken the path of one-sided concessions to Israel and of separate deals with Israel without regard for general Arab interests. The so-called "peace-making" actions of Egypt and Israel are directed, first of all, at deepening the split in the Arab world and at preventing a genuine settlement, which must be an all-embracing and just one. Instead of searching for paths leading to such a settlement, Israel and those who are backing it are aiming at retaining the maximum of what was seized as a result of the aggressive war of 1967. It is clear that if one is interested in the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East, if one cherishes the interests of the peoples and their honour and dignity, one cannot take to the path of grovelling before the aggressor.

It is quite natural that the peoples of the Arab countries, such states as Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Democratic Yemen, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization, have not agreed with President Anwar Sadat's capitulatory policy and have resolutely condemned it.

As for the Soviet Union, our principled position on questions of a Middle East settlement was recently reaffirmed by Leonid Brezhnev. It proceeds from the belief that a lasting and all-embracing settlement in the Middle East can be achieved only with the participation of all the sides concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.

We are convinced that only a just all-embracing settlement can guarantee peace in the Middle East, a peace which will be really lasting and which does not become a brittle armistice.

It is impossible to reach such a goal by separate deals. The Soviet Union therefore continues to support the idea of calling the Geneva Peace Conference, but in conditions that would preclude its being turned into a screen to cover up separate deals to the detriment of the vital interests of the Arabs and the interests of maintaining a lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union will continue to take the side of Algeria and other progressive Arab states which are waging a consistent struggle against

¹⁹ Made at a dinner in honour of President Boumedienne of Algeria; English text, Soviet News (London), no. 5914 (January 17, 1978), p. 19.

imperialism and capitulatory actions and for a lasting peace and a better future for the peoples.

The Soviet Union is on the side of all the peoples of Africa fighting for their national liberation and against colonialism, racialism and apartheid. We express our solidarity with the oppressed African peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa who are waging a just struggle for their liberation, and we are confident that the day is not far off when they will gain their freedom.

The intrigues of imperialist and other reactionary forces in Africa, as throughout the world, have always been directed at setting one people against another and at weakening the strength of their liberation struggle. We see the result of this policy also in the area of the Horn of Africa, where the armed conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia has been going on already for several months. The Somali leadership, which, apparently, was tempted by the promises of certain external forces, continues to persist in its territorial claims against Ethiopia and continues military operations on its territory and refuses to withdraw its troops from there. This position of Somalia obviously conflicts with the known principles of the United Nations and the decisions of the organisation of African Unity and evokes the just concern and condemnation of most of the independent states of Africa.

The Soviet Union wants this conflict to end as soon as possible and relations between Somalia and Ethiopia to be settled at the conference table on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. We believe that the ending of hostilities and the withdrawal of Somali troops from the territory of Ethiopia are an imperative condition for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The Soviet-Algerian talks that began today show that the Soviet Union and Algeria have a common approach to all these questions, as to many other problems of the international situation. We highly value your readiness to deepen understanding between Algeria and the Soviet Union in the interests of strengthening the cause of peace and progress. We value the relations of mutual trust that have formed between the leaders of our countries and, for our part, shall do everything possible to ensure that Soviet-Algerian relations will always develop and grow in strength.

Press conference statements by Prime Minister Callaghan of Britain discussing his talks with President Sadat of Egypt²⁰

Aswan, January 13, 1978

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to hold talks with President Sadat because they come after my two meetings with Mr Begin a few weeks ago. I had contacted President Sadat by telephone; we proposed we should meet face to face. Tonight we held discussions for two hours during which we exchanged views on the latest developments in the negotiations. I would like here to repeat in President Sadat's town, in Aswan, the town of the great High Dam, that President Sadat has made gigantic strides on the right course and that his initiative in going to Jerusalem was a creative and courageous one, one that won the admiration of the world. From my talks with Mr Begin I understood that he personally shares the world's admiration for this initiative and that he responded to the initiative by drawing up fundamental proposals for peace.

After two hours of talks with President Sadat, I can say that a decisive decision is now required from Israel and from the others. I can also say that the opportunities for peace are now available to the Israeli people and the Arab people. I am convinced that the road is paved for the establishment of peace [and for solving] the Middle East problem. That was out of the question before, but now it is the duty of every one of us not to lose the opportunity. I believe that the efforts President Sadat has exerted, his meetings and the declaration of his position so very clearly, are matters which will help us in our mission for the sake of peace. I hope that the Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian sides and representatives of the PLO will participate in the talks at some stage in order to reach a comprehensive settlement.

The goal we seek is peace treaties that would lead to completely normal relations between the

²⁰ Broadcast on Cairo radio in English; partial English text, BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/ 5714/A/4-5; reprinted by permission.

states in the area either in the form of direct normal relations in this case or peace treaties that could be concluded after some time, in other cases.

Q. Can you tell us in detail the role Britain can play for the establishment of peace in the area?

A. I do not believe I can. It is a role of explanation, a role of attempting to facilitate the way, it is a helping role when difficulties appear.

Q, Last week the British Defence Secretary said that Israel must adopt a moderate stand in the light of President Sadat's initiative. What is your comment on this? Will Britain exert pressure on Israel to make it adopt a moderate position?

A. We do not exert pressure on any state. The parties must create the conditions themselves. They are aware of the importance of peace and its value as far as they are concerned. Our task is to explain and convince the parties as long as we can do so. However, we have no principal role to play. The principal role should be played by the parties, primarily Egypt and Israel. The United States will attend the political committee meetings on Monday. I am sure that Mr Vance will play a very positive role.

Q. Did you bring a letter from Begin to President Sadat, as has been rumoured here?

A. No. You know how rumours spread. I believe that President Sadat and Mr Begin are capable of contacting each other.

58

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of President Boumedienne of Algeria²¹

Moscow, January 14, 1978

Houari Boumedienne, President of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic and chairman of the Revolutionary Council, paid a friendly working visit to the Soviet Union from January 12 to 14.

During his stay in the USSR, President Houari Boumediene was accorded a warm welcome by the Soviet leaders with whom he had talks, which took place in an atmosphere of cordiality.

Taking part in the talks were:

On the Soviet side: Alexei Kosygin, member of the political bureau of the CPSU central committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mikhail Suslov, member of the political bureau and secretary of the CPSU central committee, and Andrei Gromyko, member of the political bureau of the CPSU central committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

On the Algerian side: Houari Boumediene, President of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic and chairman of the Republic's Revolutionary Council, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, member of the Revolutionary Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Draia, member of the Revolutionary Council and Minister of Transport, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Minister-Counsellor to the President, Mohammed S. Benyahya, Minister of Finance, and Abdelkrim Benmahmoud, the Ambassador of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic to the USSR.

The entire complex of traditional relations of friendship and co-operation between the USSR and Algeria, as well as prospects for their further strengthening in all fields, was considered. It was noted with satisfaction that they were fruitfully developing and extending. The mutual desire was also reaffirmed to deepen in every way Soviet-Algerian friendship, which is in accord not only with the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, but also with the cause of upholding the just struggle of the Arab peoples against the Israeli aggression and with the interests of all freedom-loving forces in their struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism.

While considering current problems of our times, the sides expressed satisfaction with a broad similarity of views on matters concerning the struggle for peace, general and complete disarmament and relaxation of international tensions, and reaffirmed their firm intention to continue to develop and deepen political cooperation.

Special attention was given to the situation in the Middle East. During an exchange of views, the Soviet side expressed great appreciation of the important role of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic in the struggle to rally the progressive forces of the Arab world on an anti-imperialist basis.

President Boumediene again reaffirmed the

 $^{^{21}}$ English text, $\it Soviet~News~(London),~no.~5914~(January~17,~1978),~p.~20.$

adherence of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic to the statement of the Tripoli Conference in December 1977.²² He emphasised the need to strengthen the Arab countries' relations with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, which constantly render help and support to the Middle East states in their just struggle against Zionism and Imperialism.

The two sides noted the importance of stepping up the just struggle of the freedom-loving Arab peoples against Zionism and imperialism now when the Middle East is living through a complex stage of its history.

The latest steps by the Egyptian government have brought about a situation which very seriously threatens the vital interests of the Arab nation and is a real and serious obstacle to a just and stable settlement of the Middle East problem.

The two sides strongly condemn those steps which constitute splitting actions aimed at undermining the unity of the Arab countries in their struggle for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and for the restoration of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Responsibility for the grave consequences of such splitting actions is borne only by their initiators.

The Soviet Union and Algeria declare their firm determination to continue to press for a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East with the participation of all the sides concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

They emphasised that a genuine and lasting peace in the area can be achieved only if Israeli troops are unconditionally, immediately and completely withdrawn from all occupied Arab territories and the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to establish a state of their own, are exercised.

The sides discussed the situation in Africa. They were in complete agreement that the imperialist powers' interference in the internal affairs of African states is aimed at restoring the old colonial order and at the same time is bringing about a serious tension endangering peace and international security. They will continue to direct their efforts towards full deliverance of the African continent from neo-colonialist and imperialist domination.

The two sides expressed concern over the

heightening of tension in the area of the Western Sahara. They declared their support for the earliest possible peaceful settlement of the Western Sahara problem through the exercise of the principle of self-determination of the people of the territory in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

The USSR and Algeria reaffirm their firm and unswerving support for the struggle of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Republic of South Africa for their freedom and national independence. The two sides condemn all manoeuvres directed towards a pseudo-settlement of the problems of the area and manoeuvres which are aimed at preserving the interests of neo-colonialism and the racialist regimes.

They express the conviction that a just solution of the problems can be achieved only through the removal of the racialist regimes and the immediate transfer of absolute power to the people of Zimbabwe represented by the Patriotic Front. They call for the immediate withdrawal of the Republic of South Africa from Namibia and for the transfer of power to the people of that country represented by SWAPO and for an end to the policy of apartheid in South Africa.

They condemn the neo-colonialist military interference in African countries, interference which is aimed at suppressing the legitimate aspirations of peoples and terminating the process of national liberation and which seriously endangers the independence of sovereign states.

The two sides expressed serious concern over the situation in the area of the Horn of Africa. In view of the Somali-Ethiopian armed conflict which is continuing there, the need was stressed for it to be settled by peaceful means on the basis of the principle of respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

The two sides emphasised that restoration of friendship and goodneighbourly relations between the countries of the Horn of Africa is in the interests of the free and independent development of all the states in the area. They condemn imperialist intrigues aimed at heightening tensions in the African continent.

The two sides, having decided to hold regular friendly meetings and to continue consultations between themselves, emphasised the importance of the Algerian-Soviet talks which took place

²² Doc. 322 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

during President Houari Boumediene's stay in the USSR.

59

Three-point agenda agreed by Egypt and Israel for the Political Committee talks in Jerusalem²³

Jerusalem, January 16, 1978

A. A declaration of principles which would govern the negotiation of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.

B. The guidelines for negotiations relating to the issues of the West Bank and Gaza (the Hebrew version says "Judea, Samaria and Gaza").

C. The elements of peace treaties between Israel and its neighbours in accordance with the principles of Security Council Resolution 242.

60

Statement by US Secretary of State Vance to the opening session of the Political Committee maintaining that a Middle East peace settlement must include a solution to the Palestine problem²⁴

Jerusalem, January 17, 1978

Let me first express to you, our host, my delegation's appreciation for the arrangements that have been made for the meetings that are opening today.

We owe a deep debt of gratitude to President Sadat and to Prime Minister Begin for their steps towards peace which have brought us to this room. We are here because of the courage and vision of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in sweeping aside the barriers that for so long separated Arabs from Israelis, barriers that

²³ English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, January 16, 1978, p. 1. Talks of the Egyptian-Israeli Military Commission took place in Cairo from January 11–13.

have caused so many wars and so much bloodshed. We are here to work to bring to fruition the task begun by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in Jerusalem and in Ismailia and in the Cairo conference, of which this committee is an outgrowth.

President Carter has sent me to represent the United States at the opening of these talks to demonstrate the importance that we attach to them and to their success. Since the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we have played an active role in the search for a settlement. Our friendships with all of the parties are warm and strong. For the meetings that begin this morning, we pledge to support the efforts of the parties to reach agreement.

The common goal of all—Egypt, Israel, the United States, and those absent today but who we hope will soon join in our efforts—is a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace. If this committee is to succeed in its goal of preparing the way for such a peace, it must come to grips with the difficult problems of substance which continue to separate the parties. As President Carter has said, we believe there are certain principles which must be observed before a just and comprehensive peace can be achieved.

First, true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to the peace. Peace means more than just the end to belligerency.

Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.

Third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.

Those of us here today bear a special and very heavy responsibility as representatives of our governments and as individuals. We must deal with and overcome many difficult problems. We will be held accountable—today by world opinion, tomorrow by history. We will not be judged lightly if we fail.

It is entirely fitting that this work be done in Jerusalem—Jerusalem, city of peace, city which has known so much strife and bloodshed, city holy to our three religions. We must carry forward

²⁴ The Political Committee consists of representatives from Israel, Egypt and the US. Text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVIII, 2011 (February 1978), p. 33. For documents relating to President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, see docs. 180–185, 187, 301 and 303–305 in *International Documents on Palestine 1977*; for Prime Minister Begin's visit to Ismailiya see docs. 199 and 200 in *ibid*.

here the work already begun. As President Carter recently suggested, the road to peace can lead through Jerusalem and Cairo ultimately to a comprehensive peace.

It is also fitting that this work should begin as Israel approaches its 30th anniversary. There could be no greater gift to the people of Israel and to the people of the Arab world than to make this anniversary the birthday of peace.

So in this place and at this time, let us strive to make a reality of the peace for which the peoples of this area have so long yearned.

61

Statement issued by the Cabinet of Israel in response to Egypt's decision to withdraw from the Political Committee talks in Jerusalem²⁵

Jerusalem, January 18, 1978

The Government of Israel notes with regret the announcement of the Egyptian government as to the sudden suspension of the negotiations within the framework of the political committee. This abrupt Egyptian announcement proved once more that the Egyptian government was under the illusion that Israel would surrender to demands that at no time were acceptable to Israel.

The Egyptians demanded of the Israel delegation the withdrawal of Israel's forces from Sinai, the Golan, Judea, Samaria and Gaza,

The Egyptian foreign minister on his arrival did not hesitate to demand that Israel transfer the Old City of Jerusalem to foreign rule, and further demanded the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territory of Eretz Yisrael, in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Such a Palestinian state would have extinguished any prospects of peace and would have created a danger to the very existence of the Jewish state.

There has never been, and there will not be, a government in Israel that would agree to such a condition.

However, the government of Israel, which strives for a real peace, has proved its willingness by presenting a peace plan that was received positively by all those who have seen it. The Israel peace plan was presented on December 17 to President Carter and to his advisers. Secretary of State Vance declared in an official communiqué that it is a notable contribution and contains a constructive approach. President Carter announced on December 28 that the Israel peace plan contains a great deal of flexibility and it is a long step forward. Former President Ford, ranking senators, including the leader of the majority in Congress, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, have all declared that it is a most constructive plan.

It is only the Egyptian government and its astonishing intransigence that sees the plan as delaying tactics and deceit, and decided in the midst of this early stage of negotiations on declarations of principles to suspend the talks. We did not put any preconditions.

We did not make any discussion on Egyptian proposals conditional on their acceptance of ours. And in all negotiations there was an exchange of proposals and counter-proposals.

Israel will continue to strive for the establishment of a permanent and just peace with her neighbours. Should the Egyptian government decide to renew the negotiations, Israel will be willing to do so.

62

Press interview statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel explaining the difference of opinion between himself and President Sadat of Egypt regarding, in particular, the future of the West Bank²⁶

Jerusalem, January 18, 1978

Q, Mr Prime Minister, what happened yesterday afternoon?

A. I don't know. We were just starting to make progress, for the first time since November. We had almost reached a first agreement. And then the order came from Cairo: No more negotiations. The Egyptian communiqué was very complicated, very far-fetched. Apparently they thought in Cairo that we were going to accept some com-

²⁵ English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1978, pp. 1–2.

²⁶ Translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Philippe Garnier-Raymond, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), no. 684 (January 23, 1978), pp. 28–29.

pletely fantastic text: our immediate withdrawal from Sinai, from Samaria, from Judaea, from Gaza. They had thought that we would say yes to what is called the "Palestinian state." Ridiculous. The Egyptian government has been cherishing a sort of illusion, a dream. Yet from the start our attitude, our proposals and our plan could not have been clearer.

- Q. The Egyptian foreign minister, Mr Kamil, made at the start a statement that was somewhat tough, but certainly very clear.
- A. Yes, yes, we were suddenly to return half of Jerusalem, we were to return Judaea and Samaria. Listen: when I came to Ismailiya did I ask President Sadat to cut Cairo in two?
- Q, I suppose that when President Sadat came to Jerusalem it was just this that was discussed?
- A. Exactly. When I told him that we were not going to let Jerusalem be divided, that we had no intention of withdrawing behind the 1967 frontiers with, among other things, the Knesset within mortar range and the lives of our women and children constantly threatened—no never again—he did not protest. Quite the contrary. The important thing is that everything was clear between Sadat and us in this respect.

Q. Did he agree?

A. I don't say that. What I say is—listen to me carefully—what I say is this: before—I am being very precise—before he came to Jerusalem, President Sadat knew that I had said: "The partition of Jerusalem and the creation of a so-called Palestinian state are unacceptable demands. We shall never accept them. Now, if President Sadat wants to come to Jerusalem to talk about it, let him come! It is his right." Just as it is the right of his foreign minister to make a crazy statement at Tel Aviv airport. But our position—our refusal to share Jerusalem—can never for a moment have been a surprise to President Sadat.

Q, I repeat my question: what happened?

A. I answer you again. It was a case of self-deception. Because I have shown our plan to President Carter, I have shown it to Cyrus Vance, I have shown it to Callaghan. What did Mr Carter say, among other things? "There is great flexibility." Well then? Had a very "flexible" plan become inflexible? Now, look at the map.

Q. Yes?

A. Our settlements up to El-Arish, look at them, look at the map, this piece of land on the coast. Now they are saying in Cairo: "Begin promised to dismantle the Jewish village, and today he refuses." They had even said "Begin has decided to burn these villages." Who do they think I am, Nero? Today I cannot quote to you what President Sadat said, but I have the minutes of our talk. And I can tell you what I said then: it is a tradition of the people of our generation never to leave the Jews in a situation where they are not protected by a system of self-defence. I have never said that these territories would be wrested from us.

Q. What was Sadat's answer?

A. Unfortunately I can't tell you. But he certainly did not reject my proposal. I'm sorry I can't quote him, but he agreed that it was a subject for discussion. I said that we would continue to settle and that we would develop these settlements.

Q. And he did not protest?

A. Not at all, not at all. On the contrary he said that we were going to set up different committees with a view to carrying out a sort of programme of friendship.

Q. Then why did he change his mind?

A. I have never said that he changed his mind. His reaction—I can't explain it rationally. People are saying: "Of course he wants to dramatise the situation." Sadat—But no. I don't want to talk about President Sadat all the time. You know, I like him very much.

Q. Still?

A. Yes, still. But from now on, if you agree, I shall say "the Egyptian government". Write "the Egyptian government,"—that will be better. Understand me: the Egyptian government probably fosters the illusion that we are going to accede to its demand and it wants to dramatise the situation. It wants to create a climate of tension. It wants to give the impression that there are pressures in Europe or America, Now you must realise that no one can exert pressure on us. As I told you, I have presented our peace plan to everyone. Now, as everyone knows, our plan includes settlement. Carter knows this. Vance knows it. Callaghan knows it. It was Callaghan who spoke of "highly constructive proposals".

Q. I return to my first question: What happened?

A. We had reached agreement on the time schedule. At the start the Egyptians presented a time schedule that we found completely unacceptable. Then we produced ours. It consisted of three points. Certain details were already in the Egyptian project. The Egyptians refused. Then came the Americans, who produced their own time-schedule. And eventually everyone agreed on the first paragraph: a declaration of principle. When the breach came, I repeat, we had made a very good start.

Q. That still does not give us the reasons for the breach. On the other hand, in an Egyptian daily eight days ago there were not only a certain number of threats, there was also a sort of plan that could be called the "Sadat plan."

A. No, no, no. There's nothing of the kind. When Sadat came to Jerusalem—this is important —he said to me: "There will never again be war, and the Egyptian army will never again pass through the Mitla Pass." But what has just been said to our military men who went to negotiate in Cairo has nothing to do with this statement of Sadat's. The Egyptians now want the zone all along this pass to be remilitarised. We, on the contrary, wanted it to be demilitarised. The demilitarisation of this zone was the best way to prevent a war. It must be clearly understood that the desert must never again be a battlefield. Therefore Sinai must never again be a parade ground. But the talks went on. This proves that negotiations must be resumed, that they will be resumed, and I am entirely optimistic about this.

Q, I still can't see the reasons for the breach.

A. Listen, my friend, the Egyptian minister came here and spent thirty hours in our country. You can't change thirty years of history in thirty hours. Patience, patience.

Q. All the same, the establishment of Jewish settlements in Samaria and Judaea constitutes a problem. How do you justify these settlements?

A. There is no reason to explain. The Jewish presence in these territories is a natural phenomenon. You don't explain what is natural.

Statement from the White House expressing hope that recent exchanges of words between Egypt and Israel have ended and quiet negotiations can begin²⁷

Washington, January 23, 1978

Secretary Vance reported this evening to the President on his trip last week to the Middle East to attend the opening sessions of the Political Committee of the Cairo conference in Jerusalem and on his visits to Greece and Turkey this past weekend.

On the Middle East, Secretary Vance described for the President the work on a declaration of principles which would govern the negotiation of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East that had begun in the Political Committee before the Egyptian delegation was withdrawn.

The Secretary expressed his judgement that, while the work of the Political Committee is temporarily suspended, the negotiating process can continue. Both the President and the Secretary have urged that discussions between Egypt and Israel in the Security Committee of the Cairo conference continue. They hope that these talks may resume soon. The President stressed that we are prepared to continue the exchanges with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat that the Secretary began last week on a declaration of principles. Assistant Secretary Atherton is staying in the Middle East to be helpful in this effort.

The President and the Secretary expressed the hope that the public exchanges of recent days are now behind us and that every effort will be made to recapture the spirit that followed recent meetings between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat and to turn full attention through quiet diplomacy to the substance of the negotiations.

²⁷ Partial text, Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2011 (February 1978), p. 39.

Speech by Prime Minister Begin of Israel to the Knesset discussing the "statement of principles" for Egypt-Israel peace negotiations²⁸

Jerusalem, January 23, 1978

The relevant passage in the transcript of the Ismailiya conference reads, I quote: "we cannot—even as we respect your dignity and your honour—we cannot leave our settlements and our civilians without self-defence. This is the resolve of our generation with all our experience behind us. We respect your principles and we ask you to respect our principle."

President Sadat's reaction to the Egyptian-Israel part of our peace proposal, including the passage I have just quoted, was, and I repeat his words: "Let me say that with this, you have made your proposal. We have to discuss it and form our proposal also through negotiation and reach results. Because as you stated clearly, you have difficulties and we have difficulties. There are points we differ on. The proper way is to exchange proposals and discuss them. For me it is a success our meeting here whatever the differences are."

In Ismailiya, I presented to President Sadat our draft for a common Egyptian-Israel declaration of principles.

I suggested that the Egyptian delegation work out a counter-proposal, which they did. We discussed both drafts at the Ismailiya talks. We, on our part, told the Egyptians that we cannot and shall not accept two paragraphs of their draft which stated: Withdrawal of Israel from Sinai, the Golan, the West Bank and Gaza; and the achievement of a just settlement of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects on the basis of the right to self-determination.

Ultimately, the following declaration of principles was actually accepted by both delegations. I quote:

- 1. The governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and of Israel are determined to continue their effort to reach a comprehensive peace settlement in the region.
- 2. Within the framework of such a settlement, they express their willingness to negotiate peace treaties on the basis of the principles envisaged in the Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.
- 3. The two sides agreed that the establishment of the just and lasting peace requires the fulfilment of the following:
- A) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict.
- B) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure boundaries free from threats or acts of force.
- C) Guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area.
- D) Achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.
- E) Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

With regard to the question of the Palestinian Arabs, no agreement was reached. Both delegations accepted the practice of stating their respective positions. And, indeed, President Sadat, at our subsequent joint press conference, read out the relevant statement, to the effect: The position of Egypt is that in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip a Palestinian state should be established. The position of Israel is that Palestinian Arabs residing in Judea, Samaria²⁹ and the Gaza Strip should enjoy self-rule.

It was because of the differing positions on this issue that the representatives of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry stated that the agreed written declaration of principles cannot be published. However, I must emphasise that, but for this, the contents of a common declaration of principles was, in fact, agreed upon by both sides.

²⁸ Partial English text, The Jerusalem Post, January 24, 1978, p. 1.
For the Ismailiya conference, see docs. 199 and 200 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²⁹ The West Bank.

Statement by USSR Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ponomaryov discussing the US-USSR statement on the Middle East³⁰ Washington, January 26, 1978

It is well known that one of the most dangerous centres of international tension, one that creates a serious danger to the peace and security of the peoples, has existed in the area for many years. The need for a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East on a just and sound basis is widely recognised in the international community today. A legal basis exists for a settlement of the conflict. This is provided by the relevant decisions of the United Nations. A special form of international machinery has been created for achieving a settlement. This is the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, of which the Soviet Union and the United States are the co-chairmen.

The Soviet-U.S. joint statement of October 1, 1977,³¹ was an important positive step toward a settlement. In my opinion, the significance of this statement consisted in the fact that the USSR and the USA, being co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, agreed upon principles on the basis of which this conference could be called and could successfully accomplish its work. The statement also set a time limit for calling the conference—not later than December 1977. But this positive process was interrupted. And now the situation in the Middle East has deteriorated sharply.

66

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Indonesia of Vice-President Doronjski of Yugoslavia (excerpts)³²

Djakarta, January 27, 1978

At the invitation of the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, Hamengkubovono, the Vice-President of the Presidency of S.F.R. Yugoslavia, Stevan Doronjski paid an official and friendly visit to the Republic of Indonesia from January 23 to 27, this year.

Reviewing the situation in the Middle East, the two sides reiterated their stand that a lasting and just settlement to this crisis must be based on the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war, the realization of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to an independent state while also ensuring the existence, security and independence of all countries in the region. It was also stressed, in this connection, that the Palestine question was the key to a lasting solution of the crisis in the Middle East.

67

Press interview statements by Labour Party member Eban of Israel outlining what he considers to be an acceptable formula on the Palestine question³³

Late January, 1978

- Q. What would you consider to be an "acceptable formula" on the Palestine question?
- A. The Palestinians do not want the autonomy offered them by Mr Begin because it is not in accord with their national aspirations. Mr Begin does not want self-determination, at the end of which he sees the Palestinian state springing up. Therefore what is required is a formula which will enable the Israelis to say: this does not necessarily lead to a Palestinian state and the Palestinians to see it as offering the possibility of transition to a Palestinian state. Resolution 242, which sets out the idea that the territory of others must not be acquired by force, but does not clearly say that Israel must withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967, is an excellent example of what I may call creative ambivalence. Creative because it creates the possibility of negotiating, of advancing towards a peace settlement.

³⁰ Made before the US House of Representatives; excerpted from the partial English text, Soviet News (London), no. 5916, (January 31, 1978), p. 46.

³¹ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

³² Excerpted from the English text, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) XXIX, 670 (March 5, 1978), pp. 25-26.

³³ Translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Victor Cygielman, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), no. 690 (January 30, 1978), p. 32.

- Q. How can this "creative ambiguity" be applied to the Palestine question?
- A. Autonomy, as a permanent solution, does not satisfy Palestinian interests. But seen as a stage it could leave the door open to later developments while at the same time depriving these possible developments of their threatening character in Israeli eyes. At the end of two or three years of Palestinian autonomy the idea of a Palestinian state will no longer appear so monstrous to the Israelis. All modern history shows that autonomy leads to the self-determination of peoples. However, I think it is also necessary to avoid making a fetish of Palestinian independence or the PLO, in the name of defending the national interests of the Palestinians. Why should not these national interests be expressed within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation? In any case, granted the strength of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people, and the no less strong apprehensions and phobias of the Israeli people in the face of these aspirations, I think that we shall never reach a solution acceptable to all the parties concerned without a certain degree of ambivalence in the formulas proposed.

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel expressing optimism as to the progress of the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks and the possibility of eventual Jordanian participation³⁴

Jerusalem, late January, 1978

- Q. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said the other day that "serious negotiations" are continuing, despite the break-down of the Jerusalem talks. Has there been any progress?
- A. Yes. Even when the Egyptians were here, we actually negotiated through the Americans, and that's what we're doing now... There has been progress. Atherton brought an Egyptian proposal for the last and only paragraph on which there had been no agreement before the talks collapsed. We've discussed it and I think that we have reached

- a very close compromise... I hope that Sadat will accept it... If he wants to torpedo the talks, he can pick on any sentence and back away. But if he wants to continue in the same atmosphere in which we've covered 80 to 90 per cent of the draft, then the joint declaration of principles can be reached in, I would say, two weeks' time.
- Q. What will happen next? Will King Hussein of Jordan and the Palestinians join the talks?
- A. That's the big question. When the negotiations started, the Egyptians said that if we reached an agreement on principles, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian Arabs would join in.
- Q, But King Hussein has been very negative about the peace talks.
- A. There is always a conflict between what he says and what we hear from the Egyptians and Americans. They are much more optimistic.
- Q. Considering how vital it is to bring Hussein in, would you agree to give him a larger role in the autonomy plan for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?
- A. I think that what we offered is absolutely enough... At any rate, it's not up to us to change our peace plan. If Hussein doesn't like it, he has two options. Either he can come with his own ideas, and we will negotiate and come up with a compromise... or he can overcome the obstacles by agreeing on some solution which would be in force for a limited time, and then it could be reviewed. We've proposed this even for the key question of West Bank and Gaza sovereignty, because we believe that in a few years' time, attitudes in the region can change.
- Q. Has there been any American pressure on Israel to keep the talks going?
- A. No. The Americans are very active, very efficient, very powerful, and their role is very constructive. Without them, I don't think that we could have gone as far as we have. But there has been no pressure on us.
- Q. Some Israelis say that Sadat is unstable. Do you agree?
- A. I have only met Sadat twice. He surely is not the same kind of stable personality as, say, Mrs. Golda Meir. In five minutes, you know exactly where you stand with her and she won't change her mind—it's yes or no and black or white, and that's it... Sadat is now moving from

³⁴ Partial text of the interview conducted by Stanley Kubic, Newsweek (New York-International edition), February 6, 1978, p. 32.

one side to another, [but] I would not say that it's impossible for us to reach an agreement with him.

- Q, If Sadat continues to demand removal of Israel's Sinai settlements, would you give them up as the price for peace?
- A. I would not. They are there, and to remove them would be a terrible mistake. If we accepted Sadat's demand, where would we be when we discuss the West Bank and the Golan Heights? ... At any rate, I don't think that the question of the Sinai settlements cannot be solved. If Jordan comes into the peace talks, and all other questions are resolved, I think we can find an agreement with the Egyptians without removing the settlements.

69

Press conference statements by US President Carter discussing the possible sale of arms to Egypt and his position on Israel's settlements in the occupied Arab lands³⁵

Washington, January 30, 1978

Q, Since I assume the subject will come up when you meet with President Sadat, could you give us a general outline of your view toward our helping Egypt acquire arms?

A. We have been, of course, facing the continuing prospect for a number of years of providing some weapons into the Mideast, heavily to Israel, also to Saudi Arabia, to Iran, and to some degree, the nonattack weapons to Egypt.

All these nations have requests to us for weapons. They've been committed to those nations to some degree by my two predecessors and reconfirmed in some instances by me.

The National Security Council will make a report to me early this week recommending from the State Department, from the Defense Department, from the national security adviser, what weapons to recommend to the Congress. After that point, the Congress will have a 30-day plus a 21-day period to respond affirmatively or not. I will decide later on this week what to recommend to the Congress.

The Egyptians have, in the past, requested F-5E fighter planes, one that is used extensively around the world for export purposes primarily, and Israel and Saudi Arabia have requested other weapons. They have some F-5's.

- Q, Do you have a clear idea now from Prime Minister Begin as to whether or not he will authorize new settlements in the West Bank and in the Sinai, and do you believe that Israel, over a period of time, ought to phase out those settlements in return for real peace?
- A. I've covered this many times. Our position on settlements in the occupied territory has been that they are illegal, that they are an obstacle to peace. When Foreign Minister Begin was over here and when Foreign Minister Dayan was here, this question arose. And my understanding of their commitment was that no new settlements would be authorized by the government, that any increase in settlers would be an expansion of existing settlements as much as possible within the aegis of the military.

The Geneva conference agreement is that civilians should not go in to settle permanently in occupied territories. I think the Israeli Government has not authorized the Shiloh settlement other than as an archeological exploration project. And I've not yet heard from Prime Minister Begin directly, but I have had information that this is a policy of the Israeli Government, that this is not an authorized settlement.

- Q, Do you have an overall view of the final borders you would like to see for Israel? Do you expect Israel to return to the 1967 borders in all aspects, especially in east Jerusalem?
- A. No, I don't have a map or a plan that ought to be the final border delineation between Israel and her neighbors. I have always operated and made my statements under the framework and within the constraints of U.N. Resolution 242, which calls for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories.

Israel intereprets this language differently, of course, from the Arab neighbors. The Arab neighbors say that Israel ought to withdraw from all occupied territories. Israel says that there's some flexibility there and that the thrust of U.N.

³⁵ Excerpted from the partial text as published by the *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVIII, 2012 (March 1978), pp. 7–8.

Resolution 242 is an exchange, in effect, for portions of the occupied territory for guaranteed peace.

The three elements that I've pursued are, one, a delineation of final borders; secondly, a feeling or conviction on the part of the Israelis that their security was preserved, which would involve both their own military strength, the delineation of the borders, and the attitude now and in the future of their neighbors.

The second question, of course, is the definition of real peace. What does peace mean? Does it simply mean a cessation of hostility or belligerency, or does it mean open borders, trade, tourism, diplomatic exchange, the location of ambassadors, and so forth?

I've taken the more definitive definition as my own preference. And the other thing, of course, is to deal in all its aspects with the Palestinian question.

But I have never tried to put forward in my own mind or to any of the Mideastern leaders a map in saying this is where the lines should be drawn.

70

Speech by Foreign Minister Minić of Yugoslavia outlining Yugoslav policy on the Middle East question and affirming that the Palestine question is the core issue to be solved in any settlement²⁵

Belgrade, January 31, 1978

During the past year our country's foreign policy strove towards the realization of the fundamental tasks and goals determined by the Assembly of the SFRY and other leading bodies in the country, which had also been endorsed at the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. These goals and tasks are well-known. The whole of our foreign political activity has been directed towards strengthening and consolidating our country's independence and

security, and making the greatest possible contribution to the safeguarding and consolidating of world peace and security, the peaceful settlement of pressing international problems, the promotion of equitable international cooperation on the principles of active peaceful coexistence, and building a new international political and economic order. To this end we endeavoured in particular to contribute the utmost to efforts to implement the decisions of the Fifth Conference of the Heads-of-State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo, and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Yugoslavia's foreign political activity during the past year was very dynamic, comprehensive and successful, both in developing and further promoting bilateral cooperation with many countries, and in all major international multilateral activities.

Nevertheless the disputes and conflicts that have cropped up between non-aligned countries recently concern us deeply. The conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia and the latest conflict, between Vietnam and Kampuchea, are certainly the most serious in their far-reaching repercussions. Serious too are the consequences of the disputes between non-aligned countries over the western Sahara. The disunity and disputes between the Arab countries have an especially adverse effect on the process of settling the crisis in the Middle East, because, in our opinion, unless solidarity and coordination are established between the Arab countries, and above all amongst Egypt, Syria and the PLO, which are in direct confrontation with Israel, a solution to this crisis which is acceptable to the Arab countries and the Palestinian people is unfeasible, and that means that just and lasting peace in that region is unfeasible.

Our country is following the most recent developments in the Middle East with special concern, in view of the significance these developments could have for the whole of international affairs, and especially the situation in the region our country lies in. Our principled and consistent position in all phases of the development of the Middle East crisis is very well-known. In connection with the latest situation, President Tito has on a number of occasions recently presented

³⁶ Made before the Assembly of Yugoslavia; excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXX, 669 (February 20, 1978), pp. 17,22 and 26.

Yugoslavia's very clear positions. I have also set our positions on several occasions.

The latest developments in January this year only bear out the accuracy of our assessment that a comprehensive solution to the Middle East crisis can only be an all-embracing, just and lasting solution which rests on the decisions of the United Nations, namely: Israel's withdrawal from all Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war, the realization of all the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to their own independent state, and guarantees for the full security of all the states of the region, including Israel. It is simultaneously being confirmed that the Palestinian question is the crux of the crisis in the Middle East and that a lasting solution to the crisis is unattainable without a solution to the Palestinian question which is acceptable to the Palestinian people. Such a solution to the crisis can only be reached through the equal participation of all parties concerned in the negotiations, which also subsumes the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine.

We shall continue to energetically work for the settlement of that crisis, which in fact presents the greatest threat to world peace, on the grounds mentioned. Similarly, we shall continue to give support to the convening of the Geneva Conference which alone-provided that all the countries concerned, including the PLO, take part on an equal footing and that constructive talks are conducted—can lead to a suitable solution acceptable to all the countries of the Middle East, including the Palestinian people. We consider that the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the USA and the USSR, should on their part and in conformity with their responsibilities issuing from the UN decisions, endeavour to secure the conditions for the convocation of the Geneva Conference.

71

Press release by the US Department of State listing official US objections to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories³⁷

Washington, February 1978

With reference to the allegation that the United States did not object seriously to the latest Israeli settlements, the chronology is as follows.

On January 5, 1978, Prime Minister Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan informed the U.S. Ambassador in Israel of Israeli settlement plans in the Sinai and the West Bank.

On January 6 the Administration sent a strong reply to Prime Minister Begin's and Dayan's January 5 information. The reply expressed our concern about new settlement reports, particularly those of the Sinai. This reply was in the form of a personal message from the President—dispatched from Air Force One.

On January 9 Prime Minister Begin informed the President of his government's decisions concerning Israeli settlement activities in the Sinai and the authorization of four new settlements in military sites on the West Bank.

On January 10 the President sent a letter to Prime Minister Begin responding to his letter of the 9th, restating our concern about the settlements and the effect they would have on the peace process.

On January 23 a number of Gush Emunim settlers declared that a permanent civilian settlement would be erected at Shiloh.

On January 27 the President sent a short message to Prime Minister Begin regarding the Shiloh settlement and restating the U.S. position.

³⁷ Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2012 (March 1978), p. 37.

Speech by USSR Prime Minister Kosygin expressing support for a reconvened Geneva conference with full PLO participation³⁸

Moscow, February 1, 1978

We make no secret of our attitude towards the attempts being made by certain circles in the Middle East and beyond that region to replace an all-embracing settlement by separate deals. If someone reacts to this position of ours in a hostile manner, that is evidently because his conscience and intentions are far from being clean.

The Soviet Union stands for a settlement in the Middle East such as will take into account the legitimate rights of all the countries concerned.

We do not close the door to the convocation of the Geneva Conference and we stand for the resumption of the Conference on such conditions as will ensure the attainment of an all-embracing—I emphasise, all-embracing—settlement without making it a cover for separate deals, and will guarantee the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in this Conference on an equal footing. It is our profound belief that the cause of peace, justice and progress will triumph in the Arab world, too.

We cannot fail to mention today such an outstanding leader of the national liberation movement as Gamal Abdel Nasser, who played a tremendous part in asserting the national consciousness of the peoples, in strengthening their determination to become full masters of their destinies.

It is with a feeling of profound respect for this man that we have recently observed the 60th anniversary of his birth. Nasser was a great patriot who refused even to admit the possibility of capitulation. He was a staunch fighter against aggression who well understood and highly valued the importance of Arab unity and the role of cooperation with the socialist countries in the struggle of the Arabs for independence and national dignity, for freedom and social progress.

The Soviet people highly assess the progressive character of the political and socio-economic reforms that are being carried out in Democratic Yemen under the leadership of the National Front.

A great deal has been done in recent years to ensure that co-operation between the Soviet Union and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen becomes richer in content and more fruitful. We, for our part, are prepared to go further along this road, to strengthen mutual understanding and confidence between our two countries and to raise the relations between us to a still higher level. This accords with the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Democratic Yemen and serves the cause of peace in the Middle East.

73

Press interview statements by US National Security Advisor Brzezinski discussing the US role in the Middle East peace negotiating process (excerpts)³⁹

Washington, early February, 1978

Q. Let's turn to the Administration's handling of specific international issues. Did you waste a year in the search for a Mideast peace by insisting on a Geneva conference to negotiate a comprehensive settlement?

A. Let's just stand back and ask ourselves what we have accomplished in the course of this past year. And when I say "we", I really mean "we," because we pushed this forward.

Look at the position Israel—and particularly Begin—has today on a number of issues, and compare it to a year ago. Look at the position today of the Arabs, notably the Egyptians, on a number of issues, and compare it with what they were saying a year ago—1977 was a year of really remarkable progress. That progress would not have taken place if the U.S. had not generated the momentum. And I think if we can keep this process moving forward, we will make '78 a constructive year.

Q. Now that a Geneva conference has been bypassed

³⁸ Made at a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Ali Nasir Muhammad of South Yemen; excerpted from the partial English text, Soviet News (London), no. 5917 (February 7, 1978), pp. 52, 56.

³⁹ Excerpted from the text of the interview, U.S. News and World Report (Washington) February 13, 1978, pp. 28-32; copyright © 1978 U.S. News and World Report Inc.

by the Egyptian-Israeli talks, what role do you see for the U.S.?

A. A few weeks ago, some were cooing and crowing about the degree to which we had been forced out of the play. Now everyone is saying how important it is for us to get in and help. We have never been quite as much out of it as it was said; nor are we as decisive a factor as some of the participants now allege. We are a necessary and a continuing element in the process.

What we have tried to avoid is the impression that we will seek to impose a settlement. That would not be workable; it wouldn't be stable.

Q. Where do we go from here?

A. I would hope that we can, No. 1, reactivate the Sadat-Begin negotiating process, which operates in two tracks—military and political. Secondly, widen it to involve the Jordanians and moderate Palestinians, making it possible to deal constructively, at least with the future of the Sinai and the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

One mustn't assume that the stalemate which developed recently is the same thing as a dead-lock. A negotiating process such as this one is bound to have its ups and its downs.

There are going to be moments in which one or another party walks out. There are going to be moments in which one party abuses the other to an intolerable degree. There are going to be moments in which one side responds to the other by saying, "This is absolutely out of the discussion; I will never discuss it," and then later negotiates about it. This is inherent in this process, and I don't think we should overly dramatize specific incidents.

- Q. To maintain U.S. influence, will the Administration meet President Sadat's request tor military equipment?
- A. I think we'll have to give it very serious consideration. After all, what is important here is to avoid the situation in which the Egyptian military turn to Sadat and say, "You have burned your bridges with the Soviets, and now you have been left in a defenseless position." I don't think that's in our interest. I don't think that's in Israel's interest.
- Q. Why are we selling sophisticated airborne radar systems—AWACS—to Iran and the most advanced

F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia, in view of the President's commitment not to introduce sophisticated weapons into areas where they don't exist?

A. If we go for the F-15s for Saudi Arabia, we will be taking into account the level and the sophistication of the Soviet equipment in Iraq, and perhaps also in Ethiopia before too long. There is also the fact that Israel has F-15s. So it will not really mean introducing a more-sophisticated system into the region.

74

Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Vance stating that Israeli settlements in occupied territories are contrary to international law and are an obstacle to peace, and discussing the US role in Lebanon⁴⁰

Washington, February 10, 1978

- Q, Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Prime Minister Begin said in Geneva the other day that the United States' supplying arms to Egypt would be a negative development. Would you agree with that?
- A. I think that the question of arms sales in the area is a very complicated one. As you know from the outset, we have applied certain criteria with respect to the approval of arms sales. Those criteria I have outlined to you many times, and we will continue to apply those criteria in connection with the requests for arms sales which have been made to us at this time by the various parties. We have not yet reached a final decision on what we are going to do. We will be doing so shortly, and this will be announced by the President when those decisions are made.

Insofar as the specific question you asked is concerned, I think that if the criteria which we have been applying all along are applied, then it is possible to make arms sales which are not disruptive.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as President Sadat left the United States,⁴¹ he put out a statement reaffirming its commitment to Israel's security, also reading 242⁴² as requiring

⁴⁰ Partial text supplied, on request, by the US embassy, Beirut.

⁴¹ President Sadat visited the United States from February 3–8, in the course of a tour of 9 countries.

⁴² Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

withdrawal of Israeli military forces from what some people refer to as occupied Arab lands. I wondered if such a withdrawal does indeed tamper with or decrease Israel's security, and I also wonder if arms sales to Egypt would square with the American commitment to Israel's security.

A. With respect to the question of withdrawals from occupied territories, 242 is the basic document under which all of the parties have agreed that the negotiations for a Middle East settlement should be conducted. 242 refers to, specifically, withdrawal from occupied territories, and "occupied territories" includes all fronts involved in the 1967 conflict.

Insofar as security matters are concerned, I believe that they can be taken care of within the framework of 242 and within the framework of withdrawal from occupied territories.

As to your second question, as I indicated a moment ago, I believe that arms sales to the various parties have to be taken a look at in the overall balance in the region, and that therefore the decision whether or not to make a particular arms sale, including that to Egypt, has to be looked at from the overall standpoint...

- Q, Mr. Secretary, the Administration has said frequently that it is committed to the territorial integrity of Lebanon and supports the building of the Lebanese Army. What is the present American role right now in the Lebanese conflict between the Syrian troops and the Lebanese troops?
- A. The American role in Lebanon is that we continue to support the government of Lebanon. We support its territorial integrity. We support its independence. We are continuing to assist in the supplying of arms for the building of a Lebanese Army. That program continues as it was outlined and discussed with the Lebanese authorities at that time, and the plans are to continue along those same guidelines.
- Q. The Syrians entered Lebanon, sir. The United States accepted the Syrians as a peacekeeping force in Lebanon, and right now they have violated that truce.
- A. The situation in Lebanon is indeed a very difficult and troublesome one at this point. Fighting has broken out again in the North as well as sporadic fighting in the South. It is a matter which we are watching with the greatest of care and caution. We are in close touch with the parties involved and are continuing to provide the kind

of services that we have in the past, working with various parties trying to help in damping down the conflict...

Yes?

- Q. When the United States expresses concern, as it did the other day in the communiqué from the White House over Israeli settlement activity, does this mean literally that you want to see the bulldozers halted in the Sinai settlements and the amateur archeologists sent home from Shiloh? And I have a follow-up.
- A. We believe that the settlement activity, including the construction and the new activities that are concerned, does create an obstacle to peace, and we believe that peace will be fostered if this is stopped.
- Q, And likewise, should the archeologists be sent home from Shiloh, in your view?
- A. If indeed this is merely archeological, that would be one thing. It is not clear that that is the case.
- Q. Mr. Secretary, the follow-up is: after your talks with Mr. Sadat are you now in a position as the mediator in the Middle East dispute, to tell the Israelis that further settlement activity could cause a breakdown in the peace talks?
- A. I don't want to characterize it in the terms which you have set forth.

Let me say again, however, that I do believe it creates an obstacle to peace and that this must be faced up to and dealt with in order to make progress in the talks...

Q. Mr. Secretary, for most of this week the Administration has been giving briefings to members of the American Jewish Community, to members of Congress who are known to be sympathetic to Israel's cause.

The question is really: what is it you would like these people to say to Mr. Begin? Or what will you be saying to Mr. Begin in coming weeks? What is it that Israel could do particularly to contribute to the peace efforts?

On the Sinai, for instance, would you like Israel to agree that the settlements would be disbanded over a period of time? On the West Bank, what is it that the Administration is looking for?

A. Let me take both parts of your question and answer them in the following fashion:

We have been talking to various members of Congress and various individuals here in the United States to bring them up to date on what has taken place during the talks with President Sadat, so that they can understand the actual condition of the negotiations at this point and the obstacles and problems that remain, in order to make continuing progress in the talks.

We are pleased that as a result of the talks which we had with President Sadat when he was here, he has said that he will persevere in the talks and that he remains committed to peace and that the door to peace remains open.

In our discussions with the İsraelis—and I shall be meeting with Foreign Minister Dayan on the 16th, when he will be here in Washington—we will be talking about the discussions which we have had with President Sadat and what we believe in light of those discussions are the key points that have to be dealt with. They, clearly, are two in number:

One is the question of settlements.

And the other is the question of West Bank-Gaza and the intertwined Palestinian question.

What we will try and do is see if we cannot in our discussions between them and ourselves, find ways of bridging the differences, because these two problems must be overcome if we are going to make any real progress in the negotiations. I think it is possible to make progress in these areas and that is the reason why we are sending Roy Atherton back to the Middle East, following Mr. Dayan's visit here, so that he can pick up our mediating role in an active way, moving between the various capitals.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after you have discussed this, as you said, with people who aren't normally having classified clearances, could you share it a bit broadly with more people?

And specifically, would the United States like Israel to agree on the Sinai settlements, to agree to closing them down over a period of time?

And on the West Bank, where do you stand, particularly on the American formula for a temporary internationalization of the area—I gather over five years—and do you still propose some kind of referendum of that at the ending of that period?

A. First, with respect to the Sinai settlements, we have said that we believe that all of these settlements are contrary to international law and that therefore they should not exist. I think our position, therefore, is quite clear with respect to that.

This, however, is a problem that has to be resolved by the parties. They are going to have to negotiate it themselves.

Secondly, with respect to the West Bank, we have indicated previously that we believe that there should be a homeland for the Palestinians and that it should be linked with Jordan.

We have suggested to the parties for their consideration the possibility of an interim arrangement covering a period of years in which the parties would have a chance to work out all of the very complicated and intricate details which would be involved in a West Bank-Gaza-Palestinian settlement, and we still believe that a formula of that type is one which should receive the most careful and serious consideration by the parties...

- Q. Mr. Secretary, in his speech at the National Press Club on Monday, 43 President Sadat approached the subject of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Was this discussed with Mr. Sadat when he was here? And, secondly, is it your opinion now that the Middle East is a nuclear-free zone, except for those nuclear or atomic weapons which may be in the area and under the control of a known nuclear power, such as the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China and India?
- A. No, I did not discuss this matter with President Sadat. This he raised himself in connection with his discussions at the meeting to which you refer.

Infosar as what is in the area at this time, we have nothing that I can add to what has already been said on this previously.

- Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the American view of Israel's reported attempts to move closer economically to South Africa? And what influence, if any, will that have on our future relations with that country?
- A. I think that is a question that I really should not speak to and that should be answered by Israel itself. I would not necessarily accept the statement which you made as being an accurate one, but I think you ought to put that question to the Israelis and not to me.
- Q. Mr. Secretary, is the United States trying to set up a three-way summit involving Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat as was reported today in the Jerusalem Post?

⁴⁸ Doc. 219 below.

A. We have not yet suggested that. On the other hand, as we move on down the road we remain totally flexible and anything that is going to move the peace process forward we would certainly consider at this particular moment, it doesn't seem necessary to do this....

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could deal with the contributions you made to President Sadat's speech in the way of suggestions or deletions or additions.

A. All I can say is that President Sadat kindly, as a courtesy, offered to let me read his speech before he made it at the Press Club. I did read it. I did make some suggestions to him. He then made his own decisions with respect to what his speech was going to be, as he quite properly should.

75

Statement by Israel's Cabinet protesting remarks made by US Secretary of State Vance concerning the illegality of settlements in the Sinai⁴⁴

Jerusalem, February 12, 1978

The Government of Israel expresses its regret and protest over the statement made by the Secretary of State Vance at the press conference of Feb. 10, 1978.⁴⁵

The Secretary of State declared inter alia: "With respect to the Sinai settlements, we have said that we believe that all of the settlements are contrary to international law and that therefore they should not exist."

The Cabinet registers that fact that the latter part of this statement by the Secretary of State is in complete contradiction to the remarks made by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister on Dec. 16 and 17, 1977, following the Prime Minister's presentation to the President of the Israel peace plan.

In presenting this plan to the President, the Prime Minister included a specific reference to the continuous existence of the settlements within a United Nations zone and an Israeli defense contingent for their protection.

45 Doc. 74 above.

During the course of the exchange in the White House not only was no reservation whatsoever made with regard to this reference, but the plan as a whole was received with a positive reaction.

The Government of Israel stands by its view that the Israeli settlement program is in full harmony with international law and that it always has been legal, legitimate and essential.

The United States holds a different viewpoint. However, no communication was transmitted to us, even during the seven weeks after having forwarded, on Dec. 27, 1977, the full text of the peace plan in writing to the Government of the United States, that the settlements should not exist.

Immediately after having made this part of his statement, the Secretary added that: "This, however, is a problem that has to be resolved by the parties. They are going to have to negotiate it themselves."

We have here an obvious contradiction in terms between taking sides by a mediator and his advice to conduct negotiations.

With regard to the area of Eretz Israel—Judea and Samaria—the Secretary of State announced that "there should be a homeland for the Palestinians and that it should be linked to Jordan."

Whatever the theoretical assumptions and interpretations, there is absolutely no doubt that this plan would lead in reality and unavoidably to the establishment of a Palestinian state ruled by the terrorist organizations as a front-line spearhead of a potential military alignment of Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Already today this alignment has at its disposal nearly 6,000 tanks, over 1,000 fighter aircraft, and more than 4,200 heavy guns.

Israel, under such conditions, would find itself nine miles from the sea and a situation would thus be created of mortal danger to its very existence.

No political goal, whatever it be, can move Israel to place almost all of its civilian population within the range of an enemy's fire and endanger the very existence of the Jewish state.

We wish to point out that it was only after the Israeli peace plan, in both its parts, obtained the moral support of the United States that the Government decided to send its delegation, composed of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister, to Ismailia in order to

⁴⁴ Read to the press by Prime Minister Begin of Israel in English; The New York Times, February 13, 1978, p. 8. Copyright 1978 by the New York Times Company; reprinted by permission.

bring the plan to the knowledge of the Government of Egypt.

The Cabinet expresses its hope that the Government of the United States will reconsider its position in the light of the positive talks held between the President and the Prime Minister in December 1977, in connection with the Israeli peace plan.

76

Statements by US Representative Findley (Rep.) recounting his discussions with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat and revealing the text of a message sent by the latter to US President Carter via Findley⁴⁶ Washington, February 14, 1978

Mr. Speaker, during a recent study mission to the Middle East, I met with Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization. This meeting was not part of the regular schedule for the entire congressional delegation but was one which I arranged on my own initiative. It occurred the afternoon of January 5 in Damascus.

I was interested in meeting with Mr. Arafat because of the centrality of the Palestinian issue to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. A solution acceptable to the Palestinian people, to the other Arabs, and to the Israelis must be found in order for a final peace treaty to be signed. This will not be easy.

Prior to settling upon a solution to the Palestinian question, some formula for representation of the Palestinian people in the peace process must be devised. This question was supposedly settled at the Rabat Conference when the Arab States designated the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in all negotiations. There is some question today, however, whether the Arab States and some of the Palestinian people are as enthusiastic about this decision as they were in 1974. Also, the Israelis refuse to negotiate with an organization which they see as dedicated to the destruction of Israel.

Alternatives to the PLO as the legitimate rep-

resentatives for the Palestinian people are not readily apparent, however. The PLO continues to hold the allegiance of many Palestinians and remains a factor in the Middle East peace process.

I was interested in assessing firsthand the PLO as a factor in the peace process. Also, I believe that to deny to a group outlets for communication is an error. It can force them to the most extreme forms of self-expression.

Therefore, I met with Mr. Arafat to listen to what he has to say and to permit him some communication with America otherwise normally closed to him. I also wanted to interject my own concerns.

Four of the central points of discussion are listed below. I have also drawn direct quotes from my 3-hour interview with Yasir Arafat to illustrate what I interpret to be his views on issues of major importance.

First, despite continued probing, Mr. Arafat left unclear whether, once a Palestinian state were established (on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip), it would renounce all further territorial claims against Israel.

Mr. Arafat. Do you know that Israel is the only state in the United Nations which has no map? No official frontiers, no map. Why is that? All right, give me their map—You are asking me to recognize them. OK, give me their map, for me to know that this is their limit. This is very important. OK, we will live together, but give me the map. I cannot neglect this about the three million or less than three million Israelis who are living in this area. Yes, they have the right to live here now... I can't kick them out. I can't, and I am against to kick them out. That's why we had this slogan to live together in our democratic Palestinian state. This means that we don't think to kick them out... OK, so-they don't want to live together in one state. Well, give me a state too. I say to my brother Palestinians we have no choice, we have to offer a part of our country for the Israelis to live, and I'm sure maybe after 25 years, after 50 years they are obliged to combine with us, because they can't continue living in this area without combinations, without links. You can help them for twenty years more, or fifty years more but then what else, they are obliged to make their roots with the populations of this area. First with the Palestinians because we are the right and correct bridges for them for the area.

At another point in the discussion, however, Mr. Arafat seemed to indicate more forcefully that he would be willing to accept a Palestinian state which existed on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

⁴⁶ Text inserted by US Representative Findley (Rep.); Congressional Record (daily), February 14, 1978, pp. H1002-H1003.

Question. Mr. Arafat, would you settle for the West Bank and Gaza Strip? If they said tomorrow the Palestinian State could be set up in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Would you say yes to that and settle for that?

Mr. Arafat. Yes, I would.

Question. You would?

Mr. Arafat. I am fighting for it.now.

Second. Mr. Arafat opposes the Sadat peace initiative and felt that Sadat had been pushed to this undertaking by the United States. Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO Political Department, who was also present at the meeting elaborated upon these views:

When President Sadat took over, it meant dynamiting Geneva. Didn't you all agree that Geneva should be convened late in December? Why did Mr. Sadat go to Jerusalem: To give all his cards without getting anything! Recognition? Dynamiting Geneva? Most of all, does this serve Peace?

Mr. Arafat indicated his strong preference for a Geneva Conference over the Egyptian-Israeli talks. In a statement intended for President Carter, Mr. Arafat stated:

Our Palestine National Council, which is the highest legislative body in the Palestinian body politic, decided last year to participate in all political and diplomatic activities and peace talks which aim at a just peace and solution in the area. Of course this includes the Geneva Conference.

Arafat considered the United States-U.S.S.R. Joint Communiqué as providing the framework of principles for Middle East negotiations.

Third, Arafat spoke of ending the state of belligerency with Israel once a peace settlement establishing a Palestinian state were concluded, but he said he would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

Question. Would you establish normal, diplomatic relations with Israel?

Arafat. No.

Question. No? You would not?

Arafat. I am speaking frankly. No. This is a matter of sovereignty.

Question. But would you hope to have peaceful relations with Israel?

Arafat. I can't say unless I know the nature of Israel's behaviour toward me.

Question. If they would reciprocate, would you stand

ready to cooperate?

Arafat. Particularly ending the state of war, yes.

Mr. Arafat denied that the PLO used terrorism:

You are saying that terrorism is being used by the PLO. Definitely not, not by the PLO. By Palestinians, but not by the PLO.

Fourth. Mr. Arafat sets forth more clearly than before his willingness to have a U.S. peacekeeping force in a newly established state of Palestine.

Mr. Arafat. I will give you a solution for your fears. What about having U.N. forces in our next Independent State if you accept. And it will be made up of the countries who have the vetoes... I will accept for them to stay for a stated period of time. I present this as the skeleton for an idea. I propose troops from the veto-power states because these are the only troops the U.N. Secretary-General can keep under his command.

Question. For what period of time would you accept the presence of the U.N. troops? Would 10 years, or five years, be acceptable?

Mr. Arafat. If the idea is accepted in principle, then we can settle the detail of time. That can be resolved satisfactorily.

Question. There will be apprehension by many people, myself included, about an arrangement under which Soviet troops would be stationed in the Mideast, even as part of a peace-keeping force. Would you be willing that the super-powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, be excluded from the peace-keeping force?

Mr. Arafat. That again is a detail that can be settled once the general principle is accepted. I would then be glad to consider it.

Question. In that circumstance, where there would be peacekeeping forces of other nations within this territory, the new state, what type of military forces would the new state expect to have under its own command?

Mr. Arafat. As a matter of principle, the question of sovereignty of any state could not be detracted from... But if there are United Nations Peacekeeping Forces there, of course, I am not going to establish an army as large as the Soviet Union's or Israel's.

Mr. Arafat continued, stressing that the army he was most interested in for Palestine was an "army of technicians" to construct schools and hospitals.

I hope that my colleagues will find the above helpful in understanding the Palestine Liberation Organization and in assessing what the role of the PLO should be in Middle East peace negotiations.

Mr. Arafat consented to have the discussion taped. Taping was done on equipment supplied by Mr. Arafat at my request. After the discussion,

typists in Beirut supplied by the Palestine Liberation Organization transcribed from the tapes. This transcript represents, to the best of my knowledge, an accurate reading of the tapes. Mr. Arafat personally read through the transcript but did not make any alterations or even clarifications. He indicated that he wanted it to stand as it appeared on the tapes. The full transcript is available for the examination of anyone interested.

For the greater part of the 3-hour interview, Mr. Arafat spoke in English.

I came away from our lengthy discussion with the following impressions, some favorable which I shall list first:

First. Mr. Arafat sets forth more clearly than ever before his willingness to have a U.N. peace-peacekeeping force in the new state of Palestine.

Second. He states his desire to end the state of belligerency with Israel.

Third. He states his desire to pursue a moderate course, the difficulties that position poses for him, and his hope that the United States will not force him into a corner but instead help him to maintain his "moderate balance."

Fourth. Mr. Arafat demonstrated a strong desire to open a dialog with the United States. He made the trip to Damascus just for this meeting. The atmosphere was cordial and involved a minimum of rhetoric.

Fifth. As an indication of his willingness to engage in a dialog with the United States, Mr. Arafat volunteered to send a message to President Carter (no one requested the message). The message is respectful and conciliatory in tone.

Sixth. Mr. Arafat disavowed the use of terrorism and denied that the PLO resorted to terrorism. His political adviser, Farouk Kaddoumi, also present at the meeting, attributed terrorist acts to the PLO's inability to control the actions of individual Palestinians for lack of apparatus available to a state such as police or jails.

Seventh. Mr. Arafat spoke warmly of President Sadat although he was critical of Sadat's peace initiative with Israel.

Eighth. Mr. Arafat denied that he was a Communist. Indeed, he was proud of his devotion to the Moslem religion which implicitly ruled out his acceptance of communism. He noted that the Soviet Union had been very helpful and friendly to the PLO.

There were also elements of the discussion with

Mr. Arafat that were very disturbing.

First. Mr. Arafat left unclear whether once a Palestinian state was established on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip, it would renounce all further territorial claims against Israel. At one point, Mr. Arafat indicated he supported this. At a different point in the conversation, however, he said that in another 25 to 50 years he thought Israel would have to be linked to a Palestinian state. This left unclear the question of whether an independent Palestinian state, according to Mr. Arafat, would respect the integrity of Israel as a Jewish state and renounce all further territorial claims against Israel.

Second. In the context of a final peace settlement which created a Palestinian State on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, Mr. Arafat stated that his Palestinian State would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Arafat, therefore, refused to accept what must be a central principle of a peace treaty and what is critical to Israel's survival. Unlike many of the other Arab States which have indicated that they would establish full peaceful relations with Israel in the context of a final settlement on the basis of U.N. Resolution 242, Mr. Arafat refused to commit himself to this. Arafat would accept a state of nonbelligerency but would go no further.

Another point worth noting is Mr. Arafat's unwillingness to accept demilitarization of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and in Gaza. He maintains the right to arm is an attribute of a sovereign nation.

From this experience, and in light of Mr. Arafat's continuing importance in the Middle East conundrum, I am convinced the United States should take a new look at him and the organization he heads.

The executive branch should reconsider its policy under which it refuses even the most informal communication with the PLO.

Here is the text of the message Mr. Arafat dictated for President Carter:

In all modesty I would like to say that I was the first Palestinian leader to express support and confidence in you following your statement⁴⁷ on a homeland for the Palestinians.

What made my statements significant was that they were made while the Palestine National Council was in

⁴⁷ Doc. 73 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

session, where criticism of U.S. policy was at its height.

More so, because we were just witnessing the last steps of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy, and its effects on the Palestinian people. When the Joint U.S.—Soviet Statement⁴⁸ was made in October, we were the first official voice to say that it contained positive indications and we were criticized for that.

Most recently our PLO colleague in London, Said Hammami, paid with his life for these moderate positions. This is just one such example of how much it costs us to adopt moderate positions here in our Arab area.

In spite of this, our Palestine National Council, which is the highest legislative body in the Palestinian body politic, decided last year to participate in all political and diplomatic activities and peace talks which aim at a just peace solution in the area. Of course this includes the Geneva Conference. Meanwhile our Council, in the same session, decided to contact Jewish progressive and democratic forces inside and outside of Israel, and we have already done this. This moderate approach to the problem was pursued, not only at the level of the Palestinian leadership, but also among the rank-and-file of the Palestinians and we faced challenge which we manged to overcome.

Had we not been a fighting and a trustworthy leadership we would not have been able to maintain our moderate stance. This is why I feel bitter about your recent statements asserting that the PLO is completely negative and has removed itself from the negotiating process.

However we are trying to stress positive views so we see that your most recent statement made in Aswan⁴⁹ carried a slightly conciliatory tone, although you did not mention self-determination for the Palestinian people, or independence, or the PLO for that matter. I see in this statement a very slight change coming on the heels of the rapid deterioration in American policy following the positive Joint U.S.—Soviet Statement.

I most sincerely hope that you will not further push me into a corner because I would like to maintain my moderate balance. Otherwise I have nothing to lose but my Kufiyah. Television interview statements by US Secretary of State Vance discussing the proposed sale of arms to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Israel's settlements in the occupied territories and Egypt-Israel peace negotiations (excerpts)⁵⁰

Washington, February 14, 1978

MacNeil: Good evening. The Carter Administration today appeared to bow a little to the personal diplomacy of President Sadat and agreed to sell Egypt some of the jet fighters he wants, but the United States refused to supply Sadat with the most advanced fighters that it sells to Israel.

In his recent visit to Washington, the Egyptian leader argued strongly that sophisticated U.S. arms supplies made Israel inflexible in the current peace negotiations. Egypt needed the same weapons to create a better balance. Specifically, Sadat asked for F-5's, a fighter supplied to some 25 foreign countries, but not used by the U.S. Air Force

The State Department said today that we would sell Egypt the F-5's but not the more advanced planes Sadat also wanted, the F-15 and F-16, both of which we agreed to supply to Israel.

However, the aircraft decision marks a significant change of American policy to Egypt, just when relations with Israel have soured somewhat.

Tonight—new complications for American diplomacy.

Lehrer: And a conversation about those complications with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Mr. Secretary, welcome.

A. Thank you.

Lehrer: Why was the decision made to sell planes to Egypt?

A. We had outstanding for a long while requests for sales of aircraft from Israel, Egypt, and from Saudi Arabia. Some of these went back as far as a year or two in the past.

We determined that we should deal with these issues, make a decision, and move forward in this particular area. In doing so we took a look at three basic factors.

First, would these be conducive to the continuation of and progress in the peace negotiations?

⁴⁸ Doc. 160 in *ibid*.

⁴⁹ Doc. 52 above.

⁵⁰ Interview conducted by Robert MacNeil and Jim Lehrer and broadcast on PBS; excerpted from the text supplied, on request, by PBS.

Secondly, would they be consistent with the security requirements of the various countries?

Thirdly, would they be consistent with the basic military balance within the Middle East, or would they change that balance?

After a very careful examination of all of these factors, we came up with a package today which was approved by the President, which we think meets all of these various requirements.

Indeed, we believe that rather than hindering the negotiations, the decisions which have been made today will foster and be supportive of them.

Lehrer: Was Israel informed of the Egypt decision before it was announced publicly?

A. Yes, it was.

Lehrer: At a high level of communication?

A. We informed each of the governments last night.

Lehrer: What was the reaction from Israel to the Egypt decision?

A. As one might expect, the Israelis were unhappy about that decision. They have, as far as I know, made no public statement on that, but they have made no bones in advance, when there was rumor that this decision might be forthcoming, that they did not like it.

Lehrer: Well, I notice that an Israeli official testified this morning in Congress after the decision was known and said that: "The sale to Egypt would be a radical and a very significant destabilizing factor to the Middle East military situation."

A. I completely disagree with that conclusion. I don't think it is a radically destabilizing element.

One has to take a look at the situation from the standpoint of the Egyptians. The Egyptians made a decision two years or more ago in which they decided that they were going to take a certain course of action with respect to the Middle East and negotiations in the Middle East, and as a result of that they lost their principal arms supplier, which was the Soviet Union. Since then they have had to rely on the West for their requirements.

Lehrer: In these preliminary communications, as you say, Israel was told beforehand that these planes were going to be sold to Egypt.

Were you told—was the United States told then that, hey, look, we don't like it and there are going to be public

statements made? In other words, are they going to make a big deal about this?

- A. We were told that they were unhappy about this and would not like it, and we were told by the Egyptians that they were very unhappy that they wouldn't be getting everything that they were asking for.
- So, I think there is a little bit of unhappiness on each side, but we think the decisions are sound decisions.

Macneil: Why is Egypt not getting the advanced fighters that are going to Saudi Arabia and Israel? What is the logic of that difference?

A. We believe that they do not require these for their defense requirements. We believe that the F-5's will meet their defense requirements and will not upset the military balance in the area.

MacNeil: Could you describe that military balance in a little more detail?

I mean how will it not upset the balance to have Egypt with a rather obsolete air force and supplied with a plane that President Sadat himself described as a 10th-rate plane, the F-5E, when he was here in an interview? Why would it not upset the balance to have its neighbors with much more sophisticated planes?

A. Well, insofar as Egypt is concerned, it still has a number of the more advanced MIG aircraft. It has been short of spare parts, but it is making some steps now to develop its own capability, providing substitute spare parts for those which it does not have.

In addition to that, the F-5 is really a very good aircraft. It is really not a 10th-rate aircraft. It is one of the best short-range light fighters that exists, and I think that it will fill in and provide what is needed for the Egyptian air defense capability.

MacNeil: If it is such a good aircraft, why doesn't our Air Force use it?

A. Our Air Force has different requirements. There are many, many other nations around the world who do use it and think very, very highly of it.

Macneil: Why are we giving the Saudis 60 F-15's, which is regarded, I think, as the most advanced fighter in the world?

A. About three years ago a study was made of Saudi defense requirements, including their air

requirements, and it was concluded at that time that because of the fact that their Lightning aircraft, which they had gotten from Great Britain, were becoming outmoded, that they would require an advanced interceptor in the future.

Subsequently, they came to the United States and examined the various possibilities. In addition to that, a team was sent, I think in 1976, to Saudi Arabia to take a look at the situation there, and then they were offered their choice among the various interceptor-type fighter aircraft. They at that time indicated they wanted the F-15's, and since then they have stuck to that conclusion.

Sixty aircraft is not a great number of aircraft for that country and the threat which it potentially faces. It is a large country in terms of area. It has very important resources within its country. It has a small army. And yet if faces from certain of its radical neighbors a potential threat.

MacNeil: As I said at the beginning of the program, Mr. Sadat made the argument when he was here both in Congress and reportedly also in his talks with you and the President that because Israel got such sophisticated weapons it helped Israel to be inflexible in these negotiations, and he needed to balance that out with some more sophisticated arms. Do you buy that argument?

A. No, I really do not buy that argument, because I believe that providing it with the arms which are necessary to give it the capability to protect its own security gives it self-confidence, rather than giving it an overconfidence which prohibits progress in negotiation.

MacNeil: Well, should we regard this decision to sell the F-5's to Egypt as a symbolic decision to show our support for Mr. Sadat's diplomatic initiatives?

A. I think it is more than that. I think it also does meet a genuine requirement which the Egyptians have in terms of their military requirement.

Lehrer: Now all this comes, as you know, at a time when Israel is already accusing you and the Administration of taking sides on this Israeli settlements and the Sinai issue and was triggered—I don't have to tell you this of course—it was triggered by your statement Friday where you said: "these settlements are contrary to international law and, therefore, they should not exist." 51

That is your position, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Lehrer: All right. Why are they contrary to international law?

A. The Geneva Convention, the so-called Fourth Geneva Convention, considered this question and concluded that the creation of settlements in occupied territory was contrary to international law because it was occupied territory, and that is generally recognized international law.

Lehrer: And there is no question about that?

A. There is no question about that.

Lehrer: All right. When you say "should not exist," what do you mean by that?

A. What I mean is if something is illegal, then it follows that they should not exist. But I went on to point out what was going to be done about this was a matter for the parties to work out.

Lehrer: All right. Now, Prime Minister Begin, in a cabinet statement,⁵² says that this position is contrary to the position that President Carter expressed to him privately when he was here in December.

A. I really don't want to draw out this argument again. I answered it yesterday. As I indicated then, I do not believe that is correct.

Lehrer: Okay. How do misunderstandings like this happen, Mr. Secretary?

I am not asking you to draw out the argument, but just in general terms, how can something like this that is so important result in this kind of thing? The President either said this or somebody misheard it another way. Then you say another thing, and then the Israelis say this in reaction. How do things like this happen?

A. I don't know. Insofar as my statements with respect to the settlements, I have said that any number of times publicly. I have said it privately to the Israelis. There is just no question about what my position and the U.S. position has been on this, not only in this Administration, but in past administrations.

Lehrer: This is no change?
A. No change.

Lehrer: No change in any way?

A. No change.

⁵¹ Doc. 74 above.

⁵² Doc. 75 above.

Lehrer: The Israelis say that those and other settlements are necessary for their security. Do you agree with that?

A. Well, that gets into the substantive part of the argument, which I think it is inappropriate for me to comment on. I was commenting on a factual situation: namely, what the law was with respect to this, and I have expressed my views on that. I think it would be inappropriate for me to go any further at this point.

Lehrer: But that is the heart of the Israeli argument on the settlements, is it not?

A. That is the argument which is made.

Lehrer: And that is how they say, that is the reason they say they must have those settlements, right?

A. Correct.

Lehrer: Right. But you are saying that you have no opinion or you would just rather not express it?

A. I would rather not express my opinion.

MacNeil: Mr. Secretary, there seems to be a growing impression in the press in this country and perhaps in the Congress as well that simply in public relations terms President Sadat may have overtaken or be overtaking the Israelis. How does the Administration view the phenomenon of Mr. Sadat's courting of American public opinion?

A. Mr. Sadat came here to discuss with us his evaluation of the current situation, and at the same time he indicated that he wished to speak with Members of the Congress and perhaps with others in the United States to state his position. And he did so,⁵³ and I think he did so very effectively.

But the principal purpose of his coming here was not to do that, but to discuss with us what the current situation was, to review with us his objectives.

I think it was a very useful meeting, because as a result of that, we are agreed that the objective remains a comprehensive settlement. We are agreed that the door to peace remains open. We are agreed that he will pursue the process of seeking peace. I think those are all very important conclusions to have had reaffirmed, as they were at the recent meeting which we had. As a result of that we are now picking up the threads again and moving forward.

Mr. Dayan will be coming to Washington to meet with me on Thursday, when we will have a chance to discuss the subjects which we discussed with Mr. Sadat where there are still differences between the parties. Then we are sending Roy Atherton, one of my assistant secretaries, back to the Middle East to pick up with the parties and see if we can't narrow the remaining differences in the two principal areas which exist.

MacNeil: Does the Administration believe that Mr. Sadat has made inroads in American public and, through that, congressional opinion?

A. I don't know. I read the opinion polls, as I am sure all of you do. It would appear that he has made a favorable impression, by and large, among the American people. But all I can do is draw on what I read in the polls.

MacNeil: Is the U.S. Government now taking a somewhat more neutral view of Israel than it used to?

A. We have tried right from the outset to take an objective view of the situation, and we have said that we want to work with the parties to help the parties narrow the difference between them, because they must make the ultimate decision.

We have indicated, however, that we wanted to feel free to express our views where we thought the expression of our views would help in moving the peace process forward, and we have done that. We have done that in the past. We continue to do it now, and we will continue to do so in the future.

MacNeil: I guess what I meant was this: Given that this is a country in which there has been through many administrations almost automatic support for Israel's obvious right to exist, defense and everything, are we now consciously, are you now consciously tilting slightly in Egypt's favor in order to try and bolster Mr. Sadat's position and confidence to provide more equal partners in the negotiations, psychologically?

A. No. We are not tilting in favor of anybody. We are trying to act objectively, as we did in the past, and try and bridge the gaps between the parties.

MacNeil: How important, actually, does the Administration think the so-called public relations aspect of this is? I mean, for the moment, it seems to have replaced negotiations—the sort of wooing public opinion in the West. Is it important?

⁵³ For President Sadat's speech to the National Press Club, see doc. 219 below.

A. I am glad that we have been moving back toward more private, quiet negotiations, because I think it is extremely important that that be done, because there is where I believe the real progress can be made—in quiet negotiations where the parties can hammer out their differences. There is no doubt that public opinion does play some part in affecting the views in each of the countries involved, including the confrontation countries themselves, and so therefore I cannot, obviously, say that it doesn't have some effect. But I think that the real business has to be done in face-to-face negotiations.

Lehrer: Would you buy the theory of those who say it would actually make your job and that of the President and the Administration easier if U.S. public opinion did swing a little bit off its very strong pro-Israeli position, in terms of getting the parties together?

A. As far as we're concerned, I think that we have to deal with each of the parties on a straightforward, honest basis, trying to express the views of each to the other and then expressing our views as a way of bridging them, and I think that that is the function that we ought to play. I think we ought to do this regardless of what the public opinion is or is not in this country. We ought to do what is right.

Lehrer: Mr. Secretary, let me ask you, though, in very specific terms, could you have announced a year ago that you were going to sell fighter planes to Egypt and gotten away with it with American public opinion?

A. The answer is, it would have been harder, because we didn't have negotiations going. Now that we have negotiations going, which I think is a real step forward during this past year, it is easier to take that step, and it makes it proper to take that step.

Lehrer: And the public opinion is part of that, is that right?

A. It's a part of it, but I think not only is that a part of it, but I think it is important from the standpoint of the recipients that this fact is happening.

MacNeil: Meaning that Mr. Sadat has, in a sense, earned a new consideration by the U.S. Government?

A. I think meaning that all of the parties have indicated that by moving forward in the peace process, they have contributed to the peace process.

Lehrer: About the U.S. role from this point on. You went through a moment ago some of the specifics. Mr. Atherton's shuttling back and forth, et cetera, and the White House used the term yesterday—mediator, facilitator—as the U.S. role. Yet, Moshe Dayan, the man you've just mentioned, the Israeli Foreign Minister, in reacting back to your settlements statement, said, this makes his job—meaning Cyrus Vance's job—"as a mediator, it won't make it any easier for us." What does he mean by that? How do you read that kind of statement?

A. I don't know. I can tell you more clearly after I talk to Foreign Minister Dayan when he comes down on Thursday, because I'm not quite sure what he does mean about that. I see our position as being one who is a facilitator in helping to bring the parties together and in coming up with ideas that may help them bridge the differences which exist between them.

Lehrer: But the settlements problem and now the sale of the airplanes to Egypt you don't think is going to change anything in the U.S. role?

A. No, I don't.

Lehrer: Not a bit. O.K. Is there any danger, however, that no matter how you see it and how the President sees it, that if the Israelis see it differently, which is that the United States is tilting—or taking sides I believe is the expression—that the U.S. position and its role in this whole thing could change just because of the way it's perceived?

A. Sure, that is conceivable, but Prime Minister Begin said yesterday he looked forward to Mr. Atherton's coming out, he welcomed his coming, that he thought this would be a constructive and important step forward, so I think—

Lehrer: You don't see it as a problem? A. I don't.

Lehrer: You think all this will blow over? A. Yes.

MacNeil: Could we just measure where you believe we are at the moment? Do you believe that they have made good progress in the military talks between Egypt and Israel?

A. I think they have made considerable progress in the so-called military talks and that they have narrowed the issues substantially.

MacNeil: Right. Now in the political side of it how close are we to the declaration of principles that

you, together with the two sides, have been working toward?

A. We have made, I think, good progress on all but one of the principles.

Macneil: Which one is that?

A. And that is the one which deals with Gaza, the West Bank, and the intertwining Palestinian question. That is, of course, the toughest one of the principles. We knew right from the outset that that was going to be the toughest and that has proven to be the fact.

On the others, we have made substantial progress.

MacNeil: Does that mean we are sort of one principle short of the list of principles that will make up this declaration?

A. I would say essentially.

MacNeil: I see. Do you have any sense of how rapidly one can—

A. No, I don't want to guess at that, because it's tough, and they are difficult issues.

MacNeil: Did Mr. Sadat, when he was here, ask you—the United States—to come up with a peace plan, to kind of put it on the table and try and get the two sides to agree to it? It was reported that he had.

A. He indicated to us that he hoped that we would play an active role and that we would redouble our efforts to move the peace talks forward.

MacNeil: But you don't actually want to make suggestions or put down a peace plan of U.S. contrivance?

A. We don't see any need for anything like that at this time. We think what we ought to do at this point is to work with the parties to try and help them over the hump that they have in bridging the differences.

78

Press interview statements by Deputy Speaker Rognoni of the Italian Senate warning against a separate peace between Egypt and Israel and discussing other questions concerning Middle East peace⁵⁴

Mid-February, 1978

Q. [On Italy's role in the Middle East issue]

A. On certain points we act in accordance with principles based on what is known as the Western conception. But if you are referring to the Middle East, then our line is different from that of either the United States or West Germany. Our line is very close to that of France and Belgium for example. On the whole we are fully behind the resolutions of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the nine members of the Community,55 but at the same time we greatly appreciate the mediation efforts of the United States. For we too are of the opinion that in the final instance what is important is peace in the Mediterranean basin. The Administration has a major role to play with regard to the Arab-Israel dispute, but at the same time we know that the U.S. Government is not free in its decisions but is greatly influenced by the Jewish and the Zionist lobby. This factor obliges us to act as a kind of balancing element. Well, we too are a kind of lobby on this issue.

Q, When you say lobby what exactly do you mean—the group of European countries or perhaps your party, or any other organization?

A. The European states, as a group, play a role that could in a sense be defined as "lobbying". However you must know that I am also President of the Arab-Italian Friendship League, which maintains permanent ties with all the Arab states as well as the states with a pro-Arab orientation such as the Islamic states of Africa. The Arab League is currently in a difficult situation—it has been divided since Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. This hampers our activities at the moment. For example we had intended to hold an international

⁵⁴ Interview conducted by Giora Rosen; excerpted from the English translation, *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XX, 9 (February-March 1978), pp. 69-71, 76.

⁵⁵ For the statement most frequently cited as a policy indicator by EEC member states, see doc. 220 in *International Documents on Palestine 1977*.

conference at the end of January, organized jointly by the two organizations. But the conference will not take place now because of the split. Let me add that in my opinion Israel and the West have nothing whatever to gain from a split in the League. We would like to see the Arab world far more united. On this point I think I can safely say that you can take my words as spoken on behalf of the Italian government.

As to the role of my League, I would have refused to give you this interview if I did not believe that my association serves the cause of peace and furthers the interests of peace in the Middle East. And peace, as far as I am concerned, means honouring the existence of the State of Israel.

Q, Is that one of the aims of your League?

A. Not directly, but right from the start we made it clear to our Arab friends—the existence of the State of Israel is an historic and unchallengeable fact. We told them "You will be making a great mistake if you, the Arabs do not recognize Israel." Our conception, as an organization, is based on what could be called the principle of friendship. We are actually a factor for communication between the Arab states and the Italian public.

Q. How do you evaluate President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem⁵⁶ and the efforts being made today to bring about a Middle East settlement?

A. As far as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem is concerned, I have no doubt that it was an extraordinary contribution towards modifying the positions of the parties, towards at least to some extent breaking down the psychological fears connected with an encounter. But as far as continuation of the negotiations is concerned, I am very apprehensive about the possibility of a separate settlement between Israel and Egypt. In my view this would be a grave mistake, as only a global settlement could break down the tensions of so many decades. Naturally, when I say global settlement, this would include an appropriate solution to the Palestinian problem.

A separate peace could very well serve the interests of external forces, such as the Super Powers, because a separate peace means that there is no settlement and that the confrontation continues with those not included in the agree-

⁵⁶ December 19-21, 1977.

ment and this of course would include the Palestinians. The 2 Super Powers might be interested in the continuation of the confrontation, while a comprehensive settlement would in my view mean that their presence in the region would no longer be vitally needed. Let me add that an inter-Arab equilibrium is part of what I call the inter-Power equilibrium, and this is something that cannot be attained by establishing a separate peace between Israel and Egypt for example.

Q. How do you conceive of a solution to the Palestinian problem?

A. In my view the State of Israel is duty-bound to return to the '67 boundaries, and suitable security guarantees must be found. Alongside Israel, a Palestinian state should be set up on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We politicians are not prophets. I do not know what will happen in several decades from now but to begin with (perhaps it will take a long time, perhaps not) a close link with Jordan is possible, perhaps a confederation, perhaps a federation, because after all a great many Palestinians live in Jordan. We Europeans, you know, are highly conscious of processes of unification achieved by various means. But what is important and primary is the establishment of a Palestinian state. I believe that the peace proposals of the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, should include this solution. The attempt to grant autonomy or self-rule to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip seems to me to be a grave mistake, as in this way peace will never be attained. A settlement of this kind will always be the element liable to re-kindle the flames of conflict.

A great deal is being said at this time about international terrorism, terrorism in which the Palestinians play a part. This part will continue to exist, it seems to me, if I know the Palestinians correctly, if the PLO is closed down, or if its demands are not recognized. But reducing the Palestinian pressures by the establishment of such a state could be a most important factor towards eliminating this terrorism.

Q. In Israel there is a fear of the PLO, a fear based on the contents of the Palestinian Covenant, which speaks of the elimination of the State of Israel and establishment of a Palestinian secular state etc.

A. We have spoken with Arafat and the other leaders. Last September we spoke with Farouk Kaddoumi. To sum up, I could tell you that in

the past the Palestinian leaders did regard the Covenant as the unchallenged basis for their outlook, but now they maintain that only by means of the Covenant could they have brought all the organizations and all the opinions together under one roof. Today no one assumes that the State of Israel can be eliminated, and they share this view. I am referring of course to the majority—the moderate wing of the PLO.

- Q. The "Rejectionist Front" was set up even before any proposals were brought to the conference table. It was established as soon as Sadat went to Jerusalem. Mr. Begin's proposals to Sadat were presented relatively late. What the Palestinians rejected was the actual contact between Sadat and Israel. So that there is room to doubt your clear-cut statement.
- A. True. I think that the agenda of the talks between Israel and Egypt was drawn up at too fast a pace. In my view the pace should have been kept slower. But the main point relates to Israel. You reject the PLO consistently, you make no effort to approach the PLO in any way. In this way you are placing Arafat in a complex situation. Instead of helping him as a moderate figure, your attitude is one of absolute mistrust towards the group he represents. What you are doing, with this approach, is to assure the victory of George Habash.
- Q. In Israel, a Palestinian state is feared because it is regarded as a possible base for continued hostility and for a radicalization of the confrontation.
- A. I believe that if a Palestinian state was set up it would be a progressive state, a secular state by its very character, that would not under any circumstances exploit the religious factor as a political instrument, as Ghadaffi for example has done. Such a state would certainly be built on the model of Lebanon, but be far more progressive. I say this not only because I know the forces involved but also because this is a state that would arise out of a process of struggle. A state that emerges from resistance and from struggle cannot be a conservative state—it is bound to be progressive. This state will of course be small, and highly dependent on outside factors.

It will not be a radical state as one might have thought, it will undoubtedly allow for free political struggle, but this is the natural outcome of the manner in which it will be set up, and of its progressive nature.

- Q. The indications are that, in spite of your evaluations, a partial peace is a possibility. What would be your view of such a situation?
- A. It would be a possibility. I do not rule it out. A little while ago we held talks with a delegation of the Syrian Ba'ath Party visiting here. It was at the time of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, and of course that was a subject of discussion. It is my evaluation that a separate peace between Israel and Egypt could turn out be what is known as a de-facto peace, because such a peace would mean that Syria would lose its military capacity to stand up to Israel. That is why I say "de facto". But tensions of a local nature would still exist. There would also be danger to the Palestinian cause, as far as the short-term effects are concerned.
- Q. To what degree do you feel that the developments in the Middle East will have repercussions on the situation in East Africa?
- A. There is clearly a connection and clearly a reason to be concerned. This fact brings me back to the awareness that a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East will not only prevent a general flareup in our region, but it will also prevent a flareup in East Africa. We in the Arab-Italian Friendship League are aware of this connection, and thus in the beginning of February we are sending a delegation to Somalia.

79

Speech by President Brezhnev of the USSR reiterating the three basic principles for a Middle East peace and calling for a return to the Geneva conference⁵⁷

Moscow, February 21, 1978

Dear Comrade Hafez Assad,

Esteemed Syrian Friends, Comrades, we are happy to welcome Hafez Assad, general secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Syrian leaders who arrived with him, in Moscow again.

Comrade President, you are known in this

⁵⁷ Made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Asad of Syria; English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5920 (February 28, 1978), p. 79. For President Asad's speech on the same occasion see doc. 223 below.

country as a strong supporter of developing friendly relations with the Soviet Union. We also completely support the further strengthening of our friendship.

Since both sides want this, there is every reason to hope that the coming years will be marked by the further strengthening of Soviet-Syrian cooperation.

Our countries are different, each has its own eventful history, traditions and customs, but there is also a great deal that unites us, and does so reliably.

The Soviet and Syrian people equally treasure the great cause of the freedom and independence of peoples. Both our countries come out for lasting peace, for extinguishing the centres of war and imperialist aggression and for putting an end to all the vestiges of colonialism.

Is it possible to forget the many achievements that we have already made in peaceful construction and in developing joint economic action? I shall recall only the Euphrates hydroelectric power complex, which is rightly regarded as the beacon of Soviet-Syrian economic co-operation.

Soviet people hold dear and understand the aspirations of the Syrian working people. We know very well the aims of development along the road of progress set out by the leadership of friendly Syria and by the Progressive National Front, which unites the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, the Syrian Communist Party and all the democratic anti-imperialist forces of the country. And we wish the friendly people of the Syrian Arab Republic new successes along this road.

Dear Comrades, we all see very well that the more firmly the emerging states stand on their own feet, the more persistent are the attempts of the imperialists to impede their development, to turn them back and to restore the influence they have lost there.

The imperialists are seeking to split the national liberation movement and to find conciliators and capitulators in its ranks, promising them economic and financial aid. The present turn of events in the Middle East is added confirmation of this.

In effect, the Arab countries of the Middle East are now, as it were, at a fork in the road. Will the aggressor triumph or will the just cause of freedom, peace and independence of the peoples take the upper hand? This depends on their

determination and their solidarity.

There is no need to prove that our sympathies and our support are on the side of the Arab peoples.

Everybody knows the views which we consistently hold on the question of a Middle East settlement. We hold that a settlement must include:

The withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967;

Implementation of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and first of all the right to self-determination, including the creation of their own state;

The safeguarding of the independent existence of all states of the area.

It is now clear to all that by embarking on the road of separate deals with Israel, the Egyptian leadership began unilaterally to surrender one joint Arab position after another. As a result, serious damage has already been inflicted on the struggle of the Arabs to eliminate the vestiges of the Israeli aggression, and the cause of a Middle East settlement has been pushed back.

The question prompts itself, is it not time to stop the unprincipled political manoeuvres in the Middle East, manoeuvres which threaten the interests of the Arabs, and return the cause of a settlement to the channel of the Geneva Conference?

This, without doubt, would accord with the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Middle East and make a big contribution to the cause of improving the international climate.

By again outlining the already known position of the Soviet Union, I would like to emphasise once again that we pay tribute to Syria's firm and, at the same time, realistic and constructive policy in the struggle for the attainment of a really all-embracing and just Middle East settlement.

The freedom-loving peoples also have high regard for Syria's active participation in the efforts of the progressive Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization which, at recent conferences in Tripoli⁵⁸ and Algiers,⁵⁹ laid the groundwork for strengthening the front of resistance to the policy of surrender and selling out Arab interests.

⁵⁸ See docs. 319-322, and 324 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1977.

⁵⁹ See doc. 218 below.

Comrade President, I believe that the Soviet-Syrian talks that began today already provide reason to believe that we have mutual understanding on practically all questions under discussion. And this is yet another guarantee that our friendship and all-round co-operation will successfully develop further.

I propose a toast to the health of Comrade Hafez Assad, general secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, chairman of the Progressive National Front of Syria and President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

To the success of the just cause of the Arab peoples and to lasting peace in the Middle East!

To friendship and fruitful co-operation between our countries!

80

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of President Asad of Syria (excerpt)⁶⁰

Moscow, February 23, 1978

Hafiz al-Asad, Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath) and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, paid an official visit of friendship to the Soviet Union from February 20 to 23, 1978 at the head of a party and government delegation of Syria on the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers.

The sides paid particular attention to the situation in the Middle East. They condemned Israel's continued occupation of the Arab lands and its refusal to recognize the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, which results in the explosive seat of tension persisting in the area, posing a threat to peace and international security. The sides believe that separate talks between Egypt and Israel do serious damage to the interests of the Arab peoples as they are aimed at frustrating an overall Middle East settlement on a just basis. They resolutely condemn the capitulatory actions of the Egyptian government, which divide the

unity of the Arab states and are directed against the struggle of the Arab and African nations for national liberation and independence. The Soviet Union and Syria reject separate deals as a method of achieving a Middle East settlement and believe that this serves the long-time plans of Israel and the imperialist forces to frustrate the Arabs' struggle for achieving a just peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union and Syria believe that in the obtaining situation the consolidation and concerted activities of all progressive forces are particularly important. It is the sides' profound conviction that this is one of the decisive factors of the struggle for the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression, for ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet side noted in this context the positive role played by the conferences of the leaders of progressive Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tripoli in December 1977⁶¹ and in Algiers in February 1978⁶² for furthering their solidarity and unity of action in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism, and against separate deals.

The Soviet side also emphasized the important contribution made by Syria to the cause of fortifying the front of the Arab states rejecting separate deals.

The Syrian side highly appreciated the all-round support given by the Soviet Union to progressive Arab states, and reiterated the need for its participation in a Middle East settlement at all stages on the basis of the relevant UN resolutions. The sides emphasized the need for strengthening the Arabs' friendly ties with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community and declared their resolve to continue giving rebuff to any attempts at undermining Soviet-Arab friendship.

The sides expressed their firm determination to continue their joint efforts toward achieving an overall and just settlement on the basis of the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab lands occupied in 1967 and toward ensuring the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to

⁶⁰ English translation, World Marxist Review Information Bulletin (Toronto), XVI, 8 (April 30, 1978), pp. 11, 13-14.

⁶¹ See docs. 319-322 and 324 in International Documents on Palestine 1977

⁶² See doc. 218 below.

self-determination and to establishing an independent national state, and also the Palestinians' right to return to their homes in keeping with the existing UN resolutions. All the sides concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arabs, should take part in those efforts.

81

Speech by Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng of China to the National People's Congress of China outlining his country's Middle East policy (excerpt)⁶³

February 26, 1978

The Middle East question has long remained unsettled and the trouble is due to superpower support for Israeli aggression and superpower contention for hegemony in the region. The situation in the Middle East is still in a state of flux. We stand four-square behind the people of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people in their just struggle to recover lost territories and regain national rights. We are against Israeli aggression and against the contention between the Soviet Union and the United States in this part of the world. The Middle East question cannot be solved unless Israel withdraws from the occupied Arab territories and the national rights of the Palestinian people are restored. We are convinced that ultimate victory will go to the people of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people provided they set store by the general interests of their fight against the common enemy, uphold unity and persevere in struggle. China maintains good relations with most of the Arab countries and hopes to establish and develop relations with the remaining ones.

82

Speech by Foreign Minister Owen of Britain discussing his country's policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict and affirming that the Palestinians must play a role in Middle East talks⁶⁴

London, February 28, 1978

The Middle East conflict has been with us now for so many years that there is a sense of hopelessness attached to the whole negotiating process. Certainly, if effort, energy and time were ever a guarantee of success, this issue would have been resolved long ago. The central question, however, is rooted in territory and there is no more sensitive issue: the instinct for identifying one's own territory is basic.

Studies of animal behaviour and human behaviour all show that this issue is not susceptible only to logic and reason. Animals and humans fight for territory and once they have it they fight to keep it; or if they lose it, they fight to win it back. At long last, just as many of us understand why the Jews fought for Israel, so we have come to understand why the Arabs will fight for Palestine.

Britain has had now for some many years good relations with the Arab world and with Israel. We are not only proud of the fact that we have friendship with all these countries, but we have never hidden from our Arab or Israeli friends that we believe that it is of advantage to them that we have good relations with all sides. We have not, except for one or two minor lapses, pulled away from basic principles when confronted by the conflicting loyalties which anyone dealing with the Middle East faces. We have gradually come to recognize the validity of the claim by the Palestinian people to a homeland where they can return to live. We can claim to have played a major part in the actual drafting of Resolution 242,65 the keystone for all subsequent negotiation, and we have used our position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council constantly to try to seek resolutions which will maximise the area of agreement.

We have not sought to polarise the issue: we

⁶⁸ Excerpted from the English text, Peking Review, no. 10 (March 10,1978), p. 38.

⁶⁴ Made before the Interparliamentary Union on his return from the Middle East; text as published in the *Jewish Chronicle* (London) no. 5, 681 (March 10, 1978), pp. 21, 23.

⁶⁵ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

have not sought ever to lean unfairly on any one party to this dispute. At times our Israeli and Arab friends have wished that we would be more vocal, have wished that we would say more definite things. At times we have been criticised for the stances which we have taken. The legacy from Britain's past history and past involvement cannot be forgotten or disowned. Yet, in this issue more than any other, it is possible to become a prisoner of history. I have said publicly on a number of occasions that I am very sceptical about the value of what I call the language of the Middle East, where everyone watches every word and every nuance of every word and the construction of every sentence, hoping that they can interepret a particular paragraph in a particular way. Peace does not come through wording. It comes from a political commitment supported by specific detailed negotiations.

President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem⁶⁶ broke the mould of Middle East politics. Suddenly, everything had the opportunity to be different. The rigid mould formed by the resolutions of the past, the wording of the past and the statements of the past all seemed suddenly to be very stale. There seemed a moment where, with the mould broken, it might be possible to think creatively again, to come together, and out of this remarkable new situation develop a negotiated settlement that would recast the pattern and break through with new thinking to a real peace.

Sadly, I see signs now of the mould slowly being put together, the same old treasured words beginning to come back, the same positions being readopted. You can almost see the rigid structure beginning to take shape again and attitudes hardening. Now, if that happens, in my judgement, it will take us many long years before we can bring about a settlement.

It is very strongly the belief of the Government that the opportunity presented by President Sadat's courage and initiative should not be lost. Now I know there are differing views about the way forward, but one of the major things this initiative did for the world as a whole was to break through the psychological barrier which existed. It finally shattered the image of an Arab world that wished to overrun Israel. Israel's response consisted of

proposals for a phased withdrawal to the international frontier in Sinai; and for the West Bank a detailed plan for five years subject to review. It was not perfect, but it remains, in our view, a constructive response capable of providing a framework for negotiation.

There is, therefore, clearly a chance for peace. Given the history of the past 30 years, there is now a level of Arab statesmanship, from the main countries associated with the problem, of unparalleled wisdom and moderation, and that in itself creates a unique possibility of achieving peace. The image of King Hussein as a man who has been searching for peace is pretty well known to the world and has been for some years. But the combination of President Sadat, hopefully President Assad, and King Hussein coming together in the search for peace, with signs of a more moderate view emerging in parts of the liberation movements associated with the Palestinian cause, is a promising development.

To see President Sadat in Jerusalem shaking hands with Israeli politicians was a demonstration to the world that a peace settlement would not just be a piece of paper. It would not just be a treaty or a form of words, but it would actually make possible a completely new mentality, a completely new attitude; and that Israel really would be able to live at peace with its neighbours in the region. This had a profound effect on world opinion, a profound effect particularly on Jews around the world, with all supporters of the Israeli cause, and also on that great bulk of people who feel that Israel's existence has to be safeguarded. In Israel there is now a consciousness that, if this opportunity were to be lost, it might well be that world opinion would blame them for not seizing the opportunity.

Now that the initial euphoria has evaporated and the difficulties emerge, there is an understandable tendency to feel depressed and slightly disillusioned, to wonder whether the Sadat initiative is simply going to run into the sand. I do not believe that this is inevitable. I am not wildly optimistic, but I am cautiously optimistic. When, a few weeks ago, Israel and Egypt came very near to fracturing their new-found accord, they instinctively pulled back from the brink. They could have lurched over the brink. Fortunately, they have asked themselves: "Can we afford, those of us who are men of peace and want a negotiated

⁶⁶ See docs. 180-184, 301 and 303-305 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

settlement, can we afford to let that initiative fail?" We have seen, too, with the Rejectionist Front that there are people who do not want a negotiated settlement, who believe that issues can be resolved by violence, who will rejoice the day that the Sadat initiative is buried. We need a renewed resolve that the Sadat initiative must not be buried, that we must revive it, that we must build on it, and we must somehow find a way of restoring its momentum.

First, it must be done by talking privately. Yet I see merit in exploring openly the main problem areas. There are two central problems that we have to face. One is the nature of a Palestinian homeland on which there are very differing views. The Israeli position is pretty clear; it has been openly stated on a number of occasions that they are opposed to, or are extremely sceptical of, a separate Palestinian State on the West Bank. They believe, and most outside observers agree with them, that any Palestinian entity should be demilitarised. They argue that a demilitarised State is basically an unstable entity. They point to such a State's economic fragility, its geographical isolation, and small size, and they fear it would soon be taken over by radical elements. There is now in Israel a pretty overwhelming view against the creation of a separate Palestinian State.

On the other hand, there are those Palestinians who feel that they have been deprived of their country, who have championed for decades their right to return to Palestine, and who have argued for and fought with considerable Arab support for the creation of a separate Palestinian State as an individual entity. Now these two positions are going to be extremely difficult to reconcile. Around these two poles there are differing shades of emphasis.

There is, I think, a growing strand of world opinion that says that there must be a Palestinian homeland. The British Government's position was stated on January 13 by the Prime Minister while in Aswan. He said then: "It will be necessary to involve the Palestinian people in the negotiations and the implementation of a settlement and in the eventual determination of their future within a homeland of their own, taking into account the fundamental interests of the other people and States involved in the peace settlement." 67

The problem is that some argue that the actual words "self-determination" must be included, and yet others will argue that since that is taken to mean the right to choose a separate Palestinian State, this is unacceptable. I do not believe anyone would disagree with the fact that the Palestinian people have to be involved in the negotiations about their future, yet the extent of their involvement, the exact way that this particular problem will be resolved, is something that can only come about through negotiations and once again may well be an issue which will have to be postponed to resolve in some years' time.

There is a wish by some to anticipate the major problems prior to the detailed negotiations, and by others an equally understandable wish not to prejudge the negotiations. The dilemma is perfectly fair and familiar to any negotiator, but again it needs a measure of compromise and perhaps the declaration of principle can help by focusing people's attention on the future by a general orientation.

Another major problem is going to be actual security needs as seen by the Israelis, on the one hand, and territorial rights as seen by the Arab world, on the other. The Israeli Government's response to the Sadat initiative is on the table for negotiation. It has become known as the Begin plan.68 Since publication there have been numerous public statements. Despite qualifications and elaborations of that plan, the Government's view remains, as we said on December 20, that the plan, though not endorsing it, provided a constructive basis for a negotiated settlement. We took heart from the fact that it was put forward as a plan for five years, that it was not a permanent solution, that it was a plan that would allow for a transition to an eventual end which, at this stage, should be left undefined. We took heart from the fact that, for the first time for many years, the Israelis were accepting that they would have to allow the Palestinians living on the West Bank to rule themselves.

The extent of the Israeli withdrawal in the Begin plan is, of course, nowhere near as much as the Arab world wishes or, most would say, could legitimately expect. The extent of the withdrawal and the eventual pullback in the plan was greatest in Sinai. The proposals of Sinai were more straight-

⁶⁷ See doc. 57 above.

⁶⁸ See doc. 205 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

forward. They involved a transition period in which Israeli forces would pull back to a halfway position, and later all the way to the international frontier. It proposed giving back full sovereignty to Egypt, subject to certain settlements and a UN presence. Sinai was to be demilitarised in an extensive way, no Egyptian military presence beyond the Gidi and Mitla Passes, and there would be UN forces in a buffer zone along the frontier.

The Sinai proposals have been strongly criticised by Egypt because of the Israeli wish to retain settlements with their own defence forces. Looking at Sinai objectively, there are no insuperable problems over security. The Israelis argue for an Israeli-controlled or UN-controlled strip of land separating Egypt from Gaza to prevent gunrunning, as has happened before between the Bedouin tribes, and the 400,000 people in Gaza, most of whom are Palestinians. The Israelis also make a case for keeping one or two of their arifields in Sinai, although they no longer insist on an Israeli presence at Sharm el Sheikh. The airfields are felt to be necessary while a comprehensive peace settlement is outstanding, for they allow the Israeli Air Force to be dispersed and give them more air space.

The Gaza Strip could be tackled by reciprocal land exchange, hectare for hectare, or by settlements, as proposed in the Begin plan. But the Egyptians dislike settlements, seeing them as little pockets of Israel with their own defence force, and they find this difficult to square with the return of the land to their own sovereignty. The Golan Heights present peculiar problems associated with the geography of the area and at present, while Syria stands aside, it is difficult to be optimistic about any progress.

The West Bank—Judea and Samaria, as some Israelis call it—presents problems of a far greater magnitude. There is within Israel a powerful group, particularly powerful now in the makeup of the new Government, of people who are very committed to the religious connection of the Jewish faith with Judea and Samaria. This has introduced a difficult dimension into the whole question of territory and has raised questions as to the nature of any withdrawal. Britain's position was stated in 1967 in Resolution 24269 and we have not

We believe the mere possession of territory can be considerably exaggerated in the modern world. In some cases, territory itself does bring complete security. I do not therefore accept the claim that in modern warfare there are no territorial claims that can bring security. What I do believe is that we have to understand the degree to which demilitarisation, early warning signs, new technologies, listening devices, radar, satellite technology, arrangements for thinning out troops, arrangements for holding back tank formations, and a whole range of sophisticated modern military measures can build confidence and can undo some of the traditional arguments for holding territory as a security safeguard.

Demilitarisation arrangements are an essential ingredient in any Israeli withdrawal from all three of the main areas, Sinai, West Bank and Golan. It is also unrealistic, in view of the small size of Israel, to believe that the extent of demilitarisation has to be equivalent on either side. I believe that the United Nations, which has played a role for which it is not given enough credit in the Middle East, has a further role in any new agreements. I recognize the reality that the Israelis have not as much confidence in the United Nations as other nations. The possibility of external guarantees from Western countries may be of marginal help to all the parties, although I would not overemphasize their value. The Israelis in particular need to be sceptical of any security arrangement unless they themselves police and patrol it. History shows that this scepticism is unfortunately well founded.

On the other hand, the creation of settlements on the West Bank is something which Britain has always criticised and we have consistently voted for all the United Nations resolutions criticising new settlements in occupied territory. We have opposed the creation of new settlements in occupied territory. We have opposed the creation of new facts and, particularly during the process of serious negotiation, we think it very unwise, and destructive of confidence, to proceed with this in any way. The proposals put forward by the

wavered from it. We have always accepted that there may well be some legitimate Israeli security needs which will have to be taken into account in marginal adjustments of territory. But we have never conceded that that involves retaining a large area of territory.

⁶⁹ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

Israeli Government on West Bank settlements and their wish to retain their own defence capability will not be easy to negotiate. On the other hand, I fully accept the need for demilitarisation and I therefore understand why there is a need for a mechanism to ensure demilitarisation and why the Israelis will not feel satisfied by anything which will not give them a military presence and capability for ensuring that the Jordan River is sealed off to the traffic of any military equipment or personnel.

I do not believe, however, that that need is exclusively Israeli. Jordan also has an interest in maintaining an agreed demilitarised area and Jordan could have a very valuable part to play in military and other arrangements for the West Bank. If Jordan and Israel could combine in a way which would give confidence that the West Bank area would be genuinely demilitarised and stay demilitarised, the security problems and the fears, although not disappearing overnight, might gradually wither away over a phased transitional period.

An Arab view maintains that it is no use committing themselves to a transitional period until they know when and where it is going to end. They want to have some understanding of what will be the final position. They do not want to commit themselves to a transition which will then become permanent. On the other hand, if no one makes any leaps of imagination in this area, if no one takes any risks, if no one is prepared to make any movement, then there are real risks in trying to uphold the status quo.

History shows that the situation does not stay static. History has shown, in fact, in this area that there has been over the past thirty years a progressive deterioration in the situation with more, not less, territory coming under dispute. I am unhesitating in advocating the taking of steps within a transitional process even without having absolute certainty as to its outcome. Everyone will naturally strive to get as much clarification as is possible, but it will not be possible to have absolute certainty.

Waiting for ultimate, total and absolute solutions is more likely to lead to a hardening of attitudes on unilateral implementation. The crucial element in the Begin proposals was its advocacy of a transition. This ought to be built upon and given serious thought. There are a lot of elements

in the Begin proposals which are controversial and will be argued about, and rightly so: the nature of the administration, the question of a legislative authority, the existence of settlements, their security arrangements, the actual territory covered by the administrative council, and the territory excluded, particularly the Jerusalem district as opposed to the city. All these points are ones on which there are going to be legitimate differences of view and which are going to have to be negotiated about in detail.

Britain has not urged Jordan to join in these negotiations at present. We have not felt that it is our part to urge immediate acceptance of a role in those negotiations. We understand the reason for Jordan's caution, for care, and for King Hussein's wanting to see some realistic progress before he makes a commitment. We also understand why Jordan has rightly maintained close relations with all their Arab friends, not just Egypt, but also Syria, and that they, like us, attach great importance to a comprehensive settlement. There will, however, come a time—and it may come soon-when Jordan will have to make a crucial decision whether to enter the negotiating process. The decision is for them to assess. It is a very difficult judgement and no one can make it except the Jordanian Government, but without Jordanian participation it is difficult to see how there can be any resolution of the West Bank, any homeland for the Palestinians or peace in the Middle East.

It may be that if Jordan is being asked to accept arrangements which do not return to the pre-1967 situation they should be offered reciprocal arrangements to offset this, involving Arabs living in Israel and access to the Mediterranean. It is not for Britain to start laying down a blueprint of exactly what should happen. I think what our task is to do is to coax and urge and bring the two, three, four or more sides together and to support in Europe through the European Community a common view, and also to support the efforts of the United States, a close friend and ally, in their attempt to nudge, cajole, persuade people towards the necessary compromise without which no settlement can come.

The stated public positions of the differing parties are currently incompatible. Everyone, therefore, is going to have to move. What is needed is a balanced movement in which no one side is asked to pay an undue sacrifice. I believe it can be achieved, but it will, in my judgement, only be achieved when the negotiators start opening their maps and actually look at particular villages and particular lines and particular guarantees, and both chart the progress during a five-year period, and project where one can aim to go from there.

The need is to move away from general language to the particular, and specific details and safeguards which each side is going to need. That means, in my view, patient, quiet negotiations. The forum for those negotiations may well be the political and military committees that have been set up, widened out to involve other countries. I think this is very much a question for the parties as to how they are going to handle their negotiations and their relationship, if any, to Geneva. It is, however, a matter of fundamental concern to us all that the negotiating process should continue and reach agreements bringing peace and and stability to the region.

83

Press interview statements by First Secretary Mitterand of the Socialist Party of France affirming that his party's Middle East policy is based on respect for Security Council resolutions 242 and 338⁷⁰

Late February, 1978

Q. In another domain the policy of the Socialist Party is no different from that of the majority of the Assembly. Speaking in the name of the SP, Mr. Jean-Pierre Cot, in the course of the debate on this legislation, from the rostrum of the National Assembly expressed his satisfaction with the government on account of its Middle East policy. But it is precisely on the grounds of the French attitude to the Middle East that the majority of Jews in France are opposed to the present government. As leader of the SP would you today express the same opinion as M. Cot?

A. The ambiguity, not to say hypocrisy of the present Majority as regards the problems of the

Middle East must be stressed. The ambiguity manifests itself on the most everyday level. So, a number of parliamentarians from the Majority are to be seen actively involved with the France-Israel Friendship Society, while at the same time other parliamentarians from the Majority show a great deal of enthusiasm within the ranks of the Franco-Arab Solidarity Association. Many Israelis, many Arabs, indeed many French people only know one side of this manysided problem, and this allows totally contradictory opinions to be held, according to the side adopted.

The hypocrisy begins when words become translated into acts. We could talk of arms sales. Since the lifting of the embargo on the confrontation states in the Middle East, the French government has greatly contributed to the military escalation in the region, however, without precise figures being easily available.

To finish with ambiguity and dissimulation in this domain would certainly accord with the wishes of the Socialists. We could add in this context the Abu Daoud affair, the recent arms sale to Syria—with both Paris and Bonn refusing to take responsibility—and the attitude of M. Barre to President Sadat when he visited Israel, where he was welcomed by the Jewish people with warmth and hope.

But if you want, I will review the positions of the Socialist Party.

The Socialist Party has always stood by the same position on the Middle East. This position is based on respect for UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. I said as much, and in the same terms, both in Cairo to President Sadat in December 1973 and at a press conference in Jerusalem during my recent visit to Israel. To speak in the same language to both parties is, I repeat, our first rule of conduct.

We think that a peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East will be brought about essentially by direct discussions between the countries in the Middle East. Our interest is in the establishment of this dialogue, and we will endeavour to facilitate it, be it through appropriate initiatives or within the framework of the Socialist International. We will continue to work towards this end, because numerous ties link us to the people of Israel and we hope that this state will be able to live in peace within secure, recognised and internationally guaranteed boundaries. Israel's right to its existence.

 $^{^{70}}$ Excerpted and translated from the French text, T.J. Hebdo, no. 505 (March 3–9, 1978), pp. 5–7.

and the right to safeguard this existence, the Palestinians' right to a homeland in the West Bank within the framework of statehood, which it is not up to us to prejudge, direct negotiations culminating in international guarantees—these are the essential factors. I should add that we recognize the representativity of the PLO, as agreed on by the UN, but we hold that the PLO should scale down on some of its own claimed capacities, insofar as it does not recognise the existence of the state of Israel.

Q. In order to cease all religious, racial or national discrimination in matters of international trade, a law passed on 7 June 1977 by the National Assembly prohibited in France the Arab boycott of Israel. However, in a limitative decision published in the official records on 24 July 1977, the government rendered the stipulations of this law devoid of their substance, arguing that French exports had priority over what could be called international morality in matters of commerce.

Is the SP of the same opinion as the government? If not, what measures has it taken or does it intend to take to make the parliamentary stipulations on the Arab boycott legally binding again?

A. The Prime Minister on 24 July 1977 published a decision effectively exempting most developing countries, and particularly, if not intentionally, the Middle East countries, from the 7 June anti-boycott law.

You are aware of the French Foreign Trade Company (COFACE), which insures French companies trading abroad against all risks. By considering the risk of boycott undergone by companies trading with Arab countries while they are suspected of having direct or indirect links with Israel to be among the risks covered by COFACE, the French government is establishing a code of discrimination which falls withing the provisions of the law. It is getting round the will of the legislative body, which rightly wanted to impose sanctions on practices of economic discrimination.

This attitude, dictated by purely commercial interests, does no credit to France. It marks the end of her apparent neutrality hitherto observed in the Middle East conflict. The Socialists, for their part, consider that the contradictory position of the government and of the Majority, which supports it in this affair, well illustrates the total cynicism of France's present international policy.

By contrast, our approach is one of strict neu-

trality in the settlement of the Middle East conflict. This does not exclude us from the search for a just and lasting peace.

This line in any case leads us now to demand the immediate abrogation of the July 24 directive.

It leads us to express the hope that the Council of Ministers of the EEC (commerical jurisdiction falling within the Community's domain since 1975) and of the OECD should issue a statement as soon as possible on the necessity of coordinating the terms of competition between the various member countries, notably in the sphere of credit insurance. This is the way we will act if popular suffrage elects us to the government of this country.

84

Press interview statement by President Tito of Yugoslavia criticizing Egypt's President Sadat for the latter's visit to Israel⁷¹

Igalo, March 2, 1978

Q. And the Middle East?

A. The situation in the Middle East is even more entangled. A deadlock has occurred there. President Sadat has not succeeded in his plan. By visiting Israel he has not succeeded in accomplishing anything, as it seems now. He entertained illusions. True, what he did was a very courageous move. However, when something like this is undertaken, it is indispensable to assess whether the necessary elements and realistic prospects exist for success. I do not think that the way he acted was a good way since he had not consulted any Arab country, and this is wrong because Syria and Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization also fought, and yet he did not inform any one of them. He did not inform me either although we are friends. Otherwise, I would have told him not to act so, since in that way he cannot succeed.

⁷¹ Interview conducted by James Reston. Excerpted from the partial English text, *The New York Times*, March 3, 1978, p. 6. Copyright 1978 by the New York Times Company; reprinted by permission.

85

Letter to US President Carter from 21 members of the US House International Relations Committee urging reevaluation of the proposed "package" sale of arms to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia⁷²

Washington, March 7, 1978

We are writing to you as members of the International Relations Committee in regard to the Administration's recently announced aircraft sales to the Middle East. As you know, our Committee has primary jurisdiction over U.S. arms sales under Section 36 (b) of the Arms Export Control Act.

Secretary Vance told the Committee on February 21 that the proposed aircraft sales to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel are "reinforcing" and must therefore be considered as a "package" by the Congress. We are opposed to such an approach for the following reasons:

- 1. The legislation providing for Congressional review of arms sales stipulates that each sale is to be considered separately.
- 2. In conjunction with the Sinai II Agreement of 1975,73 the United States, in exchange for significant Israeli territorial concessions, made a number of commitments to Israel including the "supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft." At that time, no mention was made of this commitment being dependent upon U.S. arms sales to other states in the region.
- 3. U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Saudi Arabia through September 1977 have totalled more than \$15 billion. Since the Yom Kippur War in 1973 Egypt has received more than \$4 billion in economic assistance and substantial non-lethal military equipment from our country. We believe the

United States does have an interest in constructive relationships with both these countries. However, a major shift in arms sales policy could have an adverse impact on the peace negotations during this delicate period.

- 4. The sale to Saudi Arabia of the most advanced fighter-bomber will have a destabilizing impact on the military balance in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions. The long-range capability of the F-15 would, for the first time, place Saudi Arabia on Israel's strategic map, raising tensions and increasing the likelihood of Saudi involvement in any future Arab-Israel conflict.
- 5. Israel had requested 150 F-16's and 25 F-15's from the United States in order to replace aging aircraft in its inventory. Israel, unlike the Arab states, can rely only on the United States to maintain its defense capability. The 50 percent reduction in the Israeli request weakens the long-standing U.S. commitment to maintain the military balance in light of massive Soviet and Western European arms sales to Israel's potential adversaries.

In view of the above concerns, we respectfully urge a reevaluation of these proposed sales before formal notification to the Congress.

86

Press interview statements by President Kirchschlager of Austria discussing Austria's position vis-à-vis a Middle East settlement (excerpt)⁷⁴

Amman, March 8, 1978

- Q. Your country supports a settlement in the Middle East on the basis of UN resolutions. Do you believe that there is a possibility of implementing these resolutions when Israel refuses to do so, especially as regards the West Bank?
- A. Austria supports Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and we have tried to contribute, within the UN framework, to the efforts being made to arrive at a common interpretation of these two resolutions. However, this has so far been impossible. But I believe that President Sadat's initiative is based on this fact and that

⁷² Text supplied, on request, by the US House of Representatives. Signatories were:

Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D. NY), Jonathan B. Bingham (D. NY), Stephen J. Solarz (D. NY), Robert N.C. Nix (D. Pa), Wyche Fowler Jr. (D. Ga), Benjamin A. Gilman (R. NY), Tennyson Guyer (R. Ohio), J. Herbert Burke (R. Fla), Anthony Beilenson (D. Cal), Michael Harrington (D. Mass), Charles Diggs (D. Mich), Dante B. Fascell (D. Fla), Andy Ireland (D. Fla), Donald M. Fraser (D. Minn), Lester Wolff (D. NY), Robert J. Lagomarsino (R. Cal), Edward J. Derwinski (R. Ill), Cardiss Collins (D. Ill), Don Bonker (D. Wash), Gus Yatron (D. Pa).

⁷³ See docs. 148, 164, 166, 167 and 169 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1975.

⁷⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Rai (Amman), March 9, 1978.

the talks held up till now to find a common interpretation have not yet succeeded. Austria supports a settlement that is acceptable to all the parties concerned.

- Q. The principal difference between Israel and the USA at present appears to be over the interpretation of resolution 242⁷⁵ which has received international acceptance, including that of Israel's former rulers. What do you think of Begin's interpretation of this resolution which maintains that it is inapplicable to the West Bank? Is this not a contradiction of the resolution itself?
- A. I believe that the diverse interpretations of the two resolutions are not the crux of the conflict but are in fact an expression of a certain attitude which predominates these days, where a peace settlement cannot be achieved. I believe that the question of finding an interpretation of the resolution will soon be solved. The present state of affairs is based upon the existence of a common will as regards a common situation for the sake of a common and peaceful settlement. The "Declaration of Principles" will in any case resolve this state of affairs provided these principles are not formulated in such a manner as to allow more than one interpretation and provided these principles are linked to a time schedule, in the framework of a peace settlement.
- Q. It is believed that the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the peace talks is one reason why no result has yet been achieved. How accurate is this belief and what, in your view, is the best way of settling the problem?
- A. I do not know if the exclusion of the Soviet Union is one of the reasons which led to failure to achieve a settlement. However, I believe that a peaceful settlement without the participation of the USA and the Soviet Union will not lead to permanent peace. In today's world, it is impossible to make such major arrangements by excluding this major power or that.
- Q. Do you believe that returning to the US-Soviet joint statement about convening the Geneva conference is a valid means to end the crisis that might face the Atherton mission, and also to widen the base of talks in that conference?
- A. I hope that the Atherton mission will achieve positive results. Let us all hope it will succeed.

But I also believe that the US-Soviet joint statement is a step forward in relations between the two powers as regards the Middle East, and the two states must now take further steps inspired by that statement.

- Q. The Palestinians and the Jewish settlements are the major obstacles. This was seen clearly in the Begin proposal rejected by the Arabs. Do you see any hope of change in the Israeli position?
- A. There is today, I believe, a general Arab position which holds that the settlements are a serious obstacle, this must be taken into account. As for the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, Austria supports the UN and Security Council resolutions and has voted in their favour at the UN General Assembly. The Government of Austria, together with all agencies that speak for her have announced their readiness to contribute to the best of their ability in finding a peace settlement based on justice in the region.
- Q, Your country contributed to the arrangement of direct talks between President Sadat and former Premier Shimon Peres in Vienna last month. What is your assessment of the results of these talks?
- A. These talks were held in the framework of the meeting of the Socialist International organization. I believe the results have been made known and there are no secret provisions. Therefore I cannot add anything new to what is well known to the whole world. In any case, the talks were obviously useful, in my view.

87

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat⁷⁷

Moscow, March 10, 1978

A Palestine Liberation Organization delegation, led by Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO executive committee, visited Moscow from March 6 to 10, during which talks took place with Andrei Gromyko, member of the political bureau of the CPSU central committee and USSR Foreign

⁷⁵ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

⁷⁶ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁷⁷ English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5922 (March 14, 1978), pp. 91–92.

Minister. Yasser Arafat also had a meeting with Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU central committee and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

During the meeting with Andrei Gromyko on March 9, which was held in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, the two sides examined in detail the present situation in the Middle East and ways of establishing a just and lasting peace in that area. An identity of views and positions was noted on the issues discussed.

The Soviet Union and the PLO believe that the separate talks between Egypt and Israel, by-passing the Geneva Conference, are gravely detrimental to the interests of the Arab peoples and contribute to the implementation of the old designs of Israel and the forces supporting it to perpetuate the occupation of a considerable part of the Arab territories captured by Israel and deprive the Arab people of Palestine of their inalienable rights.

They resolutely condemn policies of capitulation and all kinds of separate actions in Israel's favour and against the interests of the Arabs, which cannot lead to a comprehensive and just settlement in the Middle East, and they reject this way as a substitute for such a settlement.

Both sides expressed their determination to continue co-operation aimed at achieving a Middle East settlement required to ensure genuine peace in that area. Great importance was assumed in this connection, in their opinion, by the strengthening and coordination of actions of all the progressive forces of the Arab world on a consistent anti-imperialist basis.

Andrei Gromyko reaffirmed the Soviet Union's unswerving support for the just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine to secure their legitimate national rights, including the right to self-determination, to create their own state and to return to their homes in accord with the existing decisions of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union firmly and consistently declared that only such a settlement of the Palestinian problem could contribute towards establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Yasser Arafat expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev for their active and unswerving support for the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for their inalienable national rights and to rally their ranks.

He stressed that the strengthening of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community was the firm policy of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

The two sides declared their intention to continue regular contacts and exchanges of views on questions of interest to them.

Leonid Brezhnev received Yasser Arafat in the Kremlin the same day.

A community of views on a wide range of questions concerning the present situation in the Middle East, the establishment there of a just and lasting peace and the ensuring of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine was reaffirmed during the conversation, which took place in a sincere and friendly atmosphere.

It was noted that the situation in the Middle East had been considerably worsened as a result of actions by imperialist forces and Arab reaction which had aligned itself with them.

While obstructing a settlement of the Middle East conflict, these forces were trying to undermine the national liberation struggle of the Arab peoples, to perpetuate the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to deprive the Arab people of Palestine of their lawful national rights, including the right to self-determination, to the creation of their own state and to return to their homes in accordance with existing United Nations decisions.

The capitulatory actions of the Egyptian leadership, which had set out on the road of separate deals with Israel, served these aims.

It was stressed that in the resulting situation in the Middle East, a particularly important role was being played by the unity of all progressive forces of the Arab world and their solidarity with their natural allies—the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. This unity was a decisive factor in the struggle to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression and to achieve a comprehensive Middle East settlement.

In this connection the positive role was noted of the conferences of the leaders of progressive Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which took place in Tripoli in December 1977⁷⁸ and in Algiers in February 1978,⁷⁹ for

⁷⁸ See docs. 319–322 and 324 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁷⁹ See doc. 218 below.

strengthening their unity of action in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and all reactionary forces connected with them and against separate deals.

Leonid Brezhnev reaffirmed the principled policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Union towards reaching a comprehensive Middle East settlement of which the ensurance of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine was an integral part. He emphasised that the Soviet Union always sided with the just cause of the Arab people of Palestine who were staunchly struggling for their freedom and national independence.

In this just struggle, the Palestinian people, headed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, had achieved considerable success and had become one of the leading detachments of the Arab national liberation movement.

Yasser Arafat spoke about the struggle being conducted by the Palestine resistance movement in the present worsened situation in the Middle East for the implementation of its national aspirations and against the intrigues of imperialism and reaction.

On behalf of the entire Palestinian people, he expressed deep gratitude to the CPSU central committee and the Soviet government for their consistent and all-round support for the struggle of the Palestinians for their legitimate rights. The Palestine Liberation Organisation regarded the further strengthening of friendship with the USSR and other socialist countries as one of its main objectives, he said.

Leonid Brezhnev wished the courageous Palestinian people further success in their just struggle and in rallying their ranks. The Palestinian people could always count on support in this cause from the Soviet Union, which stood firm for internationalist solidarity with the peoples struggling for their national liberation.

88

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the German Domocratic Republic of a PLO delegation led by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat⁸⁰

Berlin, March 11, 1978

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by the Chairman of its Executive Committee, Yasser Arafat, stayed in the German Democratic Republic for an official visit from 10 to 11 March 1978.

Yasser Arafat was received by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED and Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR, for a friendly talk.

Erich Honecker spoke about the great efforts and creative initiative taken by the working people in the GDR in successfully implementing the decisions adopted by the 9th SED Congress and in preparation of the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the GDR. He paid tribute to the great sacrifices in the anti-imperialist struggle being waged by the PLO for its inalienable national rights and reaffirmed the GDR's basic position as regards the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East. He also assured him that the GDR will continue its solidarity with, and support of, the Arab people of Palestine who are fighting for the restoration of their national rights, including the right to return, to self-determination and the foundation of their own independent state in accordance with the decisions taken by the UN General Assembly.

Yasser Arafat expressed his high appreciation of, and respect for, the great achievements made by the people in the GDR under the leadership of the SED in building an advanced socialist society. He thanked the SED and the people of the GDR for the solidarity and support they have been extending to the PLO.

The delegation of the PLO and a delegation of the SED under the leadership of Gerhard Grueneberg, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee, exchanged views on a variety of issues.

⁸⁰ English text, Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Berlin), XVIII, 11 (April 13, 1978), p. 84.

During the official talks, which took place in an atmosphere of friendship, anti-imperialist solidarity and mutual understanding, the two sides exchanged opinions on current international issues, especially on the situation in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. They discussed the results and further tasks of cooperation between the SED and the PLO. A new agreement was signed by the SED and the PLO on cooperation in 1978 and 1979.

The talks conducted by the delegations of the SED and the PLO confirmed the agreement of both sides on questions regarding the international situation and the further development of bilateral relations.

Both sides agreed that the existing close and cordial relations of friendship will be further strengthened. They shared the view that the consistent peace policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the struggle of the progressive forces in the world are essential preconditions for making the process of détente irreversible in Europe and in the world and for supplementing it by effective disarmament measures. They take a resolute stand for the complete extirpation of the remnants of colonialism and racism and the elimination of all dangerous sources of tensions and conflicts in the world. In this connection they expressed their serious concern about the dangerous situation in the Horn of Africa and condemned the imperialist interference in the region.

Both sides devoted special attention to developments in the Middle East where the continuing occupation by Israel of Palestinian and other Arab territories and the refusal of imperialist and Zionist forces to recognize the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine continue to endanger world peace and prevent a solution of the Middle East conflict. They condemn the sustained terrorism of Israel in the occupied territories, the policy of Israeli settlement and the serious violation of human rights. The unceasing Israeli military attacks on Lebanon were condemned as dangerous provocations jeopardizing peace.

The two sides agreed that a comprehensive and just solution of the Middle East conflict can only be reached with the full participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.

Both sides underlined their basic position, explaining that a just peace in the Middle East necessitates the complete withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the Arab and Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, the guaranteeing of the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine including their right to return to their home territory, to self-determination and to establishing their own independent state according to the resolutions of the UN General Assembly. They stressed the importance of a still closer unity of their alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community in the face of the present conditions. In this connection the representatives of the GDR expressed their great appreciation of the results of the Summit Conferences of progressive Arab states and the PLO in December 1977 in Tripoli⁸¹ and in February 1978 in Algiers⁸² for strengthening their unity in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Yasser Arafat thanked the Central Committee of the SED for the cordial welcome and the hospitality accorded to the PLO delegation.

89

Statement by US President Carter announcing that President Sadat has accepted the US proposals for resolving points of issue and that Prime Minister Begin has agreed to present these proposals to his Cabinet for consideration⁸³

Cairo, March 13, 1978

I have a statement to make which I consider to be extremely important. I have just given to President Sadat a full report of my discussions in Israel.

During that visit, the United States made proposals for resolving a number of outstanding issues—proposals which were accepted by Prime Minister Begin and his Cabinet.

President Sadat has now accepted these pro-

⁸¹ See docs. 319–322 and 324 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁸² See doc. 218 below.

⁸³ Made after a meeting between President Carter and President Sadat at Cairo airport; text as published in the *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), March 14, 1979, p. 2.

posals.

Based on the discussions in Egypt and Israel, I have also presented United States proposals to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin for resolving the few remaining issues.

Earlier today, Prime Minister Begin agreed to present these proposals to his Cabinet for consideration. This will be done at the earliest opportunity.

President Sadat has carefully reviewed all the remaining issues and has accepted these same proposals. I have just informed Prime Minister Begin of President Sadat's acceptance.

I am convinced that now we have defined all of the main ingredients of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and which will be the cornerstone of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

90

Speech by Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR stating that Egypt's quest for a separate peace has jeopardized possibilities of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and reaffirming support for a Geneva conference (excerpt)⁸⁴

Moscow, mid-March, 1978

The Soviet Union is helping to strengthen Arab unity, is supporting the peoples of these countries in their common struggle against Israeli aggression and is contributing to the strengthening of peace and the spreading of the process of détente to the Maghreb area and other Mediterranean states.

We are firmly convinced that if the states drawn into the conflict display good will and if their actions are directed at achieving a relaxation of international tension, they will be able to find just solutions acceptable to all interested sides. They themselves will gain from this and so will the whole world.

More than that, the prospects of a peace settlement there have worsened because of Egypt's attempts to find a separate solution of the Middle East problem. The Soviet Union believes that peace in the area can be ensured if the national aspirations of the Arab peoples are taken into consideration and if the security of all the states in the Middle East is guaranteed, including the state of the Arabs of Palestine, which should take a worthy place among other Middle East states.

The quickest way to a solution of the Middle East problem is by talks within the framework of the already created machinery of the Geneva Conference. We confirm our position again because we do not see another alternative in any way acceptable that could be opposed to this proposal.

91

Resolution adopted by the US House of Representatives condemning the PLO and the Palestinian commando raid into Israel⁸⁵ Washington, mid-March, 1978

Whereas the Congress has learned with revulsion and horror of the brutal and vicious attack⁸⁶ by the PLO upon unarmed, innocent men, women, and children in Israel on March 11, 1978, in which at least 35 persons were killed and many were wounded, and

Whereas the PLO has acknowledged openly responsibility for said attack and has declared that said attack is only the beginning of a series of similar assaults in its campaign against the people of Israel and any persons who may support the efforts by the governments of Egypt and Israel to reach an agreement to terminate their hostilities and live in peace;

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Congress that it strongly condemns and denounces the

⁸⁴ Made at a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Osman of Morocco; partial English text, Soviet News (London), no. 5922 (March 14, 1978), p. 89.

⁸⁵ Text as published in Near East Report (Washington), XXII, 12 (March 22, 1978), p. 48.

⁸⁶ A Fatah commando seized a bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv road. In the ensuing battle at an Israeli roadblock, 35 Israelis and 9 fidayin were killed and 2 fidayin taken prisoner. Following the attack the Israelis launched a full-scale invasion of South Lebanon in which 25,000 to 28,000 troops were deployed, over 1,000 Lebanese and Palestinians killed and 285,000 made homeless. (Figures compiled from Fiches du Monde Arabe 1 L-95.)

PLO for its brutal and vicious attack upon unarmed, innocent men, women, and children in Israel on March 11, 1978; and

Be it further resolved by the Congress that it condemns and denounces the PLO for its declared intention to continue such attacks, and for its declared intention to thwart and bring to an end the efforts by the governments of Egypt and Israel to attain an agreement to terminate hostilities between their countries and to establish peace; and

Be it further resolved by the Congress that it deplores and views with disappointment the statements of approval for said PLO attack which have been made by various governments and government agencies; the Congress requests the President of the United States to make known formally to such governments this expression of disapproval by the Congress for such statements; and

Be it further resolved by the Congress that it strongly approves of the efforts by the governments of Israel and Egypt to reach an agreement to terminate the hostilities between their countries and to establish peace; and the Congress expresses the hope that the governments of said countries will continue steadfastly and earnestly to reach such an agreement by face-to-face negotiations to resolve their differences; and that other governments in the Middle East will join the efforts by the governments of Israel and Egypt to bring peace to that area; and

Be it further resolved by the Congress that it considers the most salutary and effective means to bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East will be through an agreement negotiated freely and directly between governments, and not through dastardly, inhuman attacks upon innocent people by the PLO, as herein above described.

92

Statement issued by the Israeli army announcing the aims of its invasion of South Lebanon⁹⁷

March 15, 1978

IDF forces launched a purge along the Lebanese border. The aim of the operation is to wipe

out terrorist bases near the border and to hit certain bases from which terrorists staged attacks deep into Israeli territory.

It is not the intention of the IDF to harm the (civilian) population, the Lebanese Army or the inter-Arab deterrent force—only the terrorists and their abettors, to safeguard the lives and security of the residents of Israel.

The aim of the operation is not retaliation for terrorist crimes, as there can be no retaliation for the murder of innocent citizens—men, women and children. It is to protect the state and to prevent attacks by Fatah and PLO personnel who use Lebanese territory as a staging ground to attack Israeli citizens.

93

Press conference statements by Chief of Staff Gur of Israel stressing that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon will be confined to the South (excerpts)⁸⁸

Tel Aviv, March 15, 1978

The Israeli army will retain a security belt a hundred kilometres long and between 7 and 10 kilometres wide, in southern Lebanon, from the sea and until Har Dov. It will remain in this area for as long as it sees fit to establish order therein... Israel is not concerned to remain in southern Lebanon, an area falling under Lebanese sovereignty, provided the Lebanese government re-establishes its authority in it and restores order to it... We shall do our utmost not to remain in southern Lebanon. However, so long as we find it necessary to establish order there,

⁸⁷ English text, The Jerusalem Post, March 15, 1978, p. 1.

ss Translated from the partial Hebrew text, Davar (Tel Aviv), March 16, 1978. On March 20 the Israeli government issued a statement reacting to Security Council Resolution 425 (calling for Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon) as follows: "...The Government again reaffirms that the Israeli army carried out the operation in southern Lebanon not in order to occupy land but to destroy the bases of terrorists who have brought death and destruction to Israeli as well as Lebanese civilians. Any settlement in South Lebanon must ensure that southern Lebanon will never again be used as a base for terrorists and their criminal acts and that a secure and normal pattern of life be guaranteed for citizens of Israel and of southern Lebanon..." [Translated from the Hebrew text, al-Hamishmar (Tel Aviv), March 21, 1978.]

we shall remain in that region... The Israeli army will not allow bases to be established in southern Lebanon which can be used to launch attacks against Israel... Lebanon's President Sarkis pointed out that the Lebanese government is not in control of South Lebanon and I agree with him. This region has become a military base for terrorists. This is why the government decided to order the Israeli army to enter certain specified regions in South Lebanon and to destroy terrorist bases in the hope that a legal and sovereign Lebanese government can recover that area and re-establish a prosperous and quiet life therein, as was the case in the past... No doubt the operation followed upon a bloody incident89 on the coastal road on Saturday but the operation is not one of vengeance but of deterrence, aimed at destroying terrorist concentrations in South Lebanon and eradicating them. The Israeli army operation was relatively large when compared with past operations... But Israel does not want to be involved to widen the scope of the operation to include all of southern Lebanon... I hope the Syrians understand that this operation is confined to South Lebanon. I hope Lebanon understands that our objective is to restore peace to the region. I hope the whole world understands that we want to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents... I have instructed Israeli troops not to harm civilians, especially women and children.

The Israeli army operation had as objectives four concentrations of terrorists in South Lebanon: 1) the Western region; Ras al-Naqoura on the coast, from where rockets were fired into Nahariya; 2) Bint Jubayl, a major terrorist stronghold from where rockets were fired at Safad; 3) the region facing Metulla, from where rockets were fired at Kiryat Shmona and 4) the Eastern region-al-Khiyam and Fateh land. The operation began at night, carried out by the infantry with the support of the airforce, the engineers and the navy. In the morning, a joint infantry-armour operation was launched, with artillery and other support. The terrorists fired their guns at some northern settlements during the night... There were fierce battles in some areas and, in others, the terrorists were seen to flee.

94

Statement by US State Department spokesman Hodding Carter discussing the invasion of South Lebanon by Israel⁹⁰

Washington, March 16, 1978

The President and Secretary Vance have been in close touch on the situation in southern Lebanon, and the President instructed the Secretary to report our position to the American public.

At the outset let me say we deplore this new cycle of violence which erupted in the tragic killings in Israel on March 11, 1978, 91 and continued with the military action and tragic loss of innocent civilian lives in Lebanon over the past two days.

During the intensive consultations with other governments which we have already described, our immediate concern has been to end as quickly as possible this most recent cycle of violence in the Middle East so as to keep attention focused on the basic problems which produced it. The only real solution to these problems lies in the broader search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects and for measures which would restore longterm stability in Lebanon. We do not intend to be distracted from efforts to resolve these basic problems.

As to the situation in southern Lebanon, we expect Israel to withdraw, and we have made our views in this respect known to the Israeli Government. We have also begun consultations on arrangements that could promote stability and security in that area following Israeli withdrawal. At the United Nations and elsewhere, we have been discussing possible arrangements, including the idea of a UN role, and will continue urgent exchanges on this subject with the parties in the Middle East.

The territorial integrity of Lebanon remains a matter of fundamental concern to the United States. An important objective in our current efforts is the extension of the authority of the Government of Lebanon to south Lebanon. Any arrangements will have to be consistent with this objective and with the decisions of that government.

⁸⁹ See footnote 86 above.

⁹⁰ Department of State Bulletin, (Washington), LXXVIII, 2014 (May 1978), p. 46.

⁹¹ See footnote 86 above.

95

Statement by UN representative Troyanovsky of the USSR condemning Israel's invasion of South Lebanon (excerpts)⁹²

United Nations, March 19, 1978

This act of aggression is further convincing proof of the expansionist essence of Tel Aviv's policy aimed at carving up the map of the Middle East again by annexing native Arab territories for Israel. There is no doubt that those who connive with the Israeli policy and who, by remaining inactive, actually encourage Israel to commit new ventures, are also responsible for Israel's aggression.

The Soviet Union believes that the Security Council must resolutely condemn Israel's new aggressive actions against Lebanon and take effective measures in accordance with the United Nations Charter to put an end to Israel's aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian Arab people and for the immediate withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon's territory.

The USSR's delegation would also like to state that the dispatch of the U.N. force to the territory of Lebanon, to meet the Lebanese government's request, should by no means infringe upon the sovereign rights of the government of Lebanon and should fully take into account Israel's responsibility, as the aggressor, for the actions she has committed.

Unfortunately, these proposals have not been accepted by the U.S. delegation, the author of the draft resolution. In our opinion they are absolutely necessary both from the point of view of defending the interests of the victims of Israeli aggression and from the standpoint of observance of the principles of the U.N. Charter which define

the procedure for using U.N. troops to maintain peace and international security.

96

Statement by US Senator Abourezk (Dem.) condemning the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon⁹³

Washington, March 21, 1978

Mr. President, the news of the Middle East is growing increasingly worse. I am afraid it will get worse yet before it gets better. There are now in excess of 200,000 refugees streaming into Beirut from the south of Lebanon, driven there by the savage Israeli attack on the southern part of that country. The Washington Post has reported that cluster bomb units, antipersonnel weapons provided by the United States, have been dropped on the city of Tyre.94 At least one bombing raid by the Israeli Air Force has been directed at the city of Tripoli, Lebanon, which is north of the capital city of Beirut. Anthony Lewis of the New York Times reports Monday, March 20, that at least 700 people have been killed in Lebanon thus far by Israeli military operations. A great many of these are innocent civilians. Their numbers are far in excess of the 35 civilians who were killed in the terrorist raid in Tel Aviv.

The Israeli military has moved in force approximately 20 miles north of the Lebanese-Israeli border. The communiques from the Israeli Government, and censored news reports from American reporters on the Israeli side, report all of the operations as being "surgical strikes," against guerrilla encampments. Once again, with the Palestinian attack inside Israel, the grief of the families involved, and gory details of the death of civilians in Israel have been reported time and time again in the American press. But there is hardly any mention of civilian casualties caused by Israel in Lebanon. I have said it before and the statement bears repeating; it is almost as though the lives of Arab women and children are

⁹² Made before the UN Security Council; partial English text, Soviet News (London), no. 5923 (March 21, 1978), p. 97. A Tass statement of March 16, 1978 also condemned the invasion: "Tass is authorised to state that the Soviet Union resolutely condemns the armed invasion of Lebanon by Israel and calls upon all who cherish peace to combine their efforts so that the Israeli aggression may be ended and so that Israel's forces may be immediately withdrawn from the territory of Lebanon. Responsibility for the dangerous consequences of the entire new worsening of the Middle East situation is borne by the government of Israel." (Soviet News, no. 5923, p. 100.)

⁹⁸ Congressional Record (daily), CXXIV, 41, (March 21, 1978), pp. S4179-S4180.

⁹⁴ See doc. 97 below for a letter from Representative McCloskey to President Carter protesting the use of cluster bombs.

valueless, that they are worth far less than the lives of Israeli women and children. The (in) equality of such press coverage contributes to the ability of Israel to continue to receive U.S. support for such institutionalized terrorism while, at the same time, the United States properly condemns the unorganized terrorism committed by Palestinians.

Reports of the use of American weapons, such as the $F{-}15$ and the cluster bomb units being dropped in city areas, killing anyone in range in a nondiscriminatory manner bring to mind a major question; that is, should the United States continue to underwrite such barbarism on the part of a so-called ally. The propagandists for Israel have succeeded in dehumanizing Palestinians, Lebanese, and Arabs in general because such dehumanization makes it easier for Israel to engage with impunity in the savagery of killing. That is a tragic lesson in racism, committed by people who have suffered the most throughout history from racism.

The question of the Israeli attack in Lebanon goes beyond that of retaliation. We would hardly expect the United States to invade Mexico if 10 terrorists from Mexico attacked inside the United States. We would hardly expect the Soviet Union to invade Israel the next time a Soviet Jew hijacked a Soviet airliner. Other than the desire by Israel for its expansion into southern Lebanon, what plausible reason can there be for such an attack? I was told in 1974 by an Israeli journalist that, when Israel deemed the provocation to be appropriate, it would invade southern Lebanon and effectively annex part of that country at the Litani River line. Given the past behavior of Israel in the Middle East, its expansionist history, and its desire for additional water, which can be provided by the Litani River, the statement by the Israeli journalist was believable. In view of the experience of the last few days, what he said was totally credible.

The Sunday edition of the Washington Star has reported that Prime Minister Begin is bringing a comprehensive plan for rebuilding the Lebanese Army and for reconstructing Lebanon as an independent "sovereign state." The newspaper report says that Begin will offer to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon on two conditions: First, when an equally powerful force takes up a position now held by Israel and undertakes to

keep Arab guerrillas out of the area; second, Israeli withdrawal will be linked to the Syrian withdrawal from the rest of the country.

How cynical and how arrogant Mr. Begin and the Government of Israel now appear in making such a proposal. Israel cannot pretend that it has been invited to commit aggression against Lebanon, unless it might be by the small fascist group of right-wing Lebanese who have been proposed by Begin to run the new Lebanese Army, once the Syrian forces have withdrawn. That proposal would effectively place Lebanon under an Israel mandate.

Most of the world has come to recognize the kind of imperialism pursued by the Israel Government.

The Carter administration, with is resolution in the United Nations Security Council demanding prompt Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese soil, has recognized it as well. It is incumbent upon the Congress to give support to that resolution.

As I see it, Israel will refuse to give up the fruits of its aggression, unless it is convinced it has more to lose than it has to gain as a result of such aggression. In 1956, when Israel joined France and England in attacking Egypt and attempted to keep the Sinai Desert, President Eisenhower was successful in threatening Israel to the extent that Israel withdrew from the Sinai.

Unless this administration, joined by this Congress, is equally as firm, we will have once again underwritten the acquisition of territory by force on the part of Israel. If we do so, then nobody who supports Israel's aggression, its barbaric killing of innocent civilians can, with a straight face, speak of the violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets or any other nation.

The Foreign Military Sales Act prevents the use of American weapons for aggression against a third country. All of the facts exist for the cutoff of American arms to Israel, much the same as we shut off the arms for Turkey when Turkey invaded Cyprus. Israel's clear violation of our law is the obvious lever the administration should use to enforce its demand for Israeli withdrawal.

I understand the feasance most politicians must pay to the Israeli lobby but, at some point, Mr. President, those of us in the American Government must consider the American interest, and in addition, the morality of supporting territorial aggression by Israel. 97

Letter from US Representative McCloskey (Rep.) to US President Carter protesting the use of US-made cluster bombs (CBU's) by Israel in its invasion of South Lebanon⁹⁵
March 22, 1978

March 22, 1978

Hon. Jimmy Carter President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 Dear Mr. President:

I want to protest as strongly as I can the reported use of U.S. cluster bombs (CBUs) by Israel as indicated in the *New York Times* article enclosed. I also urge you to terminate the sale or transfer of such weapons to the Israelis.

CBUs have been provided to Israel by the United States for some time. These anti-personnel weapons rank among the cruelest and most atrocious weapons ever developed by mankind. CBUs leave an aircraft as a single unit, then divide into numbers of individual grenades which, in turn, explode at random to create a blizzard of steel fragments over an area as large as 25 acres in size.

The horror of these bombs is well documented. On February 6, 1971 a single U.S. plane mistakenly dropped a single CBU on a South Vietnamese unit manouevering along the Laotian border. The resulting carnage was vividly described by *Life* reporter John Saar in the enclosed *Life* article.

I was once privileged to interview several dozen Laotian villagers who had survived CBU bombing by U.S. planes in the Plain of Jars during 1971. The terrible injuries suffered by the peasant women and children in that unfortunate area will remain a permanent reminder in U.S. consciousness that these weapons should never again be used against a civilian population.

In my judgement the nature of the Mideast conflict imposes an obligation on the United States to deny use of this U.S.-developed weapon to both sides.

I hope you will convey this message and perhaps the enclosed articles to Prime Minister Begin, and that you will take immediate steps to prevent future use or transfer of CBUs,

Sincerely, Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.

98

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister Chnoupek⁹⁶

Belgrade, March 23, 1978

The two ministers expressed great concern over the present developments in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, and stressed the need for a peaceful solution for these problems.

They resolutely condemned the Israel occupation of Arab territory and the latest aggression by Israel in Southern Lebanon, which endanger peace and international security. They confirmed that the SFR Yugoslavia and the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia resolutely support the struggle of the Palestinian people for their legitimate national rights and the creation of their own independent state, and they recognize and support the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. They underscored the need for convening the Geneva Conference on the Middle East as soon as possible, with the participation of all parties involved, including the PLO as a partner with equal standing.

⁹⁵ Text supplied, on request, from Representative McCloskey's office. See docs 107 and 113 below for statements by Secretary of State Vance and Defence Secretary Brown on the issue.

⁹⁶ Partial English text, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 673 (April 20, 1978), p. 21.

99

Press interview statements by Defence Minister Weizman of Israel justifying the extent and size of Israel's invasion of South Lebanon (excerpt)⁹⁷

March 23, 1978

Q, There is a web of contradictions. The terrorists must be attacked and yet the heart bleeds when it sees this large number of refugees. One must not withdraw from southern Lebanon before ensuring that the terrorists will not return to it. But who will guarantee this? Who will sign the agreements? Who will guarantee it? Israel has the right to protect the safety of its citizens and to use all means to that end. But the whole world is chiding us and we are losing the sympathy of friends, who have decreased a lot. There are more points to question than to wonder at.

Mr. Weizman, you made a famous statement which was not denied, where you said, "This is a strange war and has gone beyond what we planned for." What did you mean by this? Weren't other accurate directives from the political level interpreted properly by the military level without government approval?

A. No, no, this did not happen. A strange war, indeed it is a strange war. Every war is strange. Killing people is strange and us getting killed is also strange. What is happening now in Lebanon is not even a war. It is a battle with limited objectives. We announced beforehand that we had no intention of staying in the region and of annexing regions to Israel, but of getting in, acting, creating a new state of affairs and getting out.

The original planning, political as well as military, was to occupy an area smaller than the one actually occupied. The exact area in kilometers was not determined beforehand but we did not of course intend to occupy the area we do as a result of unavoidable developments. The whole issue of the Security Council resolution regarding Israeli withdrawal was not affected by the size of the operation or the region controlled by the Israeli army. The USA called for a Security Council meeting long before knowing the extent of the region in question and within 48 hours of

the beginning of the operation.

During the battle, and as has happened many times in the wars with Israel, the dimensions of the battle would change for two reasons: the resistance put up by the terrorists and their continued attempts to fire at our soldiers and the fact that some village headmen would ask the Israeli army to put their villages under its protection. There was another reason: as soon as it became apparent the UN troops were to be sent to southern Lebanon, we thought that an advance up to the Litani river would help the UN to spread out in the desired manner and, from our viewpoint, would improve its chances of carrying out the mission entrusted to it to prevent the return of the terrorists to southern Lebanon. The fact is that the crossroads taken over by the UN after it entered the region this week are in the Litani region. The entire area, with the exception of the Tyre sector, is free of terrorists. This provides the UN with a good starting point to prevent the return of terrorists to the region. Had we stopped the operation at an earlier stage, when the region was crawling with terrorists, we could not have been able to prove that the terrorists had returned to the region and that the UN had not fulfilled its role.

Q. There is still considerable doubt as to whether the UN is willing and able to perform the role of preventing terrorists from returning to the region.

A. The UN is willing. I understood from my talks with General Siilasvuo that there is a serious determination to prevent the return of terrorists. Whether or not it is able one cannot answer this beforehand. We shall provide the UN with good conditions in the region: there will be no terrorists in the area and the UN will be in control of the Litani bridges. So that a force of four thousand troops is capable under these conditions of carrying out the job of preventing the return of terrorists to the area.

Q. Suppose the UN does not prevent them? The terrorists will be the winners and the UN will protect them from the Israeli army because our freedom of action will be restricted and we will not be able to return to the region because of the presence of UN troops.

A. No, this is a false assumption. We shall study the situation after a little while and as circumstances and developments on the ground require. If the UN fails to perform its role, the

⁹⁷ Interview conducted by Dov Goldstein; excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), March 24, 1978.

Israeli army will go back and do the job. The entry of the UN is temporary. I hope that the Lebanese government will, with the help of its troops, be able to recover its control over southern Lebanon and be able to shoulder its responsibilities. One of our strange habits is that, in every war, we search determinedly for any gaps, conflicts or differing interpretations between the intentions of the political level and the execution of the military. Therefore let me clarify the following: the Israeli army did not overstep anything in Lebanon, did not deviate and did not interpret the decisions of the political level in any way it pleased. The Chief of Staff and myself consulted about every step: advance, pause, bombing. We had no differences in opinion. There were cases when the army was advised to move forward when the political level gave directives to stop. There were other cases when the army advised a pause while the political level recommended an advance. But all this took place in full consultation and understanding as it should be.

- Q. During the prior planning, did you take into account the complex aspects of an operation of this size, with 150,000 refugees fleeing in terror from the Israeli army and hundreds, perhaps more, of dead and wounded among the civilians?
- A. The question of the entry of the Israeli army into a densely populated area is something that conflicts with the desire of our people. To be responsible for one hundred thousand or more refugees is a very dubious sort of pleasure. The facts is that immediate measures were taken to bring the refugees back to their homes and we are doing all in our power to help them in this complex matter. One of the decisive considerations in planning the operation was to prevent Syrian interference in the battle. This factor dictated the military measures in a basic manner. This is why we did not cross the Litani, with the exception of two ambushes laid down on the coastal road north of the river. We carried out an operation of this kind and size without causing an explosion in the Middle East and this was a decisive aspect of our prior planning.

In the initial planning, such a large number of refugees was not expected. It is worth noting that many villages in the region have been abandoned for a long time as a result of the wars between the Muslims and Christians. There are hundreds

of thousands of refugees in Beirut and its suburbs not because the Israeli army moved off to protect citizens from being killed by the terrorists, but because Muslims and Christians have been killing each other. I believe that our sensitivity towards the issue of refugees is a necessary virtue and I do not in any way recommend that we develop instead an attitude of indifference and unconcern just because they are customary among other nations, especially those who only raise the issue of justice when the matter concerns us. But we must not be too severe upon ourselves so as not to fall into the other extreme of exaggeration and distortion of reality....

The terrorists entered Lebanon, transforming it from a quiet, beautiful and civilized country into ruins, long before any Israeli soldier set foot on Lebanese soil.

- Q. During the hundreds of talks I have conducted with you, I have never heard you speak with such disdain about the enemies of Israel, about the Arab soldier or pilot. As a former soldier yourself, do you not feel a prick of conscience when you see the Israeli army using its most advanced aircraft and guns and with such power against enemies armed with Kalashnikov rifles at the best, and in many cases lacking anything they can use to protect themselves?
- A. In every war, your heart and conscience is subject to all sorts of prickings. It is the military, who know the horrors of war at first hand, who love peace more than any other. It is the duty of every commander to execute his task without losses or with minimum losses among his troops. What should we have done? Should we have issued our troops with "Galil" rifles because the terrists have Kalashnikovs? And what about the terrorists who carried out their Bloody Saturday operation,98 a fearful massacre of civilian children and women, did they ask the bus passengers what arms they possessed? Together with others, I feel a sense of unease. All this affair is not conducive to pleasure. Using advanced weapons against the terrorists is also not heart-warming. I have participated in many battles, and I have no self arrogance. This is not like the liberation of Jerusalem in 1967 or the feeling of satisfaction when I learnt that the Israeli army had crossed the Canal in the Yom Kippur war. I visited wounded Leba-

⁹⁸ See footnote 86 above.

nese in Israeli hospitals and felt very unhappy, totally unhappy. But in this continuing war with the murderers we have no alternative but to hit them, with minimum losses on our side.

- Q. In our strenuous struggle, which has achieved no gains recently, to "win" US public opinion, did you take into account the severe losses that an operation of this kind entails at a time when the Premier and Foreign Minister are in a difficult position of confrontation with the US Administration? Only two weeks ago you said, "One tractor in Nabi Salih ploughs up the USA from the information angle." What would happen when it is a question of a hundred tanks?
- A. This was taken into account and weighed with great caution. The fact is that the reactions have been neither dangerous nor loud, as it has been in other cases. The Americans realized that we had to act after the massacre on the coastal road and there were indications on their side that they understood our need to act in an abnormal or unusual manner. We announced beforehand that we did not intend to remain in southern Lebanon permanently and we unilaterally declared a ceasefire. Both things provided the US with a certain amount of assurance.

The problem in the Middle East is not the operation of the Israeli army but the search for a peace agreement with Egypt. However, all the "angels of peace" in the world cannot expect us not to defend ourselves or to allow the terrorists to shed our blood. The "Bloody Bus" was the fuse which triggered our violent reaction in southern Lebanon, although for more than six months we had been observing the return of the terrorists to southern Lebanon, armed not only with Kalashnikovs but also with rockets and guns, striking hard at the Christian inhabitants and planning operations of great danger to Israel. We had received a warning that the terrorists were preparing a series of dangerous strikes against Israel, attempting to reach it by sea. We took preventive measures, but despite this, the horrible massacre of Saturday took place and we were obliged to hit back.

The entire question of southern Lebanon, with all the drama it contains, is marginal and odd when compared with the important issue, peace with Egypt. I have reason to believe that the question of Lebanon is no cause for us to sever the link with Egypt. I say this because in these very days, and even hours, my close contacts with

General Gamasy, Egypt's Defense Minister, continue. There is a possibility and we must do our outmost to arrive at a peace agreement with Egypt.

- Q. When will the Israeli army commence its with-drawal from southern Lebanon?
- A. This depends upon the development of UN troops but the Israeli army will begin to move back to Israeli territory within a week.
 - Q. How long will the withdrawal take?
- A. I hope it will be carried out quickly and without obstacles. We have a commitment to the saefty of Christians in Lebanon. We shall ask the UN to prevent attacks upon them and I hope that after our withdrawal, the north will not only have a "good fence" but also a "good frontier" I would like Lebanese to come and work in Israel, to do business and to receive medical care here.
- Q. Has the team investigating the events of Black Saturday arrived at any conclusion in their report?
- A. No, not yet. I received the report only this morning. I have to read, study and think about it.
- Q, Is it true that during Black Saturday the airforce patrol did not fly over the region where the murderers landed?
- A. No, this is untrue. The aircraft overflew the area and there were many ships despite the uncomfortable climatic conditions. We must not allow any black mood to dominate us. Things happened that Saturday which ought not to have happened. I will hide nothing and I will draw the appropriate conclusions. If anyone deserves to be punished, he will be punished. I would say that, in general, seven years after my leaving the army, I have found that it has been rebuilt after the Yom Kippur war in a manner that makes one proud.

100

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba condemning Israel's invasion of South Lebanon⁹⁹

Havana, late March, 1978

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hereby expresses its most vigorous condemnation of the genocidal attacks carried out against Lebanon by the Zionist Government of Israel in a flagrant violation of that country's sovereignty, massacring the Lebanese and Palestinian Arab population and razing to the ground cities and all types of civilian installations with manifest disregard for the most elementary principles of human rights and the lives of the inhabitants of that region.

Once again, with absolute disregard for human rights and in violation of the principles of the UN Charter, the Government of Israel is threatening peace and stability in the Middle East, trampling Lebanon's sovereignty and integrity, inflicting heavy losses among the civilian population and causing untold material damage. Israel's actions in the Middle East have been made possible by the support given to it by the Washington government, Israel's main source of political, economic and military support.

The Government of Cuba will collaborate through the joint efforts of the member countries of the international community, in the UN and in all other international forums, to condemn and paralyze the genocidal policy practiced by the Government of Israel.

101

Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance affirming that the two problem areas in US-Israel relations are the interpretation of UN resolution 242 and the question of settlements in the occupied territories (excerpts)¹⁰⁰

Washington, March 24, 1978

Q, Mr. Begin is gone now and by all appearances the United States and Israel are at some—not dead-

 ⁹⁹ English text, Granma, (Havana), no. 14, (April 2, 1978), p. 1.
 ¹⁰⁰ Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2014 (May 1978), pp. 24–28. lock but approaching one on what to do next in the Middle East. May I ask you if you can share with us what new departures, if any, the Administration might be considering; and is it your feeling that there can be progress in negotiations so long as Mr. Begin is in charge of the Israeli Government?

A. Let me say first that I should not and will not in any way comment on anything that has to do with the internal political affairs of Israel. It would be totally inappropriate for me to do so.

Now, coming to your main question—what are the prospects for the future? As the Prime Minister said, and as we have said, we had very full, frank, and candid talks over the past 2 days—both talks in which the Prime Minister and the President participated and talks in which I and the Foreign Minister and other members of the Prime Minister's staff took place.

As all of you know, the talks were difficult. There were differences of view between ourselves and the Israelis on certain issues. However, in no way was the atmosphere of the talks unfriendly or ugly—I want to make that very clear. They were frank exchanges of views between allies and friends. We remain fully and unequivocally committed to the security of Israel, and there should be no doubt about that.

The President put forward some exploratory ideas to the Prime Minister with respect to possible ways of bridging the gaps which remain between the parties in a number of critical areas. I am sure that the Prime Minister and the Israeli Government will reflect on these. We will be maintaining our contacts with them and with the Egyptians, and we will remain in consultation with the Members of our Congress. I hope that as a result of this process we will be able to continue the momentum which has clearly been much slowed down by recent events.

- Q. At what point do you do these two things: one, put forward a set of American ideas, and two, send Ambassador Atherton back to the Middle East?
- A. What I've said, to make it very clear: We have already suggested some exploratory thoughts which I'm sure the Israelis will reflect on. It is not a plan that the Americans put forward. It was a way of exploring various views and alternatives and to ascertain the Israeli position with respect to a number of these items.

I'll be very frank. There are differences of views on such issues as the application of Resolution 242,101 242 has been the basis of negotiations between the parties for many years. The application of Resolution 242 to all fronts has been a position which has been accepted by all of the parties over the years.

There now has been a question raised as to whether or not 242 does, in fact, apply to all fronts and, more specifically, to the West Bank and Gaza, In our judgement, it is clear from the past history from the negotiating history-and from the conduct of the parties that 242 does, indeed, apply on all fronts. The whole idea of 242 was the achievement of a full, normal, and secure peace in exchange for territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, and that applied on all fronts.

Another difference of importance is that relating to the question of settlements, both the policy of the Government of Israel with respect to settlements in the Sinai and in the West Bank. Those are two of the main problem areas.

- Q, Maybe you assumed, but you didn't answer the question. One, are we going to put forward any American plan? And two, are you going to send Mr. Atherton
- A. Insofar as putting forward any new ideas, let me say that we have always said-and I've said it to you many times before-that if there comes a time that we think it will be useful for us to put forward our ideas which might help to resolve the gaps between the parties, we would feel free to do so. I don't have any time schedule or anything like that in mind at this time.
- Q. We've been led to believe that the President, in discussing the situation with Members of Congress, discussed with them the ideas he put forth and indicated that Mr. Begin had expressed only negative reactions to them. You seem to be suggesting that there was no reaction to this, or am I-
- A. I did not want to leave you with that impression. As I said, certain exploratory ideas were put forth with respect to any number of pointssuch as the question of settlement policy—and it was very clear, in response to that, that the Israeli position is that they will not give up settlements in the Sinai as part of a peace with Egypt or let the Israeli settlers be under Egyptian protection instead of Israeli protection.

There is a disagreement, as I indicated before,

101 Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

with respect to the application of 242 to the withdrawal from at least part of the occupied West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. And there are differing views, as was indicated in some of the newspaper articles this morning, with respect to exploratory suggestions about an interim agreement that would apply for a period on the West Bank, to be followed by some form of choice at the end with respect to the possibility of affiliation of that territory with Israel to maintain the interim status or to affiliate with Jordan. Those are some of the differences.

- Q. Now on most of these positions we have already known that disagreements existed between the United States and Israel—on the settlements as well as on the American ideas on the West Bank. What was different about this visit? In other words, why was the impasse sort of taken note of now, rather than, say, a month
- A. I think that it is best explained by emphasizing that there was a detailed examination in the frankest kind of fashion between the two heads of government where it became very clear without any ambiguity where these differences lie. To a degree, there had been some ambiguity left prior to this meeting. I think that ambiguity has been removed.
- Q. Would it help at this time for Jordan to agree to enter into direct negotiations involving the West Bank? And if so, are there efforts being made to achieve that?
- A. It would help to have as many of these parties as we could get to participate in discussions. I must say as a practical matter I do not think at this moment, without a declaration of principles, that there is any real likelihood that Jordan at this point would enter into any negotiations. I think it is first necessary to establish a framework for a comprehensive peace before one can expect other parties to enter into discussions.
- Q. Mr. Begin, yesterday, appealed for patience from the United States. He also appealed for fair play from the American people and indicated that he thought the Administration had changed its attitude toward his peace plan. What is your reaction to his appeals?
- A. We have not changed our position with respect to Mr. Begin's proposal for self-rule. At the time that those proposals were made—I believe it was in December [14-19] when Mr. Begin was here—we indicated that we believed that the

proposal which he had made was a constructive proposal. It provided a first step for negotiations, and we welcomed the fact that it had been made.

We did not endorse the proposal. We still believe that it was a constructive step—but only a step—looking forward to further negotiations with respect to the issues relating to the whole West Bank question.

- Q. Has the United States not shown enough patience?
- A. The United States will persevere. It will be patient. Let me make it crystal clear that we have not given up hope. We are going to continue to work with the parties. Peace is essential, not only to the people of the area, but to the United States and to the world, and we will continue to do whatever we can to work with the parties to try and achieve that ultimate end.

Q. If I may return to just one more question on the Middle East. I am a little bit confused about what the exploratory ideas that we have put forward are intended to resolve. It sounds to me as if you are saying on at least three questions—the applicability of 242, the question of settlements remaining in Sinai, and that the issue of the West Bank of the Jordan be regarded as an interim process leading to some kind of referendum—that the United States is taking rather firm positions on those three.

Are you saying, in effect, that unless the Israelis accept what is our view on these three basic fundamental questions, that it will be difficult or impossible to move forward in the negotiations? I don't understand what the exploratory ideas—if we have taken such firm positions on these three issues—are intended to resolve. It sounds to me as if we are—

A. There are a number of exploratory issues or points that have been discussed. One of the paramount questions—indeed perhaps the most fundamental question—is that of the security of Israel. And we have made it clear to them and to the Arabs that any settlement must protect the security of Israel, and we have put forward some exploratory ideas of how this can be done.

There are a number of other specific items, or ideas, like that which were discussed on which there was agreement between ourselves and the Israelis. So there is a whole range of exploratory ideas. I was asked, in effect, you know, where the differences lie, and that is why I picked the three critical issues.

- Q. Would you accept my assumption that unless there is agreement on these three issues—the settlements, the applicability of 242 to the West Bank, and that there be some kind of a referendum or freedom of choice following an interim process—that it would be difficult to move forward?
- A. Certainly insofar as the question of 242 is concerned, this is absolutely fundamental. It is the basis for the negotiations that have taken place up until now, and if there cannot be a resolution of the interpretation of 242, then I think there are very substantial obstacles ahead.

With respect to the question of settlements, this is a fundamental difference between the two parties, and again I think this creates a substantial obstacle to any progress.

Q. You seem to be talking all around this question of the exploratory ideas for Israel's security. What precisely have you suggested to them that might be helpful in assuring them of their security?

I would like to add another related question. What is your idea now, or the U.S. idea now, relative to a mutual defense agreement with the Israelis?

A. In regard to the first of your two questions, the details of the items or ideas which we have suggested have been conveyed to the Israelis. We believe we should convey these kinds of ideas to the Egyptians as well. And I don't think until we have had a chance to explore them with both that it will be helpful to detail the specific ideas that we have put forward for discussion.

I guess your second question was: What about a defense agreement? This is a question which would ultimately have to be decided, of course, by the Congress of the United States. But if that were the final item which would be required as the linchpin to put together an agreement which would fail without something like that, then that is something I think we would have to seriously consider recommending to the Congress.

- Q, Israeli officials in Jerusalem are making the charge that the Administration, through what it is saying privately and implying publicly, is trying to bring down the Begin government or at least Menahem Begin's leadership of that government. Would you respond to that charge?
- A. I am very happy to respond to that. That is totally false. The President and I and all of us have the highest respect for the Prime Minister. We may have differences on some items as we have

agreements on many items. It would be totally improper for us to interfere or meddle in any way in the internal politics of Israel. We will not do so. Nobody has done so, and I assure you that without any sense of equivocation.

- Q. Yesterday Mr. Begin said that if we supply Saudi Arabia with F-15 fighter bombers it will make them into a confrontation state against Israel. Do you agree with that estimate of his?
- A. No, I respectfully disagree with that estimate of the Prime Minister's. Saudi Arabia is not a confrontation state. From all of our discussions with them at the highest level they have indicated that they do not and will not become a confrontation state.

Insofar as the F-15's are concerned, they have indicated that they would not base these aircraft at Tabuk, which is the base near Israel; that these would be put in bases at Dhahran, Riyadh, and in the south. The potential threats they face would be in these areas. The reasons for the F-15's are that they are very effective, perhaps the world's most effective interceptor aircraft.

Saudi Arabia has a vast land mass; it is the equivalent of everything east of the Mississippi; they have a limited number of people. The problem of ground-air radar coverage is a very tough one for them because of the limited number of people that they have to man such radars and the great cost which would be involved in setting up such a system. With the effective radar that the F-15's have, they can operate over this vast territory in a way which will give them the kind of air defense protection which is required. We believe this to be a valid requirement. We believe that it will not upset the balance of the region, and we believe that it will also be helpful in keeping movement in the peace negotiations.

- Q. In that connection, did King Khalid of Saudi Arabia write to the President saying that Saudi Arabia might have to increase oil prices because of the falling dollar value, and was there any linkage, as well, to an increase in oil prices relating to the F-15 sale?
- A. Let me say that I will not comment on any correspondence between the President and King Khalid or any other head of state. But let me answer your question.

The Saudis have never indicated to us that they would link progress or lack of progress in these

- areas to oil prices. They have indicated quite the contrary; that they will make their independent judgements on these issues. They have not threatened in any way that they are going to take punitive action of any kind whatsoever.
- Q, Really, in terms of the dollar and the value of the dollar, there is nothing to that as well?
 - A. I'm not sure I understand your question.
- Q, I was asking whether, putting aside a letter from King Khalid to the President, whether you know if Saudi Arabia has raised the question of raising oil prices because of the falling value of the dollar on international markets?
- A. Not to my knowledge, but others in the area have raised that question.
- Q. If, despite the best efforts of diplomacy, it is not possible to go any further with the Middle East peace initiative due to the positions which have been taken, what would be the consequences in the Middle East and what would be the consequences in terms of Israel's relationships in the United States?
- A. I don't want to speculate about the assumptions you made in that question. Let me say I do not think we are at a point in which one should say we've given up hope of moving forward, because we haven't. I think that there is still a real chance to move forward. There are many obstacles in the way, but I think at this point to imply that we are in a desperate situation where nothing can happen and that it is hopeless is not an accurate assessment, and I just don't want to speculate about what may happen.
- Q. The U.S.-Soviet joint statement¹⁰² is still the basis for our approach to a Mideast peace. Is there any chance that we would try to reactivate that, and, in particular, is there any possibility that we would try to reactivate that in context of looking at the Mideast in terms of the kind of development program that the Saudis in particular have been pushing, as the Soviets have indicated they would be interested in as well; that is to say, to actually develop the region—using petrodollars, by increasing U.S. exports, high technology, etc.—and in that way essentially sidestep certain problems that now exist by being able to guarantee the kind of peace that everybody in the region recognizes?
 - A. Let me say that we have always believed

¹⁰² Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

that an essential element of a final peace would be an economic development program for the area. We have done a great deal of research and work on what kinds of programs might be effective in this area. We have discussed it not only with the parties to the conflict, but we have discussed it with other nations in the area and elsewhere in the world.

Now, coming back to your first question which was related to the U.S.-Soviet joint statement which was issued. The fundamental principles which we stated in that remain principles which we believe are sound principles. Many of those principles are contained in the discussions which we have had with all of the parties, and we still stand behind those principles.

- Q. You made clear that you are not going to have any real progress without a declaration of principles for a settlement in the Middle East. It also seems clear from what you said you can't get that declaration unless Israel changes some of its views. Although you're determined to persevere, do you have any assurances that the others, for example the Egyptians, are willing to persevere under these circumstances, and do you feel any kind of deadline pressure, like October of this year?
- A. I'm not going to speculate on deadlines or anything like that. I think the parties all still are willing to persevere, and by that I mean the Israelis and the Egyptians.
- Q. (In reference to the Middle East peace process) I was just wondering if you had assurances from any of these people. You expressed some note of optimism and confidence in the process that may not be apparent to the rest of us.
- A. They have all said that they wish to continue the peace process. I am not suggesting that means the parties can sit down and talk face-to-face in the near future, because I think that that is unlikely at this point.

102

Memorandum from the White House listing those issues that are unresolved problems in the Middle East negotiations (excerpts)¹⁰³ Washington, March 25, 1978

Israel would not agree to a referendum by the West Bank-Gaza Arabs at the end of the five-year period, even though ostensibly the choices in such a referendum would be limited to three alternatives: continuance of the interim "self-rule" status; affiliation with Jordan; or affiliation with Israel. He [Begin] insisted that such a referendum nevertheless would lead to an independent Palestinian state.

Israel would not agree to a policy of stopping the establishment of new settlements on the West Bank, nor the expansion of existing settlements, even if peace negotiations were proceeding.

With reference to the Sinai settlements, Israel would not agree to their future protection being furnished by either Egyptian forces or United Nations forces but would insist upon permanent protection by Israeli forces. All of these settlements are within the proposed demilitarized zone which would remain under United Nations supervision.

Israel would not state that, regarding the principle of withdrawal, United Nations Resolution 242 applies to all fronts.

103

Statement by Prime Minister Begin of Israel explaining his government's proposal for administrative self-rule for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza¹⁰⁴

Jerusalem, March 29, 1978

Mr. Speaker, members of the Knesset, there exist points of agreement as well as disagreement between the US government and the government of Israel regarding the form and substance of a Middle East settlement. The basic points of agreement between the two governments are the following:

¹⁰³ Partial text, Near East Report (Washington), XXII, 14 (April 5, 1978), p. 56.

¹⁰⁴ Translated from the Hebrew text, Records of the Knesset (Divrei ha-Knesset), March 29, 1978, pp. 2295–2298.

There is need for peace agreements between Israel and its neighbours. This peace treaty will lay down a total normalization of life and of relations among states in the region. The frontiers will be open and normal and proper diplomatic relations will be established as well as economic and financial. Secondly: a state named Palestine should not be established in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, because it is realized that such a state will be a danger to the state of Israel and the entire free world. Thirdly: The organization of murderers called the PLO is not a party to any negotiations concerning the establishment of peace in the Middle East. I must point out that these three things that are agreed upon are not accidental but the result of determination and information and it is good that we have reached agreement concerning these three principles.

In our peace proposal, we suggested administrative self-rule for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We proposed that they themselves should elect an administrative council made up of 11 members and divided into 11 departments which run the daily life of the inhabitants without any interference whatever from us. We also proposed a free choice of citizenship, either Israeli or Jordanian, and parliamentary expression for that administrative self-rule, i.e. whoever opts for Israeli citizenship would vote for the Knesset and whoever prefers Jordanian citizenship would vote for election to the Jordanian Parliament. The US government expressed its support for our proposals in principle in so far as they contain the selfrule scheme but suggested to us that a plebiscite be held after five years in Judea, Samaria and Gaza regarding the presence of Israeli troops. US spokesmen expressed the view that our army would remain in barracks or camps to be designated in these three areas of the country even after the five year period. I would like to point out that this, in our view, is a positive and important matter because we have declared that we shall not interfere in the day to day affairs of the local inhabitants. But it is clear that we must bear the responsibility for general security and order because, otherwise, the organisation of murderers will control Judea, Samaria and Gaza with all that this entails. On the other hand, it was necessary not to accept the plebiscite proposal because to hold it would lead inevitably to something that the Americans also do not want, namely the creation of a Pal-

estinian state. According to the US proposal, the inhabitants who will be called upon to vote will have to decide among three alternatives: continuation of the status quo, a link with Israel or a link with the government of Jordan. The (Americans) have assured us that the fourth alternative, a Palestine state, will not be offered at all so as to remove from our minds any suspicion as to the result of the plebiscite. Unfortunately, we cannot accept the interpretation which says that, in case the fourth alternative is not proposed, this enemy state will assuredly not come into being. We must remember that the pressure, threats and terror that the organisation of murderers practices is still continuing. They assassinated four people in the Ramallah and Jerusalem areas, all for the sake of terror. We have before us the experience of states where fear predominates among citizens and among some rulers also.

For us, it is a question of survival. This is why we have to examine the following two alternatives; either a call to cancel a ballot carrying the alternative I spoke about earlier and in all cases, this would be a danger to our future and we are not prepared to endanger our future because of the word "plebiscite". Or else, and this we have agreed to, that after five years there will be a discussion anew as regards all the arrangements pertaining to administrative self-rule. This means that each side, the self-rule authority, the Jordanian government or the Israeli government can submit proposals for change. But we cannot and will not accept a plebiscite. In the present circumstances, this will not be a democratic measure, but quite the opposite.

As regards the declaration of principles, several versions have been submitted. I might point out that with the background of relations between us and the USA, quite a large number of versions have been accepted by representatives of both governments, the only problem being whether the third party would agree to them. And so we have discussed various versions. We received from the Egyptian government a version made up of two articles: the first having to do with withdrawal and the second pertaining to what the Egyptians call "self-determination for the Arabs of the Land of Israel." We explained that we do not accept these two articles. As regards the first, the Egyptians added to it the preamble to resolution 242 where it stated that there is danger in acquiring

territory through war and joined this to the practical side of resolution 242 which requires Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict. We explained that this addition would mean requiring Israel to withdraw completely to the lines as they were before the six-day war, which is unacceptable now and in the future. We also explained that the sentence taken from the preamble to resolution 242 stands by itself because it embodies a just political principle only when everyone realises that what is meant is a war of aggression. It is not true that according to international law and practice it is forbidden to make territorial changes in case of a defensive war. On the contrary, it was in the wake of defensive wars that all territorial changes recognized by all nations, both in Europe and in the Far East, have been made. For we all know that the six-day war was a defensive war and no international body has ever maintained the opposite. As for US presidents, they have written to us from time to time over the last 11 years to say that war was forced on Israel. So it is clear that in the wake of a defensive war and as a result of agreement concluded through a peace treaty, it is perfectly permissible to make territorial changes. Therefore, this addition to the Egyptian version, which seeks to show that we must return to the lines of June 4, 1967, as if the six-day war was a war of aggression, is incorrect and unacceptable.

The second version has to do with self-determination. We had already pointed out in Ismailiya¹⁰⁵ and on every other occasion that the meaning of this phrase can only be the creation of a Palestinian state. And since we all reject this idea, which embodies dangers that it is difficult even to conceive, we cannot accept this text....

I would like to summarize this part of my remarks by saying here, once more, that agreement over the declaration of principles will become possible when the Egyptians come to realise that they cannot ask us to carry out these two demands for we have already announced that we cannot accept either of them, namely, the demand for total withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967 and the demand to establish a Palestinian state. Any other version which does not embody these two demands will be subject to negotiations and there is reason to hope that we will arrive at an agreement.

Accordingly, we have on our part proposed during recent talks in Washington the following two items which I will read out verbatim: "Within the framework of a settlement and in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 338,106 the two governments express their desire to negotiate a peace through implementation of all the principles embodied in UN Security Council resolution 242107 which constitute the basis of negotiations between Israel and all the neighbouring states. On the basis of all the principles of Security Council resolution 242 alluded to above, there will be a withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from areas occupied in the 1967 war and there will be secure and recognized frontiers within which every state in the region can live in peace, not subject to the threat or the use of force." There is reason to believe that this version will be acceptable to all sides because this version is entirely positive. It embodies acceptance of resolution 242 and although this resolution has differing interpretations, no one can doubt our acceptance of this resolution in its true meaning according to this formula. What we do not accept is the addition of words that are not in the resolution.

As regards a settlement of the problem of the Arabs of Eretz Israel, we have proposed that there shall be a just solution for them. The Arabs of Eretz Israel in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will have the right to participate in determining their future through talks to be held between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Arabs of Eretz Israel. So it is clear that the Arabs of Eretz Israel will participate in determining their future, not through an artificial plebiscite but through their participation in these talks which we have agreed to hold....

As for the settlements, there is a difference of views between the US and the Israeli governments. Both in recent visits and in recent talks, US representatives have expressed the view that the settlement of Jews in the land of Israel is not in conformity with international law and is an obstacle to peace making. This view of the Israeli government is totally different and I must once more affirm it. First, the settlement of Jews in the land of Israel is perfectly legitimate and conforms with international law. Secondly, it is a positive

¹⁰⁶ Doc. 34 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

¹⁰⁷ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

act which is not an obstacle in any way to the establishment of peace. It is indeed part of the peace making process between us and our neighbours...

We have stated clearly in our peace proposal that our people have demands, rights and sovereignty in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We suggest that the question of sovereignty remains open for the sake of the agreement. Therefore, there is no conflict between our peace proposal and any Security Council resolution.

As regards acceptance of that resolution, I have stated this clearly and have also read out our declaration of principles.

I would like to ask our people not to be unjust to itself as others have been attempting to be. Our proposal is a good one. It ought to lead to serious negotiations about the establishment of peace in the Middle East region....

The deep friendship between us and the USA will overcome difficulties. But it is my duty to state that if we are again faced with demands that affect our people's most vital causes, we will not hesitate to tell the US government: We cannot accept these demands because they touch upon our future and that of our children. We are surrounded by enemies. We are the only state in the world concerning which there is a document stating that this state should cease to exist. No other state in the world has been faced with such a document. Behind the organization which authored that document stand most Arab states, supplying it with arms, equipment and everything. This is the danger which threatens us on every side. Therefore we must be as cautious as possible when we study any proposal, saying "yes" when our real interests, security, future and rights are not affected and "no" when such a proposal affects the interests and future of our people.

104

Communiqué issued by the Palestine National Movement in Israel calling for a general strike in commemoration of the Day of the Land¹⁰⁸

Late March, 1978

Palestinian masses,

For thirty years our Arab Palestinian people have been subjected to diverse conspiracies beginning with exile and ending with the continuing expropriation of Arab lands.

If we examine the facts carefully with the aim of determining how best to defend our land, we would find that exile and expulsion from our homeland are still going on. The expropriation of lands in the region of Tis-a, the establishment of the so-called settlements of Nahal 'Atsmon, Beit Rimon and Peten in Galilee, the demolition operations in Majd al-Kurum and Iksal, the vicious assault on Baqa al-Gharbiya, Jath, Jaljulya and Kafr Qasem, the expulsion of the Arabs of Mafjar, the settlement schemes in occupied Arab territories, the slaughtering of sheep in the Naqab and the confinement of our brethren the Beduins in specific locations—all these are clear proof of the determination of the authorities to escalate the policy of judaization and settlement of Arab lands.

We call upon our masses to unite their ranks in order to foil the schemes of the racist authorities. The thirtieth of March, which brought out all our people's hidden potential, still awaits the decisive and effective decisions that can restore morale to our masses once again following the inactivity which our masses fell into after the glorious Day of the Land, on which six martyrs fell.

In honour of these noble martyrs and of our

¹⁰⁸ Wafa (Beirut), March 29, 1978, p. 7.

^{— &}quot;Tis-a" means "nine" in Arabic; a number of regions in Galilee have been declared military zones since 1948 and are considered "closed" on the basis of Article 125 of the 1945 Emergency Defence Laws. These zones were accorded numbers, and thus Tis-a signifies "closed zone no. 9", situated in Lower Galilee.

[—] The "Arabs of Mafjar" is the name of a Bedouin fribe whose main centre is the village of Mafjar, near al-Khodeyrat. They were expelled at the beginning of 1978 under the pretext that their lands and village were needed for the installation of a central power station between Tel Aviv and Haifa. [ed. note.]

just cause, we must once again repeat the accomplishment of March 1976 when our masses stood united following the general strike of that year. Masses of our people,

The campaign of expropriation, demolition and judaization is still going on. It is part of a total scheme of liquidation which our Arab Palestinian people are being subjected to in their various localities. In order to confront these schemes of liquidation, we must stand against them in total unity, affirming our determination to continue the struggle. Our masses will not hesitate to adopt, once more, the stand they adopted on March 30, 1976.

Long live the general strike of March 30. Glory and eternal life to our noble martyrs.

105

Speech to the Knesset by Labour Party Chairman Peres of Israel discussing the settlement policy of Prime Minister Begin in the occupied territories (excerpt)¹⁰⁹

Jerusalem, March 29, 1978

... Stability and seriousness must be the basis for assessing the situation. And while exaggeration is at the very heart of this assessment, lack of control in government and its actions has done incalculable harm to the credibility of Israel. A good example of this is in the field of settlement. Mr. Prime Minister, there is hardly a place on the map where the government you head has not committed an error with respect to an existing settlement or to one under construction. At your first meeting with Sadat, you spoke of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Sinai. I can understand why that evening, the question of the settlements was not raised. Sadat won a specific point. Instead of speaking of defensible borders, the government preferred to speak of a zone of settlement, thus causing all the criticism in the world to be directed against settlement, the loveliest of Israel's projects. Some ministers addressed themselves to the settlers but did not use your language. You said: "The IDF will withdraw from Sinai," while they said "We shall give up sovereignty."

Israel still finds it difficult to explain to its own citizens and to world public opinion the truth of what is being proposed in Sinai. Tractors are now going off to eastern Sinai to set up 15 model settlement sites and here, as I said, the government has vanished. It has kept silent and vanished. No one knows who took the decision, no one knows what to say. It was impossible to get any information out of the government. Were these settlements really built? The decisive answer was: yes and no. Who decided to build them? One minister on his own responsibility? Yes and no. Yes. because the cabinet as a whole did not decide; No, because the government has declared that all decisions were taken with its agreement. Why build them specifically in eastern Sinai, which we are going to evacuate? See the previous justification. Because there is no justification, there is no explanation. Why did the government not draw any conclusion from this? The answer is: where there is no justification, there can be no conclusion. This is being printed every day in the world press, as if someone is deliberately trying to make fun of Israel-and I am certain this was not the intention. Are they making mistakes only in Sinai? Why are they not being repeated in Judea and Samaria? The government announces the building of settlements in army camps and if there are no camps then in the meantime they build temporary settlements. This, Mr. Prime Minister, is the shedding of the blood of Israel's credibility.

There is a basic and real debate in Israel: is what is wanted an Israeli control over every region in Judea and Samaria, for considerations that relate to us rather than US or Arab considerations, i.e. for considerations relating to our demographic future and our desire for peace? Should we return certain regions to Arab control? Mr. Begin, and I admire him for this, insists that there will be no foreign rule or sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. But the problem is that his government colleagues repeat what he says in whispers although for the most part they hold different views. The deputy premier claimed that Israel must be democratic and Jewish. He said either we stay in the territories, either we become Jews and non-democratic or we become democratic

¹⁰⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, Records of the Knesset (Divrei ha-Knesset), 2nd Session, Vol. XXIV, March 29, 1978, pp. 229-230.

and non-Jewish. And so we have been plunged into an unnecessary debate, a debate that condemns Israel, that is useless and stupid, regarding the applicability of resolution 242¹¹⁰ to Judea and Samaria. If it is true that resolution 242 combines the English language with an English fog,¹¹¹ then why did we refuse in effect to have this fog cover the east as well since we had agreed that it covers both the north and the south? This had been the nation's consensus.

The Premier's colleagues, or perhaps he himself, proposed that we emerge with a formula to the effect that everything is subject to negotiations. Members of the Knesset, if everything is negotiable, what need is there for resolution 242? Then Judea and Samaria will also be open to negotiations, if this is so, why do we reject 242? Why do we create a contradiction that is incomprehensible to international logic? But the foreign minister felt, it seems, that this is a very broad and generous definition so he added one of his own: "If the Arabs propose partition of Judea and Samaria, we shall discuss this honestly." If there is readiness to discuss the partition of Judea and Samaria, then why oppose 242? Why do we do this only when the Arabs suggest it? I understand that we want to test the Arabs. What if the Americans proposed it? Why do we refuse? Are we not concerned to maintain good relations with the Americans?....

The deputy premier was not satisfied with this alone but added that the government's declaration of principles embodies a readiness to accept 242. If this is so then why do we not say so, simply and in Hebrew, without ambiguity, innuendo and a controversial explanation? Why, if this is so, do we have to debate with the US President while this is in fact what the government itself has affirmed? If this is not so, then why does the deputy premier make statements to this effect? Why do we not speak out clearly? Why is the debate "on all fronts" instead of debating with the Egyptians "on all territories."?....

The US President has undertaken to continue his support for Israel's security. But, members of the Knesset, there is also a debate between us and the Americans. America wants us to evacuate

the settlements from the approaches of Rafah and we refuse. I must say that, as regards this demand too, we hear voices of dissent among the assenters. The US demand does not include evacuation of the settlements in Judea and Samaria. The USA asks Israel to agree to have a general plebiscite in Judea and Samaria and it seems to me that the Knesset, most if not all of it, rejects this. The moment it is said today that there is to be a general plebiscite, there will be no interim period. The propaganda campaign will begin at once. It is impossible to hold a plebiscite among a people when that people is threatened to be silent and is afraid of voting. In this regard, if you had only concentrated discussion exclusively on this question, my opinion is that our situation would have been better by far. I also support the entry of Jordan into the picture.

[In answer to a question by Meir Pa'il of Shelli on whether he supports free elections.]

Yes, the moment the PLO disappears, I will support free elections. Mr. Speaker, Israel has to decide, and to decide by itself, and for Israeli considerations. Peace is in the interests of Israel and the Jewish character of Israel is our national interest. In my view, we cannot have both without Israel announcing its readiness to compromise in Judea and Samaria. It is impossible to escape this. Everyone asks: What does al-Maarakh propose? Al-Maarakh proposes, for the sake of Israel's future, and not for US or Arab considerations, that we say we are ready to discuss a compromise, territorial settlement in Judea and Samaria. [Interruption: Is there anyone who would discuss this with you?]

This government is not prepared to say so. This is the point of the debate. The US accepts 242 and we have rejected it.

¹¹⁰ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹¹¹ A reference to the wording of resolution 242, article 1, which the Israelis interpret as meaning withdrawal from some of the 1967-occupied territories only.

Press conference statements by US President Carter discussing Israel's use of US arms to invade Lebanon and denying allegations that he referred to Prime Minister Begin of Israel as unfit to lead his government in the present situation (excerpts)¹¹²

Brasilia, March 30, 1978

- Q. In recent days, you've seen the use of American military supplies to invade a country and to cause untold suffering to hundreds of thousands. Some say this is the violation of U.S. law. In view of the facts that you have before you, is it a violation; and two, has it caused you to reassess your warplane package for the Middle East?
 - A. Are you referring to the Lebanon question?
 - Q. Yes.
- A. As you know, when the terrorist attacks in Israel precipitated the countermove by Israel into Lebanon, which has been a haven for the Palestinian terrorists, the United States took the initiative in the United Nations—I might say, without the approval of Israel—to initiate U.N. action there to expedite the removal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

We have obviously attempted to comply with the law, and this is a matter that we are still addressing. The other part of your question?

- Q, Has it caused you to reassess your package of warplanes for the Middle East, and how do you say you have attempted to comply with the law?
- A. We're attempting to terminate as rapidly as possible the military presence of Israel in southern Lebanon through U.N. action. I believe this is the proper way to do it, rather than unilateral action on our part, which would probably be unsuccessful in any case to get Israel to withdraw. The presence of U.N. forces—the French, the Swedes, and others—I believe, is the preferable way, and it marshals the opinion of the entire world, through the United Nations, against the Israeli presence being retained in Lebanon.

This has not caused me to reassess the American position on the sale of warplanes and other equip-

ment to the Middle East. This is a very well-balanced package. It emphasizes our interest in military security of the Middle East. It does not change at all the fact that Israel still retains a predominant air capability and military capability. There is no threat to their security. But it also lets the nations involved and the world know that our friendship, our partnership, our sharing of military equipment with the moderate Arab nations is an important permanent factor of our foreign policy.

Q. Have you or any other top U.S. officials—Dr. Brzezinski, for instance—suggested that Prime Minister Begin may not be the right man to head that government in the present circumstances? And apart from what may or may not have been said, do you now think the Begin government can make the hard decisions necessary to move the peace process forward?

A. I can say unequivocally that no one in any position of responsibility in the U.S. Administration has ever insinuated that Prime Minister Begin is not qualified to be Prime Minister or that he should be replaced. This report, the origin of which I do not know, is completely false.

I think that Prime Minister Begin and his government are able to negotiate in an adequately flexible way to reach an agreement with Egypt, later Jordan and other of the neighboring countries. This is our hope and this is also our belief. We have not given up on the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement in the Middle East.

Under the Begin government, with him as Prime Minister, recently arrangements have been made between Israel and Egypt for Ezer Weizman to go to Egypt again, which will be a continuation of the probing for a compatibility. I think it is obvious now that with the issues so sharply drawn, that key differences remain that must be addressed on the side of Israel. The things that are of deepest concern is Israel's refusal to acknowledge that U.N. Resolution 242 applies clearly to the West Bank, their unwillingness to grant to the West Bank Palestinians, the Palestinian Arabs, a right to participate in the determination of their own future by voting at the end of a 5-year period, and so forth, for the kind of affiliation they would have with Israel or Jordan or under a joint administration. And this is a problem for which I have no clear solution yet. But I believe that the

Partial text, Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2014 (May 1978), pp. 7, 8-9.

Begin government is completely capable of negotiating an agreement with Egypt.

107

Letter from US Secretary of State Vance to the Speaker of the House of Representatives regarding Israel's use of US weapons in the invasion of South Lebanon¹¹³

Washington, April 5, 1978

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to Section (c) of the Arms Export Control Act, I am providing the following information with respect to Israel's military operations in Lebanon that began on March 15.

Those operations have involved use of defense articles furnished to Israel by the United States under the foreign military sales program. Sales to Israel under this program are governed by a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952, which provides:

"The Government of Israel assures the United States Government that such equipment, materials, or services as may be acquired from the United States are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state."

In the circumstances, I must report that a violation of the 1952 Agreement may have occurred by reason of the Israeli operations in Lebanon.

We have discussed with senior officials of the Israeli Government these operations and the use of U.S.-origin equipment in them. The Israeli Government has said that it intends to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 425,¹¹⁴ which, among other things, calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. We are actively engaged in discussing with officials of the

¹¹⁴ Doc. 32 above.

Israeli Government the date for the completion of such withdrawal.

In these circumstances, including the ongoing efforts to restore momentum to the vital peace negotiations and Israel's assurance that it intends to withdraw from Lebanon, I am not recommending to the President any further action.

108

Speech by US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton outlining US policy in the Middle East¹¹⁵

Atlanta, April 5, 1978

The 30-year search for peace between Arab and Jew in the Middle East has been called a history of lost opportunities. I leave it to others to argue the question of who was responsible for losing which opportunity in the past. Our concern as a nation, and as a friend of both sides to this tragic and intractable conflict, must be with the opportunity of the present and the promise of the future.

For a brief dramatic moment last November [19–21], the world saw a vision of what that future could be, when President Sadat of Egypt met with Prime Minister Begin of Israel in Jerusalem, and in December [24–26] when they met again in Ismailia. Today many ask—what has gone wrong? Why have the hopes of November turned to frustration and disappointment, to charge and countercharge?

I would suggest to you that nothing has gone irretrievably wrong. Indeed, some morning-after reaction to the heady experience of those first moments of genuine breakthrough was probably inevitable. What has happened, quite simply, is this: The effort to transform those moments of vision into a dynamic process of reconciliation through negotiations has come face-to-face with the reality that the underlying issues which have blocked progress for so long are still there—that hard decisions involving fundamental premises and policies are ultimately unavoidable. But the opportunity for progress is still there to be seized

¹¹³ Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2014 (May 1978), pp. 46-47. For a letter from Republican Representative McCloskey to President Carter protesting the use of cluster bombs in South Lebanon, see doc. 97 above.

¹¹⁵ Made at a conference sponsored by the Department of State and the Southern Conference for International Studies; Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2014 (May 1978), pp. 42–45.

because of one overriding fact. The global and the regional context within which those issues are now being addressed is no longer what it was for much of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Sadat's offer to visit Jerusalem, and Israel's spontaneous response to that initiative, have transformed the situation.

Whether this opportunity is lost or won depends in the first instance on the wisdom and courage of the leaders and peoples of the Middle East. It depends on the sense of responsibility of the international community. It depends on the willingness of the major powers, above all, not to seek unilateral advantage in a situation fraught with danger for the entire world. And it depends upon the ability of this country to steer a steady and fairminded course, true to our commitments to our friends in the area and to our shared vision of the future, even when friends on one side or the other of the conflict may differ with us. President Carter has charted such a course. To succeed, he needs the understanding and support of the American people and of their representatives in the Congress.

I cannot tell you today what will happen in the future or even precisely what the next steps in our diplomatic efforts will be. These will depend upon the results of consultations with the parties to the conflict which are still in progress. I can, however, use this occasion to examine with you the basic issues that the United States and the parties to the conflict are facing and to describe the active role the United States is playing.

Let me first talk for a moment about why peace in the Middle East is important to the United States and to the world community—and about why our country is so deeply involved in the diplomatic effort to achieve the goal of peace.

For the United States, involvement in the search for peace in the Middle East is not a matter of preference but a necessity and a major responsibility. A responsible American policy for the Middle East must assure that we retain the capacity to influence the course of events there commensurate with our responsibilities as a major power. The United States, with the goodwill which it uniquely has among all the parties in the Middle East, is in a position to help shape events, to help prevent wars, and to help the parties find their way along the hard road to a negotiated peace. To continue to play this role, we must

pursue policies which take into account the broad range of American concerns and interests in the Middle East.

It is therefore important, as a starting point, to identify what those concerns and interests are.

First, we have an interest, dictated by our global responsibilities in this nuclear age, to prevent conflict in the Middle East from again becoming a flashpoint of superpower confrontation. More basically, we have an interest in conducting our relationships with other great powers so as to prevent a shift in the global balance of power which itself could invite confrontation.

Second is our strong commitment to the security and survival of Israel. It is a commitment rooted deeply in history and in our moral values as a nation. It has been reaffirmed by every Administration in this country since the modern State of Israel came into existence 30 years ago. It is our conviction that Israel's security over the long term can best be assured by peace treaties which resolve Israel's differences with its Arab neighbors and commit them to live at peace with Israel.

Third, a mutually beneficial relationship with the major nations of the Arab world is essential. They hold the key to their own defense against outside domination or domination by radical forces in the Middle East, and they look to us for help in maintaining their own security and independence. The oil which some of them produce is literally vital to our allies in Western Europe and Japan and increasingly important to us. Their financial power-through the level of oil prices and their large financial reserves-makes them important partners in the effort to maintain a worldwide economic order. In the course of our relationship, thousands of Arab students, professionals, and technical experts are trained every year in the United States, and jobs are created in this country by the growing volume of exports to, and investment in, Arab countries. Our relations with the Arab world, wisely nurtured, can enhance our ability to strengthen the forces of moderation in the Middle East and advance the cause of peace.

Fourth, in the deepest sense, our concern for human rights also dictates efforts to end a conflict which has taken countless thousands of innocent victims and has deflected the nations of the area from using their bountiful resources and talents for bettering the lives of their peoples.

Next, what are the fundamental issues which

must be dealt with if there is to be tangible progress toward peace? Briefly stated, the issues are these.

Israel seeks from the Arabs recognition of its legitimacy and right to exist, with all this implies—an end to belligerency, an end to threats of force, and commitments to live together in peace and security.

The Arab states seek the restoration of occupied territories and a just solution of the Palestinian problem.

An equitable and durable solution of these issues can only be hammered out through a process of negotiations between the parties. Prior to the 6-day war of 1967, no real basis for peace negotiations existed. The Arabs refused to accept the existence of Israel, much less contemplate making peace with it. Since no basis for negotiations existed, U.S. policy had to focus more on containing area tensions than on helping to resolve them.

The 1967 war began to change that. In 6 days Israel not only proved beyond all doubt that it was there to stay, but it also ended up occupying Arab territory stretching to the Golan Heights of Syria, the Jordan River, and the Suez Canal. Slowly, meticulously, painfully, the United States and other like-minded members of the international community working with the parties to the conflict in the months immediately following the war launched intensive diplomatic efforts to translate this new situation into the long-sought basis for genuine peace negotiations.

The result was U.N. Security Council Resolution 242,116 adopted unanimously by the Council in November 1967. Here for the first time in 20 years was spelled out the framework for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. That resolution was and remains the basis for all the peacemaking efforts over the past decade. At its heart is a very simple formula: In return for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, the Arabs will recognize Israel within a framework of peace and security agreed by both. It calls for a just and lasting peace based upon the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries and upon Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. Resolution 242 is clearly a package. The parts are linked together to make a balanced whole,

to be carried out together or not at all.

That having been said, let me note what Resolution 242 does not do. It does not define secure and recognized boundaries. It does not call for withdrawal from "all" occupied territories or "the" occupied territories. It does not require Israel to give up every inch of occupied territory. Neither, however, does it preclude Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967.

In the final analysis, this issue can only be resolved in agreements negotiated by the parties. The emphasis of Resolution 242 taken as a whole, however, is clear. The emphasis is on establishing conditions of peace and security based upon the concept of withdrawal-for-peace. It is also clear that all the principles of Resolution 242, including the principle of withdrawal, were intended by its authors, and understood at the time by all the governments concerned, to apply wherever territory was occupied in 1967. In other words, the withdrawal-for-peace formula applies to all fronts of the conflict. I will revert to this point later to explain its relevance to the current negotiations.

That brings me to a second issue relating to Resolution 242. That resolution does not deal in a comprehensive way with a solution to the Palestinian problem. In the decade since the passage of the resolution it has become inescapably clear that a solution to the Palestinian problem is essential in reaching a lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. No party to the conflict today disputes that the Palestinians have a sense of identity which must be taken into account. President Carter has recognized this by speaking of the need for a homeland for the Palestinians, 117 In our own view, no settlement in the Middle East can endure, for Israel and Arab states alike, which does not include a just solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

Let me now turn to the role of the United States in the search for peace in the Middle East. Soon after President Carter took office he decided to seek a new approach. For the first time in 30 years all the major parties to the dispute were ready to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. One of his first foreign policy decisions was to send Secretary Vance to the area. The Secretary

¹¹⁷ See, among other statements by President Carter, doc. 73 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹¹⁶ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

obtained agreement from the governments involved that the three issues I have outlined lie at the core of the dispute and have to be resolved in an overall settlement:

The nature of peace;

Withdrawal from occupied territories in conjunction with security arrangements that will make recognized boundaries also secure boundaries; and

Resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Beginning in March 1977 in Clinton, Massachusetts, the President, and subsequently other Administration officials, have laid out our thinking on these issues. We did this not to put forward an American blueprint or plan for a settlement but to help stimulate the thinking of the parties about new ways to overcome old obstacles to the peace process. Let me elaborate a bit on our thinking about each of these three issues.

First, the definition of true peace. Peace does not mean simply a cessation of hostility or belligerency. It means open borders, normal commerce and tourism, diplomatic relations and a range of official and unofficial contacts, free navigation through waterways, and an end to all boycotts.

The United States regards normal relations among the parties as an indispensable component of a lasting settlement. The keystone of this is the recognition of Israel's right to exist permanently and formal recognition of its nationhood.

Second, is the dilemma of providing borders that are both secure and acceptable to all. This is the other half of the withdrawal-for-peace equation set up in Resolution 242. Israel, which has fought for its very existence for 30 years, must be able to feel secure within recognized borders. But borders that might give Israel the greatest sense of security in geographic and military terms are not those acceptable to Israel's neighbors. They could not, therefore, provide true security.

We understand the very real security concerns posed for Israel by withdrawal from occupied territory. But we also believe that without withdrawal, coupled with meaningful security arrangements, there can be no peace; and without peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Israel can have no true security. The goal has to be the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the area.

Third, is the issue of the future of the Palestinian people. To achieve a durable peace, the Pal-

estinians must demonstrate a willingness to live in peace with Israel. At the same time, a durable peace requires meeting the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian refugees, responding to the aspiration of Palestinian Arabs for an identity of their own, and agreement on the future status of the West Bank and Gaza where the largest single group of Palestinian Arabs live.

This is not a simple question. It involves vital security considerations for Israel which must be taken into account. At the same time, it also involves interests of other Arab states, in particular Jordan and Egypt. And it involves the interests of the Palestinian Arabs themselves, over one million of whom reside still in the West Bank and Gaza.

A way must be found for the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future. Any solution, if it is to be viable and lasting, must be based ultimately on the consent of the governed.

Because this issue is so complex and no instant solution seems possible, we have suggested that there need to be interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza agreed between Israel and Jordan, Egypt, and Palestinian representatives. During this interim period an ultimate solution can be worked out combining security for Israel and its neighbors and a territorial solution which will not leave a residue of irredentism to ferment and threaten the peace in the future. Our own view is that an independent Palestinian state in this truncated territory would not be a realistic or durable solution and that its future should lie in a close link with Jordan.

These, then, are the issues, and these are our general views about them. Let me now discuss briefly how this Administration has approached them with the parties in the peace process. For it is clearly a process. Nothing stands still in the Middle East. Matters are always moving—toward peace, or toward war, so long as the basic conflict is unresolved. Despite the apparent deadlock, the deep differences, and the cycle of violence so tragically reflected in the terrorist attack recently in Israel and the subsequent Israeli move into southern Lebanon, we still believe the dynamics of the process are at work toward a negotiated peace.

What we are seeing today, for the first time in the history of the conflict, are genuine attempts by key parties involved to come to terms. Real negotiations have commenced. We are also seeing an unprecedented public debate over the core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Given the depth of hostility and suspicion which underlie that conflict, and the painful decisions needed to make negotiations succeed, no one should expect results overnight.

Efforts to get the negotiations moving have gone through several phases over the past year. Initially, they focused on seeking to reconvene the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, which was established and met briefly after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and which remains the ultimate framework for a comprehensive peace settlement.

Efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference last year, however, encountered sharp differences among the parties on a number of procedural issues, in particular the question of how the Palestinians should be represented. Israel took the position that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was not an acceptable negotiating partner. In this we supported Israel, in view of the PLO's nonacceptance of Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations and its refusal to state publicly its willingness to recognize the right of all states in the area, which include Israel, to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

Then, suddenly, President Sadat transformed the situation with his historic trip to Jerusalem last November. His initiative did not resolve the basic issues in dispute. But at one stroke he sought to break down the psychological barriers which had prevented serious negotiations.

For the first time, the leader of an Arab state demonstrated not by words alone but by a tangible act his country's acceptance of the peace-for-withdrawal formula of Resolution 242. He recognized in an unprecedented official and public act Israel's sovereign existence. He put Egypt in the forefront of the Arab world in accepting the concept of the nature of peace as President Carter Carter has defined it, and as Israeli leaders themselves over the years have envisaged it as Israel's goal in negotiations. In doing so, President Sadat opened up possibilities that never before existed to break out of the 30-year cycle of war and truce in the Middle East.

President Sadat made clear, and Israel agreed, that what he had done was not done for Egypt alone, but to create a new psychological climate in which there can be progress toward peace between Israel and all its neighbors. Whether other Arab leaders will seize the opportunity thus created remains to be seen. Some have reacted with open hostility, some with suspicion, some want to wait and see—but some also have wished Egypt well and are giving its peace initiative their support.

What is important today is to insure that this moment not become another lost opportunity. The United States from the beginning has supported Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Our efforts are directed toward assuring, first, that there is tangible and early progress in the negotiating process begun by Egypt and Israel in Jerusalem last November, and second; that out of this process there emerge a basis and an incentive for the negotiations to be broadened to include other Arab parties. Both Egypt and Israel have stated that this is also their objective.

Since November, the negotiating process has proceeded on two tracks. Following an initial preparatory conference in Cairo in December, attended by Egyptian and Israeli delegations and also by representatives of the United States and U.N. Secretary General Waldheim, Egypt and Israel agreed to establish two committees at ministerial level. A Military Committee was convened in Cairo to negotiate essentially Egyptian-Israeli bilateral issues. A Political Committee was convened in Jerusalem to negotiate multilateral Arab-Israeli issues. The United States participated in the Political Committee and, when President Sadat withdrew his delegation, has continued as a middleman with the support of both to seek to advance the work of the Political Committee through a process of indirect negotiations.

The immediate focus of the Political Committee is the negotiation of a declaration of principles for a comprehensive peace settlement, building on Security Council Resolution 242, which can serve as a framework for negotiations between Israel and any of its other neighbors which are prepared to move toward peace, as Egypt has demonstrated it is prepared to do.

With a large measure of agreement already achieved on those principles dealing with the nature of peace and recognition of Israel, the key differences remaining to be bridged relate to the issue of withdrawal and an approach to the Palestinian problem, including the future of the West Bank and Gaza.

The important talks which President Carter has had in recent months with President Sadat and with Prime Minister Begin have helped clarify the differences that have to be resolved. The issues to be decided are out on the table for all to see. We believe the point has come where painful compromises have to be made if the promise of peace is not to be lost.

It is no secret that we have differences with the Israeli Government about what is required to move forward on negotiations, just as we have had in the past—and expect to have in the future with Arab governments on negotiating issues of critical importance to them. The fact that we can talk frankly and openly with Israel about these differences testifies to the closeness of our friendship.

To be concrete, we have a basic difference with the Israeli Government over the applicability of the withdrawal principle in Resolution 242 to all fronts of the conflict. I noted earlier that the authors of Resolution 242 and all the governments concerned, including the Government of Israel, understood at the time that the withdrawal-forpeace concept applied wherever territory was occupied in 1967.

The present position of the Israeli Government is that this concept does not apply to all fronts. Specifically, it has not so far agreed that, in the context of a final peace treaty embodying commitments to normal peaceful relations and agreed security arrangements which can include agreed border modifications, Israel will withdraw from any of the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza—the parts of former Palestine lying outside Israel's 1967 boundaries.

This new Israeli interpretation of Resolution 242, together with the policy of establishing Israeli settlements in occupied territory, has complicated efforts to make progress in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel. It has also inhibited efforts to broaden those negotiations to include other Arab parties, in particular Jordan and Palestinian representatives who, together, have an interest in negotiations relating to the future of the West Bank and its Palestinian Arab inhabitants.

We realize that the withdrawal-for-peace formula as it applies to the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinian issue generally, are the most difficult issues for Israel. In all our deliberations, we constantly have before us the very real security questions posed for Israel. We cannot conceive of any formula the United States—or Israel could accept which did not make fullest provision for these security concerns as part of a peace settlement.

To supplement the commitments and security arrangements the parties may agree to incorporate in peace treaties between themselves, and if we judge it essential to cement final agreement, we have said we are prepared to consider whatever bilateral U.S. security guarantees Israel may consider desirable as part of the peace settlement. This would, of course, be done in close consultation with the Congress in full consonance with its constitutional authority and responsibilities.

In closing, let me say a word about where the negotiating process now stands. During his recent talks in Washington with Prime Minister Begin, President Carter put forward some exploratory ideas on how to bridge the differences in the negotiations. In doing so, we took into account the proposals—in many respects far-reaching proposals—which Prime Minister Begin advanced in December for a Sinai agreement with Egypt and for a self-rule regime in the West Bank and Gaza. We said then, and say now, that in our judgment those proposals represent a good first step and a basis for negotiations.

We understand the need for time for our ideas and these issues to be discussed and debated within Israel's democratic political process. We know that our ideas—dealing as they do with the key issues for Israel of security, withdrawal, the Palestinian question, and the future of the West Bank and Gaza—require agonizingly difficult choices to be made. We hope nevertheless that our ideas will commend themselves to Israel, because we believe they offer the possibility—perhaps the only possibility—for renewing the momentum of the Egyptian-Israeli and ultimately the overall Arab-Israeli negotiating process.

We are meanwhile gratified that direct Egyptian-Israeli talks were resumed through the visit last week [March 30–31, 1978] of Defense Minister Weizman to Cairo. We are also gratified that progress is being made, with the help of the courageous men of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon and the efforts of the Lebanese Government itself, toward calming the potentially dangerous situation in south Lebanon—a situation which can otherwise have serious adverse effects on the

prospects for regional peace.

I return in the end to where I started. When an Egyptian President has visited Israel and an Israeli Prime Minister has visited Egypt, when the President of the United States has engaged the authority of his office and the weight of the United States in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, can there be any doubt that an unprecedented opportunity exists to make progress toward that long elusive goal? At the same time there are strong forces-forces of historical distrust and suspicion, of bitterness and violence, of national ambition and ideological commitment, of perceived injustices on both sideswhich are working against the success of all that we and our friends in the Middle East are seeking to achieve. And time is on their side, not ours. We must not, we do not intend, to let this moment in history become simply another lost opportunity.

109

Press interview statements by President Ceausescu of Rumania discussing Egypt-Israel negotiations, noting that the Palestine problem is the core issue in the Middle East conflict and expressing support for a Palestine state¹¹⁸

Bucharest, April 7, 1978

- Q. Turning now to the Middle East, what is your view, Mr. President, of President Sadat's initiative and of the meetings and talks between the leaders of Egypt and Israel? Also—what was Rumania's role in promoting these contacts? Maintaining contacts as you do throughout the world, have you found that, at present, President Sadat's initiative enjoys support in various parts of the world?
- A. I should like to mention, first of all, that the continued tension in the Middle East creates the ever-present danger of the outbreak of new military clashes and of another war. That is why we have consistently taken a resolute stand favouring the speediest political settlement of the conflict, leading to Israel's withdrawal from the Arab

territories occupied in the 1967 war; to the settlement of the Palestine problem on the basis of the Palestine Arabs' right to self-determination, including their right to establish an independent state of their own; and, at the same time, to the establishment of a lasting and just peace, which should ensure the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of all states, and conditions for them to have good-neighbourly relations.

We have always believed and we do believe now that the problems in the Middle East can only be settled peacefully, by way of negotiations; that is why we have regarded President Sadat's initiative and his peace talks with Premier Begin as an important step in the solution of these problems. It seems that the explanations given on Rumania's stand regarding the adoption of the solution of peaceful negotiations has contributed towards an understanding by President Sadat and Premier Begin of the need to make use of all means in order to achieve peace.

However, 'I must say that as against President Sadat's firm initiative in the direction of peace, the response from Israel and from Premier Begin has not been up to the expectations. Or at least has not been so far...

- Q. In the light of what you have just said and taking into account that there is no satisfactory dialogue at present, are you again actively trying to assist the parties move closer? How, in this light, do you sum up Foreign Minister Dayan's visit to Rumania?
- A. I think that, considering the present deadlock, Israel is called upon to adopt an appropriate attitude and to take measures that are likely to be a fitting response to President Sadat's initiative. That is how we can overcome the present impasse.

As regards my talks with Foreign Minister Dayan, we have, of course, discussed bilateral relations and a number of international matters, giving special attention to the Middle East problems.

I set forth in detail Rumania's stand on these matters, emphasizing the necessity that Israel should respond to President Sadat's initiative.

We believe that President Sadat's proposals for a declaration of principles are a minimum of what can be expected for the continuation of the peace-making process. Plainly, it ought to be a declaration of principles providing for Israel's withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967

¹¹⁸Excerpted from the English text of the interview conducted by David Landau, *The Jerusalem Post*, April 11, 1978, p. 5.

and for the solving of the Palestine problem on the basis of the Palestine people's right to selfdetermination. This is a requirement without which one could hardly expect to break the deadlock.

Of course, Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the renunciation of settlements in occupied territories and of the claim to maintain them in the future, must also take place in the shortest possible time. It is thus necessary to adopt a clear stand, which should open the road to the continuation of negotiations with a view to achieving a just peace.

If should also be considered that the achievement of a comprehensive peace settlement implies the participation in the negotiations of Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians, represented by the PLO; this is the only framework within which a general peace can be achieved. It is our belief that an adequate framework for such a meeting ought to be created and that one such framework would be the resumption of the Geneva Conference.

Q. Do you think that the PLO should be considered as the only, exclusive representative of the Palestinians? I am asking this, because as you are probably aware, there is a general opposition in Israel in this respect.

[There was also a lengthy reference in this question to the fact that Rumania, in the official statements over recent months, has omitted any explicit mention of the PLO. D.L.]

- A. I think that the matter of the representation of the Palestinian people should be considered setting out from the wish of the great majority of that people. So far, that wish confirms that the PLO ought to represent the Palestine people in international talks. The PLO also enjoys the recognition of a large number of states and international organizations, including the U.N. Thus, it obviously appears as the most qualified representative of the Palestine people, the only one that can commit them to seek a solution that would secure their right to self-determination, including the establishment of an independent state, where they can live a free and civilized life.
- Q. As you said, Mr. President, the Palestinian question is the crux of the dispute and conflict. You have had summit contacts with both sides. It is known that in every instance you conducted frank and open talks, expressing your opinion and offering your advice, relying

on your intimate knowledge of the situation.

Knowing Israel's feelings with regard to the PLO, and the public stands of each side, what can you tell both the Palestinians and Israel? What can be done to break the present deadlock?

A. The Palestinian question is, indeed, the essential factor. And the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East depends on it. Therefore, one should set out from the need to provide the conditions for the Palestinian people to organize their own independent life, and to be able to decide how to govern themselves in the future, with whom will they collaborate and in what form. Doubtless, a future Palestinian state and the State of Israel will have to establish relations of collaboration and, in the longer term, of active collaboration.

I think that one should start from the realities in the Middle East, from the need for two states—Israel and the Palestinian Arab state—to live together in good-neighbourly relations and, in perspective, in active collaboration on the territory generically called Palestine. Such a solution to the question cannot endanger the existence of Israel and it must not endanger the existence of a Palestinian state. On the contrary, this is imperative for a just peace in the Middle East.

Of course, it is known that, over the years, a state of tension and animosity has been created. Setting out from this, the ways must be found to eliminate the factors of tension. This requires courage—that the peoples be told things openly, as they actually are. It is necessary to tell the Israeli people clearly that, if they wish peace, they should also recognize the Palestinian people's right to peace and to free existence.

- Q. You say it takes courage to tell the people how the real situation is. Is this courage also required of the Palestinian leaders, who should tell their people that a Palestinian state must coexist with the State of Israel, and it must have good relations with Israel. Briefly, do you Mr. President ask of both sides the same thing?
- A. No doubt, this calls for both sides, for all the states in the Middle East that are involved in the present conflict, to move towards peace based on equality, mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, collaboration and good-neighbourly relations.

As I understood President Sadat's initiative, it was directed precisely to that end, and he took

the responsibility to tell clearly to the Egyptian people, to the Arab peoples, to the Israeli people and to other peoples that a new policy must be inaugurated, that one must pass from the policy of confrontation, of mutual negation, to a policy of peace, mutual recognition, good-neighbourly coexistence and peace.

In my opinion, the heads of state, the governments, the statesmen must have the courage not only to declare wars and maintain military conflicts, but particularly to assume responsibilities before their peoples, before mankind and to promote a policy of peace and collaboration.

I am convinced that all peoples will support those statesmen and leaders who will work for peace, so as to ensure new relations which should preclude military confrontations for their own people and for the neighbouring peoples alike.

Q. Mr. Ceausescu, you are a man of peace who has always supported international peace and collaboration. You have helped much, especially in the last few months, the dialogue and process of negotiations. You have recently met every representative element of influential political opinion in Israel, the Labour Party, Mapam, the government represented by Begin and Dayan. There are many differences of opinion among those political forces, but there is a likely unanimity on the PLO problem—nobody is ready to think of the PLO as a possible partner in negotiations. What, in your opinion, is the way out of this situation? It is clear that no progress can be made if both sides remain entrenched in their present positions.

A. I believe that it is necessary to discuss openly in Israel the proposition that peace is conditioned on the settlement of the Palestinian question. The Israeli people must be told frankly that peace cannot be achieved unless the state of affairs which has evolved over a long period of time is overcome and future relations are established on a new basis. It ought to be understood in this respect that the PLO's participation in the discussions is a necessity. Just as the Israeli people elect their leaders to represent them, the Palestinians are the ones to decide who must represent them. Therefore talks must be conducted with those whom the people acknowledge as their representatives. There is no other way of engineering peace and peaceful coexistence in the world. The very fact that we accept relations among states having different social systems and different outlook must provide an understanding of the need

to create conditions for the PLO's participation on an equal footing in the negotiations to be held.

The Israeli leaders, the politicians in Israel, have declared of late that they wish to conduct negotiations without preconditions, that everything is negotiable. And they assert that in this framework solutions will be found to all questions. Therefore, negotiations without preconditions should be started on the Palestinian question as well. It follows that during the negotiations solutions acceptable for both sides will have to be devised.

- Q. Do you think, Mr. President, that Yasser Arafat would want to negotiate with Israel? That would mean acknowledging Israel's right to existence, and accepting Resolution 242.
- A. You know well that the PLO has expressed more than once its willingness to go to Geneva, and Israel was the one to oppose it. That move, the participation in the negotiations is a question the PLO has accepted by declaring its willingness to take part in it. As a matter of fact, that was the very aim of the Arab conference in Rabat.¹¹⁹

Actually, to participate in the negotiations means implicitly to accept the solutions that will be elaborated during the conference, which, undoubtedly, will have to take into account the safeguarding of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The very fact of sitting at the negotiating table means mutual recognition. Certainly, peace cannot be conceived without adequate agreements, without adequate guarantees.

Somebody must make a start. Normally, Israel should make it by recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination, up to the establishment of an independent state, and by accepting PLO participation in the negotiations on the institutionalization of that right.

¹¹⁹ See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

110

Statement by the Political Committee of the Sattar League of Iran condemning Israel's invasion of South Lebanon and the presence of UN troops from Iran in Lebanon¹²⁰

April 7, 1978

The shah of Iran has the distinction of being the first among the imperialists and their puppet regimes to send troops into Lebanon under the guise of the United Nations peacekeeping force. The shah's troops first went to Israel and, on March 22, crossed the border into Lebanon.

During the previous week Israeli aggression had already laid waste one-tenth of Lebanon, uprooting more than a quarter million Arab people—including 65,000 Palestinians—and driving them out of southern Lebanon.

This act of Israeli aggression is a continuation of the periodic onslaught of the expansionist Zionist state against the Arab people. The colonial-settler state of Israel came into existence by forcibly expropriating Palestinian land and expelling the Palestinians from their homeland. Ever since, Israel, with the help of U.S., British, and French imperialists, has used every opportunity to consolidate and expand its stolen domain and make millions of people homeless. In contrast to this criminal drive, the Palestinian liberation movement calls for a democratic, secular Palestine. The sentiment of the masses in Iran has always been with the Palestine liberation struggle.

Despite the pious and verbal polemics in the press, the U.S. government supports Israel politically and militarily. When President Carter welcomed Prime Minister Begin to Washington on March 20, Israeli tanks were still rolling in southern Lebanon. The Zionist state is the main imperialist stronghold in the Middle East, and a major force against the Arab revolution.

In their attempt to make further counterrevolutionary inroads against the Arab people, weaken the Palestinian resistance movement, help Israel to consolidate its gains, and cut off a massive response to Israeli brutality and occupation, the imperialists have sent in more troops to Lebanon under the guise of UN peacekeeping forces. If

they were really peacekeeping forces they would have been sent to Israel, the source of war and aggression, and not to Lebanon.

These forces were sent into Lebanon to play the type of "peacekeeping" role they played in Korea in the early 1950s and in the Congo in the early 1960s. They are there to suppress the Arab people and further stifle the Palestinian resistance movement. The UN troops and the Israeli troops are two sides of the same coin. The shah's role makes this completely obvious.

Despite his occasional rhetoric, the shah has always looked to Israel as a major ally and supported it. He has provided oil for the Israeli military, exchanged spies, and imported Israeli instructors for SAVAK torturers. He has viewed the Arab masses with contempt and considered the Palestinian movement, which has been a source of inspiration to the masses of Iran, as dangerous to his throne.

The shah's troops will play the same aggressive role in Lebanon that they did against the Omani people two years ago, when they helped to suppress the Dhofari rebellion against the corrupt puppet sultan. They will play the same role in Lebanon that they play in oppressing the Arab people inside Iran who, along with the other oppressed nationalities such as the Baluchis, Kurds, and Azerbaijanis—are denied their national and cultural rights. They will play the same repressive role in Lebanon that they do against the toilers and masses of Iran.

Iran's censored press is trying to portray the presence of the shah's troops in Lebanon as pro-Arab. This is a blatant lie that must be exposed. Our people have no interest in this reactionary plot against the right to self-determination of the Arab people. In solidarity with the Palestinian resistance movement and the Arab people, the demands must be raised:

Get the shah's troops out of Lebanon now! Stop the shah's support to Israel!

Israel out of Lebanon and all Arab territory! Palestine for the Palestinians!

¹²⁰ The Sattar league is an Iranian movement sympathizing with the Fourth International. English text, *The Militant* (New York), XLII, 18 (May 12, 1978), p. 25.

111

Amnesty International report on administrative detention in the Israeli occupied territories¹²¹

London, April 7, 1978

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 have their origins in the State of Emergency Laws of 1936 and the Defence Laws of 1939 which were introduced by the Mandatory Authority in Palestine (British) to deal with the rising Arab opposition to both the continuation of the British Mandate and Jewish immigration to Palestine. Between 1936-1945 Military courts were set up to try offenders against "State security" (these were authorized to pass the death penalty), and during this period regulations were issued and amended so that by 1945 they had come to serve as a comprehensive model for the suppression of any form of opposition in the area. This suppression took the form of censorship, restrictions of mobility and political activity, expulsions, confiscation of property and detention without trial.

Although these Regulations were first introduced to subdue the Arab population they were increasingly also used against Jewish political activists and paramilitary organizations. Regulations were vigorously condemned by the Jewish settlers in Palestine and in July 1946 a Conference of Jewish lawyers actually demanded that they be repealed. Nevertheless, when on 14 May 1948 the State of Israel was established, apart from the sections in the regulations dealing with immigration and land acquisition, the Regulations remained on the Statute Books. They explicitly supercede any other laws in the land and empower the Minister of Defence to appoint Military Commanders over defined areas where they would enforce the Regulations. Therefore, although in theory these Regulations are enforced throughout the whole country, in practice they are applied in areas where Military Commanders have been appointed to carry them out, specifically the Occupied Territories.

Administrative Detention

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations comprise 170 articles divided into 15 sections. AI is mainly concerned with Article 111 which deals specifically with detention without trial of suspected security offenders. It reads:

1. A Military Commander may by order direct that any person shall be detained for any period not exceeding one year in such place of detention as may be specified by the Military Commander in the order.

2. Where an order is made under this Regulation against a person in relation to whom an order under Regulation 109 or 110 is in force, the order under this Regulation shall be deemed to replace such other orders.

3. Any person in respect of whom an order has been made by the Military Commander under subregulation (1) may be arrested by a member of his Majesty's Forces or of the Police Force and conveyed to the place of detention specified in such order.

4. For the purposes of this Regulation there shall be one advisory committee consisting of persons appointed by the High Commissioner and the Chairman of any such committee shall be a person who holds or has held high judicial office or is or has been a senior officer in the government. The functions of any such committee shall be to consider and make recommendations to the Military Commander with respect to any objections against any orders under this regulation which are duly made to the committee by the person to whom the order relates..."

In accordance with Article 111 any person may be arrested and placed in detention without being formally charged or tried. No public reasons need be given for the arrest and although the law states "for any period not exceeding one year," the detention order can be administratively extended indefinitely. To AI's knowledge the longest period any person has been held under Administrative Detention is 4 years.

Detention Orders and Processes of Appeal

A detention order such as the one in appendix (i) can be issued by a Military Commander, who possesses the full powers to do so. In theory administrative control is exercised over his powers through the possible intervention of a higher military authority such as the Defence Minister, but in practice this rarely takes place. Judicial control is exercised through:

- 1. The detainee appealing to the Supreme Court in Israel for a reversal of the order.
- 2. The detainee's appearance before a Review Board every six months when his case is examined.

¹²¹ Text as published in *The Middle East Journal*, Summer 1978, pp. 337-339.

In practice a precedent has been established whereby the Supreme Court does not question the decision of the Military Governor when "security reasons" are quoted and very few appeals are successful, e.g.

The competence of this court to criticise the action of the competent authorities acting in accordance with the Defence Laws (State of Emergency) 1945, is extremely limited when the article under discussion allows the competent authority freedom of action as regards the individual in all cases "in which it thinks" or "in which it is of the opinion" that circumstances of which it is cognisant require such action, this, in a general way, makes the competent authority itself the final judge as regards the existence of such circumstances... and in as much as this court is subject to this narrow competence, it has no right to criticise the grounds addressed by the competent authority in justification of its issues of the said order.

The Review Board is appointed by the Regional Commander and is chaired by a civilian judge on reservist duty who has been chosen by the Military Commander. The Board is only an advisory committee which reviews the cases of administrative detainees every six months and makes its recommendations. However, the final decision as to whether the order is extended or terminated rests with the Commander.

Reasons for AI Concern

Amnesty International is concerned that under Article 111 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 any person may be arrested and detained without being charged or brought before a court of law. Such persons clearly come within AI's mandate under article 1b of our Statute which states that AI opposes:

by all appropriate means the detention of any Prisoners of Conscience or any political prisoners without trial within a reasonable time or any trial procedures relating to such prisoners that do not conform to recognised norms to ensure fair trial.

At present AI has the names of 16 of an estimated total of 30 administrative detainees being held in the Occupied Territories, (list of names attached). AI is concerned that these prisoners are being held indefinitely without charges being brought against them and without their being tried before a public court. AI is also concerned by reports alleging that because of uncertainty about the length of their detention, some detainees have in the past confessed to lesser offences which

have led to short terms of imprisonment whilst others have signed papers saying they agree to be "willingly deported" in return for their freedom.

List of Administrative Detainees Adopted by AI

To Amnesty International's knowledge there are, at present, around 30 Administrative Detainees imprisoned in Israel/Occupied Territories. AI has the names of 16 of these prisoners and all of them have been taken up as adoption cases. The names of these prisoners are listed below and you may, when appealing for the release of all Administrative Detainees, attach a list of these names.

Ibrahim Ata Hussein Abidu Miasir Abu-Hammadieh Suleiman Abu-Jalia Sirhan Abu'l Hija Abdul Rahman al-Argai Mundhir Mahmoud Diab Fawzi Halabieh Ali Awad al-Jamal Taisir Muhammad Katawi Maher al-Khayyat Eid al-Ramawi Mohammed Abdul Samal Muhammed Hammed Nimer Sopran Mousa Zacki Yassin Abdel Hafez Zeidan Hani Fuad Qassim Zurba

Appendix (i)

Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 Administrative Detention Order

By virtue of my powers in accordance with Articles 6(5) and 111 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, and my other powers in accordance with the said Regulations, and inasmuch as I am satisfied that the security of the State requires it, I order the detention of:

- 1. (Name) —of Haifa (Identity Card No...)
- 2. (Name)—of Haifa (Identity Card No...) from to The Place of detention of (Name) shall be Rameleh Prison, and the place of detention of (Name) shall be the Women's Prison, Nave Tirtza.

Date....

(Signed)

To: The Director of Prisons

The above mentioned detainees are to be kept

in detention in accordance with this detention order.

Date.... (Signed)

Appendix (ii)

Summaries of Two Case Histories of Administrative Detention

1. Taisir al Arouri

Town or place of residence: Ramallah Age/Date of Birth: 1946

Date of detention under

Article 111: 21 April 1974
Place of Detention: Ramallah prison
Date of release: 18 January 1978

Taisir al Arouri is a professor of Mathematics at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank. He was arrested in the middle of the night on 21 April 1974 and was taken to Ramallah prison where he was administratively detained. He was never charged with any offence and he was not brought before a court of law. In accordance with Israeli regulations he appeared at regular six monthly intervals before an Appeals Board and each time his Detention Order was renewed. In November 1977 he was featured as Prisoner of the Month in the AI Newsletter, and when he appeared before the Appeals Board on 1 December 1977 it was decided not to extend his detention order. He was released on 18 January having spent 45 months in detention without charge or trial.

2. Zuhair Wasif Zaki Amirah

Town or place of residence: Nablus Age/Date of Birth: 24 years old

Date of arrest under

Article 111: December 1973
Place of detention: Shechem Prison
Date of deportation: 26 January 1977

Zuhair Wasif Zaki Amirah was first arrested in February 1971 when he was charged with membership in an illegal organisation and sentenced to three years imprisonment. He was due to be released in February 1974 but a detention order was taken out against him and he remained in prison. He appeared before the Appeals Board on at least five occasions and he took out a petition at the Israeli High Court of Justice but without effect. In January 1977 he finally agreed to be "willingly deported" and he was promptly released

on Jordanian territory. Although he had been sentenced to three years imprisonment he had in fact spent nearly six years in prison.

112

Communiqué issued by the EEC deploring recent violence in the Middle East and expressing its support for UN resolution 242 as the basis for a peace settlement¹²²

April 8, 1978

The Heads of State or Government reviewed the situation in Lebanon and the Middle East.

They deplored all recent acts of violence in the area, and wished to express their deep concern over the tragic events in Southern Lebanon. They reiterated their support for UN Security Council Resolution 425¹²³ and 426 and called for the speedy and complete implementation of these resolutions. They urged all parties to co-operate fully with the UN Interim Force for Lebanon in the execution of its mandate.

They emphasized their commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Developments in Lebanon must not be allowed to prejudice efforts for a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The momentum of the peace process in the Middle East must be maintained.

They reiterated their position that a settlement must be based upon Security Council Resolution 242 applied in all its parts and on all fronts.

The Heads of State or Government confirmed the principles set out in their declaration of June 29, 1977¹²⁴ which remain entirely valid.

¹²² Read at a press conference during the European Council by acting EEC President Jorgensen of Denmark; text supplied, on request, by the EEC.

¹²³ Doc. 32 above.

¹²⁴ Doc. 120 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

113

Television interview statements by US Defence Secretary Brown asserting that Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon is the real issue to be discussed rather than its use of US-supplied anti-personnel weapons (excerpts)¹²⁵

Washington, April 9, 1978

Gwertzman: Could I ask a question on another subject? It was confirmed by the State Department yesterday that Israel violated an understanding with the

United States in using cluster bombs, which, of course, [are] a deadly anti-personnel weapon, in southern Lebanon. Was this a big violation? Is it something the United States is very concerned about, and should it

affect future policy toward Israel?

A. Of course, the whole situation, having to do with the terrorist attack inside Israel and the Israeli response of occupation of southern Lebanon, is a matter for considerable concern. It is so that Israel did have an agreement to limit its use of cluster bombs, which are an anti-personnel weapon and an anti-material weapon, to certain situations. The Israelis have indicated that they were used in this case, and we are discussing with them their reassurances that such agreements will be observed in the future. I don't want to make to much out of this, because I think that the real situation for concern is the situation with respect to Lebanon, and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Gwertzman: Are they withdrawing too slowly, you think?

A. I think that that's something that I would not want to express a definitive opinion on. The important thing is that they be withdrawn; they are withdrawing; and so long as that goes on at a reasonable pace, I have hopes that that particular problem can be settled.

Herman: The last time, before this, that somebody used American-provided weapons improperly and illegally, it was Turkey, and—in Cyprus—and what we did was, we cut off all arms to Turkey. I suppose you could argue that either we cut off all arms to Israel and all supplies to Israel, or we stop cutting off all arms to Turkey, because they've done fairly much the same thing as far as law is concerned.

A. I think every circumstance has to be looked at separately. You're speaking now, Mr. Herman, of a somewhat different matter than the one that Mr. Gwertzman raised. You're talking now about the use of U.S. weapons by the Israelis in their occupation of southern Lebanon—

Herman: I was also talking about—
A.—and not the particular matter of CBU's—

Herman: But including that.

A.—or cluster bombs. The Israelis clearly were reacting to a-a terrorist attack on themselves, and the question that one has to ask is, was the response proportional, and that has to be judged in part by Israeli action in now withdrawing from Lebanon as UN troops come in. You will also recall that in 1974, when the Turks moved their army into Cyprus, that was following a-an overthrow of the Cypriot government, and that clearly had been staged by the Greek government, which was itself then replaced. That first Turkish action was therefore also a reaction to events elsewhere, and the United States did not then act; it acted as a result of what is called the second Turkish invasion, which took place some weeks later, which was clearly deemed-which was deemed to be clearly an act contrary to U.S. law. The embargo, which was passed by the Congress subsequently, has been in effect now for three years. The two situations are not the same; they certainly have to be judged each on its own merits.

Herman: I gather in that judging process, in the first part of your sentence, part of the judging of that process as to whether this was an appropriate reaction, depends on the speed with which the Israelis withdraw, and if they do not withdraw fast enough, it is to be considered inappropriate?

A. I don't want to judge it—I don't think it will be judged—solely on that basis, but that certainly is one factor that will go into U.S. judgments on this matter. The Secretary of State, I think, has already indicated that the situation is

¹²⁵ Interview conducted by George Herman, Bernard Gwertzman and Ike Pappas; broadcast on CBS's "Face the Nation," April 9, 1978; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by CBS. For a letter from Republican Representative McCloskey to President Carter protesting Israel's use of cluster bombs in South Lebanon, see doc. 97 above. See also Secretary of State Vance's letter to the speaker of the house, doc. 107 above.

that there is a question that's been—as to whether Israel has acted in a way contrary to U.S. law, but he plans to take no further action on it.

Herman: Mr. Secretary, very little time left. You mentioned that the speed with which the Israelis move out of Lebanon might be a consideration in what we decide. Have we informed the Israelis of that? Is that a sort of pressure that we're bringing to bear?

A. I don't think it's a matter of bringing pressure on the Israelis. I think it's merely a—we've told them that we think that they should expedite their movement from Lebanon.

114

Press interview statements by the Shah of Iran supporting President Sadat's peace initiative with Israel, UN resolution 242 and Muslim sovereignty over Jerusalem (excerpt)¹²⁶

Early April, 1978

- Q. How do you see the Sadat peace initiative and what in your view is the key to an Arab-Israeli settlement?
- A. We approve of the initiative. It has shed a completely new light upon the Arab-Israeli affair, with the Arabs as peace-makers and the other side not. In my view, Israel should give back, according to Resolution 242, the land she took from Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

People tell me that the crux of the matter is the Palestinian problem. That is true, but it is much easier to solve that problem between the Jordanians and the Palestinians than between Israel and the Palestinians. After all, the Israelis took the land from Jordan and Jordan will know what to do with the Palestinian problem. This is especially true in the light of the fact that there is general recognition that any Palestinian solution must be linked with Jordan.

Q. Where do you stand on the Jerusalem issue?

A. As Muslims, how can we accept that the Muslim holy places in the city should be in the hands of non-Muslims? And as a Muslim, I am

¹²⁶ Interview conducted by the deputy editor, *The Sunday Times* (London), April 16, 1978, p. 11. speaking here about sovereignty over those places. I agree that in the end, Jerusalem may be the most difficult part of the whole package, because of the strength of emotional feelings about it.

115

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Cuba of President Haile Mariam of Ethiopia (excerpts)¹²⁷

Havana, April 23, 1978

At the invitation of Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Council of State, Comrade Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Socialist Ethiopia, made an official, friendly visit to the Republic of Cuba, April 21–27, 1978.

Cuba and Ethiopia view with concern the situation in the Middle East and strongly condemn the recent Israeli aggression against Lebanon. Only with the withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories occupied since 1967, respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people to have their own independent State, and the recognition of the PLO as their legitimate representative, will it be possible to obtain a just and lasting peace which guarantees the independent existence of all the countries in the region.

Both sides reiterate solidarity with the patriotic and progressive forces united in the Rejection Front against imperialism's manoeuvres and Arab reaction's capitulating policy.

¹²⁷ Excerpted from the English text, Granma (Havana), no. 19, (May 7, 1978). p. 8.

116

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of King Husayn of Jordan to Yugoslavia¹²⁸

April 29, 1978

King Hussein bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan paid an official and friendly visit to Yugoslavia from April 26 to 29 at the invitation of President Josip Broz Tito.

The two statesmen, together with their closest aides, conducted an extensive exchange of views on current international questions, with special reference to development in the Middle East and the activities of the non-aligned countries.

Veselin Djuranović, President of the Federal Executive Council and Modar Badrane, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Jordan, conducted separate talks on questions concerning the promotion of bilateral cooperation and relations.

President Tito and King Hussein voiced the greatest concern over developments in the Middle East. They resolutely denounced Israel's latest act of aggression against Lebanon as a flagrant violation of that country's sovereignty and independence and as a threat to world peace and security.

This aggression is aimed directly against the Palestine nation, against its existence and its national rights. It complicates the situation in the region still further and renders it still more dangerous.

Yugoslavia and Jordan most emphatically call for Israel's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanese territory and for the integral application of Security Council Resolution 425.

President Tito and King Hussein stressed that a just and lasting solution to the Middle East crisis is possible if Israel withdraws from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and recognizes the legitimate national rights of the Palestine nation, its right to self-determination, including the right to forming its own state. Such a solution implies the equal participation of the PLO in all plans for settling the Middle East crisis, as well as the right of all countries and nations in the region to independent and secure development.

Any attempt to impose a solution which would work to the detriment of the Arab countries and the Palestine nation can only prolong the crisis in the Middle East and exacerbate efforts to find a peaceful and lasting settlement of the existing crisis.

Stressing the importance of Arab unity and solidarity and of their joint actions to find a lasting and just solution to the Middle East crisis, the two sides supported efforts being made towards that end.

The two heads of state devoted particular attention in their talks to developments in the Horn of Africa. They pointed to the need for convening a session of the OAU's Good Offices' Committee as soon as possible, in the aim of finding a just and lasting peace in this region, based on the OAU and UN Charters and on the principles of non-aligned policy.

The two sides voiced their support of the liberation struggle of nations in the south of Africa and came out in favour of immediate independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia.

President Tito and King Hussein conducted an exhaustive exchange of views on the activities of the non-aligned countries. They observed that the non-aligned movement, which is working under complex international conditions, has still further increased its role as an independent and universal factor engaged in the resolution of international problems and the promotion of international cooperation, based on the democratization of political and economic relations.

The two heads of state noted with concern that some external factors are endeavouring, along various lines, to create a rift among the non-aligned countries and are taking advantage of these countries' difficulties in domestic development and mutual relations. Consequently, it is of singular importance for all non-aligned countries, in keeping with their own possibilities, to try to overcome and peacefully settle mutual disputes.

During the talks, both countries stressed their interest in having the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau in Kabul and the Ministerial Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Belgrade¹²⁹ work further to strengthen the non-aligned countries' unity and action ability

¹²⁸ English translation, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), XXIX, 673, pp. 24-25.

¹²⁹ See docs. 138-140 below.

and accélerate the implementation of jointly adopted decisions.

117

Television interview statements by Israel Foreign Minister Dayan discussing the future of the West Bank and Gaza¹³⁰

April 30, 1978

Q. After your meetings last week with Vance, you said you are encouraged, that there is a new and novel approach to break the impasse. What is it?

A. Instead of talking about formulation, we tried for two days to see what the peace could look like if that is to be acceptable to the Egyptians, to Israel, and to the Palestinian Arabs. What will happen in what we call the self-rule, the autonomy in Jerusalem, in the Gaza Strip, in the boundaries, things like that, on the ground and in reality, not just the wording.

Q. Did you feel there was a breakthrough, a possibility of a new plan?

A. I felt and I do feel better about the prospects for going on with the peace process than before because the Secretary and his colleagues say they would have to reflect on our suggestions. Now, we are not negotiating peace with you, so what I hope they will really do is try to find out how the Egyptians feel about it, coming [down to] earth and discussing what the peace would look like. And if they don't agree to our concept, to our proposals, they will come forward with their own, but not to devote ourselves, both parties and your people, only to formulation, but for a while talk realities.

Q, Can you give us specifics?

A. I think that the talk about abolishing the military roles is very important. And this is one of the elements of our proposal... that Israeli military regime would be abolished in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; they would have their own autonomy; they would run their own life and Israeli forces that would stay there will not interfere with their life, but would stay there just in order

to defend Israel in case of war. But to let the Arabs there lead their life their own way.

Q. There is a plan that has been called the Allon plan, ¹³¹ the gist of which is that the West Bank would be divided, part annexed to Israel and part to Jordan. Is this a possibility?

A. It is not our proposal now [though] I wouldn't say that this is not a possibility should the other party come forward and say that is what they

propose.

Now, we have been trying to deal along this Allon plan with the Arabs for 10 years, and they rejected it completely. So now this time we come forward with an absolutely different concept about it, not dividing the West Bank between Jordan and Israel, but living together, both the Arabs and the Israelis in the West Bank, the way we live in Jerusalem now (and no one really is now recommending dividing Jerusalem) so we say the same thing about the entire West Bank. But should the Arabs say: "No," now we come to the conclusion that the Allon plan, or something along this line, is a better way, not how to live together with you, but how to divide the area, we still discuss it, by all means.

We are coming forward with a proposal which is not based on division, and we think that our proposal is an implementation that is possible, an implementation of 242.

Let me talk business. None of them, even now, [the Americans or Arabs] none of them thinks about any plans based on division. What they really want is a full withdrawal of the Israeli forces.

Well, then, the question was whether we should agree only about what will happen right away, now for the next five years, and then there will be a review and then maybe a further step about other elements should be agreed about. So if we can't agree about everything now with the Arabs, maybe we can agree about part of the issues now and to start to put it in gear and start living and working together and say, "Now, wait a minute. Whatever you still have in mind about the next step, let's see it and review it after five years." So it is, I think, a practical possibility.

And there is another point which I think is very important, and this is the Palestinian refugees who live outside of the West Bank, because, when

¹³⁰ Interview broadcast on ABC's "Issues and Answers"; partial text, *Near East Report* (Washington), XXII, 18 (May 3, 1978), p. 77.

¹³¹ Doc. 163 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

we deal with the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we deal with part of the Palestinian-Arab people. Now, some of them, probably 350,000 or so, are now in Lebanon and Syria and about half a million refugees in Jordan, and my belief is that unless all this is settled, then the conflict will not really come to an end. So we discussed that, too, and we agree that the problem of the Palestinian refugees and the Jewish refugees that left Arab countries should be dealt with, too.

Now, just imagine, supposing during the first five years the problem of the refugees in Lebanon and other Arab countries would be solved and peace with Egypt would be achieved and with Jordan and maybe even with Syria, and then we came back to some questions that were left over about the West Bank.

Q. Like a plebescite?

A. It would be much easier to go on with.

Q. Can you give us any idea of what the solution would be for the Palestinians, especially in Lebanon?

A. I believe that half a million refugees who are in Jordan would rather stay in Jordan if Jordan, for their sake, would be helped economically. When you say a certain number would be allowed to go back to the West Bank, they didn't come from the West Bank. I would be ready to examine how many of them can really be absorbed in the West Bank. I believe there are more Arabs living in the West Bank every year now than there is room for them to come back. We suggested about the West Bank there will be a committee of Jordanians and us and Palestinian Arabs that would decide about the immigration policy to the West Bank.

I don't think really that many of them would find means to live there.

Now, of course, if Yassir Arafat would say, "I am not looking for means for settlement there, what I want is just the transfer of all the refugee camps from Lebanon to the West Bank with the idea that eventually that would serve as a spring-board to attack Israel," we shall not accept. But let's see how many people can go to Nablus and live there with their people. Let's see.

118

Press interview statements by First Secretary Gierek of the Unified Workers' Party of Poland discussing the policy of renewing links with Israel¹³²

Early May, 1978

Nothing is ever decided once and for all. In the past Poland had diplomatic relations with Israel and was among those who helped to create that State. The resumption of these relations in the future cannot be ruled out.

In the past we have never had a hostile attitude to the Israeli nation. We have always believed, and we still believe that the Israeli nation, the Jews, like any other people, have the right to have an independent state and that this right should be safeguarded by international agreements. The best illustration of our relations with the Israeli nation and the Jews is our attitude to history and all our common experiences. This history should never be forgotten in our country. It is essential to create conditions that can make possible a rapprochement in the future and the normalisation of the relations between our states and peoples. When will this come about?

The answer to this question does not lie only with us.

119

Statement by US Secretary of State Vance to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discussing the proposed warplane sales to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt¹³³

Washington, May 3, 1978

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the Administration's proposals to sell jet aircraft to three Middle East countries—75 F-16's and 15 F-15's to Israel, 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia, and 50 F-5's to Egypt. We consider these proposals vitally important to the foreign policy interests of the United States. These sales will enhance U.S. relations with three countries that play critical

¹³² Translated from the French text as published in Le Monde (Paris), May 7-8, 1968.

¹³³ Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2015, (June 1978), p. 39.

roles in the attainment of two essential foreign policy objectives in the Middle East—the conclusion of a comprehensive peace settlement that will provide the best guarantee for Israel's long-term security and the support of moderate governments that will shape the future of the region.

The three countries involved are each of exceptional importance to American interests. Our commitment to Israel's security and well-being is an enduring imperative of American foreign policy. This Administration, like its predecessors, will remain unshaken in its determination to help Israel meet its security requirements.

Egypt is also crucially important to American interests. Under President Sadat's courageous leadership, Egypt is playing a key role in the search for Middle East peace and in the promotion of moderate policies globally. The United States clearly has an interest in a secure Egypt.

Saudi Arabia has consistently demonstrated its friendship toward the United States. Saudi Arabia strongly supports a negotiated settlement for the Middle East conflict. It plays a vital role in promoting a moderate Arab consensus on the difficult questions of Middle East peace. It is a major stabilizing force in international financial matters and in decisions affecting the pricing and supply of oil.

The aircraft which we propose meet an important need for each of the three countries involved.

Israel is stronger now than at any time in its history. In order to maintain its substantial margin of military superiority in the region, however, Israel will require replacements for aircraft which become obsolescent in the 1980s. The F-15's and F-16's are intended to assure that Israel retains its lead in advanced military technology.

Egypt, having ended its arms supply relationship with the Soviet Union, has not received significant supplies of aircraft or parts in about 3 years. Egypt is understandably concerned about threats both from the west and the south. The F-5's will help Egypt present a credible air defense posture and assure confidence that the United States will assist that country in meeting its legitimate defense needs.

Saudi Arabia needs an adequate air defense system to protect its vast territory, including widely scattered population centers and vulnerable oil facilities. Saudi Arabia, whose armed forces are among the smallest in the region, has a long history of ideological conflict with Iraq. Iraqi forces, well supplied with the most modern Soviet military equipment, will have more than twice the number of combat aircraft as Saudi Arabia in 1983, even after the Saudi F-15's are delivered. Moreover, on three occasions in the recent past, Saudi Arabia has been attacked by forces from South Yemen. The potential threat from this quarter is a matter of continuing Saudi concern.

We are assured that the Saudis intend to use the F-15 aircraft for their own national defense and not otherwise. The Saudis have said that they do not plan to base the F-15's at any location that would threaten or provoke Israel.

In our best judgement, the proposed sales will maintain the basic military balance in the region. Israel will retain the ability to defend itself, Saudi Arabia and Egypt will strengthen their ability to defend themselves against nations determined to undermine regional stability.

It is our conviction that these transfers will support the Middle East peace process. At this delicate moment, we need the maximum cooperation, confidence, and trust of Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The prerequisite for addressing the hard choices for peace is the feeling of security and confidence on all sides. The creation of these conditions is our prime objective in proposing the aircraft sales.

Of course, approval of these sales will not in itself bring peace to the Middle East. These sales will maintain essential links that permit us to play the fundamental role of a mediator between the parties. On the other hand, failure to proceed with the sales will seriously undercut the American role in the peace process and raise grave doubts about U.S. readiness to work with moderate governments in the region.

I urge the Congress to join the Administration in sending a message to the Middle East that is clearly and firmly supportive of those governments that have committed their countries to a future of peace, to orderly economic progress, and to moderation.

120

Declaration by US Senate Republican Conference on National Security and Foreign Affairs criticizing US Mideast policy and outlining the principles that should govern its conduct (excerpts)¹³⁴

Washington, May 4, 1978

The syndicated columnist, Joseph Kraft, in his column appearing in the Washington Post on February 12 summed up the Carter Administration performance in the Middle East most succinctly:

"But because he is more a moralist than a strategist, because he cares more about cordial relations than diplomatic outcomes, Carter is not nearly as effective as he seems to think in personal diplomacy. The chances for peace in the Middle East after his latest encounters are where they stood before he met with Sadat and Begin.

"Unfortunately, the President does not realize that he performed in a pedestrian way. He seems to think he is a terrific whiz at personal diplomacy. And sadder still, none of those around him have the strength to tell him that in foreign policy, as in so many other matters, he would be far better off if he delegated authority to others."

When President Carter took office he inherited the substantial achievements of the Nixon and Ford Administrations in laying a basis for a permanent peace in the Middle East. The Soviet Union's military influence had been expelled from Egypt. Its influence on the negotiating process, as evidenced by the Sinai II agreements, 135 had been virtually eliminated. But the policy launched by the Carter Administration from this auspicious platform just fifteen months ago, has now reached an apparent impasse, and once again the Soviet Union may make an effort to gain control of the Middle East negotiations. On October 1, 1977 the Carter administration issued an extremely illadvised joint declaration¹³⁶ with the Soviet Union purporting to establish "principles" to govern a Middle East settlement under U.S.-Soviet cochairmanship of a reconvened Geneva Conference. Publication of the hastily drafted joint declaration met with almost universal consternation in the United States, Israel¹³⁷ and Egypt.

The ill-conceived statements by President Carter concerning a "Palestinian Homeland," and an alleged overture to the PLO itself in the summer of 1977, appeared to tilt the United States to the establishment of a PLO state on the West Bank. Such a state would be as great a threat to its Arab neighbors as to Israel.

Now the Administration has maneuvered itself into a totally unnecessary disagreement with Israel over the way to translate President Sadat's historic peace mission to Jerusalem into specific terms for a peace agreement. The Administration has sought to press Israel to make ultimate concessions before substantive negotiations begin. In connection with the Sinai II agreement, the United States pledged to try to coordinate its policies respecting peace negotiations and activities in the United Nations with Israel. This has not been done.

The United States should take Israel at its word that everything including the settlements, is negotiable. And, the Administration should pay at least as much attention to the establishment of "preconditions" to negotiations as it does to alleged Israeli "inflexibility."

The record of the Carter Administration with respect to the achievement of a Middle East peace has fallen woefully short of the grandiose goals it set for itself. The failure of Middle East policy—as in so many cases—is largely attributable to a seemingly never-ending series of gaffes, miscalculations, imprecisions, indecisions and indiscretions of word and action.

We do not underestimate the seriousness of the challenge of bringing the parties of the Middle East to a just and lasting peace agreement. In pursuing the objective of a Middle East peace we believe the following principles should govern the conduct of United States diplomacy.

(a) The commitment of the United States to the preservation, security and integrity of the State of Israel as a matter of United States national interest and as a moral imperative.

¹³⁴ Text as inserted by Senator Howard Baker (Rep.) of Tennessee, Congressional Record (daily), May 4, 1978, pp. S6910–S6920.

¹³⁵ See Docs. 148, 164, 166 and 167 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

¹³⁶ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹³⁷ For Israel's reaction to the US-Soviet joint statement, see doc. 161 in ibid.

¹³⁸ Doc. 73 in *ibid*.

- (b) The maintenance and enhancement of American friendship with the moderate Middle Eastern Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
- (c) We are in accord with the views of those moderate Middle East Arab governments and of Israel which wish to prevent the Soviet Union from exercising dominant influence in the Middle East, or casting a veto in the peace negotiating process.
- (d) The United States should cooperate with its Arab friends and allies in the Middle East and with Israel as they continue to try to achieve a lasting peace. We must assure President Sadat that his dramatic breakthrough is appreciated, through an American commitment to assist Egypt in its economic development, and to encourage those steps that will lead to a settlement of the outstanding issues between Egypt and Israel.
- (e) Preservation of the U.S. mediation role in the pursuit of an overall peace agreement so as not to inhibit subagreements between individual states along the road to a final comprehensive settlement.
- (f) We believe that equal weight should be given in the implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 to both the call for "secure and recognized boundaries" and to the call for Israeli withdrawal from "occupied territories."

121

Television statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel reiterating the risks of a Palestinian state and discussing the stalemate in Egypt-Israel peace negotiations and the proposed US sale of arms to Egypt and Saudi Arabia¹³⁹

May 7, 1978

Monroe: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is the Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin. Mr. Begin is visiting this country. Today he is in New York in connection with celebrations marking Israel's 30th Anniversary.

A few days ago he talked with President Carter in

Washington.

Mr. Prime Minister, Egypt broke off peace talks almost four months ago. Some people blame this on what they consider hard line positions you have taken such as keeping Israeli troops on the West Bank.

Considering U.S. public opinion polls, the critical statement by 37 American Jewish leaders and peace demonstrations in Israel, do you have any sense that public opinion is turning against your position?

A. Not at all. I believe it is all an expression of democracy. Everybody is entitled to his opinion. There were 37 gentlemen in the United States who expressed their opinion, and there were demonstrations in Tel Aviv for and against, as it should be in a democratic country. I accept it with complete calm. It is our difference of opinion voiced in any free land and so it is the case with us.

The fact is that President Sadat broke off the negotiations within the framework of the political committee in Jerusalem. When I was in Ismailia, we agreed to have two committees established to negotiate, ¹⁴⁰ one the military committee to sit in Cairo; the other, political committee to sit in Jerusalem. We knew very well there were differences of opinion.

I brought to Ismailia and presented to President Sadat our peace plan. It was praised in this country. Everybody who saw it stated it is a real contribution to the peace-making process and there is a great deal of flexibility in it. Nobody spoke about so-called hard line. To the contrary, I had only words of positive approach. We knew also in Ismailia we have differences of opinion, but both of us decided to negotiate and, indeed, the negotiations started. They were disrupted abruptly, suddenly. To the surprise also of the Secretary of State of the United States who was then in Jerusalem.

May I say also, even to the surprise of the Egyptian delegation. This is the reason why the negotiations until this very day were not renewed and I suggested time and again to President Sadat, also in letters and indirectly, "Let us renew the negotiations within the framework of those two committees, or perhaps we may combine into one committee the two committees.

We want to negotiate. And the essence of the peacemaking process is negotiations.

¹³⁹ Interview conducted by Bill Monroe, Elizabeth Drew, Robert Keatley and Tom Brokaw and broadcast on NBC's "Meet the Press," May 7, 1978; transcript supplied, on request, by NBC.

¹⁴⁰ Docs. 199 and 200 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Clark: You don't think the dissent within Israel is significant enough to change anything?

A. We have elaborared a peace plan. It was declared a good one and because the other side doesn't accept it, it doesn't turn out to be not a good one, Per se, it was declared a very positive approach.

Now, everything is negotiable, but we didn't put it as an ultimatum. We expect counterproposals. We didn't get them yet.

What I can say is that nobody can dictate terms of peace. Terms of peace should be negotiated.

Drew: Mr. Prime Minister, there is some confusion over Israel's position on the administration's proposal to sell arms to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Simply put, would you prefer that there be no sales to all three countries or sales to all three if it comes down to that?

A. I don't think, Mrs. Drew, there is any confusion. I will explain the facts as they are. In September, 1975, we got a very clearcut commitment from the United States Government about the supply to Israel of planes, F-16s, as it was said clearly, and since then two and a half years have passed and that commitment should have been carried out or should be carried out now.

What we objected to immediately was to try to have a package deal. Our commitment and any other supplies to Saudi Arabia or to Egypt—it is a completely separate undertaking by the United States Government to Israel, as a result of the second agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975 and therefore, in the first place asked to, if I may say so, dismantle the package deal and have separately dealt with every commitment, with every issue in this field, and then, of course, we had to object to the supply to Saudi Arabia and to Egypt for very simple reasons.

Somebody said, "I am going around now lobbying on this problem." I am not running around. I hear a question and it is my duty to answer, and I say it is very dangerous to the security of Israel.

Let me say those F-15s to be supplied to Saudi Arabia, they can turn Saudi Arabia into a confrontation state with Israel. From a certain base called Tobruk, those planes can reach Elat in less than 7 minutes and Tel Aviv in less than 27 minutes, so it is very dangerous and from time to time we hear statements that the Saudi Arabian forces

will be at the disposal of the Arab cause, whatever it means.

We have also had information that they will give those planes at the time of contingency to another confrontation state. So it is very dangerous to Israel.

The concept they may be placed on the other side of Saudi Arabia, around the Persian Gulf, wouldn't solve the problem because you can, in one night, transfer those planes to the advanced base and from that advanced base again to attack Israel. Therefore, our attitude is very simple: Let us have our planes as the commitment was given to us, and we object because of the gravest danger to our national security, through the supply of those modern, very lethal weapons to Saudi Arabia and to Egypt.

Drew: But to go back to my question, if the choice is, as it now appears to be, either all three countries get the weapons or none of them get them, which would you prefer?

A. I would prefer Israel should get them. That is my choice. I don't have any other choice.

Keatley: May I stay with the F-15 for a moment? Is the objection more political than military? Because for the first time the U.S. seems willing to enter into an arms arrangement with the Arab country despite strong Israeli objections.

A. I think it is military. It is a matter of security. It is very vital to us. Of course, it wouldn't start tomorrow because it is a matter of time. But we have to take into consideration the future. I don't think that political issues are here involved.

From the point of view of the issue itself, moral issues are involved. Israel is a faithful ally of the United States of America. We stand by each other, help each other, and its security shouldn't be put in danger through supply of such most modern planes to an enemy of Israel.

Keatley: Well, the U.S. military says the French Mirage is a superior bomber to the F-15 and that if the Saudis do not get the F-15 starting in 3 years' time, they will get Mirages next summer and perhaps an advanced version beyond that.

A. I have heard different opinions about the comparison between the Mirage and the F-15, and let us leave it to free discussion among the experts.

What I would like to outline and to make clear

is, if this should be the argument what else it is it be-

Whenever a decision is taken, for instance to give dangerous arms to a certain state, the calculation will be "We, the United States have to do it. If we don't do it, someone else will come in." So there won't be an end to it.

I suppose such problems should be dealt with on the moral plain, whether it is right or wrong. From our point of view, it is very dangerous. This is what we explain here as well.

Brokaw: Mr. Prime Minister, would you look less critically on the sale of the F-15s to Saudi Arabia if Israel were to get an additional quota of F-15s, say, 10 more, if not immediately, down the road, a commitment?

A. Well, we would like to have more. I think we were promised more. But that is not the issue at all now, and I don't think this is the so-called compromises.

We stand by our objection which is in our opinion completely justified. It is very dangerous to the future relations between us and the Arab States if those States get very modern, most modern, most sophisticated planes with which they can attack any city and any town in Israel.

Brokaw: I don't think anyone would argue with your premise that the addition of these kinds of war planes to whatever country in the Middle East will add to the possibility of war there, but a large part of the equation is the military balance and United States military intelligence experts believe strongly that even with the sale of these planes to Saudi Arabia, your country still is in a position to beat any combination of Arab States and in fact with the sale of the planes to Israel as part of this package, you are even stronger.

Would you disagree with that?

A. I am very grateful for such an appreciation of Israel's strength, but with all due respect to the experts, we must think about our future. I cannot change this opinion of our military experts, all of them, without any exception, that the delivery of such planes to Saudi Arabia will be a great peril for Israel.

Brokaw: Yes, but it does not in any way make it an equal balance between Saudi Arabia and Israel or any combination of Arab States and Israel. You still would be militarily superior to any combination, would you not?

A. No, it may change the balance, but the question is not of so-called technical superiority. Let us imagine that hostilities break out. Then the question is of bombing our cities and towns. It is a matter of lives of our citizens. The technical superiority is important, but it is not decisive from this point of view. This is the issue which we have to deal with.

We are a very small country and we live compactly in a very narrow area around the seashore and if those planes should come and bomb our cities and towns, the casualties may be very great indeed and that would be a sacrifice which we do not deserve to be asked to give. This is the danger and we explain it now as we did in the past.

Monroe: Mr. Prime Minister, it is reported that Sectretary Vance gave some new proposals to Foreign Minister Dayan approximately a week or ten days ago relating to the issues of the West Bank and the Palestinians. Could you comment on that?

A. No, I don't think there are definite proposals but our foreign minister and your secretary of state had a discussion about how to bring forward, to continue with the peace-making process, and we deal now with problems which I can call rather essential than procedural and when I come back home, also the Foreign Minister comes home, the government will discuss these issues and will take the proper decisions.

The intention is to revive the peace-making process because now, as Egypt demands of Israel that we should withdraw totally to the lines of the fourth of June, 1967, preceding the Six Day War and have a Palestinian State, these two demands are completely unacceptable to Israel.

As I said on the eve of President Sadat's arrival to Jerusalem during the Knesset debate, after, at Ismailia, on all occasions, so still, because of this obstacle—this is now the obstacle to continue negotiations about a declaration of principles.

But, try to find a different avenue and to speak about essentials and this exactly was the theme of their talks in Washington and we shall take it up in Jerusalem.

Monroe: Is there much specific hope at this time for a resumption of peace talks?

A. Great hope. We want to resume the peace talks. We want to negotiate, as I said, and the

very essence of the peace-making process are negotiations.

Monroe: Can you tell us of any specific reason for hope?

A. The specific reason for hope is that there is always hope because both of us need peace and in our opinion war is inevitable, peace is inevitable; peace will come.

The question is how to bring it quicker and this is what we want. I hope, on the other side there will also be such an approach. So this is the reason why there is hope, but I can't say anything in addition to the expression of hope.

Drew: The Israelis and the Egyptians appear to be in agreement now that there would be an interim solution on the West Bank for five years. The issue seems to be on what happens after that.

As I understand, the question before you is, you have said you are willing to discuss anything after that but the question now before you is, are you willing to go beyond saying that you will discuss it; that you will actually come to some sort of conclusions about the status of the West Bank and by what process, and that that is what Sadat needs to know.

A. Our peace plan, indeed, contains complete proposals, how to arrange life together.

First, we suggest to abolish the administration of the military government. Then to offer the local population, the Palestinian-Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, free election of their administrative council, and that council will deal with the affairs of the daily life without any interference whatsoever by us.

But, security should be, of course, our responsibility because otherwise the so-called PLO will take over and we will be in danger of permanent attacks and permanent bloodshed, as we can see and it is promised to us.

These are the basic tenets of the autonomy or what we call administrative self-rule which we suggest, and this is a very positive approach, as again I have heard from time to time from many representatives.

Now, there are other arrangements, concrete, which I will not go now into detail into, all very positive arrangements of living together.

Now, what we suggested is, after a period of five years there will be a review. A review can concern anything, and this is our opinion, which stands. If anybody asks us to say in advance what is going to happen after those five years, we say, let us rather give reality the floor. Let reality speak for itself.

Then it will become eventual. We shall live together in peace and understanding, in decency.

I think reality itself can have its influence. This is now our reply, but if we are still asked, perhaps you have an idea, then we have to think about it, and we shall think about it.

Drew: So that if, as it now appears, this is the log jam between you and Egypt over specific proposals for what would happen after the five years, are you ready to begin to give answers to those questions?

A. We will have to consult each other. We will have to deal with it.

Now, we give the following reply: We think that reality should speak for itself and we shall consult each other after those five years. There will be the administrative council, the Jordanian Government, the Egyptian Government, the Israeli Government. We believe that usually, as a result of consultations, there come about decisions and agreements. This is now our reply.

If we are asked to think about different replies, then we have, of course, to think of it. We didn't yet. We shall deal with it when we are home.

Keatley: Do you consider that after that five year period one of the possibilities would be major Israeli military withdrawals from the West Bank and Gaza?

A. That is a question which again we have to leave to that period which will end after five years. What we suggest now is to abolish the administration of the military government. As far as the stationing of Israeli forces is concerned, it is now agreed also by the United States Government for the test period and perhaps even for longer they will be stationed because we have a very serious security problem. Please don't forget it is on the threshold of our homes. It is a few kilometers from our towns. It is nine miles from the seashore.

There are the gravest dangers involved in this issue and therefore we must think of it, how to make our security assured on the one hand, and how to make it possible for our neighbors to live in autonomy on the other hand.

This is the decency [sic] of our basic proposal and what is going to happen up to five years, as I said, we should leave to that period. It is still five years.

Keatley: Yasser Arafat has said that any independent West Bank state, Arab state, would be too weak, too poor, too militarily vulnerable to risk confrontation of any sort with Israel, that it would be—

A. Look at Lebanon, my friend, and then you will see whether this is a sincere reply.

The question is not of weakness of a state, but of the charter. They have a charter, Mr. Arafat and his friends, in which it is written that the State of Israel must disappear, must be wiped off the map. We take it very seriously. We cannot but take it seriously.

We have our experience of the past, and therefore if they have those Soviet-supplied weapons, the Katushas and the artillery which they use all the time, mostly in Lebanon, we face then the most serious dangers for the lives of our civilian population. We cannot, after all the experience we have had place our civilian population into the direct danger of being hurt, attacked, killed, wounded.

Keatley: Your government has occupied the West Bank for 11 years. Do you think the Arabs who live there support the charter and after 11 years of experience with Israel, want to see it destroyed?

A. Living that way, it was proved we can live together. Of course, from time to time something happens. However, we now suggest a different arrangement. We suggest there won't be a military government or administration of the military government and there will be autonomy—self-rule. That is a far cry from the situation which existed until now. No one has yet tried it out and it should be tried out. This is the change.

Monroe: We have a bit more than 2 minutes.

Brokaw: If we can, in the final moments that we have here, Mr. Prime Minister, I wonder if we can be specific about what it would take to get the peace progress going once again. If President Sadat were here in this studio with us today, what move would you most like him to make and what would you offer him in return in an effort to get the peace negotiations moving once again?

A. If President Sadat were here, Mr. Brokaw, I would tell him very simply, let us renew the spirit of our talks in Jerusalem and in Ismailia.

Brokaw: But won't it take more than just spirit; won't it take some concrete gesture?

A. No, I think spirit is decisive. I will explain

why. Because, we knew both in Jerusalem and in Ismailia that we have differences of opinion and we decided to negotiate in openness, in friend-liness, and this is the real basis for negotiations. In Ismailia we told each other we have differences of opinion and so we said to each other in Jerusalem and yet President Sadat summed up that meeting as successful. We formed the two committees. Later we renewed the negotiations. Let there be no ultimative demands, for instance, for total withdrawal, et cetera. We brought the complete peace plan, regarding Sinai, regarding Judea, Sumaria, the Gaza Strip and autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs.

You have counterproposals. Bring those counterproposals and we shall negotiate. That is what I would tell him. But I wrote him this as well. And the reply is not yet positive. Let us hope it will be.

Monroe: Mr. Prime Minister, if the Palestinians should form a government in exile based in Jordan and agree to recognize Israeli sovereignty on a mutual basis, would that be a constructive step?

A. It is hypothetical, Mr. Monroe, and I am really not in a position to answer it. Putting a government in exile, and what would they say? We have to deal with facts and they have a charter which they do not change at all, even one iota, even one word. Israel must disappear. Instead there must be a Palestinian State. And Jews who lived in Palestine until 1917 will be allowed to live. The others will have to go.

It is all written. There were consultations. They didn't change one word. Why should I now deal in such hypothetical questions which do not have any bearing on reality whatsoever?

Monroe: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for being with us today on "Meet the Press."

122

Speech by US Senator Weicker (Rep.) to a conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) accusing the Carter Administration of deliberately pursuing a policy of confrontation with Israel¹⁴¹ Washington, May 8, 1978

This month Israel celebrates the 30th anniversary of the reestablishment of the Jewish state. It is a time of warmth and emotion and good feeling, and the Administration is playing its part

come to nothing.

by being friendly and considerate and encouraging. One does not, after all, fight with one's in-laws on Christmas or on Rosh Hashanah or on their 30th anniversary. We can hope that the tone of the President's remarks in the Rose Garden last week marked a return to common sense and fair dealing with Israel. But we have had occasion for such hopes in the past, and they have always

The fact is that the Carter Administration, from its inception, has deliberately pursued a policy of confrontation with the Government of Israel. Those with short memories now persist in the view that the differences between our two nations are predicated on the intransigence of one man: Prime Minister Menachem Begin. The effect, and I will say even the intent, is to make it appear that Begin is a stiff-necked impediment to peace in the Middle East. The truth is that this reckless policy of confrontation began before Mr. Begin became Prime Minister and while Mr. Rabin and the Labor Party governed Israel. In refusing to acknowledge this, we aid the Carter Administration in its blatant efforts to divide both the American people and even the people of Israel on the matter of the Government of Israel.

Let us recall that the Carter Administration announced last year that a Geneva conference would reconvene before the end of 1977. This was to be a major foreign policy achievement by the new Administration. Israel had no objection to this. The Arab nations did. They would not go to Geneva without prior assurances as to what would be the outcome of renewed negotiations in Geneva. Chief among their demands was that

This Administration desperately needs a success in the foreign policy arena—some manifestation of its mastery of foreign affairs. Where better to seek it than in the Middle East where shortsightedness and inexperience suggest to the Executive Branch that it can inflict its will on the sovereign state of Israel?

123

Statements by US Senator Ribicoff (Dem.) urging support for the proposed jet sales to Saudi Arabia to counteract the threat posed by the Soviet Union towards the Arabian Gulf (excerpts)¹⁴²

Washington, May 15, 1978

I requested this closed session to discuss the Soviet threat to the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. I believe this threat is of serious consequence to the United States and the Western World. Most of the information I shall use is classified secret.

The Soviets have long been interested in this region and the reason is obvious. The Persian Gulf area has half the world's oil reserves and half of the region's reserves are in Saudi Arabia. Since World War II, the United States has tried to check the Soviet strategy of gaining control of the area. When the British completed their withdrawal in 1971, something had to happen. Either we had to replace the British, or our friends had to have means to defend themselves. That is where we are today.

Saudi Arabia fears the Soviets and has every reason to. According to the CIA, the Soviets are not developing new oil reserves enough to offset declining production. Current Soviet oil production is close to the estimated maximum potential

Israel agree in advance to withdraw entirely from the Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. This would have eliminated any need for negotiation, of course. Nevertheless, the Carter Administration insisted that Israel acquiesce in those absurd demands, and Israel refused to do so—as any responsible nation would have refused.

¹⁴¹ Partial text as published in Near East Report (Washington), XXII, 20 (May 17, 1978), pp. 87–88.

¹⁴² Statements made in speech to US Senate; partial text, The Mideast Observer in Washington, June 1, 1978, pp. 1-3.

of 11 to 12 million barrels a day. By 1985, Soviet production is likely to fall to 8 to 10 million barrels a day, and demand will even be higher. The CIA does not foresee increased production from the Soviet Union until the 1990's, and it would be extremely difficult to extract the oil because of the terrain.

There are two major points here. The first is that running out of oil would cause enormous political and economic difficulties for the Soviet Union. The second is that even greater damage would be realized in the west by the loss of these oil fields. Such a catastrophe would trigger a great depression and would probably be a cause of war.

Last June, 1977, I accompanied Secretary Vance to the OECD meeting in Paris. I was privileged to sit in with him on bilateral talks with a score of foreign ministers. There was a discussion of the relationship between the United States and each one of their countries. What surprised me was, whether we were talking to the Finns or the Portuguese or the Australians or the Germans or the French or the Italians, every one would end up asking, "How about the Middle East?"

The final talk was between Secretary Vance and the Japanese foreign minister. They discussed the problems between China and the United States and Japan; they talked about South Korea; they talked about Taiwan; they talked about the problems of trade. When it was all through, the Japanese foreign minister turned to Secretary Vance, and he said: "Mr. Secretary, how about the Middle East?"

Secretary Vance then said: "Mr. Foreign Minister, I wonder if you would allow Senator Ribicoff to respond?"

I said to him: "Mr. Foreign Minister, first, I want to tell you that I am of the Jewish faith. My sympathies are completely with the State of Israel. But I am very curious. I have sat in on the bilateral conferences now with the Secretary of State and with a score of foreign ministers. Every one of the foreign ministers has asked exactly the same question you have asked. Why do you ask that question?"

He thought for a minute, and said: "95 percent of our energy is dependent on oil. 70 percent of our oil comes from the Persian Gulf. If the Middle East is not straightened out and something happens to cut off the supply of that oil," he said: "it

would lead to grave harm to Japan economically, politically, and socially."

How are the Soviets moving in the region and why are they there? In the final analysis, what is there in Yemen and what is there in Ethiopia? There are no assets in Yemen and Ethiopia. But look at what you have. First, if you control Saudi Arabia, 50 percent of Mideast oil comes down through the narrow Straits of Hormuz. With this, whoever controls this controls 50 percent of the oil of the world.

Here is the pincer that comes right into the Red Sea. Let me analyze this. In red [pointing to an illustrative map], you have the states under Soviet control, you have the states that have Soviet and Cuban arms and personnel.

Syria is a hard-line radical state. I had a chance to hear the Syrian rhetoric. A few of us went to Syria for just a short period last year. It was amazing. I spent all my conversations, not talking about Israel or the United States. I spent all my time, all my time, defending Sadat.

[Classified material deleted from the transcript at this point.]

Gentlemen, all I can say is that the Israelis and this country ought to pray every night for the physical and political survival of President Sadat. Should these peace efforts fail and should Sadat fall, what would replace Sadat would be a radical government. The Soviet Union, that was kicked out of Egypt, will come back into Egypt with Russian arms. That is what the Israelis will be faced with, the Soviet Union back in Egypt with these arms.

The Syrians have an enormous military establishment, with 200,000 men, 500 jet fighters, and 2,800 tanks. There are 2,600 Soviet advisers in Syria, and Syria is a jealous, angry nation, out to get some of the riches. This is what they want. They want the riches that come from oil.

Take Iraq. For 20 years since the Iraqi revolution, radical government in Baghdad has posed a political and military threat to Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf States. Iraq still has not given up its claim to Kuwait. It has promoted unrest in the small Gulf States which, in turn, look to the Saudis for protection. Iran cannot be the protector, because it is not an Arab State. Iraq has 185,000 men in its military. I have all the figures right here and you can all come up and look at them. They have 412 jet fighters and

over 2,000 tanks; right now, there are 1,150 Soviet advisers and 150 to 500 Cubans in Iraq.

Afghanistan has recently had a coup. We don't know much about the new government except that it appears to be more pro-Soviet than the last one. The military has Soviet equipment and there are 300 Soviet advisers.

South Yemen has become a serious and active Soviet base of operations. It is small but has a well-trained military. Its army is roughly half the size of Saudi Arabia's—20,000 men. It has over 200 tanks and 83 jet fighters. There are 300 Soviet advisers and from 300 to 350 Cubans. The Soviets have use of the naval facilities in Aden. South Yemeni military forces are fighting alongside Russians and Cubans in the Horn of Africa.

Saudi concern here is real: There have been three military engagements between South Yemen and Saudi forces in border areas since 1969.

The Soviets backed Somalia until they found a better target and switched their emphasis to Ethiopia. Ethiopia is in chaos. It is going through an internal leftist revolution—a bloody one—while at the same time it is fighting against Somalia. By African standards the Ethiopian Army is large—200,000 men, as is its air force, with 97 jet fighters. Most of the categories of military assets in Ethiopia have increased during the past few months. Most disturbing—and central to my concern—is that Ethiopia has 1,200 Soviet advisers and 17,000 Cubans. They are an army. They are guns for hire and they are there where they mean business.

The Russian advisers do not fight, but the Cubans fight and the Cubans are there ready to do harm and to do mischief and come wherever the pressure can be.

Libya is a dangerous country, especially because of a belligerent and I think irrational president. Libya has been the most blatant supporter of international terrorism. It also has 300 jet fighters, 900 Soviet advisers, and 150 Cubans.

I have summarized the force strength of Saudi Arabia's immediate neighbors; Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. Compared to Saudi Arabia they are ominous. Saudi concern is understandable.

Mr. President [of the Senate], the point of all this is that the Soviets know the value of the region they are surrounding. Does anyone think they give a damn about Afghanistan or Yemen or

Ethiopia? And they are active. Let me cite an example. The Sultanate of Oman borders both South Yemen and Saudi Arabia. It controls with Iran on the other side the Straits of Hormuz—through which half the world's oil exports and 20 percent of our oil consumption pass every day. The straits have a preferred navigation channel of about 3 miles and those of us who have flown over here can recognize how narrow those straits are. The Soviets have supported South Yemen's efforts to foster a rebellion in Oman. Oman has resisted and looks to the Saudis.

The problem is both serious and extensive. It will not be solved by selling 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia will have to pay attention to the gulf and the entire region [sic]. The point is that while everyone is drawing attention to the confrontation states at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, we had better watch out for the back door and what the Soviets and Cubans are up to in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.

But what the Soviets want and what the Soviets need is control of that oil.

You can say what you want, whoever controls that oil will control the economic lifeblood of the West. Let the Soviets control that oil, and they are in a good way to surrounding at the present time, and where will the United States be? Where will Western Europe be? Where will Japan be?

So when we say now that we will deny these planes to Saudi Arabia, why?

We have had all types of assurances and these assurances came about through the questions that were raised in those two "Face the Nation" broadcasts by the Senator from Tennessee and Mr. Church.

The Saudis have a contract with the French, conditioned on the Senate turning down this deal. If the Senate turns down the sale of the planes to the Saudis, the Saudis are ready to buy F-1's from France, and they do not have to wait until 1981 to get delivery. Those planes will be delivered by the French to the Saudis this fall.

Furthermore, there will be an advance payment of \$1 billion, which is the money the French aircraft industry needs to develop its Mirage 2000 and its Mirage 4000. Do you think the French are going to care very much what the Saudis will do with the plane? It will be air-to-ground. Our F-15's are not air-to-ground. They are interceptors.

So we are gaining nothing but turning over the influence in this entire area to the French...

It is obvious that we are a giant with our hands tied behind our back. We are not doing much of anything, and the Soviets and the Cubans are gradually encroaching upon the positions of strength.

Evidently, the Soviets and their Cuban satellites have a pretty good idea of geopolitics, ecopolitics and petropolitics. They know the way the world has changed, and they understand what to (do) with power.

Apparently, the total I gave you, if you would add them up, is the overwhelming power that we have in this area under domination.

What you have in red is where the Soviet advisors and Cubans are, and the Cuban planes and the Cuban tanks and the Cuban guns that are available to the Soviet Union for their objectives. We have very little to show for it. We have the Israelis; we are trying to get defense in Saudi Arabia; we have nothing in Egypt. We are outmanned and outgunned.

So I am not bothered about whether it is 60 [planes to Saudi Arabia]. There were some who wanted to cut it down to 40 or 50 for the Saudis. I would like to see the Saudis have more. I would like to see the Israelis have more. I would like to see the Egyptians have more.

I would like to see the people who are our friends get backed up. But we are not doing that, and we are being chased out of the elements of power. There is more power in a barrel of oil than there is in a barrel of a gun. This is one of the great problems facing us as a country.

The Saudis want to be our friends. I would like them to be our friends. We need that oil and so does the entire West need it

124

Communiqué issued by the ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Nonaligned Countries reaffirming that the Palestine question lies at the heart of the Middle East issue (excerpts)¹⁴³

Havana, May 20, 1978

27. On examining the situation in the Middle East the Bureau arrived at the conclusion that the tensions existing in the region when the question was considered in the Ministerial meeting of the Bureau in New Delhi have become more acute. The serious threat to world peace and security, which the meeting in New Delhi regarded as capable of provoking a fresh armed conflict, was regrettably confirmed by the recent violation and occupation by Israel of a large part of the territory of Lebanon.

28. The Bureau reiterated again its conviction that the cause of this worsening situation continues to be Israel's policy of occupation and expansion and its stubborn refusal to comply with the principles established in the United Nations Charter and Resolutions.

28-A. After considering the developments which have occurred in the Middle East situation during the course of the past year since its last meeting in April 1977 in New Delhi, 144 the Bureau emphasized that the question of Palestine constituted the heart of the Middle East problem, and that the solution of the two problems is inseparable. The Bureau further stressed the need for safeguarding the intrinsic unity of the question of Palestine when it comes to be examined together with the Middle East situation.

The Bureau considered that any effort to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must necessarily include the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories and the recognition of the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights. It was also convinced that any solution failing to take those two basic conditions into account could not serve to further the cause of peace; on the contrary, it could but help to pave

¹⁴³ Excerpted from the English text, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), XXIX, 677 (June 20, 1978), pp. 16-18.

¹⁴⁴ Doc. 80 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

the way for all attempts by the United States of America to liquidate the question of Palestine and assist Israel in achieving its aims and to perpetuate the status quo ensuing from the occupation, thus enabling it to fulfil its role as agent for imperialism and colonialism in the area.

28-B. The Bureau reaffirms the decisions taken by the non-aligned countries at their meetings concerning the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East. It noted that those decisions constituted a set of principles serving as a basis for any attempt to achieve a just and lasting peace in the area.

The Bureau further noted that any attempt to undermine the struggle to have those principles applied was contrary to the resolve of the non-aligned countries to put an end to the occupation of Arab territories by Israel and to assist the Palestinian people recover their inalienable national rights.

28-C. The Bureau paid tribute to the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO for their resolute struggle for national independence against imperialism and Israeli expansionism, the maintenance and strengthening of their forces in the face of Israeli aggression. It also paid warm tribute to the people of the Arab countries who are fighting valiantly and persistently, foiling successive dangerous attempts of deception by imperialism, and frustrating the stubborn policy of Israeli zionists.

29. The Bureau considered that Israel's expansionist policy of annexing Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories continues, while expulsions, mass arrests, mistreatment and a systematic policy of plunder and exploitation of the Arab population in the illegally occupied territories are intenisfied.

The Bureau categorically denounced Israel's exploitation of the natural wealth and resources of Palestine and other Arab occupied territories in contravention of the provisions of the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions and called on all countries to take the necessary measures to prevent any co-operation with Israel that would facilitate such illegal exploitation by the Israeli occupation authorities.

29-A. The Bureau noted with grave concern and deplored statements made by certain leaders of the United States concerning repeated threats to use force against the oil producing countries especially in the Arab Gulf area and their proposals for stand by military contingents for intervention in the area.

30. The Bureau considered that the most elementary rights and fundamental freedoms continue to be denied to the Arab population of the occupied territories, and that religious freedom is restricted. Israel is also intensifying its policy of colonization, fostering and enlarging settlements in occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, with the evident aim of hindering the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and of changing the physical, political, cultural, religious and demographic conditions of those territories. Israel not only illegally and wantonly exploits the Arab labour force, but also continues to violate their human rights, torturing and killing Arab prisoners.

30-A. The Co-ordinating Bureau expressed grave concern about the persistent violation of the human rights of the Arab population in all the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. The Bureau condemned the Israeli authorities for their continuing refusal to allow the United Nations Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories to have access to the occupied territories and its policy of annexation of Arab land.

The Bureau expressed its complete support for United Nations Resolution 32/91 reaffirming the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12th August 1949 as applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

31. The Bureau stressed that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region can only be attained within the framework of a global solution, based on Israel's complete withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and on the recovery and exercise by the Palestinian people of its legitimate and inalienable national rights, including that of establishing a national and independent state in Palestine, and the participation of PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any endeavours for the solution of the question of Palestine and the Middle East.

32. The Bureau confirmed that in the light of Israel's expansionist policy and its delaying tactics designed to perpetuate its illegal occupation of

Arab territories, the political, economic and military support given to Israel by the USA and other States is a matter of serious concern.

33. The Bureau condemned Israel's recent aggression in the south of Lebanon in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country. Israeli invasion is aimed at occupying Lebanese territory by destroying Lebanese villages and cities, compelling Lebanese citizens to leave their homes and land, and crushing Palestinian resistance. The Bureau demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory. It also demanded the implementation of Security Council Resolution 425 and called for complete respect of the integrity of Lebanese territory and of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its recognized international borders.

The Bureau called upon the Security Council to consider adoption of mandatory measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in order to bring about the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel's forces of aggression from the internationally recognized territory of the Republic of Lebanon.

- 34. The Bureau called on all the countries to lend their material and moral support to the Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization, sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in its struggle to bring about the end of Israeli occupation of Arab territories.
- 35. The Bureau renewed the call for the suspension of all aid designed to augment the military potential of Israel and for the rejection of the changes that the Zionist state is trying to introduce in the region, altering its physical, demographic and economic condition.
- 36. The Bureau condemned the Israeli military escalation in conventional arms and denounced its intentions of possessing nuclear weapons, as a serious threat to international peace and security and therefore called on all members of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament to endorse a proposal:
- a) calling upon all States, in particular the United States of America, to co-operate fully in effective international action, in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to avert the grave menace to international peace and security caused by the continued escalation of

Israeli armament;

- b) requesting the Security Council to call upon all States under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and irrespective of any existing contracts, to refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or any spare parts thereof, to Israel; to ensure that such supplies do not reach Israel through other parties and to end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material or technology to Israel.
- 37. The Bureau also condemned Israel's growing military and economic ties and sales of arms to South Africa in its policy hostile to the African and Arab peoples, and noted with concern that the sale of Israeli-made arms to various countries, including some Latin American countries, especially Guatemala and Nicaragua, strengthen the Israeli war industry.
- 38. The Bureau reaffirmed that the question of Palestine lies at the heart of the conflict in the Middle East and condemned all the policies of the United States designed to ignore the legitimate inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and to impose partial settlements.
- 39. The Bureau reiterated its grave concern that Israel's continued usurpation of Palestine, its flagrant denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, and the expansionist racist policy of the Zionist state, were being intensified in flagrant defiance of the international community and in steady and increasing violation of the principles of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- 40. The Bureau recalled that the Fifth Summit Conference in Colombo had stressed the need for the Non-Aligned Countries to exert greater pressure on Israel in the United Nations and in all its specialized agencies and, in particular, called on the Security Council to take effective measures including those under Chapter VII of the Charter. to oblige it to comply with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations. It observed with great concern that despite those actions, the Zionist State had carried out further violations and aggressions which, like the one perpetrated against Lebanon, had led to international condemnation. The Bureau considered it necessary to emphasize the gravity of the situation and to call for stronger and firmer action to stop Israel's policy of systematic aggression.

41. The Bureau urged the Security Council to implement the measures necessary for implementing the recommendations in the report¹⁴⁵ presented by the United Nations Special Committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its 31st and 32nd session; and, in particular, the recommendations to enable the Palestinian people to attain and exercise their Inalienable Rights, including the right to return to their homes and property and the national right to self-determination and to establish their national independent State in Palestine.

42. The Bureau reiterated the decision of the Colombo Summit Conference¹⁴⁶ asking all the Non-Aligned Countries to pledge their support to the Palestinian people in their struggle, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole legitimate representative, until they had fully recovered their inalienable national rights.

43. The Bureau called for the annual observance commencing in 1978, of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people.

44. The Bureau recalled that the Colombo Conference had reaffirmed that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination and called upon the Non-Aligned Countries to bear that in mind in their participation in the World Conference to combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, to be held in August 1978.

Speech by Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany stating that peace can only come to the Middle East through an overall settlement and calling for Israel's adherence to UN resolutions concerning withdrawal from South Lebanon (excerpt)¹⁴⁷

Bonn, June 7, 1978

The government of the FRG knows it will be appreciated that a sincere, trustworthy dialogue has been initiated between our two countries on matters concerning the Middle East conflict. I hope that the attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany towards this important international problem which coincides with the other member states of the European community, finds understanding among all parties to the conflicts in its balanced views. I hope that this policy, that is committed to the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, will be recognized in the same way as our firm readiness to establish good relations with both sides in the service of this search for peace.

The continuing conflict in the Middle East also affects us. For we Europeans are linked to this neighbouring region in many ways. Thus we have a pressing and immediate interest in a settlement of the conflict, which will finally bring true peace and the stability that we all want to the region. We Europeans derive from this the right and duty to show the parties to the conflict the principles which we believe must be observed if a peaceful solution is to be found in the Middle East.

This European position is well-known. It is summarized in the declaration of the European Parliament of June 29, 1977.¹⁴⁸

Since, as I said, our Middle East policy is committed to the search for a peaceful solution, we support every step we hope serves this purpose. In the same way we speak out against activities which hinder the peace efforts.

¹²⁵

¹⁴⁵ Doc. 4 in International Documents on Palestine 1976 and doc. 4 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹⁴⁶ Docs. 139-144 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

¹⁴⁷ Made on the occasion of Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's visit to the Federal Republic of Germany; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 62 (June 8, 1978), pp. 589–590.

¹⁴⁸ Doc. 220 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Efforts for a peaceful solution to the conflict go further. President Asad, and you yourself, Mr. Minister, play an important role in this.

We do not close our eyes to the fact that there are differences among the governments of those Arab countries directly involved in the conflict on how to reach a settlement to the conflict, and we regret that this has led to strained relations in the Arab world.

A just and lasting peace in the area can ultimately only be achieved in a comprehensive settlement. Because of this we have an interest in the unity of those Arab states in conflict. It would, in our perception, be a good thing if the present misunderstandings and differences of opinion could be clarified.

The situation in the Middle East is still dangerous. The present relative peace cannot blind us to this. However, I should not like to omit to point out the essential role that Syria has played in pacifying its civil-war torn neighbour, Lebanon. The responsible and prudent attitude of your President seems to us a proof of the Syrian desire for peace.

The Federal Republic of Germany has, from the beginning, actively supported the peace efforts of the United Nations in Lebanon. It now transpires that the appropriate resolutions, among which will be a call for the withdrawal of Israeli troops, will be passed immediately.

The goal to be reached must be the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the land.

Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany stand, each of the two countries on its land, before the truth, both difficult and important, of attaining and building peace. Both do this under different conditions, but, both find themselves, so I believe, on the right path.

126

Statement by US Assistant Secretary of State Saunders to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East reviewing US policy in the area since World War II 149

Washington, June 12, 1978

Introduction: This Subcommittee's annual review of U.S. policy in the Middle East provides a significant forum for the Administration to analyze American interests and goals in the Middle East and to share with members of Congress and the public our perception of the policies necessary to pursue them. I can think of few areas of the world where it is more important to understand what is at stake for our country and for our friends and how our interests relate to each other.

How perceptions of the Middle East have evolved: It may help focus our understanding of what is at stake today in the Middle East to examine how our perceptions of this area have evolved over the last three decades.

After the Second World War, our thoughts ran along two lines.

First, on the strategic front, we spoke in terms of physical geography, characterizing the Middle East as "the strategic crossroads" and a "land bridge" joining Europe, Asia and Africa. This perception grew out of pre-war European political concepts and the experience of a generation that fought in the Middle East and North Africa and across the Mediterranean during the war. The later Soviet thrusts in Iran, Turkey and Greece to expand their post-war influence reinforced this view.

Then, in 1948 we committed ourselves to the existence and to the survival of Israel as a Jewish State, as a home for victims of the holocaust and others who wished to come, and as a functioning democracy.

By the early 1960's, the advent of intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads and the fact that the USSR has achieved an active position in the Middle East caused us to shift from seeing national interest primarily in terms of the Middle East's geographic position to a perception of the Middle East in global strategic terms. We wanted to

¹⁴⁹ Text supplied, on request, by the US embassy, Beirut, pp. 1-23.

enhance our influence in the area partly because the Mediterranean remained in important lifeline to our NATO allies and our allies to the East but also because of the importance of oil to Western Europe and the political orientation of key states. We did not at that time see a direct threat to American interests coming from this area. Direct U.S. economic interests, apart from our interest in the reliable availability of oil to our allies at reasonable prices, largely centered in oilrelated activities.

The U.S. also continued its firm commitment to Israel's strength and well-being and at the same time, expressed humanitarian concern for peace in the Middle East which would permit all the people of the area, including the displaced Palestinians, to build better lives.

Today's perceptions of our interests: In the 1970's yet a further evolution in our view of the Middle East has taken place. It reflects new developments there with which we and our friends must deal creatively.

Today there are few areas in the world where so many compelling American interests intersect as is the case in the Middle East. The basic catalogue of interests remains unchanged and familiar to us all, but there are important new points to be made about them. Let me discuss each of them in turn.

A. We have long recognized that it is imperative that the United States seek to prevent conflict in the Middle East from again becoming a flash-point and that helping strengthen the independence of Middle Eastern countries will contribute to stability in the region and make war less likely.

Since the mid-1960's, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 have demonstrated to us in the heat of crisis that the Middle East is an area where U.S. and Soviet forces could confront each other in the context of a local war. Now, with estimates of the Soviet Union's own changing needs, a new dimension has been added to the traditional Soviet interest in a strong position in that area. These facts provide an important part of the backdrop against which we pursue our interests in the area.

B. Our irrevocable commitment to the security, strength, and well-being of Israel has been reaffirmed by every American Administration since the modern State of Israel was born thirty years ago. It is a permanent feature of American

foreign policy. I might add that this has been a deep personal commitment of mine. Many Americans share this commitment to a people who have suffered beyond our ability to comprehend and who have yet contributed so much to our heritage and to our world.

In this decade this commitment has been broadened and strengthened by the passage of time and the steady development of relations between our two countries.

Today, however, Israel and the U.S. must face together new and more difficult circumstances.

It is increasingly obvious that Israel's security can best be guaranteed over the long term by a policy of continued military strength coupled with a peaceful relationship with its neighbors. Close American cooperation with key Arab states is essential to achieving and guaranteeing that peace.

In the past year, the opportunity for peace has increased dramatically. Before 1967, when no Arab state would talk of recognizing Israel and making peace with it, the basis for a final, peaceful settlement of this conflict did not exist. Following President Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem¹⁵⁰ and Israel's warm reception, Israel for the first time since its establishment as a modern state is dealing with an Arab state which is prepared to accept and recognize a Jewish state in the Middle East and to make peace and establish normal relations with it. Opinion in the Arab world has shifted gradually since 1967, and the shift accelerated after the 1967 war. In going to Jerusalem, President Sadat dramatized that shift and broke out of the thirty-year cycle of war and truce to create a new psychological climate in which there can be progress toward peace between Israel and all its neighbors. The issue is no longer whether there can be peace, but whether there can be agreement in terms of peace.

In that context, we have particularly come to recognize in new wars the importance of a just resolution of the problem of the Palestinian Arabs for a peace settlement. This is no longer seen as simply a refugee problem; it is a problem of fulfilling the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in ways that enable them to participate in the determination of their own future and to live in

¹⁵⁰ See docs. 301 and 303-305 in International Documents on Palestine 1977

peace and security with Israel. The Palestinians for their part must demonstrate a willingness to live in peace with Israel.

Finally, Israel's development has reached a point where the advantages of peace for the further growth of the Israeli people are clearer than ever. Peace can release their extraordinary talents and energies to the benefits of Israel and of the world at large. In per capita terms, Israel possesses more scientists, engineers and other professionals and technicians in service fields than most nations of the world. Already, despite thirty years of conflict and tension, Israel's contributions to human and material development in areas such as health, agriculture, the environment, alternative sources of energy and water conservation have been remarkable. Conditions of peace which relieve Israel of the world's most crushing defense burden, its already disproportionate contribution to solutions to some of the most pressing global issues will be magnified.

C. We have long recognized the importance of the Arab world. The strength and moderation of the major Arab countries has been a bulwark against radical forces in the Middle East and they have in turn looked increasingly to the United States for support in ensuring their security and independence. The oil which some of them produce has long been vital to our allies.

Today, there is a new degree of interdependence between the U.S. and the key Arab nations that are prepared to work with us constructively. The achievement of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is surely a central goal in this relationship. There are other benefits as well.

The rapid increase in investable surplus which the Arab governments hold—now approximately 140 billion dollars—has added a new dimension to our interests in this area. Some of their increased revenues come from the willingness of some oilproducing states to meet increasing demand in the rest of the world by producing more oil than their domestic revenue needs would require them to sell. How those revenues are going to affect the ups and downs of the world economies and of the dollar, and they can play a significant role in the development of poorer nations. At the same time, the U.S. economy is important to the Arab oil-producing nations in accommodating these enormous amounts of capital.

The oil which has long been vital to our allies

has become increasingly so to us. Crude oil imports from the Middle East made up 22 percent of our total petroleum consumption and nearly half of our imports in 1977 (vs. 7 percent and 29 percent respectively in 1973).

Thus, the Middle East figures in our calculations on energy, as well as in our balance of payments position and efforts to maintain a stable dollar, in ways that would have been unthinkable ten years ago.

In the last thirty years, the U.S. has simply become much more involved in the affairs of the Middle East. Important nations in the area have looked increasingly to the U.S. for modern technology. Our relationship to their modernization programs and the increased economic involvement with them have sharply widened the range of contacts between Middle Easterners and Americans. No other country offers the the broad range and depth of technology that exists in the U.S. and none is so adaptable to the specific educational requirements of foreign students. There are over 100,000 students from the Middle East in the U.S. now and almost 90,000 Americans are living in the Middle East.

Trade between the U.S. and the Middle East has increased rapidly since 1973. The import side of this trade has been given wide publicity and the U.S. demand for foreign oil, particularly the Middle Eastern oil has risen. However, U.S. sales to the area have also grown substantially. U.S. exports to the region were 3.5 billion dollars in 1973 and counted for 5 percent of our total exports. By 1977 American sales to the Middle East had jumped to a total of 12.3 billion dollars. Our Middle East customers now purchase over 10 percent of our total exports. In addition, hundreds of millions of dollars of architectural, consulting, engineering and construction services which do not appear in the above trade figures, are being exported and reduce our deficit with the region. The link between this market and American employment levels and the importance of these exports to our balance of payments are obvious.

Finally, the key oil-producing nations of the Middle East are increasingly important to the world economy. The rise in oil prices in 1973 demonstrated clearly how oil pricing decisions and the related decisions on production levels can be a major cause of economic dislocation in

most countries of the world, from the most industrialized to the least developed. They also play an increasingly positive role in development. By the end of 1977 cumulative OPEC bilateral aid commitments totalled about 26 billion dollars. OPEC countries have also committed substantial amounts of capital—almost 11.5 billion dollars by the end of 1976—to international organizations. Further, they have pledged almost half of the billion dollar capital of the international fund for agricultural development, an organization that is in itself a result of their initiative. These emerging OPEC financial powers soon will enjoy greater voting strength as a result of increased quotas in the IMF.

D. America has long felt a moral and humane commitment to the people of the Middle East to help end a conflict that caused a generation of suffering and to help remove other obstacles that have impaired social and economic progress.

In the past year in this Administration, we as a nation have redoubled our commitment to a fuller realization around the world of basic human rights. Leaders in the Middle East have repeated to us in many ways at many times that they want to achieve peace so that they can devote their energies and their resources to the well-being of their people. Many of them have a vision of an era of growth and development which could follow a peace agreement. Many of them have asked us to cooperate with them in making that vision a reality. We remain prepared and want very much to provide this cooperation.

Premises for U.S. Policy: The preceding analysis of U.S. interests in the Middle East in the 1970's suggests four premises about U.S. policy toward that area in the late 1970's.

First: Because each of our interests in the Middle East is important, the only viable national policy is one which enables us to pursue all of those interests at the same time.

Defining our interests this broadly and recognizing how they are interrelated is the most effective way the U.S. can help strengthen all of its allies and friends. Reciprocally, all of our friends share a common interest in our strength, in our success, and in a strong American role in fostering peace, independence, and growth in the Middle East. This interdependence of all our interests deserves the most serious consideration.

For the United States, the pursuit of all of these

interests reflects a coherence of policy in which our moral commitments and our human concerns on the one hand and our strategic and pragmatic national interests on the other are mutually reinforcing.

Second: The experience of the past four years has shown that we are best able to pursue all of those interests simultaneously in circumstances where there is progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

When there is no movement toward a settlement, tension between Israel and the Arab states rises and relations between the U.S. and Arab nations become strained. The pressure on Arab states to look elsewhere for assistance increases and there is a corresponding diminution in the U.S. ability to play a role in influencing events. Additionally, Israel becomes increasingly isolated and harmony between the U.S. and its allies is jeopardized. When the U.S. is actively engaged in the peace progress and when progress is being made toward achieving agreements as has been the case in the past four years, Israel has enjoyed greater security. When as a consequence, the U.S. can strengthen its ties with all of the important Middle Eastern countries, the momentum toward peace grows and our vital interests become self-reinforcing.

Peace, therefore, is not only the best assurance of a secure and prosperous Israel, but also would strengthen moderate governments in the region and enhance U.S. global interests. It is crucial to the understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East to recognize that our urgent national commitment to an Arab-Israeli settlement is based both on our enduring commitment to Israel's security and on the fact that peace is a necessity for the U.S. and its allies.

Before leaving this point, I want to address openly a question that deeply concerns many Americans today, as well as our friends in Israel. The question is often put obliquely this way: What kind of U.S. relationship with the Middle East can we see five or ten years from now? On many many occasions the real underlying question is: Are we not reducing our support for Israel in favor of the Arab nations?

The answer to the latter question is unequivocally

So long as all of our friends in the Middle East share a common interest in peace, in a strong U.S. role in the Middle East and in checking the growth of radical influence, close relations with one party do not mean diminished relations with the other. None of our friends, nor we, will gain from a diminished U.S. relationship with any of the key states there. To the contrary, a closer relationship with each party enhances our ability to pursue joint objectives to all.

It follows from this that, in pursuing all of our interests in the Middle East, including our historic and unchangeable commitment to a strong Israel, our diplomacy must work toward creating conditions and a framework of relationships that make pursuit of these interests complementary. To do otherwise would not be consistent with our moral, strategic or economic interests. We believe our friends have an interest in our success.

Third: There has been a significant shift toward the West in the relations between principal Middle Eastern nations and the major powers outside the Middle East over the last several years.

Compared with the mid-1950's when the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies appeared to be in the ascendant and the U.S. position was eroding to a point that most Arab countries broke diplomatic relations with us after the 1967 war, the present position of the U.S. is a significant change for the better. This is not to say that the Soviet Union does not have legitimate interests in the Middle East or that it will not have an important role to play in the future of that area. Our present position does, however, testify to recognition in many of these nations that their economic progress and national independence require a significant relationship with the West.

Entirely apart from political ideology, many Middle Eastern nations have recognized that the West offers the technology and the managerial skills needed to develop their countries, and that U.S. diplomacy can make an essential contribution to a peace which will lift the burden of heavy defense expenditures from their shoulders and let them get on with the constructive work of economic and social development.

While the economic relationship may persist, radical forces could again take advantage of conditions that would follow failure of the peace negotiations. Thus, one thing at stake in the Arab-Israeli negotiations and in cooperation with key Arab countries is the future orientation of the important nations of the Middle East, both in terms of their relationships with the great powers

and the nature of their own political systems. Moderate Arab leaders have turned to the U.S. for cooperation in achieving both peace and development. Their success will limit the role of radical forces. Their degree of success will in turn in large part determine whether Israel faces the future surrounded by radical and hostile states or by nations which are committed to peace and orderly progress.

The fourth premise is that without in any way detracting from our other commitments a definition of U.S. interests in the Middle East must take serious account of the new dimensions of U.S. economic relations with the area.

These economic factors explain why our strategy in the past four years has had two thrusts—not one. The more dramatic has been our high priority drive for an Arab-Israeli settlement. Less dramatic, but of great importance, has been the effort to encourage the broadest possible range of relationships between the economic and social sectors of the U.S. and of the Middle Eastern countries. We have recognized not only the nation's economic need for these relationships, but also the fact that the U.S. presence in the future of the Middle East will be a truly national presence—not just a governmental one.

The peace progress at present: Let me turn to one final subject. I know that this subcommittee has been following closely the progress of efforts to promote an Arab-Israeli peace settlement because of its importance, I want to conclude this statement with a status report.

A year ago we reported that our objective was a comprehensive peace settlement and that we were concentrating our efforts on reconvening the Geneva conference for negotiation of such a settlement, a concept to which we are still committed. A comprehensive settlement, in fact, remains the objective of all the parties to the conflict. But President Sadat's visit to Israel opened a new approach and historic new opportunities for peace, and since November we have been working with Egypt and Israel to build on that initiative toward a comprehensive peace. We have done this in full recognition that there will be no peace for Israel or its neighbors until there is a peace that encompasses all of them, including the Palestinians.

President Sadat's initiative must be seen in two

perspectives:

First: United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November, 1967,¹⁵¹ established the basic equation for peace which has guided negotiators and mediators since that equation established the proposition that there would be Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict in return for peace and security. Now Egypt has offered peace, acceptance, and negotiations on Israel's security needs. President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem made this offer concrete.

Second: A year ago when President Carter and Secretary Vance conducted their initial consultations with the leaders of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, they identified three issues that would need to be dealt with in peace negotiations: The nature of peace, Israeli withdrawal and the security measures that would accompany withdrawal, and the role of the Palestinians. President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem resolved on Egypt's behalf that the nature of peace is to include not only the end of war but the acceptance of Israel and normal relations with it.¹⁵²

The purpose of the negotiations now are to restore the momentum created by President Sadat's November initiative and Prime Minister Begin's responses to it and out of this to develop a framework within which the other Arab parties to the conflict can join the negotiating process and address the questions of peace and normal relations with Israel. Israel can address the issues of security and withdrawal, and the problem of the Palestinians can be resolved in a just, humane, and honorable way.

The focal point of our current consultations with Israel and Egypt is the question of the future of the West Bank and Gaza—those parts of the former Palestine mandate lying outside Israel's 1967 boundaries—and the role of the Palestinians in resolving this question. This is the key to progress at the present stage of the negotiations. Without some understanding on these issues it will be impossible to achieve the declaration of principles which both Egypt and Israel want to govern larger negotiations for a comprehensive settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Our role is to help the parties find a middle ground. In practical

terms, that means helping them find a formula whereby a practical solution for the future of the West Bank and Gaza in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242¹⁵³ in a way that will give the Palestinians a voice in the determination of their own future.

Our role in this process is not simply a postman between the two sides. At decisive points of the negotiations, where we see it helpful to move things forward, we have in the past given our own ideas, and we will continue to do so in consultation with the parties. That was the way the agenda for the political committee meeting¹⁵⁴ in Jerusalem was resolved last January—our proposal broke the impasse. The current discussion of the declaration of principles proceeds from an American working draft written at the request of the two parties. That might occur again, but it would occur with the purpose of helping the parties to define middle ground where they might negotiate agreement. That middle ground would be developed from the positions of the parties, not from an abstract American peace plan. In the discussions we have important points of agreement with both sides and points on which we differ.

With Israel there is full agreement that the threats to Israel's security which could come from these areas must be dealt with satisfactorily both the threat of invasion by conventional military forces and the threat of terrorist and guerilla attack. We are also agreed that issues as complex as these will require time and careful negotiation, so we suggested a year ago that the first objective should be an interim arrangement, perhaps five years, for the West Bank and Gaza, to give time to work out solutions there. During this period, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians could work out practical security arrangements that would make it possible to separate the question of Israeli security from the question of sovereignty over the territory. During the same time, these parties would work out arrangements for the political future of the West Bank and Gaza, with provision for obtaining the consent of the people affected to the terms of a final peace

We have disagreed with Israel in one important

¹⁵¹ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹⁵² See President Sadat's speech to the Knesset, doc. 301 in *International Documents on Palestine 1977*.

¹⁵³ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹⁵⁴ Doc. 59 above.

area. The current Israeli Government, unlike its predecessors, has not agreed that Resolution 242 involves a prior obligation in principle to withdraw from any West Bank and Gaza territory. Israel has, however, agreed to negotiate with all of its neighbors on the basis of Resolution 242 and we have been discussing with it whether and how those negotiations would deal with the question of withdrawal as it relates to the West Bank and Gaza. Our position is that the issues of security and sovereignty can be separatedas Israel has already agreed to do in its proposal to Egypt on the Sinai. We are not saying that this agreement in principle to withdraw from West Bank and Gaza territory determines the timing and circumstances of actual withdrawal of the final borders, all of which must be negotiated. That would take place only in the context of a final peace treaty embodying commitments to normal peaceful relations and agreed security arrangements, including possible agreed border changes.

It is difficult to say how the negotiations for all these specialized and political arrangements can go forward until Israel has indicated that the principle of withdrawal in Resolution 242 can be dealt with in the negotiations as applying to this occupied territory. We have been discussing this matter with Israel and are awaiting their views. Until this is clear, neither Jordan nor other Arab representatives will join the negotiations. They, in turn, will have to make clear their willingness to live in peace alongside Israel if negotiations are to succeed.

We and the Arab governments who are key to the peace process agree that the common objective is a peace settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242¹⁵⁵ which, among other things, recognizes Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state. With Egypt, we have reached agreement that such a settlement should encompass the full range of normal relations that are customary between states at peace with one another. We and those Arab governments also agree that a settlement must include a just solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. And we agree that all the principles of Resolution 242, including the principle of withdrawal, apply to all fronts where territory was occupied in 1967,

155 Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

including the West Bank and Gaza.

On the other hand, we have made it clear over the past months that we do not agree with the key elements of the position of some Arab states, for instance, we do not agree with their call for a prior commitment of Israel to total withdrawal from every bit of occupied territory. That is not part of Resolution 242. We have also made clear that in our view the future of the West Bank and Gaza lies in close association with Jordan and that an independent Palestinian state harboring irredentist feeling in this truncated territory would not be a realistic or durable solution.

A concluding word: This is a period of dramatic new opportunities for the people of the Middle East and for the relationships between the United States and the Middle East. How we together handle these opportunities may well determine the character of the Middle East, the American role there, and many aspects of the economies of the twentieth century. It is because the stakes are so high that I have taken so much of your time today to analyze them in detail and to present them for your study and discussion. We are also engaged in an intensive effort to discuss them with the American people because it is essential that we enter this period of opportunity with a national consensus on policy and a shared sense of direction.

127

Answers by the Cabinet of Israel to questions posed by the US regarding the future of the West Bank and Gaza following five years of Israeli "administrative autonomy" (excerpt)¹⁵⁶

Jerusalem, June 17, 1978

The Government of Israel believes continued talks between herself and her neighbours to be a vital matter in order to arrive at a peace agreement.

The Government of Israel expresses its approval of the fact that, five years after administrative self-rule is applied in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, which shall be implemented concurrently with the establishment of peace, a discus-

¹⁵⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, Haaretz (Tel Aviv), June 19, 1978. The two questions were addressed to Israel by the US Secretary of State in Washington on April 27, 1978.

sion will take place regarding the nature of future relations between the parties and agreement regarding them, if one of the parties submits such a request.

The framework of this discussion is negotiations between the parties, through the participation of representatives of the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, who shall be elected in accordance with the self-rule scheme and with the object of arriving at an agreement among these parties.

128

Statement by the government of Israel clarifying its proposal of self-rule for the West Bank and Gaza¹⁵⁷

Jerusalem, June 18, 1978

The Government of Israel agrees that five years after the application of the administrative autonomy in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, which will come into force upon the establishment of peace, the nature of the future relations between the parties will be considered and agreed upon, at the suggestion of any of the parties.

For the purpose of reaching an agreement, the parties will conduct negotiations between them with the participation of representatives of the residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district as elected in accordance with the administrative autonomy.

129

Statement by the government of Israel rejecting Egypt's plans for the West Bank and Gaza¹⁵⁸

Jerusalem, June 25, 1978

The Government is united in supporting the administrative self-rule scheme. This was expressed by all cabinet members who took part in the dis-

cussion with the exception of one minister, Haim Landau, who expressed reservations about some of the principles cited in it.

The Egyptian President has repeated his proposal, according to radio Cairo, that Judea and Samaria be given to Jordan and Gaza to Egypt, as a precondition to negotiations over what he calls "Israel's security problems."

Israel rejects President Sadat's proposals without reservations. Israel has proposed negotiations without prior conditions for the establishment of peace and the implementation of administrative self-rule in Judea, Samaria and Gaza as part of the peace treaties the achievement of which necessitates free negotiations between the parties.

130

Press conference statement by US President Carter expressing disappointment at Israel's response to two questions posed by the US (excerpt)¹⁵⁹

Washington, June 26, 1978

Q. Could you give us your current assessment of Middle East peace prospects at this time when Israel and Egypt are again apparently at an impasse?

A. My experience in dealing with the Mideast peace proposals leads me not to be surprised when we have temporary setbacks or rejections from one side or the other. I thought the Israeli Cabinet response¹⁶⁰ to our two basic questions was very disappointing and I noticed that this weekend the Israeli Cabinet rejected an Egyptian proposal¹⁶¹ that has not even yet been made. It's not in final form. I understand it certainly has not been presented to us to be presented to the Israelis. It's already been rejected.

Our commitment to pursuing a comprehensive and effective peace agreement in the Middle East is constant and very dedicated. We will not back off on this.

After we receive the Egyptian proposal when it's put in final form, we will be sure to relay it to the Israelis as the Egyptians will request and

¹⁵⁷ English text, The Mideast Observer in Washington, July 1, 1978, p. 3.

¹⁵⁸ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), June 26, 1978, pp. 1–2.

¹⁵⁹ Excerpted from the text, *The New York Times*, June 27, 1978, p. 12. Copyright 1978 by The New York Times Company; reprinted by permission.

¹⁶⁰ Doc. 127 above.

¹⁶¹ Doc. 129 above.

then both proposals—the Israeli proposal, the Egyptian proposal—will be on the table.

At that time it might be appropriate if the Israelis and Egyptians agree for a meeting between their Foreign Ministers, perhaps, and our own Secretary of State. I would hope that at that point we could make real progress toward searching out the common ground on which they might stand and alleviate any differences that still remain. But I can't predict the rate of progress. It obviously will require good faith and some flexibility on both sides.

131

Testimony by US Ambassador at Large for Middle East Peace Negotiations Atherton defining the US position on the PLO¹⁶²

Washington, June 28, 1978

A. Could I go on to say how we do view the PLO?

Q. Please do.

A. Because I think it is important to try to define this in some detail. First of all the PLO is in fact an umbrella organization which consists of a great many factions within it. Constituent organizations under the umbrella of the PLO as an overarching kind of organization and within it these factions are often themselves divided by dissent and disagreement.

As I think we all know, it is considered in the Arab world and by the United Nations General Assembly and throughout much of the world as the principal spokesman for the Palestinian national movement.

One of the major areas of disagreement within the PLO. [sic] And the PLO embraces not only the well-known, so-called *fedayeen* organizations and groups, but also many individual Palestinians living in other countries, associations of students, workers, writers, women and many independents who are not affiliated with any of these constitutent groups. This argument within the PLO, and the

major area of disagreement within the PLO, has been over the appropriate tactics for pursuing Palestinian aspirations.

There are those within this organization, such as the PFLP, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who have regarded acts of international terrorism as legitimate political tools.

- Q, So we do regard the PFLP as being within the PLO umbrella?
 - A. That's correct.
 - Q, As being within the PLO, let's put it that way? A. It's one of the constituent organizations.
 - 1. It's one of the constituent organization
 - Q, Thank you, go ahead.

(At this point, Atherton contrasted Al-Fatah's position to that of the PFLP.]

The position of this government on the PLO is clear and unequivocal and I would like to restate it so that there will be no reason to think that there has been any change in our position with respect to the PLO.

First of all, we accept as a reality, as a fact, that the PLO speaks for a substantial number of Palestinians.

We ourselves will not, however, recognize or deal with the PLO so long as it has not accepted Security Council Resolution 242¹⁶³ and the right of all states in the area to exist in peace, this clearly would include Israel.

It goes without saying that the use of international terrorist tactics, however they may be described by those perpetrating them, is inconsistent with that resolution.

- Q. Thank you for that extensive and clear answer, and obviously one that was anticipated and carefully prepared, and I appreciate that.
- A. Thought it was better to give you a considered answer.
 - Q. That was a very direct and good answer.

Atherton's testimony took place before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. US Senator Richard Stone (Dem.) is the questioner. Partial text as published in *The Mideast Observer in Washington*, July 1, 1978, p. 1.

¹⁶³ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

132

Statement by President Tito of Yugoslavia maintaining that one of the essential prerequisites for peace in the Middle East is Arab solidarity (excerpt)¹⁶⁴

Belgrade, late June 1978

International relations are seriously bedevilled by the trouble spots in the world. The Middle East crisis, which is focussed on the Palestinian problem, is certainly the most dangerous one. With its aggressive and expansionist policy, Israel continually impedes the finding of a lasting and just solution, on which virtually the entire international community insists. This can only be achieved by a comprehensive solution of this crisis, with the participation of all interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization. This settlement calls for Israel's complete withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, the realization of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to their own state, and for independence and security of all states in this region. One of the essential prerequisites for it is the establishment of solidarity among the Arab countries, because only Israel and the enemies of the Arab cause can benefit from their disunity. The nonaligned countries can assist here by taking an active part in efforts to find a settlement to the crisis.

133

Press interview statements by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria recognizing that the creation of a Palestinian state is indispensable towards the solution of the Middle East conflict¹⁶⁵

Vienna, early July, 1978

Q. What about the Palestinian problem and the Palestinian state?

A. As regards the establishment of a Palestinian state, I believe it is unreasonable to ask for an Israeli solution to the Palestinian state. I imagine that the West Bank and Gaza would revert to recognized Arab authority. The creation of a Palestinian state either independent or inside a federal union with Jordan must find an Arab solution, for this is more realistic. As for security problems, these can be discussed between Israel and her neighbours.

My view is that the West Bank and Gaza should revert to recognized Arab authorities. On the other hand, Israel has maintained that the territories that are returned will be returned only to those states from which they were taken. Accordingly, the problem should be discussed inside the Arab ranks.

My pro-Palestinian sympathies are well known as is my recognition of the role of the PLO and they have to create the state. I am confident that the day is near when the Palestinians will be joining the negotiations. But I repeat, the solution must come from inside the Arab side. It may be possible to solve the problem in the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian state. But I repeat: the solution must come from inside the Arab party.

- Q. What of the attitude of the Socialist International regarding the Middle East crisis?
- A. Although the meeting of the Socialist International last February was a closed one, I can say this, that I was struck by the fact that the Socialist International's closest party to Israel the Israeli Labour Party—expressed their inability to comprehend and accept that holding on to settlements is more important than peace. It was necessary that Shimon Peres himself should see that Israel's closest friends adopt this view. Some members inside the conference also stated my understanding of the policy of the PLO. I am happy to see that the Socialist International, which traditionally sympathized only with Israel, today listens with an open mind to the Egyptian viewpoint in particular and to the Arab viewpoint which desires peace.

As for me, I shall work to set up a dialogue between representatives of the Arab socialist parties and international socialism because the Middle East crisis must be examined from a broad international perspective. In the past, I tried to get the Helsinki conference for European Security to

¹⁶⁴ Statement made in a speech to the 11th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; partial English text, *Review* of *International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIX, 678–679 (July 5–20, 1978), pp. 20–21.

¹⁸⁵ Translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by Dr. Ali Samman, al-Ahram (Cairo), July 5, 1978, p. 5.

play a role in contributing to the restoration of peace in the Middle East, but I could not achieve this. This is what I am now attempting to convince the Socialist International of, so that it can contribute to the restoration of peace. I have been delegated by the Socialist International, ever since 1974, to undertake this role in their name along with a fact-finding commission in most Middle East capitals. I can now state that a great improvement has taken place in the atmosphere of relations between the Socialist International and the Arab world. It is possible that some members of the Socialist International will not accept the final report of the fact-finding commission¹⁶⁶ but I am certain most will agree with it.

- Q, What of America's role in the Middle East crisis?
- A. I am confident that the USA will make enormous efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis and will use all the legitimate means to arrive at that objective. The USA will often clash with Israel in the future but Israel knows that it is in dire need of the USA. America will try to get the rulers of Israel to take a more realistic view of the problems.
- Q, What of Begin's insistence that the settlements in the occupied territories be kept?
- A. I believe millions of Israelis will very soon find out that it is not possible to sacrifice peace for the sake of retaining some settlements which do not have any military significance.
 - Q, What of the future of President Sadat's initiative?
- A. President Sadat's attachment to his initiative is a most important issue because Sadat has always been logical with himself, in addition to the fact that his position is consonant with reason. The more insistent he is on pressing on the more support he gains everywhere. With a little patience, Sadat will achieve positive results. There is a deep feeling inside the Israeli people regarding the importance of the initiative and the search for peace. There is also enormous respect for President Sadat inside Jewish communities in the world. And there is full support for him in democratic states.
- Q, What of Shimon Peres' views as the representative of Israel in the Socialist International?

- A. As regards the West Bank, Peres is an advocate of a Palestinian-Jordanian state, so he is ready to return most territories of the West Bank. For him, there may be some exceptions, some military posts, but these are negotiable.
- I believe the Israeli government needs the experience and advice of Peres. Peres showed understanding for the Egyptian position after his meetings in Austria with President Sadat and the delegates of the Egyptian party and I believe he truly wants peace.
- Q. Since you are one of the "Sages" of the twentieth century how do you view the future of peace in the region?
- A. I do not believe I deserve this epithet but I have some experience in international politics and I say that Sadat's policy has, for the first time, created faith in the future of peace even among the Israeli people. Thanks to Sadat, there is now greater hope that there are now some who dream of the stage beyond the achievement of peace, the stage of cooperation among the region's peoples.

If some believe that dreams do not work in political affairs, I am confident that some dreams can be made true in politics when the right person is found to fulfil them. Sadat is a rare type of man who has proved to us that some dreams can come true. No one had dreamed of his initiative before it took place.

134

Programme for a Middle East settlement drafted by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria and head of Socialist International Brandt of the GFR calling on Israel and Egypt to continue direct negotiations until a peace treaty is concluded¹⁶⁷

Vienna, July 10, 1978

1. Peace between Israel and the Arab states can only be achieved by sincere and sustained negotiations. We urge Egypt and Israel to resume the negotiating process that was suspended in January, 1978 and to maintain the Sadat initiative until peace treaties are concluded and signed.

¹⁶⁶ See doc. 50 above.

¹⁶⁷ Sometimes referred to as "the Vienna Document." English text as published in *Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin* (New York), July 11, 1978, p. 2.

- 2. Peace must be based on the establishment of normal and friendly relations between Middle Eastern states in the diplomatic, economic, cultural and human fields. Peace means much more than the termination of the state of war. It involves the creation of a new system of regional relations based on close cooperation.
- 3. An important element in the peace settlement is the establishment of secure boundaries. In accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 Israel would withdraw in each sector to the secure boundaries thus agreed. The exact location of the peace boundaries remains to be determined in the peace negotiations. There should also be provisions for demilitarization and for Israeli security measures in such areas as the needs of security call for.
- 4. The establishment of peace requires the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. It must involve recognition of the rights of the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future through negotiations in which their elected representatives would take part.

135

Resolution of the fifteenth summit meeting of the heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) supporting the rights of the Palestinian people and condemning the racist and expansionist policies of Israel (excerpt)¹⁶⁸

Khartum, July 12, 1978

The Conference:

Reaffirms its support for the Arab confrontation countries and the people of Palestine in their legitimate struggle to recover their usurped rights. It strongly condemns the aggressive schemes of Zionism, its expansionist policy and its refusal to implement the UN resolutions.

Strongly condemns the unholy alliance between Zionism and the racialist regimes of South Africa and Zimbabwe and calls on all member states to be on their guard against the dangers of this alliance which desires domination and expansion at the expense of the Arabs. It reaffirms the

right of the confrontation countries and the Palestinian people to full and permanent sovereignty over their wealth and other natural resources in the occupied Arab territories, and the right of the Palestinian people to receive full compensation for the exhaustion and exploitation of these resources.

Strongly condemns Zionism for its persistence in its expansionist policy and in the building of illegal settlements in the occupied territories. It demands an immediate halt to the establishment of such settlements and the dismantling of all existing settlements.

Calls on all countries in the world to support the Palestinian people in their struggle to recover their legitimate national rights and to recognise the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine.

Reaffirms its support for the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle by all available means, including armed struggle, to recover their usurped rights, and condemns Zionism's aggressive schemes and ambitions and its expansionist policy directed against the Palestinian people, which culminated in the occupation of South Lebanon last March.

Once more calls on the international community to increase Zionism's isolation in the diplomatic, political and military fields, in implementation of the UN Charter.

Calls on the countries, and in particular America, that have not yet unambiguously recognised the rights of the Palestinian people, as endorsed by international pacts and resolutions, to lose no time in affirming these rights and in recognising the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

136

Declaration and press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance discussing the talks at Leeds Castle between Israel and Egypt and the progress of peace negotiations¹⁶⁹

Hollingbourne, July 19, 1978

At President Carter's invitation and with the generous cooperation of the British authorities,

¹⁶⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Safir (Beirut), July 23, 1978.

¹⁶⁹ Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVIII, 2018 (September 1978), pp. 39–42.

the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel and I have held talks since Monday evening at Leeds Castle. Our purpose was to discuss in detail the issues relating to the West Bank and Gaza and to lay a basis for the early continuation of negotiations looking toward peace in the Middle East.

During our 2 days at Leeds Castle, the three delegations met together in an informal setting. The two sides explored in depth the principal issues and clarified for each other their respective proposals concerning the West Bank and Gaza. These were the most candid and probing discussions I have heard between them. I also held several bilateral meetings with each of the Foreign Ministers.

Major differences remain between the positions of the two sides. There is a lot of hard work ahead. Common elements in their approaches have been identified. I believe Egypt and Israel remain fully committed to establishing a genuine peace, and we will continue to help them in that effort. The parties will be reporting to their respective governments. The governments will be studying these reports. I anticipate there will be further meetings when I go to the Middle East in about 2 weeks (August 5–9). In the meantime, I have asked Ambassador at Large Atherton to go to the area to maintain contact with the parties and to participate, as they might find useful, in preparations for further meetings.

The foreign ministers join me in expressing our thanks to the Government of the United Kingdom for the gracious hospitality extended to us and our delegations at Leeds Castle.

- Q. When you go to the Middle East in 2 weeks time, are you intending to chair a conference of the two sides?
- A. As I said, I anticipate that when I go to the Middle East there will be another meeting similar to the meeting which we have been holding here during the last 2 days at Leeds.
- Q. Does that mean you hope for it, do you? I mean, there is no assurance of such a meeting?
 - A. I said I anticipate there will be.
 - Q. Does that mean you expect that there will be?
 A. I expect there will be, yes.
- Q. What are these common elements in the positions of the two sides?
- A. I prefer not to go into the common elements or the details of the discussions that took place

between the parties. I think that it is better that we not go into the individual elements of the discussions and that we talk in more general terms at this stage in the discussions.

- Q, When you go, if there is another meeting with the Foreign Ministers or with other Egyptian and Israeli officials, will it be again to elaborate on the issues or will you this time attempt to sit down and write language, or whatever, about something you could agree on? In other words, will it be negotiations or just more talks?
- A. Let me say this: I think that the discussions which we have had during the last 2 days have been useful, and all of the Foreign Ministers agree to this. Let me tell you a little bit more about what the discussions were, without going into details.

Each of the sides stated the objectives and then went into the details of their respective proposals. Having done that, the other side then proceeded to question the party who had been outlining and describing their proposals and there was a series of exchanges which were very thorough and in great depth. This happened on both sides. As a result of this intensive examination and discussion of the respective positions, I think that each of the sides now has a clear understanding of not only the objectives but also of the details that are involved.

It is difficult if not impossible to really reach agreement about proposals until one understands exactly what those proposals mean and what they imply. I think that the discussions we have had here during the last 2 days have accomplished that, and, therefore, I think they have laid the basis now for discussions which could be negotiations between the parties.

- Q, Will you go only to Egypt and Israel, or will you also go to Jordan and Saudi Arabia?
- A. I haven't tried to lay out any detailed itinerary where I will go. I would not be surprised if I ended up by going to Jordan and to Saudi Arabia as well. The focus will be on the question of discussions between the parties as it was here at Leeds.
- Q, As a result of these exchanges and clarifications today, have you been able to identify any further common elements to those you already discussed before?
- A. Yes. The answer is I have and I think the parties have, too.
 - Q. Do you have any idea where you might meet with

both sides when you go to the Middle East?

- A. As far as I am concerned, I am prepared to go anywhere they want to go, and I will wait for them to suggest what the best location is.
 - Q. Have they suggested a site as yet?
- A. You have seen things in the newspapers from time to time about various possible sites for any such meeting, but there are no concrete proposals at this point.
- Q, Did both sides elaborate in any way on what it is that President Sadat told Defense Minister Weizman last week?
- A. I would answer the question this way: that nothing which came out of the discussions today and yesterday in terms of elaboration was inconsistent with what has been stated publicly.
- Q, Do you think that negotiations can resume between the two parties without Israel presenting some new element?
- A. I think both of the parties are going to go back and reflect on the exchange of views which they had. They will be discussing this exchange with their governments and then on the basis of that they will be prepared to respond to what may be proposed at further meetings. But I think it is too early yet to come to any conclusions.

I know one of the questions you are obviously going to ask me, so I might as well preempt the question. Has there been progress? I think that the mere holding of the meeting here in a sense is progress. If you would ask the question in the terms "were there any decisions taken which in the normal sense of the word would mean progress," I would say the answer is no. But I think it is too early for that question to have an answer. I think the answer to that question will have to come at a later meeting, by which time the parties will have had a chance to reflect on what was brought out in the exchanges between them here and see what the responses are when we sit down the next time.

- Q. How does this coincide with what President Sadat said yesterday in Khartoum? He said something had to come out of this meeting, something positive, otherwise there wouldn't be any use to go on.
- A. I don't want to comment on behalf of President Sadat. It will be up to him to judge.
- Q. What is precisely the role of the United States in this meeting?

A. At the suggestion of President Carter, we invited the Foreign Ministers and the delegations of the other two nations to join with us here for this exchange of views which we had. At the outset of the meeting, I opened the meeting, made a few remarks, and then in effect asked the parties themselves to take over the discussion and carry out the discussion between themselves. I would say that well over 90% of the discussion which was held and the words which were exchanged during the meetings at which all three of us were present were exchanges between the two parties. I only asked occasional questions, questions for clarifications when I wanted myself to try and understand what was being said or to sharpen an issue which I felt needed to be sharpened.

Q. [Inaudible].

A. The question was, what about the questions of principle? The questioner noted that the statement which I read at the outset referred to a discussion of West Bank-Gaza issues, and he said what about the question of principles and when will that be further dealt with.

In discussing the questions of West Bank and Gaza, one cannot help but also discuss questions of principle. They are intertwined. So in a sense, even though we were discussing the specifics—West Bank and Gaza—it had to involve some discussion of principles, and those will continue to be discussed in the future as will the West Bank-Gaza question.

- Q. In Washington on the 10th (of July) you were asked about East Jerusalem, and your answer was—
 - A. I said it was a question of negotiations.
- Q. Now isn't East Jerusalem part of the West Bank? If 242 stands for the West Bank, it should stand also for Jerusalem. Why do you divide it from 242?
- A. I was asked a specific question about negotiations with respect to Jerusalem—to East Jerusalem—and I said the answer to that question would be that the question of East Jerusalem would have to be discussed by the parties themselves and the result of those discussions would determine the status of East Jerusalem.
- Q, As these negotiations become more protracted and your participation grows greater and your traveling increases, have you had any reason to have reservations about going for a comprehensive settlement instead of reverting to the step-by-step approach? And if I can

add a thought, is your trip to the Middle East a salvage operation? Why is it necessary for you to go?

A. First, my participation in this meeting was not greater and greater; indeed, it was less than it has been in the prior meetings which I attended. The conversations were, as I have indicated, predominantly between the heads of the two delegations and their delegation staffs rather than with the United States and myself participating in a major way such as I have in the past.

Insofar as my trip to the Middle East is concerned, I think it is important that we continue our active participation because I think we can provide a facilitating role, a helpful role, to work with the parties particularly when they come to areas where they run into obstacles where it may be possible for us to make suggestions to help surmount these obstacles. And both the parties have indicated that they wish the United States to continue to participate in it. Therefore, we will do that.

Q. Has the give-and-take here over the past 2 days made it less necessary for the United States to come forward with any kind of formal peace proposals?

- A. We have said before and I will repeat it again that we would hope that the negotiations can be carried out and the successful conclusion reached by the parties. We would be very happy if we didn't have to make any suggestions, but if things become deadlocked and it appears desirable and necessary to try to break the deadlock by our making suggestions, we would be prepared to do so.
- Q. I was just asking for a completion of your answer to the previous question on the comprehensive or step-by-step approach. Have you any reason to rethink your approach for a comprehensive settlement?
 - A. No, not at all.
- Q, Was anything said that might alleviate the security fears of Israel? Fears of Israel for its security are at the core of this matter. Was anything said where Israel can feel that it would be more secure?
- A. One of the issues, as you might obviously expect, that was discussed in considerable detail was the question of security, because that is one of the key issues. And I would say that a considerable amount was said about that issue. I would think that what was said would give confidence to Israel that this problem is being seriously addressed and must be seriously addressed and

must be satisfactorily resolved if there is to be a settlement.

- Q. Has their confidence been increased by these talks?
- A. You will have to ask them about that. I think it was certainly seriously addressed and thoroughly discussed.
- Q. A question about the physical circumstances. The security problem aside, was it helpful to your process to have them in a secluded, isolated situation, free from (inaudible) and other scrutinies?
- A. The answer is yes. I think that this was very helpful. The fact that we were able to be here in this atmosphere where we could all sit informally together and discuss these matters, where we could not only participate in meetings but also chat over dinner, walk around the grounds together and talk, and all of those other atmospheric aspects of it helped in the discussions. Again, I am most appreciative for the fact that the British Government helped us in this.
- Q, Was that a consideration in moving it down here in the first place?
- A. The first time that I heard about this I was told by the British Foreign Secretary that he had attended a meeting here earlier in this year and that he had found it to be a very useful site for discussions of this type, and he recommended very highly that we come here. I am awfully glad that the British made this suggestion and that we were able to do it.
- Q. If you are able to continue these negotiations as a result of these meetings and your own trip to the Middle East, will this in effect be taking up this process where it was left off in Jerusalem? Or how does what you are going to do now compare with what has happened earlier in the year?
- A. I think since we last discussed some of these matters in Jerusalem, we have had another element put onto the table—namely, a specific proposal with respect to the West Bank and Gaza—which I think helps in dealing with the questions of principle, because, as I indicated earlier, questions of principle are also intertwined with what happened on the ground as well. Therefore, I think that the fact that we now have both recommendations and suggestions with respect to principles which would govern and act as a framework for a comprehensive settlement as well as the underlying pieces in terms of what would happen on

the West Bank and Gaza is a new and helpful element.

- Q, Is it your idea that you would go out to the Middle East, be present for the start of negotiations, and if things all proceeded well that you would perhaps leave and let what in essence would be a resumption of the political committee talks continue, or do you have something else in mind?
- A. I would assume that I would probably just go out and help in getting things started. I don't see at this point my going out and spending an extended time in the area.
- Q. When you speak of progress, do you speak for Mr. Dayan and Mr. Kamel?
- A. Let me define what I meant in terms of progress. I said I thought that there was progress in the fact that we had this meeting. I said secondly that whether or not there is progress in the normal sense, in which I think you are using the word progress, we cannot tell until there is a later meeting. I am speaking for my own—
 - Q. Not for Mr. Dayan and Mr. Kamel?
 - A. I am speaking on my own.
- Q. Did you at any time make any new suggestions to the parties on behalf of your government?
 - A. No, I did not.
- Q. Could you explain exactly how these talks will continue in the Middle East? Do you anticipate, for example, Mr. Kamel meeting you in Israel and Mr. Dayan meeting you and Mr. Kamel in Egypt or possibly El-Arish?
- A. We have got to work out the details of how we proceed from here, but let me sketch out the way that I would imagine it would happen. I have asked Roy Atherton to go out very soon to make himself available to the parties in preparation for further talks. Secondly, I would then go out to the Middle East, probably visit with the parties and advance a further meeting similar to the one which we had today to review the preparations that had been made for it and then we would go into such meetings.
- Q. About the next meeting, do you think that there will be an end to it before October, which it is well known is the month of the end of the separation between the military troops between Israel and Egypt in October—renewed or not renewed, do you think that these meetings will reach an end before October?

- A. I don't know.
- Q. What do you think about security measures for Israel on the West Bank and Gaza? Did you also discuss where the lines would be for the security of Israel on the West Bank?
- A. We did not get into that kind of detail because we did not have present with us at this meeting people who are expert in such military matters. I think it might be wise to expand at some point the participation in these meetings to include people who have this kind of expertise.
- Q. A question of principle: Do you believe that this sort of setup, in the presence of the media—negotiating in front of TV cameras—is useful or harmful for this this sort of negotiation?
- A. I think if one talks about the details of what took place in the meeting, discussion of that kind of material is not useful. I think in terms of talking about the general principles which are involved, the general status of the negotiations, the general direction in which they are moving, that kind of discussion I think is both necessary and useful.
- Q, The U.N. Secretary General, Dr. Waldheim, has expressed his skepticism about the present meeting. Would you have any comment on the position of Dr. Waldheim and would you say that the meeting in the idyllic surroundings of Leeds Castle has achieved anything to alleviate his skepticism?
- A. I haven't had a chance to talk to Secretary General Waldheim since he made that statement. I will be talking to him very shortly, after I go home, and will be reporting to him on the general nature of the discussions and what took place. I have always found the Secretary General to be very thoughtful and cooperative. I look forward to explaining to him what took place here, and I would think and hope and believe that when I have a chance to explain what took place he will think it has been useful, as do I.
- Q. In view of the sensitivities of the two sides as to the mechanics of negotiations, whether they are direct or indirect, do you feel that your going to the Middle East, possibly getting back into shuttling, is a setback or a slow-down of momentum? And how soon do you think the two sides could go back to negotiating face-to-face or possibly a summit of the leaders of the two countries?
- A. I want to make it very clear again that the discussions which took place during the last 2 days were, at least in percentage terms, 90% be-

tween the two parties. They were talking directly to each other, and it is a simple fact of life that that was what was taking place.

- Q. But now they will not be talking directly, simply because you will be the connecting factor between two separate customers.
- A. No. I said I anticipated that there would be other meetings of this type in the future and that I expected that this would be the case when I went back to the Middle East in 2 weeks.
- Q, Can you guarantee that meetings of this type will take place again, or do you just anticipate it?
- A. I cannot guarantee, because each of the governments has to receive the report from their Foreign Minister and then make a determination. I still say I anticipate and expect that they will take place.
- Q. In your statement you refer to the major differences. Just so there is no real surprise, did you find that the core elements in which the two sides have been at quite different odds, such as interpretation of 242, the question of degree of withdrawal, the question of sovereignty for the West Bank? Do all these core issues still remain differences?
- A. The core issues still remain areas where there are differences between the parties.
- Q. Is there any risk, chance, or even danger that tomorrow the other two parties, Mr. Kamel and Mr. Dayan giving news conferences, might have a different evaluation of what has been happening here these 2 days than you have now?
 - A. Anything is possible. I would doubt it.
- Q. How much of your future plans were preordained before this meeting ever took place? How much was actually decided in the last couple of days about what would do?
 - A. I don't understand your question.
- Q. Had you planned to go to the Middle East even before you got here? Was that even discussed? Was that a matter of some of your discussions?
- A. I had planned to go to the Middle East should this meeting which we have had over the last 2 days prove useful. It has proved useful; therefore, I would expect now to take the second step.
- Q. Do Mr. Dayan and Mr. Kamel also expect further meetings, or are they still reserving their judg-

ment?

A. You will have to ask each of them, and I am sure they will both give you an answer.

Q, (Inaudible).

A. The question was: Two questions have been put, as all of you know, to Israel by the United States earlier this year, with respect to the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁷⁰ Both of these questions have been answered. I was asked by the questioner, do the answers which were given give me any confidence about progress for the future?

I think that there has to be further exploration of the answer to those two questions. As I indicated previously, I did not feel that the answer to the first question that was put to them was a sufficiently responsive answer, and therefore I think that it is a question that requires further explanation and further discussion.

Q. Were the Israeli and the Egyptian Governments asked to join in a common statement with the United States and/or why is a statement only being issued by the 10% mediator instead of the 90% disputants?

A. Each one is going to talk to the press themselves. We decided that this was the best way to do it. I think Mr. Dayan is already talking to some of the press and will be talking to others. I believe that Mr. Kamel will do the same thing. We just decided that this was a convenient way for all of us to do it.

137

US Senate resolution added to the International Security Assistance Act calling for face-to-face negotiations between Israel and the Arab states¹⁷¹

Washington, late July, 1978

(a) The Congress finds that:

1. A lasting settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict is vital to United States' national interests as well as to the interests of the states of the region; and

2. Support for a strong and secure Israel and the maintenance for this purpose of Israel's effective

¹⁷⁰ For Israel's answers, see doc. 127 above.

¹⁷¹ The resolution was sponsored by Senators Baker, Chafee, Church, Cranston, Javits and Stone. Text as published in Near East Report (Washington), XXII, 31 (August 2, 1978), p. 140.

defense capabilities as essential to peace remains a fundamental tenet of United States foreign policy; and

- 3. Direct, face-to-face negotiations between Israel and Egypt without preconditions is an historic opening for peace, and the support of such negotiations by other moderate Arab states can best promote a peace settlement based on mutual concessions and accommodation; and
- 4. The establishment of secure, recognized and defensible borders between Israel and its neighbors will discourage hostilities; and
- 5. Full, normalized relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including trade, travel, tourism, communications and diplomatic relations are vital for peace.
- (b) It is the sense of the Congress that the Government of the United States should continue to promote direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt and to encourage other Arab states to enter into negotiations leading to peace treaties with Israel; and that the United States should be responsive to Israel's economic needs and defense requirements including the provision of additional advanced aircraft, to maintain Israel's defense capability which is essential to peace.

138

Political declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries (excerpts)¹⁷²

Belgrade, July 30, 1978

- 1. The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, from 25 to 30 July 1978.
- 2. The following countries participated as Members: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia,

Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palestine Liberation Organization, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Viet Nam, Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

- 3. In conformity with the decisions of the Fifth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belize was granted special status, including the right to address the Conference.
- 4. Attending in the capacity of Observers were: Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Grenada, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe—ZANU, Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe—ZAPU, Socialist Party of Puerto Rico, South West Africa People's Organization, African National Congress of South Africa, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Arab League, Islamic Conference, Organization of African Unity, Organization of United Nations, Pan African 1st Congress of Azania.
- 5. The following countries attended as Guests: Austria, Finland, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and United Nations Council for Namibia.

III

Positions and Actions on Particular International Issues
46. The Conference emphasizes that the nonaligned countries must work energetically towards finding solutions to key international problems. The Ministers consider that the following problems merit their special attention and
emphasize the need for urgent and joint actions
by non-aligned countries towards that end.

The Middle East

47. The Foreign Ministers call the attention of the international community to the grave-development in the Middle East problem posing a serious

 $^{^{172}}$ Excerpted from the English text, UN doc. A/33/206, pp. 6–7, 25–32.

danger which may lead to the outbreak of a new war. The Ministers examined the situation in this region and concluded that the reason behind the increasingly troubled situation in the region still lies in Israel's persistence in pursuing a policy of aggression, occupation and expansion, its refusal to withdraw from Palestinian and Arab occupied territories and its continued refusal to adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations resolutions, particularly those concerning the Palestinian problem and recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

48. The Foreign Ministers, having examined the recent developments in the Middle East situation, affirmed that the question of Palestine is the core of the Middle East problem and the solution of one problem without the other was not possible. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministers affirmed their insistence to maintain the unity between the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East.

49. The Foreign Ministers believed that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East definitely requires Israel's withdrawal from all the territories it occupies and the recognition of the national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as affirmed by General Assembly resolution 3236.173 The Foreign Ministers expressed their conviction that any solution which does not take into account these two basic conditions cannot serve peace, but on the contrary will only serve to pave the way to attempts by the United States to liquidate the Palestinian cause, help Israel in achieving its objectives and maintain the existing situation resulting from occupation, thus enabling Israel to carry out its colonialist, imperialist and racist function in the region.

50. The Foreign Ministers affirmed their countries' adherence to these principles and considered that any attempt at weakening the struggle to apply the above-mentioned principles is a deviation from the insistence of the non-aligned states to end Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories and help the Palestinian people in achieving their national and inalienable rights. The Foreign Ministers affirmed the right of the Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organization to foil with all possible means any solutions

or settlements laid down at the expense of the national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the liberation of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories.

51. The Foreign Ministers affirmed that the United States' continued hostile position towards the Palestinian people's rights and total withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories is contrary to the United Nations General Assembly resolutions concerning the Palestinian problem and the Middle East and constitutes an obstacle to the establishment of a just peace in the region. The Ministers condemned the policies which the United States seeks to impose on the region at the expense of the national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the liberation of all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories.

52. The Foreign Ministers considered that Israel was still maintaining its expansionist policy aimed at the annexation of Palestinian territory as well as other Arab territories, while multiplying measures to expel the inhabitants and carry out collective arrests and adopting a policy of illegal plunder and exploitation of the Arab inhabitants in the territories it occupies.

53. The Foreign Ministers strongly deplored Israel's exploitation of the natural wealth and resources in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, thus violating The Hague provisions and the Geneva Agreements. They called upon all States to take the necessary measures to prevent any co-operation with Israel which could pave the way for the illegal exploitation carried out by the Israeli occupation authorities.

54. The Foreign Ministers noted with deep concern the statements issued by colonialist and imperialist circles which threaten the resort to using force against oil-producing countries, particularly those lying in the Arab region. They also condemn any preparations made to implement such threats.

55. The Foreign Ministers considered that the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories are still deprived of fundamental rights and freedoms and that religious freedom is exposed to violations. Israel is strengthening its colonialist policy by reinforcing and increasing its settlements in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories to consolidate occupation, hinder the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and change the natural, political, cultural,

¹⁷³ Doc. 22 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

religious and demographic conditions in these territories. Israel does not only exploit Arab manpower illegally and deliberately but, furthermore, violates their human rights and deliberately resorted to the torture and killing of Arab prisoners.

- 56. The Foreign Ministers expressed their deep concern over Israel's continued violation of the human rights of the Arab inhabitants of all the Palestinian and Arab territories it occupies and condemned the Israeli authorities for refusing to allow the Special Committee of the United Nations to investigate Israeli practices, which affect the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, to enter the occupied territories. They also condemned Israel's policy of annexing Palestinian and Arab territories.
- 57. The Foreign Ministers expressed their full support for United Nations General Assembly resolution 91/32 which reaffirmed that the Geneva Agreement for the Protection of Civilians during War, concluded on 12 August 1948, is applicable to all Arab territories occupied by Israel, including Jerusalem.
- 58. The Foreign Ministers affirmed that a just peace in the region cannot be established except within the framework of a solution based on total Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and on the basis of restoring to the Palestinian people their national, legal and inalienable rights and to practice these rights, including the right to return, self-determination and setting up their national and independent state in Palestine, independent and equal participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole representative of the Palestinian people, in all conferences and international activities and spheres concerned with the Palestine problem and offering all forms of support to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab states in their struggle to end Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories.
- 59. The Ministers affirmed that in view of Israel's expansionist policy and attempts at procrastination which aim at continuing its illegal occupation of Palestine and Arab territories, and taking into account the political, economic and military support extended to Israel by the United States and other states, the issue calls for deep concern.
- 60. The Foreign Ministers renewed their call for rejecting the changes which the Zionist entity

attempts to introduce in the region to alter its national, demographic and economic conditions.

- 61. The Conference strongly condemned Israel for its aggression on Lebanon and its procrastination in withdrawing from some areas which it continues to occupy. It affirmed its keenness to maintain the security, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and the unity of its land and people.
- 62. The Ministers denounced the escalation of Israeli armament in the field of conventional weapons, and condemned Israel's intention to possess nuclear weapons, which constitute a grave threat to international peace and security. The Ministers agreed on supporting a proposal to be submitted to the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly stipulating the following:
- (i) To call on all countries, and in particular the United States of America, to co-operate completely in undertaking effective measures, in accordance with the seventh Chapter of the United Nations Charter, to avoid this perilous threat to international peace and security.
- (ii) To appeal to the Security Council, in particular, to call upon all countries to undertake the following, in keeping with the seventh Chapter of the United Nations Charter, regardless of any prevailing contracts:
- (a) To refrain from supplying Israel with any kind of weapons, ammunition, equipment, military vehicles and necessary spare parts, without exception.
- (b) To guarantee that such supplies do not reach Israel through other parties.
- (c) To terminate all transfer of nuclear equipment and fissionable material or its technologies to Israel.
- (iii) To appeal to the Security Council to establish an organ to supervise the implementation of the preceding measures of paragraph 2.
- (iv) To call upon all governments and organizations to undertake all suitable measures to reinforce support of the Palestine cause.

Palestine Question

63. The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed that the question of Palestine is the core of the present conflict in the Middle East, and denounced all policies of the United States of America that aim at ignoring the legitimate, national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the non-

recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and imposing partial or bilateral solutions.

64. The Ministers reiterated their grave concern over Israel's persistence to usurp Palestine, its blatant rejection of recognizing the Palestinian people's national, inalienable rights, and the racial expansionist policy adopted by the Zionist state. Such matters are persistently increasing, and representing an overt challenge to the international community, and constant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and resolutions, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

65. The Ministers confirmed the necessity of strengthening co-ordination between the Non-Aligned countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization; as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on both bilateral and international levels, with a view to laying down a strategy for the liberation of Palestine and for the Palestinian people to exercise their national and inalienable rights. The Conference also stressed the necessity of undertaking necessary measures for accepting the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the capitals of the non-aligned countries, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and granting it all rights, privileges and immunities of diplomatic missions.

66. The Ministers recalled all the previous Non-Alignment Conferences which stressed the necessity of the role of Member countries to exert more pressure on Israel in the United Nations and all its specialized agencies. They also appealed in particular to the Security Council to undertake effective measures, some of which are stipulated in Chapter 7 of the Charter, to compel Israel to abide by the resolutions adopted by the United Nations. The Ministers noted with grave concern, that despite such measures, the Zionist entity is still committing violations and aggressions, which were internationally condemned. The Ministers were of the view that they must stress the danger of this situation and call for the adoption of stronger and more decisive measures to put an end to the aggressive policy followed by Israel.

67. The Conference affirmed that the attempts and endeavours of the United States of America

to liquidate the Palestine issue and its assistance to Israel in realizing its expansionist, imperialistic and racist policy in occupied Palestine, through encouragement of bilateral and partial solutions, will not lead to a just solution of the problem. Therefore, the Conference condemned such policies, attempts and endeavours and called for resisting them. The Conference also stressed the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization to reject all forms of settlements, projects and solutions aiming at the liquidation of the Palestine question and denying the national rights of the Palestinian people.

68. The Foreign Ministers called on the Security Council to adopt a resolution that embodies the principles and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly relevant to the Palestine question and the Middle East, and in particular, resolution No. 3236 (D-29).¹⁷⁴ In this context, the Ministers referred to the contribution granted by "the United Nations Special Committee on the exercising of the Palestinian People of their Legitimate Rights", to the Palestinian question. The Ministers affirmed that Israel's continued refusal to co-operate with this Committee reaffirms Israel's persistence in defying the will of the international community and international legitimacy, and preventing the Palestinian people from practicing their national and inalienable rights, a matter which makes the situation more explosive in the region, and poses a threat to international peace and security.

69. The Ministers recalled that the Colombo Conference¹⁷⁵ reaffirmed that Zionism represents a form of racism and racial discrimination, and that it appealed to the Non-Aligned countries to bear this fact in mind at its meeting in the International Conference for Condemning Racism and Racial Discrimination to be convened in Geneva, in August 1978.

70. The Ministers called for work during the thirty third session of the United Nations General Assembly, to call for the convening of a special session to be consecrated to the study of the Palestine question, with a view to adopting measures leading to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to the withdrawal from Palestine and Arab occupied lands, and the

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Doc. 143 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

realization of the national, and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

71. The Foreign Ministers called for an annual commemoration of the 29th of November, as of 1978, as an international day for solidarity with the Palestinian people.

139

Resolution on the question of Palestine adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries¹⁷⁶

Belgrade, July 30, 1978

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries meeting in Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978,

Bearing in mind the principles and objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement and of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Conferences of Heads of State or Government and by the Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Countries on the question of Palestine.

Noting that the explosive situation in the Middle East resulting from Israel's persistence in usurping Palestine and its continued refusal to recognize the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people in conformity with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations constitutes a threat to the security and safety of non-aligned countries,

Reaffirming that the question of Palestine is at the core of the struggle against Zionism, and that Israel's continued refusal to withdraw from occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, and its denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people is inadmissible and constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a serious threat to international peace and security,

Considering that Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee set up under United Nations resolution 3376 (XXX)¹⁷⁷ on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as laid down in United Nations resolution 3236

(XXIX),178 confirms Israel's persistence in its flagrant defiance of the will of the international community and of international law, its violation of the Charter of the United Nations and its refusal to abide by United Nations resolutions,

Reaffirming the legitimacy of the Palestinian people's struggle under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization against imperialism, colonialism, Zionism and racism in all its forms in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and commending their struggle against the Zionist aggressors for the liberation of Palestine, which is an indivisible part of the universal liberation movement.

Reaffirming United Nations resolution 3379 (XXX)179 equating Zionism with racism and racial discrimination,

Reaffirming that the racist rule in occupied Palestine and southern Africa proceeds from the same imperialist source, and is organically linked to racial policies and practices aimed at the suppression of human freedom and the degradation of human dignity,

Expressing its conviction that the military, economic, political and moral support that Israel receives from some States, particularly the United States of America, encourages it to persist in its aggressive policy and its usurpation of Palestine,

Expressing its deep regret at the non-implementation of the resolutions adopted at the Fourth and Fifth Conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries¹⁸⁰ calling upon member countries still maintaining relations with Israel to sever all such relations in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that maintaining political, economic, cultural, technical and other relations with Israel assists it to continue its usurpation of Palestine and to persist in its violation of the will of the international community and of United Nations resolutions, and encourages it to pursue its expansionist, colonial, racist policy which is essentially founded on aggression,

Considering that Israel's continued membership of the United Nations is contrary to the Charter, and encourages Israel to ignore United Nations

¹⁷⁶ UN doc. A/33/206, pp. 134-140.

¹⁷⁷ Doc. 14 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

¹⁷⁸ Doc. 22 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

¹⁷⁹ Doc. 15 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

¹⁸⁰ Docs. 118-120 in International Documents on Palestine 1973, and doc. 143 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

resolutions and to act in collusion with various aggressive, racist and expansionist régimes,

1. Decides:

(a) To reaffirm its total, effective support for the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole legitimate representative, in order to recover their inalienable national rights in Palestine which comprise:

Their right to return to their homeland, and to recover their property as guaranteed by United Nations resolutions,

Their right to self-determination, without any outside interference, in keeping with the principles of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Their right to freely exercise sovereignty over their territory,

Their right to establish their independent national State in Palestine.

- (b) To strive in all fields, at the widest international level, to promote the recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole legitimate representative. The non-aligned countries undertake to carry out all necessary measures to realize that objective.
- (c) To co-ordinate the activities of the nonaligned countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization with a view to creating a strategy for achieving the liberation of Palestine and enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable national rights.
- 2. To confirm the right of the Palestinian people to pursue their struggle in all its military and political forms, by all means, in order to recover their inalienable national rights and establish their independent national State in Palestine.
- 3. To call upon all non-aligned countries to pledge their total support for the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle against the Zionist, racist occupation of Palestine, until they fully recover their inalienable national rights, which is a prerequisite to the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East.
- 4. To call upon all non-aligned countries to adhere to all the resolutions adopted by the Summit and Ministerial Conferences of the Non-Aligned Countries on the question of Palestine, and to implement them as soon as possible, particularly those concerning the severance of all

- forms of political, economic, cultural, technical and other relations, as well as tourism and communications with Zionist, imperialist Israel.
- 5. To reaffirm the need to take the necessary measures to ensure the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in the capitals of non-aligned countries, to grant it all the rights, privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic missions and to call upon those non-aligned countries that have not yet taken such measures to do so forthwith.
- 6. To reaffirm that the question of Palestine is at the core of the struggle in the Middle East, and that any attempt to ignore this fact will not serve the cause of peace in the region; and that the measures and initiatives of the United States of America in order to serve its own interests and exert its influence in the region, eliminate the question of Palestine and help Israel to implement its colonial, racist, expansionist policies in occupied Palestine by encouraging bilateral, partial solutions that ignore the essence of the question, will not lead to a just peace. Consequently, the Conference condemns these measures and initiatives and urges that they be resisted. It also condemns all policies and practices which contravene or infringe the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the conferences of the non-aligned countries.
- 7. To affirm the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people to work for the rejection and defeat of all forms of settlements, projects and solutions aimed at eliminating the question of Palestine and infringing the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine.
- 8. To reaffirm the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representatative of the Palestinian people to have equal and independent participation in all international conferences, meetings and activities concerned with the question of Palestine and the Arab-Zionist struggle, with a view to achieving the exercise by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly resolution 3236 (XXIX).¹⁸¹ The Conference reaffirms the right of the Palestine Libera-

¹⁸¹ Doc. 22 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

tion Organization to reject and declare null and void the results of all activities in which it is not enabled to participate in accordance with the principles contained in the aforementioned resolutions.

- 9. To condemn Israel for its continued refusal to implement United Nations resolutions on the question of Palestine particularly resolution 3236 (XXIX)¹⁸¹ on the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. It also condemns Israel's refusal to co-operate with the United Nations Special Committee on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people established under General Assembly resolution 3376¹⁸² (XXX).
- 10. To condemn Israel's racist, expansionist, terrorist policies and practices, its schemes and measures for establishing settlements, the Judaization of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and the alteration of their political, demographic, geographic, social, cultural and economic character, including the Judaization of Jerusalem, Hebron, Nazareth, Galilee, Negev, Golan and Sinai. It declares that all such measures are null and void and illegitimate, and should not, under any circumstances, be recognized either in their substance or in their effects.
- 11. To denounce Israel's continued violation of the human rights of the Palestinian and Arab peoples in the territories occupied in 1948 and 1967 and its refusal to apply the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular the Fourth Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War. It condemns the Israeli policy and practice of seizing territories, the continued evacuation of the Palestinian people, and the destruction of the cultural and religious heritage of Palestinian cities and of the Palestinian people. The Conference regards these policies and practices as war crimes and acts of defiance against humanity.
- 12. To condemn all countries that provide military, economic or political support or manpower to Israel, and calls on those countries to immediately desist from providing any form of material or moral support to Israel.
- 13. To call upon the Security Council to consider the report and recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, established under General Assembly resolution

- 3236 (XXIX), and subsequent resolutions on the question of Palestine. It also *calls on* the Security Council to adopt a resolution embodying the principles and provisions of the aforementioned resolutions, especially those relating to the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. Since Security Council resolutions are an expression of the will of the international community, failure to comply with their provisions constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, a threat to international peace and security, and a perpetuation of the injustice done to the struggling Palestinian people and a denial of the exercise of their inalienable national rights.
- 14. To call once again on all non-aligned countries to take the necessary measures to exert greater pressure on Israel at the United Nations and other international fora with a view to adopting the most severe sanctions against Israel including, if necessary, depriving it of its membership of the United Nations.
- 15. To urge all non-aligned countries to work to that end by entrusting the Conference of Foreign Ministers with the task of ensuring maximum coordination with the Palestine Liberation Organization during the consideration of the question of Palestine at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and to international participation on 29 November, the World Day of Solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people.
- 16. To call on non-aligned countries to work, during the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to convene a special session on the Palestine question, with a view to implementing the resolutions of the United Nations concerning withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and achieving the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.
- 17. To include "The Question of Palestine" as an item on the Agenda of the Sixth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.

¹⁸² Doc. 14 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

140

Resolution on permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries¹⁸³

Belgrade, July 30, 1978

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries

Recalling resolution No. 29 of the Fifth Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Colombo, August 1976,¹⁸⁴ entitled "Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories",

Recalling also General Assembly resolution 32/161¹⁸⁵ of 19 December 1977, with the same title,

- 1. Emphasizes the right of the Arab States and peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to full and effective permanent sovereignty and control over their natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities,
- 2. Reaffirms that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories are illegal, and strongly condemns Israel for its exploitation of these resources,
- 3. Further reaffirms the right of the Arab States and peoples subjected to Israeli aggression and occupation to the restitution of and full compensation for the exploitation, depletion, loss and damages to their natural, human and all other resources, wealth and economic activities, and holds Israel responsible to meet their claims thereof,
- 4. Calls upon all States to support and assist the Arab States and peoples and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the exercise of their abovementioned rights,
- 5. Urges all States, international organizations, specialized agencies, investment corporations and all other institutions not to recognize or co-operate with or assist in any manner any measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the resources of the occupied territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition or geographic character or institutional structure of these territories,

6. Condemns the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories and calls upon all Governments to take legislative, administrative and other measures in respect of their nationals and the oil companies and other institutions and corporate bodies under their jurisdiction who own or operate enterprises in the occupied Arab territories in order to put an end to the activities of such enterprises and to prevent any such operations in these territories, and to refrain from any cooperation with the occupying power,

7. Recommends that all Member States of the United Nations should take joint action in the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to undertake, through the office of Public Information of the Secretariat and any other channels available, a sustained and wide campaign with a view to informing world public opinion of the facts concerning the pillaging of natural resources and the exploitation of the indigenous Arab populations in the occupied territories, particularly the Palestinian people and its labour force, by Israel and by other foreign economic interests.

141

Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Nonaligned Countries¹⁸⁶

Belgrade, July 30, 1978

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries meeting in Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978

Bearing in mind the principles and objectives of non-alignment as well as the principles and objectives of the United Nations,

Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Heads of State or Government and of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries on the situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing that the non-aligned countries, through their common destiny, are committed to the objectives of their common struggle for peace, justice and progress; and against colonialism, occupation, Zionism and racism,

Deeply concerned by the progressive deterioration

¹⁸³ UN doc. A/33/206, pp. 141-142.

¹⁸⁴ Doc. 143 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

¹⁸⁵ Doc. 29 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹⁸⁶ English text, UN doc. A/33/206, pp. 127-133.

of the situation in the Middle East, which constitutes a grave danger that could lead to a new war in view of Israel's persistence in its policy of aggression and in its refusal to implement the United Nations resolutions concerning withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and the realization of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,

Denouncing all attempts to impose a fait accompli, as well as the expansionist policies, the establishment of settlements, the exploitation, domination, repression and terrorism which constitute the essence of Zionist policy in Palestine and the Middle East,

Reaffirming that the support extended by the non-aligned countries to Arab countries for the liberation of their occupied territories and to the Palestinian people for the restoration of their inalienable national rights is a responsibility and duty inherent in the principles and objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement; and that such support must be provided through practical and effective means,

Convinced that the time has come to impose on Israel the mandatory sanctions provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in view of its persistent violation of the principles of the Charter, refusal to comply with the resolutions of the world Organization and continued aggression against Arab countries and the Palestinian people,

Convinced that the non-aligned countries must adopt pratical and stringent measures to counter the persistent agression and violations on the part of the Zionist enemy,

- 1. Reaffirms the commitment of the non-aligned countries to the support of the Arab cause and their pledge to give political and material assistance to the Arab countries and to the Palestinian Liberation Organization in its legitimate struggle for the recovery of all the occupied territories and the realization of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people in their Palestine homeland,
- 2. *Reaffirms* that a just peace in the Middle East can only be established on the basis of the following:
- (a) the total and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories;
- (b) the restoration of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the exercise

of those rights, particularly the right to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of an independent State in Palestine,

- 3. Reaffirms that the question of Palestine is at the heart of the Middle East problem which together constitute an indivisible whole which must be approached and resolved as such, and also asserts the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to participate independently and equally in all international conferences, activities and fora concerned with the question of Palestine and the Arab-Zionist conflict with the aim of exercising the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,
- 4. Considers that any attempt at weakening the struggle for the implementation of the principles laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution is in conflict with the determination of the non-aligned countries to put an end to Israel's occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories and to assist the Palestinian people in achieving their inalienable national rights,
- 5. Condemns strongly Israel's aggression on Lebanon and its procrastination in withdrawal from some positions it still occupies, and confirms the security, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of Lebanon and the unity of its people,
- 6. Calls upon the countries and peoples of the world to adopt a decisive stand against Israel's intransigence, continued policy of aggression, expansionism, persistent refusal to implement United Nations resolutions on the question of Palestine,
- 7. Confirms the right of the Arab countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization to confront, by all means possible, any solution or settlement at the expense of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the liberation of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories,
- 8. Confirms that the continued hostile position of the United States towards the rights of the Palestinian people and total withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories contradicts with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly concerning the Palestine question and the Middle East, and constitutes an obstacle to a just peace in the region; and condemns the policies the United States seeks to impose upon the region at the expense of both the inalienable national rights of Palestinian people and the liberation of all occupied Palestinian and Arab

territories,

- 9. Calls upon all the countries and peoples of the world to refrain from providing Israel with the military, human or material support that is likely to encourage it to continue its occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories; and declares that continued support of Israel by any such countries will force the non-aligned countries to review their attitude towards them,
- 10. Denounces the countries which provide Israel with aid and weapons, and considers that the sole purpose of providing Israel with vast quantities of the instruments of death and destruction is to consolidate it as a base of colonialism and racism in the Third World in general and in Africa and Asia in particular,
- 11. Condemns the collusion between Israel and South Africa and their identical policies of aggression and racism, and their co-operation in every field with a view to threatening the security and independence of the Arab and African countries,
- 12. Strongly condemns Israel for its persistent implementation in occupied Palestinian and Arab territories of such policies as annexation, as in the case of the city of Jerusalem and elsewhere; the establishment of Israeli settlements for alien populations, the demolition of houses, the confiscation of property, the subjection of the Arab population to the evils of eviction, deportation, displacement, mass arrest, ill-treatment, torture and banishment, and the denial of their rights to repatriation; as well as such policies as the obliteration of the national, historical, spiritual and cultural features of the occupied Arab territories; the denial of individual freedoms, and the prevention of the Arab population from exercising their religious rights, and the illegal exploitation of the population and the natural resources of the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories,
- 13. Declares that these Israeli policies and practices constitute grave violations of the Charter of the United Nations, especially of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of the principles and provisions of international law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, and are a major obstacle to the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,
 - 14. Reaffirms that all the measures taken by

- Israel with a view to changing the political, demographic, geographical, economic, cultural and religious features of the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, either wholly or in part, are null and void, and therefore calls upon Israel to rescind all these measures forthwith, and appeals to all the countries of the world to refrain from any action that might assist Israel in pursuing the above-mentioned policies and practices,
- 15. Holds Israel responsible for all its measures of exploitation, subversion and land-expropriation in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories,
- 16. Affirms the right of Arab countries and peoples subject to Israeli occupation to full, permanent and effective sovereignty and control over their natural and other resources, and their economic activities, and also the right of these people to recover these resources and economic activities, together with the right to obtain full compensation for whatever damage and loss they may have incurred.
- 17. Reaffirms the need to sever all forms of diplomatic, consular, economic, cultural, sporting, and other relations, as well as tourism and communications, with Israel at all official and unofficial levels, and calls upon the non-aligned countries which have not yet severed relations with Israel to do so.
- 18. Calls upon all the non-aligned countries to join the Arab boycott of Israel, and to co-ordinate efforts, in this sphere, with the rest of the Third World countries to impose the boycott on all racist regimes, especially in Palestine and South Africa,
- 19. Calls upon the non-aligned countries, during the convocation of the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination scheduled for August 1978, to abide by the resolution adopted by the Fifth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, which equates Zionism with racism and racial discrimination,
- 20. Calls upon the non-aligned countries to take every useful step on the largest possible international scale, within the United Nations system and in the different international conferences and organizations with a view to exerting greater pressure on Israel, including the possibility, if need be, of depriving Israel of her membership of these organizations and bodies,
 - 21. Calls upon the non-aligned countries to

promote, during the thirty-third session of the Central Assembly of the United Nations, the convening of a special session of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine, with a view to adopting measures conducive to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions concerning Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian and Arab territories as well as the achievement of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,

22. Calls for the inclusion of an item on "The situation in the Middle East" on the agenda of the Sixth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries.

142

Press interview statements by former President Goldman of the World Jewish Congress expressing his belief that the West Bank and Gaza should not remain in Israeli hands and his willingness to meet with PLO Chairman Arafat (excerpts)¹⁸⁷

July, 1978

Q. I would like to ask you a fundamental question. Do you recognize our historic right to Judah and Samaria?

A. I do not recognize historic rights over specific places. First of all, during different periods, we had different amounts of territory. Over which Land of Israel do we have a historic right—King David's Israel, or the Land of Judah and Israel, or the land of the Hashmonaim? This is absurd. Secondly—if historic right is the basis, then we must return America to the Indians and Brazil to the natives.

The only rights that the Jews have in Israel are based on two or three things. One, is their loyalty to the land. But prayers do not mention borders. Begin determines borders, or Churchill, but not prayers. Once I reminded Begin that Jabotinsky signed Churchill's "White Paper". He was very angry with me. But the fact is that Jabotinsky did sign. I told Begin—how do you know that he wouldn't have signed a second partition, after he signed the first one, in which Churchill removed Jordan from the Mandate?

Our right to Israel also stems from the fact that without a Jewish state, it is impossible to guarantee the existence of the Jewish people. But we will guarantee our existence only if we have a state based on Ahad Ha'amism, in other words—a spiritual center.

Q. If you deny our right to the West Bank, how do you justify our right to Jaffa?

A. This claim—if not Bethlehem, then why Jaffa?—is meaningless. What is important in politics is not what one logically demands, but what one can realistically achieve. There is no possibility to remain in all the territories. It's an illusion. We were able to obtain Jaffa, we cannot obtain Bethlehem. That is the answer.

Q. What makes you certain that the Palestinians will be willing to be satisfied with a mini-Palestine, with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and will not want all of the Land of Israel, including Jaffa?

A. It's true, there is no certainty. Even if they sign a peace treaty tomorrow, can we be certain that they will abide by it? If America gives guarantees, can we be certain that they will be fulfilled? What is the meaning of certainty in politics? Politics are a permanent risk. In politics, you have to choose the least of all evils, that's all.

In history, everything is filled with danger. There are periods which are more or less dangerous. We are living in a very dangerous period. Kennedy once said: "America has to struggle every day for its survival". That was Kennedy in America—and not Israel, with Begin.

There is never anything more than a possibility in politics. And I believe that there is a possibility that the Palestinians will be satisfied with a mini-Palestine. I am in contact with Palestinians.

Q. Is that Arafat's view? ["that it is impossible to solve the problem without Palestinian recognition of Israel"].

A. I didn't hear this from Arafat, and I can't quote him. People who are very close to him say that he is willing to accept this. When they are asked, why don't they change their Covenant, they say that is the only card they have to use in negotiation with Israel. If they recognize Israel what will they be left with?

By the way, Ceausescu once suggested that I propose to Rabin, when he was prime minister,

¹⁸⁷ Interview conducted over a series of weeks by Yeshayahu Ben-Porat for *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv); partial text, *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), September 1978, pp. 43–46.

that on the same day, at the same hour, he in Jerusalem and Arafat in Beirut would declare their mutual recognition of each other. Rabin laughed, and said that this wasn't possible.

They claim, that as long as Israel doesn't recognize them, and will not be willing to grant them at least a mini-Palestine, they will not change the Covenant. I don't justify them, but it is possible to understand their position.

If were asked, I would take it upon myself, just as Mendes-France once did, to bring about within an alloted time period, not only mutual recognition, but the establishment of an economic confederation between Jordan, Palestine, and Israel.

Q, Are you proposing that the Palestinians have a state of their own?

A. No. First of all we need an agreement on the borders. We will not give up on Jerusalem, despite the fact that I believe that the Old City should have a special status. But no partition, God forbid. There will be changes in the borders, compared to the 1967 borders. This is a definite possibility: I could quote some great Arab leaders. Also, by way of Kreisky I know that it is possible to obtain changes, though not very great ones. After the borders are determined, the United Nations will take over the administration of the territories from Israel.

As for Begin's autonomy plan, in my opinion, their is no realistic possibility that it will be accepted. If I were an Arab, I wouldn't agree to an autonomy which included the Israeli army. Why should they agree? The Americans are acting as if they believe in the plan, but it's all an act.

If the United Nations takes over the administration, after a year or two a referendum should be carried out, under the auspices of the United Nations. Three options should be proposed: a sovereign state, a connection with Jordan, or a connection with Israel. What ever they decide—they decide.

Neither Carter nor Begin will decide who will represent the Palestinians. That would be discrimination, which could not be. They also will not decide who will represent the Jewish people.

Q. They will surely decide for a sovereign state!
A. I'm not at all sure of that. I could mention names, which is something I will not do since I have not been given permission, of those who

believe that an economic confederation is much more important. They will be a very small state, while Israel will be much stronger and much richer. There are also some great Communist leaders who believe that a Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli confederation solution is the best solution.

Q. Let's get back to Arafat. Why are you ready to meet with him today?

A. I am a free man. I do not represent the Congress. No one can say: you are coming in the name of the Congress. So why shouldn't I meet with him?

Q. This is the man who gives orders to lay bombs in buses, and to murder children.

A. Come let us be fair. We weren't also involved in terror? Who gave the order at Dir Yassin? And weren't 60 people killed at the King David Hotel?

Q. The comparison isn't fair. The Irgun gave advance warning at the King David Hotel, and the English didn't evacuate, because they didn't believe it.

A. Look, I reject the use of terror. And if it is possible to find a solution which will prevent such acts, it has to be done, in a political way. Otherwise, the terror will not stop—neither the kidnappings nor the rest. We must find a solution. And a solution, if it is to be found, must be arrived at by way of communication.

I have no great desire to meet with Arafat, and I said as much to my Palestinian friends. At least, not at the moment. But if there will be a situation, in which, in accordance with my humble opinion, a meeting would be desirable, for example, if Ceausescu would invite the two of us, I would come. I have already said to Begin—: you should know, that since I am no longer the president of the Congress I will allow myself to decide or not [if] I want to meet with any Arabs.

143

Statement by the US White House announcing the acceptance by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin of President Carter's invitation to a meeting at Camp David¹⁸⁸

Washington, August 8, 1978

The President is pleased to announce that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have accepted an invitation to come to Camp David on September 5 for a meeting with the President to seek a framework for peace in the Middle East.

All three leaders agree that there is no task more important than this search for peace. Secretary Vance has informed the President that both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have welcomed this meeting, and the President is gratified by their response.

Each of the three leaders will be accompanied by a small number of their principal advisers, and no specific time has been set for the duration of the meeting.

144

Press interview statements by US President Carter outlining his hopes for the forthcoming summit at Camp David and the role he envisages for the United States in the talks¹⁸⁹

Washington, August 9, 1978

Q. Mr. President, your summit meeting on September 5¹⁹⁰ with Prime Minister Begin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt is being called a great gamble on your

part. What are the risks of interjecting yourself personally, and why have you decided to take those risks?

A. This will be the first public comment I will have made since the announcement of that meeting.

It was a decision that we approached with great caution because of the inherent political risks involved. If the summit should fail, then I would be associated personally—as the President of our country—with failure. The political consequences of that are obvious.

But I have no hesitancy about the summit conference. The stakes are so great that I'm perfectly willing to risk adverse political consequences in the hope that we might make progress in establishing a framework for peace.

Q. What prompted the timing of this summit meeting? A. I recognize that the crucial element in any sort of peace agreement has got to be direct negotiations between Sadat and Begin. They recognize that as well.

In the last few weeks, the negotiating situation concerning the Middle East has deteriorated rapidly. The high hopes that were raised when President Sadat went to Jerusalem have been dashed. The results of the welcome that was extended to him by Prime Minister Begin have faded away.

There has been a high-pitched public debate, directly or indirectly, between the two nations and their leaders at high levels of responsibility. Sometimes personal criticisms have been injected into the debate.

Inherently, these criticisms are always taken out of context and exaggerated—not deliberately, but that's where the news exists. If you make a 1-hour speech about the Mideast and you say one or two phrases personally critical of another foreign leader, that's the part that receives the public attention.

Q, And you think a session at Camp David will avoid all that?

A. I feel that to go to Camp David, in a secluded place—with perhaps the foreign ministers and the defense ministers present—and to negotiate away from the glare of publicity is a very constructive thing to do.

If we can put the negotiating framework back into place and relieve the present tensions, that will be an achievement in itself. If under those conditions no progress is made, that would be

¹⁸⁸ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Summit, September 1978, p. 1. The heads of state of the US, Egypt and Israel met for 13 days at Camp David from September 5–17. The negotiators were isolated and the only reports were those made daily by US spokesman Jody Powell at the press centre in Thurmont. The only time when all three negotiators met together was on September 6 and 7, after which date Sadat and Begin did not meet for 10 days. The agreements later signed in Washington and known as the Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 below.

¹⁸⁹ Partial text of the interview conducted by senior editors of U.S. News and World Report (Washington), August 21, 1978, pp. 18-19; copyright U.S. News and World Report Inc.

¹⁹⁰ A reference to the forthcoming Camp David summit. See document above for the White House statement announcing President Sadat's and Prime Minister Begin's acceptance of President Carter's invitation to a summit.

a fairly good proof to me that no progress can be made at this time, and at least that might minimize the adverse consequences of a complete breakdown in the negotiations.

But I have a cautiously hopeful attitude toward the summit meeting. The immediate response of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin was a favorable factor. But no one underestimates the difficulty. It is a tough proposition. It's one that has defied solution or even progress for many years. But I think that—to be honest about it—this situation now, even in a depressed state, is much better than it was 18 months ago.

Q. Given the serious consequences of failure in the Mideast summit talks, are you prepared to introduce a compromise formula to attempt to break the deadlock?

A. Of course, the United States would play a major role there. Both leaders want me to, and that's a legitimate role for us to play.

Q. But do you now view this country as a full partner in the forthcoming talks?

A. I think we will be full partners in the discussion, although I want to emphasize that the only avenue for a successful conclusion of the agreement is between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat themselves. We will offer our good services as a mediator, as one who understands both perspectives.

Quite often I've already found that we can act successfully when President Sadat has a deeply felt position and Prime Minister Begin has a deeply felt position. They have in the past been much more at ease expressing themselves clearly to me than they have to one another. That's an avenue that I will provide for them.

But there's an often ignored factor: that the United States has a direct, major stake in the Mideast from the perspective of energy supplies, but primarily because of a stake to our own national security if the Mideast should erupt in war. We're not idle bystanders; we're not just message carriers. We have a direct national interest in the Mideast itself, so we are legitimately involved in those discussions.

We have a commitment to the Israelis to keep them informed about our negotiating position. I've given President Sadat myself the same assurance. I would never propose something to Prime Minister Begin with which President Sadat was not actively informed—or vice versa.

We even went to the extent of putting our proposals in writing when Secretary Vance has gone to the Mideast so that there would be no misunderstanding about what the American position was or what message was being carried back and forth.

We wrote it down very carefully and showed exactly the same copy to Prime Minister Begin, to President Sadat, to King Hussein, to President Assad of Syria—so that there would be no doubt about the fact that we were providing our services in good faith.

Q. But do you rule out the possibility of the U.S. actually presenting its own Mideast peace plan for both sides rather than simply serving as a go-between?

A. That question insinuates some imposition on those two leaders of an American proposal. That's not possible. They would have to voluntarily agree, without pressure from us, to any proposal before it would be acceptable.

But if we see, between the positions of Egypt and Israel, some possibility of an acceptable compromise, we would certainly take that assessment to both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat and say: "This is a possibility. Would you accept it?"

To that extent, the United States would be prepared to act in that role.

Q. Do you have a workable formula in mind for bridging the gap between Israel and Egypt on the central issue of the occupied territories?

A. There are several possibilities for that to be done, but I would rather not single out any particular one. I think both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat are familiar with the options that are available. There are no secrets among us.

What would ultimately be successful as a proposal no one yet knows.

145

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of a Fatah Central Committee delegation to the USSR¹⁹¹

Moscow, August 9, 1978

In response to the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, a Fatah delegation headed by Salah Khalaf and including Khaled al-Hassan, Mahmoud 'Abbas and Nimr Salah, all members of the Fateh Central Committee, visited the Soviet Union.

The delegation held talks with the Solidarity Committee, and viewpoints were exchanged as regards the current situation on the international level and particularly in the Middle East.

The participants in the meeting expressed their deep anxiety as regards the continued efforts exerted by the imperialist forces to delay the realization of a just solution to the Middle East conflict and of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. They condemned the policy of the Egyptian President, which is harming the unity of the Arab peoples in their struggle to eradicate the traces of Israeli aggression.

The two sides also called for the consolidation of solidarity among all anti-imperialist Arab forces; and expressed their firm conviction that the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, in which the PLO is participating, is considered an important channel for opposing capitulationist settlements of the Middle East crisis.

The participants in the meeting also condemned Israeli aggression and the intrigues of imperialism and reaction in Lebanon. They stressed the importance of preserving the unity of action of the Palestinian Resistance Movement, of the Lebanese Nationalist and Progressive Forces, of progressive Arab states, and of Lebanese nationalists who care for the national interests of their country, in order to foil these intrigues.

They called for supporting the efforts of the legitimate Lebanese authorities to preserve the territorial unity of the Lebanese Republic. Reference was also made to the importance of strengthening the PLO—the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people—in a comprehensive manner; on a democratic, anti-imperialist basis.

¹⁹¹ English text, Wafa (Beirut), August 9, 1978, pp. 5-7.

The representatives of Soviet social circles moreover reaffirmed their firm support for the just struggle of the Arab people, including the Palestinians, who seek their legitimate national rights, including their right to establish their own state. The Palestinian representatives expressed the deep thanks of their organization to the Soviet people and Government and to Comrade Brezhnev, for their active and comprehensive support for the Palestinian people's struggle for freedom and national independence. They also stressed the importance of continued development of Arab-Soviet friendship and cooperation.

The Fateh delegation was received by comrade Ponamariev, candidate member of the Politburo, and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

146

Press interview statements by Italian Communist Party Member of Parliament Pajetta calling for a Middle East settlement based on UN resolution 242 (excerpt)¹⁹²

August, 1978

Q. The Palestinian issue is at the root of the differences between Iraq and Syria, and between Iraq and Egypt. Specifically, these countries differ over UN Resolution 242, which Iraq rejects. How do you view their respective bositions?

A. Well we think that the main problem for the Arabs and the UN is to have 242 applied by Israel. The disputes among the Arabs seem rather formal. Let's remember that the PLO's refusal to go to Geneva was endlessly discussed, but that finally the PLO was never invited.

It is therefore rather an empty argument to discuss whether the PLO should recognise Israel when Israel wouldn't dream of recognising the PLO. Why argue about Gaza and the West Bank when Israel insists that it won't give up one inch of either? It is a pity that such arguments on formal matters should have hampered the creation of a common Arab front against Israeli arrogance.

¹⁹² Interview conducted by Fulvio Grimaldi, The Middle East (London), no. 47, September 1978, pp. 55, 58. For UN Security Council Resolution 242, see doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

This arrogance should have been more forcefully denounced, for it could then have been more successfully isolated.

- Q, But do you consider it a mere formality to oppose the recognition of the Zionist state, which is based on tribal, religious and racist principles and which treats a considerable part of its present population as secondclass citizens?
 - A. That's their business.
 - Q. Whose business?
- A. The business of those that say so. To the Italian communists, the existence of the state of Israel is a historical fact and the solution to the Middle East crisis must be found on the basis of the recognition of every people's right to exist as a state, including Israel. This obviously means the necessity for a Palestinian state as well.
- Q. It seem[s] that the countries that opposed Sadat's socalled peace initiative were right: the initiative is in ruins and has brought no benefit whatever. Where do we go from here?
- A. Yes, I think that the countries of the Stead-fastness Front were right. What had been seen as a courageous action turned out to be rash and foolhardy. It also bore the seeds of great danger, breaking Arab unity, tying Egypt to American imperialism almost unconditionally and, above all, actually disarming Egypt. Egypt has been left with no alternative but to live in a political, economic and military crisis which is getting more serious. No honest peace can come from all this.
- Q. Lebanon is the battlefield for various Arab, non-Arab and international forces. The Lebanese National Movement appears seriously weakened, various wings of the right are butchering each other and Israel is virtually controlling the south. What proposals does the international workers' movement and the Communist Party have to overcome this explosive situation?
- A. We have always said that the recognition of Lebanon's integrity and sovereignty constitutes an essential element for peace not only in the area but in the whole of the Mediterranean. This succession of crises and tragedies in Lebanon represents one of the most serious aspects of the breakdown of national and Arab unity of which we spoke earlier.

I wouldn't say that the progressive forces can be discounted. The fact that right-wing forces had to call for Israeli support in order to assert themselves is evidence that they are weak at national level. On the other hand, a complete solution cannot be obtained by the others alone, which indicates first of all a problem of reconciliation. Lebanon must be united and must belong to the Lebanese. It must be run so that neither of the two parties can prevail alone.

- Q. Syria still dictates, politically and militarily, developments in Lebanon. Has this been negative or positive so far?
- A. Syria's role has been contradictory and we have not always understood it. Also, we have not always shared in their political decisions, though we have felt that there were elements that may have justified a Syrian presence at times. The nature of this presence has changed on occasions. Now it should take on the task of assuring Lebanon's defence against Israel.

I think it would be an oversimplification to demand Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon today. But it would also be a mistake not to think that in future this will be necessary. A solution will come once Lebanon belongs to the Lebanese alone.

- Q. The PCI has long adopted a firm stand against terrorism. Yet, whenever an act of terrorism takes place, reference is immediately made to the Palestinians, whom you support. Where do you draw the line?
- A. First of all, we have always condemned terrorist actions outside what one could call the natural battlefields: hijackings, the Munich action and so on. As to the present situation, we believe that actions that don't belong to a wider popular resistance movement, to a liberation war, can be counter-productive and can feed enemy propaganda.

They may be the pretext not only for reprisals, but for real provocation. I am thinking here about the bus hijacking between Haifa and Tel Aviv and what followed. Such actions must be rejected, not only because they seem to be the product of despair, but also because they constitute serious political and military mistakes.

.

147

Press interview statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel speculating on the forthcoming Camp David talks and pointing out that in order for there to be peaceful relations a peace treaty is not essential if agreements are signed¹⁹³

Jerusalem, mid-August, 1978

- Q, You said earlier this week that at Camp David you will try to conclude a "permanent partial peace" with Egypt. What does that mean?
- A. We want peace treaties, and that's what we'll talk about at Camp David. Should Egypt be prepared to sign with us a peace treaty with the understanding that it is to be followed by peace treaties with the rest of our neighbors, we would be prepared to do so. But if it transpires that there are now insurmountable difficulties to achieving this goal, I have a concrete idea about the possibility of a partial agreement which would be of a permanent nature. If I may offer an analogy: West Germany never signed a peace treaty after the last world war, yet it lives in peaceful relations with all of its former enemies. I will bring up the possibility of such peaceful relations, based on reciprocal agreements, during our first meeting with Presidents Carter and Sadat.
- Q. What other subjects do you expect to discuss at Camp David?
- A. If there is a suggestion to talk about the socalled declaration of principles, we shall not reject it. We have, I believe, at least four or five formulas already prepared, and we'll be willing to discuss with Presidents Carter and Sadat any formulations they may make. If we find them acceptable, we'll agree to them. If not, we'll make counterproposals.
- Q. Carter believes that you and Sadat are not really too far apart. What do you think?
- A. Maybe. I can say that we have reached many agreements. But there remain hurdles, and we'll have to overcome them through negotiations.
- Q. What role do you expect the President to play at Camp David?
- A. I don't know what it means to be a "full partner." If it means that the American delegation

takes interest in the talks and sometimes even brings a concrete proposal or formulation, that is one story. But I do not expect the U.S. to propose a so-called peace plan, because that would be unhelpful. A peace plan should be the result of free negotiations between the two parties concerned. And I suppose that if an American peace plan should be tabled, it will not be accepted either by Egypt or Israel... Therefore, my personal advice would be for the United States to fulfill the very useful function of honest broker, and bring the two parties together for face-to-face negotiations.

- Q. What about the "bridging proposals" that are being considered by Carter?
- A. The President is entitled to bring forward any proposals he wishes... What I can only stress is that the great usefulness of an honest broker lies in the function which is inscribed in the platforms of both the Democratic and Republican parties, namely in bringing together for direct talks the parties of the Middle East conflict [with] no imposition of any plan.
- Q. You don't see any role for Carter beyond bringing the parties together?
- A. As I understand it, the President will meet separately with President Sadat and with myself. These talks will be very serious, and the President will play an important role in them. Then there will be the meeting of the three of us. Again, this will be a very serious talk, conducted with great candor. Then there will be meetings of delegations, which I suppose will be presided over by President Carter... Now, we want these meetings to succeed for the sake of Israel, for the sake of Egypt and, I might add, also for the sake of the prestige of the President of the U.S.
 - Q. Is summitry the best way to deal with these problems?
- A. It depends. In our personal meetings here in Jerusalem and in Ismailia, President Sadat and myself found a great deal of understanding. I treat very seriously the declaration which the President of Egypt made to me when he said "You are my friend." ...Of course, there is a risk. But nobody should call the Camp David meeting "fateful" or a "last chance". There is never a last chance in life.
- Q, What would you regard as a successful outcome of the summit?

¹⁹³ Interview conducted by Milan Kubic; partial text, Newsweek (New York-International edition). August 28, 1978, pp. 17–18.

- A. If we reach a basic agreement. Short of that, if we make sure that the negotiations will continue. And that, I think, is quite feasible. For that reason, I am optimistic about Camp David—and I hope to return home in the same frame of mind.
- Q. To what extent do you think that the talks will be influenced by the plans of your government to build five new settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan?
- A. It's all one great misunderstanding. I've heard phrases thrown in our faces that by deciding to build the settlements, we wanted to "torpedo" the Camp David summit. Nonsense. The decision was taken on the 28th of June, when nobody even dreamt about the summit meeting... Moreover, when we had to publish the fact of our decision, we immediately decided that we will not go ahead with the preparations, because we want a good atmosphere before and during the summit. Finally, people did not pay attention to the fact that the settlements will be manned by members of Nahal, the Pioneering Fighting Youth, which is an integral part of our defense forces. So this project is, if I may use a Shakespearean word, kosher from all points of view.
- Q, But doesn't your policy of strengthening the existing settlements and building new ones sometimes harm the peace process?
- A. I disagree. We openly stand for our right to build settlements and live in them. The settlements are not an obstacle to peace. They are part of our peace plan. I'll say so at Camp David. On this, I may say, we really differ with the American Government. The concept of our peace plan is to live together [with the Arabs]. Therefore, the settlements are a preparation for peace. Because if there is peace, as we say, we shall settle. We have a perfect right to do so.
- Q. Then why are your decisions on settlement matters treated as military secrets?
- A. For obvious reasons. In these times, and especially because of television, everything is played up... So what is wrong with it if we want to take decisions quietly, without causing any misgivings, and without causing any uproar?
- Q. What is your own attachment to Judea and Samaria, as you call the West Bank?
- A. A very profound feeling, which is natural to every Jew, to what we call Eretz Israel—the

Land of Israel. Our great writer Samuel Joseph Agnon used to say, "Because of the Roman Empero Titus, my cradle stood in a little town in Poland, but I was born in Jerusalem." Well, my cradle was in Brest-Litovsk, but I was born in Jerusalem... This is the land of our forefathers, and we came here as of right. But my attachment is not merely emotional. Judea and Samaria are essential to our security. If the area were ever held by an enemy, every home in Israel would be in range of his guns.

148

Speech made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Asad of Syria by President Scheel of the German Federal Republic asserting that peace in the Middle East is not possible without the participation of Syria¹⁹⁴

Bruhl, September 11, 1978

Mr. President, honourable Mrs. Asad, honnourable ladies and gentlemen,

I welcome you, Mr. President, as the first Syrian head of state to visit Germany, with warm greetings. We are delighted at your visit. It is a landmark in the history of relations between our countries

Syria was the first Arab country to open diplomatic relations with us after the war. Your visit today indicates a sincere, truthful and mutually useful relationship of intensive cooperation.

The German Federal Republic has made a contribution to the economic growth of your striving country, which also finds your appreciation. That fills me with personal satisfaction; for my first visit to the Arab world led me as a young federal minister for economic cooperation to Syria. I was the first government member from my country to be received there. In your ancient capital Damascus and outside in the open countryside I received unforgettable impressions of your illustrious Arab civilisation and the great economic potential of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The German Federal Republic's interest in our cooperation is today greater than ever. This interest and that of our European partners also

¹⁹⁴ Translated from the German text, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung (Bonn), no. 99, September 14, pp. 917–918.

extends to your Arab neighbours. It finds its expression in the cooperation agreement of the European community with the Southern states of the Mediterranean and in the Euro-Arab Dialogue of the states of the European community with the 21 member states of the Arab League.

The Mediterranean pacts and Euro-Arab Dialogue are already viewed, with justice, as trail-blazing examples of cooperation between neighbouring regions. How strongly and quickly Europe's cooperation with the Near and Middle East is growing is demonstrated by the increase in foreign trade. The total volume between these groups of countries is around 17% of the community's foreign trade. In this it surpasses all other third world regions.

But Syrians and Ārabs are, for us Germans, far more than mere economic partners. The name of your country and its capital, Damascus, bring back memories to German minds of the historical greatness and significance of your homeland, with which we have been familiar since biblical times. My own hometown, Solingen, although not quite so famous as your glittering capital, has one significant thing in common with Damascus: the world-wide and centuries-old fame of its steel blades. In our steel crafts museum we exhibit with pride Damascene and Solingen master pieces of the art of sword-making from the Middle Ages.

Damascus is a centre for Arab self-awareness. With great courage it grasped its freedom. We witnessed how bravely it had to fight against all odds for its independence. Today, too, peace and stability, which are essential for ensuring freedom, have not yet been achieved. The unresolved Middle East problem threatens the whole region, and us with it. Because of this we have a mutual and essential interest in the search for peace in the Middle East, which must be just and comprehensive if it is to last.

Syria plays a key role in this conflict. For without the cooperation of your country a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is unthinkable.

Syria therefore bears a large responsibility for peace in the Middle East.

Your own policy, Mr. President which, in spite of all difficulties, has been based on a readiness for trade and peace, has convinced us that a peaceful solution to this conflict can be found. Therefore we know that your conception differs from that presented by the other Arab parties

to the conflict, which also are our friends, to strive for the goal of a comprehensive peaceful solution. The desire for peace on the part of these parties also is unquestionable.

We Germans and Europeans, who have our own unstinting interest in a Middle East peace, seek to support all attempts to make a peaceful solution possible or easier. We firmly support the unity of the Arab world even when this is beset with trying problems. Only with the understanding of all parties will a comprehensive and lasting peace be possible.

The position of the Nine towards attempts to find a just and lasting solution to the Middle East conflict by means of negotiation, is well known. It is based on the declaration of the 29 June, 1977. 195

We are furthermore of the conviction that on the bases of these principles founded on UN Security Council resolution 242, that the territorial rights of the Arabs and the security needs of Israel can be brought into harmony.

The world today once more looks at the situation in the Republic of Lebanon. Syria has had the chance to play an exceptionally responsible and certainly thankless role, especially within the framework of the "Arab Deterrent Force". We have since 1975 followed the tragic events in the country, on which so much depends, with emotion. Renewed outbreaks of fighting today endanger not only the existence of Lebanon, but also the peace of the whole Middle East.

The German Federal Republic will intervene further for the unity, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Lebanon. She has called on all who have influence on the events to support the reestablishment of the authority of the legitimate Lebanese government and with it the political reconstruction of this grief-torn country. I hope that this will be understood as a plea for political reason which strongly calls for moderation.

Sultan Saladin who is buried in Damascus is seen by us Germans as a symbol of courage and chivalry. Our classical poet, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing has immortalized him in a poem, which deals with reconciliation and peaceful competition between Muslims, Christians and Jews. We hope

¹⁹⁵ Doc. 220 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

wholeheartedly for such a peace in the Middle East.

Mr. President, gracious lady, I raise my glass to your personal well-being, to the well-being of our Syrian guests, to a happy and peaceful future for the Syrian people and to the good development of friendly relations between the Arab Republic of Syria and the German Federal Republic.

149

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Saudi Arabia of Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan (excerpt)¹⁹⁶

September 12, 1978

4. (1) Both sides agreed on the necessity of an early realization of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East for world peace. They recognized that in order that such peace be realized, Israel should withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war including the Arab section of Jerusalem occupied by Israel in that war, and should recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination, in accordance with the U.N. Charter. The Japanese side affirmed that in order to establish a just and lasting peace, it was also necessary to respect the integrity and security of the territories of all countries in the area.

150

Resolution of the Inter-Parliamentary Union calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination¹⁹⁷

Bonn, September 13, 1978

The 65th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, Recalling the previous resolutions of the Inter-

196 Excerpted from the English translation supplied, on request, by the Japanese embassy. Beirut.

¹⁹⁷ Text supplied, on request, by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, November 30, 1978; the resolution was adopted by 603 votes to 35, with 163 abstentions. Parliamentary Union, particularly those of the 64th Inter-Parliamentary Conference¹⁹⁸ in Sofia and the 122nd session of the Inter-Parliamentary Council in Lisbon, which refer to the appropriate resolutions of the United Nations on the Middle East,

Considering that the establishment of peace in the Middle East is essential for all the peoples of that area, the security of the Mediterranean basin and the maintenance of world peace,

Believing that all efforts to achieve that objective through negotiations should be encouraged, and that any action to impede it and likely to increase tension in the Middle East should be avoided,

- 1. Expresses the wish that any endeavour to create the conditions for a comprehensive settlement and an early convening of the Geneva Conference will be successful, thus helping to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,
- 2. Reaffirms that the effective implementation of UN Security Council resolution 242¹⁹⁹ in its entirety remains the fundamental condition for the settlement of the conflict in the Middle East and that all acts contravening the spirit and letter of that resolution must therefore be reproved;
- 3. Declares itself in favour of a peaceful solution of the conflict in the Middle East, realizing the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories and guaranteeing the security and territorial integrity of all States in the area within secure, stable and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, and enabling the establishment of normal relations between those States, and which, while safeguarding human rights against all forms of persecution, respects the inalienable rights of all peoples of the area, including the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination;

Profoundly moved by the thousands of victims among the Lebanese civilian population and by the wide-scale destruction of property,

- 1. Urgently calls the attention of all member countries to the tragic situation in Lebanon;
- 2. *Recalls* the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 425 and the need for its full application in all its parts;
 - 3. Reaffirms the urgent need for measures ca-

¹⁹⁸ Doc. 158 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹⁹⁹ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

pable of putting an end to the present situation by fully re-establishing the authority of the Lebanese State against all external interference and guaranteeing its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the unity of its people, with respect for the rights of all communities, whatever the political choice or religion of their members.

151

Statement by US President Carter made in an exchange of remarks with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat at the signing of the Camp David agreements²⁰⁰

Washington, September 17, 1978

When we first arrived at Camp David, the first thing upon which we agreed was to ask the people of the world to pray that our negotiations would be successful. Those prayers have been answered far beyond any expectations. We are privileged to witness tonight a significant achievement in the cause of peace, an achievement none thought possible a year ago, or even a month ago, an achievement that reflects the courage and wisdom of these two leaders.

Through thirteen long days at Camp David, we have seen them display determination and vision and flexibility which was needed to make this agreement come to pass. All of us owe them our gratitude and respect. They know that they will always have my personal admiration.

There are still great difficulties that remain and many hard issues to be settled. The questions that have brought warfare and bitterness to the Middle East for the last thirty years will not be settled overnight. But we should all recognize the substantial achievements that have been made.

One of the agreements that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are signing tonight is entitled, "A Framework For Peace in the Middle East." [Applause]²⁰¹

This framework concerns the principles and some specifics in the most substantive way which will govern a comprehensive peace settlement. It

deals specifically with the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and the need to resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The framework document proposes a five-year transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza during which the Israeli military government will be withdrawn and a self-governing authority will be elected with full autonomy.

It also provides for Israeli forces to remain in specified locations during this period to protect Israel's security.

The Palestinians will have the right to participate in the determination of their own future, in negotiations which will resolve the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and then to produce an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.

These negotiations will be based on all the provisions and all the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.²⁰² And it provides that Israel may live in peace within secure and recognized borders.

And this great aspiration of Israel has been certified without constraint with the greatest degree of enthusiasm by President Sadat, the leader of one of the greatest nations on earth. [Applause]

The other document is entitled, "Framework For the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty", ²⁰³ between Egypt and Israel.

It provides for the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai. It calls for the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai; and after an interim withdrawal which will be accomplished very quickly, the establishment of normal peaceful relations between the two countries, including diplomatic relations. [Applause]

Together with accompanying letters, which we will make public tomorrow, these two Camp David agreements provide the basis for progress and peace throughout the Middle East.

There is one issue on which agreement has not been reached. Egypt states that the agreement to remove Israeli settlements from Egyptian territory is a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel states that the issue of the Israeli settlements should be resolved during the peace negotiations. That's a substantial difference.

Within the next two weeks, the Knesset will

²⁰⁰ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Summit, September 1978, pp. 3-4. For the statements of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin on the same occasion see docs. 271 and 152 below.

²⁰¹ Doc. 153 below.

²⁰² Doc. 208 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

²⁰³ Doc. 154 below.

decide on the issue of these settlements.

Tomorrow night, I will go before the Congress²⁰⁴ to explain these agreements more fully, and to talk about their implications for the United States, and for the world. For the moment, and in closing, I want to speak more personally about my admiration for all of those who have taken part in this process, and my hope that the promise of this moment will be fulfilled.

During the last two weeks the members of all three delegations have spent endless hours, day and night, talking, negotiating, grappling with problems that have divided their people for 30 years. Whenever there was a danger that human energy would fail, or patience would be exhausted, or good will would run out—and there were many such moments—these two leaders and the able advisers in all delegations found the resources within them to keep the chances for peace alive.

Well, the long days at Camp David are over. But many months of difficult negotiations still lie ahead.

I hope that the foresight and the wisdom that have made this session a success will guide these leaders and the leaders of all nations as they continue the progress toward peace.

[President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin make statements published as docs. 152 and 271 below.]

The first document that we will sign is entitled, "A Framework For Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David", and the texts of these two documents will be released tomorrow. The documents will be signed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. And it will be witnessed by me.

We have to exchange three documents, so we'll all sign three times for this one.

[Signing of document]

I might say that the first document is quite comprehensive in nature, encompassing a framework by which Israel can later negotiate peace treaties between herself and Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, as well as the outline of this document that we will now sign.

And as you will later see, in studying the documents, it also provides for the realization of the hopes and dreams of the people who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and will assure Israel peace in the generations ahead.

The second document is the one relating to a framework for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. And this is the document that calls for the completion of the peace treaty negotiations within three months. And I have noticed the challenge extended by these two gentlemen to each other. They will complete within three months—I might say that this document encompasses almost all of the issues between the two countries and resolves those issues. A few lines remain to be drawn on maps and the question of the settlements is to be resolved. Other than that, most of the major issues are resolved already in this document.

We will now sign this document as well. [Signing of document]

152

Statement by Prime Minister Begin of Israel made in an exchange of remarks with President Carter and President Sadat at the signing of the Camp David agreements²⁰⁵ Washington, September 17, 1978

Mr. President of the United States, Mr. President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, ladies and gentlemen: The Camp David conference should be renamed. It was the Jimmy Carter Conference. [Laughter, applause]

The President undertook an initiative most imaginative in our time and brought President Sadat and myself and our colleagues and friends and advisers together under one roof. In itself it was a great achievement.

But the President took a great risk for himself and did it with great civil courage. And it was a famous French Field Commander who said that it is much more difficult to show civil courage than military courage.

And the President worked. As far as my historic experience is concerned, I think that he worked harder than our forefathers did in Egypt, building the pyramids. [Laughter, applause]

Yes, indeed, he worked day and night, and so did we—[Laughter]—day and night. We used to go to bed at Camp David between 3:00 and

²⁰⁴ For President Carter's speech to Congress, see doc. 157 below.

²⁰⁵ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Summit, September 1978, pp. 4–6. For the statements of President Carter and President Sadat see doc. 151 above and doc. 271 below, respectively.

4:00 o'clock in the morning, arise, as we are used to since our boyhood, between 5:00 and 6:00, and continue working.

The President showed interest in every section, every paragraph, every sentence, every word, every letter—[Laughter]—of the framework agreements.

We had some difficult moments, as usually, there are some crises in negotiations; as usually, somebody gives a hint that perhaps he would like to pick up and go home. [Laughter] It's all usual. But ultimately, ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States won the day. And peace now celebrates a great victory for the nations of Egypt and Israel and for all mankind.

Mr. President, we, the Israelis, thank you from the bottom of our hearts for all you have done for the sake of peace, for which we prayed and yearned more than 30 years. The Jewish people suffered much, too much. And, therefore, peace to us is a striving, coming innermost from our heart and soul.

Now when I came here to the Camp David conference, I said perhaps as a result of our work, one day people will, in every corner of the world, be able to say "Habemus pacem" in the spirit of these days. Can we say so tonight? Not yet. We still have to go a road until my friend President Sadat and I sign the peace treaties.

We promised each other that we shall do so within three months.

Mr. President [Sadat], tonight, at this celebration of the great historic event, let us promise each other that we shall do it earlier than within three months. [Laughter, applause]

Mr. President, you inscribed your name forever in the history of two ancient civilized peoples, the people of Egypt and the people of Israel.

I would like to say a few words about my friend, President Sadat. We met for the first time in our lives last November in Jerusalem. He came to us as a guest, a former enemy, and during our first meeting, we became friends.

In the Jewish teachings, there is a tradition that the greatest achievement of a human being is to turn his enemy into a friend, and this we do in reciprocity. Since then, we had some difficult days. [Laughter] I'm not going now to tell you the saga of those days. Everything belongs to the past. Today, I visited President Sadat in his cabin because in Camp David you don't have houses, you only have cabins. [Laughter] And he then

came to visit me. We shook hands. And, thank God, we again could have said to each other, "You are my friend." [Applause]

And, indeed, we shall go on working in understanding, and in friendship and with good will. We will still have problems to solve. Camp David proved that any problem can be solved, if there is good will and understanding and some, *some* wisdom.

May I thank my own colleagues and friends, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister; Professor Barak who was the Attorney General and now he's going to be His Honor, the Justice of the Supreme Court—the Israeli Brandeis—and Dr. Rosenne, and our wonderful Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Simcha Dinitz, and all our friends, because without them, that achievement wouldn't have been possible.

I express my thanks to all the members of the American delegation, headed by the Secretary of State, a man whom we love and respect. And so I express my thanks to all the members of the Egyptian delegation who worked so hard together with us, headed by Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Touhamy, for all they have done to achieve this moment. It is a great moment in the history of our nations and indeed of mankind.

I looked for a precedent; I didn't find it. It was a unique conference, perhaps one of the most important since the Vienna Conference in the 19th Century; perhaps.

And now, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to turn to my own people from the White House in my own native tongue.

[Brief remarks in Hebrew]

153

Agreement between Egypt and Israel outlining a framework for peace in the Middle East²⁰⁶

Washington, September 17, 1978

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-conflict to adhere to it.

PREAMBLE

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

—The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

—After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

—The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to

him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

—The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

—To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

—Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boudaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

—Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict.

²⁰⁶ US Department of State publication 8954, *The Camp David Summit, September 1978*, pp. 6–10. The agreement was signed by President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel on September 17 in Washington and witnessed by President Carter of the United States. For the exchange of remarks made by the three leaders at the signing ceremony, see docs. 151 and 152 above, and doc. 271 below. The ten letters accompanying the treaty are published as docs. 155, 156, 164, 165, 166, 167, 176, 272–274 below. A further letter on Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was not published. The Israeli Knesset approved the Camp David agreements on September 28, 1978 by a vote of 85 to 19, with 16 abstentions. The Egyptian People's Assembly approved the agreements on October 14, 1978 by a vote of 351 to 7, with 2 abstentions.

They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that obejective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

- 1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
- (a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
- (b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jor-

- danian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
- (c) When the self-governing authority (adminstrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:
- 1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
- 2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
- 3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

- 4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
- 2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
- 3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
- 4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

- 1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- 2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors-Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

- 2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
 - (a) full recognition;
 - (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
- (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
- 3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
- 4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
- 5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
- 6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the Arab

For the Government of Israel:

Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

M. Begin

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER
Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

ANNEX

Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting *The Security Council*,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

- 1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
 - 2. Affirms further the necessity
- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting, on 21/22 October 1973

The Security Council

- 1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
- 2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
- 3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

154

Agreement between Egypt and Israel on the framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries²⁰⁷

Washington, September 17, 1978

FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

- (a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
- (b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
- (c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;
- (d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
- (e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

²⁰⁷ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Summit, September 1978, pp. 10-11.

For "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," see doc. 153 above. See also footnote no. 206.

(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

STATIONING OF FORCES

A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

INTERIM WITHDRAWAL

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east to El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement. For the Government
of the Arab

Republic of Egypt:

A. Sadat

For the Government
of Israel:

M. Begin

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER
Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

155

Letter from Prime Minister Begin of Israel to US President Carter outlining Begin's proposed method of presenting the question of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset²⁰⁸

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?"

The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual Parliamentary Party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both on the Government and the Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

Sincerely yours, (signed)

Menachem Begin

The President

Camp David

Thurmont, Maryland

²⁰⁸ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Summit, September 1978. This letter is one of ten exchanged by participants to the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs. 156, 164–167, 176 and 272–274. For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

156

Letter from Prime Minister Begin of Israel to US President Carter reaffirming that Jerusalem is indivisible and capital of Israel²⁰⁹

September 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967—Israel's Parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "the Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the State to any part of Eretz Israel (land of Israel—Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely, (signed) Menachem Begin

The President

Camp David

Thurmont, Maryland

157

Speech by President Carter before the US Congress following the signing of the Camp David agreements²¹⁰

Washington, September 18, 1978

Vice President Mondale, Speaker O'Neill, distinguished Members of the United States Congress, Justices of the Supreme Court, other leaders of our great Nation, ladies and gentlemen, it's been more than 2,000 years since there was peace between Egypt and a free Jewish nation. If our present expectations are realized, this year we shall see such peace again. [Applause]

The first thing I would like to do is to give tribute to the two men who made this impossible dream now become a real possibility—the two great leaders with whom I have met for the last two weeks at Camp David—first, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt—[applause]—and the other, of course, is Prime Minister Menachem Begin of the Nation of Israel. [Applause]

I know that all of you would agree that these are two men of great personal courage, representing nations of peoples who are deeply grateful to them for the achievement which they have realized. And I am personally grateful to them for what they have done.

At Camp David we sought a peace that is not only of vital importance to their own two nations, but to all the people of the Middle East—to all the people of the United States—and indeed, to all the world as well.

The world prayed for the success of our efforts, and I am glad to announce to you that these prayers have been answered. [Applause]

I've come to discuss with you tonight what these two leaders have accomplished, and what this means to all of us.

The United States has had no choice but to be deeply concerned about the Middle East, and to try to use our influence and our efforts to advance the cause of peace. For the last thirty years, through four wars, the people of this troubled region have paid a terrible price in suffering and division and hatred and bloodshed. No two nations have suffered more than Egypt and Israel. But the dangers and the costs of conflict in this region for our own Nation have been great as well. We have long-standing friendships among the nations there and the peoples of the region, and we have profound moral commitments which are deeply rooted in our values as a people.

The strategic location of these countries and the resources that they possess mean that events in the Middle East directly affect people everywhere. We and our friends could not be indifferent if a hostile power were to establish domination there. In few areas of the world is there a greater risk that a local conflict could spread among other nations adjacent to them and then perhaps erupt into a tragic confrontation between us superpowers ourselves.

Our people have come to understand that unfamiliar names—like Sinai, Aqaba, Sharm el

²⁰⁹ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Summit, September 1978. This letter is one of ten in an exchange by participants of the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs. 155, 164–167, 176, and 272–274. For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

²¹⁰ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Agreements, September 1978. The agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above. For the ten letters accompanying them, see docs. 155, 156, 164–167, 176, and 272–274.

Sheikh, Ras en Naqb, Gaza, the West Bank of Jordan—can have a direct and immediate bearing on our own well being as a nation and our hope for a peaceful world.

That is why we in the United States cannot afford to be idle bystanders and why we have been full partners in the search for peace and why it is so vital to our nation that these meetings at Camp David have been a success.

Through the long years of conflict, four main issues have divided the parties involved. One is the nature of peace—whether peace will simply mean that the guns are silenced, that the bombs no longer fall, that the tanks cease to roll, or whether it will mean that the nations of the Middle East can deal with each other as neighbors and as equals and as friends, with a full range of diplomatic and cultural and economic and human relations between them; that's been the basic question.

The Camp David agreement has defined such relationships, I'm glad to announce to you, between Israel and Egypt. [Applause]

The second main issue is providing for the security of all parties involved, including, of course, our friends the Israelis, so that none of them need fear attack or military threats from one another. When implemented, the Camp David agreement, I'm glad to announce to you, will provide for such mutual security. [Applause]

Third is the question of agreement on secure and recognized boundaries, the end of military occupation, and the granting of self-government or else the return to other nations of territories which have been occupied by Israel since the 1967 conflict. The Camp David agreement, I'm glad to announce to you, provides for the realization of all these goals. [Applause]

And finally, there is the painful human question of the fate of the Palestinians who live or who have lived in these disputed regions. The Camp David agreement guarantees that the Palestinian people may participate in the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, a commitment that Israel has made in writing and which is supported and appreciated, I'm sure, by all the world.

Over the last eighteen months, there has been, of course, some progress on these issues. Egypt and Israel came close to agreeing about the first issue—the nature of peace. They then saw that the second and third issues, that is, withdrawal

and security—were intimately connected, closely entwined. But fundamental divisions still remained in other areas—about the fate of the Palestinians, the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and the future of Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territories.

We all remember the hopes for peace that were inspired by President Sadat's initiative, that great and historic visit to Jerusalem last November that thrilled the world and by the warm and genuine personal response of Prime Minister Begin and the Israeli people and by the mutual promise between them, publicly made, that there would be no more war. These hopes were sustained when Prime Minister Begin reciprocated by visiting Ismailia on Christmas Day. That progress continued, but at a slower and slower pace through the early part of the year. And by early summer, the negotiations had come to a standstill once again.

It was this stalemate and the prospect for an even worse future that prompted me to invite both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to join me at Camp David.

They accepted, as you know, instantly, without delay, without preconditions, without consultation even between them. It's impossible to overstate the courage of these two men or the foresight they have shown. Only through high ideals, through compromises of words and not principle, and through a willingness to look deep into the human heart and to understand the problems and hopes and dreams of one another can progress in a difficult situation like this ever be made.

That's what these men and their wise and diligent advisers who are here with us tonight have done during the last 13 days.

When this conference began, I said that the prospects for success were remote. Enormous barriers of ancient history and nationalism and suspicion would have to be overcome if we were to meet our objectives.

But President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have overcome these barriers, exceeded our fondest expectations and have signed two agreements that hold out the possibility of resolving issues that history had taught us could not be resolved.

The first of these documents is entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David". It deals with a comprehensive settlement, comprehensive settlement, between Israel and all her neighbors, as well as the difficult question of the Palestinian people and the future of the West Bank and the Gaza area.

The Israeli military government over these areas will be withdrawn and will be replaced with a self-government of the Palestinians who live there. And Israel has committed that this government will have full autonomy. Prime Minister Begin said to me several times, not partial autonomy, but full autonomy. [Applause]

Israeli forces will be withdrawn and redeployed into specified locations to protect Israel's security. The Palestinians will further participate in determining their own future through talks in which their own elected representatives, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, will negotiate with Egypt and Israel and Jordan to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel has agreed, has committed themselves, that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people will be recognized. After the signing of this framework last night, and during the negotiations concerning the establishment of the Palestinian self-government, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The future settlements issue will be decided among the negotiating parties.

The final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be decided before the end of the five-year transitional period during which the Palestinian Arabs will have their own government, as part of a negotiation which will produce a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, specifying borders, withdrawal, all those very crucial issues.

These negotiations will be based on all the provisions and the principles of Security Council Resolution 242, with which you all are so familiar. The agreement on the final status of these areas will then be submitted to a vote by the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, and they will have the right for the first time in their history, the Palestinian people, to decide how they will govern themselves permanently.

We also believe, of course, all of us, that there should be a just settlement of the problems of displaced persons and refugees, which takes into account appropriate United Nations resolutions.

Finally, this document also outlines a variety of security arrangements to reinforce peace between Israel and her neighbors.

This is, indeed, a comprehensive and fair frame-

work for peace in the Middle East, and I'm glad to report this to you. [Applause]

The second agreement is entitled, "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." It returns to Egypt its full exercise of sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula, and establishes several security zones, recognizing carefully that sovereignty right for the protection of all parties. It also provides that Egypt will extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel at the time the Israelis complete an interim withdrawal from most of the Sinai, which will take place between three months and nine months after the conclusion of the peace treaty. [Applause]

And the peace treaty is to be fully negotiated and signed no later than three months from last night. [Applause]

I think I should also report that Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have already challenged each other to conclude the treaty even earlier. And I hope they—[applause] This final conclusion of the peace treaty will be completed late in December. And it would be a wonderful Christmas present for the world. [Applause]

Final and complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces will take place between two and three years following the conclusion of the peace treaty.

While both parties are in total agreement on all the goals that I have just described to you, there is one issue on which agreement has not yet been reached. Egypt states that agreement to remove the Israeli settlements from Egyptian territory is a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel says that the issue of the Israeli settlements should be resolved during the peace negotiations themselves.

Now, within two weeks with each member of the Knesset, or the Israeli Parliament acting as individuals, not constrained by party loyalty, the Knesset will decide on the issue of the settlements. Our own government's position, my own personal position, is well-known on this issue, and has been consistent. It is my strong hope, my prayer, that the question of Israeli settlements on Egyptian territory will not be the final obstacle to peace.

None of us should underestimate the historic importance of what has already been done. This is the first time that an Arab and an Israeli leader have signed a comprehensive framework for peace. It contains the seeds of a time when the Middle East, with all its vast potential, may be a land of

human richness and fulfillment, rather than a land of bitterness and continued conflict. No region in the world has greater natural and human resources than this one. And nowhere have they been more heavily weighed down by intense hatred and frequent war. These agreements hold out the real possibility that this burden might finally be lifted.

But we must also not forget the magnitude of the obstacles that still remain. The summit exceeded our highest expectations—but we know that it left many difficult issues which are still to be resolved. These issues will require careful negotiation in the months to come. The Egyptian and Israeli people must recognize the tangible benefits that peace will bring and support the decisions their leaders have made so that a secure and a peaceful future can be achieved for them. The American public, you and I, must offer our full support to those who have made decisions that are difficult and those who have very difficult decisions still to make.

What lies ahead for all of us is to recognize the statesmanship that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have shown and to invite others in that region to follow their example. I have already last night invited the other leaders of the Arab world to help sustain progress toward a comprehensive peace.

We must also join in an effort to bring an end to the conflict and the terrible suffering in Lebanon. [Applause]

This is a subject that President Sadat discussed with me many times while I was in Camp David with him. And the first time that the three of us met together, this was a subject of heated discussion. On the way to Washington last night in the helicopter, we mutually committed ourselves to join with other nations, with the Lebanese people themselves, all factions, with President Sarkis, with Syria, and Saudi Arabia, perhaps the European countries like France, to try to move toward a solution of the problem in Lebanon which is so vital to us and to the poor people in Lebanon who have suffered so much.

We will want to consult on this matter and on these documents and their meaning with all of the leaders, particularly the Arab leaders. And I'm pleased to say to you tonight that just a few minutes ago, King Hussein of Jordan and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, perhaps other leaders later, but these two have already agreed to receive Secretary Vance, who will be leaving tomorrow to explain to them the terms of the Camp David agreement. [Applause]

And we hope to secure their support for the realization of the new hopes and dreams of the people of the Middle East.

This is an important mission, and this responsibility I can tell you, based on my last two weeks with him, could not possibly rest on the shoulders of a more able and dedicated and competent man than Secretary Cyrus Vance. [Applause]

Finally, let me say that for many years the Middle East has been a textbook for pessimism, a demonstration that diplomatic ingenuity was no match for intractable human conflicts. Today we are privileged to see the chance for one of the sometimes rare bright moments in human history—a chance that may offer the way to peace. We have a chance for peace because these two brave leaders found within themselves the willingness to work together to seek these lasting prospects for peace, which we all want so badly. And for that, I hope that you will share my prayer of thanks and my hope that the promise of this moment shall be fully realized.

The prayers at Camp David were the same as those of the shepherd King David who prayed in the 85th Psalm, "Wilt thou not revive us again that thy people may rejoice in thee?

"I will hear what God the Lord will speak: for he will speak peace unto his people and unto his saints: but let them not return again unto folly."

And I would like to say, as a Christian, to these two friends of mine, the words of Jesus, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be the children of God." [Applause].

158

Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe of Japan supporting the Camp David agreements²¹¹

September 18, 1978

1. The peace and stability of the Middle East are matters of great concern to Japan. And

English text supplied, on request, by the Japanese embassy, Beirut. The Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

through the exchange of views with the leaders of various Middle East countries on the occasion of Prime Minister Fukuda's recent visit, the government of Japan has been re-impressed with the necessity of an early conclusion of peace in the Middle East region, and has renewed its determination positively to support and cooperate in the efforts for peace by the countries concerned.

- 2. The government of Japan has therefore observed with keen interest the summit conference of the United States, Egypt and Israel at Camp David. Now thanks to the enthusiastic efforts of the participants, Egypt and Israel have agreed to try to conclude a peace treaty within three months, and have reached agreement on the framework of negotiations about the treatment of the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip, as well as the Palestinian problem. This is to be highly applauded as a further advance towards the attainment of peace in the region.
- 3. The government of Japan strongly hopes that through future talks among the countries concerned, there will be an early achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, through full implementation of resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, and also through the recognition of and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

159

Statement by the foreign ministers of the European Economic Community supporting the results of the Camp David summit conference and describing them as a decisive step towards peace²¹²

Brussels, September 19, 1978

The nine member states of the European Community pay tribute to President Carter for the great courage he showed in organising the Camp David meeting and bringing it to a happy conclusion. They also wish to congratulate President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin for the outstanding efforts they have made.

For some years the Nine have been in favour

of a comprehensive and permanent peaceful settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The attitude of the Nine was clearly set out in the statement issued by the European Council on June 29, 1977,²¹³ and this attitude remains unchanged. It was on this basis that the Nine acclaimed the initiative taken by President Sadat in November 1977.

The governments of the member states express the hope that the results of the Camp David conference will constitute a new and decisive step towards a just, comprehensive and permanent peace and that all parties concerned will find it possible to take part in the process leading to this objective.

For their part the Nine will firmly support all efforts aimed at the establishment of the desired peace.

160

Letter from Prime Minister Callaghan of the United Kingdom to US President Carter congratulating him on his success at Camp David²¹⁴

September 19, 1978

Dear Jimmy,

I hasten to send you my warmest congratulations on the most encouraging outcome of the Camp David meeting. Only your personal dedication and determination to make progress could have brought the two sides to this significant measure of agreement.

I do not understimate the difficulties still to be overcome. It will, of course, be of vital importance to win the backing of moderate Arab governments for the Camp David principles, and to secure Jordan's participation in future negotiations.

But none of this detracts from the achievement of the last 12 days. I look forward to hearing from you how Britain and the European Community can help in these matters. With warm regards. Jim Callaghan.

²¹²Translated from the French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), September 21, 1978, p. 5. The Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

²¹³ Doc. 220 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²¹⁴ The Times (London), September 19, 1978, p. 6. The Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

161

162

Statement by President Giscard d'Estaing of France evaluating the Camp David agreements and declaring that peace in the Middle East must be based on resolutions 242 and 338²¹⁵

Paris, September 20, 1978

France pays tribute to President Jimmy Carter's unflagging efforts towards peace, and to the understanding he has met with on the part of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.

With regard to the Middle East crisis, let me recall France's attitude: the French government believes that a real climate of peace can only be restored in this area, in conformity with resolutions 242 and 338, through a general agreement between all the parties concerned, including the representatives of the Palestinian people, that is recognised as just by all states concerned and by the whole international community.

The Camp David meeting has made it possible to define extensive areas of agreement between Israel and Egypt on the question of Sinai and to outline principles with a view to solving the problem of the West Bank and Gaza, and thus the Palestinian problem.

These results open up possibilities and involve uncertainties. France believes that the stage the three parties have just completed will only be decisive for the destiny of peace in the Middle East if it opens the road to a general settlement which is essential if the peoples of the area are to have the comprehensive, just and permanent peace they seek.

The course that is followed from now on will make it possible to judge the value of the stage that has just been completed.

as docs. 153 and 154 above.

Press interview statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel outlining his country's position toward the Camp David agreements²¹⁶

September 20, 1978

Q. Were you at ease with the decision to sign the document in which Israel, for the first time, made a commitment concerning the rights of the Palestinian people?

A. We did not use, and are not using the term "Palestinian people," even though that is what's written in the English version. We agreed with President Carter that he would tell me, in a letter addressed to myself, that these words, in our language, and according to our understanding, will be read "the Arabs of Israel," just as the West Bank, in our language and according to our perception will be called Judea and Samaria. In this respect, I had no difficulties recognizing the rights of Palestinian Arabs whom we have recognized always, and it was out of the recognition of their rights that we arrived at the comprehensive peace programme which includes autonomy for Palestinian Arabs in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. I had some trouble with the sentence "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs", because we at Camp David, used only the noun "rights." But we were able to surmount this difficulty after we proved to ourselves and our hosts that, in fact, the adjective constitutes no special addition, and it is nothing but a repetition of the term itself. Is there such a thing as illegitimate rights? In order to make things easier for the other side, and reach an agreement, we were quite able to agree to this redundancy while we persist in our interpretation. If someone grants a right which we consider not legitimate, we will obviously have the right to not recognize it. But I don't think it will come to that, because this is, explicitly, an emphasis lacking any substantive content.

Q. Were there other moments in which you were torn between the desire for peace and positions which you hold to be historically just?

²¹⁵ Translated from the French text, Le Monde (Paris), September 22, 1978. The Camp David agreements are published

²¹⁶ Translated from the Hebrew text of the interview conducted by Moshe Zak, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), September 20, 1978. The Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

- A. I had no such problems. We conceded no principle nor did we demand that anyone else concede their principles. That is the meaning of our peace programme since December 1977. A high level American spokesman told me that the world at the time did not fully appreciate our peace programme. But today it is appreciated. I was not impressed, since already in February, I had written to President Carter: "We are called an obstacle to peace." I am not worried. Since the days of my youth I have believed that truth would win out. And indeed, in this case too it has started to win.
- Q. Do you agree with the opinion expressed this week by a senior official, that the summit's main achievement is Israel's consent to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people?
- A. I have not heard this claim. It is unfounded. We recognized these rights in our peace plan. In our opinion, the agreement's main accomplishment is in approving our autonomy plan, and the full recognition of the I.D.F.'s continued presence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza—our people's sole defence.
- Q. President Sadat stated that he could not make a commitment for Husayn and the Palestinians concerning Israeli military presence following the five-year period?
- A. President Sadat is entitled to express his opinion. The word "following" is of great importance. The I.D.F. remains in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Full stop.
- Q. What is the meaning of the highway, which according to the agreement, will run between the Sinai and Jordan. Will it be extra-territorial?
- A. In the first draft it was referred to as an "international highway." On first reading, I noticed this expression and stated that it could be interpreted to mean an extra-territorial throughway. That is why I proposed to erase the word "international" and leave only the word "highway," which would be under absolute Israeli sovereignty. The road itself will be to everyone's advantage: it will serve to increase the number of tourists and visitors, and will contribute to Israel's 'economy. Those who make use of it will be our guests, and we have been hospitable ever since the days of Abraham.

163

Statement by Prime Minister Fraser of Australia declaring his support for the Camp David agreements²¹⁷

September 21, 1978

I seek leave to make a statement to the House about the agreements reached at Camp David between Prime Minister Begin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt.

As Honourable Members will know, the thirteenday-long Camp David talks which concluded on September 17 resulted from the personal initiative of President Carter.

The Government very much welcomed this initiative and it welcomes the promising results that have been achieved.

I can mention to the House that President Carter was in touch with me immediately before the talks at Camp David, and that he again wrote to me following the conclusion of the talks.

In my reply to the President's latest letter, I conveyed to him my warmest congratulations on his personal achievement in bringing the two parties to agreement on a Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the Australian Governmant's commitment to support his untiring efforts to bridge the distance between Israeli and Egyptian stand-points.

I am sure all Members of this House would wish to join with me in congratulating the President on his initiative, and I note that the Honourable Member for Holt on Tuesday gave notice of a motion to this effect in which he was supported by Members on both sides of the House.

I also pay tribute to the statesmanship of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.

All Honourable Members will be fully aware of the importance of the Middle East region for world peace, and its vital significance to Western interests.

In the last thirty years, the region has been in continual turmoil. There have been four wars between the Arabs and the Israelis. This has brought appalling suffering to the peoples of the region.

The instability created by this situation has been

²¹⁷ Made before the Parliament; text, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, XL, 9 (September 1978), pp. 469–471. The Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

a constant threat to world peace, and a constant invitation to unwarranted external interference.

The search for peace has been a continuing pre-occupation of the United Nations and Western states throughout this period.

Under successive American Presidents, the United States has made strenuous efforts to promote a settlement. These efforts, however, foundered largely on the inability of the parties concerned to overcome their deep-seated mutual fear and distrust.

It was not until the bold and imaginative initiative of President Sadat in going to Jerusalem in November 1977 that the hope of a breakthrough towards some sort of settlement in the Middle East seemed capable of realisation.

Unfortunately, the negotiations which followed President Sadat's visit to Israel, and Mr Begin's return visit to Egypt, did not gather the necessary momentum to enable a proper framework for a settlement to be established.

It became apparent after the Leeds Castle meetings in July²¹⁸ that if there was to be any prospect of further progress, some new stimulus would be needed.

President Carter took the courageous step of inviting the Egyptian and Israeli leaders to meet him at Camp David for personal discussions. President Carter wrote to me on 15 August about his reasons for initiating the Camp David talks, and what he hoped to accomplish from them.

In my reply to him I emphasised the Australian Government's support for the talks and the importance we attached to them.

The outcome of the talks is known to Honourable Members. In summary, two agreements were signed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and witnessed by President Carter.

The first agreement is entitled 'A Framework for Peace in The Middle East' and covers the West Bank and Gaza. It envisages a five-year transitional period during which Israeli military forces will be withdrawn to garrisons in specified locations, and the election of a self-governing authority with full autonomy.

Negotiations will be held among Egypt, Israel and—if it agrees to participate—Jordan, as well as elected representatives of the Palestinians to determine the final status of the West Bank and

Gaza and—it is hoped—to produce a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

During the negotiations there will be a freeze on the establishment of new Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Security arrangements may include United Nations forces, special security zones, demilitarized zones and early warning stations.

There is to be an exchange of letters on the Status of East Jerusalem.

The second agreement, entitled 'A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel', covers the Sinai and future bilateral relations.

It envisages a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to be signed within three months; full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai phased over no more than three years from the signing of the treaty; the handing over of Israeli airfields in the Sinai to Egyptian civilian control beginning from three to nine months after that signing; the establishment of security zones; and the establishment of normal relations between Egypt and Israel on completion of the first major Israeli withdrawal.

The Australian Government believes that the two agreements provide a constructive framework for the resolution of the Middle East conflict.

President Carter's timely initiative was clearly a vital factor in bringing the two parties to these agreements, which will surely be regarded as an historic turning point in the search for a settlement in the Middle East.

We particularly welcome the agreement by the leaders of Egypt and Israel that the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 will govern the negotiations for an agreed basis for a peaceful settlement between Israel and its neighbours. This is a position which the Australian Government has consistently taken.

We also welcome the recognition in the Camp David agreements of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to participate in the determination of their own future. This also accords with the stated policy of the Australian Government.

A difficult road lies ahead. Other Arab states, whose support will be essential to any lasting settlement, have yet to be convinced that the Camp David framework can be an acceptable basis for future negotiations.

We hope that the Middle Eastern governments,

²¹⁸ See doc. 136 above.

in the spirit of Camp David, will be encouraged to support this framework and to participate in future negotiations in the search for peace.

It is most important that the momentum generated by the Camp David agreements be maintained. Continued diplomatic activity will be critical to the objectives of ensuring further progress in the negotiations in the months ahead.

In this context, the present round of talks being undertaken by Mr Vance with key Arab leaders will be of fundamental importance.

The Australian Government stands ready to give its support to the terms of any settlement agreed upon between the parties in the Middle East.

I have written to President Carter today to inform him that the Australian Government regards the agreements reached at Camp David as a major contribution towards a peace settlement, and that he has our full support for his efforts to bring an end to the threat of war in the Middle East.

164

Letter from US President Carter to President Sadat of Egypt discussing the issue of Israel's Sinai settlements²¹⁹

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin²²⁰ setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter²²¹ that Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Sincerely, (signed) Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
Anwar Al-Sadat
President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt
Cairo

165

Letter from US President Carter to Prime Minister Begin of Israel acknowledging receipt of the latter's letter²²²

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978,²²³ describing how you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter²²⁴ to me on this subject.

Sincerely, (signed) Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
Menachem Begin
Prime Minister of Israel

166

Letter from US President Carter to President Sadat of Egypt stating that the US position on the status of Jerusalem remains unchanged²²⁵

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978,²²⁶ setting forth the Egyptian position on

²¹⁹ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Agreements, September 1978. This letter is one of ten in an exchange by participants of the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs 155, 156, 165, 166, 167, 176, and 272–274.

²²⁰ Doc. 155 above.

²²¹ Doc. 272 below.

²²² US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Agreements, September 1978. This letter is one of ten in an exchange by participants of the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs. 155, 156, 164, 165, 167, 176, and 272–274.

²²³ Doc. 155 above.

²²⁴ Doc. 272 below.

²²⁵ US Department of State publication 8954, *The Camp David Agreements, September 1978*. This letter is one of ten exchanged by participants of the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs 155, 156, 164, 165, 167, 176, and 272–274. For the Camp David agreements see docs. 153 and 154 above.

²²⁶ Doc. 274 below.

Jerusalem: I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, 227 and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969, 228

Sincerely, (signed) Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
ANWAR AL-SADAT
President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt
Cairo

167

Letter from US President Carter to Prime Minister Begin of Israel acknowledging Begin's definition of certain terms²²⁹

September 22, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

A) In each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs."

B) In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

Sincerely, (signed) Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
Mehachem Begin
Prime Minister of Israel

227 For text, see Department of State Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 148. [orig. note.]

²²⁸ For text, see Department of State Bulletin of July 28, 1969, p. 76. Footnotes added by the Department of State. [orig. note.]

168

Speech by President Brezhnev of the USSR condemning the results of the Camp David summit and calling for an all-embracing settlement of the Middle East conflict (excerpts)²³⁰

Baku, September 22, 1978

The achievement of a just peaceful settlement in the Middle East is, of course, one of the most important tasks that must be solved if we are to achieve lasting peace and international stability. The situation there remains complex and potentially dangerous, both to the countries of that region and to the international situation as a whole.

This is caused by the stubborn refusal of Israel and the forces on which it relies to take into consideration the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab peoples and by Israel's efforts, whether by force of arms or by way of diplomacy, but in any case from positions of strength, to impose its will on the Arabs.

The main emphasis in the achievement of this aim has recently been put on the method of behind-the-scences separate deals with those who are ready to trade in Arab interests. The intention is absolutely clear: to split the Arabs, set them at loggerheads and to impose separately on the Arab countries the terms of settlement that suit the aggressor.

All attempts to ignore the basic preconditions of a true settlement of the Middle East problem, to exclude or side-step certain legitimate participants in the settlement, to sacrifice their interests and to dictate terms to them, can produce nothing but illusions of a settlement. No matter what "framework" is used for a separate collusion that covers up the surrender of one side and perpetuates the results of the aggression of the other side, the aggression by Israel, can only make the situation in the Middle East even more explosive.

This is demonstrated by the experience of the recent American-Israeli-Egyptian talks in Camp David. We are witnesses of a new anti-Arab deal between Israel and Egypt that was worked out with Washington's active participation.

²²⁹ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Agreements, September 1978. This letter is one of ten exchanged by participants of the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs. 155, 156, 164–166, 176, and 272–274. For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

²³⁰ Excerpted from the English text, Soviet News (London), September 26, 1978. The Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

Attempts are being made to compel the other participants in the Middle East conflict to succumb to the terms of this deal which was worked out behind their backs and directly contradicts their interests. But this, it must be stated frankly, is by no means a simple task. It is already clear today that the Arabs resolutely condemn the separate deal in Camp David and angrily dissociate themselves from it. It is not difficult to understand these feelings.

Experience over many years irrefutably proves that there is only one road to a true settlement of the Middle East conflict, and that is by the complete liberation of all the Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967, by full and unambiguous respect for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to create their own independent state, by ensuring the reliably guaranteed security of all countries of the region, naturally including Israel, as well. Such an allembracing settlement is possible only with the participation of all interested sides, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation. And the sooner such a settlement is achieved, the quicker the Middle East will cease to be a centre of tension.

169

Speech to the Knesset by Labour Party leader Peres of Israel voicing the party's position on Camp David²³¹

Jerusalem, September 25, 1978

I unhesitatingly congratulate the government of Israel and her prime minister on their difficult, awesome, but also vital decision they have taken to progress towards peace at a price that seemed impossible for this government.

The birth of peace is accompanied with much pain and progress towards it requires difficult decisions. The peace negotiations were conducted amidst an accumulation of grave errors and are today burdened with issues which are of vital concern to the state of Israel and her security. The peace agreement proposed to us today has a double price. The price of peace as such, a price we have to pay, and the price of errors committed on the way, errors which could have been avoided.

While negotiating, the government began to build settlements in Sinai and in the heart of the West Bank. These settlements coming at this particular period and in these particular places, caused much damage to the status of Israel and to her government which was then forced to abandon them after the damage was done.

At first, the government refused and later hesitated to apply resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza. Finally, it agreed but, once more, after the damage had been done.

The government calculated that Sadat could not last by himself on the road to peace. But he did so and greatly enhanced his prestige.

The government hesitated about signing a general declaration of principles similar to the Vienna version and instead signed detailed and dangerous principles which were not in the first draft of the declaration at all.²³²

It refused to answer the two US questions²³³ and ended by giving far broader answers than was required.

It did not believe that Sadat would agree to the stationing of Israeli troops in the West Bank and once more was mistaken and now has to accept a partial military presence. We paid a heavy price for these mistakes.

The Government, one clear Jerusalem evening, conceded the whole of Sinai. Later on, it conducted negotiations regretfully, but to no avail. In Sinai, this government destroyed Israel's credibility where before we used to insist on defensible frontiers, with settlements and airports.

The nation's consensus was drowned in the sands of Sinai. For we have returned to the 1967 frontiers and conceded defensible borders and airports which, in my view, could have been better negotiates. I say all this in the wake of my talks with Sadat. And now the Government is saying something that startles me—and I address my words to the Foreign Minister—which is that

²³¹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, Maariv, (Tel Aviv), September 26, 1978. The Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

²³² For the statement of principles as agreed to by Prime Minister Begin, see doc. 64 above.

²³³ For the Israeli Cabinet's answers to the two questions, see doc. 127 above.

the UN will set up a buffer zone. If the UN establishes such a zone, it will be a precedent for the Golan.

We are facing today a fact of yesterday which has been shattered. This dangerous fact of today is facing the inhabitants of Yamit: Those who were the envoys of the people and remain so.

As for the future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the situation is no less dangerous, perhaps even more so.

It is now evident that self-rule has not replaced resolution 242 but been added to it, and that the provisions and principles of resolution 242 will be applied to all the territories, that the joint Jordan-Israel committee together with elected representatives of the districts will also be forced to define the frontiers on the basis of resolution 242 as well as the security arrangements. Once more we shall have to define the frontiers with the security arrangements—a self-rule for propaganda purposes but in effect a withdrawal in the not too distant future.

Self-rule, in its current version (according to Camp David)—and if Jordan joins, there will be yet another version—has become a temporary proposal, no longer a partial and permanent agreement but a temporary and passing one.

According to this agreement, the military government will be abolished, the inhabitants will be given a governing authority in the framework of self-rule and full autonomous administration, and this authority will determine the running of affairs in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. But it will also determine the future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, in accordance with the will of their representatives, and it will be the final authority which will decide the future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

This will be an elected self-rule with an administration and a police force. More important, it will have latent ambitions which it might possibly announce from an official platform, whether in regards to the continued presence of the Israeli army or to the possibility of self-determination.

I do not expect this administration to beg the Israeli army to remain in the territories or to announce its preference for a link with Israel rather than self-determination. The basic point, however, is that this government of Israel, which claims to be one of principles, has now declared its prior and public agreement that the negotiations would eventually embody recognition of "the legitimate

rights of the Palestinian people and their just demands". And so a historic debate among us has come to an end. We have recognized the existence of the Palestinian people.

It is true that the prime minister, in the exchange of letters, expressed his reservations by stating that only the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza were intended. The answer he received from Carter now...I know, Mr. Prime Minister, what your personal views are but you have in effect two opinions. The first is the one you agree to by signing a public and clear document which recognizes the Palestinian people and their legitimate demands while the second is the one you expressed in a private letter to President Carter.

In this debate, the Labour Party had a position. We stated that it is necessary to reach compromise and I address Knesset member Moshe Shamir. We said there was a Palestinian problem which we could not ignore. We stated that a settlement of the question of Palestinian identity ought to be made in a Jordanian-Palestinian framework. We warned the government that the alternative to our proposal would be a Palestinian entity.

The government wasted time with versions of sovereignity and, in my view, lost the possibility of secure borders. The government lost, the people of Israel lost and peace lost. This is because the Palestinian people this time include not only the inhabitants of the territories but also, as recognized by the Israeli government, those who were expelled from the territories since 1967: a Palestinian people with the right to return.

The Israeli army will remain in the region at specific points but the demand for evacuation is certain to come, whether in five years time, or sooner or later.

This plan does not gladden the heart. Responsibility for it belongs solely to this government. Israel was forced to accept—and it would be better if the government stated this frankly—because otherwise the Camp David conference would have collapsed. I personally opposed this because it would have led to Israel's isolation. We must reveal to our people, and I do not hide this, that this collapse would have done harm to the USA and to our relations with it and would have harmed Sadat, the first Arab leader to come forward and talk frankly to us about peace. Such a collapse would have endangered peace prospects not only for this but also perhaps for future generations.

Mr. Speaker, honourable Knesset, no opposition has ever had a better chance to exercise its role than the chance offered to it today. It is not difficult to guess what Begin would have said in his speech today had he been in my place as a member of the opposition. Geula Cohen performed this role for him but not for me. We did not lose because we are a movement that bears responsibility towards our people.

We did not hesitate. When we saw the gravity of the danger and the great hope also, we chose to support peace and to support the only chance for peace—the only alternative—and chose not to be an opposition which wins for itself illusory gains.

In addition, and as we today express our support for the two Camp David agreements, we take upon ourselves in an indirect fashion—and I am aware of this—the consequences of errors made by the government in the past, against which we have been warning for a long time. We also bear the burden of future and expected difficulties. This is not the end of the road and we are not doing so in order to occupy a place in the cabinet.

The burden expected is a great one for it is evident that Jordan, in case it joins the negotiations, will proceed with new conditions. If Jordan does not join and Egypt joins [instead], it will bring upon itself more troubles on the Egyptian sector without making things easier for us in the Jordanian sector. If neither joins, then a Palestinian entity will emerge. But if nothing happens, the issue will remain open, bothering the world, obstructing peace, condemning the USA, enhancing the rejection front and might also lead to the resumption of the Geneva conference.

If Syria does not join the rejection front, then it will look for ways to justify its nonacceptance. It is likely that this will be through threats and terror and calm in the South will be coupled with a state of readiness in the north.

The question of freezing the settlements is not merely a matter of interpreting the agreements. In the conditions that have arisen, it is difficult to see how the government can continue to pursue a policy of "multiplying Elon Morehs" [that is, building more settlements similar to Elon Moreh]. On the other hand, a policy of removing "many settlements like Elon Moreh" is not pleasant, as the government has assuredly found after believing it would not be forced to do so.

Before us also is the important issue relating to Jerusalem. This city needs total and maximum aid so that the fait accompli will be more telling than all the hints contained in the exchange of letters regarding its future.

Members of the Knesset having analysed in perfect clarity the net result of this policy which we did not formulate but which we were unavoidably embroiled in, it is necessary that we examine the degree of hope found in this same delivery room: an imminent peace, a peace that is not yet born but is still in the making and still a lonely child threatened by angry brothers. Even after it is born, it will still be subject to the pains of childhood, and will live for an unknown span of time. It may be capricious and might suffer from sleeplessness but it is all the same a creature that may emerge into our world and change it. We have became used to worrying about Israel's security and we cannot rid ourselves of this worry. But, for the first time, it is possible for us, we Jewish and Arab fathers and mothers, the ancient Egyptian people and the Jewish people who have had their fill of catastrophes, to taste something the like of which we have not tasted before.

The slogan contained in splendid prophetic visions will turn into the men and women of a new reality. It is possible that open frontiers in the Middle East will replace barbed wire and its deserts, once battlefields, will bring neighbouring wheat fields.

We call upon all Middle Eastern people to a peace in the region among all states, a peace that will enable us to join the common and just battle against poverty, disease, drought, ignorance, corruption and discrimination.

Peaces opens new opportunities before the Jewish people. It is a peace we owe to those who fell in Israel's battles. We hope it will usher in a new migration to the land of Israel.

al-Mi'rakh, the Labour and Mapam parties, will join this earnest endeavour for peace until peace is established. Until this is completed, we shall devote ourselves from now on to struggle to build an image for Israel so that it could not be a state living on aid and thus on the charity of foreigners but a state living from its own toil, not a people living off the stock exchange, but a working people. Zionism is not merely a movement to change a place of residence but a movement to change the ethics of a people.

Mr. Speaker, honourable Knesset members, we shall face danger with open eyes and I have explained this without adding or subtracting one item. We shall look upon past errors with regret but also with the realization that they cannot be made good. We shall look forward to peace with firm Jewish conviction. In the end, we are all looking forward to this.

170

Statement by Foreign Minister de Silveira of Brazil before the plenary meeting of the 33rd session of the General Assembly (excerpt)²³⁴

United Nations, September 25, 1978

In this sense, the extremely volatile situation in the Middle East gives all of us reason for the most profound concern. The continual resurgence in that region of the mistrust and hostility that have so often marked its turbulent history and, in particular, the tragic events in Lebanon, which caused the convening of another special session of the General Assembly this year—all contribute to create a climate of disquiet and discouragement.

The recent negotiations at Camp David²³⁵ are a new element in the search for peace in the region of the Middle East. We await with interest new stages in the process that is now under way, and we are attentively observing the degree of acceptance it is being accorded by the other parties more directly involved in the question, while cherishing the hope that it will be possible, to arrive at just and lasting solutions compatible with the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force, with the principle of the recognition of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, and with the right of all parties to the conflict to survival and self-determination.

171

Speech by Secretary of State for External Affairs Javieson of Canada expressing support for the negotiating process initiated by President Sadat (excerpt)²³⁶

September 26, 1978

All of us must be heartened by the remarkable progress achieved over the past year towards a just solution to the Middle East conflict. President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem less than a year ago and the warm reception given to him by Prime Minister Begin and the Israeli people have had a dramatic sequel in the accords at Camp David. The Government of Canada has sent its congratulations to President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin for this act of statesmanship. The prospect of a real and durable peace is now much closer, though serious issues remain to be resolved.

Canada supported and encouraged the negotiating process begun in Jerusalem. We welcomed the bold initiative of President Carter in again bringing the heads of government of Israel and Egypt together at Camp David, and we endorse the agreements²³⁷ reached there. They are a milestone on the long road to peace, a road Canadian soldiers have watched over for more than 20 years. We hope that, after due consideration, the nations concerned will find that the framework established at Camp David constitutes a sound basis for moving towards a general peace settlement.

The process of direct negotiation of the difficult and sensitive issues at the heart of the problem must continue. All parties face agonizing and hard decisions. But my Government is confident that the will exists to take the next steps. Meanwhile, the deliberations of this Assembly should serve to bolster confidence between the parties and to facilitate their negotiations. Surely we must try to avoid recriminations and polemics, now that serious negotiations are under way. I am well aware that deep differences of view exist, nor do I question the sincerity of such views. My plea is that we make an effort to moderate passions, to encourage

²³⁴ Excerpted from UN Document A/33/PV. 6, p. 7.

²³⁵ See docs. 153 and 154 above.

²³⁶ Made to the Empire Club, Toronto. Excerpted from the text, Canada Statements and Speeches (Ottawa), no. 78/5, pp. 3, 4.

²³⁷ Docs. 153 and 154 above.

constructive action in the area, and to strengthen the prestige and competence of the UN in the search for solutions.

For all concerned, these are days of both accomplishment and opportunity, which require patience and fortitude. We do not know what the ultimate shape of a peace settlement might be. It might make provision for international involvement to assist in the implementation of its terms. Canada would consider very seriously a request to make an appropriate contribution to such an enterprise. Canada also hopes that other aspects of the problem will be addressed in the context of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. It may well be that generous financial contributions from the international community will be required; here too, Canada will certainly be prepared to assist within the limits of its capacity.

172

Statement by Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany before the plenary meeting of the 33rd session of the General Assembly (excerpt)²³⁸

United Nations, September 26, 1978

The events that have occurred since the last session of the General Assembly, especially the courageous initiative of President Sadat and the Camp David conference, have renewed hope for a settlement to the bitter Middle East conflict which has threatened security of the world for the past 30 years.

In view of the close ties between Europe and the Middle East, efforts to achieve a peace settlement in that region are of vital interest to us too. This is reflected in our determination to support all efforts to bring about such a settlement.

The nine member States of the European Community have therefore paid tribute to the achievements of the participants in the Camp David conference and its successful conclusion. They have expressed their hope that the results of that summit will represent another important step on the path

to a just, comprehensive and therefore lasting peace settlement.

If such a peace settlement is to be achieved it is imperative that all parties concerned participate in its negotiation and completion. Meanwhile no obstacle should be placed in the way of this process, which should be kept open and should through further development and wider participation lead to a comprehensive settlement.

Proceeding from Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which would have to be applied in all their parts and on all fronts, the Nine continue to believe that the settlement should be founded on the principles which they last set out in their declaration of 29 June 1977²³⁹ in London, namely: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967; respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; and recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

It remains our firm view that all these aspects must be taken as a whole.

We uphold the view that a peace settlement in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact. This would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.

In this context it is important that Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) have been accepted by both Israel and its neighbours. This must be the starting-point for any progress in the peace-making process.

The situation in the Middle East is inseparably

The situation in the Middle East is inseparably linked with the situation in Lebanon. After three years of crisis and conflict the restoration of peace and order and the rebuilding of that country still seem remote. The Nine are still deeply concerned about this situation, which threatens not only the existence of Lebanon but the stability of the entire region.

Once more they appeal urgently to all who

²³⁸ Excerpted from UN Document A/33/PV. 8, pp. 61-62.

²³⁹ Doc. 220 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

have an influence on developments in that country to be fully conscious of their responsibility for peace, and they hope that all parties concerned will support efforts to strengthen the authority of the Lebanese Government in the whole territory, as called for in the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon. The Nine welcome the fact that the Security Council has renewed the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL). They appeal to all parties to give that Force their full support in exercising its mandate.

173

Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR before the plenary meeting of the 33rd session of the General Assembly (excerpt)²⁴⁰

United Nations, September 26, 1978

What is the root cause of such a situation? It lies in the fact that 10 years after the aggression its consequences have still not been eliminated, while the aggression itself goes unpunished. Israel continues to hold sway over territories it has seized. Unfortunately, even in the Arab world there are some politicians who display no concern about Arab lands and who are inclined to neglect the legitimate rights of the Arabs, especially the Palestinian Arabs, and to cringe and surrender to the demands of the aggressor and those who protect him.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated its willingness to play a part in ensuring peace in the Middle East and to participate in the most stringent international security guarantees for all States of that area. Israeli spokesmen contend that they have no use for international guarantees. This is no more than polemical bravado. If Israel genuinely cared for its security—real, not illusory, security—it would seek a political solution. For the fact is that with existing means of warfare the distance from the borders to which a neighbouring State has withdrawn its guns is of little consequence. What is required here is a radical break-through towards a situation in which the guns would be altogether silent.

Only a solution that would guarantee the right to independence and security of all States and peoples in the Middle East, including the Arab people of Palestine, which is fully entitled to a national home, a State of its own, can lay the foundations for a lasting peace in that part of the world.

All the accumulated experience, particularly recent experience, indicates that a radical and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East can be achieved only on the basis of joint efforts by all the parties directly concerned. Separate deals at the expense of the Arabs have only sidetracked the solution of the problem.

And such, precisely, is the nature of the understandings reached at the recent three-sided meeting at Camp David.²⁴¹ If one looks at things realistically, there are no grounds for believing that they, as claimed, bring a Middle East settlement closer. On the contrary, what this is all about is a new anti-Arab step making it more difficult to achieve a just solution of this pressing problem. That is why a campaign of artificial and affected optimism can mislead no one.

There is machinery specifically established to achieve peace in the Middle East, and that is the Geneva Peace Conference. The sooner an end is put to attempts to keep it in a state of paralysis, the nearer will be the moment when the solution of the Middle East problem can be tackled with a chance of success.

174

Statement by Foreign Minister Soder of Sweden before the plenary meeting of the 33rd session of the General Assembly (excerpt)²⁴²

United Nations, September 26, 1978

The Middle East has long been afflicted by conflicts and antagonisms. The meeting in Camp David²⁴³ and the peace efforts of President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin deserve

²⁴⁰ Excerpted from UN Document A/33/PV. 8, pp. 22-25.

²⁴¹ See docs. 153 and 154 above.

²⁴² Excerpted from UN Document A/33/PV. 9, pp. 122-123.

²⁴³ For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

our respect. We sincerely hope that their efforts will initiate a process that ultimately can lead to a comprehensive and lasting settlement in the Middle East.

The Swedish Government reiterates its view that the principles contained in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) must be the basis for a final settlement. These principles must be supplemented with the recognition of the right of the Palestinian Arabs to decide their own future. This includes also the right, if they so wish, to establish their own State living in peace side by side with Israel.

Peace in this region can only be durable if it is founded as much on mutual trust as on military security considerations. Otherwise, a settlement can never be more than a cease-fire which compels the peoples to live in continuous anxiety with the constant threat of war breaking out. Israel's existence as a State and its right to live within secure and recognized borders cannot be called in question. Let me add that we emphatically repudiate all attempts to equate zionism with racism. Such attempts benefit no one.

Israel's settlements policy is a grave obstacle to an agreement. We hope that the Sinai settlements will be evacuated. We also hope that this will mark a change in Israel's settlement policy in the other occupied areas. The principle that territories may not be acquired by force must apply unconditionally.

The tragic events in Lebanon are a serious reminder to us. They show the urgent need to reach a comprehensive and lasting solution in the Middle East, including a settlement of the Palestinian question.

It is extremely important that all parties now exercise restraint. The world must be spared a new spiral of violence which can definitely shatter the hopes for peace. 175

Statement by Foreign Minister Vajpayee of India reaffirming India's position that existing UN resolutions on the Middle East provide the framework for peace in the area²⁴⁴

New Delhi, September 27, 1978

We have seen the texts of the framework agreements concluded at the meeting of Camp David²⁴⁵ arranged by President Carter with President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. These are complex documents and merit careful study. Prime Minister has also received a letter from President Carter on the subject.

The West Asian problem is vitally important not only for the countries of the region but to all nations concerned with peace and stability in the world. The area has witnessed four wars and has suffered refugee movements and insecure conditions during the last 30 years. Every effort at peaceful solution, which would lead to a comprehensive settlement in this vital area, cannot but be commended.

As far as India is concerned, it has consistently upheld that the constituent elements of the relevant Security Council resolutions must provide the framework for a durable settlement. This, inter alia, includes withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories, the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to determine their future, and enabling all states in the region to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries. Any settlement which does not provide for these elements, would not secure peace in the region or prove lasting.

We intend to continue to study in depth the framework agreements which have been reached and follow the further diplomatic conversations and inter-governmental discussions which are taking place.

²⁴⁴ Text supplied, on request, by the Indian embassy, Beirut.

²⁴⁵ For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

176

Letter from US Defence Secretary Brown to Defence Minister Weizman of Israel pledging American assistance to Israel in building two military airbases in the Negev to replace those in Sinai²⁴⁶

September 28, 1978

The Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301

September 28, 1978

Dear Mr. Minister:

The U.S. understands that, in connection with carrying out the agreements reached at Camp David, Israel intends to build two military airbases at appropriate sites in the Negev to replace the airbases at Eitam and Etzion which will be evacuated by Israel in accordance with the peace treaty to be concluded between Egypt and Israel. We also understand the special urgency and priority which Israel attaches to preparing the new bases in light of its conviction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai airbases until the new ones are operational.

I suggest that our two governments consult on the scope and costs of the two new airbases as well as on related forms of assistance which the United States might appropriately provide in light of the special problems which may be presented by carrying out such a project on an urgent basis. The President is prepared to seek the necessary Congressional approvals for such assistance as may be agreed upon by the U.S. side as a result of such consultations.

> (signed) Harold Brown

The Honorable

EZER WEIZMAN

Minister of Defense

Government of Israel

177

Statement by US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Saunders testifying on the Camp David agreements²⁴⁷

September 28, 1978

I appreciate your inviting me to testify on the agreements reached at Camp David, because it is essential that we work together to build on the foundation for peace laid in these meetings.

The framework for peace produced at Camp David by President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter provides an unprecedented opportunity for the people of the Middle East to turn away from the long and tragic course of conflict, tension, stalemate, and terror that has for so long afflicted Israelis and Arabs—and the world at large. As President Carter said:

There are still great difficulties that remain and many hard issues to be settled. The questions that have brought warfare and bitterness to the Middle East for the last 30 years will not be settled overnight. But we should all recognize the substantial achievements that have been made.

It would be tragic to lose this opportunity.

The issues that underlie the Arab-Israeli dispute have been recognized by successive American Administrations as having profound consequences for America's own interests—our historic and moral commitment to the people of the region, the important and mutually beneficial economic retionships between the United States and the Middle Eastern nations, and the dangers which perpetual crisis in the region pose for world peace and freedom.

The U.S. diplomatic role in the Middle East has been and continues to be a matter of national importance to us. It has been, as well, indispensable to hopes for a negotiated settlement by the parties, for it is the United States alone among the world's nations that both Israel and its Arab neighbors have been prepared to work with on this complex and difficult problem.

The President's effort at Camp David was

²⁴⁶ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Agreements, September 1978, p. 15. The letter was added later to the nine exchanged by participants of the Camp David conference on September 22, which are published as docs. 155, 156, 164–167, and 272–274. For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

²⁴⁷ Made before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on International Relations; text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVIII, 2020 (November 1978), pp. 42–44. For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

conducted in this spirit—with humility, with perseverance, and with the deepest sense of responsibility toward the interests of the American people, toward the nations and peoples of the Middle East, and in the cause of peace, justice, and cooperative progress. As a result of this effort, the prospects for peace in the Middle East have been advanced significantly, and good prospects exist for even further progress—if the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict commit themselves to seizing the opportunity that now is offered.

No international agreement can succeed unless it provides a balance of benefits. Each party must be able to perceive that its particular interests are addressed seriously and with a sense of reciprocal advantage and responsibility. This is all the more true in the case of any agreement to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East. All the central dimensions—human, political, security, and psychological—must be dealt with in a balanced and fair manner if we are to expect the parties to commit themselves to go forward with the peaceful resolution of the differences that for so long have caused war and destruction.

Support for a secure, free, and democratic Israel in the Middle East has been and will remain a permanent feature of American foreign policy; indeed it is a moral commitment by our country and a strategic concern. The ties of friendship that bind our two nations will, I am sure, be strengthened by the Camp David agreements.

Israel, like any nation, has a right to recognition and acceptance by its immediate neighbors and by all nations. Beyond this, Israel, like any nation, has a right to live in security—a security that would derive from its own strength and fortitude from the growing cooperation and good will of its neighbors, and from firm security arrangements agreed between them. The Camp David agreements go further toward meeting all of these fundamental concerns of Israel than any international action since the founding of the modern State of Israel.

For Israel, these agreements speak to the centuries-old aspiration of the Jewish people to live in peace in a state of their own in the land of their forefathers, within secure and recognized borders, and to take their rightful place in the international community of nations. As President Carter said: "...this great aspiration of Israel has been certified without constraint in the greatest degree of en-

thusiasm by President Sadat, the leader of one of the greatest nations on Earth."

In practical terms, Israel now can look realistically to a future of full peace with Egypt while it carries through the resolution of problems that will lead to peace with all of its neighbors. The agreement with Egypt provides for diplomatic relations, an end to boycotts, the right to free passage through international waterways, and other ties characteristic of normal peaceful relations between sovereign states.

The framework agreements also contain another indispensable element—arrangements to guarantee the security of the parties.

In the Sinai:

A wide demilitarized zone;

A limited armament zone east of the Suez Canal; U.N. forces in a zone along the Egyptian-Israeli border and the Gulf of Aqaba;

U.N. forces to assure freedom of passage through the Tiran Strait and as a buffer between Sinai and Gaza;

Relocation of Israeli airfields east of the border, in the Negev; and

A small limited armament zone on the Israeli side of the border.

In the West Bank and Gaza:

Israeli security forces will remain in specified security locations to provide for Israel's security;

There will be arrangements for assuring internal security;

There will be a 5-year interim period before the final status of the area is decided; and

Israel has a voice, together with Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians, in the determination of the final status of the area and its boundaries.

These concrete security arrangements are, of course, important, but far more is involved. True security cannot be achieved by physical, material, or geographical measures alone; true security must be founded on a relationship of amity, trust, mutual respect, and acceptance between a nation and its neighbors. For the first time ever, this can become an actuality—not just a dream—for the people of Israel. With a responsible and positive approach to the provisions of these framework documents, a new era of mutual friendship, respect, and cooperation between Israel and its neighbors—and all the benefits that can flow from this—becomes a reality.

If the nations of the Middle East can seize the

opportunity before them and cross the threshold to peace, no one will benefit more than the people of Israel. At long last, Israel will be able to begin to free itself of the crushing defense burden which its citizens have had to bear from the inception of the state.

Today Israel's development has reached a point where the advantages which peace can bring to progress are unprecedentedly bright. Peace can release the extraordinary talents and energies of the people of Israel to address the range of modern problems. In per capita terms, Israel possesses more scientists, engineers, physicians, and other professionals and technicians trained in public service fields than most nations of the world. Already, despite 30 years of conflict and tensions, Israel's contributions to human and material development in areas such as health, agriculture, the environment, alternative sources of energy, and water conservation have been remarkable. Under conditions of peace, Israel's already disproportionate contribution to solutions to some of its-and the world's-most pressing issues will be magnified.

President Sadat and Egypt can take great pride in the extent to which the Camp David agreements speak to the concerns of the Arab world at large. Through its contribution to the document entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East [Agreed at Camp David]," Egypt has laid the foundations for an overall Arab-Israeli settlement and established a procedure and principles which can be used by all Israel's neighbors who are prepared to negotiate for peace and security on the basis of all the principles and provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which applies to each of these negotiations-Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. If the opportunity is seized, the results can shape the future of the Middle East for decades to come. It can mean a Middle East that can live in dignity, with expanding prosperity and influence, and freed from the shadow of outside pressure or threat. It offers an avenue for the Arabs to work together, not in the negative way of marshaling their energies against a common adversary but toward the attainment of the highest human

At the heart of Arab concerns, of course, are the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian problem. The "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" offers the Arabs a fair and honorable way to begin resolving these problems. While not achieving everything the Arab people want at a single stroke, it sets in motion a political process which will significantly advance legitimate Arab objectives while assuring Israel's security and its right to live in peace with its neighbors.

To anyone who has worked on these problems, it must be evident that the issues involved in the West Bank and Gaza and in the Palestinian question generally are far too complex to be resolved all at once. Because of this we have long felt that the only realistic approach to their solution would be to establish a 5-year transitional period for the West Bank and Gaza in which the decisions that needed to be made could be dealt with in a logical sequence.

That approach has been agreed to by Egypt and Israel, and they have invited other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to support it. As the key Arab nations consider their choice, it is imperative that they understand what the framework agreed at Camp David achieves.

For the first time in history a Palestinian self-governing body will be established—something that has never before existed.

Throughout the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian authority will be established during the transitional period, pending negotiation of final boundaries.

The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn and will be replaced by a Palestinian self-governing authority freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas. A major initial removal of Israeli military forces will take place, and those remaining will be redeployed in specified locations. A strong local Palestinian police force under Palestinian authority will come into being.

The Palestinians—along with Egypt, Israel, and Jordan—will participate in negotiations based on all the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242; they will thereby have a clear voice in determining their own future. They will participate in setting up their self-governing authority, in the negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and in the negotiations for an Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Their agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be submitted to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to ratify or reject. Their elected representatives will, by themselves, decide

how they shall govern themselves after the 5-year transitional period, consistent with the terms of their agreement on the final status of the area.

These arrangements will set in motion a political process in the West Bank and Gaza which will establish Palestinian authority and administration with full autonomy there.

There are also provisions for Palestinians not now in the West Bank and Gaza. Representatives from among these Palestinians as mutually agreed may join the negotiations among Egypt, Israel, and Jordan on establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Throughout the transitional period in all the negotiations that will take place, responsible Palestinians in this area and outside almost certainly will reflect each other's views and concerns.

Israel has agreed that the solution from negotiations must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

This framework provides a start—self-government for one-third of all the Palestinian people in the world within the agreed framework. The issue to be decided now is whether to concentrate on assuring this historic step—which in 5 years will lead to a determination of the final status of the area approved by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza—or whether to reject this step in order to pursue the impossible goal of an immediate resolution of all outstanding issues. We believe it is imperative to get the process started now.

Let me dwell on this point for a moment. I have found that this is one of the most difficult points for some of our friends in the Middle East to understand. We have started from the knowledge that all of the complicated issues in an Arab-Israeli settlement cannot be resolved in one negotiation at one time. Therefore, we have put them in sequence and provided procedures for their resolution within an agreed period. Meanwhile, each change in the situation will produce new conditions which will make it possible to resolve issues later that cannot be resolved now.

This framework speaks as well to a deep human concern of the Arab people and indeed of all people. At Camp David we found both the Israelis and the Egyptians eager to come to grips with the tragic refugee problem. For the first time, two parties to the conflict have committed themselves to work with other interested parties to establish

agreed procedures for a prompt, just, and permanent resolution of this too long unresolved problem. More immediately, the agreement provides for the creation of a mechanism which should permit early readmission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. These people will be able to reestablish themselves in their homes and pursue their livelihoods for themselves and their families in dignity and justice.

Finally, the document entitled "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel" provides for restoration of the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai to the internationally recognized border. This agreement calls for the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai; and after an interim withdrawal, which can be accomplished quickly, the establishment of normal peaceful relations between the two countries, including diplomatic relations. This offers the Egyptian people, who have suffered and sacrificed so much in the wars of the past three decades, the possibility of devoting their considerable energies and resources to the cause of economic and social progress.

Let me conclude by noting the Camp David agreements serve critical American interests in the Middle East as well. The Camp David agreements:

Provide renewed expression of America's traditional moral dedication to help find just and peaceful solutions to international problems and particularly to find a peace that will benefit all the people of the Middle East while serving American interests;

Demonstrate that our commitment to the security and well-being of Israel is effective and enduring;

Strengthen our effort to deepen ties with our friends in the Arab world, with its increasingly influential international role;

Lessen the danger of the Middle East becoming a focus or flashpoint of conflict between the great powers that could lead to nuclear war;

Further the interest of our allies and ourselves in a peaceful Middle East;

Contribute to an international environment which can narrow the gap between the rich and technologically advanced nations and the developing world; and above all

If accepted by the parties for implementation and supported widely by the international community, will be a bulwark for further efforts to establish peace and cooperation among all nations.

The United States remains committed to a just and lasting overall peace for the Middle East. The Camp David agreements do not bring such a peace immediately into existence—the delicate complex of issues on the West Bank and Gaza will have to be settled and peace achieved between Israel and its other neighbors, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon—but they lay the groundwork for a comprehensive settlement.

The outcome at Camp David is a major step toward phased, cumulative agreements through which a record of success and confidence can be compiled and on which further and, at some point, ultimate decisions can be reached to achieve a final accord.

The choice now is clear. It is whether to turn away from these agreements because they do not answer every question, provide for every detail, insure all parties against all risks or whether they will be supported for what they are—a framework for peace which can set in motion a political and psychological dynamic capable of transforming this terrible and tragic conflict into the just, lasting, and comprehensive peace that the nations of the Middle East have so long sought. The unprecedented involvement of the President of the United States at Camp David demonstrated the meaning of the U.S. commitment to help achieve peace in the Middle East. The parties, and all those interested in the Middle East problem, can rest assured that the United States will remain fully involved until a final, just, and lasting settlement is achieved.

We have said for many years now that the modern history of the Middle East has been a record of lost opportunities. All of us recognize that we now face an opportunity of unprecedented potential for peace and that this time it must not be lost.

178

Resolution adopted by the Bureau of the Socialist International welcoming recent efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict²⁴⁸ Paris, September 28, 1978

The Bureau of the Socialist International states its satisfaction with the joint statement of Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky made at the meeting with President Anwar Sadat of the Egyptian Arab Republic and Shimon Peres, Chairman of the Israel Labour Party, in Vienna on July 9, 1978.²⁴⁹ The Bureau considers the declaration an important step in the resumption of the peace process in the Middle East. The Bureau welcomes the steps taken by President Carter and the results of the meeting between him and the governments of Egypt and Israel.

It is now of the utmost importance to take further steps along the same track, towards a solution which requires a just solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

The Bureau urges all the parties involved to demonstrate their will for peace in the area. The process now started should include the participation of Syria, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people, according to the provisions and principles of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.

179

Statement by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) leader Yanez calling upon the Socialist International to invite the PLO as observer to its Vancouver Congress²⁵⁰

Paris, September 28, 1978

Comrade President, I should like to say, firstly, that I suppose that the fact that this point is introduced in the Agenda at this moment means that it will not be part of the discussion of the invitations to the Congress, to be dealt with in a small committee tonight and more widely

²⁴⁸ English text supplied, on request, by the Socialist International, London.

²⁴⁹ See docs 133 and 134 above.

²⁵⁰ English text, Socialist Affairs (London), no. 3 (May-June 1979), pp. 68, 71–72.

tomorrow. Perhaps this is simply due to the important and transcendental nature of the subject as felt by many-or some-of the members of the Bureau, or such, at least, was the interpretation we gave it. Our view of the problem concerning the invitation to the PLO has two sides. Firstly, the general criterion to be followed in issuing invitations from the Socialist International for the Congress in Vancouver. I believe that the criterion followed in Dakar, which I think will continue to be applied in general to the invitations to national or international organisations to Vancouver will be a wide one, and it is in this sense that we have introduced—or suggested—the question of the invitation to the PLO. Secondly, in the concrete case of the conflict in the Middle East, we think-and a resolution has just been discussed and passed on this—that if 115 countries, as well as, in practice, several international bodies like the Conference of Non-Aligned States and the United Nations consider the PLO to be the representative of the Palestine people, well, then this is universal acceptance of a practically unchallengeable kind. An entirely different matter is the opinion which each party or organism might have of the ideology, the political actions or the programme of the PLO, which I think is not up for discussion at the moment. I have heard that many organisations whose principal programmes we do not particularly agree with will be invited to the Congress in Vancouver, but that the idea behind it is that the International should attain a wider and wider sense, especially as regards parties invited purely as observers and who are not full members by right. I also think that the problem of the Middle East will never be envisaged correctly if the most important part—or one of the two parts—of this problem, the Palestinian people, are not taken into account. The other important part is, of course, the people of Israel. To take any third parties into account, however important they may be in their position as neighbouring countries to Israel, is of secondary importance from the point of view of priorities. When, as in the previous resolutions, which we did not oppose because we agree with it 100%, we talk about the representation of the Palestinian people, it is in its present form insufficient for us, because the subject is dealt with without determining who the representatives of the Palestinian people are today—whether we like it or not. We

think that political reality must supersede the wishes or sympathies of the individual parties. According to our information, and I shall not go into details, most of the parties belonging to the Socialist International keep up regular or irregular, formal or informal contact with the Palestine Liberation Organisation even though they may not particularly agree with many of the PLO's ideas or many aspects of their programme. Why then this effort directed at not saying things clearly? If we speak of the representative of the Palestinian people many will think that it is the PLO, others will think that as they are not thus described it is not the PLO...I think this is the time, given the development and the—fortunately positive change that has been experienced in the last few months, even in the last few years, to face the subject of a national identity, national rights of the Palestinian people and their right to a spokesman, namely the PLO, once and for all. If the possibility of political expression, of intervening in a dialogue, of negotiation, of being a spokesman, is taken away from organisations of this kind, the only alternatives they will find will be precisely those that will win them the condemnation of the very Bureau that has not allowed them to become partners in a dialogue. I don't want to go on for too long because the agenda is long and today has been a long and and tiring day; but of course we think that one way to contribute decisively to the peace and to a final solution for the problem in the Middle East would be to have the Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine with us as a partner in the dialogue, and therefore, to invite them to join us as observer at the Congress in Vancouver.

We wanted to hear the opinion of the other members of the International who wanted to take part in this discussion. We do not know the opinion of those who did not take part, so that it is difficult to interpret the discussion in terms of majorities or minorities. That is not anyhow the way these things are looked at within the Bureau of the Socialist International, where agreement is reached by consensus, i.e. if there is opposition, there is, in practice, the right to veto. In fact, to use the last words of Comrade Kreisky, it is the intention of our proposal—as with any other of the parties of the Bureau of the Socialist International-to contribute to the building of bridges which will help solve the conflict in the Middle East, bridges made of the dialogue and the understanding be-

tween Israel and the Palestinian people. We think that this kind of suggestion could contribute to that solution, to the building of that bridge. Perhaps this is not so, and we shall have to find another solution. We do not withdraw into an intransigent position, in the same way as we criticise, and do not accept intransigent positions from other parties. We think, however, that the fundamental argument that has been used to reject the invitation to the PLO—the basic argument, not the only one—is a very well-known fact: the inclusion in the statutes or in the programme of the PLO of a clause requiring the disappearance of Israel. Indeed, from our point of view this is wholly condemnable and we reject it totally. I had already said in my first contribution to the discussion that we do not agree with the programme of the PLO in the same way as we do not agree with the programmes of many other parties that have been invited, which have been invited—or will be invited-taking into consideration their political, not strictly ideological reality within the framework of what is known in the world as progressivism, or labour movement, or liberation movements. But what I really wanted to say, briefly, is that I think many of the contributions to the discussion, or some of them, have been very partial, because nobody wasted a thought on the Israeli incursions on camps involving genocide, the killing of Palestinian women and children in Lebanon or Jordan or in any other of the territories occupied by Palestinian camps, all suffered without on many occasions even the solidarity, the support or the condemnation of the Socialist International of these incursions of the state or the government of Israel. That is to say that whether to concede terrorism-a question we are not debating at present—is a terribly difficult matter, because we believe that there exists a terrorism of the state, which we discussed when we spoke about Argentina and about Iran, or at least the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party saw it like that. We also condemn individual terrorism or the terrorism of armed gangs, of armed organisations. As far as I know the PLO has not as such vindicated acts of terrorism carried out by Palestinians but not under the official control of the PLO, which, as everybody knows, is a very moderate organisation by Arab standards. On the other hand Comrade Shimon Peres made certain remarks on ETA for instance, the Basque terrorist organisation. This goes to

show that we do not apply different standards to this matter, and I should like to remark—this is nothing confidential, the newspapers print it every day and everyone knows it in Spain-that both the Socialist Party and Felipe Gonzalez himself advocate a peaceful settlement in the Basque region. Furthermore, everybody in Spain knows that socialist leaders have had meetings with ETA to negotiate and try to solve the serious problems we have with the Basque region. The problem we are discussing, however, is much wider, more difficult, more complex and of much longer standing. Obviously it needs a different approach, but I wanted to give you that information which, I think, clarifies some questions. In any case, I think that the suggestion made by Comrade Kreisky would be perfectly acceptable to us. I know that if there were to be an initiative from the President of the International or from a Vice-President or a deputy to negotiate before the PLO for a declaration or a definition of their position which would involve the recognition of the State of Israel as an irreversible and indisputable fact, perhaps as a pre-condition for them to be invited to the Congress, I would regard that as a perfectly acceptable position, at least as concerns the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. Logically, in order to reciprocate, the Socialist Party of Israel should also recognise the right of the Palestinian people to an independent state. The aim is not to make a state which fortunately exists disappear, but to let a nation which for decades has not been allowed to exist, and which lives scattered all over the world. putting up with genocide and the most unjust exploitation, be a state. Thank you.

180

Press interview statements by US Ambassador to Lebanon Parker affirming that a US-PLO dialogue is possible if the PLO accepts UN resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist²⁵¹

Beirut, late September, 1978

Q. The Camp David agreements have raised fears in Lebanon that this country may become a battefield for the agreements' advocates and their opponents, and that

²⁵¹ Interview conducted by Claude Khoury, Monday Morning (Beirut), October 2-8, 1978, pp. 13-17.

the agreements may lead to the permanent settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Do you think these fears are justified?

A. Certainly I am aware that those fears exist because everybody keeps expressing them. I think the fears are overdrawn. We all know that historically, Lebanon has been the theater where various countries in the area have played out their rivalries from time to time, but in this instance we hope that wiser counsels will prevail and that people will see that the Camp David accords are in the interest of the people in the area, including the Palestinians, and that this will not become cause for further strife in Lebanon or anywhere else, for that matter.

God knows there are already enough causes. As for the permanent settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon, that is not the intent of the agreements. Undoubtedly there will be Palestinians who will permanently settle in Lebanon; there already are. As for the agreement, I am afraid that many people have not read their full text and they have not paid full attention to what President Carter said to Congress in his statement²⁵² on the 18th of September. He said: "We also believe there should be a just settlement of the problems of displaced persons and refugees which takes into account appropriate U.N. resolutions."

The Camp David agreement itself says:

"Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem."

Just what the terms of that implementation will be, what the Israelis will agree to, what the Arabs can accept, is something that will need to be worked out through negotiations. But certainly there is no plan on our part to force the resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon or anywhere else. We're trying to work out a solution which takes into account eveybody's interests.

- Q. So no stand has been taken by the United States on the implantation of Palestinians in Lebanon—either in favor or against?
- A. This is one of those question[s], like being asked, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" We have never had any plan for the implantation of the Palestinians in Lebanon. I have said this

- Q. Why do you think President Carter compared the PLO to the Ku Klux Klan?
- A. My first response is that everyone should read the full remarks. I don't think he intended to compare the PLO to the KKK or to the Nazi party. The point he was making was that in our democracy we must hear everybody's view whether we like them or not.
- Q. Do you think there is any possibility of a dialogue between the PLO and USA, as suggested by Senator Paul Findley, for instance?
- A. I certainly hope that we can have one. I think our position remains as stated by President Carter last year, that if the PLO is prepared to accept Resolution 242 and accept Israel's right to exist we can have a dialogue with them. That's a public position we have taken and we don't have a great deal of flexibility in interpreting it. But I hope some day we can get to the stage when we can have a dialogue.
 - Q. Can you say when?
- A. We cannot say when. As far as I personally am concerned, the sooner the better.
- Q. Mr. Carter has stressed the need for efforts to put an end to the suffering of the Lebanese people. Has any American initiative been launched to that end since he made the statement two weeks ago? If not, do you expect such an initiative to be launched, and what form do you think it will take?
- A. No, we have not taken any new initiative. President Carter was expressing a very deep and serious concern on his part. It is my understanding that this question, the question of Lebanon, was discussed at Camp David, not in detail, but that there was general agreement that the problem here is serious and that everyone should try to act constructively to help resolve it. Certainly I can assure you that President Carter is following the situation closely and that we are prepared to do what we can to help.

On the question of what form the initiative will take, that's very difficult for me to answer. I don't like this term "initiative," because in a sense it implies that we haven't been doing any-

publicly, but I don't remember that we've ever had any other official denial of it. We don't take the accusation very seriously. This is a part of the Kissinger plot story and we just find it difficult to take that accusation seriously.

²⁵² Doc. 157 above.

thing, whereas we have been continuing a serious effort to help. We have been urging moderation on all the parties, and we will continue to do so. We think that from time to time we have had some impact. We will continue to support the government of President Sarkis.

The term "initiative" implies that there is going to be something that springs full blown, like a great new change. I think that if anybody had a magic remedy for the situation in Lebanon they would apply it. What the President's remarks mean is that there will be a continuing effort on our part to do everything we can to help.

- Q. Saudi Ambassador Ali Shaer has said that U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's talks in Riyadh covered the situation in Lebanon. Did his talks in Damascus also touch on the Lebanese problem? And has anything been agreed upon in those talks which might give Lebanon hope?
- A. Well, I think both men, both the Secretary and (Syrian) President Assad, agreed that the situation here was serious and that everybody should try to make constructive efforts to help it. I think there is general understanding on the part of the Syrian government, as well as ours, of the necessity for a political solution to Lebanon's problems.
- Q, Premier Selim Hoss has expressed "disappointment" with America's failure to pressure Israel into permitting the deployment of Lebanese troops in the South, despite prior American assurances to this effect. Could you tell us why U.S. assurances were given, if they were, and why America is now tolerating Israeli support of anti-government forces in the border area?
- A. I think there was general disappointment in the Lebanese government that we were not able to support more effectively its plan for sending troops to the South. There were, I think, some problems of communication; there were perhaps some misunderstandings on everybody's part. I think that on all sides there were some assumptions regarding the behavior of the others which were not borne out by events on the ground. The role of the United States in this affair is first of all that of a mailman-hamel el-bareed. We transmitted messages between the parties. We did not give any assurances to the Lebanese government as to what the Israelis would do. We reported what the Israelis said they would do. I can't go into the details of these exchanges, of course. But I can say that we did make a sincere effort, that for us

- the fact that the Lebanese troops did not arrive at Tibnine as scheduled was a great disappointment, and that we hope that this problem can be dealt with effectively in the near future.
- Q, The other part of the question is, why does America now tolerate Israeli support of anti-government forces in the border area?
- A. I think that is a loaded question. We have made very clear our position, publicly and privately, that Lebanese sovereignty should be returned and restored to all of Lebanon, and we have made sincere efforts with all the parties, including the Israelis, to make this possible. But the problem of the return of the Army to the South in something that's very complicated, and it's not going to be solved tomorrow.
- Q. Ambassador Tueni has said that UNFIL's mission may be "redefined" if it has not been accomplished within four months. Do you think there is any possibility that UNIFIL will be turned into a deterrent force? Would the U.S. approve such a redefinition?
- A. There is a problem of definition—of what we mean by a "deterrent strike force." If we mean converting UNIFIL into a force that is going to be prepared to start fighting the Lebanese or the Palestinians or other people, I don't think so. I do not think the nations that have contributed the contigents are going to be prepared to send troops in here to fight in what they regard as essentially a family quarrel.
 - Q. Would the U.S. approve such a redefinition?
- A. I honestly can't speak for my government. But I rather doubt it.
- Q, Is the U.S. in favor of extending the ADF mandate in Lebanon?
- A. Our position on this is that this is an internal decision for the Lebanese government and the Arab League. As the Secretary, Secretary Vance, said some time ago, we are going to support whatever position the Lebanese government takes on this. If the Lebanese government is for renewal of the mandate, we will be for it.
- Q. What is the United States' position on the continuing clashes between Syrian troops and militias of the Lebanese Front?
- A. We think this is very regrettable, and we hope for everybody's sake that it can be brought to an end.

- Q. Many Lebanese are under the impression that the U.S., in view of its relation with Israel, has the power to defuse the Lebanese situation. Do you consider that impression accurate?
- A. I certainly wish it were accurate, because then maybe we could defuse it. I don't deny that the United States has a certain amount of influence, and I hope that we can help, but we certainly cannot defuse the Lebanese situation. That can be defused only by the Lebanese themselves and by the other parties directly concerned. We are not a party to the dispute in Lebanon. We are simply trying to help those parties agree on how to solve it.

181

Press interview statements by Knesset Member Avneri (SHELI) of Israel discussing the domestic political situation inside Israel following the Camp David agreements²⁵³ September, 1978

Q. How do you characterise Israel's political environment today? What is the strength of Likud and of the Labour Party?

A. Begin has lost the confidence of the upper class in Israel, by which I mean the well-educated, established people. These people are becoming extremely disillusioned by Begin—not only by his politics, but also by his personality.

Of course Begin is not, and never has been, a real Israeli in the sense of having an Israeli style in thinking and in talking. This is now becoming much more pronounced in the last few months. The style of Mr. Begin is irritating a bigger and bigger number of Israelis. This, by the way, finds its statistical expression in public opinion polls where Mr. Begin, while still commanding a great majority, is steadily declining.

What this means in political terms is difficult to forecast. Likud—together with its allies—has a majority in Parliament and this is reflected in Knesset votes. But this doesn't really mean anything at all beyond day-to-day practical politics, because the question is how will this majority

stand up in a real political crisis. For example, if public opinion in this country reaches a point where enough people realise that Begin has personally become an obstacle to peace how will this influence his standing inside the Likud bloc, inside the government coalition and inside the country at large?

As long as things go on as this—there's no real American pressure, and people still are not quite conscious of a crisis with Egypt—then Begin can go on as he does. He's being attacked and he reacts. A lot of people have their doubts about his mental stability now, but this can go on.

But if any of these things assume crisis proportions things may happen. There can be a kind of civilian public uprising. This has happened in Israel before. It's one of the characteristics of Israel that in certain situations the public becomes disgusted with the political establishment and starts to make peaceful, non-violent protest demonstrations which sometimes have a very interesting and big impact on political life.

- Q. It is generally argued that if the US were to create or let be created a political crisis with Israel—try to push Israel or impose on Israel—this would unify Israelis behind the Government, not bring it down.
- A. Either thing can happen. You can't plan. It depends how it looks to the public and how the the public reacts to this. If it's done in a brutal and harsh way the public may say we can't let our government be pushed around.

The peculiarity of this kind of thing is that it's quite impossible to calculate what will happen in advance because of the many imponderables. First there is a crystallisation of public opinion in a certain direction under the impact of events. Then politicians react to public opinion. Everybody thinks it's now popular to do this and not to do something else. And then the political establishment, in some way not easy to forecast, adjusts itself to the new public climate.

For example, when this new movement started, the "Peace Now" movement, it looked like the beginning of this kind of process. It had a big momentum. Then, for some reason which is very difficult to analyse, it suddenly got bogged down. And today it is bogged down. It's not the same as it was two or three months ago. Now tomorrow this may change again.

²⁵³ Interview conducted by Mark Bruzonsky, The Middle East (London), no. 48, October 1978, pp. 48-52.

Q. Assuming there were a crisis and Likud and Begin

did lose public confidence completely, what is the state of the Labour Party? Is it capable of taking over and asserting a more flexible leadership?

A. First of all, losing confidence in Begin and losing confidence in Likud are two different things. In the Likud you have Ezer Weizman, you have the Liberal Party. The Likud is not a unified party, it's a bloc with many different components and the change may first of all try to take expression in the Likud itself.

For example, if Mr. Begin for some reason, let's say for reasons of health, was compelled to lay down power, the whole process would happen differently than if Mr Begin were there in full command.

- Q, Before talking further about Weizman and other potential Likud leaders, what is the state of the Labour Party?
- A. The Labour Party was in a very sorry state after its tremendous election defeat—totally demoralised and disjointed. The first year after nothing happened to change this. There is no new leadership in the Labour Party at all. Nothing new is emerging there—not one new leadership personality has emerged since the defeat. There are no new groupings or realignments inside the Labour Party. Everyone has been totally demoralised, even ideologically.

There was no real criticism of Begin during this year. Some poked at Begin from the left, others from the right. As a matter of fact, the Labour Party has criticized Begin for being too eager to give Sinai to Sadat, for being too ready to give up the Jewish settlements in North Sinai. They've even criticised Begin's so-called "administrative autonomy" proposal for the West Bank as being dangerous because it might lead to a Palestinian state. It means they have tried to outflank Begin on the right, something absolutely ridiculous! And they are still continuing with this line. It shows the total disorientation of the party. They thought that the country had been shifting to the right and that they must shift to the right with it otherwise they'll lose even more.

- Q. But you've implied that Labour is improving now.
- A. Yes, all this has been partly changed by the recent Kreisky initiative. Austrian Chancellor Kreisky brought Labour leader Shimon Peres to Vienna and got him to meet Sadat. And when Begin reacted the way he did the Labour Party

became, to a certain extent, revitalised. It got a new confidence. Peres himself, who is a very shifty kind of fellow, suddenly sees himself in the role of an elder statesman, with a new political line. This concept of territorial compromise is nonsense by itself, but still looks more moderate than the Begin stand. It's nonsense because not one single Arab who I know would agree to what the Labour Party calls a territorial compromise. But it's not nonsense in the sense that this might be a step forward in getting negotiations going again.

- Q. You have just written a rather positive article about Ezer Weizman for Der Spiegel. Why does someone like you who's known for advocating Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and creation of a Palestinian state hope for Weizman to take over from Begin?
- A. One has to start with the assumption that there's not going to be a revolution in Israel in the near future, that the programme of my party, Shelli, has no chance of becoming overnight the majority opinion in Israel. And therefore we are looking inside the existing establishment for the best choice there is.

Weizmann, to my mind, is now the best choice because he has undergone a transformation since the Sadat visit. I would say he is perhaps the only one in Israeli government circles who really grasped the historical significance of Sadat's visit, who really understands the historical chance of achieving peace.

- Q. Which brings up the question what are Egypt's minimum goals, what is the bottom line for Egypt in making a settlement just supposing there was a Weizmann negotiating with Sadat?
- A. Exactly nobody knows for sure. If Ezer Weizmann could make a separate peace with Egypt leaving the West Bank in Israeli hands he probably would. But if Weizmann comes to the opinion that the West Bank cannot remain in Israeli hands if he wants a peace with Egypt he will become flexible on the West Bank and look for solutions which, to his mind, safeguard Israeli security while not keeping the West Bank as Israeli territory.

This raises the question, what will Egypt really do, how far are they committed in not making a separate peace in practice as distinguished from theory and rhetoric? That they are looking for some statement on intentions in order to bring the West Bank theory into the framework of an

Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is clear. The question is, is this enough, will they be satisfied with this or will they really want to make an Israel-Egyptian peace conditional on a real solution for the West Bank and the Palestinians?

I hope they do, because, as an Israeli, I do not believe that a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace is valuable in the long term, or that it's in Israel's interests to have a separate peace. I believe that it's in the interests of Israel to utilise the present situation in order to get a general solution. In this I am a heretic in Israel because the general opinion is, of course, the opposite. It would be stupid for Israel, I think, to make a separate peace solving only one thing, because this one thing will not withstand the test of time if the conflict itself is not liquidated.

To put it in practical terms. Assuming for a minute that we do achieve a separate peace, but that the general turmoil in the Arab world continues, that the Palestinians remain the radicalising factor in the Arab world, that the Arab-Israeli conflict continues. Can one really believe that Egypt could stand outside this process, or do we have to believe that Egypt will be drawn into it sooner or late whether it wants it or not? Let's not forget that Egypt was drawn into the whole thing in 1948 against its wishes. All the pressures of the Arab world are operating on Egypt and in Egypt. This will happen again, even if not tomorrow. It will happen in five years or 10 years—the whole thing will start again.

- Q. Is there a solution short of a Palestinian state?
- A. I don't think so. I think a Palestinian state is the solution. And I believe it's a good solution for Israel. This is heretical in Israel to most people, but by no means to all people including some in official circles.
- Q. That's interesting. Who in Israel is in favour of a Palestinian state assuming that you are able to find Palestinians to talk to and to work out security arrangements with?
- A. Without mentioning names I know of two or three extremely important army officers—present and past. Some of the most important strategic thinkers believe that this is the best solution for Israel—that an independent Palestinan state which will have to safeguard its own independent interests will be bound to be an element for peace in the Middle East and an

element for security.

- Q, I assume you are talking about negotiating for such a state with Fatah?
- A. I mean a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip which I believe would have to be negotiated with the PLO, which means practically Arafat. And I believe that such a state will terminate the radicalisation process of the Palestinian people. Once they have achieved a minimum state in which they can live and solve their problems they will have an interest, like every people in the world, to safeguard their national institutions and their national identity. This will be a normalisation not only of the Palestinian people, but also a normalisation of Israel and a normalisation of the status quo in general.
- Q. How many Knesset members, not mentioning names, do you think could be brought to favour creation of a Palestinian state?
- A. Depends when. Today, there has been such a demonology created around the PLO and the idea of a Palestinian state that very few people would be willing publicly to admit that they are in favour of it. Today you have only the five communist members and the two Shelli members. And there are a small number of people in Mapam and the Labour Party who would subscribe to this half-heartedly today. But when you speak with people seriously and privately you find that there are a much greater number of people who are open-minded about this, who say that if the PLO really changes its public stand it can make it possible for people in Israel to mention the PLO without immediately invoking the association of terrorism and the idea of the liquidation of Israel. Then they would be able to advocate a Palestinian state.
- Q. You were one of the Israelis that started meeting with the PLO in 1976. Lova Eliav was another and he now feels very nagatively about Arafat's leadership of the PLO. He has even called him a "petty, little man". What do you think about Arafat and the present state of the PLO?
- A. I started to have contact with the PLO long before this. I was in contact with the late Said Hammami in London from late 1974. And, of course, for me this was not the beginning of something, but the continuation of something, because I've been in favour of a Palestinian state since

1948. In the fifties I drew up and published a plan for a Palestinian state.

Now with all respect to my friend Lova, I don't think he's an expert on the Palestinian question. I think he doesn't realise the terms of reference of Yasser Arafat. Lova looks at it from the Israeli side only and thinks that if Arafat would have done this or that, he would have made our job in Israel much easier. And he is understandably angry at Arafat for not doing these things. But if you look at things objectively, dispassionately, unemotionally, to think what is the situation of the Palestinian people, what is the situation of the PLO, what is the situation of Fatah inside the PLO and Arafat inside Fatahif you take all these practical, political things into consideration you cannot really criticise Arafat. I think he's done a remarkable job as a person who has created some kind of Palestinian consensus in the most incredible circumstances. And he has further been up against the manoeuverings of all the Arab states, each one of whom has promoted a different section of the Palestinian people in order to achieve different aims.

Holding things together is already a remarkable achievement. Surviving as the leader of this consensus for such a long time is a remarkable achievement too. And of course for the Palestinian people the consolidation of recognised and accepted national institutions in the situation they are in is such an important and overwhelming thing that one has first of all to judge leadership in respect to this achievement.

Q. What specifically should the PLO do?

A. The PLO will have to achieve a consensus which makes it possible for its leadership to say that whatever the historical circumstances were, whatever happened in this country, now it is a fact that there are two peoples, two nations, living in what used to be Palestine. Neither of these can remove the other and, therefore, both have to live with each other. They absolutely cannot live in the same state and therefore there has to be two states and therefore the national aspirations of the Palestinian people will have to be realised in the framework of an independent Palestinian national state in the West Bank and Gaza. Since this can only be achieved in agreement with Israel, direct contacts and peace negotiations will have to happen sooner or later. Therefore, if they criticise Sadat they should make it clear that they do not do so because he recognises the fact of Israel and wants to make peace, but because, as Palestinians, they may think that Sadat shouldn't have acted without the Palestinians.

The question, then, is could Sadat have acted with the Palestinians? They did not really make it possible for Sadat to start his negotiations with a Palestinian partner. So I think they must make clear in the most unequivocal terms that the historical objective of preventing Israel from coming into being and then to destroy Israel has to be openly abandoned and a new objective adopted.

- Q. Two months ago in Forum Hisham Sharabi outlined the possibility of such a two-stage historial compromise, but he insisted that the Zionist, racist attitudes in Israel would have to end before full peace is achieved. You're one of the few Israelis famous in the Arab world because your book, Israel Without Zionists, is on many Arab bookshelves. What are your feelings about Zionism today?
- A. The term has lost its exact definition, no one quite knows when one says "I am a Zionist" or "I am an anti-Zionist" what it means. If Zionism means Israeli patriotism, or the belief in the continued existence of Israel I certainly am a Zionist.
- Q, As a Jewish state, a Jewish homeland, with the Law of Return and a special Jewish character?
- A. A state which is as Jewish as France is French or Germany is German. Which doesn't mean that the Germans have a particular privilege in that state. Citizens must be equal, whatever their backgrounds. But as a state which more or less allows a nation to express its personality in their own state. I want Israel to exist—though I advocate many reforms including changes in the relationship between Arab and Jews inside Israel—as a state, the majority of which is Jewish and, therefore, expresses a Jewish personality. This I am for and if this means Zionist I am a Zionist.

If Zionism means the belief that 15 million Jews will one day gather in Israel, I don't believe in it, I think it's obsolete.

Q, What is your reaction to this statement by Hisham Sharabi? "If we are going to live together in other than a suspicious, hostile existence, Zionism has to go". Then I asked him, "Does a Jewish state stay?" And he added, "Yes, anything. I don't know how the operation, the excision, is going to take place and keep the body—whatever

body—they want to keep, I want the racism out. Because this is the barrier between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East today."

A. I agree this is what many Arabs think. But this is an immensely complicated subject. Israel is a state born in unique circumstances, the outcome of a great historical movement with an ideology of some very good, and let's admit, some very bad points. Creating a state which has continued in war for more than 30 years now, can you say that there are inherent attitudes that cannot be changed? Or do you rather have to say that once you have peace most of these attitudes will disappear?

Not without a struggle, of course. But you must rely on us in Israel to fight our own battles and you must say that if you have a state of peace—if Palestinians and Israelis live together in two states, but in the same country with lots of relationships and daily contact—then people like myself have a chance to fight for those reforms which we want to fight for and we have a far bigger chance to succeed.

I could say exactly the same about the Palestinians by the way—I could say that we can never live together until the Palestinian people eradicate from themselves the terrorists and the ultra-chauvinistic elements—people whose slogan is the liquidation of Israel. I don't say this because I understand the Palestinians, as they are a result of their own historical experience. I'm sure once there is a Palestinian state living in peace, the existence of this state will change a lot of things in the Palestinian people putting an end to certain tendencies which have been the outcome of a state of war.

- Q, Let me shift to the US. How do you assess the Carter Administration's performance since the Sadat initiative?
- A. Of course I can't help being extremely disappointed by the Carter Administration. Either they don't do what should be done, or if they decide to do it at long last they don't do it the way I think it should be done.

Of course one realises the domestic problems of the American Administration when one realises the pressures being exerted. Therefore, it's easy to understand why they don't do what they should do and why they are doing things which perhaps they should not do.

I believe it was wrong for Carter to celebrate Begin when he came over the first time and therefore Carter gave an enormous push to Begin at a time when the Israeli public was still doubtful about Begin and a little bit afraid that Begin's chauvinistic attitudes were going to cause damage to Israel.

- Q. Not to mention American Jewish attitudes?
- A. Exactly. When Begin came back as the victor in triumph from America he got the power base which now enables him to reject American initiatives. I never quite understood why it was done unless they had the most curious misconceptions about Begin.
- Q. What has the US done wrong in the last year and a half?
- A. I think everything. Absolutely everything. They should have made it quite clear what the American attitude is. They should have used American influence—and, of course, America has an enormous influence upon Israel—by keeping a very clear line: we want this, this is how we see the future, this is what American interests require.
- Q. Well, not everything. Carter came into office pursuing the policies outlined in the Brookings Report, ²⁵⁴ advocating a "Palestinian homeland".
- A. Same as with Nixon if I may mention the name. Nixon came to power. After a year or so there was the famous Rogers Plan²⁵⁵—which was an extremely good plan. And then when there was a Jewish and Israeli opposition he just forgot about the whole thing.

Here came Carter. He said for the first time candidly things which had to be said about a Palestinian homeland. And then he said he didn't mean it all, that he meant something quite different. You can't command respect and really compel the Israeli public to treat America seriously if the American line changes every two days because some senator says something.

- Q. What about the joint statement with the Soviet Union on 1 October 1977?²⁵⁶ Was that not the right thing to do?
 - A. That was a curious thing, because, what did

²⁵⁴ Doc. 194 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

²⁵⁵ See docs. 54 and 205 in International Documents on Palestine 1969.

²⁵⁶ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

they do? They made a statement with the Soviet Union—which on the whole was a good statement. Then they immediately retreated by making a joint statement with Israel²⁵⁷ something quite different.

Q. Well, they say there was a revolt against the US-USSR joint statement in the US.

A. Ok. If you are a politician either you make an assessment before hand and say that this is a policy I can't conduct and therefore let's not announce it. But if you do announce a policy then you should be ready to sustain it and fight for it.

One thing the Americans have in common with the Palestinians, with the Arabs, is the tendency to think Israel is a monolithic thing, acting like one man who happens to be the prime minister at any given time. Perhaps they come to this conviction because they look at American Jews who monolithically support—or used to anyway—any prime minister.

But if you believe a certain policy is good then your policy should be formed in such a way that you encourage the elements in Israel which are working for this kind of solution and discourage the kind of people working against your policies. What the Americans are doing, and also our Palestinian friends, is exactly the opposite.

Q. What now in Israel? How do you now view Begin? You wrote a few months after Sadat's Jerusalem visit "The big question now is: What will Begin do if peace cannot be reconciled with his ideology? The fate of the Middle East... may well depend on the answer. It is a battle that will have to be fought in the heart and mind of Begin himself. On the one hand, the temptation to make peace is immense. If he achieves this, his name will be inscribed forever in the annals of Jewish history: Ben-Gurion created the State of Israel, Begin gave it peace. But equally great is his loyalty to the cause, the teachings of Jabotinsky, the land of Israel."

A. The question has had a final answer. Begin has not been able to change his historical objective for a newer, much more important one. Therefore we must now think how to remove Begin and what to do afterwards. This now is the big question.

I'm rather sorry about this. I've always had a certain respect for Mr. Begin. But I must draw the conclusion that he's not a big enough personality to adjust himself to a totally new historical

situation, which is exactly what Ezer Weizmann has done—perhaps because he's younger, less dogmatic, because he's a military man and used to adapting himself to new circumstances.

There's absolutely no hope that Mr. Begin will change his opinion. He is now the great obstacle to movement towards peace and must be removed.

You quoted me about Begin. I would now change this quotation, enlarge on it. I said at that time that the decisive battle was being fought inside the mind of Menachem Begin. I would say now that the decisive battle is really being fought inside the mind of the Israeli people. The more that can be done to provide ammunition and reinforcements to the forces inside the Israeli mind willing to take the great leap into peace, into unknown territory, the more chances it will really happen.

I'm quite sure that even today, if you really could talk heart to heart with the 120 members of the Knesset and everybody would do what a politician never does—candidly say what he really believes in—you have in this Knesset a dovish majority. I have absolutely no doubt about it and I know all the 120 people quite well. There is a majority of 60–70 out of the 120 who ordinarily you would call doves. But they are dominated by a political structure which is commanded today by Begin. If you had an equally strong leadership by somebody else you wouldn't need new elections in Israel to have a different kind of government.

182

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of President Asad of Syria to the German Democratic Republic²⁵⁸

Berlin, October 4, 1978

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic and the General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Baath Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic discussed world affairs devoting special attention to the situation in the Middle East. They resolutely

Excerpted from the English text, Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Berlin) XVIII. 31 (November 6, 1978). pp. 243–244.

condemn the continuing Israeli aggression against the Arab peoples maintaining a dangerous hotbed of tension in the region and jeopardizing international security.

Both sides reaffirm their consistent position that a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement in the Middle East can be achieved only by Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, and by the implementation of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to self-determination and to establishing a national state of its own, as well as the right to return to its home in accordance with UN resolutions.

They reject any attempts to settle the Palestinian issue while infringing upon the rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They reaffirm their support for the Palestine Liberation Organization, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and for the struggle of the Palestinian people which they regard as an inseparable part of the Arab peoples' national liberation struggle.

They most strongly condemn the continuous Israeli terror, the persistent violation of human rights, racial discrimination and oppression in the territories occupied by Israel, the pillaging of cultural assets as well as expulsion of the Arab population and the establishment of so-called fortified settlements by the occupation power.

They emphatically reject the policy of making separate arrangements. They particularly condemn the accords negotiated at Camp David recently ignoring the will of the Arab peoples and seeking to split the ranks of the Arabs and to impose conditions on them dictated by the aggressor. Such a policy hampers the efforts to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict, representing in essence an anti-Arab plot. It poses a serious threat to peace and international security.

The German Democratic Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic expressed their conviction that it is now particularly imperative for all forces in favour of eliminating the consequences of Israeli aggression and of a comprehensive and just Middle East settlement to close ranks and coordinate activities.

In this connection they regard the results of the conferences of the Arab Front of Steadfastness and Resistance in Tripoli, ²⁵⁹ Algiers ²⁶⁰ and Damascus ²⁶¹ as important steps towards establishing unity of action of all Arab states and forces in the struggle against the imperialist-Zionist plot. The German Democratic Republic supports its consistent stand for the interests of the Arab peoples. It expresses its appreciation of the firm-principled position adopted by the Syrian Arab Republic and President Hafez al Assad personally in fighting for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Syrian Arab Republic appreciates the support of the German Democratic Republic for the determined struggle to uphold the interests of the Arab peoples and to ward off the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy.

Both sides deem it urgently necessary to achieve a comprehensive and just Middle East settlement by collective efforts of all parties concerned, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with the Palestine Liberation Organization participating on an equal footing within the framework of international legitimacy.

The German Democratic Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic condemn the Israeli aggression and Israel's incessant interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. They stand for normalizing the situation in Lebanon on the basis of safeguarding its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. They emphatically advocate the strengthening of legitimate Lebanese state authority in the country's entire territory and the upholding of the interests of the Palestine resistance movement in Lebanon.

The German Democratic Republic commends the efforts made by the Syrian Arab Republic to keep up security and stability in Lebanon as well as to preserve the country's unity. Both sides resolutely reject imperialist and Israeli attempts at a territorial or confessional division of Lebanon.

²⁵⁹ See docs. 319-322 and 324 in International Documents on Palestine 1977

²⁶⁰ See doc. 218 below.

²⁶¹ See doc. 231 below.

183

Press conference statement by Foreign Minister Vajpayee of India listing the short-comings of the Camp David agreements ²⁶² New Delhi, October 6, 1978

The External Affairs Minister Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee today described it as incorrect impression that India had welcomed the Camp David Agreement on West Asia. In his talk over the telephone with President Carter the Prime Minister Mr. Morarji Desai had made it clear that all parties should be made partners in any agreement. The agreement Mr. Vajpayee said suffered from three shortcomings: (1) The question of Palestine is the core of West Asia problem and unless the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people were restored including the right to return and set up their national State there could be no just and lasting peace in the region. (2) The second shortcoming was, Mr. Vajpayee said, the Camp David Agreement was silent on the status of Jerusalem. (3) Thirdly the Palestine Liberation Organisation has not been accepted as representative body of Palestinian people. PLO had been fighting for their liberation and has made immense sacrifices. When he met the U.S. Secretary of State Mr. Cyrus Vance in New York, Mr. Vajpayee said he had sought clarification from him on these points. Mr. Vance replied that once the process was set in motion these problems will be tackled at the appropriate time.

184

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of President Asad of Syria to the USSR (excerpts)²⁶³

Moscow, October 6, 1978

The Soviet and Syrian sides held a detailed and fruitful exchange of views in a friendly atmosphere on questions of further strengthening relations of friendship and co-operation between the Soviet

²⁶² "Press Trust of India"; partial text supplied, on request, by the Indian embassy, Beirut.

Union and Syria and also on some international problems of mutual interest.

The main attention during the talks was focused on the situation in the Middle East and the tasks of the struggle for establishing a just and lasting peace in that area.

President Hafez Assad of Syria, on the instructions of the conference of the National Steadfastness and Confrontation Front held in Damascus from September 20 to 23 this year, informed the Soviet side about the decisions taken at the conference. He stressed that the participants in the conference condemned the capitulatory position of the Egyptian leadership before the Israeli aggressor and categorically rejected the Camp David agreements.

The Soviet side attached great importance to the results of the Damascus conference, which made an important contribution to strengthening the solidarity and unity in action of progressive Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organisation in the struggle against the machinations of imperialism and against anti-Arab separate deals.

It was noted that, in the prevailing situation, the task of rallying and activating all the forces opposed to the capitulatory line in Middle East Affairs and in favour of the achievement of genuine peace by the peoples of the Middle East has become particularly urgent.

The sides were unanimous that the Camp David agreements between Israel and Egypt, which were reached with the active participation of the USA, constituted collusion behind the backs of the Arabs and were contrary to their interests. They believe that the essence of the Camp David deal is to substitute for a just and comprehensive Middle East settlement partial, separate decisions which would allow Israel to retain the captured Arab lands and prevent the implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestine Arab people.

By means of this deal, yet another attempt has been made to divide the Arabs and pit them against one another and to impose on Arab countries terms of settlement suiting the aggressor and the forces supporting him, all of which merely intensifies the explosive character of the Middle East situation.

The Soviet Union and Syria strongly condemn the Egyptian leadership's actions, which seriously damage the struggles of Arab and African peoples for national liberation and greater independence.

Excerpted from the partial English text, Soviet News (5949), October 10, 1978, pp. 341–344.

It is the deep conviction of the sides that, far from bringing peace closer in the Middle East, the method of conducting behind-the-scenes separate deals only puts off and complicates the establishment of peace.

The sides drew special attention to the connection between the policy of separate deals and the striving of imperialist circles to expand their positions in the Middle East, particularly in the military respect.

The leaders of the Soviet Union and Syria confirmed the determination of the two countries to continue jointly the struggle to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The only way to achieve this goal is that which provides for the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the implementation of the Palestine Arab people's inalienable national rights, including their right to self-determination and the creation of an independent state of their own, and also the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland in accordance with existing United Nations resolutions.

The sides believe that such a settlement requires the collective efforts of all the interested sides, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the Palestine Arab people, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, the international machinery specially created for achieving peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet side stated the Soviet Union's unswerving solidarity with the Arab peoples waging a just struggle to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression. The Soviet side highly assessed Syria's principled position in Middle East affairs and its important positive contribution to the strengthening of the forces which reject the road of anti-Arab deals.

The Syrian side expressed deep appreciation to the Soviet Union for the all-round support it gives the Arabs in their just struggle. It also stressed the need for Soviet participation in a Middle East settlement at every stage.

The sides underlined the importance of the maximum strengthening of the friendship of the Arab peoples with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, something which is in the interests of ensuring the independence and security of Arab countries, of

developing their national economies and of improving their living standards. They declared that they would continue to rebuff any attempts to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship.

Having discussed the situation in Lebanon, the sides condemned the interference by Israel, which enjoys the support of imperialist forces, in the internal affairs of that country, as well as its continual attempts to increase tension and bring about a division of the Lebanese state. The USSR and the Syrian Arab Republic confirmed their striving to facilitate a normalisation of the situation in Lebanon based on ensuring the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. They are in favour of the strengthening of the legitimate authority of the Lebanese government throughout the country's territory and the observance of the legitimate interests of the Palestine resistance movement in Lebanon.

185

Television interview statements by Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel reaffirming Israel's intention to continue aid to the Lebanese rightists²⁶⁴

October 8, 1978

- Q. Do you see any connection whatsoever between the new fighting in Beirut and the Camp David agreements?
- A. No, not really. I think that the Syrians are trying—they have been trying before, and they keep trying—to take control of Beirut and to defeat the Christians there, and I don't think it has got to do with the Camp David accord.
- Q, Is it your government's policy that the Christians will not be allowed to be crushed by the Syrians?
- A. Well, the way that I would have put it is that we do feel obliged to send to them as much help and aid as we can, but whether that would be sufficient for them to hold on, that I'm not sure.

²⁶⁴ Interview granted to CBS's "Face the Nation"; partial text as published in Near East Report (Washington), XXII, 41 (October 11, 1978), p. 188.

- Q. Do you rule out the possibility of going into southern Lebanon once more?
- A. Southern Lebanon has got nothing to do with that, and I do rule out going into Lebanon with our forces to control Lebanon. That, I think, is not really one of the options.
- Q. What was the reason for the Israeli ship attack the other night in the Beirut area?
- A. The objective that we fired at was a PLO naval base, and we had information that they were about to have an attack against Israel. Maybe that indirectly it served a signal that we won't hesistate to send our forces to strike, whether by sea or by other means, as far as Beirut or to other parts in Lebanon. But the immediate objective was not the Syrian forces...
- Q. So you're not ruling out that Israel would come to the assistance of the Christians again?
- A. I do not rule it out. I think that we are committed, and we should be committed. These are the feelings of the people of Israel, of the Israeli government, and of myself, that if the war were renewed—let's hope that the cease-fire will hold; and I hope that it is holding now. But just in case the Syrians renew their fire attacks on the Christians, I do not rule out further assistance and aid to the Christians to help them to hold on.
- Q. How far can you go on the West Bank if you don't have King Hussein participating? Can you have elections with just Egypt and Israel in the negotiations?
- A. You omitted a third party, the Palestinian Arabs who reside in the West Bank, in Judea and Samaria. We can go on and have an election if they come in, even if Hussein will not come in.
- Q, But can you get them to participate if they don't get some sort of support from King Hussein? The PLO is obviously not going to signal their counterparts on the West Bank to participate.

It's not for us to get them to participate. It's up to them. We think that we are really taking a great step forward for their benefit, by being ready to withdraw the military authority there. If they don't want it...no one can force them, and if they will not come in and will not have election, will not establish their own administration, then the proposal will not be carried out.

Q. The last time you were on this program, you said, we do not want to negotiate a Palestinian state; not only with

- the PLO, but even with the Palestinian Arabs; we want to negotiate peace with Jordan; we want the Palestinians to be a part of the Jordanian delegation. Is that still somewhere in the back of your mind, or is that history?
- A. That's absolutely on the paper now, not only in my mind. The transitional period is not a substitute for the peace treaty. It is a period between now and the negotiations for a peace treaty that would be concluded with Jordan, with the participation of the Palestinians with the Jordanian delegation.
- Q. So regardless of which way the inhabitants of the West Bank vote, you are interested in going with Jordan rather than with an independent Palestinian state there.
- A. When it comes to boundaries, to a peace treaty between states, then the only state that would be the party with whom we would negotiate would be Jordan. And this is according to the 242 resolution. The party with whom Israel should negotiate peace and peace treaties are Egypt and Jordan and Syria, and maybe Lebanon; but not the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. They're not a state.
- Q. Will the self-governing authority on the West Bank have control over the formerly Jordanian state-owned land that the Israeli military government now has control over?
- A. Not exactly. They are not a substitute for a Jordanian state control.

This is something to be discussed and agreed about, with many other similar questions, like the water.

- Q, So it's a possibility that that land could pass to the control of the self-governing authority, since the whole settlement question turns on, in part, on who has control of that land.
- A. Not really. You can have Israeli settlement by buying lands from Arabs—which has nothing to do with state land. And about the state land, this is one of the subjects that should be negotiated between Israel and the Arab administration, when they would be elected there, with many other issues, it should be discussed there.
- Q. It is fairly widespread opinion in the United States that the Begin government has said in effect, we're giving up not one inch of East Jerusalem.
- A. The negotiation over the line which would divide between the sovereignty of Israel and the sovereignty of the other party, which is Jordan, will be discussed after five years, and not now.

If it'll be up to us, then the entire area would be under our sovereignty. But we do realize that the other party might claim sovereignty—but not now, only after five years.

Q, You said that if King Hussein doesn't wish to participate in the West Bank, and the Palestinians don't, that you're satisfied for things to remain the way they are. I gather you assume that if they remain the way they are, that President Sadat will go ahead and implement a peace treaty, and there'll be peace between Egypt and Israel. You'll withdraw your troops; exchange ambassadors, and the whole thing. Is that your expectation?

A. No, it's not my expectation. My expectation is that they [the Jordanians and Palestinians] will come in. But I cannot speak for President Sadat. I do hope that if they boycott it and will not come in that he will not get cold feet, and he will have the guts to go on with his own peace treaty negotiation with Israel.

186

Speech by US President Carter at the opening session of the peace treaty negotiations at Blair House²⁶⁵

Washington, October 12, 1978

For 2,000 years in the Middle East, people have cried, "Peace, peace," when there was no peace. The burden of war has lain heavily on this troubled ground. But less than 1 month ago, President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel created a chance for true peace. In their negotiations at Camp David, they displayed the wisdom and the courage necessary to forge a framework for peace in the Middle East. 266

Everyone who shares their dream of bringing division and bitterness to an end in the Middle East will join me in welcoming their representatives to Washington as they take their next vital steps toward turning that framework into a lasting structure of peace.

No one who is aware of the history of our own generation or of this century or, indeed, of the last 20 or more centuries can overlook the historic importance of this event—the moment when Egyptians and Israelis meet to begin negotiating the terms of a treaty which will define in a practical and concrete way relations of peace between them.

Our meeting today gives us a measure of what has been accomplished and what remains to be done to make peace and dignity a reality for all the people of the Middle East. We have certainly not resolved all the issues nor removed all the risks. We have established, however, principles and procedures for resolving the negotiations ahead.

Again, we invite Jordan, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, and others who are ready to seize this opportunity to join with us in our search for peace. The alternative is drift, stalemate, continued enmity, and perhaps even another war.

The talks that begin today deal primarily with that part of the Camp David framework related to a peace between Egypt and Israel, to establish the specific terms by which Egypt will assume its full exercise of authority and sovereignty over the Sinai, under which security will be assured to both nations, both peoples, and under which the two countries will live and work together as peaceful neighbors.

This peace between these two great nations must be the foundation and the first step toward the larger, even greater, more important result which we all seek—a comprehensive and a lasting settlement between Israel and all her neighbors. A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel should be complemented by progress toward fulfillment of the provisions of the general framework agreement which was concluded at Camp David dealing with the West Bank and Gaza and the just solution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects.

In the days since Camp David, we've seen difficult but important decisions made in both Egypt and Israel, decisions which demonstrate the firm commitment of the leaders, the governments, and the peoples to this great effort; decisions which demonstrate their willingness and their ability to turn the existing commitment to peace into an early reality.

With President Sadat's striking vision of the future, he's made even more clear his nation's determination to achieve peace, not only for Egyptians but for all those involved in or affected by recent conflict, a peace that answers their yearning for an end to bloodshed, an end to destruction, and assures the legitimate rights of all who have suffered or who might suffer in the

²⁶⁵ Department of State Bulletin, (Washington), LXXVIII, 2021 (December 1978), pp. 40–41. The Israeli-Egyptian negotiations were resumed, with US participation, on October 12 at Blair House and closed in failure on December 18, the date scheduled at Camp David for the signing of a peace treaty.
²⁶⁶ See docs. 153 and 154 above.

future through never-ending war.

In these recent days Prime Minister Begin has displayed once again his courage and his statesmanship, his determination in dealing with the very difficult decisions which are necessary and must be taken for peace. I appreciate how hard, how difficult it has been for him to make some of the decisions and for the members of his government to join in with him. They touch the very heart of every citizen of Israel. The Knesset's decisions confirm what we in this country have always known and believed: that Israel's greatest wish is to live at peace and in good neighborly relationships with all the countries around Israel.

The United States is committed without reservation to seeing this great process through until each party to the Arab-Israeli conflict is at peace with all the others. Our own national interests are deeply involved.

The question of peace or war in the Middle East affects the well-being of every American. But beyond this, the generations-old cycle of tragedy and suffering speaks to America's moral conscience and to our deep and lasting concern for human rights and the expansion of human potential for peoples everywhere.

We will work hand in hand with all involved parties until the job is done, and peace is assured.

Minister Moshe Dayan, Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, Minister Ezer Weizman, Minister Boutros Ghali, the Egyptian, Israeli, and American peoples and people throughout the world are depending on you now. Our assistance is available.

My own personal involvement is assured to you. Our hopes are with you, and our prayers.

187

Press interview statements by US Assistant Secretary of State Saunders discussing the US position on the repatriation of Palestinians in Lebanon and the relationship between the Palestine problem and the Lebanese crisis²⁶⁷

October 13, 1978

I am not quite sure of the existence of an American idea foreseeing the settling of Palestinians in

Lebanon. In fact, I do not think we have proposed such a thing. Definitely we shall work with the interested parties in the Middle East to find a solution to the refugeee problem which has been in existence since 1948. At this moment it will be up to the Palestinians to decide where they would want to settle.

We have no authority to impose peace in Lebanon. For the Lebanese war is fundamentally a result of internal Lebanese problems, complicated, it is true, by certain elements of the Middle East crisis. Up until now, we have done much to try and end the civil war so that talks between the Lebanese can be initiated. We are in favour of a return to peace and national unity in Lebanon, and we are resolved that all parties in the Middle East guarantee respect for the unity of Lebanese territory. But to do this, we must cooperate closely with all the parties concerned, mainly the Arab governments whose interests lie in the achievement of these objectives.

We must all be aware of the fact that the settlement of the Palestinian problem is closely linked to the settlement of the Lebanese problem. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that there are specifically Lebanese problems, and one wants to reunite the ranks and Lebanese territory. This is why I think it is wrong to believe that with the settlement of the Palestinian problem all Lebanon's problem will be automatically resolved. At the same time, the settlement of the Palestinian problem will count for a great deal in the solution of the Lebanese problem, since it will give to refugees in Lebanon a sense of national belonging [enabling them] to strike roots in a country which could be determined later.

[In answer to a question on the state of security in Lebanon] The United States has, more than once, made contact with the Israeli government and the other governments concerned. At present we think that resolution 436 of the Security Council and mainly what was decided by Presidents Sarkis and Asad, as well as the Arab tour undertaken recently by the Lebanese head of state, will contribute effectively to reducing tension and

²⁶⁷ Made in an interview with an unspecified television station;

partial French text as published in L'Orient-Le Jour (Beirut), October 14, 1978, pp. 1, 6.

assuring a period of calm in Lebanon, in order to allow the principal problems from which Lebanon suffers to be treated.

188

Replies made by the US in response to the questions of King Husayn of Jordan on the Camp David accords²⁶⁸

October 16, 1978

- 1. The United States supports the right of the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future, and believes that the framework provides for such participation in all the important steps in determining the future of the West Bank and Gaza.
- 2. The United States believes that provisions in the framework do not preclude the holding of an election by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, after the conclusion of an agreement of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, for the expressed purpose of electing representatives to whom that agreement will be submitted for a vote.
- 3. The framework provides for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to participate fully in the negotiations that will determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and, in addition, for their elected representatives to ratify or reject the agreement reached in those negotiations.
- 4. It further provides that the solution from the negotiations must also recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
- 5. At the time the process is taking place, a strong local police force will exist and will be responsible to the self-governing authority to ensure that there is no interference in the political process that ensures these rights.
- 6. In reply to a question as to what would happen to the Israeli settlements in the occupied areas during and after the transitional period and

what would happen to the properties acquired and construction made there and what would their status be, the United States points out that the framework does not deal with the status of Israeli settlements in the occupied areas, nor with the properties acquired or construction made there.

- 7. The powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority, which will exercise full autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional period, will be defined in an agreement to be negotiated between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and, as provided in the framework, Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed to be on the Egyptian and Jordanian national delegations.
- 8. The question of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and their relationship with the self-governing authority during the transitional period, will have to be dealt with in the course of those negotiations.
- 9. The framework also provides for a continuing committee, including representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority, which may deal with outstanding matters of common concern during the transitional period.
- 10. The question of the Israeli settlements and their status after the transitional period would be a matter for discussion during the negotiations regarding the final status of the West Bank and Gaza as referred to in the framework.
- 11. The United States is of the position that Israel should refrain from creating new settlements on the West Bank while negotiations are on the way to the establishment of the self-governing authority.
- 12. These negotiations will determine the question of existing settlements as well as any new settlement activity during the transitional period.
- 13. The position of the United States is that settlements established during a military occupation are in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of persons in time of war.
- 14. The parties to peace negotiations should define the mutual rights of inhabitants to do business, to work, to live, and to carry on other transactions in each other's territory.
- 15. Israeli citizens residing in settlements on the West Bank and Gaza could participate in the establishment of the self-governing authority only as members of the Israeli negotiating delegation.

²⁵⁸ Delivered to Jordan by the US Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders; text as published in *Arab Report and Record* (London), October 16, 1978, pp. 790–791. King Husayn in an interview with CBS television network on October 1, 1978, said that he had submitted thirty questions about the Camp David resolutions to the US special envoy Alfred Atherton which are published as doc. 309 below. The Camp David agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

There is no provision for their separate participation and their participation, if any, in the selfgoverning authority must be determined in the negotiations for the transitional regime.

- 16. The negotiations under provisions of the framework define the powers and responsibilities of the authority to deal with the status of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and Gaza and, accordingly, with the status of Israeli citizens in them.
- 17. Whatever settlements remain beyond the transitional period, and their status, would presumably be agreed in the negotiations concerning the final status of the West Bank and Gaza envisaged under provisions of the framework.
- 18. The idea of a 5-year transitional period was an American suggestion which was first put to the parties in the summer of 1977. The key point is the concept of a transitional period-not the precise duration of 5 years which has been suggested and agreed. The United States believes a transitional process of several years—at the outset of which the Israeli military government and it's civilian administration will be withdrawn and a self-governing authority established for the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants—can demonstrate that the practical problems arising from a transition to peace can be satisfactorily resolved. The United States sees the transitional period as essential to build confidence, gain momentum and bring about the changes in attitudes that can assure a final settlement which realises the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people while assuring the security of Israel and of the other parties.
- 19. The term "West Bank and Gaza" describes all of the area west of the Jordan river under Jordanian administration prior to the 1967 war and all of the area east of the western border of the British mandate of Palestine which prior to the 1967 war was under Egyptian control and is known as the Gaza strip.
- 20. The United States believes a distinction must be made between Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank because of the city's special status and circumstance. The United States envisages a negotiated solution for the final status of Jerusalem that could be different in character in some respects from that of the rest of the West Bank. The final status of Jerusalem should not be prejudged by the unilateral actions undertaken in Jerusalem since the 1967 war. The full United States position

- on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and by Ambassador Yost to the Security Council July 1, 1969.
- 21. The issue of the status of Jerusalem was not resolved at Camp David and must be dealt with in subsequent negotiations. The questions of how the Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem relate to the self-governing authority remain to be determined in the negotiations on the transitional agreements. The United States position is that in those negotiations the United States will support proposals that would permit Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem who are not Israeli citizens to participate in the elections to constitute the self-governing authority and in the work of the self-governing authority itself.

It is probably not realistic to expect that the full scope of the self-governing authority can be extended to East Jerusalem during the transitional period. Such an outcome would not, however, prejudge the final status of Jerusalem, which must be resolved in the negotiations that are to begin no later than the 3rd year after the beginning of the transitional period. Whatever solution is agreed upon should preserve Jerusalem as a physically undivided city. It should provide for free access to the Jewish, Muslim, and Christian Holy places without distinction or discrimination for the free exercise of worship. It should assure the basic rights of all the city's residents. The holy places of each faith should be under the full authority of their representatives.

- 22. The status of the West Bank and Gaza, and their relationship with their neighbours, as well as peace between Israel and Jordan, will be determined in the negotiations referred to in the provisions of the framework.
- 23. The provisions in the framework provide that Egypt and Israel will work together with other interested parties to agree on a resolution of the refugee problem. The implementation of the procedures agreed upon should be prompt just and permanent.
- 24. The provisions of the framework provide for a continuing committee to decide on arrangements for the admission to the West Bank and Gaza of persons displaced from those areas in 1967. In addition, as the political institutions of self-government take shape on the West Bank and Gaza through negotiations among the parties the re-

lationship between those institutions and the Palestinians living outside the area would be addressed.

25. The United States believes that a resolution of the refugee problem should reflect applicable United Nations resolutions. Any programme for implementation must provide those refugees living outside the West Bank and Gaza a choice and opportunity to settle themselves permanently in the context of present-day realities and circumstances.

26. The United States maintains that the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, including the question of sovereignty, should be determined on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242²⁶⁹ in all its parts in negotiations among Jordan, Egypt, Israel and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza which should begin not later than the 3rd year after the beginning of the transitional period.

27. Under the terms of the framework agreement, the outcome of those negotiations—including determining the issue of sovereignty—shall be submitted to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza for ratification or rejection.

28. Since the negotiation of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan and the negotiations of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza are interrelated, the framework provides that representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza should participate in both these negotiations. Thus Palestinians will participate in each negotiation to resolve the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

29. The United States believes that the agreement of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza must meet the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

30. On the definition in the framework of representatives of the Palestinian people, no comprehensive definition is attempted. In some cases, the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza are specified. In one case, it is clear that "other Palestinians are mutually agreed" refers to the representatives from outside the West Bank and Gaza, and need not be citizens of Egypt or Jordan. Palestinians who are citizens of Egypt or Jordan, may of course, be members of the negotiating terms [sic] representing those coun-

31. The United States asserts that it fully endorses the principal of reciprocity as applied to security requirements, in the context of Middle East negotiations.

The United States also strongly asserts that it will adhere to its own consistent interpretation of resolution 242, and in particular to its interpretation that the withdrawal provision of that resolution applies on all fronts.

In the event of conflicting interpretations among the negotiating parties, the United States will seek, as it did during the intensive negotiations at Camp David, to bring about a consensus among the parties and will make known its own interpretations as required to bring about resolution of the conflict.

The interpretations of the United States remain those it has held since 1967.

32. The United States stressed that the framework stipulates that it is intended to constitute a base for peace between Israel and each of its other neighbours. It further states that the objective is a just, comprehensive, and durable peace and that each negotiation must carry out all the provisions and principles of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

189

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Moscow of President Boumedienne of Algeria²⁷⁰

Moscow, October 19, 1978

In the period between October 15 and 19, Houari Boumedienne, President of the Algerian Democratic Popular Republic and Chairman of

tries. In other cases the self-governing authority itself is mentioned. The United States interprets the phase "the representatives of the Palestinian people" not in terms of any single group or organisation as representing the Palestinian people but as encompassing those elected or chosen for participation in negotiations. It is expected that they will accept the purposes of the negotiation as defined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, and in the framework of a settlement will be prepared to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Israel.

²⁶⁹ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

²⁷⁰ Translated from the Arabic text as published in *Novosti* (Beirut), October 23, 1978, Item 4.

the Algerian Revolutionary Council, paid a friendly and working visit to the Soviet Union, accompanied by a delegation. The Soviet leaders welcomed the Algerian President warmly.

In discussions on the international scene, the Soviet and Algerian leaders paid their main attention to the current situation in the Middle East. The two sides affirmed that the agreements arrived at in Camp David between Israel and Egypt and with the active participation of the USA, constitute a conspiracy hatched behind the back of the Arab peoples and at variance with their interests. They greatly increase the difficulty of arriving at a settlement in the Middle East and can only complicate anew the situation in the area. This conspiracy seeks to foil a just and comprehensive Middle East settlement and to replace it with partial and individual deals that will allow Israel to retain occupied Arab territories and to prevent the fulfillment of the firm and national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The Soviet Union and Algeria strongly condemn the policy of separate deals and surrender pursued by the Egyptian leadership, a policy that does immense harm to the struggle of the Arab peoples for enhancement of their national independence and social progress and seeks to divide the unity of Arab ranks and incite them to mutual enmity. They consider this political game to be one of narrow interests as regards a Middle East settlement and, together with all other individual acts, as constituting a compliance with the will of imperialism to which a final end is to be put.

The two sides expressed their firm conviction that a just and stable peace in the Middle East can only come on the basis of the total and unconditional liberation of all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the fulfilment of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine including their right to establish their state. Such a settlement requires the concerted efforts of all parties concerned, including the PLO, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people.

The two sides believe that the current situation is of special importance, requiring further joint action among progressive Arab states and the PLO in the struggle against the schemes of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

The Soviet Union expressed its support for those Arab countries and peoples who oppose the deal concluded in Camp David. The Soviet

leaders valued highly the results of the conference of the Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation held in Damascus last September, which was an important contribution to the question of the unity of all forces opposed to a policy of surrender as a solution for the Middle East problem. The Soviet Union further expressed its high appreciation for the important role played by the Algerian Democratic Popular Republic in the struggle to consolidate the unity of action among progressive forces in the Arab world, on the basis of anti-imperialism.

The Algerian Democratic Popular Republic expressed its deep thanks to the Soviet Union for the comprehensive support that it provides to the just cause of the Arab peoples. It pointed to the necessity of Soviet participation in a Middle East settlement at all its stages.

The Soviet leaders announced once more the firm solidarity of the Soviet Union with the Arab peoples struggling to remove the traces of Israeli aggression.

190

Communiqué issued by the Cabinet of Israel approving in principle the draft of the peace agreement with Egypt²⁷¹

October 25, 1978

The cabinet adopted the following resolution:

- A. The cabinet approves in principle the draft of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which was submitted to the cabinet by the delegation to the Washington peace conference.
- B. The cabinet approves the amendments to the draft treaty proposed by the prime minister.
- C. The cabinet instructed the delegation accordingly, and authorized it to continue the negotiation towards the conclusion of the peace treaty
- D. The cabinet also approved a number of guidelines for the delegation, proposed by the minister of justice.
- E. The final draft of the peace treaty with Egypt, including all its annexes, will be brought before the cabinet and the Knesset, for their approval.

The cabinet convened as the ministerial defence committee.

²⁷¹ English text, The Jerusalem Post, October 26, 1978, p. 1.

Press interview statements by Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee President Couve de Murville of France linking the political crisis in Lebanon to the Arab-Israeli conflict and stating that there can be no peace in the Middle East until an independent Palestinian state is established²⁷²

Paris, late October, 1978

- Q, Your Excellency, it was observed that you did not join in the controversy over the statements made by Louis de Guiringaud, the French Foreign Minister, to the Anglo-American press, and your reserve has been interpreted as meaning that you approved in substance of what the French foreign minister said. Is this so, or not?
- A. It can be said that the general reaction to what Luis de Guiringaud said was an instinctive one. Because public opinion, I mean parliamentary public opinion, sees this as being an attack on the Christian community in Lebanon. I say "community" because the ordinary Frenchman does not know that there is more than one Christian community in Lebanon—the Maronites, the Greek Orthodox, the Greek Catholics and so on.

The impression arose that it was a question of an attack on the ancient loyalty and friendship that linked France with the Christian communities in the East. This resulted in a clash which evoked a violent reaction. This reaction was an honourable phenomenon in that it showed the extent to which the French are still attached to the Christians of the East—it was both admirable and moving. So much for the general picture. The situation in Lebanon is extremely complicated. All trends are to be found within all the communities—there are both moderates and extremists. This is something I do not want to stress or to make statements about.

All I want to say is that all parties were responsible for the Lebanese war, including the Palestinians, since they are part of the present population of Lebanon. I mean, of course, that it was the extremists in all the communities, who were responsible.

- Q. What do you mean by extremists?
- A. By extremists I mean all those who reject dialogue, because it is clear that things cannot

²⁷² Translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by Marwan Hanna, al-Safir (Beirut), November 7, 1978. return to normal in Lebanon as long as all parties have their arms at the ready. This operation can only be carried out through dialogue between the various communities.

Moreover, two years ago an additional factor was added to the elements that constitute the Lebanese problem—the presence of the Syrian army—and experience shows that if we are extremist we shall not be more successful in solving problems.

- Q. Let us return to what you said about the Lebanese crisis. You followed the development of that crisis closely. Could you provide a picture of the principal factors in it?
- A. First there is the internal Lebanese factor: the fact that there are a number of communities in Lebanon that since 1943 have existed in a specific state of equilibrium. In light of the developments that have taken place since then, many people thought that the system should be revised to ensure a better equilibrium. Briefly, some people started to question Christian, and in particular Maronite, domination. This led the Christians to adopt a defensive position.

Secondly, there are the Palestinians. Here there have been some excesses; some Palestinians have acted as they liked and felt that they were in their own land. This conflicts with the Cairo agreement.²⁷³ A point of particular importance is that though some Palestinians are Christians, the majority of them are Muslims. Therefore many people thought that their presence upset the existing confessional balance in Lebanon.

There is no prospect of the Palestinians returning to their country in the foreseeable future. In this sense the Lebanese crisis is linked to and influenced by the Arab-Israeli crisis.

Q. At the start of the civil war, when you visited Lebanon on an official mission, the Kaslik Convention submitted a document in which the idea of partition was clearly expressed.

Many people had the idea of partition long before the civil war; these things can be felt. Are we to stop the process. But how? At that time the civil war was everywhere, even within the government. In fact the incident of the bus (April 13,

²⁷³ See doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969* for an alleged text of the agreement.

1975)²⁷⁴ was only the fuse that sparked off the explosion. Long before that people were arming, organising and making ready for the civil war, and all the objective conditions for it had existed for a long time.

- Q. But do you not think that the objective conditions had existed as a seed within the framework set up in 1943, with the establishment of the state?
- A. Certainly not. I think that the contrary was the case. The conditions that attend on the birth of the Lebanese state, I mean the National Pact, consolidated coexistence between the confessions. In any case, in this connection we must bear in mind an important fact: when the parliament was meeting in 1976, after the Syrian intervention that put an end to the civil war, to elect Sarkis as President of the Republic, no one suggested that the Pact should be called into question, especially the fundamental article to the effect that the President of the Republic must be a Maronite. This indicates that, in spirit, the Pact is capable of survival and should be maintained.
- Q, But what is ironical is that it was not the Islamic communities that rejected the National Pact.
- A. Those who dispute or reject the Pact are those who want partition, whatever their confession.
- Q, Do you think it is merely a question of restoring the 1943 Pact?
- A. No, some revision of the National Pact is necessary and essential, with a view to securing a better equilibrium between the confessions.
- Q. But do you not think that the system of political representation based on confessional affiliations itself produces and reproduces the present differences?
- A. I do not think that this is a realistic way of putting the question.

In fact Lebanon to some extent has a feudal system and the system of parliamenary representation is based on groupings. These groupings exist in isolation from the religious confessions, and sometimes come into confrontation with each other, whether they belong to the same or to different confessions.

Lebanon is still a feudal country, and the de-

velopment that must take place in it is the development of society.

Q, In what way, do you think?

A. No one can give a prescription. This development must take place naturally, or through a revolution, and I think that the latter solution would be injurious. There must be dialogue between all the Lebanese without exception, between all the political forces that represent them.

Q, Then dialogue is the only solution?

A. It is not reasonable to reject dialogue. All the conflicting parties must discuss things so that a solution takes shape, and meet with President Sarkis in the chair, so that he may provide the stimulus and act as umpire.

Q, Does Your Excellency think that the charge that Syria wants to annex Lebanon should be taken seriously?

A. I do not think it is in Syria's interest to annex Lebanon as such an operation would result in the dividing up of part of Mount Lebanon and the invasion of South Lebanon by Israel. Syria is not going to take over the problems and difficulties of Lebanon, and this would also give her long frontiers with Israel. This is why I say Syria's interests lie in defending the unity and independence of Lebanon. And I think that this is the best way for her to protect her security.

In any case I believe that the maintenance of the independence and unity of Lebanon is an essential part of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. In fact the partition of Lebanon could only be an obstacle to peace, because it would be a source of new problems.

- Q. In other words, only Israel would benefit from the partition of Lebanon?
- A. The independence and unity of Lebanon are also in Israel's interest, if she really wants peace, I mean a comprehensive and permanent peace that solves the most important problems.
- Q. But where does the responsibility of the US lie as regards the problem of Lebanon? I am thinking in particular of some of the charges that have been made against Henry Kissinger and his successors.
- A. The US is not greatly interested in Lebanon. It sees Lebanon as no more than one factor in the game, and as far as it is concerned the game is firstly Israel and then oil. These are its principal interests.

²⁷⁴ A reference to the massacre of the Lebanese and Palestinian passengers of a bus in the Beirut suburb of Ain Rumaneh on April 13, 1975.

Only one country is interested in Lebanon as such—France.

Q, Yes, but this interest sometimes shows an overall view of the role that is required of France, which has started to abandon the policy initiated by de Gaulle as regards the Third World and the Arab world. The principles of this policy have started to become evident in, for example, Africa.

A. It is not in France's interests, nor is she able, to intervene militarily in Lebanon. In any case such an initiative would be politically dangerous, because it would take us back 30 years and lay us open to all sorts of charges.

Therefore action taken by France can only be political, and if she wants to take such action she will do so in a friendly manner and along with all parties to the conflict.

The UN can play a role but, judging by past experience, this would not be effective enough.

Q, What do you think links Camp David and the so-called American peace to the Lebanese crisis?

A. There is such a link, inasmuch as Lebanon is linked to the Middle East conflict. If peace is established between all, that is between all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Lebanese crisis will be resolved.

Q. Then a separate peace...

A. That is why I say "between all". What concerns Lebanon is peace between Israel and Jordan, Syria etc. That is to say, a peace between Egypt and Israel does not change anything as far as Lebanon is concerned.

Q. What do you think would be the "just, comprehensive and permanent peace" in the Middle East, and what place do the Lebanese people have in this perspective?

A. Again I say that all the problems must be solved. That is to say, peace must mean acceptance of the Palestinian *fait accompli*, security for all, and the solution of the Palestine problem, which means the creation of a state independent of Israel, and the solution of the problem of the occupied territories.

192

Joint communiqué issued at the end of a visit to Moscow by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat rejecting the Camp David agreements as inimical to the Arabs²⁷⁵

Moscow, early November, 1978

A PLO delegation headed by Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. paid a friendly visit to Moscow from October 29 to November 1. The two sides firmly condemned the separate deal between Egypt and Israel concluded at Camp David with US participation, viewing it as a conspiracy made behind the back of the Arabs and at their expense, with the aim of helping Israel to entrench itself in occupied Arab lands, including Palestinian territory and to prevent the fulfillment of the firm national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They are firmly convinced that this separate agreement between Egypt and Israel, prepared in Washington, is regarded as the national expression of this policy that is inimical to the Arabs.

They reject this anti-Arab policy which seeks to foil a comprehensive and just settlement in the Middle East, replacing it with partial and individual settlements that serve only the aggressor and the forces that support him. They share the view that the policy of surrender pursued by the Egyptian leadership does enormous damage to the just cause of Palestine and the struggle of Arab and African peoples for the sake of national liberation and increased independence.

Those participating in the talks believe that the rise of the Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation, in which the PLO plays an active role, has become an important factor in escalating the struggle against the schemes of imperialism and Zionism as well as the policy of encouraging aggressors. They are firmly convinced that top priority in these circumstances should be assigned to the job of consolidating and activating all forces that confront separate, anti-Arab deals. In this regard, both sides welcomed the holding of the Baghdad Arab summit.²⁷⁶

Yasir Arafat outlined the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people for their national rights. He

²⁷⁵ Originally published in Pravda; translated from the Arabic text, Novosti (Beirut), November 3, 1978. Item 1.

²⁷⁶ See docs. 318-327 below.

pointed out that the Palestinian people will allow no one to settle the Palestinian problem for them, especially if this conflicts with their legitimate rights. Separate agreements of this kind cannot and will not have effect where the Palestinian Arab people are concerned, and are considered illegitimate.

In the name of the PLO leadership and the Palestinian people, Yasir Arafat expressed his deep gratitude to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet leadership and Comrade Leonid Brezhnev personally as well as the whole Soviet people for the fraternal aid furnished to the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine and the honest and comprehensive support it continuously provides. He pointed to the fact that enhanced friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other members of the Socialist family is a fixed strategic policy of the PLO.

The Soviet side affirmed the principled policy of the Soviet Union which seeks to achieve a comprehensive Middle East settlement. The fulfillment of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine is an inseparable part of that policy. It also declared the firm solidarity of the Soviet Union with the Palestinian Arab people and the other Arab peoples that wage a just struggle to remove the traces of Israeli aggression and for the sake of their freedom and independence.

The two sides expressed their determination to continue the struggle to achieve a just and stable peace in the Middle East. They are convinced that such a peace cannot be achieved without total and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the fulfillment of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to self-determination, to the establishment of their independent state and to return to their homes in accordance with relevant UN resolutions. Accordingly, common efforts by all concerned parties must be made, with the participation of the PLO on a footing of legal equality, since it is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people.

Grave concern was expressed regarding the situation in Lebanon as a result of continued Israeli interference in the internal affairs of this country and of her attempts to increase tension and incite the fragmentation of the Lebanese

state. The two sides declared their intention to help restore the normal situation of Lebanon on the basis of guaranteeing Lebanon's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. They called for strengthening the authority of Lebanon's legal government over all the territory of the country with due attention paid to the legitimate interests of the PLO in Lebanon.

193

Press interview statements by Democratic Movement for Change leader Yadin of Israel discussing various aspects of the Camp David agreements²⁷⁷

Early November, 1978

Q, Professor Yadin, is it true that Israel, as some ministers and Knesset members claim and as many citizens feel, has for months been continuously pushed into further concessions by a united US-Egyptian front?

A. The US is in fact playing two roles in the peace negotiations. One-with the agreement of both parties—is as mediator. In this capacity, it is trying to bridge the gaps and exert pressure on the two parties. This is a usual and familiar technique for an arbitrator and mediator. However, the US would not have undertaken to play this role, had it not had an overriding interest in accomplishing the peace agreement. In this capacity, it has positions of its own, which, in certain domains and with regard to certain issues, are in contradiction to ours. This is not something new, but now it is expressed more strongly. The answers which the US gave to Husayn and the statements of Harold Saunders have sharply highlighted the contradiction between Israel and the US: the US interpreted the Camp David agreements in the spirit of its positions and gave its opinions as to what the solution to controversial issues should be. This gave rise to much complaint from us, because this was a remarkable deviation of the US from its first role as mediator-including in very sensitive

To put it simply, this behavior on the part of the US did not contribute to the promotion of the peace negotiations with Egypt, for we cannot

²⁷⁷ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), November 10, 1978. For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

expect Egypt to compromise more than the US and to give concessions to Israel in matters in which US support of Egypt is guaranteed.

On certain issues, Israel has undoubtedly found itself facing Egypt and the US together. In contrast, on other issues, concerning the question of diplomatic relations for example, the US supported the Israeli position, in accordance with the "Camp David" agreements.

- Q. Did not Israel also at Camp David give concessions with respect to some of its previous positions and deviate from its original peace plan? Did not Israel behave in this way with regard to the question of autonomy, when it conceded the source of authority to the Arab administration, the maintenance of order, and security of the borders of the autonomous area?
- A. The Camp David agreements, on certain issues for example, were founded on the original Israeli peace plan. Thus, for the initiators of the Israeli plan and those who support it, the justification exists that it was not, in fact, possible to attain peace with Egypt, except on the basis of the concessions on Sinai and the autonomy plan.

The virtue of the autonomy plan was—and will remain—that, prima facie, it leaves each party with open options to continue the political struggle when the five years have ended. In the autonomy plan there are differences between the original intentions of Israel and the Camp David agreements. This is true, insofar as it is true that Israel did not, from the outset, intend to give up its settlements in Pithat Rafih—and was obliged to agree to do so. But, in the main, the basic Israeli plans for autonomy have remained, and were in addition agreed upon in the Camp David agreements. Therefore...

- Q. Excuse me, in the Camp David agreements, Israel agreed not only to the withdrawal of the military rule but also its abolition. It is not clear from this that Israel has ceased to be the party which gives authority to the autonomy.
- A. No! This is not the case! The question of authority is a subject that has to be discussed prior to the establishment of autonomy. The intention is not to abolish the source of authority. In the negotiations, Israel will demand that the source of authority for autonomy and its administration be in the hands of Israel, even if physically the military rule is based in Tel-Aviv and not in Nablus.

Allow me to make a general remark to facil-

itate understanding of the question: Israel has not agreed, in any place or in any document, to define the final status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza —with the exception of the status of autonomy. Israel has agreed that, in the negotiations between the parties, the establishment of autonomy and its institutions should be accomplished. The implication of this is that, if an agreement is not attained, the present status quo will remain unchanged. And therefore, if Israel refuses, for example, to enter into negotiations with Jordan for the establishment of peace, three years after the establishment of autonomy-this implies a violation of the Israeli commitments at Camp David. But if Israel enters into negotiations, as dictated by the agreements, and the parties do not arrive at an agreement-this implies no violation of the commitment on the part of Israel. In such an event, autonomy will continue to exist-if it were established. The same applies to the present stage: if Israel refuses to conduct negotiations on the establishment of autonomy—this implies a violation of the Israeli commitment. However, if Israel enters into negotiations but the second party refuses to establish autonomy according to the conditions defined in the Camp David agreements and according to the conditions on which Israel insists—this will not imply any violation of Israeli commitments.

We very seriously intend and are fully ready to establish autonomy, of our own free will, not according to coercion, and with the conditions which we view as being vital to our security.

- Q. Is it true that Israel has agreed to conduct the negotiations on the establishment of autonomy with Egypt alone?
- A. Since Jordan did not respond to the invitation to participate in the discussions, we were asked [to agree] that the negotiations take place between Israel and Egypt, while in the original agreement the participants would have been Egypt, Jordan and Israel. In principle we have no objection to this, although this implies a deviation from the original agreement. Israel, nevertheless, demands that nothing be determined now in the peace agreement with Egypt, in the form of a contract, which is not defined in the "Camp David" agreements.
- Q. The US has just announced that there is no connection between the financing which Israel is demanding and

the signing of the peace agreement. Is this another expression of the deterioration of US-Israeli relations?

A. I do not know of such an official announcement... It must be said that at Camp David we would not have agreed, in any case, to remove our bases had the US not committed itself to helping us in financing their removal to the Negev. From the financial point of view, the implementation of the peace agreement does not end with the question of the air bases, but includes removing all the military installations from Sinai and setting up new installations in the Negev, with all the infrastructure necessitated by this move. It also includes the need to ensure that our settlers in Sinai will not be harmed from the material point of view. Israel will need as yet unspecified sums of money for the move, and it cannot bear their burden without American assistance, and without Israel collapsing economically.

US assistance to Israel is necessitated not only by the friendly relations that exist between the two states, but because the peace agreement contributes to the advancement of US interests. At the same time, we would be making serious mistakes with regard to US public opinion if we presented the matter in this way, as if we have no interest in peace and have done everything for the sake of the US only—therefore it must bear all the expenses. We have to explain to the Americans—and that is what we are doing—that we cannot agree that the peace, instead of bringing benefits to Israel, makes her collapse both economically and socially.

194

Draft agreement submitted by the US to Egyptian and Israeli delegations at Blair House negotiations in Washington regarding the peace treaty to be signed between Egypt and Israel²⁷⁸

November 11, 1978

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel:

Preamble

Convinced of the urgent necessity of establishing

a just, comprehensive and permanent peace in the Middle East which conforms with Security Council resolutions 242 and 338,

Reaffirming the commitment of the two governments to the framework of action for peace as agreed upon at Camp David on September 17, 1978.²⁷⁹

Noting that the above-mentioned framework is an appropriate framework meant to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and all her other Arab neighbours ready to negotiate with her for peace in accordance with this basis,

Desiring to arrive at an end of the state of war between them and to establish peace in the shadow of which every state in the region can live in security.

Convinced that the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for a comprehensive peace in the region and for arriving at a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its facets,

The two states, calling upon the other Arab parties to this conflict to join the peace process with Israel, a process that is guided by the principles of the framework agreement mentioned above and is built upon these principles,

Desiring, also, to develop relations of friendship and cooperation between them, in accordance with the UN Charter and with the principles of international law that relate to international relations in peace time, the two governments agree to the following articles, thereby exercising their free sovereignty to implement the framework of work agreement in order to conclude a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Article One

1. The state of war between the two parties shall end and a peace shall be established between them as soon as documents of ratification of this treaty shall have been exchanged.

2. Israel shall withdraw all her armed forces and their civilian employees from Sinai to beyond the line of the international frontier between Egypt and Mandate Palestine as set out in the Protocol

²⁷⁸ Translated from the Arabic text as published in al-Ahram (Cairo), November 24, 1978. The al-Ahram version contained no appendices and no map and did not give the source of

the document. However, the US submitted a plan for a peace treaty during the negotiations between Israel and Egypt at Blair House in Washington, which opened on October 12, 1978.

²⁷⁹ For the Camp David agreements, see docs 153 and 154 above.

- no. 1 appended. Egypt shall resume her exercise of full sovereignty over Sinai.
- 3. Following the end of the temporary withdrawal explained in Appendix 1, the two sides will establish normal and cordial relations, in accordance with Article Three.

Article Two

The permanent frontiers between Egypt and Israel are the internationally recognized frontiers between Egypt and the region of Palestine formerly under the Mandate as set forth in the map in Appendix 2, without prejudice to the question of the status of the Gaza Strip. The two parties recognize that these frontiers are inviolable and each shall respect the territorial integrity of the other, including territorial waters and air space.

Article Three

- 1. The two parties shall adhere to the articles of the UN Charter and to the principles of international law as they apply to relations between states in peace time, and especially,
- A. The two parties recognise and respect each other's sovereignty of territorial integrity and political independence.
- B. They recognize and shall respect each other's right to live in peace inside secure and recognized frontiers.
- C. They shall refrain from the threat or use of force, directly and indirectly against each other and shall settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.
- 2. Each side binds itself to ensure that no aggressive military action or acts of violence or the threat thereof shall issue from or be committed in each other's lands, or through forces that are under its control or any other forces stationed on its territory, against the citizens or possessions of the other side.

Each side binds itself not to undertake any military measure or aggression or any other act of sabotage or violence against the other side in any place, nor to incite to, induce, help or participate in any such action or threaten it. Each side binds itself to ensure that any who commit such actions will be prosecuted.

3. The two parties agree that the normal relations arising between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, an end to economic boycott and to all discriminatory barriers blocking the free passage of persons

and goods and shall guarantee that their citizens shall enjoy the necessary legal rights on a reciprocal basis.

The procedure by which they blind themselves to achieve these relations in a parallel sense as well as the implementation of the other articles of this treaty are set forth in Appendix 3.

Article Four

- 1. In order to ensure the minimum degree of security for both parties on an equal and reciprocal basis, certain security arrangements shall be made as agreed upon, including zones with limited forces in Egyptian and Israeli territory and the presence of UN troops and observers. Appendix 1 sets forth in detail the nature of these arrangements and their timing as well as other security arrangements that the two parties may agree upon later on.
- 2. The two parties agree to the stationing of some UN personnel in an area specified in Appendix 1. The two parties agree not to request the withdrawal of these UN personnel and that these personnel with not leave unless the UN Security Council agrees to this with the assent of its five permanent members, unless the two parties agree on some other measure.
- 3. A joint committee will be formed to facilitate implementation of the treaty, as set forth in Appendix 1.
- 4. The security arrangements set out in sections 1 and 2 of this article can be re-examined and amended by mutual consent, upon the request of any one party.

Article Five

1. Israeli shipping and cargo, going to or from Israel, shall enjoy right of free passage across the Suez Canal and through its approaches in the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea, in accordance with the provisions of the 1888 treaty which apply to all states.

Those who carry Israeli nationality as well as Israeli ships and cargoes, as well as ships and cargo proceeding to or from Israel shall be treated in a non-discriminatory manner in all issues relating to the use of the Canal.

2. The two parties consider the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all states for the purpose of ensuring freedom of shipping and air travel without let, hindrance or prohibition. The two parties shall

respect each other's rights of shipping and air travel to either country across the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Article Six

- 1. This treaty does not affect, and will not be interpreted to affect in any way, the rights and commitments of the two parties, in accordance with the UN Charter.
- 2. The two parties bind themselves to remain faithful and well intentioned as regards their commitments arising from this treaty, without heeding the behaviour or reaction of any other party and independently of any consideration outside this treaty.
- 3. In addition, the two parties are bound in adopting all measures necessary for implementation in their relations, to the provisions of multilateral agreements to which they are a party, including the submission of appropriate notes to the UN Secretary-General and to other quarters where such treaties are preserved.
- 4. The two parties are bound not to enter into any commitments that are contrary to this treaty.
- 5. In compliance with article 103 of the UN Charter and in case of a conflict of commitment arising out of the present treaty and any other commitments of the two parties, the commitments of this treaty shall be binding and shall be enforced.

Article Seven

- 1. Any conflict arising out of the implementation or interpretation of this treaty shall be resolved through negotiations.
- 2. All such conflicts of this type which cannot be resolved by negotiations shall be settled by mutual agreement or be submitted to an arbitration committee.

Article Eight

1. The two parties agree to establish a conciliation commission for mutual settlement of financial claims.

Article Nine

- 1. This treaty shall come into effect as soon as documents of ratification have been changed.
- 2. This treaty shall supplant the agreement between Egypt and Israel signed in September 1975.²⁸⁰
- ²⁸⁰ See docs. 148 and 164 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

- 3. All protocols, appendices and maps attached to this treaty shall be considered essential and complementary parts of it.
- 4. This treaty shall be submitted to the UN Secretary-General so as to be recorded in accordance with article 102 of the UN Charter.

1978—In Arabic, English and Hebrew. Each text shall be equally authoritative. In case of any disagreement over translation, the English text will be considered the final authority.

195

Statement by leaders of communist and workers' parties and governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and the USSR condemning the policy of separate Egyptian-Israeli deals²⁸¹

Mid-November, 1978

Having discussed the existing situation in the Middle East, the leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties and governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the USSR firmly condemned the policy of separate Egyptian-Israeli deals under the aegis of the United States, which only leads to new and dangerous complications in that region.

They expressed the conviction that such separate, anti-Arab deals run counter to the interests of attaining a comprehensive political settlement in the Middle East in accordance with the interests of all peoples of that region, the Israeli people included, and are in contradiction with the interests of international security and United Nations resolutions.

The leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties and governments of the fraternal states, the statement continues, pledged their support for the decisions of the Baghdad conference of the heads of state and government of Arab countries. They believe that these decisions will play an important positive role in the struggle for an effective and just settlement of the Middle East problem, in the interests of peace in the Middle East and in the interests of universal peace.

²⁸¹ English text as published in *Soviet News* (London), November 28, 1978, p. 398.

196

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of President Ceausescu of Rumania to Yugoslavia (excerpt)²⁸²

November 17, 1978

Examining the situation in the Middle East which continues to be complex, the two Presidents again expressed their conviction that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in this region can only be achieved through Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war, and recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination and the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

The solution has to be grounded in recognition of the interests of all parties to the conflict, as well as the right of all countries and peoples of the region to independent and secure development. The two Presidents underscored the significance of cooperation amongst all the Arab countries and their efforts to surmount disagreements amongst them and achieve solidarity in seeking a just solution to the crisis in the Middle East and the Palestinian problem. In connection with this they support efforts directed towards peaceful, integral and lasting solution of the crisis by means of negotiations with the participation of all interested parties, including the PLO, as the generally acknowledged representative of the Palestinian people. The need for full support and the active participation of the UN in these efforts was underscored once again on this occasion.

197

Message of solidarity from National Council President Zhikov of Bulgaria to PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat²⁸³

Late November, 1978

On the occasion of the International Day of solidarity with the Palestinian people, it is my pleasure to send to you and the PLO on behalf of the National Council and government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and on my behalf, our most sincere congratulations.

Our country highly esteems all U.N. efforts, and especially the great material and moral support against racism and colonialism which it offers through establishing the 29th of November as an International Day of solidarity with the Palestinian people.

The activities of the Israeli government (annexation of occupied territories, construction of settlements, driving out of Arab citizens, and mass arrests) are a major violation against human rights, overtly condradict the UN Charter, and threaten international peace.

The Palestinian cause is the cornerstone of the Middle East problem and a just and lasting peace in the area cannot be achieved without the establishment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, mainly the right of self-determination, establishing an independent state and the right of return as decreed by UN resolutions.

All attempts at a separate solution which take place against the Arab peoples will not only hinder the achievement of a complete settlement of the struggle, but also lead to greater complications in the area.

198

Message from Council of State Chairman Honecker of the German Democratic Republic to PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat conveying greetings of solidarity to the Palestinian people²⁸⁴

November 29, 1978

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Council of State and the people of the German Democratic Republic I convey to you, to the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and to the Palestinian people militant greetings of solidarity on the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.

The German Democratic Republic wholeheartedly supports the message of this Day. We reaffirm

²⁸² Excerpted from the text, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), XXVIII, 688, (December 5, 1978), p. 19.

²⁸³ English translation, Wafa (Beirut), November 27, 1978, p. 5.

²⁸⁴English text, Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Berlin), XVIII, 35 (December 9, 1978), pp. 278–279.

our unswerving solidarity with the just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine and with its sole legitimate representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The dangerous policy of separate solutions produced a complicated situation for the Arab peoples and added another obstacle to a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. In the face of these dangerous machinations great importance is to be attached to increased solidarity with the just struggle waged by the suffering Arab people of Palestine. With their consistent rejection of the separate deals of Camp David the conferences of Arab states held in Damascus and Baghdad adopted significant decisions in the interest of the Arab peoples. The commitment to render support and assistance, both in and outside the occupied territories, to the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and to defend the national unity of the Palestinians marks a success for all forces of peace in the Middle East.

I seize this opportunity to reiterate the principled position of the German Democratic Republic that no lasting and just solution in the Middle East can be achieved without solving the Palestine issue. We therefore vigorously demand the implementation of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to self-determination and to establishing a national state. To this end it is indispensable that the Geneva Middle East conference be reconvened with all interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, participating.

I assure you that the German Democratic Republic, faithful to the socialist principles of its internationalist foreign policy, will continue to stand in solidarity by the side of the Palestinian people who, under the guidance of the Palestine Liberation Organization, wage a successful struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

199

Statement by Foreign Minister Genscher of the German Federal Republic delineating his country's position vis-à-vis the Camp David agreements (excerpts)^{28,5}

Bonn, November 30, 1978

There can be no doubt that the situation in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict are closely linked. This is also the reason why the governments of the Nine states of the European community have several times pointed out that the Lebanon conflict threatens the stability of the whole Middle East area. It is likewise known that Europe has its own interest in leading the Middle East conflict to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace.

No-one should gain the impression that the Federal Republic needs to be challenged concerning its responsibilities in this matter. Both during and before its presidency of the European community, the Federal Republic has, in complete agreement with all its partners, brought all the influence it has in the neighbouring states and in Lebanon itself, to bear in order to contribute towards peace. But we should not give the impression that the decision as to whether peace reigns in Lebanon or not, lies in the hands of the Federal Republic.

In pronouncing on this matter we must review developments in the Middle East; for it is also in our joint interests to influence developments in a positive manner for the sorely tried people of Lebanon.

In the household debate I have announced for the Federal Republic that we will put our good relations with all parties to the conflict, and with all other states of the Middle East, in the service of the peace efforts on the basis of the declaration of the European parliament of June 19, 1977. ²⁸⁶ We want to suggest that those who did not take part in the Camp David talks also be brought into the negotiations process.

Ladies and gentlemen, there is no doubt that at Camp David important questions were not or have not yet been clarified. This should not mean that further negotiations have no prospects

²⁸⁵ Made during the parliamentary debate on the situation in Lebanon. Translated from the German text as published in *Deutscher Bundestag* (Bonn), November 30, 1978, pp. 9299–9300.

of results. For this reason it was pointed out on the latest visit of Jordan's King Husayn to Bonn that the developments initiated at Camp David can with the goodwill of all parties achieve its own dynamic in the direction of the goals which are set out in the declaration of the European parliament of June 29, 1977. ²⁸⁶

The Federal Republic has greeted the fact that at the Arab summit conference in Baghdad²⁸⁷ no decisions were taken which endangered the unity of the Arab position or that drove Egypt into a lasting isolation. A positive element of the Baghdad conference also was that all the states taking part spoke in favour of a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the principles as laid down in resolutions 242 and 338 of the United Nations Security Council.

Ladies and gentlemen, a glance at the history of the Middle East conflict shows that it has not always been thus, and that this chance should be used. That we have come this far is due not to a policy of confrontation between separate parties to the conflict, but rather to the patient use of our possibilities and relations to convince of the necessity for a negotiated solution. To this policy we wish to adhere.

The Federal Chancellor said at a dinner in honour of the Jordanian king on November 7:

"The ways opened up by the participants of Camp David offer chances for a real step forward in the direction of a comprehensive and just peace. The Federal Republic would warmly welcome it if a test of all the possibilities created at the Camp David led all the participants to use this opportunity."

Honourable ladies and gentlemen, we are currently experiencing how difficult it is, after more than 30 years of enmity and deep mistrust, to create trust, without which no peace is possible. The more so do we welcome the American government's moves, made with such energy and dedication, for a negotiated result. Your cooperation is of decisive importance for the future of the peace process. I say to you: the governments of the European community, as the American government, need no call to action. The governments are aware of their responsibility, but they also know that they alone do not hold the key to a

solution of a conflict that has been with us for centuries.

In view of the indisputable desire for peace on the part of the governments of Egypt and Israel, of the already charted long path in the direction of peace, and in view of the advantages that this peace will bring to the people, the Federal Republic has the established hope that the not underrated difficulties can still be overcome. We must all realize that the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours is long, and that can only mean it must be comprehensively settled. It is even more important that a framework for peace for all the parties and not just for the relations between two states be drawn up.

200

Letter to US President Carter from 16 members of the US Congress House International Relations Committee advocating a more active US role in the peace process and calling for US financial aid to enable Israel to withdraw from Sinai²⁸⁸

Washington, early December, 1978

As members of the Committee on International Relations, we are writing to express our support for a supplemental U.S. assistance program for Israel and Egypt, once a peace treaty is signed between them, to enable both countries to develop peaceful relations and promote regional stability in the Middle East.

We are proud of our country's role in facilitating direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel leading to the agreements reached at Camp David, and it is our hope that the dramatic events of the past months will soon lead to a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.

Once a treaty has been signed, we believe our

²⁸⁶ Doc. 220 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²⁸⁷ See docs. 318-327 below.

²⁸⁸ The signatories were as follows: Anthony Beilenson (D-Calif.), Jonathan B. Bingham (D-N.Y.), Don Bonker (D-Wash.), William S. Broomfield (R-Mich.), John Buchanan (R-Ala.), John J. Cavanaugh (D-Nebr.), Edward J. Derwinski (R-II1.), Wyche Fowler, Jr. (D-Ga.), Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.), Tennyson Guyer (R-Ohio), Robert J. Lagomarsino (R-Calif.), Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.), Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.), Larry Winn, Jr. (R-Kans.), Lester L. Wolff (D-N.Y.). Gus Yatron (D-Pa.).

Text as published in *Near East Report* (Washington), XXII, 50 (December 13, 1978), p. 229.

country must continue its preeminent role in encouraging and implementing the peace process. It is our assumption that a supplemental aid request by you is a logical extension of the agreement reached at Camp David.

The cost of Israeli withdrawal from the entire Sinai and the relocation of its defense forces is likely to be quite substantial. We believe a militarily strong and economically viable Israel is essential for any further progress in the pursuit of a genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it would be entirely appropriate for the United States to to provide Israel with a supplemental appropriation to enable it to defray the costs involved in withdrawing from Sinai and re-establishing an adequate defense system in the Negev.

In negotiating a peace treaty with Israel, President Sadat has made a major break with past Egyptian policy. Clearly, the people of Egypt anticipate a significant improvement in their standard of living as a result of the Camp David Agreement and we believe the United States should also be forthcoming with a meaningful aid program designed to enable Egypt to experience some of the tangible benefits of peace.

Considering the tremendous costs of another conflict in the region, we believe that our investment in the peace serves the highest interests of the United States, and, therefore, we shall sympathetically review any such request from you.

201

Press conference statements by US Congressman Findley (Rep.) urging the US government to enter into discussions with the PLO (excerpt)²⁸⁹

Washington, December 1, 1978

Mr. Arafat's pledge meets the essential conditions of a 1975 memorandum in which the U.S. government promised Israel it would not "recognize or negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."

The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Harold

Saunders on September 28 testified before the House International Relations Committee that the U.S. "could establish direct contact or dialogue with the PLO if it accepted all the principles and provisions of Resolution 242 including Israel's right to exist." ²⁹⁰ He also suggested that "some variation" of this formula might be enough.

Mr. Arafat's pledge, by promising defacto recognition and the renunciation of all forms of violence against Israel, meets the principles of Resolution 242 in sufficient detail and justifies immediate talks with the PLO.

The reaction of the U.S. government to Mr. Arafat's pledge is critically important. It will be a clear test of our good faith interest in talking to the PLO. If we still refuse to talk, then I must question whether our government is really interested in exchanging ideas with the PLO—despite the public statement of President Carter early this year that "there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects."

The breadth and perseverance of the PLO movement, in my view, is not fully appreciated in the United States. The PLO is the unchallenged spokesman of the Palestinian cause. It can be either an enormously constructive or disruptive influence on the Camp David process and in my view it makes great sense for the Carter administration to begin talks immediately. The U.S. administration cannot destroy, or even seriously weaken the PLO by refusing to deal with it.

Everyone should recognize, of course, that much hard negotiating with the PLO lies ahead, but the only way to start is by talking.

Critics may quibble that Mr. Arafat's pledge keeps open the right to use non-violent, that is, diplomatic and democratic means, to enlarge the new Palestinian state at the expense of Israel. But anyone with the slightest understanding of Middle East realities must understand why, at this stage, this reservation—totally non-violent in its form—is the very least recognition Mr. Arafat must give to the dreams the PLO has nurtured for 30 years. Yet, like everything else, even this reservation can be negotiable.

As Mr. Arafat has said time and again in conversation with me, he has very few cards to play and he must not play them all at once. He played a very big card in making this pledge to me.

 $^{^{289}}$ Excerpted from the text of a press release by Congressman Findley.

²⁹⁰ Doc. 177 above.

We discussed each phrase of his statement in detail. I have found Mr. Arafat to be a man who sticks very carefully by what he says to me. I base this on the experience I had after our first discussion last January. He had prepared a type-off of the taping of that discussion. I examined the text Mr. Arafat sent me, and I was impressed with its meticulous accuracy.

This time the moment I arrived, one of Mr. Arafat's aides brought in a tape recorder. He said he would again send a copy, and I expect eventually to get it. I took copious notes myself.

In my opinion, Mr. Arafat took a deliberate and substantial risk in approving this statement. To use one of his favorite expressions he was playing a card, this time a card he had never before played. The risk of course is that he may get nothing in exchange for playing it.

If, on the other hand, the U.S. Administration regards this as a significant statement and uses it as the basis for discussions with the PLO, then it could open the way to a comprehensive peace which would be very much to the benefit of all parties in the Mideast, especially Israel.

The statement was developed and approved toward the end of our four-hour discussion. He repeated the declaration issued several times recently by the PLO that "the PLO will accept as a state any part of Palestine that is liberated or evacuated. We have said that many times."

I told him that this statement does not answer the fear so often voiced by Israel that the PLO would continue violence against Israel even if a Palestinian state is established.

We then developed through discussion the pledge of non-violence. Here is what Mr. Arafat agreed to, after I wrote down the words, read them to him, and he discussed them repeating the phrases several times. He said he would stand behind the statement.

Mr. Arafat's statement, the one which I feel had the greatest significance:

The PLO will accept an independent Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza, with connecting corridor, and in that circumstance will renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of that state. I would reserve the right, of course, to use non-violent means, that is to say diplomatic and democratic means to bring about the eventual unification of all of Palestine.

He promised, "We will give de facto recognition to the State of Israel."

I asked, "Would you then live at peace with all your neighbors" His answer, "we would live at peace with all our neighbors."

Then he added,

"But it is we who would need protection, not Israel. Israel has 12 to 15 atomic bombs. I know."

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that the head of the PLO has promised de facto recognition and peaceful relations with the State of Israel.

Israel can no longer say that the PLO is pledged to destroy Israel with force. Every previous statement kept open the possibility that the PLO might continue violence even after a Palestinian state is established.

202

Speech by Secretary General Taraki of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan outlining Afghanistan's stand vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and separate agreements (excerpt)²⁹¹

Moscow, December 5, 1978

As regards the Middle East, the DRA considers that the Israeli aggressors must withdraw their troops from the Arab lands they have seized. The rights of the fighting people of Palestine, including the right to establish an independent national state, must be guaranteed. This problem cannot be settled through talks without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, for the fate of the people of Palestine is the heart of the matter. No final solution can be found to the problem, nor can a durable peace be established in the area through partial and separate agreements and accords between third countries.

²⁹¹ Made at a dinner given in his honour by the CC CPSU; excerpted from the partial English text, World Marxist Review Information Bulletin (Toronto), no. 3 (February 15, 1975), p. 16.

203

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister van der Klaauw of the Netherlands reaffirming the EEC's conviction that a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem must be based on UN resolutions 242 and 338 and on the necessity for a homeland for the Palestinian people²⁹²

Damascus, early December 1978

- Q, The Netherlands long stood aloof from the burning questions of the Middle East and the Third World. However, during the last few years your country has adopted a new attitude, a new openness to these problems. What are the principal aspects of this openness? Has your diplomacy succeeded in convincing and making itself heard?
- A. The Netherlands has always been greatly interested in the problems both of the Middle East and of the Third World. I think that the Netherlands' votes at the United Nations, as well as the outstanding efforts the country has been making for several years in the field of development aid, provide eloquent proof of this.
- Q. The European Community, of which the Netherlands is a part, has taken a stand, through official communiqués, in favour of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the accent placed on the need to find a just solution of the Palestine problem in conformity with the national rights of the people of Palestine and the UN resolutions. Now the agreements concluded at Camp David do not allow the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination and to the free choice of their future; this conflicts with international law and the resolutions of the UN, not to mention the foundations of a just peace. The reaction of the nine member states of the European Community has been ambiguous, whereas the old attitude was clear and the Arabs are almost unanimously opposed to the Camp David agreements. How do you explain this situation? Has your country a particular view to offer? How do you see the future of the Palestinian people?
 - A. In the past the Nine have on several occa-

- —The inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force.
- —The need for Israel to end the occupation of the territories she has been occupying since 1967,
- -Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and for its right to live in peace within secure and recognised frontiers,
- -Recognition that in the establishment of a just and permanent peace the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be taken into account.

They remain firmly convinced that all these aspects must be considered as constituting a whole.

The Nine are convinced that the Middle East conflict can only be resolved if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to their national identity is realised, with the need for the Palestinian people to have a homeland being taken into account. In conformity with this view, at the end of the Camp David conference the Nine expressed the hope that the results may constitute a great step forward on the road to a just, permanent and comprehensive peace and that all the parties concerned "will join in contributing to the attainment of this goal".294

- Q. The Euro-Arab dialogue has met with difficulties, the most important of which is the desire of the European party to express the dialogue in the form of economic and cultural cooperation, whereas the other party insisted on political cooperation as well. Is it to be concluded that Europe is afraid to face up to the consequences of European-Arab economic cooperation? How can this difficulty be surmounted?
- A. The Euro-Arab dialogue arose from the desire expressed by the countries of the Arab League and those of the European Community to make concrete, through a particular form of cooperation in many fields, the manifest improvement in the relations between these organisations. Although this has taken the form of economic, technical and cultural cooperation, nevertheless,

sions—in their statements of November 6, 1973, ²⁹³ September 28, 1976 and December 7, 1978, for example—expressed their conviction that a peace settlement should be founded on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and on:

²⁹² Interview conducted by *Tishrin* (Damascus), December 12, 1978. Translated from the French text of the interview supplied, on request, by the Royal Netherlands Embassy, Beirut. For UN resolutions 242 and 338, see doc. 268 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967* and doc. 34 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

²⁹³ Doc. 184 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

²⁹⁴ Doc. 159 above.

from the start the dialogue has had a political dimension.

- Q. On what points does Your Excellency think that the views of the Netherlands and Syria coincide, so that they could constitute a basis for cooperation between the two countries in their mutual interests?
- A. The importance that the Netherlands and Syria attach to the conscientious performance of their obligations as members of the United Nations, their desire for the achievement of a comprehensive, just and permanent settlement of the Middle East conflict, not to mention their experience—satisfactory to both parties—of mutual relations—constitute an excellent basis of agreement for the further exploration of the many possibilities of cooperation between the two countries.
- Q. The Netherlands being a member of the European Community, and granted that the Common Market countries have supported the resolutions calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, what is Holland's attitude to these resolutions and to the efforts at present being made to establish peace in the area?
- A. Like Syria, the Netherlands voted for Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The Netherlands is of the opinion that a just, permanent and comprehensive peace settlement must be based on these two resolutions. In the light of the close relations between Europe and the Middle East, the peace efforts currently being made in the latter area are of vital interest to the Netherlands. The firmness with which the Netherlands supports these efforts provides incontestable proof of this.
- Q. What subjects do you expect to discuss with Syrian officials during your visit to Syria?
- A. The problems of the Middle East and the possibility of strengthening bilateral relations in the political, economic and cultural fields will be the principal subjects discussed.
 - Q. What do you hope from this visit?
- A. I very sincerely hope to succeed in strengthening official contacts between the Netherlands and the Arab countries.
- Q. How do you appraise the nature and the level of the relations between Syria and the Kingdom of the Netherlands?
- A. I have the great honour to be the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands to pay

an official visit to your country. I think I may say that this shows how good are the relations between our two countries.

- Q. In your view, Mr. Minister, how can the Netherlands and Western Europe in general contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East?
- A. The countries of Western Europe have on many occasions stated their attitude to the Middle East conflict. In doing so they intended, within the limits of their ability, to contribute to the reaching of a comprehensive peace settlement.
- Q. What is the present attitude of the Netherlands government to the question of the national and political rights of the Palestinian people?
- A. The Netherlands, and their partners within the framework of European cooperation, are convinced that the Middle East conflict can only be resolved if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to their national identity is made a reality, with the need for the Palestinian people to have a homeland being taken into account. They believe that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, should take part in the negotiations, in an appropriate manner, to be decided in consultation between all the parties concerned.

204

Final communiqué issued by the NATO Ministerial Meeting²⁹⁵ (excerpts)

Brussels, December, 8, 1978

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 7th and 8th December, 1978.

Ministers reviewed developments in the Middle East and expressed the hope that all parties concerned would take the fullest advantage of the opportunities for a just and lasting peace offered by the current negotiations. They expressed hope for an early successful conclusion of these

²⁹⁵ Excerpted from the English text, Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXIX, 2022 (January 1979), pp. 36-37.

negotiations as a major step towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East and expressed support for United States efforts for such a comprehensive settlement.

205

Final communiqué of the fourth session of the General Committee of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (excerpt)²⁹⁶

Damascus, December 11, 1978

Ι

- 1. The General Committee of the Euro-Arab Dialogue held its Fourth Session from 9 to 11 December 1978 in Damascus. The meeting was opened by H.E. Sayed Abdul Halim Khaddam, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Prime-Minister of Syria who delivered a speech.
- 2. The two parties expressed their profound gratitude for the warm welcome given by the Syrian Government and for its efforts which have ensured the perfect organization of the meeting.
- 3. The two sides pursued the exchange of views on all the aspects of Euro-Arab co-operation—political, economic, social and cultural—which had taken place during past meetings of the General Committee at Luxemburg in May 1976,²⁹⁷ at Tunis in February 1977²⁹⁸ and at Brussels in October 1977.
- 4. They reviewed the situation in the Middle East and its developments since the last meeting of the General Committee held in Brussels from 26 to 28 October 1977. Both sides agreed that the continued Arab-Israeli conflict constitutes a threat to the security and peace in the Middle East and to international peace and security.

In this context both sides reaffirmed their conviction that the security of Europe is linked to the security of the Mediterranean region and the Arab region.

5. Both sides recalled their views that the Palestinian question is central to the conflict in the

²⁹⁶ Excerpted from the English text supplied, on request, by the

area and that a peaceful, comprehensive and just settlement of the conflict including obviously a solution to the Palestinian problem was not only a matter of vital importance to the Arabs but also of great concern to the Nine in view of the close relations existing between Europe and the Middle East.

- 6. The European side recalled that the Nine set out on many occasions in the past, for example, in their statements of 6 November 1973,²⁹⁹ 28 September 1976 and 7 December 1976, their view that a peace settlement should be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on:
- —the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force
- —the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict in 1967
- —respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries
- —recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

It remains their firm view that all these aspects must be taken as a whole. Such a settlement must also take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.

In this context, the European side emphasised that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned.

7. The Arab side reaffirmed that the continued occupation of territories by Israel constitutes a threat to peace and security in the Middle East and to international peace and security. It set forth the Arab position as regards the solution to the Palestine question. It emphasised that such a solution must enable the people of Palestine to establish their independent State on their territory and exercise the right to return to their homeland.

The Arab side noted the necessity of not putting any constraints on the rights of the representatives of the Palestinian people to speak in their name. With respect to cooperation between the two sides

²⁹⁷ Doc. 102 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

²⁹⁸ Doc. 57 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²⁹⁹ Doc. 184 in International Documents on Palestine 1973,

in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement, the Arab side felt that it was time for the European Community to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, which was already recognized by all the Arab States, most of the other nations of the world, and indeed by the United Nations.

- 8. The Arab side expressed the hope to receive a positive response to this demand in the forthcoming meeting of the General Committee.
- 9. The European side took careful note of the elements put forward by the Arab side at the General Committee and undertook to bring them to the attention of their Governments.
- 10. The Arab side referred to and condemned measures and actions taken by Israel in the occupied territories since 1967, such as the establishment of settlements in addition to changing their legal status and democratic structure including Jerusalem, as well as the coercive and repressive acts perpetrated by Israel against the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories in flagrant violation of the universal declaration of human rights. The two sides recalled the General Assembly Resolution under agenda item no. 126 of October 27, 1977. This resolution, inter alia:

determines that measures and actions taken by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

strongly deplores the persistence of Israel in carrying out such measures, in particular the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories;

calls upon Israel to comply strictly with its international obligations in accordance with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;

calls once more upon the Government of Israel as the occupying Power to desist forthwith from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature or demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.

11. The two sides stressed the need to restore peace in Lebanon and expressed the hope that every Lebanese would grant his steadfast support to President Sarkis, the symbol of legitimacy in Lebanon and its safeguard.

The two sides considered that national unity amongst the Lebanese was a pressing need in order to secure the independence of Lebanon, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to which the two sides pledged support.

The Arab side stressed its refusal to settle Palestinians in Lebanon, an idea rejected by the Lebanese and Palestinians and by all the Arabs. The European side confirmed that such an idea had never been advanced by the Nine.

The two sides expressed their hope that Euro-Arab Dialogue might offer a framework for future projects in Lebanon.

- 12. The Arab side favoured a meeting as soon as feasible of Arab Foreign Ministers with the Foreign Ministers of the European Community.
- 13. Both sides expressed the intention to ensure that the forthcoming General Committee should be convened within the due period in a European capital.

206

Communiqué issued by the Cabinet of Israel rejecting Egypt's proposed amendments to the draft treaty between Israel and Egypt³⁰⁰

Jerusalem, December 15, 1978

- 1. The government of Israel is ready to sign, without delay, the peace treaty with Egypt and its appendices as formulated on November 11, 1978, with the consent of the United States government. The fact that the peace treaty has not been signed is the full responsibility of the government of Egypt.
- 2. This week, in the course of contacts made between the two countries through the U.S. Secretary of State, Egypt set forth the following new demands from Israel:
- a. The implementation of autonomy in the Gaza Strip at least, is conditional on the exchange of ambassadors.
- b. A fundamental change in Article 4 of the peace treaty aimed at the revision of security arrangements in Sinai after five years.
- c. An interpretive letter concerning article six which negates its contents.
- d. Setting a date called target date for the implementation of autonomy in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

³⁰⁰ Translated from the Hebrew text, Davar (Tel Aviv), December 17, 1978, p. 2.

- 3. These demands deviate from the Camp David agreement or are not included in it, and change fundamentally the substance of the abovementioned peace treaty. Therefore they are unacceptable to Israel and rejected by it.
- 4. The government of Israel rejects the American attitude and interpretation concerning the Egyptian proposals.
- 5. The letter concerning the autonomy arrangement is open to clarification and reformulation.

207

Television interview statements by US Secretary of State Vance clarifying some of the issues involved in the Camp David agreements that were discussed with Israeli and Egyptian leaders (excerpts)³⁰¹

December 17, 1978

Monroe: Mr. Secretary, in the Middle East could you tell us what is behind the current snag in negotiations and tell us how serious you look on it as being?

A. First, let me say the parties have come a long, long way and that the issues which remain are very few and of much lesser importance than the issues which have been resolved. Indeed, there are only a handful of issues. Let me tell you what they are. I think perhaps the best way to do it is to describe my recent trip to the Middle East.

When I went to the Middle East there were about four of five issues separating the parties. The President and I decided that what we should do is go first to Egypt and see whether or not we could, in discussions with them, get a resolution of some of these issues, which could then be discussed with the government of Israel.

One of the issues was the question of the interpretation of Article IV of the proposed draft treaty. That, as currently drafted, provides that either party may—and I underscore "may"—ask the other party to review the provisions of that treaty and that when such review takes place

amendments to the treaty can only be made by mutual agreement of the parties.

A question had been raised as to whether or not the word "may" left the parties in a situation where if one asked, the other could say, "Thank you very much. I have heard your request, but I will not sit down and discuss it."

President Sadat agreed during the discussions which we had that he wanted to clarify that, not change the language as it existed, but to make sure that when one party asked, that the other party would sit down and discuss it, and that was agreed. That is all that that clarification does.

The second clarification was a very simple one sentence statement relating to another article in the treaty which indicated that this clarification would make it clear that the treaty was not in contradiction of what has already been stated in the preamble, namely, that this treaty was in the context of the overall Camp David framework.³⁰³

The third open item was the question of how to deal with ambassadors. On the question of ambassadors, there had been a quid pro quo between the parties. In the earlier discussions it had been agreed that, ad referendum to the governments of the two countries there would be an accelerated withdrawal from the Sinai, particularly the area around El Arish. In response to that, the Egyptians have said, "If that early accelerated withdrawal takes place, then I will be prepared to accelerate the exchange of ambassadors."

When the cabinet in Israel turned down the accelerated withdrawal, Sadat then withdrew his quid pro quo for that, namely the accelerated withdrawal—exchange of ambassadors.

Finally, the fourth issue related to a letter that would cover the procedures for proceeding to set up a self-governing authority on the West Bank and Gaza. The proposal there was to work out a letter which would be agreeable to the parties. Such a letter was worked out. I then took these proposals to Israel and discussed them with the Israeli Defense Committee. I think you are all familiar with the fact that they have been turned down at this point.

Where we go from here, we will have to see. I do not think this means an end to the negotiations. We will continue to be willing to work with the

³⁰¹ Interview conducted by Bill Monroe, Steve Delaney, George Will and Carl Rowan; broadcast on NBC's "Meet the Press"; excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by NBC, pp. 2–3, 5–7. For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

³⁰² Doc. 194 above.

³⁰⁸ For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.

parties to try to bring these to a successful conclusion.

Delaney: Mr. Secretary, back to the Middle East for a moment.

In 1975 your predecessor was trying to arrange the Sinai II agreement³⁰⁴ by which further separation of forces would go on between Egypt and Israel. There was a period in March where the thing seemed to break down and we were in a holding pattern for about six months, and then in September essentially the same deal was made as rejected by the Israelis in March. Is there a parallel in the situation we are in now? Are we going to have a cooling off period followed by a resumption and essentially the same deal being struck?

A. I think that the suggestions which I took with me to Jerusalem were constructive suggestions. As I indicated, two of them are simply clarifications. I think those clarifications ought to be able to be worked out between the parties.

The question with respect to the West Bank/ Gaza letter is one which has as its most difficult issue and, really, the only substantive issue, whether or not there will be the specification of a target date, not a fixed date but a target date, for the accomplishment of the elections and inauguration of the self-governing authority.

It seems to me this should not be a problem the parties can't resolve.

Delaney: Sir, when we were in the Middle East a few days ago, there were some indications that at least some of the Israeli cabinet members were theoretically prepared to accept a target date and that the fact that it didn't go through the cabinet was belied to some extent by the expressed willingness of the Israeli government to consider new arrangements. Is that an opening, an opening toward the resolution of that question of the target date?

A. I hope that is what it means.

There was, as you indicate, in the statement issued by the cabinet,³⁰⁵ an indication that with respect to that particular letter they were prepared to have further discussions, and I hope that that means there is a willingness to discuss the question of a target date.

Delaney: Can all this be boiled down then to the

status of being—the timing of sending an ambassador to Israel against the timing of an autonomy election in the West Bank?

A. That, I think, is the most difficult issue, as I see it, in the aftermath of the discussions which I had, and I would come back to the basic nature of the problem there. This is the question of the bargain that had tentatively been struck before but fell apart when the accelerated withdrawal could not take place and then the quid pro quo for that was withdrawn. I think that is the most difficult of the issues, yes.

Monroe: Mr. Secretary, the Israelis have accused the United States of one-sidedness as between Israel and Egypt. A moment ago you mentioned several modifications in the treaty favored by the Egyptians and made them sound rather reasonable.

Do you feel that Israeli inflexibility is a major factor in the breakdown of negotiations?

A. I feel that the proposals that I took to Jerusalem were reasonable proposals; I so stated. I think it is the duty of a mediator not only to move between the parties and try to find a way to bridge the gaps between them, but also when we see either of them taking a position which we think a reasonable position, to state it as a reasonable position, and that is what we have done.

I think and hope that there will be further considerations of the proposals which I took and that the discussions will be able to get started again.

Monroe. By implication are you stating that you don't feel the Israelis are now in a reasonable position?

A. I think that I was saddened, let me say, at the fact, and disappointed, that the proposals were apparently turned down so flatly at the end of my trip.

Rowan: After conversations with the President, the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Byrd said that the Congress might deny aid to Israel if they continue to put settlements in occupied territory. Is the administration supporting this kind of pressure on Israel?

A. Senator Byrd is a very distinguished Majority Leader of the Congress. When he returned from his trip to the Middle East, he made this public statement with respect to the question you have mentioned, Mr. Rowan. Those reflect his views as the Majority Leader. He is not speaking for the administration with respect to that.

³⁰⁴ Docs. 148 and 164 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*. ³⁰⁵ Doc. 206 above.

We have said with respect to the question of settlements that we consider this to be a fund-damental issue and one in which we disagree with the government of Israel. We believe that the establishment of settlements is illegal, but when Senator Byrd was speaking he was speaking for Senator Byrd, not for the administration.

Will: Mr. Secretary, on the subject of the alleged illegality of the settlements, the State Department recognizes indeed as its basis of negotiations in Southern Africa the authority of the International Court of Justice with regard to Namibia.

There are those who argue that the principle implicit in that negotiating basis, applied to the continuing validity of the Palestine mandate, indicates clearly that the settlement of Jews in the West Bank is permissible until the unallocated portion of the Palestine mandate is allocated through negotiations.

Isn't there a conflict between your acceptance of the principle in South Africa and your rejection of it in the Middle East?

A. No, there is not. I think this is clearly covered by the provisions of the Geneva IV Conference which dealt with the question of the establishment of settlements in occupied territory. We have examined this on a number of occasions and have had, through many administrations, several administrations, a clear legal view that the establishment of the settlements is illegal.

208

Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin of Israel discussing Egypt's proposals for a peace treaty³⁰⁶

Jerusalem, December 19, 1978

Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen, Knesset members, what were we—and are we—ready to sign, what we cannot—and will not be able to—sign?

On 21st November, 1978, we decided that if the other party was ready to agree to what we were, we would sign the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt as consolidated on 11th November,³⁰⁷ following lengthy and tiring negotiations between the Israeli and Egyptian delegations with the help, knowledge and full consent of the US delegation.

This peace treaty includes Article XI [number as heard, presumably VI], which has two major paragraphs. Paragraph 2 says: The parties agree to fulfil in good faith their obligations under this treaty, without regard to the action—or inaction—of any other party, and independently of any document which is external to this treaty.

Paragraph 5: Subject to Article 103 of the UN Convention, in the event of a conflict between the parties' obligations and their other obligations, the obligations under this treaty will be binding and will be implemented.

Paragraph 2 of Article XI [number as heard] has but one meaning; the peace treaty stands on its own feet. It is not conditional upon what has been done-or has not been done-by this or another party. And I shall give an example: At Camp David, Egypt and Israel both invited three other Arab countries: Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, to join the peace-making process. Neither Egypt nor Israel can force these three countries, Israel's neighbours, to do so. The same applies to the autonomy arrangements, which involve a constitution dealing with elections and [also involves] holding elections. We, of course, wish to implement this part of the Camp David accords, but things are not dependent either on us or on Egypt.

In paragraph 2 we had made the commitment that the peace treaty will stand regardless of what any party does, or refrains from doing, and that is why we cannot accept a list of Egyptian interpretations for that paragraph of Article XI [number as received] backed by the US Administration, saying: The contents of Paragraph 2 of Article VI in this treaty will not be understood as contradicting the fact that this treaty was made in connection with a comprehensive peace arrangement according to the instructions of the framework for peace in the Middle East which had been agreed upon at Camp David. In other, simple, words: According to this list of interpretations, which is supposed to be an annex to the peace treaty and which was submitted to us for the first time last week, the peace treaty would

³⁰⁶ Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/ 6000/A5-11; reprinted by permission.

³⁰⁷ Doc. 194 above.

not stand on its own feet, and the other party would be able—any time it reaches the conclusion that it is worth doing so—to claim that a comprehensive peace had not been reached and, therefore, the peace treaty as it was to be signed would not be valid.

Paragraph 5, for which the US Administration provided the legal interpretation, says: The questions raised in connection with Article VI refer to the result of the treaty about mutual—or collective—defence and security agreements of the parties. We had been specifically asked whether Article VI would have prevented Egypt from lending a hand to a country with which Egypt had a mutual defence or security agreement—or a collective one—in the event of that country being the vicitm of armed aggression. The answer is that Article VI has no such result.

I have read [the above] from that list of interpretations compiled by the State Department adviser which had been given to Egypt several weeks ago and came to our knowledge only last week. What is the meaning of this authorized US announcement? The treaty we were about to sign with Egypt is a peace treaty. When, in Paragraph 5, it says that if there is a contradiction between the parties' other commitments—whatever they are—and the commitments according to this treaty, the commitments according to the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli treaty would be the ones which would be binding and would be the ones which would be carried out, we could have been assured that we had indeed signed a peace treaty with Egypt. On the other hand, if it says that in the event that an Arab country with which Egypt is connected in a collective or mutual agreement should be a victim of war, then the commitment according to that treaty-with a third, fourth or fifth country, and so on-will be effective, and not the peace treaty with Israel, then again, that treaty ceases to be a binding peace treaty with Israel.

True, the words "a victim of armed aggression" are positive, nice and even acceptable words, but first of all, we—the State of Israel—have no such treaties with any other country. The reference is only to the other party, to Egypt. However, we all have the experiences of this generation, especially in the Jewish state. Well, there were cases in which we were clearly attacked, and [yet] it was claimed that we attacked. There is a prob-

lem of decisions made in various summits according to which our very presence, whether on the Golan Heights or in Judea and Samaria is aggression, and therefore, anyone who attacks the aggressor carries out—so to speak—an act of self-defence, and if Israel resists such aggression...

[Likud member of the Knesset Moshe Shamir, interrupts] Mr Prime Minister, did that include Sinai as well?
[Begin] Yes.

[Shamir] You have not mentioned the Sinai. Why? I am asking whether this included the Sinai as well?

[Begin] I am prepared to answer the question in the affirmative. Is that OK? Are you satisfied? I meant to give an example, and I did. There is no need to get angry.

[Begin continued] Then we would be in a position whereby, in fact, the defending party might be accused of aggression. Things like this have already happened, and this is our experience. In fact, all these mutual defence agreements, all the security arrangements, are treaties against Israel. They are signed between Egypt and the Baghdad Treaty countries. There is such a treaty between Egypt and Syria, between Egypt and Jordan, between Egypt and Iraq, between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and between Egypt and all the various other Arab League countries. That is why this interpretation, too, makes Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the proposed peace treaty devoid of all content.

As for Paragraph 4 of Article IV in the peace treaty—which states that the security arrangements provided for in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the parties—we have heard an argument according to which the Egyptians interpret these words that we should be able to reject outright a request or a proposal to discuss changing these arrangements. I should like to announce from this podium that we have never had such an intention. If there is a need to clarify the real intention, then if the Egyptians one day ask to dicsuss the security arrangements, we will be ready to discuss this with them. Of course, a change can only take place with the consent of the two parties. However, the Egyptian list of interpretations submitted to us-again, with US support-says: Paragraph 4 of Article IV will be understood to mean that

the reassessment, as determined in this article, will be carried out at the earliest and that the change could take place only by mutual consent of the parties; let it be accepted that such a reassessment will be effective after the treaty has been in effect for five years. We do not accept this addition.

There is no precedent for a peace treaty to include time determinations. There are treaties in which temporary arrangements which include a period of time are made, according to which, prior to the end of the binding period, it is possible to announce the cancellation of the treaty. However, there is no such precedent in peace treaties. It is signed as such for ever. This is why we are not accepting the list of interpreations which includes the determination that a reassessment must take place five years after the treaty is signed.

It was agreed between us that we would exchange ambassadors. This is stated in Article I of Annex III in the following words: The parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal, that is to the El Arish-Ra's Muhammad line. In connection with this mutual commitment, a letter from President Carter addressed to me was to have been received. saving: I have received a letter from President Sadat to the effect that within one month after Israel has completed its withdrawal to the interim line in the Sinai, as determined in the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive an Israeli resident ambassador in Egypt. I would be grateful to you if you could confirm that this procedure will be acceptable to the Israel Cabinet.

It is acceptable. However, in the meantime, we have received another draft of Article I of Annex III, and it says: The parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations upon the completion of the interim withdrawal, and afterwards to exchange ambassadors. At the same time, we received a draft of the following letter, which was written on 12th December by President Sadat to US President Jimmy Carter, saying: In reply to your request, I can confirm that within one month after the self-rule administration, which may first be established in the Gaza district as a step towards the full implementation of the Camp David framework is inaugurated, Egypt will send

a resident ambassador and will receive an Israeli resident ambassador in Egypt. This is a fundamental change. According to the agreement which had been reached and according to Annex III—as well as President Carter's letter which was about to be sent to me—it had been determined that one month after the completion of the withdrawal of our forces to the El Arish-Ra's Muhammad line, there would be an Egyptian ambassador in Israel and an Israeli ambassador in Egypt.

Now, this promise has been cancelled and the exchange of ambassadors will be connected to the establishment of the autonomy, either in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, or at least in Gaza.

The Egyptians, as we have heard, explain this change in that, with reference to the period of between three to nine months, we have supposedly promised them to have shortened the withdrawal stages and that the Cabinet decided otherwise and cancelled the promise given to them. The truth is this: During the negotiations, as sometimes happen, our representatives talked about the possibilities of shortening the time of pulling our forces back in the first interim stage: instead of nine months, six months; perhaps even instead of three months, two months. All this is true. No minutes were taken about this. In the midst of the negotiations, the Cabinet discussed this issue and decided that it could not take upon itself shortened, predetermined stages of withdrawal, but it agreed to set up a joint Egyptian-Israeli committee which would discuss this issue in accordance with the Cabinet decision.

There is no connection between this issue and the mutual relations between Egypt and Israel. The exchange of ambassadors is merely a bilateral problem between two countries. It has clearly been agreed, as I have proved by the documents, that on a certain date the ambassadors would be exchanged. Now we are required to agree that the exchange of ambassadors be continent upon the establishment of the autonomy, at least in Gaza. We cannot, under any circumstances, link the two things, which cannot be linked at all, because the issues are different and that is why we have not accepted this Egyptian proposal as supported by the United States.

In addition to this, we have received a draft letter—it is still not clear whether this is supposed to be a unilateral letter or an exchange of letters or a letter which will be written by the President of the United States—however, I should like to say that in this letter there is an attempt to impose a special Egyptian guardianship over the Gaza Strip. According to the Camp David accords, such a guardianship has never been agreed upon, it has not even been mentioned. There are also two other transgressions from the Camp David accords in this very letter. However, the essence of this letter is setting a date for the implementation of the autnomy and for holding elections for the self-administration, as agreed upon at Camp David.

Mr Speaker, the Cabinet unanimously decided to reject any idea of any kind of date with reference to the implementation of the autonomy in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. As I have said before, we want to carry out and fulfil the Camp David accords. We signed them, and our signature is our commitment. However...

[Interruptions from the floor.]

The Cabinet has unanimously decided not to accept the proposal of a date, not even of a date called the target date. The reason is crucial. It is true that there is a need to have a constitution for elections and it is necessary to know the composition of the administrative council. It is necessary to determine the authority and responsibility [of that council]. It is necessary to determine the security arrangements for the interim period and for the period beyond the five years agreed upon as the interim period for Israel and its neighbours. Many details must be decided upon, and elections must be held. However, in order to hold elections, it is first of all necessary to have people to vote and candidates.

Today, after all that has happened in the last few months, we can say for the moment there are neither the former nor the latter, because there is intimidation, and there are things [which prove the existence of] objections to...

[Interruptions from the floor]

There is intimidation. Things are outside the supervision of the Egyptian President and outside the supervision of the Israeli Cabinet. Even if it is called a target date, it is a date. And not only would it not bring any good, but on the contrary, it will do a lot of harm because towards the date there will be increased intimidation, and we should like to carry out what we have taken upon ourselves. That is why we have all unanimously decided that we shall not accept what is called

here a target date, which is 12 months; the end of 1979. We now have proof by experience. At Camp David, the two countries had agreed to what had originally been called a target date, namely; that within three months after the signing of the agreement we should sign a peace treaty. There were prolonged negotiations, conducted by men who represented both countries, and thus, not by our fault—I shall proceed to deal with this issue—we were ready to sign the peace treaty of 11th November. That peace treaty was not signed after three months, and yet there are those who blame Israel for not meeting the target date.

This was in the hands of the two sovereign countries, in the hands of the two Cabinets. They were to have conducted the negotiations, and their representatives indeed conducted the negotiations. This is the lesson, that even what is called a target date might prove to be an obstacle and we could not accept any target date, as we have decided.

Mr. Speaker, our case is just. If things had depended on us, the peace treaty of 11th November would have been signed between 18th November and this date. We could have signed that treaty any day since 18th November, and it would have been signed. We have made sacrifices for peace, sacrifices which were very painful. Not only will I not deny this, but I will be the first to admit it. We want peace and believe in peace, but we are not prepared to sign a peace which is rendered devoid of content by what is called lists of interpretations because this is a matter of life and death for us. Someone may claim: it is always possible to violate a treaty. This is true, and there have been treaties which have been violated and the members of our generation remember them, but there is no one who could demand that we endanger Israel's security with our own hands, that we sign a treaty which is not a peace treaty, whose major articles are devoid of content, which is connected by an umbilical cord to a comprehensive arrangement which is not completely in our hands but is in the hands of other elements which, according to the same lists of interpretations for Paragraph 5, might create a situation in which one of the enemies should wage a war against us and we still have some enemies in the North and in the East even after signing the peace treaty with Egypt-a southern front might be opened as well. That is why our cause is just, and we will insist on it.

[Interruptions from the floor]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to repeat my main announcement. Today we are also prepared to sign the peace treaty as consolidated on 11th November with Egypt. However, these lists of interpretations supported by the US Administration have not made it possible for the Israeli Cabinet to do so and will not permit it to do so in the future either. We must be prepared, with all the friendship that exists between ourselves and the United States and with all recognition of the existing and continuing mutual aid between the United States and the State of Israel-we must be prepared to reject Egyptian demands which endanger the wellbeing of our people even if they are supported by the US administration, until the US Administration recognizes its mistake, because the State of Israel is an important element in the free world and must not be weakened, but must be further strengthened, as many important and great men in the United States are saying these very days.

[Unidentified Knesset member, interrupting]. What about the publicity campaign?

[Begin] I can tell the Knesset that in this campaign over a just cause we are not alone. Not only are our people throughout the world today at the side of the State of Israel, but enlightened people also say that Israel has been accused for no reason and it was blamed for no reason for the fact that the peace treaty was not signed by 17th December. It was prepared to sign it, but the other party—by its proposals which transgress the framework of the Camp David agreements and which are not included in it, or which make the major points of the peace treaty valueless—it is the other party which prevented the signing, and total responsibility for not signing the peace treaty to this day rests upon it.

Mr Speaker, the State of Israel will not sign a treaty with Egypt for non-peace. The State of Israel will sign a peace treaty with Egypt. 209

Press interview statements by Chairman of the World Labour Zionist Movement Allon criticizing the Israeli government's handling of negotiations with Egypt (excerpt)³⁰⁸

December 1978

Q. It can be said that Mr. Begin's interpretation of Judaism was at least partially responsible for the kind of peace plan that was worked out at Camp David. On You are the architect of the Allon Plan which reflected your party's approach to a peace agreement, unofficially at least. This approach was quite different from the one adopted at Camp David and yet when the Camp David agreements came up for a vote in the Knesset most of the members of your party, if not you yourself, voted in favor of them. How can you reconcile your approach to peace with your vote in the Knesset?

A. It is true that I have my own concept about how peace can be achieved. This concept was already crystallized in June, 1976 during and immediately after the Six Day War. This was not a capricious plan. It was a plan which was based on sheer rationale. It was a plan which took into account the historical ties of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel, not as a compulsory cartographic concept but as a moral basis for the existence of a Jewish State in the Land of Israel. It took into account the strategic necessities based on topography and it also took into account the demographic necessities based on the desire to keep Israel a Jewish state. Although we shall always have a distinguished Arab minority, annexation of the entire Land of Israel-to which we incidentally do have an historical right-would have changed Israel from a Jewish state to a binational state if we were to grant them equal rights. If we accept all sorts of ill-advice about controlling the area and depriving the Arabs of their equal rights we shall cease to be a democracy. Zionism envisaged both a Jewish and a democratic state.

I also felt a moral obligation to contribute our share towards solving the Palestinian problem. We cannot solve it by ourselves but we can contri-

³⁰⁸ Interview conducted by Robert Salz, *Jewish Frontier* (New York), XLVI, 1 (January, 1979), pp. 18–19.

³⁰⁹ For the Camp David agreements, see docs. 153 and 154 above.
³¹⁰ For the Allon plan see doc. 163 in *International Documents on Palestine 1978*.

bute our share. By allowing the inhabited parts of Judea, Samaria and Gaza with over one million Arab inhabitants the possibility of reuniting with their brethren across the river in Jordan—which is also part and parcel of the historical land of Israel and Palestine—we were also doing a good thing which would help us morally as well as politically. As you said, this plan was neither accepted nor rejected. It was impossible to get a consensus in the national coalition which included ministers from Mapam to Herut.

If I may quote the late Prime Minister Eshkol who said "You may have a strange coalition here. The hawks and the doves will both oppose the plan." The hawks thought I was giving away too much while the doves thought I was taking too much away from the Arabs and they would both comprise a majority. I interjected that one should add to this those who would oppose the plan merely because it was mine... So he laughed but nevertheless accepted the plan and said "Don't ask for a vote, leave it open." He promised me that as far as the land settlement was concerned we would stick to the parameters which were set by the plan.

Now within the Party which used to be and still is to some extent a pluralistic party, there were those who were against it and those who were for it. At the very least the Party's land-settlement policy was compatible with the concept which I developed in my plan, from the very beginning, immediately following the Six Day War until the last day of the Labor Government. This concept was adopted officially (not necessarily mentioning the name of the plan) by the Party's convention before the last general elections. It was included in the manifesto of the Labor Party prior to the elections. When Mr. Begin took over one of the first statements which he made was "Now ladies and gentlemen the Allon Plan is dead, dead in spirit and dead in action." I was present so I smilingly reacted saying "Mr. Prime Minister, a day will come when you will long for this plan." I think that he is beginning to long for it now.

As for the Camp David Accords, I did not personally vote for the Government's proposal to approve them. I proposed to the Party that we work out a draft resolution of our own which would approve the Camp David Accords as the least evil of the alternatives left open at this point, but would add to it several demands of our own.

When it came to Labor's resolution, I voted for it together with the rest of my colleagues in the Knesset but since in this special case, all of the Knesset factions decided that no faction discipline would be required, I abstained in the vote for the Government's proposal. I voted for the peace agreements by supporting my party's proposal. I abstained in the vote on the Government's proposal in order to demonstrate my disassociation with the way in which Mr. Begin and his colleagues introduced the agreement and with the results of the agreements. I did this particularly because I saw before my eyes those settlers who were sent by me and my colleagues to settle those borders which we considered indispensible to our security needs. Although I am ready to give up much the greatest part of the West Bank and other areas I am not ready to sacrifice our legitimate security needs as the Camp David Agreements do to some extent. So I abstained and remained faithful to my views.

Q. Specifically, how do you think that Mr. Begin has been mishandling the peace negotiations?

A. I think that we are paying heavily because of Mr. Begin's obsession. His obsession is to realize his dream of a Greater Israel. This is my only explanation. Why was Mr. Begin so generous when he voluntarily gave up all of Sinai, including all it contains such as defensible borders, airfields, all the settlements. When we negotiated the Sinai Accord in 1975,311 he not only criticized it so bitterly but he voted against it and his followers went out into the street and built barricades and protested the Accord, using violent methods. Now Begin was willing to cede all of Sinai because he hoped that in return for his generosity in Sinai Sadat would give him a free hand in Judea and Samaria. But I'm afraid that Mr. Begin knows very little, not only about the nature of his counterparts but also about what negotiations are.

Austrian Chancellor Kreisky once made a very ugly comment about Mr. Begin which I rejected. He said that the Prime Minister was just a small shopkeeper from Eastern Europe. After rejecting this remark, I said that I wished that Begin were a small shopkeeper because then he would have known how to bargain. He paid heavily in order to maintain the principle of a complete Israel or

³¹¹ Docs. 148 and 164 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

Land of Israel (which is bigger than Israel) at Camp David when he accepted the idea that Arab autonomy should embrace the entire area which is being administered today by the military government. What will happen to the defensible borders? What will happen to the settlements along the borders, not to speak of the undesireable settlements which the Gush Emunim established over the past $1-\frac{11}{2}$ years? All this will be lost because Mr. Begin did not even want to make any gestures that might indicate the possibility of partitioning the country. He thinks that through his approach he is keeping his option to extend Israel's sovereignty over the entire areas of Yehuda. Shomron and Gaza open.

In my view this is playing the entire bank, which means either I get everything or I lose everything. Knowing the nature and the deep roots of the Palestinian Arab community which lives in this area, the establishment of autonomy within five years will initiate an irreversible process toward

some kind of national identification. Therefore Begin made a mistake, a grave mistake which will force us to work hard to find an interpretation which will allow us to maintain a security presence while establishing the autonomy. By the way, I am not against autonomy. The Allon Plan originated the idea of autonomy 1112 years ago and this was a better kind of autonomy, better for the Arabs and better for us. Based on this I would insist that when we come to implement this part of the Camp David Agreements, the autonomy should include only the inhabited parts of the West Bank and Gaza. By correctly interpreting the article which allows Israel to redeploy her forces in agreed specific locations we will be able to form this indispensible security zone even within this interim arrangement. According to my colleagues and to me, this type of arrangement would resemble our own concept which happens to be the Allon plan.

Arab World



Address to the Palestinian people by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat on the 13th anniversary of the outbreak of the Palestinian revolution (excerpts)¹

Beirut, January 1, 1978

Our enemies have unmasked their repugnant faces and their dangerous ambitions. What they want is a sphere of influence and plunder and a market for the new slave trade.

We of the Arab nation want our land to be clean. We want our land to be pure and liberated, liberated from all kinds of repression, domination and military, economic and political occupation.

In the light of this they, led by the US, are inveigling, arguing and manoeuvring to create Bantustans of varying sizes, forms and goals, not only on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as the arrogant Nazi terrorist Begin so humiliatingly proposes to us, but throughout the Arab homeland, though these Bantustans may have different names, take varying forms and have different aims and characters. It is a new form of colonisation of our area, strange in form, character and appearance. Their idea is that they should have another policeman besides the Israeli one and more than one police station to protect their vital interests in this strategically and economically important area of our land which is Arab by birth, origins and roots.

Hence our unshakable and unambiguous attitude of opposition. We cannot forget the weight of Egypt and the people of Egypt in this struggle for our destiny and our civilisation we are waging with President Sadat over his visit to our beloved occupied Jerusalem and our usurped and plundered land. This conflict is also over the grave long-term consequences of that visit for the Arab situation as a whole and the destructive consequences that have left their imprint on the very essence and import of the Arab-Zionist-imperialist conflict in the Arab area. This is something that concerns not only our generation and contem-

porary generations. It amounts to a new concept of the future of the generations that come after us. We have no right to prejudice either them or what is sacred to them because of this expansionist Zionist idea which says: "This is your Land, O Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile," and because of their dreams of Jerusalem as the capital of a kingdom of Greater Israel to which people come from all over the world to find wisdom, judgement and advice, according to the prophecy of Joshua with which the leader of the Irgun gang opened the celebrated session of the Knesset. But—and let this be known to all and sundry and to those who go in for forging and falsifying history under the auspices of the combined brute force of America and Israel - such untruths cannot be imposed upon the Arab nation. For our eternal Arab nation is capable of correcting the course of history as it has always done at all times and in all ages. This land belongs to our peoples and our masses, the possessors of this heritage and of the will and the right that cannot be wrested from them by any force, however strong it may be at certain times.

This revolution came into existence to last, broke out to continue and was born to be victorious. Brothers and comrades in arms:

The situation is dangerous, dangerous indeed, the conspiracy is vast and complex and our enemies are many and varied. But let the whole world realise that the Palestinian revolution and this Arab nation, with all their free, proud and noble vanguards, are capable of resistance, defiance and steadfastness—this eternal nation, with its unshakable convictions and faith and its unchanging attitude and position, that has defeated all the invasions that have befallen it or tried to defile its soil, humiliate its peoples and occupy its cities.

This is the basic significance of the Stead-fastness and Confrontation Summit held in Tripoli, because it embodied this course of committed action as regards the goals of the Arab nation against all that the expansionist racialist Zionist invasion is hatching against it. This is no narrow and restricted trend in the course of the history and culture of the Arab nation: it is a comprehensive and surging tide. It sometimes rises and sometimes falls, as it follows different courses in

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), no. 305/219 (January 1, 1978), p. 4.

our holy war and flows through various localities of conflict in the eternal Arab nation. But it is always, always victorious.

We do not advocate war and destruction but we do demand our rights. We are a people who have been persecuted, rendered homeless and expelled from our land unjustly and forcibly, through an imperialist-Zionist conspiracy. If its slogans and myths were judged by current international criteria, it is the leader of conspiracy, America, that should pay the price, rather than we,.... The fables of ancient times that they relate-and Begin and the fanatical devotees of Zionism should understand this—are in fact a farce in modern times and constitute the great lie of the twentieth century. Therefore we are determined to resist them for the sake of the future of our infants and children, and so as to protect our rights. We are not alone in this conflict. We are supported by the peace-and freedomloving countries. We are supported by free men throughout the world. We are supported by many friends in the socialist, non-aligned, Islamic, African, Latin American and friendly countries. This is because all of them realise how great is the injustice that has been done and is still being done to our people. They also realise that what is being done to us here will have immediate and serious effects on this area and the areas surrounding and attached to it, and all who have dealings with this area. They therefore support us and stand by us. The UN resolutions are the best proof of their support for us, of their repudiation and rejection of this conspiracy. These attitudes, which we value and rely on in our struggle, give us greater clarity, firmness and strength as we pursue our course of struggle to eliminate the injustice that has befallen our people, to liberate our land, to return to our homes and to build our independent state on the soil of our homeland, Palestine. This is a right and a fact conceded by all international pacts and legislation.

On behalf of these freedom fighters, of these revolutionary rifles, of the revolutionaries of the Palestinian revolution, we declare frankly and in a loud and clear voice that no solution of the problem of the area can be acceptable or permanent if it is reached at the expense of the Palestinian people and their inalienable national rights. These

rights are being liquidated by agents, they cannot be protected by mercenaries and hirelings who are being assembled as false puppets and as substitutes in the persons of effete personalities worn out by time, while various states are being allotted roles to play—each according to what is expected of them in the conspiracy, and each according to his standards and the time appointed for him to appear on the stage of events in the theatrical sequence of the great conspiracy. But they are working in vain. They are planning in vain. The rifles, the revolutionaries, the freedom fighters alone protect the noble and lofty goals of our people, and it is they who are responsible for their victorious revolutionary march.

Here we must consider what is happening in South Lebanon and the courageous, brave, long-suffering and steadfast stand of the people of South Lebanon in the face of the reverse side of the conspiracy. On behalf of the Palestinian revolution, and of the Palestinian people, I want to place on record, with the greatest esteem and respect, the unyielding attitude to their daily sufferings of our people in steadfast, proud South Lebanon. I salute its liberals and nationalists, I salute its freedom fighters, and I hope that our revolutionaries and the nationalist revolutionaries will maintain the standards required of them in the light of the magnificent sacrifices of these men.

Brothers and comrades in arms;

National unity constitutes our sustenance and our provisions. Let us then strengthen it and make it more solid and unyielding. In his unbridled aggression the enemy makes no distinction between us, and the bullets aimed at our breasts know no distinction as they hit their marks. Let us close our ranks and unite, now that the enemy has unreservedly shown his cards. Are we to continue to quarrel over something that is purely chimerical? In his attack on the PLO has not President Carter disclosed the whole plan? Has not Begin disclosed the full dimensions of the conspiracy in his mystical expansionist projects? Are we not aware of these moves on the part of substitutes and puppets, and the extent to which they are linked to the vast conspiracy against our people? Certainly we are, and certainly our revolutionaries are too. And certainly our people ARAB WORLD 409

are aware of them, and certainly the Arab nation is aware of them.

211

Press interview statements by King Husayn of Jordan discussing the representativity of the PLO and the consequences for the area if peace negotiations fail²

Tehran, January 1, 1978

Herman: King Hussein, a few days ago, President Carter said in a broadcast interview³ that what he will be trying to learn from you is what the United States can do to get you to give your open support and encouragement to the Begin and Sadat negotiations. This morning he said that he doesn't see any reason now for Jordan to join in those negotiations. What happened? Why did the President change his tone?

A. We had a very useful, very frank and constructive talk, both yesterday and today, and I believe as far as we're concerned, we have given President Sadat, following the surprise that he sprang on all of us in the area, in terms of his move, our recognition, in terms of that move being a very courageous one, and our hopes, following listening to his statements at the Knesset,4 that a solution could be found along the lines that were contained in that outline. We support what he has said fully, and we are definitely hopeful that the momentum for peace will continue and that we will have a dream come true in our area, the establishment of a just and durable peace. In the meantime, we are trying our very best with all our contacts with others in the area to bring about harmony and cohesion, and no one expected us to go to Cairo. The other parties, we hope, eventually, will join the negotiations. If we are able to see the outline of a solution, and whenever an opportunity does arise where we feel that we can act in a more constructive way, we definitely would not hesitate.

Herman: King Hussein, in your opening answer you

expressed some admiration and warmth for the meetings that have been taking place between Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat. You said that you thought that there were other parties which you hoped would join the negotiations. It all leads me to ask right away if you hope other parties will join the negotiation, and if you feel so warmly about them, why do you not, yourself, on behalf of Jordan, move now to join in some way the negotiations?

A. I voiced my admiration regarding the initiative that President Sadat took. However, there are other parties involved, such as Syria, the people of Palestine, and, in particular, since the Rabat summit conference, as well as Jordan [sic]. After the time President Sadat made his intentions known and took his initiative and went to Israel, we were working for a joint Arab delegation that would go to Geneva, and we were involved in the process of organizing ourselves to do so. President Sadat took it upon himself to assume the responsibility on behalf of all, and expressed before the world the general desire of Arabs for a just, lasting peace. A meeting was called in Cairo to prepare for Geneva. I don't think that Geneva is totally out of the question at this date. We have had rifts within the Arab world, as you well know, and we have overcome, I feel, the initial surprise, in terms of the fact that it was [sic] However, we are trying in Jordan, our best, to see what could be done to bring everyone into a degree of understanding that is required for the time and affairs to come. Mr. Begin's recent actions sort of complicate Jordan's presence even further. He has made statements regarding the future of the West Bank, and the future of the people of Palestine that make it extremely difficult for us to see where we would fit in. Since Rabat, we are obviously considered—concerned. We are concerned and involved, in terms of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, that Mr. Begin appears to have taken no step, in my opinion, to really match in any formal way the very courageous initiative of President Sadat.

Morris: Your Majesty, among the people involved in this you mentioned the people of Palestine. Most people seem to believe that the Palestinians are fundamental to any solution in the Middle East. I am a bit confused by your position—about your position on the Palestinian situation. You agreed, at Rabat, 5 at the Arab summit,

² Interview conducted by George Herman, Joe Morris and Bob McNamara and broadcast on CBS's "Face the Nation," January, 1978; transcript supplied, on request, by CBS.

³ Doc. 203 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁴ Doc. 305 in *ibid*.

⁵ See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and Appendix A in *International Documents on Palestine 1977*.

that the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization, should be the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. More recently, you have talked in terms of the PLO disappearing from the earth should there ever be a liberation of the Palestinian territory. What is your position now? Who represents the Palestinians?

A. The Palestinians themselves, and—however, it has been very clear, since 1967 onwards, we could only negotiate a resolution if Israel were prepared to return all the territories occupied in June of '67—Arab sovereignty over the Arab part of the city of Jerusalem. In a context of peace it would be the city of peace for all—maybe some minor fortifications on a reciprocal basis regarding the West Bank, but anything short of that would mean that we would be compromising the rights of Palestinians regarding their human rights, regarding their territorial rights, and this is almost impossible for us to do. If we look back at the charter of the PLO,6 which came into being before the war of '67, one of its articles says that when the territory is recovered there will be a referendum, there will be the expression of selfdetermination by the people of Palestine. It does not mean anything but that, that the people of Palestine must be given the freedom of choice under conditions of total freedom. This is what I referred to—if there is liberation, there is no need for a liberation organization anymore.

McNamara: Your Majesty, President Carter said, several days ago, that it was his opinion that he could not support an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. This morning the Shah of Iran supported the President's statement. President Sadat has said that the President's remarks make bargaining for him with the Israelis rather difficult. How did you view the President's statement?

A. As far as I'm concerned, I've always said that I have great faith in the position of the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians as people who seek peace with dignity and their rights, and I think that there is room to hope, genuinely, that the Palestinians will make their contribution. There must be a vote in the process leading to a solution, be it PLO or otherwise.

McNamara: But the Israelis say that it will make for a dangerous situation. Shells can be lobbed from the West Bank into heavily populated Israeli areas if an independent Palestinian state were to come about on the West Bank.

A. Why should the Israelis assume in advance that this is the choice that's going to be?

Herman: Because they listen to the words of Mr. Arafat who is continually saying that Israel still has no right to exist and should be driven into the sea.

A. I believe that this is not the view of most of us in the area who have accepted 242 and 338, the famous Security Council Resolutions, and I believe that this is also, in terms of our view, the view of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians if given the chance to express themselves under conditions of freedom.

Herman: Well, it sounds to me as though you're saying that Mr. Arafat and the Organization does not properly represent the majority view of the Palestinian people.

A. If they are extreme and if they are irresponsible, then obviously, I doubt whether they do represent the Palestinians.

Herman: Let me remind you of something President Sadat said recently. He said that the PLO had cancelled Rabat, meaning that they had voided the agreement that they were the sole representative of the Palestinian people, that they had cancelled Rabat by participating in the Tripoli conference, and then he said something in which he involved you. He said that he and King Hussein would continue to abide by Rabat, but if the PLO does not re-enter the peace-making process, he will turn over—and by implication he sort of brought you in on that—he would turn to other spokesmen for the Palestinian people. Are you, fairly, dragged in, in that fashion, by Mr. Sadat?

A. No. I think that I can answer in the following way—if it comes to details and the responsibilities of each individual country, it is easy for Egypt at that point, if a set of principles is agreed upon, to deal with Egyptian-Israeli problems. It is easy for Syria to do so in terms of the Golan Heights, but as far as we are concerned we would be dealing with the core of the problem, the Palestinian problem. Therefore, we must know exactly what the end result is, and before Rabat, we have said that if we can secure the recovery of the territory,

⁶ The Palestine National Charter was adopted by the First Palestine National Conference in Jerusalem, 1964. The fourth Palestine National Assembly, held in Cairo from July 10–17, 1968, issued a revised Palestine National Charter. This is published as doc. 360 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1968.

⁷ See doc. 322 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

have the area placed under international auspices, have the people exercise their right of self-determination, we would be doing our duty, and this is as far as we can go.

Herman: You do not feel that the knot of Rabat has been untied, in your own phrase in a recent interview, by the Tripoli meeting?

A. I don't care to comment about the Tripoli meeting. We did not attend it, and we do not endorse the decisions taken there.

Morris: Do you think, your Majesty, do you—at this point we've had tremendous convolutions starting with President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, with the Cairo conference, with [the] Ismailia meeting, 10 and so forth. Where do we stand now? Do you think we are progressing towards something concrete, or is there just too much resistance on anyone's part? You mentioned the return of occupied Jerusalem to Arab hands. This would still seem to be a major point the Israelis would never agree on. Are we just barking up into the air, or what?

A. You're speaking of Arab Jerusalem?

Morris: Arab Jerusalem.

A. And in terms of Jerusalem one should make it very clear, also, that it does not only involve the holy places, holy to Christians and Moslems. It involves a part of the city that was Arab. Israel has annexed that part. It has annexed additional areas surrounding it. In point of fact I don't see how they can justify that under security arrangements. It is outright annexation. And what I'm talking about is the possibility of the rights of both, dual sovereignty, in terms of the Arab part being under Arab sovereignty, and the Israeli part of Jerusalem being under theirs, and its being, possibly, an open city, a city where peace is truly represented, a symbol of peace—

Morris: I wanted to ask whether you thought we were going to get to this point or not?

A. I sincerely hope that we will.

Morris: Can we—are you optimistic?

A. I think that the road is a difficult one, obviously, but we must try. There is no other way.

McNamara: Over the last month as events have been unfolding very quickly in the Middle East, have you

had any direct or indirect contacts with the Israelis?

A. No, not recently.

Herman: Did the President bring you any message, either directly or indirectly, from the Israeli side of the negotiation?

A. No.

Herman: Did he bring you any message from any other Middle Eastern leaders, any of the Arab leaders?

A. No, he did not—and I've been in touch with most of them afterward.

Herman: Well, I guess the other answer is, was he—did he take any message from you to any leaders or to any Israeli officials?

A. Well, the way I have been going, I probably will be visiting most of the countries in the area anyway, on the Arab side certainly.

Herman: Do you expect that you may visit the Israeli side?

A. Not in the foreseeable future, as things stand at this time.

Morris: What about the two million Palestinians that live outside of the occupied territories and outside of what is now Israel? Prime Minister Begin has apparently tried to isolate them from this whole question of a peace solution. Can he do that?

A. I don't think he can; I don't think it's his right to do so. But just before all the recent developments and President Sadat's visit to Israel, the position, as far as we were concerned, was that we'd go to Geneva, and this was the position of most of us who are involved—to seek the return of all territories occupied in June of '67, with the references I made regarding the West Bank, to seek the recognition of the rights of Palestinians for self-determination under conditions of total freedom, to try to find a solution for the Palestinians in terms of return or compensation, the implementation of UN resolutions; and against that, total peace in the area. This was our Arab position, as spelled out by President Sadat in his Knesset speech.

Herman: You leave me in just a little bit of confusion as to how you view the situation. I'm not sure that you think that President Sadat's initiative has speeded peace or whether you think perhaps it has slowed peace.

A. I believe it's a very courageous move, which caught me by surprise, and all of us in the area, obviously. I hope that in the final result it will have speeded peace, or the process towards peace.

⁸ See docs. 180–184, 301,303–305 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁹ See docs, 313-314 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

¹⁰ See docs. 199-200 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Herman: But at this point you're not sure.

A. I think none of us can be sure.

Morris: Have you seen any signs, Your Majesty, to indicate that Prime Minister Begin is prepared to be flexible in any way whatsoever?

A. I haven't seen, from his statements—public statements—anything to indicate that, and this is really shocking and very distressing, as far as I'm concerned. I believe that there is a golden opportunity. The Arabs have come at the very highest levels before the world to say their word, to indicate their genuine desire for peace; and if this is not reciprocated in kind, I don't see what the future will hold for all of us, except possible disaster.

Herman: Do you think that President Carter's statement¹¹ recently that the West Bank should not be an independent state, but should be tied either to Israel or to Jordan, speeds the negotiations towards peace?

A. I believe that what must happen is obviously to arrive at a set of principles, to accept them, and these principles must include withdrawal from all territories occupied in June of '67, recognition of the rights of Palestinians, under international auspices, to self-determination—and to take it from there.

Herman: So you do not necessarily feel that the Palestinians in the West Bank, when they win their liberty, should be or must be tied either to Israel or to Fordan.

A. I think that there are very many ties that continue to exist with Jordan; there is a possibility that these ties will grow stronger. Of course, anything is possible, but I don't believe it's the right of Mr. Begin or myself to say what the Palestinians should or should not do. I have infinite faith in what their choice would be, and that, if given the chance and if we progress towards peace, and evacuation commences towards the lines of '67, or thereabouts, the overwhelming majority will go for something we can all live with very comfortably and very happily.

McNamara: Would you demand an immediate withdrawal of all Israeli security forces from the West Bank, or a portion of it, if the Israelis were to say that they would move back?

A. No, one can't say that this could happen overnight, but certainly it would have to happen

within the shortest practical time.

McNamara: Would you seek to have a dismantling of Israeli settlements on the West Bank?

A. I believe that all these points would have to be covered in the process to come. But the basis for a solution regarding anything that is discussed has to be a form of reciprocity, in terms of dealing with any topic or any subject.

McNamara: So these are points you would be willing to bargain—you're willing to bargain on?

A. I frankly can't see how military positions can remain in the West Bank.

Herman: But it's over a period of time that you're talking about, a sort of practical time, I think you said. Sir, as you know, the Iraqis have suggested an Iraq-Syria-PLO confrontation state treaty against Israel. You said yourself recently that if the Arab rift is not healed, there'll be convulsions and upheavals, a series of explosions, I think you said, whose cumulative effect could be as serious as another Arab-Israeli war. Is that what you see happening, with Egypt going one way, Iraq, perhaps Syria, and the PLO going another way, and you caught in the middle? Is the rift not only not healing, but is it growing wider between the Arab states?

A. There is a rift; that is fairly obvious; but more than that, as far as Jordan is concerned, we will only act, and always act, in whatever manner we believe is in the interest of our people, the people of Palestine, the Arab people. And the only force that would defeat us would be our conscience and nothing else, whatsoever.

Herman: But I'm calling on your expertise as an observer of the area, to ask whether you think that the rift between the other Arab nations—not including your own, you being in the middle—whether it is getting worse or whether there is movement towards healing it.

A. Let's put it this way—if President Sadat's initiative does not meet with success due to Israeli intransigence, I think that the result will be terrible in terms of the area. Anyone who has sought peace—[a] solution to the problem, a just, lasting peace—would be discredited. All sorts of eruptions could occur in the area, and not only the interests of all in the area, but many in the world would be hurt.

Morris: Your Majesty, do you think that President Sadat is likely to go for a separate peace with Israel if—if this overall concept fails to get anywhere?

A. I believe he's very much for a comprehensive settlement, as he has stated time and again, and

¹¹ Doc. 203 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

to me when I last met him.

Herman: One of the keys—the confrontation states are Egypt, yourself, Syria. Now we come to Syria. Do you think that Syria is aligning itself with the rejectionist states permanently, or do you feel that, like yourself, Syria will play some kind of a middle role?

A. We have kept our contacts with Syria and with Egypt; we have kept them with most of our Arab brethren in an attempt to salvage what we could and to bring everyone together, and to create better understanding. I believe that Syria basically believes that there is going to be no progress towards peace, but Syria has not rejected Security Council Resolution 338 or the possibility of going to Geneva. So I don't know what the final position will be, but it will be depending to a very large extent on Israel and her actions in the very near future.

Herman: If the Sadat initiative fails, will the situation be infinitely worse than it was before?

A. I believe so.

Morris: What about the role of Saudi Arabia, Your Majesty? The Saudis are increasingly—becoming increasingly influential in the Arab world. Can they, and you, and a few other moderate people who don't want to get pinned down to a certain stand—can you finally bring these people together again, the warring Arab states, I mean, as the Saudis did to help solve the Lebanese Civil War?

A. If we see an opportunity—this is what we have been discussing repeatedly in the recent past—if there is an opportunity, and it appears before us, we will definitely take it to do everything we can to—

Morris: But there's been no opportunity? There's been no—

A. Not as yet, not as yet.

Herman: Do you feel that the President now understands your position on all these matters?

A. I believe he does, yes.

212

Statement by the Foreign Relations, Arab Affairs and National Security Committees of the People's Assembly of Egypt listing the dismantling of Israeli settlements in Arab territory, full Israeli withdrawal from the 1967-occupied territories, and self-determination for the Palestinians as essential elements in a just peace (excerpt)¹²

Cairo, January 3, 1978

I. It is impossible to reach a just and permanent peace in the area without full withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied by Israel in June 1967, so that no occupying forces remain in any Arab territory and that such territories are not subject to any form of Israeli control.

Any peace plan that does not insist on this would be incompatible with Security Council resolution 242¹³ and 338¹⁴.

- II. The Committee rejects any proposal to the effect that any Israeli settlements should remain in the Arab territories and calls on the Israeli side to dismantle the existing settlements immediately.
- III. The Committee is of the view that security safeguards in any peace agreement should be provided for all the parties concerned.
- IV. Inasmuch as the acknowledgement of the national rights of the Palestinian people is essential for the establishment of a permanent peace in the area, the acknowledgement of these rights must include respect for the principle of self-determination, as stipulated by the UN Charter. Therefore, any peace plan that does not concede this right to the Palestinian people cannot lead to a just and permanent peace in the area, because it would ignore the basis and the essence of the problem and would be in defiance of the unanimous decision of the international community, as expressed in the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and as affirmed by the American-Soviet joint communiqué and the statements issued by the summit conferences of the

¹² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), January 4, 1978.

¹³ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹⁴ Doc. 34 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

Arab, African and non-aligned countries and the countries of the European Common Market.

In this connection, in the light of their belief that the US must play a basic role, the Committees await with concern the US government's elucidation of its attitude to the Palestinian people being granted the right to self-determination, which is a human right that the American President always claims to defend.

At the same time, the Committee welcomes the assurances given by the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt¹⁵ and the French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of their support for the Palestinians' right to self-determination, as previously declared by the European Common Market countries last June.

V. The Committee reaffirms its full support for the repeated statements of President Sadat in which he has declared that it is Egypt's firm policy not to agree to any separate or partial peace and to insist on the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, including their right to establish an independent state.

In the light of Egypt's consistent attitude to the cause of the Palestinian people, from which she has never deviated, the Committee once again calls on the leadership of the PLO to adopt a positive attitude, to abandon their negative approach and to start on a new stage in which they participate in Egypt's efforts in support of the struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their national rights.

213

Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria discussing the initiative of President Sadat of Egypt and the prospects for peace with Israel¹⁶

Damascus, January 4, 1978

Q, President Sadat has been accused of treason by Palestinian, Iraqi, Libyan, Algerian, Southern Yemeni and Syrian authorities. What has been treasonable in his policies thus far? Wasn't his Knesset speech¹⁷

¹⁵ See doc. 202 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

the kind of statement you yourself would have made at a Geneva conference?

- A. Well, he went to Israel, which meant the recognition of Israel. He went to occupied Jerusalem, which meant the recognition of Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel. He broke Arab solidarity and dealt separately and alone with affairs that concern the whole region, which he had no right to do. And he destroyed efforts for peace which were on the way to being fruitful. By doing this, by doing all of this, he gave up the process of peace and shifted to capitulation. He weakened the Arab stand and acted against the desires and aspirations of Arab masses. These are some of the most important meanings of Sadat's visit. When he came to see me before going to Israel, I warned him he would get nothing out of it and after he left I told our party leadership not to expect anything to materialize. Another piece of land in Sinai means nothing. What's vital is that Arab land should be returned to us with dignity. These are the lessons of history.
- Q, Sadat reiterated again this week there can be no compromise on total Israeli withdrawal from Arab land occupied in 1967. Isn't that identical to your own position?
- A. This is not true. What he says is one thing and what he does quite another. Sadat is now on the way to a separate deal. The road he has chosen can only lead to such a deal. Don't confuse separate agreement with an overall settlement and real peace in the area. When he went to Jerusalem he had in the back of his mind that there should be such an outcome. He is merely paving the way—his disclaimers notwithstanding. And this is what made me say to him that his trip to Israel would destroy peace efforts for which we had all labored so long.
- Q. Sadat's stand on a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza has surely been consistent with what you yourself have told me in recent years was your own position?
- A. Words are one thing, deeds another. Of course we are in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state, just as we are in favor of the road that leads to its creation. The question is whether Sadat has taken the right approach. He quite clearly has not—and he knows it.
- Q. Am I correct in assuming that you share Sadat's overall concept of peace—a return to the 1967 borders

¹⁶ Interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), January 9, 1978, pp. 1, 5.

¹⁷ Doc. 305 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

ARAB WORLD 415

with proper guarantees, including demilitarized zones on both sides of the frontier, early-warning stations, etc., etc., and a Palestinian state in return for real peace, or at least the kind of nonbelligerency we see between East and West Europe today?

- A. I think you should turn the question round. Does Sadat share with us the view that peace should be based on complete withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, in their own state, and that all this should be achieved through joint and collective Arab movement? This can only be done by not bowing in front of the enemy and by maintaining the possibility of using various legitimate means to restore our rights in full—in other words, real peace. Goals and means are complementary. One cannot view peace in isolation from the road that leads to it. Peace is an honorable goal and the path we follow should likewise be honorable. The way Sadat behaved was inconsistent and incompatible with this concept.
- Q, Ever since Sinai II in September, 1975, 18 you have been apprehensive about Sinai III, or a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. Now that Sadat has refused an Israeli offer of complete withdrawal from Sinai within five years, and that he is holding out for a real Palestinian state, as opposed to home rule, and the complete evacuation of Israeli troops from the West Bank, why don't you close ranks with Egypt? Sadat, incidentally, has categorically and repeatedly rejected the idea of an Israeli-Egyptian agreement as a substitute for an overall settlement.
- A. All that floats on the surface now is pure theatrics with the aim of hiding the realities and misleading Arab masses. What is presently going on is something that will lead to a Sinai agreement coupled with a cosmetic formula on the West Bank designed to liquidate the Palestinian question.
- Q. What has Sadat given away that he cannot retrieve? The war option?
- A. He has given up both the war and the peace options.
 - Q. In other words, he has opted for no-war-no-peace?
 A. The situation in the Middle East does not

¹⁸ See docs. 148, 164 and 169 in International Documents on Palestine 1975. depend only on what Sadat says or does. I fear that maybe you are influenced by what Sadat reiterates frequently when he says Egypt is the key to war and peace in the area. Of course we are proud of Egypt and its role in the past. However, Sadat's statement that the ruler of Egypt has in his hands the power of decision for war and peace lacks convincing evidence. Otherwise we would have had to avoid any argument on Sadat's behavior and accept what he has done without any discussion. You should not forget that Syria is the cradle of Arab nationalism. We have never capitulated, from the days of the crusaders to modern Zionist expansionism.

- Q, Sadat says we must abandon the sterile policy of all-or-nothing, that there must be give-and-take in the negotiations. Isn't that the essence of commonsensical, reasonable policies in an age when small conflicts can quickly escalate into major confrontations and conflagrations?
- A. Tell me, when he says this is he addressing himself to the Arabs or to the Israelis?
 - Q. I think to both sides.
- A. I feel that when he addresses such statements to Arabs he is abusing them and he is condemning the whole Arab struggle of the last 30 years. The question now is one of rights or no rights and one cannot surrender what is right. Nor can Sadat accept what I know he himself believes is not right.
- Q. Sadat, for example, recognized that Israel, like its Arab neighbors, has legitimate security concerns. Do you agree?
- A. Judging from tangible evidence, such as the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, we conclude that Israel has expansionist concerns more than it has security concerns. And the proof is what Israel is putting forward and demanding under the heading of security, the kind of demands that are not made by any other country in the world, regardless of its size.
- Q. If you are fearful of Egypt going it alone and splitting the confrontation states, why don't you and Jordan join Egypt in the current negotiations, instead of distancing yourself from Egypt as you have been doing?
- A. Because we have opted for the road to peace, not war.

- Q, Sadat's route will lead to war?
- A. It does not lead to peace.
- Q. Two negotiating committees are getting under way at the ministerial level in both Cairo and Jerusalem. These are new facts. Where do you see this process going and why did your foreign minister reject in advance anything that comes out of these negotiations?
- A. One cannot construct a strong building on a weak foundation. Wrong beginnings lead to wrong conclusions. Therefore one cannot expect anything useful or beneficial to a just peace from such committees or any similar formula which may be arranged through this process.
- Q. Sadat says he hopes to produce the paper work that will enable the Geneva conference to get right to the heart of the matter—the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Why don't you at least give him the benefit of the doubt?
- A. Sadat himself knows full well that what he's been doing is to close the door to a Geneva conference because it cannot be used as a cover for separate deals which are now being concluded behind the scenes in the dark.
- Q. What role do you see Jordan playing on the road to an overall settlement?
- A. Jordan, as one of the confrontation states, has a role in the context of an overall comprehensive settlement. Peace cannot be achieved without Arab unanimity. But I don't see a role for Jordan to play under the shadow of separate deals.
- Q, For years you and Sadat have wanted a Palestinian solution in the context of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, closely linked to Jordan. Is that still your position?
- A. I said in the past and repeat now we will accept anything agreed upon between the Palestinians and the Jordanians.
- Q. With the PLO hardening its position and moving toward George Habash's PFLP, they are not bringing the prospects of a Palestinian state any nearer. If the PLO wants to enter the negotiating process, shouldn't it be rethinking its position?
- A. Faced with current developments, it seems to me the PLO is left with but a single choice—namely to consolidate national Palestinian unity and to reinforce its struggle to achieve an independent state.

- Q. An armed struggle?
- A. I don't mean that struggle is by force of arms only. Struggle for national causes throughout history has never been by armed force alone but has taken on various forms—military, political, economic and otherwise. In any event, I'm not trying to determine for the Palestinians how they should conduct their struggle. This is the PLO's responsibility.
- Q, Begin says he will negotiate anything except Israel's destruction—and since he maintains that the PLO seeks Israel's annihilation, he won't deal with the organization. Do you believe the PLO stands for Israel's destruction?
- A. Let him address himself to the PLO. Let him say to the PLO's executive committee, "I want to negotiate with you but not on the destruction of Israel" and let him hear their answer.
 - Q. Will Begin then be favorably impressed?
- A. This is the business of the PLO and Israel, not mine.
- Q. After Sinai II you told me Palestinian guerrillas would be allowed to launch raids into Israel from Syrian territory but none took place. This authorization has been repeated by some of your ministers recently. What is your position?
- A. The same permission stands. But we have to remember that the Israeli military measures facing the Syrian front have always been very vigilant so perhaps the reason why raids have not taken place is technical.
- Q. How many Palestinians do you believe a West Bank-Gaza state could absorb in addition to the 1.1 million already living there?
- A. Maybe not a large number but that will not be necessary anyway because under. UN resolutions refugees should have the choice of compensation or returning to their dwellings from which they were evicted in 1948.
- Q. If the Arab confrontation states do not agree with Begin's 26-point peace plan, don't you think it's now incumbent upon Israel's neighbors to come up with their own peace plan?
- A. We have come up with our peace plan since the 1973 war. We said real peace means withdrawal from territories occupied in 1976, recognition of Palestinian rights and the end of the state of war. Nothing could be clearer. And we were

ready to go to Geneva to implement this when Sadat went off on a tangent.

- Q. The Israelis have left the door open to self-determination on the West Bank in the future and they have not rejected withdrawal in principle after a fixed period of time. Isn't this worth exploring?
- A. These are statements that I am not aware of but what is known to us and what is certain is that Israel has no intention of withdrawing from all the territories taken over in '67 and insists on staying in the West Bank and Gaza. It even says that these territories are part of greater Israel while pretending to leave the question of final sovereignty for the future. This was stressed by the Israeli authorities themselves during recent developments. And what's known of the Begin plan confirms this. So I think you're misinformed.
- Q. Opponents, adversaries, enemies are talking to each other all over the world. Why shouldn't Arabs and Israelis?
- A. After the 1973 war Arabs accepted and agreed to negotiate on the basis of UN resolutions and under the UN umbrella. So we have not refused to talk. It was in this context that the Geneva conference was conceived under the cochairmanship of the two superpowers. However what's under way now is very far from this concept and also far removed from international legitimacy and UN resolutions.
- Q. What exactly are the Arabs generally and Syria in particular prepared to do about peace today?
- A. We have nothing more to do now than what we have already done since 1973, that still stands. It's my view that interaction and reaction are now taking place in the region and with time these will shake down into their final shape. The movement toward peace is now at a standstill. This may continue for a time which is difficult to measure now. It's also difficult to determine in what way this movement will take place in the future. However, I want to reemphasise that peace remains our goal and we shall continue to strive for it as much as we can—but it must be a just one in the full sense of the word.
- Q. Then why did you join the Rejectionist Front countries at the recent Tripoli summit¹⁹ in Libya?

- A. What took place was definitely not a Rejectionist Front. It was the front of Arab steadfastness. We decided not to retreat in the face of the Zionist offensive and to persevere because the moves now taking place in the region embody a conspiracy against the Arab nation with the objective of imposing its capitulation. And we will not allow this conspiracy to pass. We will defeat it. In the first article of our statement at the end of the Tripoli summit, we said that Sadat had destroyed peace efforts. We didn't say we were against peace. Therefore there are no rejectionist states.
- Q. Your information minister told me last night that he was convinced Washington had advance knowledge of Sadat's initiative. I tried to disabuse him of this notion. He also concluded that by backing Sadat, the U.S. must have realized the repercussions in the region and therefore the U.S. must be in favor of a nowar-no-peace situation. Does this mean that you feel the U.S. role of "honest intermediary," which you praised when I last saw you in July, has been overtaken by events?
- A. Well, U.S. backing of Sadat's moves does not serve the cause of peace. And it appears that the U.S. is now confining its own moves and role to the framework of Sadat's initiative. That's obvious to any observer and not at all helpful if the aim is to bring about a comprehensive settlement.
- Q. What would be the point of another anti-Sadat summit so soon after Tripoli as proposed by Algeria?
- A. We're now in the course of working for the consolidation of the national Arab stead-fastness front which we formed at Tripoli. The exact details of what will be discussed at the new summit are now being considered in bilateral meetings, such as the ones President Boumedienne of Algeria conducted in Baghdad and Damascus this week.
- Q, Behind the PLO, say Western critics, stand such radical states as Syria, Iraq, Libya and Southern Yemen and behind those states stands the Soviet Union. This is the line of subversion, they argue, that Moscow hopes to establish close to the oil jugular of West Europe, the U.S. and Japan. Do you feel comfortable in such an alliance?
- A. The Soviet Union is merely standing on our side for our struggle to liberate the occupied territories and to ensure Palestinian rights. No

¹⁹ See docs. 319-322 and 324 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

more, no less. The assessment of this stand by all those concerned with peace in the region, whether they are in Europe or the U.S., should be a positive one.

214

Declaration of principles submitted by Egypt's delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli Political Committee²⁰

Jerusalem, January 16, 1978

The governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and of Israel are determined to continue their efforts to achieve a comprehensive peaceful settlement in the area, and within the framework of that settlement they declare their readiness to negotiate the conclusion of peace agreements on the basis of the full enforcement of all parts of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and the two parties have agreed that the establishment of this just and permanent peace requires:

- 1. Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, the Golan, the West Bank and Gaza, in accordance with resolution 242²¹ and with the principle that it is inadmissible to take possession of territory through war.
- 2. The need to safeguard the territorial integrity and the political independence of all states in the area through dispositions agreed on by the parties on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.
- 3. Respect for the right of all states in the area to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.
- 4. The achievement of a just settlement of all aspects of the Palestine problem on the basis of self-determination, through talks in which Egypt, Jordan, Israel and representatives of the Palestinian people take part.
- 5. The ending of all occasions for or states of war, and the establishment of peaceful relations between all the states of the area, through the conclusion of peace treaties in conformity with the UN Charter.

215

Statement by the government of Egypt announcing the recall to Cairo of Foreign Minister Kamil and the breaking off of the negotiations by the Egyptian-Israeli Political Committee²²

Cairo, January 18, 1978

President Muhammad Anwar Sadat has instructed Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil, the Foreign Minister, who has headed the Egyptian delegation at the meetings of the Political Committee in Jerusalem, to return to Cairo immediately, now that it has become clear, from following Israel's moves and from the statements of Mr. Menahem Begin, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Mr. Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Foreign Minister, that the sole intention is to reduce the situation to a state of flux and to put forward partial solutions that cannot lead to the establishment of a permanent, just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East area.

President Sadat has taken this irrevocable decision so that the negotiations may not continue to revolve in a vicious circle, to become involved in secondary issues, or to move on from one aspect, the discussion of which has not been completed, to another and irrelevant aspect, in the hope of involving the negotiations in obscure issues that cannot serve their objectives.

From the start of the peace initiative Egypt's attitude has been clear and unambiguous, and, to avoid any kind of outbidding, the Egyptian attitude has not changed at all, and it was hoped that the other party would be equally unambiguous.

Clear and correct attitudes alone can ensure a solution that realises the aspirations of the millions throughout the world to an unshakeable peace and, since the courageous peace initiative was launched it is no longer possible to accept any other method. From the start, Egypt has declared the firm principles on which her attitude is based; they are the principles that have guided her throughout her struggle during the last eight years. Here is an attitude based on the need for Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories she occupied after June 5, 1967, including Jerusalem and the acknowledgement of the legitimate rights,

²⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), January 20, 1978. For US Secretary of State Vance's statement at the opening session of the talks, see doc. 60 above.

²¹ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

²² Translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), January 19, 1978.

ARAB WORLD 419

including the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people who have remained homeless, as a result of aggression, for nearly half a century. If the conscience of the world has decided that these principles constitute the true basis of a solution, because they are in accord with justice and the principles of international law and international pacts, it is no longer acceptable that bargaining, outbidding and wasting time and energy should be the course pursued to acknowledge them. If the Jews of the world were expelled and dispersed, that does not mean that the Palestinians should be evicted to live under occupation as the price of the sufferings of the Jews. If Israel imagines that a settlement here or there, or an airfield here or there can ensure her security better than persuading her neighbours to coexist peacefully with her, it means that she prefers a peace imposed by force of arms to a peace deriving from a conviction of its inherent benefits. Israel's restricted area and the proximity of her territory to Arab territory is not a phenomenon unique to Israel, and cannot justify the imposition of tension on the area on the pretext of self-defence or protecting herself from destruction. The states of Europe have been neighbours and, indeed, their territories have been interlocking, but this has not prevented neighbouring states with interlocking territories from living in peace, untouched by excessive sensitivity as regards the outbreak of war or fear of destruction. Many countries of Europe and the world in general have passed through stages of dislike and bitterness more intense than those arising from the fighting there has been between the Arabs and Israel. In taking this decision, Egypt regards it as part of the clear and unambiguous attitude she has assumed in the confrontation of this situation and leaves the assessment of the situation to the conscience of the world; she refuses to bear the responsibility for a possible failure not caused by her, or for the disappointment of the hopes of millions of which she is in no way the cause. In any case, Egypt has passed through and surmounted many tribulations throughout her long history, but she has never accepted the principle of deceit, manoeuvring and outbidding. For this was not her objective in the initiative of her president and courageous leader. The goal of the initiative was to prevent the shedding of blood and to ensure that peace did not remain a demand that could never be

met.

The peace that Egypt asks for is above all a peace for this area and for the whole world, and she has done all she can to achieve this end. All the same, Egypt will be true to her pledge: her desire is for a just, comprehensive and honourable peace and her aim is the security of the area which could lead to the achievement of the security of mankind in the age we live in.

Mr. Muhammad Anwar Sadat has called an emergency session of the People's Assembly for 11.30 a.m. on Saturday, Safar 12, 1398 A.H. (January 21, 1978 A.D.) so that he may submit all the facts of the situation to the representatives of the nation.

216

Speech by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf (Abu Ayyad) reaffirming Palestinian insistence on an independent state, rejection of settlement and the PLO attitude towards the USSR (excerpts)²³

Beirut, January 22, 1978

Four years ago, we asked for a Palestinian state in part of our land, for the sake of a just peace. Because when we started on January 1, 1965, we had no strong and secure base. We wanted this state and we still want it. Israel knows this. A state for us, not for al-Ja'bari and not for those agents. We want a base for the revolutionaries who have struggled and who are an extension of the Arab revolution.

We are all flexible. We asked for this state and what was the reply? They do not want to admit that the word "Palestine" exists. They insisted that Sadat, in his speech in the Knesset,²⁴ could say anything he liked as long as he did not mention the PLO, for three quarters of the members of the Knesset had threatened to withdraw if he mentioned the PLO.

We say this for the world to hear. We are not adventurers and we do not like adventures. We stretch out our hands for peace, but there can

²⁴ Doc. 305 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), Special Supplement, January 22, 1978, p.3.

be no peace in this area without the Palestinian people and without the revolutionaries of the Palestinian people. We have said this in a loud voice. At the start we asked for a democratic state, saying that the erstwhile oppressor and the oppressed should live in a single democratic state. For many years we raised our voices calling for a democratic state, and accepted Arab-Jewish coexistence. But they refused. We said that a Palestinian state on our land would not amount to more than 23 percent of our territory, but they refused. They said the PLO is not acceptable, give us something less unacceptable and then again something less unacceptable than that, and we agreed. What happened then? All that was left for us was to go to Begin on bended knee. Begin will never give us an inch of our land because he knows that we once committed a great crime for which we deserve to be executed retroactively. The crime was that on January 1, 1965, we decided to shoot a bullet at Israel, and they cannot forgive us for that crime. In Zionist justice this is a crime for which a man is to be called to account retroactively. We are rejected by Israel, all who have borne arms are rejected by Israel. Everyone knows this. This is the tragedy that has befallen the Arab nation. They want to warn us. They think that if we look at the television and see Ezer Weizman and Begin sitting down with Arabs, in time we shall come to think that this is something normal, that we shall become acclimatised to it. Our hostility, hatred, dislike and rancour will gradually pass away until it becomes a question of a fait accompli. We say to them: you are deluded. We are the owners of the land however long it takes; this nation has never waived its right. It is up to our generation to keep the banner we have raised. It may be that this generation is not capable of liberation but at least it is up to this generation to keep the banner of liberation clean and unspotted, unblemished by surrender or submission, because the presence of Israel in our land is contrary to history and to logic.

We have seen the ruler of the greatest Arab state coming to Israel to surrender and submit, yet she gave him nothing. For Israel despises the Arab nation. This ruler of the greatest Arab nation came to her to surrender and submit, yet Begin gave him nothing. For Israel despises this nation. See, they say, here is the ruler of the

greatest Arab nation who has come to us. In 1956 Ben Gurion said that "Time is on our side"—with every day that passes Israel gains time. So let the Arabs recognise us. It is second nature to the Arabs to forget, just as they forgot Alexandretta and many other things before that. They can forget. But we say to all the Zionist enemy leaders: We are the sort of people that will only hand on the banner to coming generations clean and unspotted. We have not forgotten and we shall never forget. We shall never forget Jaffa, Haifa, or Acre, or any part of Palestine. We are a generation that was brought up on the rifle, a generation reared not on hatred, but on constructive love, on the love of our land, all of our land.

Our land is dear to us, and to the rubbish talked by some people to the effect that we want to settle in Lebanon, we reply as we have done before. We would not accept a piece of paradise as a substitute for Palestine; we accept no substitute for Palestine. We shall not give up our rifles, for if we had given up Palestine we should not have fought for two years, and these isolationists do not understand. They should realise that we only fought them for two years to keep these rifles; it is to keep Palestine that we keep our rifles, for we want to protect the revolution. Why do we want to protect the revolution? So that we may return to our country, to Palestine.

I say emphatically, we are not communists. At the same time I say just as emphatically and just as frankly that we, the sons of this revolution, regard the USSR as our greatest friend in the world. We regard the USSR as the friend of the Arab nation: we believe that without the USSR the Arabs cannot hold out in the battle. We regard all the socialist countries as our friends in the world. We regard China as our friend in this world. We are people who know who are our friends and who are our enemies. No freedom fighter with any sense, no nationalist, can think of setting America and the USSR on an equal footing. This man wants to deceive our hearts and minds. The Suez Canal that has been cleared is not worth the price of ten Soviet tanks the USSR sent Egypt. This is deceiving people, deceiving the people of Egypt.

217

Statement by the PLO Executive Committee spokesman rejecting President Sadat's scheme and all other "schemes for liquidation"²²⁵

Beirut, January 26, 1978

1. The scheme proposed by President Sadat in his latest speech violates the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences of Rabat²⁶ and Algiers²⁷ regarding Palestinian national rights, especially our people's right to return to their homeland, to self-determination and to the creation of their independent national state under the leadership of the PLO. The speech may be considered as a response to the US scheme which seeks to create a weak and disarmed entity subject to 'Israeli'-Jordanian hegemony. It is a scheme which is just the other side of the coin of the plan for autonomy proposed by the Zionist prime minister.

The PLO, in rejecting all such schemes for liquidation, draws the attention of our people and Arab nation to the dangers of such schemes, affirming its determination to oppose them in order to protect patriotic and national rights.

- 2. The cause of the Palestinian people is not solely confined to the problem of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as our enemies try to picture and to circumscribe it. It is the cause of the entire people of Palestine wherever they may be, both inside and outside the occupied territories. Accordingly, to ignore this fact would be to ignore the presence and struggle of our people, baptized with the blood of thousands of martyrs and enshrined in a course of struggle that our people will continue to follow in all firmness and determination.
- 3. The Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied lands, who rally around the PLO, their sole and legitimate representative, have, on innumerable occasions and in opposition to all sorts of conspiracies, asserted their unqualified rejection of all suspect schemes that seek to frag-

ment their national unity and their solid national support for the PLO.

Our people have expressed this in all sorts of ways, beginning with official petitions submitted to Arab and non-aligned summit conferences, to UN Secretary General Waldheim, and even to US Secretary of State Vance, and ending with notable uprisings, violent demonstrations and other acts of resistance to the occupation, and this despite the daily repression and intimidation to which our people are subjected.

- 4. The PLO, basing itself upon popular solidarity and the struggle of its heroic revolutionaries, has rejected and will continue to reject all schemes that conspiring forces have submitted here and there to our steadfast people. The PLO declares that our people's struggle shall continue until it achieves all our inalienable national rights, chiefly the right to return, to self-determination and to the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the soil of the homeland.
- 5. The PLO is earnestly attempting to accomplish Arab solidarity based on liberation and a challenge to the Zionist imperialist conspiracy now being concocted by several parties under US leadership.
- 6. The PLO emphasizes the importance of the convening of the Algiers summit²⁸ as a model for the challenge to all conspiracies and conspirators, led by the USA. This latter has been inimical to our people at all stages of their national struggle, attempting to repress our national rights. Current developments in the region, however, have shown that, given the obduracy of the Zionist enemy backed by US imperialism, what was taken by force can only be recovered by force.

Accordingly, we shall redouble our determination to prolong the armed struggle, to prolong all aspects of the struggle and to intensify our determination to foil all conspiracies and conspirators.

7. The PLO, in adopting this line, is supported by a wide front of allies and friends throughout the world, chiefly the socialist states led by the Soviet Union, as well as the non-aligned, friendly, Islamic and African states.

²⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), January 26, 1978, p.2.

²⁶ See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²⁷ See docs. 331-333, International Documents on Palestine 1973.

²⁸ See document below.

218

Statement issued by the summit conference of the states of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation (excerpt)²⁹

Algiers, February 4, 1978

Within the framework of the periodical meetings of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation, and at the invitation of His Excellency President Boumedienne, the third session of the Front's summit met from Safar, 24-26, 1397 (February 2-4, 1978) The session was attended by Their Excellencies President Houari Boumedienne, President of the Algerian Democratic People's Republic and Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, President Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, Secretary General of the General People's Conference of the Libyan Arab People's Socialist Republic, Mr. Abd al-Fattah Ismail, Secretary General of the Unified Political Organization of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Mr. Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Palestine revolution.

On the basis of faith in the unity of the Arab nation and of its struggle, destiny and aspirations, and in affirmation of the national responsibility to defend its goals and rights, and from devotion to the principles which form the basis of solidarity in confrontation of the dangers that today encompass the Arab homeland from its furthest West to its furthest East, and in response to the demands of continued struggle against Zionism, colonialism, imperialism and racism, the conference discussed all the developments that have taken place since the first meeting of the Steadfastness Summit in Tripoli,30 including the continued implementation of the imperialist plan within the framework of which President Sadat is working in concert with the Zionist enemy and making concessions which prejudice the essential national and historical rights of the Arab nation. The conference also discussed the current Arab situation and the attempts of certain regimes to A detailed review of the current situation as a whole showed that events have proved the truth of the analysis, submitted by the Tripoli conference, of the dimensions of President Sadat's policy and the danger it constitutes to the future of the Arab nation and to its vital higher interests, and the conference was provided with affirmation of the following facts:

1. That President Sadat is working within the framework of the imperialist-Israeli-American plan aimed at undermining the chances of achieving a just peace based on withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the safeguarding of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return, to selfdetermination and to establish their independent state on the soil of their homeland. These rights have been recognised by the world and affirmed by the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, the UN, the Islamic, African and Socialist countries and the non-aligned countries. Furthermore, this plan aims at achieving conciliation with the enemy and recognition of the legality of his presence in all fields, political, economic and cultural, and open frontiers, with a view to enabling Zionism to control the Arab homeland, its resources and capabilities.

The plan is also aimed at assisting Israel to substantiate her concepts of expansion and holding on to the occupied territories on the pretext of alleged security, and enabling her to achieve the principal goals of Zionism, and imperialism, which are the liquidation of the rights of the Palestinian people and the imposition of projects which are in radical contradiction with their national aspirations, such as the project for the establishment of a puny entity under tutelage.

2. That the imperialist plan is aimed at inducing the Egyptian regime to perform a role hostile to the interests of the African and Arab countries as regards maintaining their independence, their liberation and the choice of their course of progress.

cover up Sadat's policy which is aimed at isolating Egypt and removing her from her natural and historical position in the arena of the conflict with the Israeli and imperialist enemy, and making the Egyptian regime a tool to be used by American imperialism and its allies in an attempt to impede the march of the Arab nation towards liberation, progress and unity and to prevent the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

²⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), February 5, 1978.

³⁰ See docs. 319-322 and 324 in International Documents on Palestine 1977

ARAB WORLD 423

- 3. That this plan is also aimed at removing Egypt and certain Arab countries from the framework of the policy of non-alignment and linking them to the imperialist camp, manufacturing a conflict with the USSR, the other Socialist countries and the forces of liberation and progress throughout the world, and depriving the Arab nation of its friends and isolating it from all kinds of support in its struggle to achieve its national goals.
- 4. Equally evident are the dimensions of the conspiracy that is presently being hatched against the whole of the Arab nation, from East to West, and which is being implemented through expansionist ambitions and direct military intervention by the forces of imperialism and its protégés, with the aim of striking at the freedom of peoples and their right to self-determination, and of prejudicing the principles of sovereignty and independence.
- 5. Among the aims of the plan is the administration of a cruel blow to Arab solidarity whose aim is the mobilisation of Arab energies against the Zionist enemy with a view to liberating the occupied territories and recovering the rights of the Palestinian people. A further aim of the plan is to create a split between the Arab countries to ensure that the plan can be implemented without integrated Arab resistance.

These hostile projects are also aimed at enabling the Zionist enemy to weaken world solidarity with the Palestine cause and Arab rights at a time when there is increasing consciousness everywhere of the expansionist and racialist character of Israel, and at allowing imperialism to return to the area in full strength, so that it may assume the upper hand in dealing with the Middle East problem.

6. America and Israel, along with President Sadat, are currently trying to reach a separate Israeli-Egyptian solution at the expense of the occupied Arab territories and of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and their sole legitimate representative, the PLO. This axis is also striving to attract certain Arab countries to this project, both to provide Sadat with cover and to ensure their implementation of all the successive stages of the conspiracy. Having established these facts, the conference conducted an appraisal of all aspects of the situation in the Arab homeland, which led to an appreciation of the dangers that threaten the Arab nation. In the

light of the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences and the statement issued by the Tripoli conference, the conference took a number of measures and resolutions with a view to meeting the requirements of the present stage.

- 1. The conference affirms its adherence to the Tripoli statement³¹ and the resolutions adopted by the Tripoli conference and stresses the need to continue the struggle to frustrate the current conspiracy and to thwart all attempts to induce the Arabs to accept defeat and surrender and to liquidate the Palestine problem, to continue the occupation of Arab territories and to perpetuate the Zionist presence and enable it to control the area at the political, economic and military levels.
- 2. The conference also affirms its determination to resist all attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem and warns all Arab parties, whether governmental or non-governmental, whether individuals or groups, against infringing the resolutions of the Algiers³² and Rabat³³ Arab summit conferences in an attempt to claim that they represent the Palestinians in any guise whatsoever, inasmuch as the PLO is their sole legitimate representative.
- 3. The conference stresses the importance of Arab solidarity aimed at liberating the occupied Arab territories and recovering the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people by mobilising energies for the struggle against the Israeli enemy. It also stresses the importance of continued efforts and contacts with the Arab countries that have not supported Sadat, with a view to strengthening the Arab position and ensuring the best possible conditions for the establishment of effective Arab solidarity within the framework of the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences.
- 4. The conference likewise stresses the importance of action to ensure the widest possible international support for the just struggle of the Arab nation, and to reinforce cooperation with the African, Islamic and non-aligned countries and the Socialist countries, headed by the USSR. The conference commends African solidarity with the cause of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, which proves Africa's profound awareness of the

³¹ Doc. 322 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

See docs. 331–333 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.
 See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and

Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

dangers of this conspiracy and its repercussions on the African liberation movement.

5. The conference declares its rejection of all agreements reached at the expense of the higher interests of the Arab nation and condemns all agreements that prejudice the rights of the Palestinian people and their just cause. The conference also affirms that the Egyptian President is not legally entitled to discuss the cause of the Palestinian people, who are represented by the PLO, or the future of the occupied Syrian Arab territories and that the current conflict concerns the whole of the Arab nation: the Egyptian President cannot decide the outcome of this conflict on his own, because peace must be an all-Arab one.

The conference was informed of the contents of the letter that Mr. Yasir Arafat, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Palestinian Revolution, intends to send to the heads of states that are permanent members of the Security Council and to the Secretary General of the UN. This letter stresses that the PLO alone has the legitimate right to speak for the Palestinian people and that neither President Sadat nor anyone else has the right to represent the Palestinians. It further affirms that there can be no peace in the area if it is based on disregard of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. The conference expresses its confidence that the peace, justice and freedom-loving forces will redouble their support for Syria, the people of Palestine and the Arab nation in their just and legitimate struggle.

6. The conference believes that now more than ever before, national duty requires the adoption of an attitude of resolute support for Syria and the PLO and of reinforcing their position by all ways and means with a view to frustrating partial settlements that can be of service only to the ambitions of Zionism and the aims of imperialism.

The conference also believes that the Arab countries must mobilise their energies and efforts by all available means and take action to achieve a strategic balance between Syria and the Zionist enemy.

- 7. The conference supports the Arab people of Egypt and their progressive vanguards who are resisting the current imperialist conspiracy and valiantly opposing all attempts to isolate Egypt from the Arab nation, its goals and its aspirations.
 - 8. The conference affirms that the Arab nation

will continue to work for a just peace in accordance with the principles of freedom, justice and the right of peoples to self-determination and to build their own future. The conference also stresses the extensive international support enjoyed by the cause of the Arab nation and the stand of the Steadfastness Front against the current conspiracy, whose aim is to impair the security of the peoples of the area and of the whole world.

219

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt discussing political developments subsequent to his initiative seeking to establish peace in the Middle East (excerpts)³⁴

Washington, February 6, 1978

Mr. Chairman,

Following my historic mission to the Holy City, we all proceeded along the road to peace assuming that a new chapter had begun, that a new spirit had come to dominate, that the old methods had come to an end, that worn out definitions were no longer valid in dealing with the new state of affairs, that a basic change had come over events, and, therefore, that the equation itself had to change. For, in the past, each party was content merely to submit his viewpoint and to search for legal justifications for that viewpoint. The task then was to seek to find the means best suited to justify the gap between the two positions, not to bridge that gap.

I believe that it is now time to change that picture. The challenge now resides in how to reconcile, not how to organise a dialogue, in how to win the hearts and minds of peoples, how to mobilise the masses of both parties for the cause of peace. It is our duty to fortify their faith that peace is not only necessary but possible, to deepen their commitment to that cause, to prove to them that it is possible to arrive at peace and, thus, to be guided by a set of values and directives.

However, I must inform you in all sincerity that the events of the past few weeks have given

³⁴ Made before the US National Press Club during a visit to the United States from February 3–8; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), February 7, 1978.

us cause for concern. The Israeli government elected to revert back to the vicious circle of debating every word and comma. They have reverted once more to old tactics and worn out ideas, giving one the impression that a deliberate attempt is being made to wipe away the traces of that historic initiative and to rob it of its spirit and momentum. This is a very grave matter and no one stands to benefit from such a development. In fact, I firmly believe that that initiative belongs to all peoples of the world. It has become part of the collective conscience of humanity. It is a living example of how to rid ourselves from our ills.

Mr. Chairman, dear friends,

I knew all along that the path to peace was not strewn with roses, that it is a laborious process requiring hard work, sincerity and persistence. But I must tell you in all frankness that I was disappointed by some of the negative developments that might threaten our efforts, against all expectations and despite all the good intentions.

We demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that we are prepared to accept Israel fully as a good neighbour. We further stated that we are ready to live in peace and amity with the people of Israel. We expressed our sincere desire to let the October War be the last, once the other side accepted its commitments in accordance with the UN Charter and with the general principles of international law.

While we were doing all this, we were told that there will be no return to the 1967 frontiers. We were also told that the Palestinian people do not have the right to self-determination, which is considered a basic human right. We were told that the Israeli government would resign rather than compromise over the illegal settlements created on Arab land in defiance of world public opinion as reflected in unanimous UN resolutions. We were told that Arabs, both Christians and Muslims, have no rights in the city of Jerusalem. Even worse, we are being told that Israel does not need our recognition.

This is not the Jerusalem spirit. This is not the road to be followed in order to establish peace and do away with war and hatred. Such a policy will revive mistaken views and ancient suspicions. It would rebuild the old barriers between the Arab nation and the Israeli people and this assuredly will be the saddest thing of all.

It has been suggested to us that any negotiations are a process of give and take, that, in other words, it implies successive concessions from both sides and that, therefore, the Arabs ought to continue to negotiate and compromise irrespective of the Israeli standpoint. I want to make it perfectly clear that we are still committed to the cause of peace, giving this every chance. Despite all difficulties, we shall persevere. As far as we are concerned, the quest for peace is a strategic objective that we pursue relentlessly. I am aware that the idea of compromise and concession is acceptable in the American system and that it is one which appeals to you as a way of meeting requests and settling disputes. But I submit that this idea ought to be viewed in a different manner in this particular instance. This is a case where one party spontaneously expressed its willingness to shoulder its responsibilities on the basis of reciprocity. In order words, this party has in fact fulfilled its part of the bargain.

Naturally, it is not possible to ask anyone to make unilateral concessions. But the fact is that we have expressed our sincere readiness to fulfil our commitments in accordance with the special definition of the requirements for peace and with Security Council resolution 242. A comprehensive settlement of this conflict, as is the case with any other conflict, implies a delicate balance between two sets of commitments.

As stated before, we are ready to carry out the part that concerns us. I need not tell you, however, that this hinges upon the declared readiness of the other side also to fulfill its commitments. What is wanted is to implement resolution 242³⁵ in all its parts. We have announced our readiness to accept the following:

- 1. To end the state of war and all that it implies, such as the Arab boycott.
 - 2. To establish peaceful relations.
- 3. To furnish all the necessary guarantees for the security of each state.
- 4. To permit peaceful navigation through the Straits of Tiran.
- 5. To safeguard the right of every state in the region to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

Those who maintain that Arab recognition of Israel is not necessary and not important are missing the essential point. The operative word

³⁵ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

is acceptance and not just recognition. The first is comprehensive in meaning whereas the second has a narrow legal connotation. The Israelis ought to be the first people to comprehend and appreciate the fine difference between the two concepts. When we agree to accept them fully and unreservedly as an independent entity in the Middle East, this cannot be taken lightly.

I am confident, my friends, that you will agree with me over this, and that it is now up to the other side to take a similar step by demonstrating a willingness to shoulder their responsibility in the framework of a comprehensive settlement. More specifically, the other side is asked to accept the following:

- 1. Withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied since June 1967, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through war.
- 2. Enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their national right to self-determination.
- 3. Providing appropriate safeguards for the security of Arab states.

We have been told that any Palestinian entity, even if accompanied by all these guarantees, would mean the destruction of Israel. This is false. A Palestinian state connected with Jordan will be a positive force making for stability and a restoration to normalcy in the region. Without it, the structure of peace will remain shaky. Any peace agreement can collapse so long as the Palestinians are left frustrated and unsatisfied.

In brief, this would be an open invitation to renewal of violence and tension. The conflict, like a volcano, can lie dormant but can also erupt at any moment. Is this what we are striving for?

The proposed Israeli settlement for the West Bank and Gaza is, quite simply, inadequate. It is premised upon continued occupation, and this means creating more illegal settlements in a region already overcrowded and where emotions run high. I have myself received many Palestinian delegations of people living in the West Bank and Gaza and they all oppose this concept, unanimously asserting that this will not solve the problem. It is quite simply an attempt to evade the issue, which cannot be considered marginal. Rather, it is now recognised to be the very heart and crux of the whole problem.

The other factor which impedes the course of justice is that the Israeli position is growing harder

rather than softer as we proceed along this path, and this constitutes an obstacle to peace.

Having agreed to commit themselves to withdrawal to the Egyptian international frontier, they now maintain that we must be satisfied with limited sovereignty in a certain part of our land. When I expressed appreciation for their need to feel secure, they began to include every conceivable subject under the heading of security. Thus the annexation of territory became a matter of security, as did the matter of building illegal settlements on lands belonging to other peoples. The creation of new settlements is illegal as is the expansion of existing settlements on Arab lands. It is an act that implies a direct challenge and is an escalation of the situation. It provokes a challenge to the fourth Geneva Convention and to numerous UN resolutions ratified by your own country. It further complicates an already complex state of affairs, breeding hatred and friction between two societies, since it places one of them in the position of aggressor against the lands of the other. This is an indication of the true intentions of the Israeli establishment and it broadens the gap of mistrust and suspicion.

Finally, I shall define for you the US role at this critical juncture. We do not wish to cause you any trouble, but we need your help to settle our problem since you have a special relationship with one party and friendly and amical relations with the other. Israel relies a great deal on your government, militarily, politically and financially. On the other hand, since you have worldwide interests, this places you in a unique position from where you can exercise your authority for peace and stability.

We do not ask you to take sides or to be biased in favour of one side or the other. It is to be expected that you will remain true to your values and traditions. I am certain that you cannot ignore the suffering of the Palestinian people. Can the Americans who fought for their independence turn their backs upon the right to self-determination? This right is the collective embodiment of human rights.

Can the Americans tolerate, indeed support, the acquisition of territory through force? Can you accept that the concept of secure frontiers should lead to expansion? When planes fall from the sky upon foreign lands, how can anyone speak of security merely as an issue of defensible frontiers? ARAB WORLD 427

Did not the October War disprove the argument of defensible frontiers? We see a constructive US role as more than one of an intermediary. You are a full partner in the quest for peace and you have built up a reserve of good will.

220

Statement by the PLO Central Council affirming its unanimous adoption of the resolutions of the Tripoli and Algiers Steadfastness summit conferences and discussing developments following the Camp David agreements³⁶

Damascus, February 12, 1978

At the meeting of the Central Council in Damascus on February 12, 1978, the Executive Committee submitted a comprehensive review of the current Arab situation in the light of the resolutions adopted by the Steadfastness and Confrontation conferences in Tripoli and Algiers, and of the contacts it has made at the Arab and international levels. As a result of its discussions, the Council decided to affirm its unanimous adoption of the resolutions of the Tripoli and Algiers summit conferences. The members affirmed their full support for the establishment of a national front for steadfastness and confrontation to face all the conspiracies of imperialism and Zionism, assisted by the policy of Sadat and the course he is following. which constitute a grave infringement of the principles of Arab struggle against Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Palestinian Arab people and the Arab nation. This policy also involves the acceptance of the logic of the Zionist enemy, the ceding of Arab rights and the splitting of Arab ranks; it is a patent infringement of the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, in particular those of Algiers and Rabat. As a consequence of this policy the capacities of the Arab nation have fallen into the hands of American imperialism and the Zionist entity. In the light of this definition and of the resolutions of the Steadfastness and Confrontation conferences in

Tripoli and Algiers, the Council affirms the following:

I. The PLO, on the basis of its Charter and its adherence to the resolutions of its National Councils, affirms its resolute unshakable opposition to the policy of President Sadat and expresses its determination to continue armed struggle until it achieves its goals of recovering the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return, to self-determination and to establish their independent state on the soil of their homeland, under the leadership of the PLO. It affirms that no one has the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian Arab people or to represent them in international gatherings except their legitimate organisation that is their spokesman.

II. The Central Council is proud to salute the stand of our people in the occupied homeland vis-à-vis the policy that derives from that of Sadat, and regards this as an indication of our people's resolution to resist all attempts at Judaisation, the establishment of settlements and the imposition of the fait accompli.

III. The Central Council is proud to salute the attitude of the masses of the Arab nation in all the Arab countries of support of the PLO. It likewise salutes the attitude of the Arab regimes that have refused to depart from the resolutions of the Arab summits and the Charter of the Arab League, and affirmed their determination to resist the conspiracy. It calls on the other Arab countries to adopt an unambiguous attitude to these conspiracies, political moves and current discussions and to provide further aid to the forces of real confrontation.

IV. The Central Council is particularly proud of the high-principled nationalist attitude of the nationalist and progressive forces and the masses in Arab Egypt which, it believes, indicates that the great people of Egypt and her valorous army are determined to reject schemes aimed at withdrawing Egypt from the Arab-Zionist conflict, and that the people of Egypt should play their historical role in the Arab liberation struggle.

V. The Central Council believes that the strengthening of strategic relations with Syria in particular and with the steadfastness and confrontation countries in general is the mainstay of Arab steadfastness in the face of the new conspiracy.

VI. The Central Council calls on all Arabs in official positions to be on their guard against the

³⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), February 13, 1978, p.2. For the resolutions of the Tripoli and Algiers Arab summit conferences, see docs. 320, 322 and 324 in *International Documents on Palestine 1977* and doc. 218 above.

conspiracies that are being hatched by Israel and her supporters in South Lebanon, within the framework of military plans to arouse civil strife in Lebanon once more. The Council affirms the PLO's intense concern for the sovereignty of Lebanon and the unity of her territory and people.

VII. The Central Council stresses the need to strengthen national unity between all sections of the Palestinian resistance movement and, in particular as regards its military forces, to advance further along the road to national unity so as to confront the dangers and conspiracies to which the Palestinian revolution is exposed.

VIII. The Central Council calls for effective action to strengthen and crystallise all forms of cooperation and coordination between Arab states and nationalist forces, and the socialist countries, headed by the friendly USSR, and also with the Islamic, African and non-aligned countries.

IX. The Central Council affirms its decisive rejection of the conspiracies of imperialism and Zionism, under the leadership of the US, in the Arab area, Africa and the Third World countries, which conspiracies are aimed at bringing these areas into their sphere of influence and placing them at the mercy of domination by their voracious monopolies.

221

Press interview statements by Information Minister Iskandar Ahmad of Syria discussing Syria-Palestine relations and opposition to the peace initiative of President Sadat of Egypt³⁷

Damascus, mid-February, 1978

Q. How do you evaluate the American decision to supply Egypt with arms?

A. The decision may give the appearance of a friendly gesture toward Egypt, but it is in fact a trick.

It is a well-known fact that the jet fighters which America has agreed to sell Egypt are obsolete and very dangerous for the pilots.

In West Germany, so many of these planes exploded in mid-air that they began calling them

"flying coffins."

The decision to sell Egypt those planes was also meant to provide cover for the decision to give the Zionist enemy the most advanced American jet fighter, the F-16.

Where numbers are concerned, Egypt is to be sold 50 F-5's, and Israel is to be given 130 F-16's.

The American decision is an attempt to hoodwink the Egyptian people, and a plot against the Egyptian pilots who will be forced to fly these flying coffins.

- Q. Did President Hafez Assad succeed in his mission during his recent tour of the Arabian Gulf, which we understand was aimed at polarizing Gulf states against the Sadat initiative? Is the position of Saudi Arabia closer to Syria's than to President Sadat's?
- A. President Assad noted great understanding of the Syrian point of view in those countries, and great appreciation of the steadfastness of Syria and the sacrifices it has made in its struggle for the Arab cause. I personally believe that the positions of those countries have become closer to the Syrian position than to the position of any other country.

This is especially true now, several months after Sadat started spreading his delusions, after he fell into the trap of contradictions and was forced to issue more lies.

- Q. What are the next steps which the Syrian-Palestinian alliance will be taking regarding the Sadat initiative?
- A. Syrian-Palestinian relations are good, and they are improving continuously. This is dictated by the strategic necessities which preceded and followed the Sadat initiative. I have no doubt that Syrian-Palestinian solidarity will continue and grow stronger, in the service of the just Arab struggle and in support of the resolutions of the Steadfastness and Challenge Front.
- Q. What do you think the position of this Front would be in the event of an Israeli attack on Syria?
- A. The member nations of the Steadfastness and Challenge Front will not abandon Syria should Israel attack. They will offer all the help they can.
 - Q, Where will the third conference of the Front be held? A. It will be held in Syria.
- Q. The President of Algeria, Houari Boumedienne, has been working to close the gap between Syria and Iraq. Joint committees have been formed for the same

³⁷ Interview conducted by Nadim Abu Ghannam, Monday Morning (Beirut), VII, 296 (February 20-26), 1978, pp. 20-21.

purpose. What have the results of these efforts been so far?

- A. Nothing new has happened since the eve of the recent Steadfastness and Challenge Front conference in Algeria. It is known that our brothers the Iraqis are still looking for excuses not to join the Steadfastness and Challenge efforts. It is our hope that Iraq will shoulder its national responsibilities, move from the slogan stage to the action stage and participate effectively in the Arabs' struggle side by side with Syria, which is the center of Arab Steadfastness and Challenge.
- Q, President Assad is to go to the Soviet Union soon. Will he take any requests with him? And is it true that Libya has agreed to finance a new Syrian-Soviet arms deal?
- A. President Hafez Assad's visit to Moscow comes in response to an official invitation, in the context of the fruitful contacts between Syria and our friends the Soviets. There is no doubt that this visit will further strengthen the bilateral relations between the two countries, to serve the interests of both. Nor is there any doubt that this visit will produce clear results in terms of supporting the Arabs' just struggle to liberate their occupied lands and regain their usurped rights. All Soviet-Syrian summits have been positive and fruitful.
- Q, Is it true that Syria has since the Sadat initiative received advanced Soviet weapons to help it stand up to Israel alone?
- A. The Syrian Arab Republic's defense capabilities are being bolstered on a continuous basis, to enable it to challenge the imperialist-Zionist plot and block all attempts to impose capitulation on the Arab nation.

Syria has rejected the concept of strategic balance with the Zionist enemy and is acting on this decision in various ways.

- Q. Is there anything to the reports that a Syrian-Libyan-Soviet summit is to be held in Moscow?
 - A. I have no information on this subject.
- Q. What is the current status of the Syrian-Jordanian alliance? What is Jordan's position on the recent developments in the region (and why does that position remain vague)? Was it strain in Jordanian-Syrian relations which ended the production of the Syrian-Jordanian News Agency and brought the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) back to its independence?

A. The offices of SANA and the Jordanian agency were never unified, so there is no question of separation.

The Jordanian position has been defined in a number of official statements.

Regarding Syrian-Jordanian cooperation in the fields of economy, agriculture, industry and transport, it exists and is continuing. Both countries are interested in developing it.

We in Syria believe that Jordan's interests, like the interests of Syria and the Arab nation as a whole, lie in rejecting and blocking the American-Zionist plot—the plot which Sadat is implementing against the Arab nation.

- Q, Syria has announced that it has no intention of attending the Arab League meeting in Cairo. If no meeting is held, what will happen when the mandate of the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon expires (in April, 1978)? Can the mandate of those forces be extended without holding a meeting of the Arab League Council?
- A. The Syrian contingent in the Arab Deterrent Forces will remain in Lebanon as long as Lebanon's legal authorities wish it to remain, and as long as its mission—the mission of maintaining the security and stability of Lebanon—continues to exist.
- Q, Do you think the meeting of the Arab League Council, which is scheduled for March 27, will be held?
- A. The member nations of the Steadfastness and Challenge Front will boycott any meeting held in Cairo. I don't think there is any possibility of the Council meeting being held.
- Q. How would you explain the recent developments in Lebanon? What's behind them, and what could their consequences be?
- A. The factors which led to the unfortunate incidents in Beirut will definitely be determined by the joint investigation committee which has been formed for that purpose. As far as our own views of those incidents are concerned, I am sure that the perpetrators were not aiming at bolstering Lebanese security and stability. This was an attempt to spark a new crisis, to bring tension back to Lebanon and smear the human and national role of Syria in Lebanon.

But regardless of the motives, Syria is determined to continue its efforts to maintain the security of Lebanon. Syria believes that the security of Lebanon is more important than any individual or group or faction.

Those who are conspiring against Lebanon, those who believe they can spread terror in Lebanon will be severely punished if they try to push their plan through.

We will not allow the disturbances to return to Lebanon.

Q. Is (former) President Camille Chamoun expected to visit Syria?

Chamoun has not asked for an invitation to visit Syria. If he comes, it will be on a hunting trip only.

Q, Is there anything else you wish to tell our readers about the current situation?

The information ministers of the Steadfastness Front's member nations will be holding a conference in Damascus in March. This conference will deal with ways of blocking the cultural and mental sabotage which the agencies of Sadat and international Zionism are engaging in against the Arabs. It will deal with the pyschological war which Sadat and international Zionism are waging against the Arabs.

The conference is sure to discuss external information affairs and ways of continuing efforts to explain and clarify the Arab cause in all its aspects.

222

Press interview statements by President Qadhafi of Libya expressing his attitude towards President Sadat of Egypt's peace initiative with Israel³⁸

Tripoli, mid-February, 1978

- Q. Mr. President...
- A. I am not President...
- Q. What are you then?
- A. I am Secretary General of the Libyan People's Congress, and so speak in the name of my people. After the people have taken power presidents and ministers are done away with.
- Q, So, Mr. Secretary General, who is your most bitter enemy, Israel's Prime Minister Begin or Egypt's President Sadat?
 - A. Both are my enemies to an equal degree.

However, our greatest enemy is the disunity of the Arab nation. The more divided the Arabs are, the weaker they are.

- Q. Egypt's President Sadat is travelling through the western world to enlist support for his peace initiative in the conflict with Israel, while you are meeting with other Arab heads of state to protest this peace initiative. What have you against Sadat's peace plan?
- A. The Arab masses from the Gulf to the Atlantic reject this peace of Sadat. They are not against peace as such, but against Sadat's method of solving this problem.
- Q. What criticism do you have of this method?
 A. The nature of this conflict does not allow for such a method. Sadat's method leads to a deadend, and thus will not succeed. This is what the Egyptian Foreign Minister and ambassador [Shazli] wanted to show with their resignations. Through the Tripoli and Algiers conferences³⁹ we have articulated this rejection.
- Q. What in your opinion constitutes the correct method then, since you condemn Sadat's method?
- A. It consists in holding fast to one's rights and not rashly giving them up. Peace cannot be obtained by begging. It is not a matter of peace but of the occupation of Arab territory.
- Q. But it is just these territories that Sadat wants to regain through negotiations. What have you against that?

 A. From the first day Sadat's initiative was
- doomed to failure. But he can't admit that it is a miserable failure.
- Q. It is still a bit early to prove that. For what reasons do you think Sadat went to Jerusalem?
- A. Sadat only wanted to achieve one thing, namely to prolong his presidency. He is quite simply power-hungry. All these shows on international television and pompous visits to foreign statesmen are supposed to reveal Sadat himself as a great statesman, which in reality he isn't. He is purely and simply a bungler. I would like to remind you that Sadat has publicly stated that he will resign if his policy fails. We anticipate that with pleasure. He should actually have done it after his Jerusalem visit.

³⁸ Translated from the German text of the interview granted to Der Spiegel (Hamburg), February 20, 1978, pp. 120-127.

³⁹ See docs, 319, 320, 322 and 324 in International Documents on Palestine 1977 and doc. 218 above.

- Q. Sadat's initiative, even if it does fail, has still obtained some positive results for the Arabs. Thanks to Sadat, the buck has now been passed onto the Israelis.
- A. I see things differently. Sadat's policy has shown that the Palestine question cannot be solved Sadat's way. The Zionist enemy denies our rights, although the whole world recognises these rights. Sadat is playing a game. When he maintains that 99% of the cards are in the hands of the USA that is nothing but a deception, a manoeuvre. Why don't the USA cut the Zionists down to size, as Sadat always claims they will?
- Q. Sadat has shown the world that at least one Arab partner wants peace. That's a positive step isn't it?
- A. Of course it is positive. And I am extremely happy about it, that Sadat has plunged deeper into the blind alley and in his naiveté he will continue to negotiate until in the end he will be stripped completely bare.
- Q, But you wouldn't leave an Arab brother standing naked?
- A. (laughs) No, we Arabs never leave anyone standing naked. We will find some suitable garments for His Majesty.
- Q, Do you see a possibility that things can ever be patched up with Sadat again?
- A. If he acknowledges his shameful historic blunder and makes a solemn vow never again to take such steps, then I believe that God will forgive him.
 - Q, And you?
- A. (laughs) If God forgives him, then why shouldn't God's subject forgive him? But he must have the courage, and be man enough to make a public confession before the Arab people.
- Q. Libya is a rich country, Egypt is poor. Perhaps there were also economic difficulties which impelled him to do what he did. Why didn't you provide sufficient aid to Egypt in good time?
- A. We have always been and we still are prepared to pay on Egypt's account all that is asked of us.
- Q, Is it correct that shortly before Sadat's Israel visit you sent a special envoy to Cairo and offered every kind of assistance on the condition that Sadat didn't go to Jerusalem?
- A. That is correct. But he did not want us to pay his debts; he wanted military aid and support.

All his requests for military aid met with my approval.

- Q. And what were these requests?
- A. He wanted more squadrons for his Air Force and about 300 of the most modern tanks, to be deployed in the Suez Canal zone as soon as possible. I gave my approval, and the arms began to roll slowly towards Egypt. But then Sadat suddenly turned round and rejected this aid under the pretext that it was not coming as quickly as he had requested. This kind of assistance cannot be delivered within 24 hours. He took this as an an excuse and said that everything was coming much too slowly and that he would undertake his visit to Israel after all.
 - Q. How do you explain this turnabout?
- A. You see we know Sadat very well. He likes to think that he is a crafty bluffer. But we have seen through him for a long time. Any weapon for Egypt—wherever it comes from—will some time or another constitute a danger for Israel. Sadat wants to avoid that at any cost. So don't be amazed if I tell you now that I would have nothing against it if the USA armed Egypt to the same degree that they have armed the Israelis. If that happened I would be really pleased.
- Q. Sadat has in fact requested arms from the USA, but he has pledged not to attack Israel with them. Maybe he would use them for a strike against Libya?
- A. Let us be realistic. No western power will arm Egypt to such an extent that it could constitute a danger for Israel. Even if Sadat got down on all fours and licked his enemy's boots. Still, if he does try, he will be in for a big surprise. He won't get any arms, and even if he does he won't dare to use them against Libya.
- Q. The USA will do all it can to advance the peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Maybe the Israelis and the Egyptians will come to terms after all. What would Libya do then?
- A. Whatever Sadat signs with the Israelis won't be worth more than the paper that it is written on. For the Israelis won't abide by the agreements, just as they haven't abided by any of the numerous UN resolutions. After a few years the Arab countries will once more be in confrontation with the Zionist enemy.
- Q, Will you wait for an eventual agreement between Israel and Egypt to happen, or will you try to do something

beforehand?

- A. The betrayal has already been committed, that is beyond dispute. Sadat should not try to gloss over his crime. It is not only Egypt that he has betrayed but the Arab people as a whole.
- Q. Why are you opposed to a peace with Israel? Some Arab countries are prepared to recognise the existence of Israel.
 - A. Your question is not formulated correctly...
- Q, Everything indicates that Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states seem to be prepared to recognise Israel.
- A. Your question is not put in the correct way, insofar as you are thereby placing the cart before the horse. You can't just ignore the situation as a whole and ask: "Why are you not going to conclude a peace agreement?" First the situation must be rectified, and then we can discuss peace.
- Q. So you want first to alter the existing political equation and then negotiate.
- A. The real problem is not peace or war, it is the occupation of Arab territories and the dispersion of the Palestinians. We demand the return of the occupied territories and the return of the people who were driven out. If that happens, then we can talk about peace.
- Q. By return do you mean Israel going back to the 1967 borders?
- A. First Egypt must regain her territories occupied since 1967. That is Egyptian territory as recognised by international law and the Israelis have no right, even for an hour, to remain on this land. The same goes for the Golan Heights which are an inalienable and integral part of Syria.

Secondly, the Palestinian people must be accorded the right and the possibility to live in their homeland. The question you should have asked is: "Where are the Palestinian people to live?" I would answer: "In their homeland."

- Q. Can you envisage a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip?
- A. Under no circumstances. The least that the Palestinian people would accept is the 1947 UN partition plan.
- Q. It is of course unrealistic, but let us suppose that Israel were to withdraw to the 1947 lines. Would Libya then recognise Israel?

- A. In that case a new situation would come about which would have to be recognised.
 - Q. You would recognise Israel then.
- A. No, I do not mean recognition of Israel. I consider Israel to be a colonial product of the Second World War. In historical, geographical and political terms the world knows only Palestine. Even the Holy Scriptures speak only of Palestine. The word 'Israel' is nothing but a political expression which has as much significance as Rhodesia, built on the ruins of Zimbabwe.
- Q. Would you not, at least in principle, accord the Jews the right to possess a state in the Near East?
- A. We believe that Palestine belongs to the Palestinians.
 - Q. And who are the Palestinians?
- A. They are the Arabs of Palestine and the Oriental Jews. They alone have the right to live in Palestine. Conversely, all those who came to Palestine after the end of the British Mandate have no right to live there. They are nothing more than mercenaries, just like the Crusaders or the mercenaries in Zimbabwe.
- Q. The majority, even of the Palestinians, would be happy to recognise Israel if Israel agreed to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- A. This has not occurred, it is mere rumour and speculation. Even if the Palestinians were to accept such a thing, it would merely be a tactical move so they could have a base under their feet in order to achieve liberation from the (Jordan) River to the sea.
- Q. So you do not believe that a Palestinian state will rise up next to Israel?
- A. We are convinced that Israel will never accept an independent Palestinian state. For that would mean that the Palestinians would obtain a territory from which they would be able to struggle for the remainder of their Palestinian homeland. The establishment of a Palestinian state would spell the beginning of the end of the artificial entity Israel.
- Q. Is that also the opinion of PLO Chairman Arafat? He has, to be sure, turned his back on Sadat and is now completely on your side.
- A. My faith in Yasser Arafat is unshakeable. Arafat committed no betrayals in the past and he

won't do so in the future. Arafat has shown that the path followed by Sadat is the wrong one. Sadat has thereby forsaken the right and authority to speak in the name of the Palestinian people.

- Q. Sadat can still speak in the name of the Arab people.
- A. Sadat is only authorised to negotiate over the Sinai. Whatever else he claims is pure fancy. The PLO is recognised by the whole world as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Whoever wants to solve the Palestine question must speak with the representatives of the PLO.
- Q. Not necessarily. Sadat wants the negotiations to progress to the stage that Jordan could later come in.
- A. If Jordan does that and joins in this game Hussein will lose his throne.
- Q. It seems to us that Libya holds such radical attitudes because it is far from the front-line. The further a country is from Israel, the more radical it is in many cases.
- A. How do you reach that conclusion? All the wars with Israel were fought by her neighbours not by Libya.
- Q. In the case of Libya and Algeria we find in the Rejection Front two states that have no common border with Israel. What gives you the right to criticise Egypt?
- A. Egypt is a confrontation state; Libya and Algeria are and always have been part of the strategic hinterland. In all Egypt's wars with Israel both these countries provided the basis for Egypt's reserve and logistical support. Consequently we are able to strengthen or weaken Egypt's position. We should not be taken lightly. Without us Egypt cannot decide on war or peace.
- Q. Egypt does not want war with Israel, it wants peace.
- A. Whether they like it or not, they will have to fight a war against Israel.
- Q. Let us turn away from Egypt for the time being do you believe that Syria is in a position to fight a war against Israel on her own?
- A. I am convinced it can. The key to war or peace with Israel now lies in Syria's hands.
- Q. It has been said that you would give Syria a billion dollars worth of aid. Is that correct?
- A. We have not discussed an exact sum, but I have undertaken to do all I can to help Syria. And I assure you that I will fulfil this responsibility.

- Q. Will you also send Libyan troops to the Syrian front?
- A. Syria does not need any Libyan soldiers, it has enough men under arms.
 - Q. Have you also undertaken to help the Palestinians?
- \widetilde{A} . Of course, they receive all sorts of material aid.
- Q. You asked Syria at the Algiers Conference to give the Palestinians a free hand against Israel. Did Syria agree to that?
- A. The Palestinians have given a green light for resistance action against Israel.
 - Q. Have the Syrians given them a green light?
 - A. They have a green light.
 - Q. So it is up to the Palestinians to act or not?
 - A. That is what I mean to say.
- Q. Are the Palestinians then agreed on how the struggle against Israel should be conducted?
- A. The greater the pressure from outside, the more they have to be united.
- Q. UN troops are stationed on the Golan Heights. These must first be withdrawn if the Palestinians are to attack Israel from there. Or are you thinking of Lebanon or Jordan as bases for operations?
- A. The Palestinians have the right to operate from Lebanese or Jordanian territory. Neither regime should stand in their way, otherwise they will be the ones to lose.
- Q, Colonel Qadhafi, you consider yourself to be one of the leaders of the Third World. At least in Africa you have in the Cubans serious competition. After their initial military involvement in Angola, they are now fighting m the side of Ethiopia. Do you consent to Cuban military involvement in African affairs?
- A. I do not believe that it was necessary for Ethiopia to bring in Cuban troops to solve its problems.
- Q, The Somali authorities showed the international press a Cuban prisoner.
- A. We are against all foreign military interference in the internal affairs of other states.
- Q. Are there any Cuban and Russian soldiers in Libya?
 A. We have neither Cuban nor Russian soldiers in our territory. We only have military advisers.
- Q, Libya supports various liberation movements. Following what criteria do you do this, and which organisations are they?

- A. At the moment we support the liberation movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa, as well as the Palestinian resistance. These are movements struggling against racism, slavery and the remnants of European colonialism.
- Q. Do you also support organisations such as the West German Baader-Meinhof gang?
- A. I hear of these liberation movements just like anyone else. I neither bother with these things, nor do I know anything about them.
- Q. Do you distinguish between liberation movements and terrorism?
- A. What is terrorism? Could you perhaps tell me what terrorism is? What you really want to ask is whether I consider the Palestinian resistance organisations to be terrorist organisations. I will tell you quite simply: No. By putting such questions you in the West aim at manipulating and distorting the struggle of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians want nothing more than to return to their homeland. Zionism denies this, and you in the West mindlessly follow suit.
- Q. But what about, for example, airplane hijackings by Palestinians?
- A. We are against hijackings, and we have very strict laws against it. I hope that the rest of the world will take similar measures. However, at the same time I would like to say that we are also the guardians of those who are struggling for their freedom and independence. They have their own defined methods and I must accord them the freedom to adopt these methods.
- Q. Libya also supports the liberation movement of Arabistan which claims oil-rich southwest Iran as its own.
- A. We acknowledge the aims of the Arabistan liberation movement. We hope that the day is not far off that Arabistan will return to the Arab nation. There are no problems between the Arab and Iranian peoples. After the Shah has been overthrown there will be no more problems with Iran.
- Q, The Shah is one of your most important partners in OPEC and the commander-in-chief of one of the largest armies in the Near East. Are you not afraid that he might intervene?
- A. We fear neither the Shah nor anyone else, however powerful they may be. Shah Reza Pahlavi is a bad dream for the Iranian people, and

no people can live under a nightmare for ever. The time will come when the people will be rid of this bad dream.

- Q. Ever since you came to power you have striven to unite your country with Egypt, but without success. Are you disappointed by this outcome?
- A. I do not believe that my attempts have been in vain. Measured against Arab history as a whole these have been attempts of a very minor duration. The seed of Arab unity has been sown, one day it will come to fruition and the artificial boundaries will disappear. Even partial success is better than not trying at all. Only in this way can we approach the goal of Arab unity.
- Q, Colonel Qadhafi, thank you very much for this interview.

223

Statements by President Asad of Syria praising USSR policy in the Middle East and rejecting capitulationism⁴⁰

Moscow, February 21, 1978

We completely reject all plans which it is sought to impose on us, against our will, contrary to our lawful and just aspirations and contrary to the honour and pride of our people....

For a long time now, forces hostile to the Arab people have been trying to change the situation in the Middle East in their favour and against the interests of the peoples of the region. These attempts have always come up against the solidarity of the Arab countries and their firm allegiance to the rights of the Arabs and to a real basis for a just peace in the area which includes the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The recent visit to Israel and the actions that followed it have seriously worsened the situation. This plays into the hands of the enemies of our nation and the enemies of freedom and a just

⁴⁰ Made at a dinner in his honour on the occasion of his visit to the USSR; partial English text, Soviet News (London), no. 5920 (February 28, 1978), p. 79. For a speech made by President Brezhnev on the same occasion see doc. 79 above. For the joint Soviet-Syrian communiqué issued on February 23, see doc. 80 above.

peace which can be achieved only on the basis of the United Nations resolutions.

We shall reject and resolutely fight against all the manifestations of capitulationism that have already taken place or may be manifested in the future.

We are glad that the position of staunchness that has been assumed by Syria and other Arab countries which are upholding peace, justice and freedom is met with support and assistance from the socialist countries led by the Soviet Union and is supported by all forces seeking genuine peace.

The Soviet Union has always been on the side of the Arabs in their just struggle for the liberation of all the occupied lands and for restoration of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and has constantly given them assistance and support, which has had great and effective significance in strengthening the Arab front of struggle against aggression and expansion.

The development of friendship and the strengthening of co-operation between our two countries in different spheres serve the interests of our peoples and the noble goals and principles which both are seeking to put into practice.

Today's Syrian-Soviet talks took place in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding. There was coincidence of views on all the problems discussed. This helps further to strengthen the relations between our countries and raises the level of our struggle for common goals.

224

Press interview statements by General Secretary Bikdash of the Communist Party of Syria analysing the balance of forces in the Middle East after the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel (excerpt)⁴¹

February 22, 1978

Q, How do you assess the recent Middle East events with respect to the balance of forces between the progressive movement and reaction?

A. In the Middle East a fierce struggle is now being waged—at times open, at times covert—between the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction, on the one hand, and the liberation and progressive forces represented by the Arab popular masses and some Arab governments.

Despite certain phenomena which strike the eye, developments favor the forces of progress. The general course of development cannot be judged simply from the stance of one or another Arab leader. They cannot of course be ignored. but it would be wrong to draw conclusions from them alone, as this could lead to erroneous views and an incorrect assessment of future prospects. To take the stand of Sadat, for instance: what has it resulted in? By his visit to occupied Jerusalem, 42 by his shameful capitulatory policy, his separate negotiations on a basis designed to strengthen the USA and Israel, by his betrayal of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, Sadat has shown that he is serving U.S. imperialism, the ruling circles of Israel and world Zionism as a whole. He helped them in evading the Geneva conference and in lessening somewhat Israel's international isolation. Moreover, he helped Israel by imparting an outward legality to its aggressive expansionist policy toward the Arab countries, which is bolstered by U.S. imperialism.

Sadat facilitated the implementation of imperialist plans aimed at establishing U.S. domination in the Middle East, at concluding an official or unofficial pact directed against the Arab and African liberation movement. All that is true. But it is equally true that in the Arab world Sadat's policy was supported only by King Hasan II of Morocco, Gaafar Nimeiri of Sudan and Sultan Qabus of Oman, whose unstable regime, which is propped by foreign troops, is being threatened by a people's revolution. Also true is the important fact that one result of Sadat's capitulatory policy is the growing popular movement in the majority of Arab states directed against imperialism in general and against the U.S. variety in particular.

The progressive Arab countries gathered for their first high-level conference in Tripoli, and for a second conference in Algiers. This "Front of fortitude and rejection," as you know, includes Syria, Algeria, Libya, Democratic Yemen and the

⁴¹ Interview granted to Rude Pravo; English translation, World Marxist Review Information Bulletin (Toronto), XVI, 8 (April 30, 1978), pp. 16-20.

⁴² See docs. 180–184, 301, 303–305 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

PLO. Iraq, which unfortunately has not officially joined the front, agrees with the front's policy on many key points. We retain the hope that Iraq will join the front, which will meet the interests of the fraternal Iraqi people and the entire Arab liberation movement. This "Fortitude front" represents an important qualitative change in the entire Arab liberation movement. The concept of Arab solidarity has acquired a truly antiimperialist and anti-Zionist character. The maneuvers of U.S. imperialism and Arab reaction, which sought by every means to use the "Arab unanimity" slogan to their own ends, have failed. They have befuddled the concept of Arab solidarity to such an extent as to totally emasculate it, seeking thereby to achieve solutions which would satisfy U.S. imperialism and Zionism.

What can we see in the Middle East now? At present a correct and just Middle East settlement has been further complicated. But who is experiencing the greatest difficulties? Undoubtedly, U.S. imperialism and the reactionary forces. Their maneuverability has been substantially restricted and in the global aspect it is already clear that the U.S. plans which Sadat is putting into effect will not result in a solution of the Middle East problem nor bring about a stable peace in the region.

At the same time the front of the progressive Arab countries and forces is gaining in strength both militarily and economically, and with respect to the oil situation. It enjoys the broad support of the Arab popular masses, the generous aid of the great Soviet Union and other socialist countries, of the non-aligned movement and all liberation and progressive forces throughout the world. This front is based on the sound political foundation of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions. As distinct from the Americans, Zionists and Sadat they do not see the convening of the Geneva conference as a cover for separate negotiations and stress that the Geneva conference is the sole international body that is competent to settle the Middle East problem peacefully with the participation of all sides, including the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine. This solution can only be based on Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, and ensurance of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, including the right to set up their own independent state.

In short, every revolutionary or progressive-

minded person, considering the powerful and growing resistance of the Arab world to imperialist plans (and not only in the countries of the "Fortitude front," but in other states, like in Tunisia, for instance, where a powerful strike took place against the exploitative and pro-imperialist policy, and in Morocco, where mounting resistance is in evidence), will inevitably arrive at the conclusion that a really deep-going development of our region is not in the interests of imperialism, as might seem at first glance. The same conclusion is prompted if we examine the Middle East events from the point of view of a great world battle between the forces of socialism, the nationalliberation movement and the world proletarian revolution, on the other hand, and the forces of imperialism and reaction, on the other. Clearly the Middle East developments inspire and strengthen the global world revolutionary process in the struggle for peace, independence, democracy and progress.

Q. What is your opinion of U.S. imperialist plans in the Middle East and its new tactic?

A. The plans of U.S. imperialism in the Middle East are part of the global strategic plan to establish world domination. The U.S. imperialists began implementing this dream of theirs right after World War II. As is known, U.S. Middle East plans pursue the aim of creating a pact (official or unofficial) extending from Iran, through Israel, Egypt and Sudan to Morocco and encompassing all the other Arab countries. The pact is designed to serve the struggle against the Arab and African national-liberation movements and to establish U.S. domination over the oil resources and strategic positions in the Middle East and over the rich natural resources of the African continent. This plan will never be effected; it is as illusory as the aspiration to world domination. The U.S. imperialists in view of their class essence are incapable of understanding that the clock of history cannot be turned back.

Every revolutionary-minded and progressive person in our country and thoughout the world should realize that U.S. imperialism intends to carry out its Middle East plans, relying above all on Israel. Sadat seeks to create the impression that he is unaware of this when he publicly asserts that the USA on questions of armaments, economic aid and others would take the same approach to

Egypt as to Israel. Not a single Arab state can occupy the same position as Israel in U.S. imperialist plans, nor can they adopt the same stand.

The USA is aware of the situation in Egypt. Whereas formerly Sadat was able to mislead public opinion by asserting that by supporting the U.S. course and bowing before Israel it is possible to stop the rapid worsening of the economic situation and the growing oppression of the masses, now he can no longer do so. Sadat was unable to meet a single one of his promises. The Egyptian people by their powerful actions on January 18 and 19, 1977⁴³ demonstrated that they were capable of fighting against imperialism and reaction. All this is known to the U.S. imperialists. There is even the possibility that the U.S. will depose Sadat. Since they installed him, they can also oust him.

A basic feature of U.S. imperialist Middle East strategy is the striving to isolate the Arab peoples and the entire Arab national-liberation movement from the USSR and the other socialist countries. The U.S. imperialists had counted on Sadat, in the role they had allotted to him, to help them in this. But their plans turned against them, however. The political line of the USA, Israel and Sadat engendered a powerful public movement aimed at furthering and strengthening friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. This movement encompasses the broad popular masses, patriotic and progressive forces in the Arab countries. This was manifested most clearly at the recent meeting of Arab leaders in Algiers, 44 at the previous meeting in Tripoli⁴⁵ and at the All-Arab Peoples' Congress, also held in Tripoli. As is known, some 70 political organizations and 140 popular and trade union organizations from all Arab countries took part in it.

The present U.S. tactic consists, above all, in forcing other countries, particularly the "Fortitude front" countries, to follow in Sadat's footsteps.

225

Statement addressed by the Communist Party of Egypt to the national forces discussing the principles of the struggle to be followed so that Egypt can be spared the consequences of President Sadat's current policy (excerpts)⁴⁶

Mid-February 1978

This is the practical result of the policy of Sadat, a policy of complete surrender to the American imperialist umbrella, a policy that has led to total surrender to the conditions of the minor agent, or perhaps, the minor partner of imperialism: Zionism.

Israel has taken everything. The logical consequence is that it has made new demands and dictated conditions that dishonour our national dignity and national soil, our Arab national responsibility and our brave armed forces. The Israeli enemy was perfectly true to itself logically. So long as the President of Egypt has totally isolated himself from Egypt's natural allies in the world, denying to the Egyptian army the only source capable of providing it with weaponry that can be a balance to the US-Israeli arsenal, and having followed this up by disdaining all his relations and links with the Arab confrontation forces and all the Arab powers that sustain them, crawling towards the enemy, weaponless, and asking him for "peace"—so long as this is so, the enemy is now in a position in which they can dictate the terms they want.

The policy of wooing imperialism began by sacrificing the Soviet ally then by seceding from the Arab liberation movement and then by rejecting the Palestinian revolution. Today, this policy has led to sacrificing the national soil, dishonouring national dignity and squandering national independence, a goal that Egypt spent eighty years of struggle, sacrifice and heroism in order to achieve, and to a return to imperialist vassalage under an Israeli Zionist military protectorate....

Sadat himself admitted in his speech that Egypt today is in urgent need of rescue, whether on the domestic, Arab or international levels.

⁴³ A reference to the anti-government riots in Cairo and Alexandria instigated by the removal of government subsidies to basic commodities at a time when prices had increased and wages had remained static. [Ed.]

⁴⁴ See doc. 218 above.

⁴⁵ See docs. 319, 320, 322 and 324 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

⁴⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Hurriya (Beirut), no. 853 (February 27, 1978), p.26.

We believe that this same principle was embodied in the agreement of all the national forces which rejected and condemned all that might do harm to the national soil, to Egypt's Arab affiliation and to its national duties and responsibilities to the Arab liberation struggle in general and to the revolution of the Palestinian people, led by the PLO, in particular.

Since separate contacts and separate and direct negotiations with the Zionist enemy which are proceeding under a US umbrella are the major obstacle in this regard, our first and immediate demand, which all the national forces must adopt, is to stop any and all talks and negotiations with the Zionist enemy as a first and necessary step on the road back to a policy of coordination with the Arab confrontation forces. Our second demand is for the adoption of a policy of mobilizing all the financial and political resources of Egypt for the sake of liberating the occupied lands, with all that this policy entails on the domestic level, in the way of scientific economic planning directed towards the fulfilment of the demands of the popular working masses. This must take place within the framework of a war economy where the classes capable of it are to shoulder the major burden of this economy and where a political democracy is established that guarantees the popular masses truly democratic freedoms and allows all the national forces to join the liberation struggle and to make fateful decisions. On the Arab and international levels, this entails the recovery of unity among the Arab confrontation and supporting states and solidarity with the Soviet Union and the rest of the friendly socialist states and international forces of national liberation.

We must reach agreement on the basis of these two immediate demands. For their sake, all the national forces that are faithful to Egypt and to its glorious patriotic and national heritage must struggle.

226

Communiqué by the Saudi Royal Council condemning the Israeli attack on South Lebanon⁴⁷

Rivad, March 15, 1978

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia strongly condemns the unjustified Israeli aggression against Southern Lebanon by land, sea and air, which Israel has justified by claiming that it was merely an act of revenge for an operation performed by a few Palestinian guerrillas whose lands Israel has usurped and whom it has evicted to the far corners of the earth. These people preferred to die on the soil of their usurped homeland in order to awaken and to appeal to the conscience of the world for a settlement of their long-standing problem in a spirit of justice and equity. The justification given by Israel is merely a pretext for aggression, a matter that is obvious to everyone. Equally obvious is Israel's expansionist strategy, now that it has placed various obstacles in the path of a just settlement and of recovery of rights.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia calls upon the conscience of the world to oppose this unjustified aggression in order to spare bloodshed and to arrive at the just settlement that everyone desires.

227

Press conference statements by Foreign Minister Butrus of Lebanon discussing the measures being taken by Lebanon to counter Israel's attack on the South (excerpt)⁴⁸

Beirut, March 15, 1978

The matters I discussed with the ambassadors of the major countries in Lebanon are not such as can be expected to yield immediate results. By this I mean that, as you know, they are thorny and important problems, and there is room for consultation with and reference to governments, and for further discussion and study with a view to securing attitudes that safeguard Lebanese interests and are in harmony with the exigencies

⁴⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Riyad (Riyad), March 16, 1978.

⁴⁸ Translated from the partial Arabic text, al-Nahar (Beirut), March 16, 1978.

of the situation.

All I can say today about the events that are taking place is that there is a flagrant Israeli aggression against territory that is strongly condemned by every loyal Lebanese, and that Lebanon cannot be held responsible for any previous action that may have taken place and that Lebanon may be accused of having had a hand in. Because this is absolutely untrue, and because as a result of the actions of some and the counter-action and reactions of others, Lebanon is now in a position where she alone is paying the exorbitant price of the Palestine problem. This is absolutely unjust, and Lebanon alone cannot bear the cost of a problem that concerns the whole area and the Arab countries.

In any case, it is out of the question that we should keep silent about the aggression that Israel has launched, and of course we are going to inform the UN today, reserving our rights and continuing our efforts and contacts which tomorrow we shall extend to include the ambassadors of the Arab countries, so that we may take the necessary steps to put an end to this aggression and its consequences.

- Q, [On his contacts with the ambassadors of the major countries]
- A. Today they were not able to inform me of the results because we discussed the problems, and I shall be informed of the results later. It was a day spent in exchanging views and opinions, and I became aware of these countries' concern as regards matters related to and connected with Lebanon. I also observed that they considered it undesirable that the situation should continue without Lebanon's security requirements being observed, as this can do no good either to the Lebanese or to any other cause they may espouse.
- Q. Are you going to ask the Arab countries to exert pressure on the Palestinians to leave the South?
- A. I shall meet the ambassadors of the Arab countries tomorrow and I shall consider what I ought to say to them about the events that are taking place.
 - Q, [On whether he expected a ceasefire soon]
- A. At the moment I am not in a position to answer this question. We have sent a message to inform the Security Council, but so far we have not called for it to meet.

Q, Did you ask the major countries to mediate to secure the withdrawal of the Israeli forces?

ARAB WORLD

- A. All these things are on the cards, both as a whole and individually. In any case, we are continuing our efforts.
- Q. Have precautionary measures been taken to ensure that the Lebanese army replaces the Israeli forces when they withdraw, as was decided nine months ago?
- A. This matter was discussed in the past when there was talk of implementing the third stage of the Shtura agreement. At the moment I do not know exactly to what extent the army is in a position to enter the South. But I am sure that the Command must have made the necessary preparations for these eventualities.
- Q, Does the government intend to declare a state of emergency if the situation gets worse?
- A. When, God forbid, we are faced with further developments, we shall take the appropriate measures.
 - Q, Has Israel crossed the so-called Red Line?
- A. Not according to the information at my disposal.

228

Speech by Foreign Minister Kamil of Egypt describing the objectives of Israel's attack on South Lebanon as an attempt to occupy it and to exterminate the Palestinian people⁴⁹ Cairo, March 19, 1978

Mr President, Members of the People's Assembly; Your concern at the current development of events in Lebanon as a result of the brutal Israeli attack on her territory and on the Palestinian people, is equalled by the government's concern to keep you always in the picture and to rely on your support to strengthen it in the efforts it expends in the service of the causes of the Arab nation. I have therefore been at pains to be present today, although the energetic attempts we are making and participating in to halt the Israeli aggression have not yet ended.

Firstly I want to set the Israeli aggression against

⁴⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), March 20, 1978.

Lebanon and the Palestinian people in its true perspective. It is certainly not a reaction to the commando operation that took place in Tel Aviv; it is an attempt by Israel to achieve two of her objectives that we know she has been planning for a long time.

The first objective was to occupy South Lebanon, and the second was to strike at the Palestinian presence, and in fact to exterminate the Palestinian people.

In the light of this understanding of Israel's objectives, we have had to determine our moves on all fronts as follows:

- 1- To achieve Israel's immediate withdrawal from South Lebanon, not only because this is right and just, not only because respect for Lebanon's territorial integrity is absolutely essential, but also because, at a time when attempts are being made to achieve a just, permanent and comprehensive peace, it is unreasonable that Israel should be allowed to create a new problem in an attempt to distract attention from the essence of the problem.
- 2– To protect the Palestinian presence and halt the aggression against the Palestinian people.

In this connection, ever since the commando incident took place on the Haifa-Tel Aviv road, Israel has made it clear that the profound significance of this incident lies in the fact that real security cannot be achieved by frontiers or fortifications. It can be achieved by enabling the Palestinian people to attain their legitimate rights, first and foremost of which is their right to self-determination. Egypt has also made it clear that the situation in the Middle East must be dealt with on the following basis—that right and justice alone can achieve security and safety.

Brother members of the People's Assembly;

It was easy for us to realise that it had become clear to Israel that the Egyptian peace initiative had put her in a quandary because of her intransigence. For the whole world—even Israel's sincerest friends—has condemned her attitude, which impedes the sincere efforts that are being made for peace. She is therefore trying to distract the world's attention from the natural course of events.

Egypt thus warned against the dangers threatening the situation should Israel have the idea that mounting aggressive military operations against any Arab country, or against the Palestinian

people, will extricate her from the quandary in which she has put herself as a result of her refusal or inability to respond to the Egyptian and international peace efforts. Moreover, in the course of our diplomatic contacts with various countries, we have explained the danger of going along with Israel's efforts to induce these countries to withdraw their recognition of the PLO and/or to close PLO offices. Our efforts have borne fruit, since not a single country has acceded to this request.

As soon as the Israeli aggression was launched I issued a statement in which I explained Israel's real aims and stressed:

- 1. That the attack is a new affirmation of the Israeli government's expansionist policy, and that the attack was aimed at killing Palestinians simply because they are Palestinians. That is to say, it is an operation of genocide directed against the Palestinian people.
- 2. That the attack constitutes a new obstacle in the way of achieving a just and comprehensive peace, a grave violation of the sovereignty of a member state of the UN and an infringement of the UN Charter and the principles of international law.
- 3. That Egypt calls on all states, and in particular the five major states, to face up to their responsibility and take action to halt the aggression immediately and secure Israel's withdrawal.

I have also made rapid diplomatic contacts with the member states of the Security Council and informed them of the following:

- 1. That the Israel aggression confirms that Israel is still pursuing expansionist policies that conflict with the efforts that Egypt has made and which have been supported by the whole world with a view to achieving a just peace.
- 2. That this aggression creates a grave situation that the world must face up to.

I asked these states to condemn the Israeli aggression and to lose no time in adopting decisive attitudes with a view to halting it, ensuring Israel's immediate withdrawal from Lebanese territory and halting her acts of aggression against the Palestinian people.

Egypt has also made contacts through her delegation at the UN with the other Arab countries, with a view to a meeting of the Security Council being called to consider what measures should be taken immediately to halt the Israeli aggression and to secure an immediate withdrawal.

These contacts resulted in an Arab agreement to raise the issue at the Security Council. Our instructions to our delegation in New York were to the effect that what has happened in Lebanon must be placed within a wider strategic framework. Our instructions to our delegations were as follows:

That there must be cooperation and coordination with the other Arab countries and with friendly countries, to ensure the following:

- 1. The adoption by the Security Council of a resolution calling for respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, unity and security and for Israel's immediate withdrawal.
- 2. The need to concentrate on the facts of and the reasons for the present situation in Lebanon, which is the result of Israel's desire to expand and of her denial of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, and the fact that as long as Israel refuses to recognise these rights, in particular the right to self-determination, the area will continue to seethe with anger and will be unable to escape from the vicious circle of violence it entered thirty years ago as a result of the Palestinian people being deprived of their homeland.
- 3. The need to stabilise the situation in South Lebanon, even if this requires the dispatch of UN emergency forces to protect Lebanese territory from the ambitions of Israel until such time as the Lebanese army is in a position to defend its territory.

Our meetings with the ambassadors of the various countries continued yesterday, as did my contacts with our delegation in New York. I also met a PLO delegation and explained to them the Egyptian position and assured them of our support for the heroic struggle of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples against the brutal Israeli aggression.

We are continuing to follow developments with the closest attention, and we are receiving reports from New York, Lebanon and all other quarters. A draft resolution has been submitted to the Security Council and contacts are still being made with regard to it.

Members of the People's Assembly;

As I have explained, Israel has been seeking an opportunity that she could exploit to extricate her from the predicament in which she has placed herself, now that her attitude has been made completely clear to the world as a result of Egypt's moves and efforts. We have therefore moved rapidly in all fields so as to ensure the early liquida-

tion of the Israeli aggression against South Lebanon, to secure the protection of the forces of the Palestinian people and to ensure events are re-directed to their proper course, which lies through efforts to achieve a just, permanent and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, a peace based on full withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and on the Palestinian people attaining their legitimate rights, in particular their right to self-determination.

Israel must realise the following facts:

- 1. That experience has proved that her policy has utterly failed to extricate her from the vicious circle of violence that has accompanied her since her birth. Indeed, this policy has been the direct cause of the proliferation of acts of violence in the area during the last thirty years.
- 2. Attempts at expansion will result in nothing but continued wars, because Egypt and the Arab states will in no circumstances accept that the Israeli government should continue its attempt to satisfy ambitions that are totally in conflict and inconsistent with international law.

.

Within the framework of these objectives, Egypt welcomes any efforts to unify Arab attitudes to confront Israel's aggressive policies. Proposals have been made for the convening of Arab conferences at various levels. I wish to affirm that Egypt approves in principle of these efforts, and is studying all these proposals in the light of her conviction that what is important is not a meeting in itself but that the Arabs should meet in circumstances that permit them to rise to the level of their responsibilities.

I hope that, in this very brief summary, I have succeeded in throwing light on some aspects of what is happening and on Egypt's attitude to it.

The fighting continues, with the heroic Palestinian people bravely and intrepidly confronting this ferocious aggression, and international contacts are still being made with a view to defeating the new Israel aggression. I must therefore ask for your leave to return to my headquarters to follow the course of events. But I want to reaffirm to you something that really needs no affirmation—that Egypt, under the leadership of Sadat, is the strongest and firmest supporter of the rights of all

the Arabs. It is Egypt that is the impregnable barrier in the face of Israel's aggressive and expansionist policies, it is Egypt that is striving resolutely and energetically for a just, comprehensive and permanent peace that will secure for the Arab states and their peoples their full and undiminished rights.

We are confident that our honourable struggle will achieve its noble objectives thanks to the support of our Arab people for their leaders.

229

Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria asserting that Israel's invasion of South Lebanon was preconceived and that he would not object to UN troops in the South should that be the desire of Lebanon⁵⁰ March 19, 1978

- Q. What do you think of the U.S. idea to replace Israeli troops in southern Lebanon with a UN peace-keeping force?
- A. We know little about it. It's rather vague. what will be such a force's duties?
- Q. To replace the Israelis and insure security by keeping the fedayeen out of the cordon sanitaire now occupied by Israel.
- A. It is Lebanon's decision and whatever it agrees to we can live with. We are in close touch with each other.
- Q, And if Lebanon agrees to the deployment of a UN peace-keeping force in the south?
- A. Then we will, too. But you must not have any illusions that this will keep the peace in the area. The fedayeen operation north of Tel Aviv did not originate from the area now occupied by Israel. This we know for a fact.
 - Q. Where did it come from?
- A. North of the line held by Israeli troops. This proves that there was only a fictitious connection between the raid and the occupation. The Palestinian operation was a mere pretext for Israel to implement a plan that had been decided and

well prepared some time ago. That's why I would be surprised if the Israelis were to withdraw in favor of a UN force any time soon.

- Q. Besides a UN peace-keeping force, what other solutions do you see?
- A. And what's wrong with the Lebanese Army or the Arab deterrent force now keeping the peace in Lebanon?
 - Q. But most of this force is made up of Syrian soldiers.
- A. Yes, and they have kept the peace all over Lebanon, with the exception of the part that is south of the so-called Red Line. So why not extend the mandate to include all of Lebanon until such time as the Lebanese Army is ready to take over.
- Q. Because Israel said Syrian troops on its borders would be a casus belli.
- A. And what do we have now? Another Israeli occupation. Israel is not fooling the world with its double game. If Syrian troops had been helping keep the peace in the area, the Israelis would not have had the pretext they were seeking for their present occupation. But the longer they stay in southern Lebanon, the bigger the conflict will get.
 - Q. How?
- A. The Israelis are going to bleed where they are now with a new war of attrition. No one can stop the fedayeen from striking both inside Lebanon against the Israelis and inside Israel proper. Longrange artillery has a range of 30 kilometers. So what are they going to do? Keep moving north? That's no way to establish real peace.
 - Q. Are you still ready for real peace?
- A. Of course we are. But not the kind of peace Israel has been talking about since the Sadat initiative. They have made very clear they are not interested in pulling back to the 1967 frontiers as they are required to do under Security Council resolutions, and as the U.S. itself has advocated, nor are they willing to allow the establishment of a Palestinian homeland, again as advocated by President Carter, let alone a Palestinian state, which is the only way to end the fedayeen raids and find lasting peace.
- Q, Why didn't your army intervene in southern Lebanon?
- A. Our own actions will depend entirely on whatever plans we may decide to adopt. But

⁵⁰ Interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave; partial English text, *International Herald Tribune*, March 20, 1978, p. 2. Copyright, International Herald Tribune 1978.

Israel's plan will not draw us into positions of adventurism.

Q, What do you plan to do to help the Palestinians?

- A. We have opened up our country and our skies to the transit of volunteers, equipment and ammunition. But the Palestinians are not short of manpower. They need arms, which we are supplying. And we will offer them all possible assistance in the future.
- Q, Your foreign minister said the Israeli offensive was a direct result of the Sadat initiative. What is the logic behind that statement?
- A. Sadat helped make Israel stronger by neutralizing Egypt militarily which, in turn, gave Israel the opportunity it had been waiting for. The Israelis made very clear their latest invasion was not retaliation for the Tel Aviv raid.
- Q. What has happened to the Sadat initiative as you see it?
- A. We wrote it off as counter-productive and doomed to failure when Egypt launched it last November. And that's what we still believe. There is no way it can lead to genuine peace. But President Sadat says it is not yet played out and he and President Carter are still moving in the framework of this initiative.
- Q. What is Russia's position on a UN peace-keeping force for Lebanon?
- A. We have not talked to them directly about it but I heard from other sources they were in favor.
- Q. You have asked for a meeting of the foreign and defense ministers of the Arab "steadfastness front." What for?
- A. To reassess the situation in the light of Israel's ongoing expansionism.

230

Communiqué issued by the National Movement of Lebanon calling for vigilance in the fight to defend South Lebanon from occupation by Israel⁵¹

Beirut, March 19, 1978

Our country today faces a fatal danger that confronts our whole future with a great challenge. Israel has occupied a huge part of the South and the Zionist army continues to escalate its criminal aggression, making more of our people homeless, turning our cities and villages into ruins. In the face of this, the Joint Forces are heroically defending the land from the massive US-backed and US-supplied Zionist war-machine.

Israel was under the illusion that its invasion of the South would be a short picnic, with all their aims realized within a few hours; and that the Arabs and the whole world would thereafter be faced with the new status quo. But the heroic and continuous national confrontation halted the Israeli advance in more than one place, forestalled a prompt victory of the enemy, and inflicted heavy losses on his forces.

While the enemy continues to escalate and expand his invasion he is today getting ready to invest his military gains politically by declaring his conditions for putting South Lebanon under actual Israeli control, changing Lebanon into a new investment for Israel so as to control its land and people, with the aim of completely liquidating the Palestinian presence.

In view of all this, we today call upon all the Lebanese, who believe in the Arab identity and unity of Lebanon, to unify their ranks in order to liberate their land and impose an unconditional and complete Israeli withdrawal from the South.

In issuing this call, the LNM declares its resolution to continue fighting to liberate occupied Lebanese land and mobilize the potentials of the nationalist masses to halt the criminal Israeli aggression and enforce their withdrawal from the South. The LNM moreover affirms its rejection of the Israeli blackmail; and calls on the Lebanese authorities in these critical conditions to fully shoulder their responsibilities, whether by resolving to adhere to the complete unconditional Israeli

⁵¹ English translation, Wafa (Beirut), March 19, 1978, pp. 2-4.

withdrawal from the South or by facilitating the process of mobilizing the national capacities for liberating the land, or by quickly attending to the seven basic social problems resulting from the Israeli occupation, especially the problem of the refugees who have lost all means of livelihood.

The LNM turns to the Arab brothers, to Arab national forces and regimes, to the Arab masses everywhere, putting in front of them the realities of the Israeli aggression which is not only aimed at annexing Lebanese land and liquidating the Palestinian presence but also against the Arabs as a whole in their struggle against the US-backed Zionist aggression that aims at completely dominating the Arab region. In this context, the LNM demands a firm Arab stand that places all Arab political, military and material potentials on the side of the Lebanese national struggle.

The LNM, in the name of our own people and the Arab Nation, asks friends and allies to support our people against this new imperialist plot.

Let us all unite and fight, to liberate our land and force Israel to withdraw from the South.

231

Statement issued by foreign and defence ministers of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front condemning Israel's attack against Lebanese territory and calling for Israel's complete withdrawal⁵²

Damascus, March 21, 1978

Within the framework of action to confront the recent Israeli aggression against South Lebanon, the foreign and defence ministers of the National Front for Confrontation and Steadfastness held an emergency conference in Damascus from Rabi' al-Thani 10–11, 1398 AH. (March 19–20,1978 A.D.)

The conference discussed the situation that has resulted from the Zionist aggression against South Lebanon, which is aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem, striking at the Palestinian resistance, violating Lebanon's independence and sovereignty, outflanking the Syrian front with a view to encircling it, as being the main bulwark of stead-

fastness against the enemy, and creating circumstances favourable to pushing through a capitulationist solution within the framework of the imperialist scheme that the head of the Egyptian regime is seeking to implement in the Arab homeland.

The conference discussed what immediate measures should be taken to confront the aggression and its consequences, and with this end in view practical measures were adopted in the political and military fields.

The conference affirmed the following:

- 1. Condemnation of the Zionist aggression against Lebanese territory, the Lebanese people and the Palestinian resistance.
- 2. The need for Israel's total, immediate and unconditional withdrawal from all the Lebanese territories she has occupied.
- 3. Condemnation of the terrorism practised by the Zionist enemy against the Palestinian Arab people.
- 4. Solidarity with the Lebanese people and affirmation of respect for the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, for the unity of her people and the inviolability of her national soil, and support for the legitimate constitutional authorities to enable them to meet all their national responsibilities and to consolidate national entente under the leadership of President Elias Sarkis.
- 5. Resistance to the American and Zionist conspiracies aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem and support for the Palestinian resistance in all fields, in particular the political and military fields, and providing the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO, with all the resources they require to continue their just struggle for return, for the right to self-determination and for the establishment of their independent national state on the territory of Palestine.
- 6. In the light of the resolutions of the Tripoli and Algiers conferences, the Conference rejects any Arab meeting in which President Anwar Sadat takes part, in view of his responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in the area, and condemns his role and attitude to Zionist aggression against South Lebanon and his continued association with the American imperialist-Zionist scheme directed against the whole Arab nation.
- 7. Support for the steadfastness and struggle of the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied homeland in their uprising against the Zionist

⁵² Translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), March 21, 1978.

occupation.

The conference expresses its profound belief that current events will increase the strength and solidity of the fraternal relations between the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and their insistence on solidarity in the struggle against the common enemy.

The conference salutes the steadfastness of the Lebanese people and the forces of the Palestinian resistance which have resisted Zionist aggression with such courage and heroism, thereby affirming that there can be no peace in the area unless the Palestinian people recover their national rights.

The conference praises the attitudes of the people, states and forces that have condemned the Israeli aggression and supported the just cause of the Arabs.

232

Speech by President Sarkis of Lebanon before the Lebanese Council of Ministers expressing the hope that the presence of UN forces in the South will enable Lebanon to regain its sovereignty over the area (excerpt)⁵³ Beirut, March 23, 1978

This hope [that with the arrival of the UN troops in Lebanon, Security Council resolution 426 would be implemented] is strengthened by the attitude of the international community to Lebanon which has been embodied in the Security Council resolution calling for meticulous respect for Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence within her internationally recognized frontiers.

The importance of the Security Council resolution lies in the fact that it saves Lebanon from becoming **involved** in any dispute that may arise in the future over her frontiers on any occasion and with any one in the area.

While we continue our efforts to impose our effective sovereignty over every inch of our territory, it is natural that we should continue to seek the cooperation of the UN, other international circles and Arab and friendly countries in ensuring the

implementation of every paragraph and sentence of the Security Council resolution.

We shall continue to make these efforts at home and abroad in every way open to us and we shall not be diverted from this task by any difficulties or circumstances, however harsh, until we achieve full sovereignty over all our territory.

We reject intervention by any state or any quarter in our affairs, or on our territory unless it be with our approval and carried out in a manner consistent with our sovereignty and territorial integrity, whatever pretexts are invoked and whatever considerations are involved.

We affirm these principles, which derive from the wishes of all Lebanese and from the exigencies of our independence, sovereignty and dignity. We cannot affirm or insist on them too strongly.

To those who try to impose any solution, course of action or command because of the recent crisis, ignoring the wishes of and interests of our people, we say that we know the affairs of our home and the interests of our people better than they, and we insist on being masters of ourselves and of our destiny.

To put an end to such intervention we shall resort to all means, both those afforded to Lebanon by her own resources and her friendships and those placed at her disposal, in response to her clear request, by generous brothers who have had so much to bear. For concern for the country's sovereignty, safety and unity is a trust that has been laid upon us and we shall spare no effort to protect this trust.

233

Statement by West Bank Mayors and representatives of trades unions and federations condemning the Israeli attack against South Lebanon and reaffirming their solidarity with the PLO⁵⁴

March 25, 1978

The masses of the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied Arab territories, both organisations and bodies and individuals, strongly condemn the brutal Israeli aggression against South Lebanon

⁵³ Translated from the partial Arabic text, al-Nahar (Beirut), March 24, 1978.

⁵⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), March 25, 1978, p.5.

and the attacks on civilians in the camps, villages and towns. They affirm their absolute solidarity with their sole legitimate representative, the PLO.

The steadfast masses of our people in the occupied Arab territories, who are proud of the steadfastness of our heroes in the face of the barbarous Zionist attack, are amazed at and condemn the attitude of the Arab countries in general and call on them to cease their negative bickering, to issue statements and to start immediately to take effective and practical steps to support the PLO and the steadfastness of our heroic fighters.

They also condemn the silence of the countries of the world on the new Zionist aggression and call on the countries that support Palestinian rights to translate their support into immediate action.

The Palestinian Arab people under occupation will never relax in their steadfast stand in the face of the activities of the occupation authorities, that will never intimidate them or prevent their providing aid and support and making every sacrifice to establish their existence and to ensure that they are granted their right to self-determination and to establish their state in their land.

Signed by: The Municipalities of Ramallah, Nablus, al-Bira, Qalqiliya, Tulkarm, Halhul, Tubas, Jenin, Salwad, Beit Jala, Baituniya, Salfit, Dura, Hebron, Bethlehem, Bait Sahur, and Jericho, the Federation of Trades Unions in the Occupied Territory, the Bir Zeit Students Union, the Bethlehem Students Union, the Bir Zeit Doctors Association, all the camp Youth Clubs in the occupied territory, the unions affiliated to the General Federation of Trades Unions. the Doctors Association, the Pharmacists Association, the Lawyers Association, the Dentists Association, the Tailors Union, Ibrahim Daggag, Engineers Association, Bashir al-Barghuthi, the Arab Womens Association, Ismail Ajwa, Muhammad al-Batrawi, Husain Abu Suwait, Ibrahim Hanta, the newspaper al-Shaab, the Jerusalem Electricity Company Workers and Employees Union, the Magasid Society, the Graduates Club, Muhammad Abd Uraiqat, Fahd al-Ansari (Gaza: Rafi al-Alami, Dr Haidar Abd al-Shafi, Daud al-Sati', George Rashmawi, Abd al-Latif Abu Madyan, Zuhdi Abu Sitta, Zuhair Rayyis (lawyer), Muhammad Al Radwan, Rafat al-Bar, Ibrahim Abu Dagga (lawyer), Zahid Abu Rahma, Hashim al-Shawwar.

234

Speech by President Boumedienne of Algeria stating that President Sadat did not visit Jerusalem to solve the Palestine question but to regain Sinai for Egypt (excerpt)⁵⁵

Algiers, March 25, 1978

We were told that the Arabs were victorious in 1973, but now find that those who carried the banners of victory have gone to Israel to sign a document selling Palestine down the river.

I declare here that I have no personal problems with President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, who has recently acquired the habit of attributing to me things that he said he heard from me.

If we are to believe all we hear in the mass media about this topic, did I tell him to go to Israel? He has said a lot and it remains for him only to say that I told him to do so, in his diverse and repeated statements, which are published all over the place.

This is a statement we could not possibly make because we are sons of an Arab revolution that triumphed by force of arms and belong to a generation that does not know what surrender is even though it has known colonisation, repression, torture and exile. We are sons of a generation that has preserved its Arab and Islamic character declaring at the top of its voice that the land of Algeria was and will remain Arab and Islamic.

This is what history tells us. Some leaders can falsify certain facts but no one can falsify or fabricate history.

Our generation symbolizes the strength of our mountains. We cannot go back on what we believe is right. We neither weaken nor deviate nor surrender. We believe that peoples' causes cannot lapse through the passage of years and do not understand why it is said in the Arab East that this is a fateful problem which has lasted too long so we must settle it and hand over our affairs to the enemy.

He who follows what is happening these days feels that there are certain brethren in the East who are convinced that the superpower there is Israel and behave accordingly. But we say,

⁵⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Shaab (Algiers), March 27, 1978.

brethren, that national causes cannot be measured in years and that we differ with the political line followed in this regard.

We told the Egyptian President in complete brotherliness, which he has himself admitted, that we will disagree with him if he disagrees with the Palestinians. Has President Sadat disagreed with the Palestinians or has he not?....

You have all said with one voice, the voice of the Algerian people, that the Egyptian President has disagreed with the Palestinian revolution and that his trip to Jerusalem represents recognition of the city as capital of Israel, something that even America has not yet done. He did not go to Jerusalem for the sake of the Palestinian problem but went under the illusion that he could recover the Egyptian territory in Sinai. He spoke without being empowered to do so, in the name of the Arabs and in the name of the Palestinians, recognising Israel and telling the Palestinians that their homeland, whose soil they walked upon, whose air they breathed and in which they lived until the recent past, that it is no longer their homeland, where their fathers and grandfathers are buried.

These are the differences between us and the Egyptian leadership. There is no personal quarrel, nor are we trying to complicate the Arab scene more than it is already complicated, nor do we entertain any enmity towards the people of Egypt. The Egyptian people, like the rest of the Arab peoples, stood with all its heart by the side of the Algerian people. But to say that had it not been for the support of a certain people, Algeria would not have gained its independence is a grievous error, a distortion of history and an insult to our people who won victory by the costliest of sacrifices and sacrificed the lives of millions of people since the occupation and until independence was achieved.

If we differ with some of our brothers in the East, it is because of historical reasons. If we agree with them about what is happening and ignore it, this would be an act of treachery to the Palestinian people who live from one exile to another, one massacre to the next.

A voice over there is raised saying that 99% of the cards in this game are in the hands of a particular country. I do not blame the USA or any other state. The USA has its strategic interests in the region and strives to preserve them. But

it is our right as Arabs who have taken part in the Great Arab battle, it is our right to blame those who did not confront our questions of destiny with what is required by way of a strong will and firm determination.

The fact is that Israel today occupies Sinai and other territories of other Arab states and plays the role of a policeman, killing and expelling an Arab population within sight and hearing of the friends of that state, which they maintained, holds 99% of the cards. What is left for the Palestinians to do? Nothing but to be thrown into the sea. My brothers,

I have stated already that there is no conflict between us and the Egyptian people but we do not agree with the policy followed by the Egyptian President who has taken Begin as a friend, turned friends and brothers into enemies and used the arguments of the largest and most populous state as a means of pressure on the rest of the Arabs. We shall continue to differ with him so long as he differs with the Palestinian revolution and until the Egyptian leadership returns to Arab ranks.

We have not disagreed and shall not disagree with the Egyptian people. In the past, we did not differ for personal reasons with the Egyptian leadership, whether in the period of former President Nasser, God rest his soul, or in the period of President Sadat. But distorting what is said, falsifications and jumbling cards together in these critical historical times—all this is of no value.

This is why Algeria adopted the policy it did as regards the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation, despite the scarcity of member states, because the important thing is in the policy and not in numbers. We believe that our policy was one of justice.

We stood by the Palestinian people and shall stand by them. The issue has never been and will never be one of hegemony, leadership or attempting to create polarities. It was said that Algeria wanted to create an axis through the Front for Steadfastness in order to deal with the problems of the region. Those who say this forget that we are capable of facing the problems of today as we did those of yesterday. In standing by the people of the Western Sahara, we are working to establish truth and aid the weak and the repressed, and to stop the massacre taking place near our frontiers. We are not motivated by any national regional interest.

If I discuss this issue, it is because our country's policy should be clear and unambiguous. The mask has fallen off and the Western mass media have beaten their drums, calling it courage that makes a man a leader if he deals with the occupier of his land as a friend.

Some have shouldered their responsibilities. Others, known as the silent ones, have maintained their silence long enough. We believe that if silence is maintained for a long time, it denotes assent, especially if it is a silence about a grave state of affairs which seeks to humiliate the Arabs again and pave the way for their colonisation once more. This policy, called a moderate oil policy, in reality serves the interests of the West and the industrial states in the first instance, because the countries of the third world have only received the crumbs, as the saying goes.

Algeria attended the Tripoli summit for Stead-fastness and Confrontation, hosted the second conference and attended the ministerial meeting in Damascus. It did so in order to demonstrate, once again, its correct, firm and unchanging policy which aims at nothing else but to stand by the Palestinian revolution and people in their cruel ordeal.

This is where I end my remarks. I wish you all success. Peace be upon you and the mercy of God.

235

Statement by the Arab League calling for a mobilization of Arab pressure against Israel's invasion of South Lebanon⁵⁶ Cairo, March 28, 1978

Following its meetings this evening [28th March] the Arab League Council issued a statement which says that the Council has studied with utmost concern the present situation in the Middle East and the Israeli aggression against Lebanon. The Council considers that Israel's insistence on pursuing its aggressive and expansionist policy and its disavowal of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination in accordance with the UN Charter, is likely to prevent the achievement of a just peace in the

- area. While affirming the necessity of national solidarity and of settling current Arab disputes, the Council resolves:
- (1) That there is a need to convene an Arab summit conference, as soon as possible, to mobilize all Arab strength and resources to confront the aggressive Israeli defiance, and to shoulder the joint pan-Arab responsibility in accordance with the Resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat Arab summit conferences which were held in 1973 and 1974.
- (2) To form a committee on Arab solidarity at the highest level, in which the Arab League Secretary General will participate, to settle current Arab disputes and create the appropriate atmosphere for convening the Arab summit conference. The Council assigns to its Chairman, the Sudanese Vice President and Foreign Minister, Rashid atTahir, the job of contacting the Sudanese President, Ja'far Numayri, to request that he assume the chairmanship of the committee and the task of forming it.
- (3) To continue backing the PLO, in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and to bolster its achievements in the international sphere and develop its capabilities within the framework of the collective Arab commitment.
- (4) To condemn the Israeli aggression against Lebanon, continue collective action to achieve the expeditious withdrawal of the Israeli forces, and to affirm total respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon and its sovereignty and political independence within its internationally recognized borders.
- (5) To call on the Arab states to extend urgent humanitarian aid to the Lebanese and Palestinian victims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon through the Lebanese Government and the PLO.
- (6) To back the Arab League and enable it to carry out its effective role in the joint Arab action in all fields.

Arab League Council Chairman Rashid at-Tahir has stated that there was complete agreement that the convening of an Arab summit conference was considered a necessity at this stage. The Council asked President Numayri to contact the Arab Kings and Presidents in this connection to prepare the appropriate atmosphere for the conference in order to draw up a long-range strategy encompassing political, economic and military aspects. He added

⁵⁶ Broadcast on Cairo in Arabic; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/5775/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

that the Arab League Council has decided to extend the mandate of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon for another six months. The Council Chairman was to send messages to the Arab rejectionist states.

The Arab Foreign Ministers will resume their meetings tomorrow to continue discussing the topics on their agenda, including a reassessment of Arab-US relations.

236

Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat discussing Israel's invasion of South Lebanon⁵⁷ Late March, 1978

- Q. Did you expect such a massive Israeli attack in South Lebanon after your raid outside Tel Aviv?
- A. This was not an attack, it was a war, the fifth Middle East war. I say war because the Israelis used every arm of their service and all their weapons. They used tanks, artillery, warships and warplanes. We did expect it and we expected it in this strength.
- Q. Do you think the attack was a straight reprisal by the Israelis for your raid on Tel Aviv?
- A. No, it was long planned...They used all their strength against us and against the civilian population, even the F-15s, that the US had just given to Israel. I am astounded that the US gives weapons like that to the Israelis and then lets them be used in these barbarian attacks. Surely it is a condition...that planes like these should be used for defensive purposes alone, and not for attacks on Lebanese and Palestinian civilians and towns—which they attacked quite apart from our military forces and bases. The Tel Aviv raid and the invasion of south Lebanon have no connection with each other.
- Q, You say these were 'barbarian' attacks, but many people say that your guerrilla attack near Tel Aviv was also barbarous.
- A. It is important to say that our commandos were not trying to kill anyone. The civilian deaths

in that operation could have been avoided if the Israelis had just freed the five men that our commandos were trying to release. But instead they attacked the bus and the people died...This is typical of Begin's terrorist mentality—kill the commandos regardless of how many of your own civilians you kill with them.

- Q, Are you happy about the way your men fought in south Lebanon?
- A. We are very happy. Our men fought for eight days until the Israelis, not us, asked for a ceasefire. Our tactics worked; we fell back in front of their advance, then turned back to strike at them from the sides. For us it is a new dawn because we have destroyed the myth of Israeli military superiority. The world has seen the little David, the Palestinian people, stand up and defeat their Goliath, which is the mighty power Israel supported by the superpower America.
- Q. Do you think the Israelis will leave Lebanon now that United Nations peace-keepers are moving in?
- A. I think they will stay in south Lebanon. They have ambitions for the waters of the Litani River, and as always with them, we see expansion and more expansion. It is all part of the plan for Greater Israel, the Israel that stretches from the Nile to the Euphrates.
- Q, You still have the forces in place in South Lebanon. Will you tell them to fight on even if the United Nations peace-keepers are there?
- A. If the Israelis remain, I will continue fighting in the south with my colleagues in the Lebanese National Movement. I could not leave my Lebanese colleagues to face Israel alone. The United Nations resolution concerning the peace-keepers is clear—Israel must withdraw from the south.
- Q. After this fighting, do you think there is any hope for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative, and if not, what will Sadat do?
- A. The Sadat initiative died this week, under the tracks of American tanks and under the bombs of American planes. As for President Sadat, what he does is up to him to decide.
- Q, Do you have any hope at all for peace in the Middle East?
- A. If America is willing to have a just peace in this area, then we can have that peace. But while we look for that dream, America encourages her

⁵⁷ Interview conducted by Tony Clifton, Newsweek (New York-International edition), April 3, 1978; text as published in Free Palestine (London), XI, 3 (April 1978), p. 6.

policeman, Israel. I do not think we can have peace while the Israeli leadership has this gangster mentality. I do not always look for the moon; I am a freedom fighter who has to deal with facts and realities. And I cannot see why the Israelis should not continue their aggression while they have American military and financial support.

- Q. But don't you think it is a hopeful sign for you that President Carter seems to have made great efforts this week to make the Israelis change their present policies on the West Bank as well as in Lebanon?
- A. No, I do not think it is a hopeful sign. Carter has tried to put pressure on Begin in the past, and it has always been Carter, and not Begin, who has retreated. Remember Carter's big words at the beginning of his term—his big words about freedom and human rights. But where are those big words now that the people of the south of Lebanon are suffering so fiercely under the Israeli invaders with their American guns and warplanes?

237

Press interview statements by "Sons of the Village" representative Kiwan describing the aims of his organization as defending Palestinian land, asserting Palestinian identity and creating a Palestinian mass movement capable of dealing with national issues⁵⁸ London, April 1978

Q. As the founder of 'Abna' al-Balad, can you tell us a little more about the organization? How did it start?

A. 'Abna' was started eight years ago. We began as a local organization, focusing our activity on community problems in the Arab villages in Israel. After that, we developed and expanded the organization—now it is more political, and we are working more directly on specific national aims, as Palestinians. We defend our rights to the land and defy and challenge the Israeli policy confiscating our land. For example, we helped to organize the Yawm al-Ard (Day of the Land) demonstrations on March 30, 1976. We are also a member of the Arab Committee for the Defence of the Land (Lajnat ad-Difa^c al-Ard al-^cArabiyya).

- Q. I understand you have been taking part in various municipal elections and now have members of your organization on some councils.
- A. Yes. In Israel, the Arabs are not allowed to organize themselves freely because the Israeli government is opposed to the existence of the Palestinian nation, as a nation. So, to be able to operate, we have exploited the Israeli law concerning municipal elections and set up our group according to the requirements of this specific law. This means that we are run as a local organization. We participated in the municipal elections in December 1973 and at that time I was elected to the council in Umm al-Fahm as a representative of 'Abna' al-Balad. The day after the election, we began to expand by setting up a cultural club in Umm al-Fahm. There we hold public meetings and speeches about the Palestinian cause. We also have a library; it is small, but it is not bad for a beginning.
 - Q. Now there are several clubs elsewhere as well?
- \widetilde{A} . Yes. After 1973, many other Arab villages also began to organize themselves as a local organization, sometimes with a slightly different name. For example, in Taibah, another village in the Triangle, their name is not 'Abna' al-Balad, but al-Nahda (meaning 'the Resurrection,' or the 'Rebirth'). In another village, called Ara Arara, the name is al-Bayadir, which is Arabic for the 'threshing floor,' in the sense of 'the place of the harvest.' In other places we have another kind of organization. For example, in Deir al-Asad, in the Galilee, the mayor of the municipal council represents our trend and so is part of the Palestinian national movement. In other places, like Nazareth, for example, our friends the Communist Party (Rakah) have formed a united front with us. The front now rules the Nazareth municipal council.
- Q. What role did 'Abna' al-Balad play in the demonstrations to commemorate the death of Rashid Hussein [a Palestinian poet]?
- A. Part of our work is to assert our identity as Palestinians. So we organized these demonstrations on the 40th day of mourning (Yawm al-Arba'in) after his death, in March 1977. It was the first time we invited dignitaries from all over Palestine. They included mayors from the West Bank like Bassam Shak'a (Nablus), Fahd Qawasmeh (Hebron), Karim Khalaf (Ramallah) and others. Many representatives came from the so-

⁵⁸ Interview conducted by Pamela Ann Smith, Merip Reports (Washington), no. 68 (June 1978), pp. 15-17.

called 'Arabs of Israel.' Altogether, more than 10,000 people were present from all parts of Palestine—the West Bank, Gaza and from within Israel. It was a very, very significant meeting. Afterwards, the Israeli press and radio said that this was the first truly all-Palestinian demonstration to be held since the creation of the State of Israel.

This year, we repeated the demonstrations on the first anniversary of his death and many officials and leaders from all over Palestine again participated. We have also published a collection of the works of Rashid Hussein, and writings about his life and activities. We established a fund in his name to finance cultural activities, especially the publication of other national poets, and to support students by providing scholarships, etc.

- Q. How do you compare your organization to al-Ard, the nationalist group which Israel banned in the early 1960's? How do you hope to avoid a similar fate?
- A. Well, at that time, al-Ard was a pan-Arab group, an Arab nationalist movement which believed in Arab unity and Nasserism. Although I was young at the time, I supported it. But now we have learned from experience, and the situation has changed. The problem for us is not how to create Arab unity, but the question of the Palestinian people. So the most important thing for us now in 'Abna' al-Balad is our Palestinian identity.

Also, al-Ard was a group of intellectuals, who formed their organization from the top down. 'Abna' al-Balad works from the bottom up, by organizing ourselves in all Arab villages to create a mass movement capable of working on local problems which arise on a day-to-day basis, as well as on national issues and issues of cultural identity.

- Q. What are your relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization and with the West Bank?
- A. Well, as you can see in our declaration, we say that the only true legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people is the Palestine Liberation Organization, and that all attempts to create a substitute for the PLO from among those who are cooperating with the occupation or with Arab reaction are plainly ridiculous. This is the first principle. Secondly, that all the Palestinian people, everywhere, constitute one identity.

As you can see in the declaration, we emphasize

that because we form an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people, any solution of the Palestinian problem must include official recognition and international guarantees for the national identity of the Palestinian residents in the State of Israel as well. This includes their right to remain in their homeland, the return of their confiscated lands, including their property, villages and charitable waqf estates, and the full implementation of their cultural, social, civil and political rights.

- Q. What would be your attitude toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and/or Gaza?
- A. First of all, I am not the one to decide for the Palestinians. That is for the PLO to decide, and only the PLO. I am not a spokesman for the PLO, but personally, I feel that if Israel were to agree to withdraw from one centimetre of Palestine—and this is the first step to recognizing their national identity—it is a good first step. But the Palestinians in Israel must be a part of any solution.
- Q. Can you tell us a little about the conditions Palestinians in Israel are now experiencing? Let us take, for example, your village of Umm al-Fahm. What is the economic situation? Has it worsened?
- A. Umm al-Fahm is a good example because it is typical of all the Palestinian villages in Israel. In 1949, it was given to Israel by King Abdullah (of Transjordan) under the terms of the Rhodes Agreement. In the Agreement there is an article which expressly says that Israel shall not take any measures against Arab property. But what in fact has happened?

Umm al-Fahm is an integral part of the so-called Triangle, the lower Triangle. Before the establishment of the State of Israel, Umm al-Fahm owned 140,000 dunums of land (35,000 acres). The population consisted of about 5,000 people. Now we have about 20,000 people, but the amount of land, by various Israeli decrees, has been reduced to 15,000 dunums. Virtually all of this is mountainous and not suitable for cultivation. The other arable land was confiscated under the terms of the 1953 Law of Land, Insurance and Compensation. Two 'socialist' kibbutzim have been built on these lands—Meguiddo and Giva'at Oz. The remainder was turned over to a Jewish moshav, a type of cooperative settlement for Jews only.

When the Arabs lost their land, all of them had to become workers. They had to travel every day

from Umm al-Fahm to Tel Aviv, or Haifa, or to other Israeli towns where they are employed on a daily basis in the least desirable jobs. The majority are working in the construction sector, on building sites, or in restaurants or as maintenance men, cleaning the streets.

Some now work in factories in unskilled jobs, but most of these belong to the Histadrut, the trades union federation of Israel. There are no factories in the Arab villages, so Palestinians in Israel must travel constantly to find work. They may be employed in one place for two weeks, or if they are lucky, for six months. When the project is finished, they must look for work elsewhere. This is why, for example, there are no organized trade union strikes by Arab workers in Israel.

We can make strikes, but these concern national issues, such as the confiscation of land. All of us suffer from this problem in common. In Umm al-Fahm, for example, there was a strike last summer in which all the residents participated to protest against the shortage of drinking water, not to mention the lack of water for cultivation, and we succeeded in getting the Israeli authorities to respond to our needs.

- Q. Are any of the workers from your village employed in the kibbutzim set up near Umm al-Fahm?
- A. There is not one Arab who is a member of a kibbutz in the whole of Israel. But sometimes they hire Arab workers for the unskilled jobs. Under this strange kind of socialism, Arabs are forbidden membership, and if a Jewish worker is available, he is given preference for any jobs. Only if there are no Jewish workers available are they allowed to employ an Arab.
- Q. Where are most of the villagers in Umm al-Fahm working?
- A. The choice of where to go depends on what area is booming at the moment. Five years ago, most of the villagers were working in the Tel Aviv area, but now there is no work in the construction industry in Tel Aviv. So most of the workers are now going to the Galilee, which is unfortunate on the one hand because work is available there only because of the Israeli government's projects to Judaize the area. But on the other hand, the villagers have families they must support. They have to eat. They must work to live.
 - Q. Can you tell us how the rise in the cost of living

in Israel is affecting Palestinians?

- A. Today there is a sense of fear among our workers, because the rise in prices is so high relative to their wages. For example, a Palestinian worker on a building site earns a maximum of about 150 Israeli pounds a day. Out of this, he must pay 30 to 35 pounds just for transportation to work. Then he needs another 20 or 25 pounds for his daily expenses—cigarettes, etc. This leaves only about 100 pounds left over, if he is lucky. If he then wants to eat dinner in a very modest restaurant, it will cost from 40 to 50 pounds. You can see how difficult it is.
- Q, I assume this is for a single person. But what about families, those workers who have children to support? How do they manage?
- A. I ask myself the same question. I don't know. We do have in Israel a form of social security which provides family allowances, but under Israeli law those who have served in the armed forces receive double the amount of those who have not. So, without expressly saying there is discrimination between Arabs and Israelis, in effect this is what happens since the Arabs are not allowed to serve in the military.
- Q. So a Palestinian receives only about half the allowance provided to a Jewish family?
- A. Yes. An Arab man with three children would receive about 400 pounds a month. An Israeli would receive 800 pounds.
- Q. Now that Prime Minister Menahem Begin has announced his new economic policy, what effect do you see this having on Palestinian workers?
- A. Well, the first people to be fired are the Arabs. Until recently, the Arab workers in Israel had not suffered greatly from unemployment. But now there is, for the first time, the fear that a worker will lose his job and also the chance to find another. Some have already lost their jobs. They have no security and no assurance of finding work in the future. In fact, ever since the beginning of the Zionist movement, the policy has been that Jews should be given the first right to employment, as well as to the land. The function of the Histadrut, ever since its foundation, has been to defend the right of Jewish workers to work in a Jewish homeland, in Jewish employment, and to combat the employment of Arab workers. This is the main responsibility of the Histadrut.

- Q. What would you like people in the United States, or in Europe, to do to help your organization?
- A. I think this is a question they must answer themselves. But if you put it to me, I would say that for example they could help provide funds for our library in Umm al-Fahm. As I mentioned, it is small, and we need more books for it, and more libraries in other villages. Another example would be to form a support group for 'Abna' al-Balad. Finally, and this is most important, if public opinion in the West is informed about our activities it will help to make us more secure against the repression we face from the Israeli government. They are afraid that we have support outside.

238

Speech by Defence Minister Tlass of Syria listing the objectives of Israel in invading South Lebanon⁵⁹

Damascus, April 17, 1978

President Hafiz al-Asad, Secretary General of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party; comrade members of the National and Regional Commands; comrade members of the National Progressive Front; brave strugglers; respected audience: The First World War had hardly ended when the Allies bared their colonialist fangs. Instead of keeping the pledges and charters which they gave Ash-Sharif Husayn Bin Ali, commander of the great Arab Revolt, to establish an independent Arab state including Greater Syria and the Hijaz, they began to implement the Sykes-Picot Treaty which provided for the fragmentation of the Arab East into spheres of influence by placing its statelets under the British and French mandates. Thus, hardly had we rid ourselves of the Ottoman domination when we came under French tutelage. As the common saying goes, we jumped from the frying pan into the fire.

A reading of the history of the years which followed independence will show us that Syria—the first Arab country to gain its liberation from foreign rule—is distinguished from its sister Arab

states by two basic points:

- (1) It is the only Arab country which accepted another flag, the flag of Arab unity, to be flown above its own flag. This took place in February 1958 when Syria united with Egypt. On this occasion the former President of this struggling country, Shukri al-Quwwatli, was the first Arab President who agreed to relinquish his post and become an ordinary Syrian citizen.
- (2) Syria is the Arab country which sacrificed more of its sons for the Palestinian cause than the entire Arab nation from the Ocean to the Gulf....

I wanted to mention these two facts not to brag about what this country offered but because truth should be told so that the outbidders in Baghdad will know the dark corner of history in which they are sulking.

Mr President, respected strugglers: During the glorious October war, the ground shook under the feet of the Zionist invaders. The long night of the Arab nation ushered in a noble and unionist Arab rebirth. Imperialism and its ally Zionism decided to break the chain at its weakest links. Imperialism cast a look at Syria and found a lion a leading party and a united people. It turned towards Egypt and found the President of the Egyptian regime relaxing in Aswan in a state of imbalance. It rejoiced. Kissinger beamed because he had finally found what he was looking for. Anwar as-Sadat began the series of treacheries and deviations, the most important of which was the trip of shame which he began in Jerusalem on Id al-Adha....

A total of six months [as heard] has passed since the trip of shame and Anwar as-Sadat has not received anything. Thus he had to save face, if he had any left. Agreement was reached that nothing save the invasion of southern Lebanon could cover up for Anwar as-Sadat's failure in the march of humiliation and capitulation which he began in the autumn of 1977. Menahem Begin was in Washington when the invaders overran southern Lebanon on 15th March 1978. [Sentence as heard]....

On this occasion, I would like to speak briefly about the objectives of the Zionist enemy and imperialism in invading southern Lebanon:

- (1) Southern Lebanon holds an important place in Israel's expansionist designs and aggressive strategy. It covets Lebanon's land and waters....
- (2) Liquidation of the bases of the Palestine Revolution in southern Lebanon in order to force

⁵⁹ Made at a rally marking the 32nd anniversary of the evacuation of foreign troops from Syria. Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/5792/A/6-9; reprinted by permission.

the Palestinians to retreat to the interior and create new problems for them, transforming their national struggle into a power struggle with the Lebanese.

- (3) To drag the Syrian army into waging a battle in southern Lebanon against Israel, planning thus to enable imperialism and Zionism to impose a humiliating capitulation on the Arabs, because without Syria the Arabs cannot face Israel....
- (4) Gradual eviction of residents in southern Lebanon using all Zionist means so that the number of those returning will be less than the evacuees....
- (5) Israel will repeat its invasion of southern Lebanon for a third, fourth and fifth time if our brothers in Lebanon continue to believe in the corrupt theory which says that the secret of Lebanon's strength lies in its weakness. International forces are primarily concerned with their interests, whereas the idyllic natural beauty of Lebanon can be enjoyed in other places in the world.
- (6) During the implementation of the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will stall. Each time the international community—represented by the UN Security Council—manages to pass a resolution to expedite withdrawal, Israel will carry out a symbolic withdrawal to show its good intentions. However, each subsequent time it will still further accustom the international community to accepting the Israeli solution in doses, using the method applied by Hitler in Europe, known in military science as the 'artichoke manoeuvre' (munawarat alkharshufah).
- (7) To draw attention away from Sadat's initiative because the Arab nation is aching under the new wound. In southern Lebanon, our martyrs' bodies are still warm and bleeding. Hence all talk in the entire region is about Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
- (8) Some, including Anwar as-Sadat, erroneously thought that the Martyr Kamal Udwan operation was what prompted Israel to overrun southern Lebanon on 15th March 1978. President Hafiz al-Asad clearly clarified this point in his interview with the US magazine "Newsweek" on 19th March 1978. He said that the link between the fida'iyin raid and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon is imaginary. The Palestinian operation was a mere pretext used by Israel to implement a scheme which had already been set and planned. The matter is linked to the mentality of expansion.

What we see now is simply another Israeli occupation...

These are, in brief, Israel's intentions and the objectives of the Zionist invasion of southern Lebanon. We can conclude that the most important objective, namely, dragging the Syrian army into the battle, was not accomplished, despite the pleas of the rulers of Cairo and Baghdad who said: "For God's sake, fight. We will clap for you and hear your news." This is what they used to say in Baghdad and Cairo. President Asad made a wise and courageous decision when he said at the Euphrates Dam that we do not fight according to Israeli plans and that our land and skies are open to the Arabs to support the Palestinian Resistance....

Anwar as-Sadat is bursting with anger and spite because Syria was not embroiled in a war against Israel. The leaders of Baghdad were also in a frenzy. Spite was tearing their insides. They also wanted us to be embroiled and dragged into a battle where we would be like dummies and pawns moving by reaction. To the agents of imperialism in Baghdad we say: Dispatching several hundred volunteers carrying obsolete Czechoslovak sidearms and a few bags of dates to the Palestine Resistance will not liberate Palestine. The logic of figures says: If you want to assist the steadfastness front -represented by Syria and the Palestine Resistance -you should pay as much as the United States pays Israel—approximately 2,300 million dollars annually—or your army should come to the Golan so that the sending of the Iraqi army will not be a mere theatrical play like that of the summer of 1976....

On this occasion, we would like to say that despite the fact that Syria delivered to its destination eveything Iraq sent—which, in our opinion, was not much—Baghdad radio continues to hiss like a viper against Syria, claiming that Syria is impeding the flow of abundant supplies which Baghdad is sending to the Palestine Revolution. I have never in my life seen such liars as the rulers of Baghdad....

When the Zionist invasion did not achieve its objectives, imperialism decided to recruit its agents in Lebanon to spark off sedition and take the Lebanese people to the bloodbath which they suffered in the past two years. Imperialism and Zionism thought that Syria could not intervene in the matter because the problem had become extremely complicated. The timing of the sedition

⁶⁰ Doc. 229 above.

is significant. It came only one day before the implementation of Israel's symbolic withdrawal, so that world public opinion (?would be preoccupied) and would not ask: What kind of a withdrawal is this?...A simple mathematical calculation will show that Israel withdrew from only 1.18 per cent of the territory it occupied in southern Lebanon...

Syria did not remain idle, as imperialism and Zionism had thought it would. The Syrian forces operating within the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon occupied positions which enable them to stop the bloody fighting among the brethren. These forces succeeded in this mission. President Sarkis played a national and pan-Arab role in this respect. On this occasion, I would like everybody in Lebanon to know that Syria's policy has not changed. We are against those who spark off sedition and open fire on their brothers and kin of the same nation. We will never allow the disruption of security in a neighbouring fraternal state, because Syria's immediate security is largely linked to Lebanon's security, stability and safety....

Can Arab solidarity perform miracles in the region? Arab solidarity, as understood by Syria and all Arabs, should be geared to the service of Arab objectives, primarily the expulsion of the Zionist invaders from our land and the restoration of the national legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in their land and homeland. If Arab solidarity is to be used as a cover for Anwar as-Sadat's squint [as heard], disgrace and sins, it would be better for us to remain as we are now because the future is ours. The Arab people in Egypt are able to expel Sadat and his retinue as they expelled King Faruq.

Syria will never forget the vile and mean stabs which this treacherous lackey aimed at its back. We cannot trust a liar and a defeatist. We cannot extend our hand to a man who does not fight in defence of his land and honour. Proceeding from this premise, there can never be a meeting with this traitor, because "once bitten, twice shy"....

Brother citizens: From amidst these difficult circumstances, the Arab nation will emerge victorious over its enemies. There is one thing which imperialism and Zionism have not realized yet, namely, that under the leadership of Asad, Syria is much stronger than the calculations of thousands of computers and brains. The Arab nation will never abandon its frontline position and its con-

frontation against its traditional enemies. God will grant victory to those who support him. God is Almighty.

Glory to the martyrs who died for freedom and national independence. Hail to their brother strugglers who performed heroic deeds for the homeland. Peace be upon you.

239

Statement by a PLO official spokesman on the visit of UN Secretary-General Waldheim to PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat⁶²

Beirut, April 17, 1978

Yasir Arafat assured Dr. Waldheim of the PLO's readiness to assist the UN in the performance of its task of supervising the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon.

Yasir Arafat assured Dr. Waldheim of the PLO's concern for the fraternal relations in struggle that exist between us and President Sarkis and Prime Minister Huss, which derive from our determination to support the advance of peace and our absolute respect for the Lebanese authorities and their constitutional, legislative and executive institutions.

240

Communiqué issued following a meeting of information ministers of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front countries reaffirming their support for the Palestinian struggle and their opposition to the initiative of Egypt's President Sadat (excerpt)⁶²

Algiers, April 18, 1978

In implementation of the lines of information activity laid down by the summit conference of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation held in Algiers from February 2-4, 1978, and of the resolutions adopted by the conference of

⁶¹ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), April 17, 1978, p. 11.

⁶² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Shaab (Algiers), April 19, 1978.

Foreign and Defence Ministers of the countries of the National Front for Steadfastness and Resistance held in Damascus on March 19 and 20, 1978:

And at the invitation of Mr Rida Malik, the Minister of Information and Culture of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic, the Information Ministers of the National Front for Steadfastness and Resistance met in Algiers on April 17 and 18, 1978.

The conference of the Ministers of Information of the National Front for Steadfastness and Resistance adopted a number of measures in implementation of the line of information action endorsed by the Front's second summit conference, and with a view to ensuring cooperation and coordination between the various information organisations of the member countries, with the aim of:

- 1. Affirming that the battle is an all-Arab battle, that the cause is one and indivisible and that the Steadfastness Front is the embodiment of the Arabs' free and unhampered will to resist the imperialist-Zionist scheme aimed at subjugating the Arab nation and bringing it under the political, military and economic control of Zionism. Therefore the Steadfastness Front is open to all Arab states that appreciate their national responsibilities and wish to participate in the Arab battle of destiny.
- 2. Concentrating on the concept of progressive Arab nationalism as being the basis of Arab action and dealing with regional problems in the light of the higher national interests of the Arab nation, because this supports the nationalist attitude of each Arab country and, in the long run, will reinforce the capability of the Arab nation as a whole.
- 3. The information media of the Steadfastness and Resistance Front stress that the Arabs' freedom lies in their strength, that their strength depends on their achieving unity, and that the Arabs are capable of achieving their goals of unity, liberation and progress to the extent that they employ their resources in the service of these goals.
- 4. The Arabs' own unaided strength is the basis of all Arab progress and, whether the choice be for war or for peace, each of them must have sufficient strength to influence the course of events and, if necessary, to act as a deterrent.
 - 5. Mobilising the Arab masses and making

- world public opinion aware of the just cause of the Arabs and of the fundamental goals of the struggle of the Palestinian people.
- 6. Condemning the schemes aimed at maintaining imperialist-Zionist domination of the Arab area, increasing tension in the Arab homeland and threatening international peace and security.
- 7. Taking action to secure effective Arab solidarity based on the continuation of the struggle against the American-Zionist scheme of which Sadat's regime is a hanger-on, and frustrating the manoeuvres of those who deviate from the basic goals of the Arab nation.
- 8. Supporting the Syrian Arab Republic, which is the principal base of steadfastness in confrontation of the Zionist enemy and the schemes of imperialism in the area, and calling on all political, trades union and popular bodies and organisations in the Arab homeland to give Syria all kinds of material, moral, political and military aid with a view to reinforcing her steadfastness and enabling her to perform her sacred national duty of resisting aggression and defeatist solutions; also calling on these forces to give their full support to the Palestinian Arab people, as represented by the PLO, particularly in the political and military fields, so that they may continue their struggle until they achieve liberation and victory.
- 9. Efforts to achieve cooperation in the field of information with the Arab countries that are opposed to defeatist and capitulationist solutions.
- 10. Continuing the struggle against all obstacles and impediments in the way of the liberation, development and resurgence of the Arab nation.
- 11. Efforts to ensure the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East through the recovery of all the occupied Arab territories and of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return, and to establish their independent state in their homeland.
- 12. Efforts to support the struggle of the people of the Western Sahara for their right to self-determination in strengthening the links between the liberation movements of Africa, the Arab homeland and the Third World and reinforcing solidarity among the peoples who are struggling against imperialism and exploitation and for liberation and self-determination.
- 13. The conference salutes the steadfastness and solidarity of the Lebanese peoples in their confrontation of Zionist occupation in South Lebanon.

It also salutes the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory and their support for the PLO, and the struggle of Palestinian writers and journalists against Zionist occupation.

- 14. Stressing the importance of the role played by nationalist and progressive forces in resisting Sadat's capitulationist policy inside Egypt. The conference salutes the struggle of Egyptian journalists, writers and media men who are resisting the campaigns of misrepresentation and distortion of facts which Sadat's regime is conducting, against the will of the Arab people of Egypt.
- 15. To oppose information campaigns against any member of the Front, and maintain determined resistance to these campaigns with the aim of frustrating them and thwarting their plans.
- 16. Efforts to strengthen the relations of friendship and cooperation with the socialist countries, headed by the USSR.
- 17. At the conclusion of its session the conference decided that its next session should be held in Damascus during the last four months of this year.

The conference offered its greetings and expressions of esteem to the Arab people of Algeria, to President Hawari Boumedienne and to the Algerian government, for acting as hosts to this conference and for their efforts to ensure its success.

241

Press interview statements by former Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt discussing why the peace initiative by President Sadat of Egypt failed⁶³

Cairo, mid-April 1978

Q, Why did you resign your post as Foreign Minister?

A. As Foreign Minister, I had been working very hard to reach a final global peace settlement that would include all the parties and I think we were on the right track to clearing the way for Geneva. But I declined to go to Jerusalem because I did not believe I had enough material—or any material all—to justify the visit. It was not because I was afraid to sit down and negotiate with Begin or Weizman or Dayan. But it is always my opinion

that one should be very pragmatic. Only after the Israelis prove to me beforehand they are serious about negotiating should we sit down together. So I didn't think the timing was right. This is why I didn't agree to support the initiative. And this is why I resigned.

- Q, Now, five months after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, would you say the misgivings you had at the time have been confirmed?
- A. The events since then proved that my evaluation was correct. Since the visit-and I don't say because of the visit—the position of the Israeli Government and the Knesset has deteriorated more and more, specifically on the question of the settlements and the applicability of Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza. Begin is the first Prime Minister supported by his government and Knesset since 1967 to say that 242 does not apply to the West Bank and Gaza. So now Israel cannot agree on an agenda or even a common basis for discussion. This proves both sides are still very far apart. In this connection it is of particular significance to recall President Carter's recent statement: "Peace is far away," which explains my misgivings of five months ago.

Q, What went wrong?

- A. If one follows the response of the Israeli Government and the Knesset, one must have very dark glasses not to see what is happening. Israel does not want to agree—it wants to dictate. They cannot imagine that the trophies of their victories in 1967 will go just like that, and they will have to withdraw completely to the borders of 1967. They want to establish for the first time that aggression pays. They don't care about public opinion any more. They feel they are strong enough to stand against any public pressure from any quarter, including the U.S. What they really want is to stay in the occupied land, and they don't want peace at all.
- Q. Why do you say that Israel does not want peace?

 A. Because the state of no peace, no war is 100 per cent in favor of Israel. As long as there is no final peace, the Israelis can continue to claim they are in need of the full support of the U.S. This way they can continue to suck American blood and make every American pay for these sophisticated arms to kill us. If we assume there is a final peace, do you think when Israel asks for billions of dollars

⁶³ Interview conducted by William Schmidt; partial English text, *Newsweek* (New York-International edition), April 24, 1978, p.56D.

in aid and economic support the U.S. Congress and the American people will support this? Impossible.

Q. But if Israel does not want peace, what then is the advantage of Geneva as opposed to Sadat's initiative?

A. Everybody would be there—the two superpowers and all the Arabs. Israel would not afford to perform the acrobatics it does when it negotiates with one party alone. With everybody at Geneva, Israel would not fool anyone. Could they go to Geneva and say 242 is not applicable to the West Bank and Gaza? Could they talk about the Torah? Their Holy Book has not been adopted by the Security Council.

Q. So what is the future of Sadat's initiative?

A. The purpose of the initiative was to prove to everybody Sadat is not afraid of Israel and that he is willing to normalize relations. No responsible Israeli can now say the Arabs are not ready to sit with Israel and sign a peace treaty. In my opinion, the President will continue to give the Israeli Government a chance to reconsider their position. And if they don't do that they will hang themselves by their own rope.

- Q. You do not believe Sadat will settle for a separate peace with Israel?
- A. No. Impossible. He is not looking for just any peace. That would be a surrender.

Q. Are all the Arab states now ready for peace?

A. There is no basic disagreement between the confrontation states that Israel exists in the area. This is the crux of the whole matter: for the first time in 30 years the confrontation states are willing to accept Israel, to live in peace within secure boundaries. But the irony is that Israel does not agree.

A. You do not worry that the Mideast is close to war?

A. If you are talking about a major war, I don't believe so unless Israel starts it. It will not be initiated from the Arab side. And this is why Israel is playing foul. They know this and are taking their time.

242

Statement issued following a meeting held by communist and labour parties in the Arab countries to discuss the current political situation (excerpts)⁶⁴

Mid-April, 1978

Sadat's visit to Israel and his policy of surrender, which is a blatant challenge to the national and patriotic sentiments of the Arab peoples, came as a climax to the backsliding witnessed by Egypt in the various political, economic and social fields over recent years.

The basic significance of this visit and the series of activities which ensued lies in the fact that the Egyptian regime has transferred the political and military weight of Arab Egypt from the front for the struggle against imperialism and occupation to a position of alliance with these forces against the Arab and African liberation movement. The major and direct result has been to destroy the chance for a just peace in the region and to intensify the arrogance of Israel's rulers and their expansionist ambitions as evidenced in their repeated declarations refusing withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in their intensification of the building of Israeli settlements in all the occupied territories including Sinai, in their utter refusal to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people and in their unjustified aggression against and occupation of South Lebanon.

As was the case before, the conflict in this sphere continues to be between two basic currents: a national liberation current and an imperialist, reactionary current of surrender. The national liberation current emphasises a comprehensive settlement of the problem on the basis of a total liberation of occupied territories, guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to return and to the creation of their independent state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and rejects all partial or individual settlements. This current believes that a just and firm peace can be established only on this basis as well as by struggling continuously against

⁶⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Nida (Beirut), May 16, 1978.

imperialism and entrenching the alliance with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and with all forces of progress and liberation in the world, using all means, energies and methods of struggle to that end.

The imperialist and reactionary current is based, on the other hand, on abandoning the objective of liberating all the occupied Arab territories, abandoning the right to self-determination by the Palestinian Arab people, disavowing the PLO as their sole and legitimate representative, adopting a policy of partial and individual solutions and spreading a defeatist spirit.

The US is not content merely with arming Israel and granting her all sorts of aid. In addition, it applies pressure on the Arab countries to march behind Sadat and prepares to impose capitulatory settlements in all sorts of ways, including the use of economic and military threats.

In the context of the Arab national liberation movement, the Palestinian resistance movement occupies an important place as one of the major forces of struggle in the region against imperialism, Zionism and reaction. It is an obstacle in the face of conspiratorial schemes, raising the banner of a struggle for a just cause, the cause of the Palestinian Arab people. This is why the PLO and the resistance is now a target for Israeli military attacks as well as attacks by Lebanese isolationists. Furthermore, it is being subjected to pressure, sabotage and attempts at containment, the imposition of tutelage upon it, restrictions of its freedom and attempts to deprive it of its revolutionary ideology, to divide it and to create an alternative to it.

But all such attacks and pressures have failed because of the will to remain steadfast and to sacrifice in a heroic manner and because of the consciousness displayed by the national forces and the Palestinian masses, and because of the alliance between the Palestinian and the other Arab liberation movements, based on a background of the large-scale international support which this movement enjoys among forces of peace, progress and socialism, most notably the Soviet Union.

In the context of this struggle and steadfastness, the Palestinian masses in the occupied land are carrying out bold and continuous acts of struggle against the occupation and all its works, against Sadat's surrender policy and against all schemes that seek to circumvent the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and the PLO, their sole and legitimate representative.

The course of events in the Middle East over the past three decades shows that no peace can come about in this region by ignoring the national rights of more than 3 million Palestinians or by transcending and circumventing them.

.

The Arab masses welcomed the creation of the Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation as an important step in the struggle to foil the imperialist-Zionist onslaught and the policy of surrender. What was achieved at the Tripoli summit and in the Popular Congress there is an important step along that road. The Algiers summit further strengthened and advanced that step. The communiqué issued there stressed the decisive determination to struggle against imperialism, Zionism and the Egyptian regime's policy, and to increase cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union and with all forces of progress and socialism throughout the world.

Arab national and progressive forces and all forces of progress, liberation and socialism throughout the world welcomed the results of the Tripoli and Algiers summits, regarding them as an important event in the developing Arab cooperation and as a blow to Sadat's policy of surrender. These conferences are important points on the road to building an Arab national and progressive front whose resources will no doubt grow larger and stronger with Iraqi participation. Political and geographical circumstances in the region point to the fact that such a front should have Syria, Iraq and the PLO as its principal base.

In withstanding the schemes of imperialism and Israel's aggressive and expansionist policy, great importance is to be attached to developing the defensive capabilities of the Arab and confrontation states in particular, including the PLO.

Recent history has shown that, ever since the Arab states gained their independence and began their struggle to protect and entrench it, the achievement of this major goal has not been possible except through cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union and with the Socialist bloc countries, on the basis of a frank and honest policy.

The program of struggle against imperialism,

Zionism and reaction and against a policy of surrender and for the sake of liberating the occupied Arab territories and of securing the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, requires the achievement of the following tasks:

- 1. To construct a comprehensive Arab national and progressive front on broad front principles and with the participation of all national progressive currents and forces. This is to be done in accordance with a practicable and realistic programme of struggle which can expand and consolidate the foundations of steadfastness in order to effect the desired change in the conditions of the Arab national liberation movement by raising it to the level required at this stage and, at the same time, to develop and enhance solidarity so that all these forces can join the common battle against the comprehensive imperialist scheme.
- 2. To protect national and progressive regimes against attempts made to undermine or contain them and to work to bolster their role in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.
- 3. To support the Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation and to work to rid it of any factor that might weaken it, in order that it can meet the increasing challenges. This is to be done on the basis of a decisive rejection of Sadat's policy of surrender and of the adoption of a clear anti-imperialist policy, offered in particular to American, Zionist and reactionary policies, and ready to confront all their schemes and manoeuvres in the region.
- 4. To furnish the political, financial and military means to enable the Syrian front to withstand the Zionist enemy and to build up progressive relations of struggle between Syria, the Palestinian resistance movement and the national and progressive Lebanese movement.
- 5. To furnish full political, financial and military support to the Palestinian revolution on the basis of preservation of the freedom of its political decision-making that expresses the independent national identity of the Palestinian Arab people, and to help it to protect its present capabilities and to develop and intensify them in struggling to restore the right of that people to return, to self-determination, and to the creation of their own independent national state, and to recover their full and legitimate national rights, under the leadership of the PLO, their sole and legitimate representative.
 - 6. To support the struggle of the Lebanese Na-

tional Movement and all forces that are concerned for Lebanon's unity and Arab character; to condemn Israeli aggression and to expel its forces of occupation from South Lebanon unconditionally; to confront the isolationist scheme which seeks to deprive Lebanon of its Arab character and to turn it into a confessional and sectarian entity.

7. To support the struggle of the Egyptian national and democratic movement against Sadat's policy so that Egypt can recover its national place in the Arab front against imperialism and Israeli occupation.

The Jordanian Communist Party; the Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria; the Sudanese Communist Party; the Syrian Communist Party; the Iraqi Communist Party; the Lebanese Communist Party; the Socialism and Progress Party of Morocco; the Egyptian Communist Party.

243

Press interview statements by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia denying that his country has a secret oil agreement with the US and warning that the oil weapon is not one to be used lightly (excerpt)⁶⁵

Riyad, late April, 1978

- Q. Your Highness, during President Carter's visit to Saudi Arabia were you in agreement with him on the problems of the Middle East?
- A. My talks with the President of the US centred in particular on the Middle East and I cannot say that we were in agreement on everything. But it was understood between us that the US and Saudi Arabia always exert efforts to find just and right solutions. I discussed with President Carter the problems that concern us and common problems. I do not think that views can coincide on everything and at all times. The members of a single family disagree on certain matters.
- Q, Do you think that the US will exert pressure on Israel to reach a solution?
 - A. President Carter officially declared to the

⁶⁵ Interview granted to Paris Match. Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the interview as published in al-Riyad (Riyad), April 25, 1978.

General Assembly of the UN that his country had incontestably undertaken to guarantee Israel's security. But the US has also undertaken to restore peace to the Middle East. I am sure that President Carter is aware of the importance of the problem and that he will make the most conceivable efforts to reach a just peace.

- Q. Does not Your Highness think that the Arab countries that accepted mediation have begun to lose all hope because of Israel's obstinacy?
- A. This obstinacy cannot be in the interests of Israel or her allies. If Israel does not take advantage of this opportunity to restore peace, this may lead to a reaction destructive to Israel. I think that this hard line is only a threat. We have been peaceable. It is not up to Israel to choose between the just peace we want and war.
- Q, Your Highness, it is being said in some political circles that Saudi Arabia has means it can employ to exert pressure on the US so that it, in turn, may exert pressure on Israel. But it is also being said that Saudi Arabia does not want to exert this pressure. We all know what results the use of the oil weapon following the October War led to. You have other weapons—the Saudi capital invested in the US. What is your answer?
- A. Firstly and above all, I know that "what is being said" does not interest us. We direct our policy and take our decisions solely in accordance with the requirements of our national interests and our national problems. When we performed our national duty of using the oil weapon, we did so to achieve a specific aim at that particular moment. Oil is not an ordinary article of commerce that we throw on the political market as and when we feel like it. We are opposed to an excessive increase in the price of oil, though this is against our interests. Indeed, we have been censured by some of our friends in OPEC. All this has been to protect the world economic system. For even though the oil is our property it is a substance that is indispensable to humanity and civilisation.
- Q. This is the point for me to ask you: Is there a secret oil agreement between Saudi Arabia and the US?

 A. This question has been put to other responsible persons in Saudi Arabia, and the answer has been unequivocal. But I would like to add that everyone knows the aims of the propaganda campaign that is being waged against us by certain groups in the West to influence our decisions and our national

attitudes.

I know that Saudi Arabia makes its decisions as it wishes and in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty King Khalid. We shall continue to pursue this course, indifferent to lies and accusations. There is nothing secret about what we do. Everything is done in the full light of day. Our agreements are clear and open, and are concluded on the basis of the interests of our country and our nation.

- Q. You declared recently that you are not afraid of war. Does that mean that you are prepared to face it?
- A. All Saudi Arabia's forces and strength are ready to assist in winning the victory of the rights of the Arabs, their honour and all that is sacred to them. Every year eight billion dollars are allocated to the arming and training of our army. This means that its task is not only to defend Saudi Arabia; it can intervene anywhere when required to do so by our national duty. Our army was in Syria, and we have forces in Jordan and with the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon. All this shows that we are prepared. All the same, we do not want war, but peace. It appears that the moment is favourable for reaching a solution. If we do not succeed in this, it will be the fault of Israel which should bow to the world's wish for peace. Israel must withdraw from all the Arab territories she occupied in 1967; in particular she must withdraw from the eastern sector of Jerusalem. This is a matter of principle for us, for we are linked to Jerusalem by Arab, national and Islamic commitments.
- Q. It appears that some Arab heads of state have changed their minds from fear of the outbreak of another war, believing that the balance of forces is in favour of the Israeli side. What do you think about this?
- A. When war breaks out the situation is always new, and arms are not the only means of ensuring victory. The best kind of strength is that you should believe in your rights and we thank God that the Arab nation believes in its rights. The Arab countries must unite, close their ranks and act in solidarity to rid themselves of everything that divides them so that they may face up to the future. The Arabs must stand up to the challenge that confronts them. Past events have shown that the Arabs are stronger when they are united and weaker when they are quarrelling. If the Arabs cannot convince themselves that their strength lies

in their being united, no one else can convince them.

In the Ramadan War the Arabs proved not only that they have high technical standards but also that they can win battles when they are united. Their enemy can only advance when they are divided, and these present divisions and differences in the heart of the Arab world are just what the enemy wants.

Q. Does Your Highness have a specific Arab strategy to propose for the confrontation of Israel?

A. Arab strategy is solidarity along with the will

A. Arab strategy is solidarity along with the will to confront the enemy. Without this principle no strategy has any value. Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of His Majesty King Khalid, is continuing its efforts to unite our brothers, and with God's help we shall spare no effort until we achieve this. We feel that these efforts have been well received and this increases our hopes of success.

244

Statement by a PLO official spokesman describing the remarks made by US President Carter rejecting a Palestinian state as inimical to the Palestinians⁶⁶

Beirut, May 2, 1978

On the eve of the visit by the terrorist Menahem Begin, US President Carter made some statements to the London *Sunday Times* in which he affirmed his absolute rejection of an independent Palestinian state and declared his open backing for the schemes of Begin, which consecrate Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territory.

The PLO, which is not surprised and has never been surprised by the inimical policy of the US administration as regards the question of the Palestinian people, finds that Carter's remarks furnish new proof of the enmity and aggressive attitude of the US government against the PLO and the struggling people of Palestine.

These antagonistic remarks merely confirm the fact that the policy of the US Administration seeks to impose its hegemony over the Arab region and to unleash its Zionist base to pursue its aggression

against the Arab region. Carter says that Israel's security is the chief consideration in Washington's policy in the Middle East. In revealing his true policy towards the Middle East and the Palestine question and people, Carter is merely sketching for the terrorist Begin the outlines of US moves in the coming stage, under the slogan of capitulatory settlements that he seeks to implement. The PLO believes that this policy has dangerous implications and presages the implementation of aggressive schemes now being prepared by Carter and Begin in Washington against the Palestinian people, the Arab nation, their future and their very existence.

The PLO, in declaring its outright rejection of these statements, in whole and in part, emphasizes its determination to pursue the path of struggle and its just fight to liberate its homeland, return our people to their land, and create an independent national state on the national soil of Palestine.

245

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the prospects for peace with Israel (excerpts)⁶⁷

Shubra al-Khaima, May 2, 1978

Let me start my speech to you by talking about the issue of peace, or the peace initiative. All of you follow the developments in the peace process, so there is no need for me to tell you that the whole world is now with us as witness for the prosecution, as a positive party supporting full withdrawal from the occupied territory and all aspects of the rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost of which is their right to self-determination and to establish their state on their land. Today the world supports us, not only as a witness for the prosecution, not only as a party supporting Arab rights—it joins us in protesting against Israel's intransigence and insistence on continued expansion and her obstruction of all peace plans. Thus the conscience of humanity from one end of the world to another has become aware of a fact that is new to it-the fact that all the claims Israel has made during the last thirty years of her desire for peace

⁶⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut, May 2, 1978), p. 3

⁶⁷ Made at a May Day rally. Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), May 3, 1978.

and for existence with the peoples of the area have been shown up the first time she was put to the test over the issue of peace.

With its attention closely focused on the Egyptian initiative, the world was expecting the Israeli government would take the necessary decisions, that the government of Israel would face up to its people and have the courage to abandon old ideas, ideas that have been weakened and undermined by the Egyptian peace initiative. But it is clear that up to now the Egyptian initiative has had the impact of a sudden earthquake both on the Israeli government and on political action. Or do they think, for all their appraisals of Arab methods, that it is possible or imaginable that Egypt should spark off this situation, with the result that it reverberates throughout the world getting louder every day, opening up profound dimensions, strengthening and redoubling world support for the historic Egyptian move that has won over peace-loving people even inside Israel itself?

When I agreed to meet Mr Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister, in Ismailia, we heard that thousands of Israelis were gathering in the public squares of Tel Aviv, chanting songs of peace and dancing till dawn for peace. And when, after that, the whole world realised how intransigent Mr Begin was and how attached to the past and to all his mistaken theories that had been destroyed by the October War and by the peace initiative—I say we saw in Israel young reservists gathering in their thousands in support of the peace movement, and calling on their Prime Minister to be flexible and to give up land for the sake of peace. You have doubtless read recently that a large number of university professors in Israel have also joined the Peace Movement, which now has offices and members in all Israeli towns.

Thus the Egyptian initiative is growing and becoming increasingly influential and positive, to the extent that it is no longer surprising to hear even Israeli politicians and their political and information establishments saying that in every home in America and in every home in Europe, Egypt is regarded with admiration and respect by all generations and by adherents of all religions. And we hear that the real crisis of the Israeli government is the following: How, with all the immense resources of the Zionist forces in America and Europe, how can it diminish the powerful effect the

Egyptian initiative has had? What can it do in an attempt just to improve the image of Israel in the eyes of the millions of the Western peoples that used to support all Israel's moves and ambitions, from blind conviction and without protest? The Israelis are now trying just to improve that image, for to restore it to the state it was in before the Egyptian initiative is impossible. The American government, under the leadership of President Carter, is now playing a historic role on behalf of the establishment of peace. Mr Begin's recent trip to America—the one before the current one resulted in a clear and definite statement of the main points of difference of principle between President Carter and Mr Begin. No doubt you read in the press yesterday the statements attributed to President Carter and how our foreign minister sent for the American ambassador, and how he met the American ambassador who informed him that the attitude President Carter had adopted and agreed on with me during my visit to the US remained unchanged.

President Carter declared a moral political attitude that merits the highest appreciation on our part. This was when he insisted on resolution 242, which calls for withdrawal on all fronts from the occupied territory, and when he insisted on the illegality of establishing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. But it is not only Carter that has adopted this moral and just political attitude. Many elements in the American Congress have adopted the same attitude. American public opinion, with all its power to influence decisionmaking, has adopted this attitude too. Indeed, a large number of American Jews-and this for the first time since the creation of Israel-I say, a large number of American Jews have adopted the same attitude and do not want this historic opportunity of peace to be missed. I want to thank the thousands of people who have been sending me letters and cables offering to devote themselves to the victory of the Egyptian initiative, the victory of the cause of peace.

But some people, who are politically adolescent and who hate our society, are stupidly asking: Was the aim of the initiative merely to disclose Israel's intransigence? They add: Surely we all knew about that before? It is a silly question—a child could see what lies behind it. Anyone with any sense and with eyes to see can appreciate the difference between the situation in which we

scream day and night accusing Israel of intransigence, arrogance and expansionist policies without convincing anyone, and a situation like today's, when the world is speaking our language and talking about our rights, and adopting our attitudes. No one could have imagined, particularly not Israel, that the people of America of all people, where there has been penetration by Zionist organisations for two hundred years—no one could have imagined, I say, that the Americans, of all people, would be the first to support our rights and to disclose how intransigent Israel is and how she has killed all chances of peace. The Israeli government has not yet had the courage to take the necessary decisions. The effects of the earthquake of the initiative are still causing her the greatest perplexity among the ruins of old and obsolete ideas.

There are also other adolescents and people full of resentment who talk with the arrogance of philosophers or people who claim to know what is concealed and secret, saying that the Egyptian initiative has closed the road to the Geneva conference. What I want to ask is: Was the road to the Geneva Conference ever open? Last summer, the Arab foreign ministers had talks...and the Israeli foreign minister had talks with President Carter and Mr Vance in New York and Washington, which lasted a whole month and resulted in an American working paper, then an American-Israeli working paper, then an American-Soviet working paper, and the way to the Geneva Conference was lost amid all these papers. This is what led me to announce immediately, so as to forestall any manoeuvring, that Egypt was ready to go to the Geneva conference without any working paper.

When has Egypt refused to attend the Geneva conference? Is not the reason why we have called for, and are still calling for, a Cairo conference, that preparations could be made for the Geneva conference? Were not the Ismailia and Cairo talks in fact held to prepare for the Geneva conference? We are not against Geneva conference and we have never opposed the Geneva conference. But for the Geneva conference to meet without full preparation and without clear agreement on the principles of peace would get us into a vicious circle with no hope of reaching a decision, and the conference would be mere form without substance, as is the case with the disarmament conference

which is still meeting in Geneva after 25 years.

Brothers and sisters, to sum up what I have to say about the issue of peace, the world's appreciation of and positive support for the peace initiative is growing daily. And international efforts to keep the peace process moving have not stopped for a single day, in the capitals of the continents and among leaders who are influential in promoting the cause of peace. We still maintain the firm and unwavering attitude we declared in the heart of Israel, to the Knesset, and we shall never abandon the slogan of the Arabs' full right to insist on full withdrawal from the territory occupied in 1967 and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to establish their state in their land.

246

Letter from the PLO Higher Political Committee in Lebanon to the UNRWA Commissioner General in the Middle East condemning UNRWA's decision to transfer its headquarters to Vienna⁶⁸

Beirut, May 4, 1978

The resolution to transfer the UNRWA head-quarters from Lebanon to Vienna comes at this specific time as a new indication of the fact that UNRWA is gradually abandoning its responsibilities, because UNRWA and the United Nations bear the full responsibility for helping the Palestinian refugees in accordance with the resolution establishing the Agency in 1950.

From here, the PLO Higher Political Committee for Palestinian Affairs in Lebanon rejects and is surprised by this resolution, which would affect the stability of the Lebanese situation in particular, in terms of the reactions and fears it would provoke on more than one level.

Consequently, it does not serve the security interest of Lebanon, for whose reconstruction many sincere efforts are being exerted on the basis of understanding and sincere concern.

The Political Committee warns UNRWA against putting this resolution into effect because of the negative effects and reactions which it may entail, and which would sully the humanitarian reputation

⁶⁸ English text, Wafa (Beirut), May 5, 1978, pp. 2-3.

which UNRWA is supposed to bear.

It is of concern of us to stress in this context that we will undertake at once all necessary contacts with the Arab states where Palestinian refugees are residing, so that they should take a serious stand in accordance with their national convictions in order to foil this resolution and prevent its implementation.

247

Statement by the permanent secretariat of the Arab People's Congress of Libya insisting that armed struggle is the only road to the liberation of Palestine⁶⁹

Tripoli, May 14, 1978

On the 15th of May 30 years will have passed since the occupation of Palestine. The Zionists persist in their iniquity, depriving and killing our Arab Palestinian people. Even this has not satisfied their rancour, [so] that they have gone on to occupy parts of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and who knows what more is to come, as their announced ambitions are from the Nile to the Euphrates.

All that was not enough for the Zionists, their imperialist allies and their reactionary Arab stooges. They also wanted a moral and political defeat for the Arab man. Unfortunately they have achieved that. Also, they have occupied Cairo, the centre of gravity of the Arab homeland, where they conducted capitulationist negotiations, achieved recognition and escalated their military and political strikes to impose the status quo upon the Arab nation. Undoubtedly it is a tragedy and a sad fact that defeat and submission have been imposed upon Arab dignity and national pride. In spite of all the repeated conspiracies the vital revolutionary forces among our nation have not lost their correct outlook and the armed struggle of the Palestinian Revolution has been supported and protected by the Arab masses.

Today, 30 years have passed since the occupation of Palestine and the enemy persists in its intransigence and aggression of occupying southern Leba-

non. The stands of the Arab masses and Governments are quite clear; thus the patriotism, progressiveness and Arabism of any regime or organisation is determined by its stand towards the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movements.

Words and propaganda are no longer capable of covering national treasons. Let everybody shoulder his responsibilities of struggle to protect the Arab and Palestinian armed struggle, otherwise the fate of future generations will pursue those who abandon their responsibilities, and the popular revolutionary will will ultimately overthrow the reactionary traitors.

On this occasion, which marks a severe national setback, the permanent secretariat of the Arab People's Congress affirms its support for the permanent secretariat's resolutions which stated that the Palestinian struggle is a national struggle for liberation, its aim is the unity of the dialectic of struggle as an end and a means. Since this 30-year-old national defeat is caused by divided leadership and the treachery of the stooge regimes, and since a victory will not be achieved without a new national outlook, idealistic spirit of struggle and an effective revolutionary will, particularly in the current decisive circumstances, we affirm the permanent secretariat's resolutions:

- (1) to open the door to honourable volunteers to wage [the] struggle and to launch continuous campaigns for this purpose;
- (2) to open the door to donations and aid and to launch continuous campaigns for this purpose;
- (3) as a practical expression of rejecting the occupation, affirming our right in Palestine and standing by our people under the occupation, it has been decided to donate the wages of the 15th of May for the sake of the Palestinians in the occupied land;
- (4) to launch information and political campaigns to expose the capitulationist plots and the discredited calls for solidarity;
- (5) to insist that armed struggle is the only way to recover Palestine.

Working on implementing those steps is the proof of the sincerity and seriousness of what we say. The peace and mercy of God be upon you.

⁶⁹ Made on the 30th anniversary of the establishment of Israel. Broadcast on Tripoli radio in English; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/5814/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

248

Memorandum submitted by five organisations of the Palestine resistance movement to the Central Committee of Fatah on the principal problems in the field of a united Palestinian attitude⁷⁰

Beirut, May 18, 1978

The Palestinian revolution is facing one of the most serious stages in its struggle, a stage which is witnessing the intensification of the conspiracies aimed at aborting the struggle of the masses of our people who have kept the flag of armed struggle flying through recent years with the aim of liberating the Arab land of Palestine and establishing a progressive democratic society on the soil of the whole of the Palestinian homeland.

In the course of its long march, the Palestinian revolution has been the target of a series of conspiracies on the part of hostile forces, which have directed all their resources to the aborting of the Palestinian struggle as represented by its armed revolution. But our revolution has held out in the face of these ferocious attacks and succeeded in maintaining its existence and its continuity.

Our responsibilities require that we take a historical view of the situation so that we may attain a unified political attitude in the Palestinian arena, an attitude that is capable of resisting all forms of the new and continuing conspiracies and of protecting the existence of the revolution and its masses from wrangling, outbidding and accusations. Aware as we are of the gravity of the present stage, and realising as we do the importance of and necessity for a unified Palestinian attitude, and in the light of our concern for our revolution and its continuity within the framework of the goals affirmed in the Palestine National Charter and the Palestinian Tripoli72 Document which was signed by all organisations of the resistance and constitutes an acceptable basis for a democratic national programme for action in the Palestinian arena—in the light of the above,

we believe that it is necessary to face up to the following main problems with a view to providing a basis for a unified attitude in the Palestinian arena.

Political Settlement

Events have established that no national achievement is possible at this stage in view of the present disturbance of the balance of forces in favour of the enemy's camp, which is the result of concessions and treasonable negligence on the part of the right and Arab reaction, especially in recent years.

Sadat's treasonable initiative was the culmination of the capitulationist course that has been followed by more than one Arab party.

To continue to count on the achievement of anything under the aegis of the policy of the PLO vis-à-vis the policy of the hostile forces can only result in our falling into pitfalls that will lead to the aborting of Palestinian and Arab national struggle at this stage.

The US, which is still directing the settlement process, tries from time to time to put forward delusive settlement projects aimed at aborting the Arab liberation movement and the Palestinian revolution.

We stress the importance of escalating the struggle in all its forms-military, political and mass struggle—both inside and outside the occupied territory so as to ensure the continuation of the conflict with the enemy camp as embodied in imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. This is so that we may be able to change the balance of forces in our favour and thereby achieve the goal of our people, which is the establishment of the authority of the people over any part of the soil of the Palestinian homeland we succeed in liberating. Certain parties in the PLO and its leadership still keep their relations with the Egyptian regime and are continuing to consolidate their relations with reactionary regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco, under the delusion that through such relations they will be able to get a share in the promised settlement and a seat on the American bandwagon.

The Arab Regimes

By putting their money on many of the reactionary and capitulationist Arab regimes, in particular Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, certain parties in the leadership of the PLO have fallen into many pitfalls and restrictions, to the extent that the PLO

⁷⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Thawra Mustamirra (Beirut), no. 58, (May 27, 1978), p.4; the organizations that signed the memorandum were: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Arab Liberation Front, Palestine Popular Struggle Front, Palestine Liberation Front, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

⁷¹ Doc. 360 in International Documents on Palestine 1968.

⁷² Doc. 322 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

is no longer able to take independent political decisions that can have an important influence on allied and friendly forces at the Arab and international levels. In this context attention must be called to the contacts made with the Jordanian regime with a view to a reconciliation with it at any cost, and to working out a political formula that will give the PLO a role in the delusory settlement through collaboration with the rulers of Amman.

Attention must also be called to the reports of inflammatory propaganda on the part of Saudi and Egyptian reaction directed against the progressive Palestinian forces. There is also a danger of certain Palestinian quarters being induced to promote the views of Arab reaction and to instigate certain parties to cause the collapse of the revolution from within and to spark off secondary disputes so that the revolution may destroy itself, now that the enemy's moves from outside have failed to achieve their objectives. The PLO leadership is no longer playing the role it should in the unflagging struggle for the unity of progressive Arab forces, both official and popular, within the framework of a broad front opposed to the capitulationist settlement. Such a front would constitute the Arab framework of alliance and solidarity with the Palestinian revolution that would enable it to continue the struggle until it achieves its aim of the complete liberation of the soil of the Palestinian homeland. Instead of performing this role, certain parties in the leadership of the PLO are more and more tending to throw themselves into the snare of relations with the reactionary countries at the expense of the principal role.

The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front

The role played by certain parties in the resistance vis-à-vis the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front has not been effective in ensuring that pressure is exerted on it from the masses' point of view to develop its policy, its positions and its commitments. All these parties have done is to ferret out the errors and shortcomings of the Front to justify continued links with the reactionary Saudi-Egyptian axis.

The Situation in the Lebanese Arena

The Palestinian armed presence in the Lebanese arena has been confronted with many conspiracies aimed not only at uprooting it but also at putting an end to the Palestinian popular presence altogether.

In the course of the revolution's advance in the principal arena of our activity, and because of the importance of this activity to the course and continuity of the Palestinian revolution, we believe that there should be a unified attitude to a number of issues, the most important of which are:

Alliance with the Lebanese National Movement

The views of the different organisations of the resistance to the alliance with the Lebanese National Movement are at variance; past moves by the Palestinian leadership have injured this alliance....and control of decision-making by the Palestinian and progressive leadership and at the level of relations with the Lebanese masses [sic].

We believe that the right formula for the alliance with the Lebanese National Movement is that we should let it be free to take its own decisions, but that at the same time we should place all our capacities and resources at its disposal in the service of the common struggle. In this way the Lebanese National Movement will itself be the political and military command in this arena in the struggle to liberate the Lebanese territory occupied by the enemy in the South and to achieve its nationalist and democratic goals.

The time has come for certain parties in the resistance to stop meddling with the National Movement and setting up delusory and popular organisations to influence it from within and to control its political decision-making.

Palestinian Decision-making

We feel that Palestinian political decisions are taken on an individual basis and not through frontal procedures in the Palestinian arena, and there is no participation in decision-making-it is your leadership that still takes political decisions. This is absolutely incompatible with the orientation towards the establishment of a front that is accepted by all, that should exist and that is provided for by the National Charter. In the light of this we believe that it is essential to devise a formula, agreed on by all organisations of the resistance, that can form the sound basis for the direction of Palestinian action. We propose that the secretaries-general of all organisations of the resistance, representatives of the Fatah Central Committee and such other nationalist elements as may be agreed on, should constitute the leading body of the Palestinian revolution. This body

should be the one empowered to take Palestinian political decisions and to draft programmes and organisational and executive regulations for dealing with all issues in the Palestinian arena, after which the composition of the institutions constituting the front should be reviewed, with a view to devising practical formulas for the unification of the instruments of the revolution. This requires that the Palestine National Council be convened in ordinary session within a month to endorse the Tripoli Agreement and the programmes based on it.

The Palestinian revolution is in a dangerous corner. If it does not hold out against the continuing attacks and prove capable of resisting them—and we hope that it will and are working to ensure that it does—it will be faced with withdrawal and liquidation.

We believe that a unified Palestinian attitude established on the bases we have outlined in this memorandum can constitute the basis for our ability to confront the coming stage. It can also constitute the basic factor in the escalation of our struggle and in the development of our action in such a way as to make us competent to achieve the goals of our people and our nation.

While calling for a unified Palestinian attitude for the achievement of the major objective for which the revolution broke out—the liberation of the land and its people and the establishment of a progressive democratic society—we warn against the various new conspiracies, one of whose aims is to stir up internal strife within the Palestinian arena. This we reject; we refuse even to think of it, stressing the importance of democratic dialogue in dealing with all the contradictions by which our advance is beset.

At the same time, we affirm that we shall continue armed struggle, whatever the obstacles and whatever the nature of the schemes, confident of the will of our masses and the strength of our revolution, and maintaining our principles which we can never relinquish, whatever the cost in sacrifices.

It is revolution until victory.

249

Statement by the PLO Central Council calling for unity among the Palestinians, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon under UNIFIL supervision, and support for the Confrontation and Steadfastness Front on the part of Arab states⁷³

Damascus, May 21, 1978

The Central Council of the PLO met in Damascus on May 20-21, 1978, with Mr. Khalid al-Fahum, President of the National Central Council in the chair, and the chairman and members of the PLO Executive Committee attending. A comprehensive review was submitted of the current Arab situation and recent developments as regards the Palestine problem at all levels, in the local, Arab and international fields. Also submitted was an exposé of the objectives of the Zionist invasion of Lebanon, its consequences and the developments in the heroic fighting of the forces of the Palestinian revolution, along with the nationalist forces, against the Zionist enemy. There was also a review of the recent activities and contacts of the PLO Executive Committee, and as a result of its discussions the Council affirmed the following:

I. At the Palestinian level

1. The Council calls for the overcoming of the obstacles that lie in the way of national unity, and of marginal disagreements, and for the development of Palestinian relations in the democratic dialogue between the different sections of the resistance movement so that they may attain an advanced level of unified joint action. Such action must be on the basis of relations appropriate to a front and of an unambiguous programme for union in accordance with the resolutions of the Palestine National Council for the promotion of the ability to confront the challenges inherent in this stage, in particular the American-Israeli plans aimed at imposing on the area a capitulationist settlement that is incompatible with the national rights of our people and the national interests of the Arab nation.

2. The Central Council stresses that resistance to the Zionist enemy and the imperialist forces

⁷³ English translation, Wafa, Special Supplement (Beirut), May 21, 1978, p. 1.

that support him requires serious and unremitting efforts to enable the forces of the Palestinian revolution to exercise their responsibilities and perform their tasks on all the fronts that surround Palestine, and to overcome all obstacles that stand in the way of their doing so.

- 3. The Central Council salutes our people in the occupied homeland who are so valiantly resisting the Zionist enemy, his occupation and his policy of aggression and settlement, his fascist racist practices, and his liquidationist projects. It also salutes them for their support of the PLO and its political line and calls on Arab, Islamic and friendly countries to provide moral and material support to their heroic steadfastness.
- 4. The Central Council recommends that the Palestine National Council should meet in the middle of the coming August; the venue of its meeting will be decided later.

II. At the Lebanese level

1 The Central Council affirms its confidence in Lebanese-Palestinian brotherhood and calls for the strengthening of relations with the Lebanese people, along with all their nationalist forces, on the basis of respect for Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and the unity of her territory and people. The Council also affirms that adherence to the Cairo agreement and its annexes, 74 concluded between the Lebanese authorities and the PLO, including the Shtura procedural agreement, is an affirmation of Lebanon's sovereignty. The Council also draws attention to the fact that the imperialist-Zionist plan is still being implemented. The aim of this plan is to spark off the situation in Lebanon through forces and elements that share its aim of striking at the Palestinian revolution, at the stability of Lebanon and at the advance towards peace in Lebanon. A further aim is to exert pressure on Syria through the Lebanese arena so as to weaken the unified Palestinian-Syrian position, which is the mainstay of resistance and steadfastness in the face of imperialist-Zionist capitulationist settlements and schemes.

2. The Council stresses that it sees the task of the UN forces in South Lebanon as being the supervision of the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory.

III. At the Arab level

1. While affirming its belief in the importance of and need for Arab solidarity, the Central Council believes that such solidarity must be based on service to the goals of the Arab nation, which are liberation, return and the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people. It also stresses that, for this Arab solidarity to be properly based and sound of content, it must rest on resistance to the Zionist occupation and to the imperialist forces that support Israel's aggression and expansion. Arab solidarity also demands that Arab political, military, economic and oil resources be mobilised and directed towards the service of the causes of the Arab nation, in particular the central cause of the Arabs, that of Palestine. These resources must also be directed against the Zionist enemy and his schemes, along with the forces that participate in and support his aggression. This applies in particular to the US, which is hostile to the aspirations of the Arab nation and ignores the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, in particular their right to return and self-determination, and to establish their independent state on the soil of their homeland, under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative.

In this connection, the Central Council rejects the convening of any Arab summit under the auspices of the policy which President Sadat has pursued.

- 2. The Central Council stresses the need to support the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and to reinforce its strategic political line, and to take action to convene a summit conference of the Front as soon as possible, to complete its charter and lay down the lines of its action during the present stage.
- 3. The Central Council recommends the early implementation of the decision of the Steadfastness and Confrontation summit in Algiers⁷⁵ to contact

⁷⁴ The basic Cairo agreement between the PLO and Lebanon is doc. 449 in International Documents on Palestine 1969. The authenticity of that text, which was supposed to have remained secret, was attested to by Charles Helou, who was president of Lebanon at the time, in an interview with al-Nahar (Beirut), September 7, 1976. The appendices or annexes to the agreement consist of a series of secret agreements and memoranda and the minutes of confidential meetings over the period January 1970 until May 1973. No official texts of these have been published, but an English translation of unofficial texts was published by Arab World Files (Fiches du Monde Arabe) in early 1977.

⁷⁵ See doc. 218 above.

the Iraqi Republic with a view to its joining the Front and meeting its responsibilities to it.

- 4. The Central Council salutes our people in Egypt and their nationalist forces that are struggling to protect the true interests of the Arab nation and resisting attempts and suspect projects that are incompatible with the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people and to the advantage of Zionism and American imperialism.
- 5. The Central Council salutes the masses of the Arab nation for their sincere and continuing protection and support of the Palestinian revolution, and in particular their attitude to the struggle and their material and moral support for the forces of the Palestinian revolution during its resistance to the Zionist invasion of South Lebanon.

IV. At the international level

The Central Council stresses the need for action to reinforce the intrinsic capacities of the Palestinian revolution and of the Arab forces that are resisting the imperialist-Israeli capitulationist plans, and to strengthen the links of friendship and alliance with our friends, headed by the USSR, the socialist, Islamic and non-aligned countries, to make possible the recovery of our rights and to put an end to the injustice that has been the lot of our people since 1948.

Arab capabilities, committed to the will for liberation, and relying on the support of our friends for our just cause, can achieve our national goals and rout the capitulationist course which is incompatible with the interests of our people and our nation.

Eternal glory to our devoted martyrs. Revolution until victory.

250

Communiqué by the Political Council of the Lebanese National Movement accusing the government of Lebanon of prejudice in favour of the Lebanese Front⁷⁶

Beirut, May 23, 1978

First: Since the return of the Hoss government the Lebanese Front has been attempting to escalate the crisis, this time in South Lebanon, by utilizing the Israeli occupation against Palestinian and Lebanese nationalist presence there.

Debates on the Cairo Agreement and on UN resolutions 425⁷⁷ and 426, intensification of international moves regarding the UNIFIL's role and prerogatives, the manipulation of reactionary tools in South Lebanon against the Palestinian presence, as well as sectarian mobilization, all of which are practised by the Lebanese Front, are indications of the general trend which the Front is trying to follow in the coming phase.

Second: In light of the above, the recent visit of UN Undersecretary Roberto Guyer is part of a plan which gives the UNIFIL a role other than that assigned to it by Security Council resolutions 425 and 426. In this context, the LNM stresses its opposition to any intervention by the UNIFIL in Lebanon's internal affairs and in Palestinian-Lebanese agreements which were endorsed by the Arab countries. The PLO and the Lebanese Government are the direct concern of Lebanese and Palestinians and cannot be decided by any one Lebanese party, and that any encroachment on these agreements will only complicate the crisis and endanger the country.

Third: The LNM believes that the Lebanese Government continuously responds to the pressures and demands of the Lebanese Front with regard to the South and is prejudiced in blaming the LNM for the deterioration of the security situation and the persistence of the Zionist occupation of South Lebanon. Moreover, the government is not exerting efforts in exposing the problem of the Israeli occupation locally or internationally, but is unfortunately only concerned with provocations against the Palestinian and nationalist presence, ignoring the horrors perpetrated by the "legitimate" gangs of Saad Haddad and the violations committed by the occupiers and their agents in the areas they supposedly withdrew from. During talks with UN Undersecretary Guyer the Lebanese Government should have demanded that the UNIFIL execute the mission assigned to it in South Lebanon, i.e. to replace the Israeli occupiers in the areas which they vacate.

In this context, pressure is being exerted from various sides to impose Israel's conditions for its so-called withdrawal on June 13th. By setting a date for its withdrawal—a withdrawal conditional on retaining a direct or indirect control over South

⁷⁶ English translation, Wafa (Beirut), May 24, 1978, pp. 2-3.

⁷⁷ For resolution 425, see doc. 32 above.

Lebanon—Israel aims to escalate the reactionary campaign calling for the annulment of the Cairo agreement, and to pressure the Lebanese authorities into adopting a similar stand on the Cairo agreement.

Fourth: The LNM reaffirms its stand regarding the rebuilding of the Lebanese army on a basis of national balance.

Fifth: The LNM warns against the Lebanese Front's attempts to encourage sectarian feelings, and retain an atmosphere of war in the areas it controls.

251

PLO statement issued following talks between PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon expressing the PLO's determination to facilitate the task of UNIFIL (excerpt)⁷⁸

Beirut, May 24, 1978

- 1. The PLO and His Excellency the Prime Minister of Lebanon affirmed their determination to facilitate the task of the UN forces which is to bring about the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon and to restore Lebanese authority there.
- 2. The PLO condemned all negative activities and transgressions in the South and expressed its full readiness to make every effort to prevent such transgressions as soon as possible with a view to protecting Palestinian-Lebanese relations.
- 3. The PLO expresses its determination to put an end to armed manifestations in the South to assist the lawful authorities in performing their task and imposing their sovereignty.
- 4. At the request of the Prime Minister, the PLO will make efforts to ensure the return of those who volunteered during the Israeli invasion of the South.

It was agreed that meetings should continue with a view to regulating Lebanese-Palestinian relations for the protection of Lebanese authority and in the service of the Palestinian cause. 252

Joint communiqué issued following the visit of Colonel Qadhafi of Libya to Algeria (excerpts)⁷⁹

Algiers, June 6, 1978

In the context of periodic meetings agreed upon between the two political leaderships and proceeding from the strategic alliance of the two revolutions, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, Secretary General of the General People's Congress in the Socialist Popular Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya, accomapanied by a high level delegation, visited the Popular Democratic Republic of Algeria in the period between 23 and 30 Jumada II, 1398 (corresponding to May 30 to June 6, 1978).

The two delegations studied the current scene in the Arab region and affirmed their national adherence to the resolutions of the Tripoli and Algiers steadfastness summits and their condemnation of the policy of surrender and abject submission to Zionism and imperialism. The two sidesaffirmed their complete rejection of any Arab meeting that takes place under the aegis of a policy of surrender and disregard for national rights. Solidarity must be against the enemy and not with him.

The two sides declare their absolute support and backing for the Palestinian revolution and their decisive rejection of all schemes that aim at liquidating the Palestinian cause and affecting their national rights, including their right to liberate their homeland completely, to self-determination and to return to their usurped homeland.

The two sides salute the steadfastness of Syria and the Palestinian revolution who stand steadfastly and courageously in the forefront of the national struggle against Zionism and imperialism as a strong wall blocking all schemes of liquidation.

The two sides condemn Zionist aggression against Lebanon and further condemn the isolationist forces who have made themselves allies of Zionism. They salute the Arab people of Lebanon who have given unhesitatingly to the national cause and the Arab struggle.

The two sides believe that the role of the UN troops must be restricted to guaranteeing the withdrawal of the Zionist invading forces from South Lebanon.

⁷⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), May 25, 1978, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Fajr al-Jadid (Tripoli), June 7, 1978.

The two sides salute the steadfastness of the Egyptian people and of their national and progressive forces as they suffer from repression, pressure, terror and famine. They call upon all national and progressive forces in the Arab world to stand with the Egyptian people in their ordeal...

253

Message from PLO member Safadi to the Commissioner General of UNRWA opposing the decision to move UNRWA headquarters from Beirut to Vienna⁸⁰

Beirut, June 23, 1978

In rejecting the decision, the PLO considers that UNRWA was established in 1949 on condition that its headquarters be set up in the Middle East region, the memorandum added. It furthermore suggested that US and Zionist financial and political pressures were behind the transfer, pointing out that no pretexts are plausible in the face of the Agency's primordial responsibility to remain in the region to confront the problems of Palestinian refugees spawned by repeated Israeli attacks on South Lebanon and by repression in the occupied territories. The memorandum noted that it was the responsibility of the international community to cover the financial deficit from which the UNRWA suffers.

- 4. We feel that there is a disturbing concentration on the importance of the Arab oil-producing countries to cover the deficit in the budget of the agency, which may be made to shoulder the responsibility of financing UNRWA. This in turn would lead to relieving the international community of its duties towards financing UNRWA and towards the Palestinian refugees. The links between this and the Agency's intention to move to Europe is clear.
- 5. The problem of UNRWA's financial deficit is caused by the same forces that caused our people's diaspora, because these same forces give Israel billions of dollars annually for military purposes.

Lastly, we see that the services offered by UNRWA have not been improved since the establishment of the Agency and until the present day. Those services are in reality below the necessary human requirements and lately have become merely symbolic, serving only half the refugees entitled to these services.

For the above reasons, the PLO demands that UNRWA call on all concerned countries to make the UNRWA'S budget part of the U.N. budget, or at least include the salaries of UNRWA personnel in the U.N. budget, like all other U.N. personnel.

- 6. The PLO firmly refuses to accept the decrease in the agency's services and firmly opposes the decision to transfer the UNRWA headquarters to Vienna, which has dangerous repercussions for the status of the Palestinian refugees.
- 7. The PLO reserves the right to take the measures it sees necessary to make this decision ineffective.

For this decision and its repercussions only serve the purpose of the imperialist-Zionist plot against our Palestinian people.

254

Press interview statements by King Hasan II of Morocco discussing the situation in the Middle East and his country's role in arranging the Sadat-Begin meeting⁸¹

Late June, 1978

There is a grain of truth in the role attributed to Morocco in the period leading up to the Sadat-Begin meeting. I had openly received my friend Nahum Goldmann, and Mr. André Shuraqi, the former mayor of [West] Jerusalem. The contacts did not go beyond this level. However, we were not informed of the intentions of President Sadat. I was as surprised as anyone else. But I did know that he would not undertake any commitment which would not elicit the consensus approval of all the Arab states. As for our participation, it was like the wind carrying the pollen from tree to tree. We knew that there was something in the air, and our meetings were conducted on the level of

⁸⁰ Partial English text, Wafa (Beirut), June 23, 1978, pp. 2-3. Tawfiq Safadi is head of the PLO's Higher Political Committee for Palestinians in Lebanon.

⁸¹ Translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Yves Cuau and André Pautard, L'Express (Paris), no. 1407 (June 26-July 2, 1978), p. 50.

intellectuals or religious leaders, never on the level of political figures....

Now I am disappointed, very disappointed. Israel has not taken advantage of the opportunity she was given. It was a skylight looking out into the future. Yes, on that day Israel's genius failed her...Personally I despair of Mr. Begin. However, I think that there is still some hope.

255

Peace proposals submitted by the government of Egypt listing the procedure for Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the consequent security arrangements⁸²

July 5, 1978

- 1. The establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East necessitates a just solution of the Palestinian question in all its aspects on the bases of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and taking into consideration the legitimate security concerns of all parties.
- II. In order to insure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority there shall be a transitional period not exceeding five years at the end of which the Palestinian people will be able to determine their own future.
- III. Talks shall take place between Egypt, Jordan, Israel and representatives of the Palestinian people with the participation of the UN with a view to agreeing upon:
 - A. Details of the transitional regime
 - B. Timetable for the Israeli withdrawal
- C. Mutual security arrangements for all the parties concerned during and following the transitional period.
- D. Modalities for the implementation of relevant UN resolutions on Palestinian refugees.
- E. Other issues considered appropriate by all parties.
- IV. Israel shall withdraw from the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip occupied since June 1967. The Israeli withdrawal applies to the settlements established in the occupied

territories.

V. The Israeli military government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be abolished at the outset of the transitional period. Supervision over the administration of the West Bank shall become the responsibility of Jordan, and supervision over the administration of the Gaza Strip shall become the responsibility of Egypt. Jordan and Egypt shall carry out their responsibility in cooperation with freely elected representatives of the Palestinian people who shall exercise direct authority over the administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The UN shall supervise and facilitate the Israeli withdrawal and the restoration of Arab authority.

VI. Egypt and Jordan shall guarantee that the security arrangements to be agreed upon will continue to be respected in the West Bank and Gaza.

256

Address to the nation by President Sarkis of Lebanon explaining his reasons for offering his resignation and the conditions on which he withdrew it (excerpts)⁸³

Baabda, July 15, 1978

The day I assumed office, in a situation in which our very destiny was at stake, there was unanimous agreement that no time should be lost in extinguishing the flames that were raging thoughout the country and in reconstructing the state, whose very foundations had been shaken. When I took the constitutional oath I explained the bases of the policy I had outlined with a view to achieving this goal, and it was unanimously approved. I then drew up a plan of action, which was adopted by the Cairo⁸⁴ and Riyadh summits.⁸⁵ This plan was to the effect that there should be a cease-fire and that the fighting in Lebanon should be stopped, and that the Arab security forces already deployed in Lebanon should be reinforced so as to become a deterrent force capable of enforcing the ceasefire, separating the warring parties, guaranteeing

85 See docs. 313 and 314 in ibid.

The proposals were transmitted to Israel by the US on July 8. Official English translation, New York Times, July 6, 1978, p.8. Copyright, The New York Times Company; reprinted by permission.

⁸⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Nahar (Beirut), July 16, 1978.

⁸⁴ See docs. 267 and 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

the Cairo agreement, maintaining internal security and supervising the withdrawal of armed elements and the collection of arms.

The Arab Deterrent Force proceeded with the performance of its task until such time as the army should be reconstructed. It was natural that these forces should be regarded as legitimate a force as the regular Lebanese forces, that they should enjoy the same immunities and rights and be subjected to the same obligation. There can be no state if the legitimate authorities lack effective strength and no state if the effective force lacks legitimacy.

The atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding that characterised the relations between the Arab Deterrent Forces and the Lebanese was an important factor in stopping the battles that were then raging.

However, it was not long before the conflicts in the area and Arab disunity made themselves felt in the Lebanese arena and impeded the implementation of the resolutions of the Riyadh and Cairo conferences. This created an explosive atmosphere heavy with suspicion and fraught with surprises of every kind. Every day new obstacles appeared on the road the state was trying to follow, to the extent that all ways seemed blocked. Once again we tried to clear the way on the basis of a plan of action drawn up at Shtura, aimed at inducing the PLO to implement the Cairo agreement voluntarily. But once again our efforts were unsuccessful. Yet I continued to hope that the situation would change and I spared no efforts to bring this about, to secure circumstances favourable for the implementation of the Cairo agreement,86 and for the surmounting of all the obstacles. For the fighting which had bled the country white had stopped and it was now possible for the state to devote some of its efforts to the problems of development besides the problems of

But the sky became overcast again. There was the Israeli aggression against South Lebanon, and further clashes ensued, with increasing intensity and gravity. With the proliferation of bloody incidents, the state had to devote its attention to repairing the damage rather than continuing to perform its task of reform and reconstruction. It was unable to re-establish its institutions in the various fields, and the organisation of the army was constantly impeded by a variety of obstacles. The decisions taken by the state in the public interest were met with every kind of defiance, and promises were all it received from the parties that were capable of providing aid. There were constant provocations, reactions became increasingly violent and innocent victims continued to be killed. When the state is confronted with such deterioration which, to its extreme distress it is unable to check, the Head of State finds himself obliged to answer the promptings of reason and conscience and to retire from office. This is how the idea of resigning came to me, after long meditation on the course of events and meticulous consideration of how the situation had developed.

But there has been a long series of urgent representations and requests that I abandon the idea of resigning, and the same wish has been expressed by international, Arab and Lebanese quarters too important to be ignored. Moreover, there have been manifestations of good will on the part of all parties concerned. In view of all this I cannot do otherwise than reconsider the problem and renounce the idea of resigning, thus responding to these generous appeals and representations and endeavouring once again to deal with the situation and the problems it poses in a manner consonant with the basic principles of the exercise of power.

People of Lebanon;

I address you today with my habitual frankness so that I may make clear to you the principles on the basis of which it will be possible for me to remain in power and cope with the problems that affect the very destiny of the country. I have not renounced the idea of resignation merely to find myself once more in the situation that was the cause of my decision to resign. The exercise of power involves responsibilities which cannot be assumed unless certain essential conditions are

The spectre of violence will continue to threaten security, the state, the legitimate exercise of power and the lives of innocent people, as long as the populations are in possession of hundreds of thousands of weapons and as long as there are tens of thousands of combatants in the country. And as long as international conflicts in the area and inter-Arab disputes, with their repercussions on Lebanon, make it impossible to collect the arms of the Pal-

⁸⁶ For an alleged text of the Cairo agreement see doc. 449 in International Documents on Palestine 1969; see also footnote 74, p. 469 above.

estinian organisations and to eliminate armed manifestations, the disarming of the Lebanese will remain a thorny problem for which there is no immediate solution.

And the government will remain unstable as long as we are unable to eliminate the illegal practices and manifestations, armed or unarmed, on the part of certain parties and organizations, which are in direct conflict with the role of the state and its legitimate institutions. The state must therefore use all the means at its disposal to deal with these matters and lose no time in reconstituting the army and restoring its proper level of numbers and equipment. The compulsory military service law must be implemented so that the army, even though it is not completely reconstituted, may play the role that is expected of it. Moreover, in the light of the resolutions adopted by the UN on ending the Israeli aggression against the South, the withdrawal of Israel's armies and the securing of Lebanon's sovereignty over all her territories, and the subsequent deployment of UN forces in South Lebanon, it is only natural that the Lebanese army should be sent to the South to perform its national role there.

In any case, harmony and trust should characterise the relations between the Lebanese and the Arab Deterrent Forces, and in particular between the Lebanese and the Syrian forces, as a reflection of the fraternal relations that exist between the Lebanese and Syrian peoples.

The Syrian forces should be regarded as legitimate Lebanese forces temporarily performing the task of our own armed forces and should be treated and behave on this basis. At the orders of President Hafiz Asad, Syria is helping us to carry our heavy burden, and no development must be allowed to cloud these relations.

257

Communiqué issued by the PLO Central Council criticizing the plan by Egypt's President Sadat to give the West Bank to Jordan and Gaza to Egypt⁸⁷

Damascus, July 20, 1978

A. On the Palestinian level

- 1. The PLO Central Council stressed the importance of solving all obstacles that stand in the way of national unity amongst all Palestinian Resistance factions and the need to build this unity on sound democratic foundations according to a political program based on the resolutions of the Palestine National Congress. It was therefore agreed that projects for national unity will be discussed in a meeting to be held within two weeks and attended by the PLO Executive Committee, faction leaders, and PLO Central Council members, aimed at reaching a unified plan for national unity to be presented at the PLO Political Council [sic] extraordinary meeting to be held between August 18-20. The Council moreover stresses the importance of democratic dialogue to solve inter-Palestinian factional problems, and of ending propaganda campaigns and all other provocations, especially those related to external provocations and which are intended to harm the Palestinian Revolution.
- 2. The PLO Central Council saluted and called for more consolidation with the Palestinian people inside occupied Palestine, who are courageously confronting the Zionist enemy and its expansionist policy and the U.S.-Zionist liquidation projects. The Council moreover demanded that all friendly Arab and Islamic countries provide the Palestinian people inside occupied Palestine with material and moral support.
- 3. The Council recommended the convening of the Palestine National Congress after the Ramadan feast at a date and place to be decided at the next meeting of the Council.

B. On the Arab level

1. The PLO Central Council discussed the dangerous situation as represented in the US-Zionist plots and in Sadat's continuous concessions, the latest one being the project determining the future of the occupied Palestinian land, which

⁸⁷ Wafa (Beirut), July 20, 1978, pp. 2-3.

called for returning parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Jordan and Egypt. This project, which is identical to the US project carried by Vance, ignores the Palestinian people's rights and struggle led by the PLO, and constitutes a blatant violation of the Algiers and Rabat Summits and the UN General Assembly resolutions.

The Council stresses that neither Sadat nor anybody else has the right to negotiate or speak on behalf of the Palestinian people and to relinquish any part of Palestine. As Sadat is persisting in his dangerous policy by directly negotiating with the Zionist enemy and its allies in Germany, Austria and London, focus has again been put on the need to revive Arab solidarity to make up for these capitulationist moves.

In this respect, the Council calls for reinforcing the Confrontation Front to check the US-Zionist conspiracy in the Arab region, and cautions any Arab party against involvement in this conspiracy.

2. The Council adopts the PLO Executive Committee's memorandum addressed to the Iraqi government, denounces the hostile stand of certain Iraqi organisations, and condemns the outrageous assassination of Ali Nasser Yasin and Said Hamami.

C. On the Lebanese Level

What is being executed by the isolationist forces in Lebanon in cooperation with the Zionist enemy, is part of the U.S.-Israeli-reactionary plot in the region, aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause and revolution, and placing the whole Arab region under imperialist domination. To confront these activities and conspiracies, the Council called on all Muslim and Christian forces and masses in Lebanon and the Arab region to unite with Syria, the Palestinian Revolution, and the Lebanese national forces. The Council moreover stressed the importance of closing ranks between the world liberation force and the friendly Socialist countries to confront Imperialism and Zionism.

258

Press interview statements by Minister of Information Iskandar Ahmad of Syria placing responsibility for the deteriorating security situation in Lebanon on the US and Israel, their aim being to force Syria to accept compromises in its national goals (excerpts)⁸⁸ August, 1978

- Q. What are Syria's long-term objectives in Lebanon and by what strategy does Syria intend to achieve them?
- A. From the onset of the crisis, Syrian aims in Lebanon have been based on firm principles. They are: 1) To prevent partition, whatever efforts and sacrifices this might require; 2) To establish and strengthen security and prosperity; 3) To preserve the Palestinian resistance; 4) To help our Lebanese brothers develop their political, economic and social conditions so they may achieve prosperity and progress.

Q. Could you specify what external factors made the Chamounists and Phalangists change their mind about Syria?

- A. We believe—and our belief is based on facts that are becoming very obvious—that the exploding of the Lebanese security situation, as well as the attacks against the Lebanese state legitimacy, are being carried out with the encouragement of the United States and Israel; the intention being to exercise pressure on Syria to make it accept compromises on its national aims. Lebanon has been made Israel's and the United States' scapegoat in the area to divert Syrian attention from American-Israeli plans. In the Chamounists and Phalangists Israel found a cheap tool for the implementation of anti-Lebanese and anti-Syrian projects.
- Q. How do you think Syria can help Lebanon overcome the contradiction represented by the necessity of establishing state control over the parts now held by the Maronite right-wing and at the same time avoid the threatened Israeli intervention on behalf of these Maronites?
- A. We are trying to strengthen the legal Lebanese authorities and we believe the existence of armed militias cannot be reconciled with the re-establish-

⁸⁸ Interview conducted by Fulvio Grimaldi, The Middle East (London), no. 47, September 1978, pp. 27, 29.

ment of the Lebanese state. Thus we support the legal authorities in their effort to extend their control over the whole Lebanese territory and to build up the state's institutions as quickly as possible. Promoting the sovereignty of the Lebanese state means reducing the bulk of the militias up to the point of getting rid of them altogether. We cannot keep our troops in Lebanon for a very long time, which is also why we want the establishment of state institutions in Lebanon, enabling it to do without the services of the Arab peace-keeping force. Our troops in Lebanon are costing us a lot.

- Q. Does this mean that in trying to establish Lebanese sovereignty Syria will not be intimidated by any Israeli threat whatever?
- A. Syria doesn't accept threats from anybody. We are prepared, as always, to face any probability and any possibility.
- Q. If Syria had let the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian resistance defeat the Phalangists in 1977, would it now have this problem on its hands?
- A. This is not an accurate hypothesis. I already said Syria is supporting attitudes, not individuals, in Lebanon. Those who work against these attitudes will find themselves in conflict with Syria.
- Q. The Palestinians are now barred from the border with occupied Palestine, their movements in the South are severely curtailed by UNIFIL, elsewhere they are under the supervision of the Arab Deterrent Force. Yet fight the Israelis they must. How can they?
- A. This point was discussed during the summit of the Steadfastness countries and the PLO, and Syria has declared over and over again that the PLO's freedom of military action against the Israeli occupation forces must be assured.
- Q. Do you still believe that a wider national front, like the one you tried to form with both the right and the left in Lebanon, is a viable, even necessary, hypothesis?
- A. There are now moves to unify Muslim and Christian forces under the slogan of strengthening the state, preventing partition and getting rid of militias and Israeli agents. I think that this is a necessary and useful step.

259

Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt declaring his acceptance of Israel in the region and discussing some of his differences with Prime Minister Begin of Israel⁸⁹

Fuschl Castle (Salzburg), mid-July, 1978

- Q. When you make a balance-sheet and weight the achievements alongside the failure of your peace initiative, how do you evaluate the results to date?
- A. Well, to be frank with you, I have had as of this moment some achievements, though the initiative also has its weak points. But, all in all, the successes are greater than the failures. It is impossible to compare them. I will say this: after Mr. Begin adopted the hard line and began with his falsifications I was asked during those unfortunate moments if I didn't regret my initiative. And I answered: I received my reward, when I met with the Israelis in Israel. When I saw them in the streets of Jerusalem-and particularly after my speech in the Knesset90 on my way back to the hotel. Before that I was afraid that the enthusiasm of the people in the streets, the feelings I saw expressed in their faces-I was afraid that it would all disappear after they heard my speech, or at least that their expressions would be very different. I was moved, when I saw that the enthusiasm in the streets was even greater after my speech. than on my way to the Knesset.
 - Q. And what were the feelings in Egypt?
- A. Like I told you, I already received my reward for the initiative in Israel. But, upon my return to Egypt, a great surprise was waiting for me. Something happened to my people, upon my return from Jerusalem. I travelled from the airport to my house. The airport is to the east of Cairo, and my house is on the western side. The sun had already set. The road was filled with people. More than 5 million out of 8 million in Cairo came to meet me. I said to the Vice President

⁸⁹ Interview conducted by Willy Gafni, New Outlook (Tel Aviv), XXI, 4 (July-August, 1978), pp. 4–7. On July 9 President Sadat had taken part in a quadripartite meeting in Vienna with Chancellors Kreisky and Brandt and Israeli opposition leader Peres. He also met UN Secretary-General Waldheim at Fuschl Castle on the 10th and 12th. See doc. 134 above for the "Vienna document."

⁹⁰ Doc. 301 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

who was sitting with me in the car; something has happened to these people, something that hasn't happened during the past 20 years. There already were great moments in my life. I lived the moments of victory of our 23rd of July revolution, but I never met such emotions—particularly from the women.

Q. What about the other countries?

A. At the press conference that was held in Jerusalem with Mr. Begin and myself⁹¹ there were 4,000 journalists—from the extreme west, the United States. To the extreme east, Australia, I am still receiving letters from journalists who were at that conference-mainly from the United States. And to my great joy, also from the Jewish community from around the world. Also many letters from West Germany and from England and France; letters of support for my initiative. One of them in particular deeply moved my heart. Before I left Alexandria on my current journey, I received a telegram from a Jewish woman in San Francisco, complete with signature and address, in which she warned me about a "putsch" that they want to carry out against me in Cairo. She read propaganda about the lack of stability in Egypt written by a foreign correspondent, and this caused her worry and led her to send the telegram.

Those are some of the successes, I would say the dividends of my initiative. Of course I also include among them the package deal, confirmed by the United States Senate, which symbolizes the fact that the United States is trying to maintain a more balanced policy—a policy which is for the good of peace, and believe me, also for the good of Israel.

Q, Is this the view in the Arab world as well?

A. There are many in the Arab world who said and say that my initiative will fail. Some of my colleagues are demanding that I already declare right now that I have failed, and that I should break off all contact with Israel. I told them flatly: the initiative will not die. It will always live. Especially since it has all this support throughout the world.

Actually, my initiative has created a division in the Arab world and has created some very serious arguments. Many are asking: are we on the right road? We have Mr. Begin to thank for this, since he placed cards in the hands of the rejectionists. But I am certain that in the end, he will have no other way but to admit his error, and the initiative will not die.

Q. What did you hope to get from the current meetings in Vienna and are you encouraged by the results?

A. Before Shimon Peres came, I had a very interesting talk with Kreisky, who is a very sincere man. The next day there was a meeting of the four of us: Brandt, Kreisky, Peres and myself. We had a long joint discussion, and afterwards I met for a private meeting with Shimon Peres.

Actually, it is now clear, that there do not exist great differences in our approach to things.

What is the difference between us concerning the acceptance of Israel in the region? This is the approach that we adopted in the Arab world, and at least as far as Egypt is concerned, there is no question. I was in the Knesset and I met with the elected representatives of Israel. I have provent that we accept Israel into the region.

Is there any difficulty concerning the normalization of relations between us? Until now the Arabs have rejected the idea of normalization. As far as we are concerned, it is clear that we are ready for normalization.

Are we divided concerning Israel's need for security? During my discussions in Israel and at the press conference at the close of the visit I said: A—I recognize that Israel has security needs. And we also have security needs. Let us sit and discuss the matter like civilized people and not make war. B—The October War will be the last war. I was asked at the press conference here, if that is still my view, and I answered: yes, that is still my view.

Are we divided concerning neighborly relations and open borders? No. I am ready for open borders, and for normalization. I am ready to provide for the security needs of Israel, as I made clear in the 6 point programme concerning security.

Q. If there is no division why isn't there any progress?
A. The difference between us is very simple.

Mr. Begin wants peace, security, neighborly relations, and also land; and also part of our sovereignty. We will give peace, we will give security and good neighborly relations, but we

⁹¹ See docs. 184 and 303 in ibid.

will not be ready to give up on a part of our land or our sovereignty.

I didn't find any difficulty in discussing these matters with Shimon Peres. We talked among us about many aspects of the problem, about all the aspects of the problem, and we didn't find great differences between us.

From my point of view, the visit in Austria was very useful and it gave me a good opportunity to clarify my position to my friends Kreisky and Brandt and to discuss with Shimon Peres about the possibilities of the future. I hope that something will develop out of this. Tomorrow, on the last day of my visit, I hope that there will be an important development.

Q, For the good?

A. I hope so. I am always hoping for the best. I am an optimist by nature. (President Sadat was hinting here at the projected meeting between him and Mr. Ezer Weizman).

Q. Before your visit to Israel, you said that the problem is 70% psychological.

A. I said 75%.

Q. Is that still your estimation?

A. On my part, and on the part of the Egyptian people, a nation with 40 million people, the largest Arab nation, the intellectual base of the Arab nation, a nation which has a 7,000 year old history and civilization, much has changed since the October War. We had our revenge and this is our custom—40 to 50% already was left behind then. And now, after my visit to Jerusalem, and you can quote me, we have no more mental blocks or complexes, bitterness or hatred. I mentioned the 5 million who came to receive me. There were another 2 or 3 million from surrounding communities who wanted to come, but they were stopped because of a fear of overcrowding.

On our side there are no more psychological problems. But I am bewildered when I think about Mr. Begin's position. He is living in the past. He is of the old guard. Within him there is a bitterness, and this is very unfortunate. I always try to live without bitterness. And it hasn't been easy. For many years I had no normal family life. I was in prisons or in concentration camps, I was persecuted by the government. I never had any time to devote to my family. But I never became bitter. You can read about it in my book which you

perhaps have read. This is the village tradition of optimism and faith.

From our side, there is no bitterness, therefore I didn't have to postpone Mr. Begin's invitation to come to Egypt. In Jerusalem I said: let us wait. And Mr. Begin understood this. But on the day after my return, I sent an invitation to come to Ismailia. We bear no grudge from the past. But your man, and I am very sorry for him about this, is a bitter man. A bitter man is not happy and cannot bring happiness to others.

Q, Do the recent proposals presented by the Egyptian government⁹² rule out previous proposals, such as the formula of a proposal for a declaration of principles which was presented at the meeting of the Political Committee in Jerusalem?

A. The new program has been rejected by the Israeli government, despite the fact that it has agreed to send Foreign Minister Dayan to a meeting with our Foreign Minister, Kamal. But all of our previous declarations are still valid. Instead of presenting our suggestions in general terms, we tried in our last proposal to present them in detail. We tried to return to the peace process, by proposing a return to the situation that existed before 1967 -that the West Bank should be turned over to Hussein (and I know that you are able to talk with him) and the Gaza Strip should be turned over to Egypt; and then we would sit down and talk about security needs, in a transition period which would last for 5 years, about everything that would be necessary to guarantee Israel's security needs. In our view, at the end of this period, and in accordance with the Aswan formula, the Palestinians will determine their fate. My proposal is simply attempting to make it easier for all the sides to build a bridge, which can be used to sit down and discuss all that will be necessary for peace after the signing of a peace treaty.

I differ with Mr. Begin, not only because my approach lacks bitterness, unlike his approach, but also in another very important matter. Mr. Begin thinks that the signing of a peace agreement is a final goal. He wants to receive what Israel wanted to get in war or in peace, but didn't receive, because it is unjust. He wants to impose everything upon us. But in my opinion, the agreement will only be an opening of a new period of development.

⁹² Doc. 255 above.

We must find the way to realize peace, and this is more difficult than just the matter of a signature. In my opinion, the agreement is not the goal, but rather peace. This is similar to the approach of a number of newly independent states, who thought that the main thing was to achieve independence, the signature on a declaration of independence. I have experience. Our troubles began only after we signed the papers for our independence. Mr. Begin thinks that the signature is everything. In my opinion, that is only the beginning of everything. And because of this, I placed an emphasis on the building of a new concept in our 6 point program. I suggested that there will be a united Israeli-Egyptian committee which could meet at El-Arish or in Be'ersheva, and together we will overcome the difficulties that stand in the way of the building of peace, co-existence, and the future.

260

Letter from Defence Minister Gamasi of Egypt to Defence Minister Weizman of Israel requesting Israel's representatives at the Israeli-Egyptian military talks to leave Egypt⁹³

July 26, 1978

I regret to inform you that the National Defense Council has decided that there was no more need in the continued presence of the Israeli military mission to Egypt. We, on our part, have made the necessary arrangements for the return of the military mission on Thursday by an Egyptian Boeing 747.

261

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt explaining recent developments in the Egyptian-Israeli talks (excerpts)⁹⁴

Alexandria, late July, 1978

The second point I want to deal with today, as I promised—I hope I have not kept you too long—the second point is the situation as regards the initiative and what has happened between us and Israel in the last two days, to be exact.

All I did—I am very patient, and right always makes one strong and unshakable—was to exchange two letters with Begin. I am speaking about this for the first time—these letters were exchanged through the American ambassador, through America, so that President Carter and his foreign minister knew about these letters. In one of them I said it was shameful...and he [Begin] replied that it was a regrettable attitude.

.

Why did I withdraw Muhammad Kamil, the foreign minister, from Jerusalem? The time has come for us to disclose all the secrets.... As you know, we formed two committees, a military one and a political one, the military one consisting of the two defence ministers and the political one of the two foreign ministers. We said that one of them would meet in Jerusalem and the other in Cairo. The military committee met in Cairo and the time came for the political committee to meet in Jerusalem, in January. Muhammad Kamil went to Jerusalem and the meeting of the political committee started.95 The whole world followed it on television. I followed it too and heard Dayan's opening speech....His speech was very fine, and no one could object to it. But if we went by what he said, I should lose half my territory....His words were very fine, but what did his talk of compromise and meeting half way mean? Half way means my territory....The land is mine, but you talk to me about compromise and meeting half way...the land was stolen...

⁹³ English text as published in the Jewish Telegraphic Agency Daily News Bulletin (New York), July 28, 1978, p. 1.

⁹⁴ Made at Alexandria University on the 26th anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), July 27, 1978.

⁹⁵ See docs. 59 to 62 above.

Muhammad Kamil put Dayan in his place in the presence of Vance. They tried to fix another meeting and said it should be in Sinai. I intend to leave this subject now, because I think I may have kept you rather a long time. I want to tell you the latest story about Weizman and my meeting with him in Salzburg, because this gave rise to a big battle that is still going on in Israel. As you know, I went to Vienna at the invitation of my friend, Chancellor Kreisky. Shimon Peres, the leader of the Labour Party and of the Opposition in Israel, said he wanted to meet me, and I agreed and saw him. Of course you all know how he was attacked by Begin [in Israel] that they call the island of democracy in the area. One of their arguments is that it is an island of democracy. But what Begin said about his leader of the opposition—is that democracy? Is that what happens in an island of democracy? He stopped him going and said I'm not going to give you a visa to go anywhere again. I'm not going to give a visa to anyone who wants to see Sadat.

So I saw Shimon Peres and after that I went to Salzburg to rest for two days. I had to think about the speech on the 22nd and the decision, and this had tired me, and about what was to follow. When I think about an operation I do not take it in its narrow scope; I take it in its full dimensions so that it may be implemented completely. I want it to be fully implemented, one step after another, according to our democratic process, which you are accustomed to...

I forgot to tell you that when I withdrew Muhammad Kamil over the question of the reward, Begin tried to arouse the world by saying that Sadat had broken off the talks because he didn't want peace, and a lot more talk of that kind. The American President Carter contacted me by telephone that day at night, the day I had recalled Muhammad Kamil, an hour after I had recalled Muhammad Kamil. President Carter contacted me. He was very concerned. He is a man of morals, principles and real values, and also a personal friend. He was very upset because he really sincerely wants to establish a peace based on justice. His recent decision—none of the gangs can say anything against his recent decision when South Lebanon was occupied by Israel.... No one is saying anything about the American decision and no one is saying anything about the Soviet objection—there are some Arabs who make fools of themselves and say that the USSR supports Arab interests.... They still say that it supports the Arab nation and it still directs the policy of many Arabs—the poor Palestinians....

Carter really is honest with himself and with others. So when he contacted me that day, an hour after I had recalled Muhammad Kamil, I said to him: As you have contacted me, I want to tell you that it is not a question of my dragging my feet in the peace process or wanting to withdraw. No, I did not want to get into a situation that would destroy peace completely.... I said to Carter: To prove to you that I am not upset or anything of the kind, the military committee will continue. Part of the military committee had stayed here in Cairo. Weizman went and left it; he said he would bring the rest of the group with him when he came back, but he would leave the other part of the group here. I agreed to this. The military committee met once even after the withdrawal of Muhammad Kamil, so that they might realise that we are not afraid of direct contacts or of the peace process, but that it must be a peace based on justice.

Weizman came to me in Salzburg, and we sat down with Weizman. I can talk about anything with Weizman, and I repeat it here before you, so that Begin and all the world may hear, I received Weizman in his personal capacity, because he is a man I can sit down with and talk to and because he can talk to me as a human being, a person and a man who wants peace and loves his country at the same time—I do not dislike someone who loves his country. But the most important thing about him is that he wants peace. We sat down and talked in Salzburg for about four hours. We talked about everything without any reservations. including the future and my views that you have heard me expressing and that I imparted to Mondale so that he could impart them to the American President. My views on peace are different from Begin's. Begin thinks that the peace agreement must include all Israel's dreams of territorial expansion. I told him, No, keep away from territory and sovereignty and I will give you full peace. The important thing about the peace is what comes after the agreement, not the agreement itself.

I explained that we shall never give Israel what

she was unable to get with wars or without wars, with America or without America. We agree to a peace based on justice and we are ready for it and for guarantees—I offered six guarantees. No one had imagined as much as this. Muhammad Kamil told them of the guarantees at Leeds and repeated them, and they know that.

.

The important thing is that we talked with Weizman. Afterwards Weizman asked them if I had proposed El Arish when Mondale was here. When the American Vice-President Mondale visited me and submitted to me the American President's initiative for a meeting of the foreign ministers in London, as you know, at that time we decided that, as long as there were no new factors in the Israeli attitude, we would not be prepared to sit down with them and talk again. However, if there was any change in the Israeli attitude we were ready to to sit down and discuss things with open minds and hearts. We were not afraid to sit down and talk, but we did not want to waste time. If there was nothing new there was no point in discussing things. He asked me if I had proposed El Arish, and I told him that I had proposed El Arish...El Arish is the capital of Sinai, and instead of going to Cairo or here or there, or going to Tel Aviv or somewhere, there is El Arish. El Arish is exactly half way between the two towns. If there was any meeting between us at any level, and any one wanted to refer to his government, he could go and come back once or twice in the same day, because El Arish is half way.

All the same I told him I agreed to London. I also told him: I regret to say that I always find that you don't understand the problems and then a bit later you come back and say, for example, that that was possible or impossible. This is what I said to Weizman and he said, Very well, I will tell Begin. I said to him, Just tell him that we shall not wait for you in El Arish until you return it. Last year I performed the Great Feast prayers in the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and I told him that I am thinking, God willing, of performing the Great Feast prayers on Mount Moses, in the middle of Sinai, near Saint Catherine's monastery. This is the valley in which Almighty God spoke to Moses, and I want to perform the Great Feast prayers there. And that is not all. I want to do something that I feel is a mission—in that place where God spoke to Moses I want us to build a

mosque, a church and a Jewish synagogue, because the three revealed religions are one...

He said to me: The world would be turned upside down. I told him, You won't be able to get rid of me unless you shoot me and kill me. But if the car keeps going, I shall certainly go. I spoke simply and said to Weizman: By the way, I promised Pope Paul of Rome that I would invite him to pray in this place. He accepted this during my last meeting with him in February....When I met him in Rome I said to him, I will invite you to pray on Mount Moses in Sinai and he welcomed the suggestion even though his health is rather delicate, and he was very happy.

Weizman said he would go and tell Begin.... Weizman went and the Knesset met, and before that Weizman saw Begin. Begin was furious because Peres, the leader of the opposition, had met me.... He went to the Knesset and made a great commotion. He said that the Israeli cabinet would study President Sadat's new initiative. But there had been no initiative on my part, or anything of the kind. What really did happen was that I said to Weizman: You do not understand why I choose El Arish, and you understand too late. Think about it. I will not go to El Arish while you are there. No, you will hand it over.

I did not submit any plan to Weizman. My foreign minister, Muhammad Kamil, was going to London. How could I let him go to London and engage in an initiative while I was engaged in another initiative? That is not my way, not my method, as you know.

When I ask for anything I shall not ask for El Arish, but for Sinai, which is mine, and for all the Arab territory—the Golan, the West Bank and Gaza. The quarrel between me and them is about the West Bank and Gaza. So far we have not discussed Sinai at all and we shall not do so, for to me Sinai is not a subject for discussion, as I told them in the Knesset. Begin said: First we will discuss the initiative which Sadat has put forward, and secondly Sadat has asked us to give him a present, but we do not give presents, not a single grain of Sinai sand, we do not give anything gratis.

It is all baseless for there is no new initiative, and I have not officially asked for El Arish because if I asked for anything I would ask for all of Sinai.

ARAB WORLD 483

The whole of my problem is that of the West Bank and Gaza before El Arish, before Sinai, before the Golan. Hafiz al-Asad was angry when he read our proposal; he said: It doesn't mention the Golan. The journalists asked me about it in Austria and I said to them: That's right, the plan doesn't mention either the Golan or Sinai. The plan is centred on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip because in my view there are no problems over Sinai or the Golan. Sooner or later they will have to leave them. There is no question of that.

Our real problem is the Palestine problem. I said to Weizman...Listen Weizman, tell Begin the following: We are ready to make peace in a matter of hours because there are no longer any points of difference except for one thing—Mr Begin wants land as well as peace. No, I'm sorry, it's either land or peace. Peace with all guarantees, but land, No, we can never accept that, not till the Day of Judgement. I said to him: Listen, Weizman, Tell Begin that if he understands this there will be no limits to the possibility of mutual understanding, because you will be a state living within your frontiers and you respect your neighbours and your neighbours will respect you. I don't think anything more than this is required.

All the world read the agency reports.... As I have told you, there was a military group here. I have kept them here ever since I told Carter that this was a confession on my part that we were ready to continue even after I had recalled Muhammad Kamil. So the military group was here. The message came through this group. My clear orders to al-Gamasi were that he must not engage in political activities. So he refused to receive the message and returned it, saying I'm sorry, this is politics, I am a military man, and I advise you to send it through America. Mr Begin gave the message to the US ambassador in Tel Aviv, and the message came to the American ambassador in Egypt who wanted to deliver it. But the Egyptian foreign minister told him: The contents of the message reached us two days ago, through the press agencies. We reject them, so we will not receive messages. So the message went back unopened through the American ambassador... Begin's attitude is unacceptable in both form and substance and this is why we refused to receive it through the military group that was here. I

ordered the group to leave, 96 and it did so today. We returned the message, we did not accept it from the American ambassador because it was unacceptable in both form and substance.

I say to the Jewish people of Israel, whom I have seen, and to the Jewish people in Europe and America who have supported my initiative, that I will never abandon this initiative. But Israel is entitled to security, permanent peace and good neighbourliness, but she is not entitled to a single centimetre of land. The day will never come under any circumstances when we agree that the security guarantees should comprise a single inch of Arab land. My position is clear.

I say to the Jewish people of Israel that if they are told that Arab guns threaten women and children in Israel—I say to the Jewish people inside and outside Israel that this is untrue, false and a deliberate lie. For we have said we are ready for full security guarantees, apart from land and sovereignty. This protects every woman and child and also every grain of the crops in Israel too. I say to our Christian brothers, who are also a party to this stage, that I have called for a temple of peace. I still call for this temple of peace, but they must realise that I cannot allow it to be a den of traders, traders with the money of others. Our Christian brothers will understand this, because the temple in which there was trading is mentioned in the Gospel.

To our people and the 700 million members of the Islamic nation, I say: But if they incline to peace, do thou incline to peace, and if they ask for peace we will make peace and continue to maintain this initiative.

Brothers and sisters, these have been the events of the last few days since my July 22 speech, whether in the domestic field, which is the field of reconstruction, or in the battle for liberation.

I pray to Almighty God that when I meet you next year we shall have achieved for Egypt all that we have promised, so that Egypt may ever hold her head high, and be noble, faithful, steadfast and strong.

God's peace and mercy by upon you.

⁹⁶ See doc. 260 above.

262

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Kamil of Egypt demanding that Israel give up its claim to occupied Arab territory⁹⁷ Early August, 1978

- Q. Under what conditions will you resume direct talks with the Israelis?
- A. We would be most willing to continue talks if Israel would drop its illegal claim to Arab territory. What we want is the implementation of United Nations Resolution 242.98 We do not want another renegotiation or reinterpretation of 242. The Israelis said openly at the Leeds conference in the presence of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that there was no substitute for territory. They want to keep our land and then negotiate and offer back a portion of it.
- Q. Would you sit down again with Israel if, as an act of good faith, it offered to return part of the Sinai?
- A. We are not going back to step-by-step negotiations. If there was a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel, giving us back the whole of Sinai, it wouldn't establish peace or stability.
- Q. How long will Egypt be willing to wait for some clear change in the Israeli government's position?
- A. We cannot go on forever. The Israelis want to eat the West Bank and Gaza piece by piece through the establishment of illegal settlements, and drag us into this endless process of talking about nothing. They want to create a status quo that would be very difficult to change. If nothing changes, then the peace process automatically will come to an end.
 - Q. How can the stalemate be broken?
- A. This is where we count on the U.S. The Carter Administration said clearly that Resolution 242 applied to all fronts, that the settlements are illegal and that the U.S. has a formula for the Palestinian question. Israel has ignored all of this.
- Q, Do you want the Americans to put a specific plan on the table?
 - A. We have always asked the U.S. to be a full

partner in these talks. How that is done is up to the U.S. We are not asking Washington to withdraw its commitment to the security of Israel. On the contrary the U.S. can double those efforts, but within the borders of 1967.

- Q. Do you worry that your refusal to talk will label Egypt as the inflexible party?
- A. We are ready to establish peaceful and neighborly relations, and to guarantee Israel's security. People sometimes forget we were the ones who started this process and kept it alive. The U.S. seems to feel if it simply gets the parties together something might change. Unfortunately, the Israelis, by their own declarations, have made this an impossibility.
- Q, Did you ever agree that there would be a resumption of the talks following the Leeds meeting? 99
- A. No, never. Our position was clear: only if new positive elements come from the Israelis would we be willing to continue this process. We won't negotiate in a vacuum.
- Q, Do you fear that your refusal will strain your relations with Washington?
- A. Not at all. Even when they said they were disappointed by our stand, I was told by U.S. envoys Alfred Atherton and Hermann Eilts that the remark was not meant in this spirit.
 - Q, Are the chances for peace badly hurt?
- A. They are still wide open. Sadat's peace initiative has facilitated matters 90 per cent. The world knows that Egypt wants peace, and it should know that Israel wants land and peace, which is not possible. The Israelis can no longer distort our image and our intentions.
- Q. Can there be any peace as long as Prime Minister Begin remains in power?
- A. It is not for us to choose who governs Israel. We are not against him. But unless he changes his policies and ideas there will be no hope for peace.
- Q, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia recently visited President Sadat. Is Egypt looking toward mending its fences with its Arab brothers as an ultimate alternative to the collapse of the initiative?
 - A. President Sadat has always supported Arab

⁹⁷ Interview conducted by William Schmidt; partial text, Newsweek (New York-International edition), August 14, 1978, p. 56.

⁹⁸ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

⁹⁹ For a statement on the Leeds conference, delivered by US Secretary of State Vance, see doc. 136 above.

solidarity. We know that some countries chose to oppose his approach to peace; that is up to them. Our policies are made in Egypt.

- Q. Are the Saudis urging Egypt to drop the initiative or offering to pressure the U.S.?
- A. We always consider the views of our Arab friends. We know the Saudis have very close relations with the U.S. and are very keen to reach peace.
- Q. Do you think Egypt's position in the Arab world is stronger today?
- A. Our position has always been strong because the Arab peoples have always understood our aims, which are to defend Arab rights. The Arab governments that opposed us must now realize that Sadat has never budged from the Arab objectives—liberation of all Arab territories and the rights of the Palestinian people in return for security and peaceful relations with Israel. Egypt's position is stronger because nobody can pretend that Sadat is seeking a separate peace.
 - Q. Would Egypt attend an Arab summit?
- A. We have no reservations about an Arab meeting to help achieve a comprehensive and just peace settlement.
- Q. The Saudis have urged Egypt to go to Geneva within a united front. Would you?
- A. Yes. Sadat has always said we will go to Geneva if there is good preparation. There is no taboo against Geneva.
- Q. If nothing happens by October, will Egypt with-hold the mandate on the U.N. emergency forces in the Sinai?
- A. I cannot say what will happen in October. But if the Israelis care about peace, they must change their positions.

263

Press interview statements by Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon criticizing the US for not supporting the Lebanese government in its attempts to sent troops to South Lebanon 100

August 18, 1978

- Q, Could you evaluate the results of your talks with President Hafez Assad in Latakia?
- A. I can describe my talks with President Assad as being very cordial and very positive.

We discussed a number of issues pertaining to the situation in Lebanon which are of concern to both Lebanon and Syria at this stage.

We discussed both security and the political situation in the country at present and also the future prospects of both. I felt a very positive response from the Syrian officials and from their leader, President Assad. I hope that the results of our talks will emerge gradually in the future.

The emphasis of the talks was on the political situation—the political issues. Any solution will require a lot of effort before it bears fruit.

If anyone imagines that I went to Syria to bring back a magical solution, he is wrong.

I believe that the security situation, which is uppermost in everybody's mind these days, cannot be stabilized firmly and permanently unless and until it is reinforced by political stability in the country.

This has always been my approach to the problems of Lebanon and it will continue to be so. This is why a great deal of the emphasis (of the talks in Syria) was laid on the political situation and the political issues.

I think that we can reach a satisfactory solution to the political problems that have been plaguing the country for so long.

In my view, Lebanon's security unrest is, to a large extent, a symptom of the political instability that the country has been suffering from for such a long time.

I think it is high time that the political issues are resolved and the rift between the Lebanese is dealt with once and for all. I am sure that once this is achieved it will have favorable and positive

¹⁰⁰ Monday Morning (Beirut), VII, 322 (August 21–28, 1978), pp. 10–13.

implications on the security scene.

Î discussed this particular approach with President Assad, and his response was very positive, in the sense that Syria will always stand behind the Lebanese authorities. Syria will support and advocate whatever stand the Lebanese authorities adopt in this respect.

I think it is futile to continue to deal with the security aberrations and upheavals with purely military means. We have been going around in this vicious circle since the two-year war, trying to deal with a barricade here or a military position there, trying to disengage the combatants on both sides in certain spots or declaring a cease-fire and forming a coordination committee or what have you...I don't believe this is the way to get Lebanon out of its crisis.

The proper approach is to tackle the roots of the crisis. The roots are largely political and to some extent social. This is the line of action that we are now working on.

- Q. You said that your talks with President Assad were positive, but aren't there still some differences between you and the Syrian leaders?
 - A. No, the points of view are in agreement.
- Q, Will Lebanon be going to the Security Council to press for the deployment of the Army in the South?
- A. As a matter of fact, the Security Council is scheduled to meet by the middle of September to discuss the Lebanese problem.

A new resolution will have to be adopted by the Council then on the extension of UNIFIL's mandate in Lebanon.

Whether or not we call for an earlier meeting to discuss the Lebanese Army unit stalemated in the South is a matter that we are now considering.

You must realize that this problem has a lot of implications and ramifications that one would have to consider thoroughly before one takes such a step.

Though we have not yet decided whether to call for a special meeting of the Security Council, we are going to inform the president of the Council and, of course, the U.N. secretary-general of the facts of the situation.

Our final decision will depend on the results of the diplomatic contacts that we are now conducting. But as I said, we are going to ask for a Security Council meeting to discuss the UNIFIL question in mid-September anyway.

- Q, Could you brief us on the talks you will hold with the United Nations envoy Brian Urquhart?
- A. Under Security Council Resolutions 425¹⁰¹ and 426, the U.N. has to assume certain responsibilities in order to pave the way for the Lebanese authorities to regain their control of the South.

According to the text of the Security Council resolutions, the United Nations is supposed to take over the area specified for UNIFIL operations and facilitate the hand-over of that area to the Lebanese authorities.

Some of the U.N. responsibilities for obvious reasons have not yet been fulfilled.

Specifically, UNIFIL has not been able to deploy properly in the border strip, which is still under the domination of the militias supported by Israel, with a view to handing it over to the Lebanese government.

Our decision to send an Army force to the South was inspired first of all by our duty towards the South as a part of Lebanon which is dear to us all. But I should also mention that we were under continuous pressure from various countries in the world, including some of the big powers and some of the countries which are participating in UNIFIL with their own military units, and by the United Nations itself, to send an Army detachment to the South in order to make UNIFIL's job easier.

So, we sent out that detachment at the incitement of some of the countries that are participating in UNIFIL, the big powers, and the U.N. itself. We have not been able to push through, for reasons you know.

Since UNIFIL is supposed to take over and hand over the territory to us, we want to discuss with Mr. Urquhart the ways and means by which the United Nations as an organization can help us, through its diplomatic channels and through UNIFIL as a military unit, with the deployment of our forces in the southern region.

- Q, When you say "through UNIFIL as a military unit," are you saying that UNIFIL should no longer be a peacekeeping force, but a force that will take action?
- A. This is something that we will have to discuss with the United Nations.
- Q. Does the government feel let down by the United States over the Army's deployment in the South, as Foreign

¹⁰¹ Doc. 32 above.

Minister Butros intimated recently?

A. Yes, we do feel let down to a large extent, because the United States was one of the countries which encouraged us to dispatch an Army unit to the South.

The last initiative the U.S. took was in the form of a visit by Mr. Leonard, a U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and Mr. Howell, of the State Department, who came here and met with President Sarkis, Foreign Minister Butros and myself.

The two U.S. representatives stressed the urgency of dispatching an Army unit to the South. They pointed out that this step had become particularly pressing because the Security Council will soon be considering the extension of UNIFIL's mandate, and the mood in the Security Council might not be as favorable as we might wish it to be unless Lebanon establishes its presence in the South by sending a unit of its army to the region. Apparently, some of the countries participating in UNIFIL with their own military units were insisting, and some of them were alluding to the possibility of withdrawing their participation at the end of the present term unless Lebanon actively shared in UNIFIL's operation with its own army contingent.

For my part, I assured them that the government had already decided to embark on this step. President Sarkis had already agreed with President Assad in the Latakia summit to send a contingent to the South, and we had been doing all that we could to make this move possible.

I assured them that the government would undertake this step very soon, not only in fulfillment of our obligation under the Security Council resolutions, but also in recognition of our basic obligations towards the South, which is part of Lebanon.

I also discussed with Mr. Leonard and Mr. Howell the manner in which the U.S.A. could help vis-à-vis Israel, should Israel take a hostile stand. I was assured of U.S. intervention whenever necessary in order to overcome any hindrances that might arise from the side of Israel.

We had all this encouragement from the United States, as we had it from the United Nations and other countries.

Now that we are confronting this resistance from certain local groups in the border strip, supported openly by Israel, it is only natural that we should feel let down if we don't get all the support from all the countries that encouraged us to undertake that step.

Q, Is it true that it is U.S. pressure which is preventing Lebanon from seeking a Security Council meeting on South Lebanon?

A. There is no such pressure now, and there can be none in the future.

In any case, we would not bend to any kind of pressure from outside, no matter where it comes from, especially if vital national interests are at stake, as is the case with our problem now in the South.

- Q, What hopes is Lebanon pinning on the Camp David summit?
- A. We have nothing to do with the Camp David talks. We have our own problems in Lebanon and we don't think that the solution will come from Camp David or any other place in the world.

Solutions for the Lebanese problem should emanate from the Lebanese themselves and should be sought in Lebanon itself.

- Q. But the Lebanese people have a tendency to think that any move which takes place in the Middle East reflects automatically on the situation in Lebanon?
 - A. Well, this is wrong.

I cannot deny that Lebanon has to a large extent been torn by the conflicts connected with the Middle East problem, but that is mainly because the Lebanese are not yet in agreement among themselves on the basic issues that concern them. When the Lebanese do come to an agreement through a national consensus on the basic issues that confront them, particularly regarding the political future of their country, then they will have built up a minimum measure of immunity against outside influences, including any repercussions of developments related to the Middle East problem.

We cannot divorce our situation completely from the Middle East problems. No Arab country can divorce itself from the ramifications of the Middle East crisis. But this does not mean that Lebanon should pay the price for every development in the Middle East.

- Q. You have talked about national unity. What truth is there to news agency reports that a plan has been agreed upon to form a national unity government?
- A. In my view, any new cabinet that might be formed must be the outcome of a national consensus and not a prelude for it. You are certainly aware of the experience we have had: our government resigned (in April) and we could not form a new

government because of the sharp political discord in the country. As a result, we had to withdraw our resignation.

There has been no improvement in the political situation. On the contrary, it looks as though the discord has assumed new dimensions since then.

I don't think that under the present situation a new government is easy to form. A move in the direction of achieving some kind of a national consensus over at least the basic issues that cloud the political scene should precede any attempt at forming a new government.

- Q, Do you anticipate any difficulties in having the ADF's mandate renewed?
- A. The Arab Deterrent Forces came here to perform a specific role, and that is to fill in the void that was created by a breakdown of the Lebanese Army during the two-year crisis. And they are supposed to stay here until our Army is rebuilt properly and on solid foundations—until our Army regains its strength and effectiveness. Until then the Arab peacekeeping forces will be needed here.

I am sure that in due course a decision in that direction will be taken, and I am sure we will have no problems in securing the extension of the ADF's term.

- Q. When the ADF mandate is renewed, will there be any reduction in the size of these forces, as demanded by the National Liberal Party's Dany Chamoun last week?
- A. It is very unlikely that this would be the case, because the country is still badly in need of the services of the ADF.

Until our own armed forces are rebuilt properly; until they regain their full effectiveness and their ability to take over from the ADF, we will be needing the assistance of the Arab peacekeeping forces.

I think that under the circumstances it is very unlikely that we might ask for a reduction of the ADF troops.

Q, Is there a possibility of withdrawing the ADF troops from Beirut and deploying them in "back-up" positions around the capital?

This is linked to the prospect of rebuilding the Lebanese Armed Forces on solid foundations such that they would eventually be in a position to take over from the ADF on the ground.

Q. Is there a possibility of replacing Syrian troops

in East Beirut with Saudi, Sudanese and Lebanese troops?

A. Technically, I am not qualified to say anything on such matters.

It is up to the ADF command to talk it over with the command of the Lebanese Armed Forces and agree on whatever they find appropriate before anything of this sort is discussed at the political level

- Q. What is the government's position on turning Beirut into an open city?
- A. This is as yet just an idea that has been proposed by certain political leaders. But as a project it has not yet been discussed in any depth.

I don't know what to say about it at this stage. One would have to study it from all angles, find out what it means, what it implies and what enforcement measures it will require. One would have to know these things before one could pass judgment on whether it is feasible or unfeasible, desirable or undesirable.

- Q. The local press has said that the government will now move from its role of "mediator" to the role of "ruler." Could you comment on this and on the criticism that the State has been indecisive on all major issues?
- A. The State is always supposed to rule. This is not something that has just cropped up. We are supposed to have started ruling from the day that we came to office, so this is not a new development.

I agree that we in government have to take a stand with respect to the basic issues facing the country. This is especially true at the political level in order to achieve political stability which, I am sure, would have positive implications on the security situation.

We, as a government, have to take such a stand. We have to take such positions and decisions in order to put the country on the road to reconstruction and development.

A position from the government is a prerequisite for any entente, for any consensus to be achieved in the future.

This is a responsibility that we have to shoulder—that we have to face.

The fact that the government has not been able to take such a stand so far is a long story. It is something that one might discuss. I don't want to get into an apologia at this moment.

- Q, Do you have anything to say to the Lebanese people, who are quite panicky these days?
 - A. I would like to say that a lot of what has been

ARAB WORLD 489

happening in the country is our own responsibility as Lebanese.

If we want to free ourselves of this plight, it is largely within our control to do so. We can do so by our own determination. We should not always look to the outside to explain or to justify what is taking place in the country.

Our vulnerability to outside influences and pressures does not absolve us of the responsibility for our own fate, which we should take into our own hands.

Of course we are exposed to outside influences, because we feel the repercussions of any developments pertaining to the Middle East problem.

But it is up to us to build up the immunity that we need against damaging influences from the outside.

The unstable security situation in the country—which looms uppermost in everybody's mind—has its roots in the political instability. This was the case when the events first erupted in 1975. I think this was the case throughout the two-year war and it has been so since then.

I think that Lebanon is in a very peculiar situation, because the war ended without having really ended. The war ended with none of its causes eliminated. In addition to the causes which are still very much alive, we now have the consequences of the war on our hands, which are no less important or weighty than the causes of the crisis.

The fact that there is so much unrest and insecurity at this stage is very painful, but not really surprising under the circumstances, particularly since both the causes and the consequences of the crisis are now jointly at work.

The important thing to remember is that an end to this plight is within our own control. We can solve our problems by agreeing among ourselves, as Lebanese.

The major problem that faces us now is the lack of what you may call a national Lebanese will. There is no unified Lebanese determination.

If there were such a unified will or determination, we would have the kind of immunity that we require against adverse external influences.

That is why I think the proper approach to our problem is a political one. A political detente is a sure prerequisite and prelude for a security detente.

Whether we agree among ourselves or not, whether we can achieve a national consensus or

not is up to us.

Q, At this stage of the political and security game, are you optimistic or pessimistic?

A. I hate to talk in terms of optimism or pessimism.

I am hopeful. I have always been hopeful.

My very stay in office is an indication that I am hopeful.

I have great faith in our ability, as Lebanese, to resolve our own problems with our own hands.

I am sure that the Lebanese, renowned for their initiative at the economic level, will find a way to apply their initiative in finding a solution for their political ills.

264

Press interview statements by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia describing the forthcoming Camp David meeting as decisive and asserting that the Arabs can give no further concessions (excerpts)¹⁰²

Ta'if, late August, 1978

- Q. Following Your Highness' visit to Egypt, Syria Syria and Iraq, the impression has grown that a summit conference is about to be held and that the initiative of President Anwar Sadat is about to be declared a failure. However, everyone was surprised by your recent statements which supported the Camp David summit.
- A. We supported the Camp David summit in order to move the wave of optimism to the point of hope. When we supported it, there were indications that this summit would be a decisive and last meeting. Either the story would come to an end to the advantage of peace or this door would be finally closed.

The Arabs have given a lot and were flexible to the utmost degree. The time has now come for the other side to give. In our view, it is now up to the USA to be firm and decisive. As Arabs, we have no more to give than this. Therefore, in my view, the Camp David meeting will be the decisive meeting, either positively or negatively. Accordingly, and in the light of this, we supported the tripartite summit...

¹⁰² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Siyasa (Kuwait), August 23, 1978.

265

Communiqué by the PLO Central Council outlining the need for Palestinian national unity and condemning the planned Camp David summit meeting¹⁰³

Damascus, August 23, 1978

In a communiqué released following its extraordinary meeting in Damascus yesterday, the PLO Central Council, headed by the President of the Palestine National Congress, Khaled Al-Fahoum, and attended by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat, affirmed that it had discussed the issues of national unity, the latest developments enveloping the Palestinian cause, especially the forthcoming meeting at Camp David, and the armed terrorism practised by the Iraqi regime against the PLO. They agreed on the following points:

First: National Unity

The PLO Central Council, which has followed the meetings and the constructive dialogues conducted between the various factions of the Palestinian Revolution for the purpose of achieving national unity, expresses its deep satisfaction with the positive atmosphere prevailing and the serious orientation towards unity evident throughout the meetings. The PLO Central Council confirmed the importance of pursuing positive attitudes and objectively exchanging points of view during meetings, and opposing anything that will harm national unity, i.e. propaganda and mutual accusa-tions. In its effort to achieve national unity in the shortest time possible, the PLO Council decided to form a committee made up of PLO Executive Committee members, representatives of factions of the Palestinian Revolution on the highest levels, and some PLO Central Council membersthe purpose being to follow up the current dialogue on unity, and to encourage a definite approach toward it.

The PLO Central Council will hold a meeting in the third week of September in order to approve the final draft of a program for Palestinian National Unity.

Second: Political Development and Camp David

The PLO Central Council sees the forthcoming
meeting at Camp David as a further step in Sadat's

¹⁰³ Partial English text, Wafa (Beirut), August 24, 1978, pp. 1-4.

policy of giving concessions which benefit U.S. imperialism and Zionism and as a new imperialist -Zionist conspiracy against the Palestinian cause and Arab liberation in general.

The PLO Central Council stresses that the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in rejecting this summit meeting which may result in self-rule, a three-party administration, or a revival of Jordanian rule in the occupied territories, affirms that neither Sadat nor any other ruler has the right to represent the Palestinian people, talk on its behalf or attempt to squander their inalienable national rights to return to their land, determine their future and establish unconditionally their national independent state under the leadership of the PLO. The PLO Central Council moreover considers the intensification of the U.S.-Israeli-isolationist conspiracy in the Lebanese theatre against the unity of Lebanon and its people as being aimed at dealing a blow to Syria and the Palestinian Revolution as part of the current plot to impose a U.S. capitulationist settlement. The Council affirms the PLO's determination to confront the conspiracy on the Lebanese level by abiding by the agreements concluded between the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese authorities, and through consolidating the militant relationship with the national and progressive Lebanese forces and with Syria.

Third: Condemning Iraqi Terrorism

The Central Council is horrified at the terrorist activities unleashed by the Iraqi regime against the PLO, which have resulted in the martyrdom of militants Said Hamami, Ali Nasser Yasin, Ezzedine Kalak, Adnan Hammad and three martyrs at the PLO office in Islamabad. The Council condemns this cowardly conspiracy and holds the Iraqi regime nationally and historically responsible for these actions. The Council moreover calls for a halt to the criminal campaigns against the Palestinian Revolution and asks the Arab peoples to condemn and oppose such policies so as to preserve the Palestinian people and their armed Revolution.

The Council adds that the PLO, acting on the basis of its national charter and its basic principles, and in view of its endeavour to channel all Arab militant potentials against the imperialist-Zionist enemy, has always been careful to avoid marginal battles that waste its capabilities. The PLO consequently calls on all to adhere to this stand. The PLO moreover has been careful to settle differences

ARAB WORLD 491

on the basis of equality, mutual respect and adherence to the PLO's role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO consequently asks all concerned to adhere to this policy, and stresses its determination to defend itself by all means against all conspiracies whatever their sources.

In view of the danger of this current stage of Palestinian and Arab struggle, the PLO stresses the importance of consolidating national unity between all factions of the Palestinian Revolution within the PLO. It moreover stresses the outstanding and important role played by Palestinian citizens in occupied Palestine in confronting Zionist occupation, and calls on them to redouble their resistance against all conspiracies concocted by the Zionists under various guises.

The PLO Central Council stresses the importance of consolidating the militant relationship with Syria on all levels in order to jointly confront all capitulationist settlements imposed on the Arab nation.

The Council stresses the importance of consolidating and supporting the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and calls on all the Front's parties to adopt the necessary measures that will increase their effectiveness in confronting the current U.S. imperialist-Zionist conspiracy.

The Council finally stresses the PLO's firm and constant stand in consolidating relations with the Socialist bloc, especially the USSR, with the non-aligned nations and all friendly countries, in order to increase the potential of the PLO and of all Arab liberation forces and thus defeat imperialist-Zionist plots.

266

Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat declaring that the Camp David summit meeting will ignore the Palestinian people¹⁰⁴

Late August, 1978

Q, What is the situation of the Palestinian resistance in light of the latest developments and the Camp David Summit?

A. The Revolution and the whole Arab region are now living through extremely critical moments, for US and Israeli plots still seek to bypass the Palestinian movement in order to impose Israeli conditions on the region, actions which have no relation whatsoever with real efforts to bring about a just peace in the Middle East. If we consider the stands of the USA, we will notice a series of blatant retreats, from Carter's statement regarding a Palestinian homeland¹⁰⁵ and the American-Soviet Joint Communique of October 1977, 106 leading to Brzezinski's notorious declaration "Bye Bye PLO", and Carter's talk about the Palestinians sharing in determining their future (meaning that there is more than one party) which contradicts the most basic of human rights, consecrated by the UN Charter, that every people has the right to selfdetermination.

Finally, new formulae were floated such as the idea of a joint Israeli-Jordanian Administration. In addition we saw an escalation of repressive and terrorist measures in the occupied territories.

In my opinion, the Camp David Summit will convene in order to bypass the Palestine cause and ignore Palestinian rights. I do not believe that anything will come of Camp David, except some general statement with the aim of saving face; because the Summit is founded on bases that do not give the Palestinian people, under PLO leadership, anything.

- Q, Arab press sources said Jordan refused Carter's invitation to take part in the Camp David Summit. Does this imply a rapprochement between Jordan and the PLO.
- A. There was no invitation for Hussein to join the Summit, for he would not refuse. He is however under pressure from the US administration and hopes to obtain a role in this game, in order to isolate the Palestinian people and Revolution.
- Q, PLO officials and you personally have often reiterated the necessity of escalating political and military struggle to confront Begin's plans to annex more land, and his attempts to cause splits among the Palestinians under occupation. How do you assess the results in this context?
- A. Our people's response to this decision was positive and decisive, and the unity between the Palestinian people under occupation and abroad

¹⁰⁴ Interview granted to L'Unita (Rome); partial English text, Wafa (Beirut), August 31, 1978, pp. 2-6.

¹⁰⁵ Doc. 73 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹⁰⁶ Doc. 160 in ibid.

is very strong and lasting, as is proved by the number of memos sent by West Bank and Gaza Mayors to the U.N. stressing PLO representation, and by the people's steadfastness in the face of the repressive measures adopted against them by the occupation authorities. As for military work, we need do no more than refer to the statements of the Israeli leadership, which prove the success of our continuing daily operations.

- Q, What can you tell us about the PLO-Iraqi conflict and its causes?
- A. First of all I must say that most unfortunately differences between us and the present Iraqi regime began in 1970 when it took a stand in favour of King Hussein. Following that, the regime seized huge amounts of weapons, enough to arm 15,000 fighters, sent by China, in addition to other equipment. It confiscated factories which were co-owned by us and them and expelled our experts.

I consider this onslaught as part of the conspiracy against the Palestinian people, its Revolution, and against the PLO which is spearheading the confrontation against the U.S. offensive in the Arab region.

Recently, the Iraqis made some Palestinian elements in Lebanon engage in provocative clashes with UNIFIL forces. We knew that this would push us into clashes with UNIFIL, thus presenting the PLO to the world as being unable to implement its agreements. It was therefore imperative for me as commander of the Palestinian Revolution to intervene directly and order the arrest of those who instigated the clashes in South Lebanon and the Arquub region.

Some organs tried to portray this as an inter-Palestinian conflict. No doubt there are some differences, which is natural, but a distinction must be made between Palestinian differences and outside attempts to create problems in the Palestinian movement.

- Q, Palestinian national unity was discussed in the recent PLO Central Council meeting 107 held in Damascus. What has Fatah proposed in this context?
- A. Palestinian national unity was stressed in the recent meetings of the Palestinian National Congress. We know it is not easy to unify all Palestinian factions because of political differences, which

occasionally emanate from the alliance of certain factions with some Arab regimes. Therefore we are trying to reach the maximum possible level of unity, rather than complete unity, through the PLO, and we have made great progress. There are many unified organs such as the Unified Military Council, the Martyrs' institution, the Central Council and the National Congress, both of which include all factions, federations, unions and notables representing the Palestinian people, wherever they are. In this latest meeting the PLO Central Council approved the proposal presented by Fatch as the basis for national unity. A special commission was formed to follow up the developments of this issue, and many bilateral meetings between Fateh and most Palestinian factions were also conducted.

Q. Are you satisfied with the results?

A. I am satisfied with these discussions, in spite of the imperialist campaign that is exaggerating the problems and differences inside the PLO. This is part of the general manoeuvres aimed at smearing the PLO's good name.

Q. What is the PLO's and your personal evaluation of the Lebanese situation, which has been deteriorating for the past few months?

A. The situation in Lebanon concerns us since we live there and therefore are affected by what happens. We have frequently stressed that we are for the establishment, unity and Arab identity of Lebanon. Currently, there is a conspiracy to push us to the brink of conflict in which the Israelis and the Lebanese isolationists are directly involved, not to forget the manipulation of the U.S. intelligence service.

The recent incidents in Lebanon commenced when the isolationists killed Tony Franjieh and his bodyguards in Ehden. This incident was a dangerous turning point, and it refutes allegations of an aggression against Christians. Aggressions by the isolationists were continued against the Arab Deterrent Forces.

What is currently happening in the South is that the isolationists, backed by Israel, are preventing the newly formed Lebanese army from entering that area. This is an example of the isolationist-Israeli cooperation which shows clearly that Israel is the basic source of all Lebanese problems. I am alarmed that the isolationists, with support from the U.S., are further endangering the situa-

¹⁰⁷ See above document.

tion. Therefore, we demand that all progressive Arab and international forces do their utmost to stop this escalation and terminate the conspiracy against the Palestinian and Lebanese people, against the Arab nation and the unity of Lebanon.

Q. What is your opinion of international terrorism?

A. The PLO opposes and condemns these operations which we consider as wrong. There are some hostile attempts to label every such operation that happens in the world as being committed by the Palestinian people, led by the PLO. The Palestinian people, and the Palestinian Revolution's armed forces, are not involved in these terroristic activities—we are with the world liberation movements that are fighting imperialism, Zionism, racial discrimination, and fascism.

267

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Butros Ghali of Egypt stressing the importance of the Camp David summit¹⁰⁸ Cairo, September 1, 1978

Q. The Egyptians are going to meet with the Israeli leaders, while they recently stated that any new Egyptian-Israeli meeting would be useless as long as the position of the Begin government on the Middle East does not develop....

A. The considerable changes that have occurred in the general context are such as finally to bring Israel to adjust its positions. You have only to note that the status of the USA has just progressed from being that of providing its "good offices" to that of full partner in the negotiations. (It should however also be noted, because it is often forgotten, that the Americans at the time of the 1975 agreement were already a full partner as regards the supervision of the provisional demarcation lines in the Sinai.)

There has moreover been a significant "diplomatic escalation." The leader of the most powerful state on earth, President Carter, has for the first time lent all the weight of his influence to the peace process, indicating that he would devote all his time to the negotiations, as required. In 1957,

President Eisenhower obtained Israel's total withdrawal from the Sinai in next to no time.

- Q. But still, it is not for the moment a question of an American plan capable of breaking the deadlock....
- A. The Americans have spoken of "concrete and specific suggestions." It doesn't really matter if they are formulated one by one rather than being in a bloc. After all a plan is no more than the sum of a number of suggestions.
- Q. Nevertheless, what does Egypt expect from the Camp David meeting?
- A. In the course of this summit a genuine new impetus could be given to the negotiations. For that to occur we would have to recapture the same spirit at Camp David that we had at the King David [Hotel where Sadat stayed and conducted negotiations during his visit to Jerusalem—ed. note.] forgetting all that happened in between.

Camp David, while allowing us to bring our points of view closer together, will enable us to prepare for future stages in the negotiations and to maintain the peace process. At the very least, and even that is not to be sniffed at, Camp David will give us the chance once more to present our position to our partners in front of the whole world. That said, Camp David will be as important as President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Jerusalem was the point of departure, Camp David will be an arrival—to clinch the affair, or to make a new departure.

- Q, Has the Egyptian position on how to achieve a settlement in the Middle East changed at all?
- A. No, it has remained the same, reflecting our deep desire to establish peace on solid and definitive foundations. To achieve this, we must first find a solution to the Palestinian problem. Israel has to recognise the principle of Arab sovereignty over the territories occupied in 1967: the West Bank and Jerusalem, then under Jordanian mandate; Gaza, administered by Egypt at that time; the Syrian Golan, and the Egyptian Sinai. In exchange, we are entirely prepared to accord Israel all the possible and imaginable guarantees to enable her to overcome her obsession about security and become integrated into the region.
- Q. Would you go as far as to accept "minor adjustments to borders" according to the formula which the official Cairo weekly "October" has recently used?
 - A. Perhaps, on condition that these minor

¹⁰⁸ Interview conducted by J.-P. Peroncel-Hugoz, *Le Monde* (Paris), September 3-4, 1978, pp. 1-4.

adjustments are reciprocal, that they are confined to the demarcation lines between Israel and the West Bank, and, above all, on condition that the Palestinians accept them.

- Q. If the whole of the Sinai were given back to Egypt, with no Israeli settlements or bases, would you accept its being demilitarised?
 - A. Absolutely not.
- Q. Would Egypt in the present phase agree to sign permanent partial accords with Israel?
- A. No, inasmuch as they could be interpreted as being an obstacle to the global accord that we are seeking.
- Q. You no longer seem to be making the immediate evacuation of the occupied territories a precondition for negotiations
- A. The most important thing, in the immediate, is that Israel recognises the Palestinians' right to be no longer deprived of a homeland, the right to achieve the dignity of citizenship. Ever since my first meeting with my colleague Mr. Dayan in November 1977 in Jerusalem I have been trying to explain to him the major importance of the rec-ognition of this right for the achievement of an Arab-Israeli accord.
- Q. In the best of the territorial scenarios, the Palestinian state that you envisage in the West Bank and Gaza could not absorb the three million Palestinians dispersed all over the world....
- A. We can, unfortunately, have illusions: there will always be a Palestinian diaspora. But a Palestinian passport, which would have to be created when the intermediate period begins, would be even more important for the expatriate Palestinians, now actually without a homeland, than for those living on their ancestral soil.
- Q. Here we are a long way from Camp David. What concrete element going in your favour do you hope to bring back from this conference?
- A. For example, a declaration in which Israel recognised Arab sovereignty over the West Bank of the Jordan, or the power of the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination. In a word, Israel must recognise the Other, as Jean-Paul Sartre called on them to do in *Le Monde* (4–5 December 1977). Israel must emerge from its psychological ghetto, which to be sure is explained by ancient and modern history, but which is no

longer justifiable in view of the new circumstances brought about by Egypt. This is the price that has to be paid for peace, and believe me it is well worth the effort which Israel is going to have to go beyond herself to contribute.

- Q. Let us suppose that Israel gets round this corner, what happens next?
- A. Egypt's position is flexible, we are ready to continue to negotiate no matter what the formula. Nevertheless, following a satisfactory meeting at Camp David, it appears that the next stage should essentially consist in studying the modalities of implementing Palestinian self-determination and in establishing the organs for putting into practice the agreed principles of a common accord.
- Q. All that and still without Arab or Palestinian mandate?
- A. Assuredly not. Before going on with the talks we would submit the results of Camp David to our Arab colleagues in order, if possible, to enlarge the circle of negotiators (I am thinking, for example, in the first instance of the Palestinian people and Jordan), and above all in order to obtain an Arab consensus. This could be arranged through friendly states such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Morocco, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Somalia, states which have supported us since the beginning, with other Arab capitals being gradually drawn in. You know that Riyadh, with whom we are in permanent contact, supports Camp David. I would also remind you that in the framework of the Non-aligned Conference this summer in Belgrade, the twenty-two members of the Arab League, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation, adopted unanimously one motion on the Middle East¹⁰⁹ and another on the Palestinian question.110
- Q, Yes, but these motions made no allusion to President Sadat's peace initiative?
 - A. But neither did they condemn it.
- Q. What will Egypt do if Camp David fails?

 A. At the meeting of the National Security Council, which President Sadat just organised at Ismailiya, alternative strategies were examined. But why talk about a failure? We have to be optimistic. In any case Camp David is not an

¹⁰⁹ See doc. 141 above.

¹¹⁰ See doc. 139 above.

ARAB WORLD 495

end in itself. It should also be stressed that in tripartite negotiations, the combined will of two of the participants should normally prevail over that of one party alone. You should finally take into account the fact that Africa is with us, as is world public opinion and a growing number of Israelis who want peace now. China, the European Community, the Catholic Church, the Socialist International and others also support us.

- Q. Don't you think that the Jewish pressure groups in the United States, in this case, are on their own more influential than the rest of the world?
- A. Camp David should be the occasion for balancing the Jewish pressures with those of all our various supporters accross the world. American mediation or conciliation will function that much better if an equilibrium has been reached between the two big pro-Arab and pro-Israeli pressure groups.
- Q. Why is President Sadat stopping off in Paris' before Camp David? Is it to request a speeding up of military co-operation with France if the peace talks fail?
- A. Since the time of General de Gaulle France and Egypt have taken up the course of privileged relations which have spanned the last forty-five years. The French and Egyptian presidents have been in agreement over every crucial step in the peace process. Whatever the results of Camp David, we are counting on France and the West European countries to assist us in every way in our quest for peace.

268

Statement by President Sadat of Egypt commending American interest in maintaining peace in the Middle East¹¹¹

Andrews Air Force Base, September 5, 1978

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Vance, thank you for your thoughtful words and the genuine sentiments you express toward me and the Egyptian people.

As you well know, these feelings are mutual. The Egyptian people value very highly the evergrowing friendship and cooperation with the people and leadership of the United States. We are also gratified by the keen interest you are maintaining in the establishment of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East.

All along, we have held the view that this nation is the most qualified to be a full partner in the peace process. Your heritage is unique and so is your global responsibility. When you demonstrated your determination to assume such responsibility fully, you reaffirmed the faith of my people in the United States and its dedication to the cause of peace.

We come here at the crucial crossroads. The challenge is tremendous, but we have no choice except to accept the challenge. We cannot afford to fail the hopes of nations all over the world. No one has the right to block the road to peace. This is no time for manoeuvres and worn out ideas; it is time for magnanimity and reason.

I pray to God Almighty to guide us in this great endeavor and to enable us to achieve the noble goal which inspired President Carter to call for this conference. This inspiration is and shall remain a brave and gallant act of statesmanship. Together we shall proceed to build a viable structure for peace on the solid foundation of law and legitimacy. Together, we shall realize the hopes of those who believe in the supremacy of right and justice, and together we shall overcome.

269

Memorandum from UN Representative Tueni of Lebanon to the UN Security Council asserting that UNIFIL has been unable to carry out its task in South Lebanon because of Israeli opposition¹¹²

United Nations, September 5, 1978

Upon instructions of the Government of Lebanon, we have the honour to bring the following to your attention and to that of the members of the Council, reserving our right to press for a meeting if conditions are deemed such that a debate by the Council becomes necessary or useful.

1. On 31 August, the Government of Lebanon

¹¹¹ Made on arrival to attend the Camp David summit meeting and in response to a welcoming statement by US Vice President Mondale; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXVIII, 2019 (October 1978), p. 4.

¹¹² The letter was addressed to the Secretary-General. English text, UN doc. S/IL834.

was advised that UNIFIL could now establish two "liaison offices" in Marjeyoun and Bint [beil, as well as some new "UNIFIL posts" in the border area of south Lebanon. A greater "freedom of movement" was also to be arranged for UNIFIL military personnel in that same area. These, and other arrangements, were and are still being negotiated with Israeli authorities, in conjunction with the so-called "de facto Lebanese forces" operating there. If UNIFIL considers its present move as a positive step towards the full implementation of its mandate, the Government of Lebanon would raise no objection, provided no recognition is thereby entailed of a special status for the "border area" nor of the "de facto forces" and their so-called "Commanders." In the light of the above-mentioned reservations, the dispositions now made by UNIFIL should be looked upon as merely a step forward towards the full deployment of both UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army.

2. As you are undoubtedly aware, the Israeli forces, who were supposed to withdraw totally from the "border area" (sometimes called "enclave") on 13 June, have systematically refused to turn over control of the said area to UNIFIL, in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). This matter was taken up by the Secretary-General with the Government of Israel. It was brought to the attention of the Security Council, and has since been the object of extensive negotiations with all the parties concerned, but to no avail.

3. Pressed by the United Nations and by Governments of the various States concerned, particularly by some of those who had contributed to the formation and deployment of UNIFIL, the Government of Lebanon, notwithstanding the various obstacles and difficulties, started implementing resolutions 425¹¹³ and 426 (1978). Anxious to regain full control of and sovereignty over its territory, assisted by UNIFIL—as stated by the above-mentioned resolutions—the Government of Lebanon started to move units of the Lebanese Army towards the south on Monday, 31 July, and Tuesday, 1 August. The United Nations, UNIFIL, as well as the permanent members of the Security Council, were all duly informed well in advance.

4. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Government of Lebanon had consistently considered

In the light of this attitude, and prior to the movement of fresh units of the Lebanese Army to the south, another meeting of ILMAC was requested and held at Naqura on 30 July 1978 at 10:20 hours, during which Israel was informed of what was happening in accordance with the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and within the framework of resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

5. The difficulties that have been encountered by the Lebanese Army detachment in its movement to the south have since been brought to the attention of the United Nations through various channels, and particularly the UNIFIL command and the Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Missions in the Middle East, as well as United Nations representatives in Beirut. Due to the heavy shelling to which the Army was subjected in Kawkaba (a position controlled by UNIFIL) on 1 August, with the ensuing casualties and heavy risks encountered, it was decided to discontinue movement as previously planned towards Tibnine, pending further arrangement through UNIFIL. It appears to us, as it was clearly apparent to all concerned, that Israel was actively opposing the deployment of both the Lebasese Army and UNIFIL, by military, political, as well as diplomatic action. Various pretexts have been evoked by Israel, all legally and politically unacceptable to the international community as well as to the Lebanese Government.

6. Since then, and particularly since 18 August, extensive consultations and negotiations have taken place with a view to finding the appropriate means of ensuring not only the further deployment of the Lebanese Army but also, and more particularly, the unhindered deployment of UNIFIL in the "border area." The Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Brian Urquhart, as well as General Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Missions in the Middle East, have come to Beirut more than once within this framework. During these consultations, the Government of Lebanon has stated unequivocally the following positions:

[—]as consigned in the report of the Secretary-General of 13 June (S/12620/Add.5)—"that all border problems shall henceforth be discussed with UNIFIL and in the framework of a reactivated Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission." A meeting of this commission (ILMAC) had been held, as reported in S/12620/Add.5, on 12 June.

¹¹³ Doc. 32 above.

ARAB WORLD 497

A. That UNIFIL has not, as yet, been enabled to entirely fulfil its mandate by deploying fully into the border area, thereby guaranteeing the "strict respect" of Lebanese sovereignty.

B. That Lebanon has required and is again requiring that UNIFIL should find it possible to "assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area," according to paragraph 3 of resolution 425 (1978) and the dispositions of the report of the Secretary-General confirmed and approved by resolution 426 (1978).

C. That the Government of Lebanon considers that orders issued to Major Saad Haddad and Major Sami Chidiac having not been obeyed, the Commanders of the so-called "de facto Lebanese Forces" are now to be considered as having no further quality or authority whatsoever to act on behalf of the Lebanese Army, to negotiate with the United Nations, or to exercise any legal command in the area.

- 7. As the Mandate of UNIFIL nears expiration this month, the Government of Lebanon wishes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the initial six months have not been and may not be sufficient for the fulfilment of the objectives set in resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). Yet, it being in the interest of all parties concerned to seek the speediest and most effective modes of action, the Government of Lebanon considers it necessary that the Council should now assess the future possibilities of UNIFIL, its ability to achieve its objectives within the framework of its present terms of reference, and the possibility of seeking a redefinition of its mandate to ensure the full implementation of resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), and particularly the first paragraph of resolution 425 which clearly states that the Security Council "calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries".
- 8. The Government of Lebanon, while bringing this whole matter to your attention, leaves it, at present, entirely at your discretion to undertake whatever action you may judge befitting. It is, however, wished that this letter should be distributed as a document of the Security Council, and made available wherever necessary or useful.
- 9. In conclusion, the Government of Lebanon wishes to take this opportunity to express particular gratitude to all those who have brought assistance

and support to us in the very difficult and tragic days in which we are living, more specifically to His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to his assistants, to the commanders, officers, and soldiers of the United Nations Forces, to the members of the Security Council, and to the Governments of States which have contributed troops and assistance to UNIFIL. Their various efforts and the efforts of their representatives in the field, at United Nations Headquarters, in their respective capitals, in Beirut and in other capitals concerned have all been a tremendous contribution to the cause of international peace and security.

270

Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria criticising President Sadat's peace initiative and the Camp David meeting, and reaffirming that peace can only be discussed on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338¹¹⁴

Bonn, early September 1978

- Q. Mr. President, you have described the Camp David summit meeting on the Near East as a "trap for the Arab nation." What do you mean by that?
- A. Right from the beginning Sadat's course was misguided. His visit to Jerusalem¹¹⁵ brought a short period of confusion to the region. However, it did not bring any lasting positive results. It did not bring peace, because the achievement of peace requires definite rules.
 - Q. What rules?
- A. Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and the realisation of the rights of the Palestinian people. No people in the world would accept peace while a part of their country was under occupation.
- Q. But Sadat has stated quite clearly that he wants to obtain both Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and the realisation of the rights of the Palestinians.

^{Translated from the German text of the interview granted to} *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), September 11, 1978, pp. 129–141.
November 20–22, 1977.

- A. Neither of these things are Sadat's exclusive concern, and consequently he cannot decide these issues on his own. They can only be decided through joint Arab action. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was not a step towards peace, rather it was a step in the direction of war.
- Q. We find that difficult to understand. Sadat came to make peace.
- A. He has fortunately not yet managed to conclude a separate treaty. Still, that is one thing; peace is something quite different.
- Q. But a separate agreement would still constitute a peace, even if it was just between Egypt and Israel.
- A. Such a separate treaty would not last long. Having started off on the wrong track, he can only remain on the wrong track. Sadat may be able to obtain some declaration of principle formulated by himself, but it will be of no use. The UN resolutions are laid out in the clearest possible terms and they have been no help.
- Q. Still, the USA would stand behind such a declaration of principle.
- A. Quite possibly, but that would only complicate the situation further.
 - Q. How?
- A. Even if the USA pledged to stand firm on a number of issues, we could not ignore the Zionist influence in the USA. The US president cannot accomplish anything; with the best will in the world Carter cannot prevail over the Zionists.
- Q. Let us suppose that Carter does manage to achieve something.
- A. The Arabs can accept no compromises over territory because any such compromises would be unjust. I am not prepared to share the Golan Heights with the Israelis and put them down as part of a compromise deal. And then, how can I make compromises with the Israelis over the rights of the Palestinians without the consent of the Palestinians themselves? How is Sadat going to justify dividing the Sinai with Israel and offering that as a compromise? Compromises are the most Sadat can achieve in America.
 - Q. What do you understand by unjust compromises?
- A. If Sadat and Begin make peace it will be a peace loaded in favour of the Israelis and against the Arabs. And if he does not even achieve that, it will be nothing more than declarations of prin-

ciple which are not binding.

- Q. Sadat's initiative has still got some attraction for the hardline fronts, it is the first really constructive Arab contribution to a solution of the problem of the Near East.
- A. In my opinion, exactly the opposite is the case. What Sadat has done is unprecedented in history. Sadat was under no pressure to go to Jerusalem. Through his visit he has tilted the balance of power in this region in Israel's favour.
- Q. However, there are examples in history of statesmen going over to their enemies to make peace.
- A. Of course there are. But these statesmen have always been condemned and denounced by their people.
 - Q. Would you still condemn Sadat if he succeeded?
- A. For me there is no way I will be able to look on Sadat as a heroic figure.
- Q. We all saw on television how the Egyptian people greeted their Sadat as a hero after his return from Jerusalem. That means that the Egyptians are standing behind their president.
- A. I am not of that opinion, but I am not going to complain about it. As an Arab citizen, I can say that all Arabs, including the Egyptian people, were against Sadat's initiative.
- Q. You spoke with Sadat before his Jerusalem visit. What did you say to him?
- A. I warned him not to undertake this visit because from that moment on it was doomed to failure. In order to achieve peace certain points must be taken into consideration. One Arab state on its own cannot conclude this peace. It must be a peace obtained through joint Arab efforts.
- Q, But the Arabs were so divided as to not be ready for peace. So Sadat had no alternative but to go it alone.
- A. Sadat can only obtain a peace which is binding for him alone.
- Q. Nevertheless, he has managed to gain more sympathy in the world for the Arabs than they enjoyed before.
- A. On the contrary, the West is better disposed towards Israel than before. You only need to look at the Israelis' visits to the EEC countries which paid off significant dividends for them. The West also now has more sympathy for Israel than before. That is one of the fruits of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

- Q, But isn't the real significance of these visits that the Israelis are on the defensive and have to clarify their policies?
- A. You can look at it in an entirely different way. The Europeans' feelings for Israel are more warm now than they were before. I still hope that this will not work out.
- Q. Public opinion polls in the USA show that the Arabs have gained a lot of popularity following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.
- A. That depends on whether they viewed Sadat's peace as a genuine peace, which it isn't. People believed that Sadat needed to do no more than sign a piece of paper for peace to be achieved. If we were to make compromises in the Sinai or on the Golan Heights people would believe that peace was just round the corner. The reality, however, is quite different.
- Q, The Israelis themselves have become divided over Sadat's initiative. A body of opposition has now emerged against Begin's hard line.
- A. What does the Israeli opposition understand by peace? There is no essential difference between their position and Begin's. The opposition has fully accepted Begin's hard line before the Camp David summit.
- Q. We don't mean so much the parliamentary opposition as the opposition of individuals, for example the Defence Minister Weizman. Under the influence of Sadat's initiative he has been transformed from a hawk to a dove. That at least is positive.
- A. Weizman was a hawk and he always will be a hawk, even if he touts himself as a dove. If Weizman, with the positions that he adopts, passes for a dove, what then is a hawk?
- Q. All the efforts to produce a solution to the Middle East conflict had failed. Didn't Sadat have to undertake his visit in order to break the deadlock.
- A. There are the UN resolutions. We had all tried to find a way to realise these resolutions by means of the Geneva Conference. It was only a question of finding the right way and making the right formulas. I don't deny that there were difficulties, but they were not insoluble. Then came Sadat's visit to Jerusalem which divided the Arabs. In all the towns and villages of Syria, as in other Arab countries, there were demonstrations against Sadat's initiative. Even in places where there were no demonstrations, the people were against Sadat's

initiative. We must bear this in mind.

- Q. What then is your alternative to Sadat's attempt?
- A. We want peace, but through the implementation of UN resolutions 242,¹¹⁶ 338¹¹⁷ and others.
- Q. However, your colleagues Iraq and Libya are both opposed to UN resolution 242.
- A. Neither of them need to recognise the resolutions. We were working in the direction of the UN resolutions, and all the Arabs supported Syria and Egypt in this.
- Q. UN resolution 242 was difficult to carry through because it was subject to various interpretations. But let us suppose that Israel were prepared to withdraw to the 1967 borders, would Syria then sign a peace treaty with Israel?
- A. For peace to be realised, three elements must be present: complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967; recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, and the ending of the state of war. Once the state of war has been ended, peace will automatically ensue.
- Q. Many Israelis argue that the 1967 boundaries do not constitute secure borders for them.
- A. What are secure borders? Geographically there can be no secure borders. In 1967 we were on the Golan Heights and Egypt was in the Sinai. Nevertheless, the Israelis stormed the Golan and took the Sinai. In 1973 we stormed the Golan Heights and were pushing on as far as the Jordan, in spite of the fact that the Israelis were on the Heights and had dug themselves in there for good. The same goes for the Suez Canal, which the Israelis considered to be their most secure border, but which the Egyptians overran.
- Q. Still, if Israel were to withdraw to the 1967 borders would you sign a peace treaty?
- A. It is not just a question of technicalities. We are prepared to go over to a state of peace. But it would not be logical to expect the Arabs to love Israel. A condition of peace is one thing, loving one another is something quite different.
- Q. But you do not necessarily have to love your neighbour. Are you prepared to recognise him?
- A. If the state of war is ended, peace will inevitably follow. Any time that I sign a peace treaty

¹¹⁶ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹¹⁷ Doc. 34 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

there will be peace. With me there can be no half measures. We have been in a state of war with Israel for 30 years. When the state of war comes to an end, peace will reign. That is our wish.

- Q. If the state of war between Syria and Israel comes to an end, will Syria then open diplomatic relations with Israel?
- A. Diplomatic relations have nothing to do with peace. There are some Arab states which have no diplomatic relations with us, but still we are at peace with them and enjoy brotherly relations. I repeat, peace treaties have nothing to do with diplomatic relations. Israel is demanding something which has no significance.
- Q, Mr. President, can we envisage a Palestinian state established in just the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip?
- A. That is a matter for the Palestinians to decide and in which I do not wish to interfere. The PLO is the only body entitled to speak on such things. However, in general terms I can say that the Palestinian people aspire to a state which could be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with some kind of a link between them. On that a consensus could be obtained. But unfortunately I must stress that Israel has other ideas, and acts accordingly. For Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are inalienable parts of Israel, and they even call the West Bank of the River Jordan, Judea and Samaria.
- Q. Granted that the majority of the Palestinians are in favour of a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, would Syria accept that as well?
- A. We are agreed on this point, but the final decision remains in the hands of the PLO.
- Q, What is your view of Palestinian operations undertaken outside Israel and the occupied territories—in particular, aircraft hi-jackings and bomb attacks?
- A. Neither the PLO nor the Palestinian people should be judged on the basis of individual actions. The majority of the Palestinian groupings disapprove of such actions. It is difficult to say to a dispersed people: "We are withdrawing our support from you because some of you have committed bomb attacks and hi-jacked aeroplanes." However, one thing is quite clear: We are against aircraft hi-jackings. Nevertheless, one hi-jacking is not going to diminish my sympathy with the Palestinians.

- Q. Many people are calling on the Palestinians to carry on their struggle exclusively on the political level.
- A. I am in no position to recommend that they lay down their weapons. Israel has fought against the Palestinians with weapons and through political means. There are some, however, who want nothing to do with the political approach and want to pursue armed struggle and nothing else. That is obviously wrong.
- Q. As the Camp David summit approaches, the fighting between Syrian troops in Lebanon and the Christian militia has intensified. Do you want to exploit the situation because just now Israel cannot come to the help of the Christians? Or do you want to provoke the Israelis, and thereby foil Camp David?
- A. Neither supposition is correct. Firstly, the fighting began before there had even been any talk of Camp David. Secondly, Syria was not the one who started the fighting. I can say quite objectively that there is a misunderstanding here. We are not acting as a party in Lebanon. Those who instigated the fighting want to divert attention away from Camp David.
 - Q. Who are "those"?
- A. I mean Israel and her associates, for they have an interest in diverting the attention of the Arabs away from Camp David. Those who are fighting against the Arab peace-keeping forces in Lebanon consist of two parties—the Phalangists and the National Liberal Party. If we were seriously to set about dealing with them, we would be finished with them in 24 hours. Israel is making use of the opportunity to profit from the situation. Israel is bringing the two parties against us.
- Q. What kind of a Lebanon would you wish to have as a neighbour, an independent state or a vassal?
- A. The only thing that I want is that Lebanon should be able to live as a state in security and peace. Its institutions must begin to function again, and the bloodshed must cease. I am not interested in whether Lebanon is pro-Western or pro-Eastern. We marched into Lebanon because the women and children, yes even those of the militia, asked us to. Right from the start we made it quite clear that we could not stand idly by while the Lebanese hacked each other to pieces. We ended the civil war, despite the fact that other states wanted to intervene against us.

- Q. Don't many Syrians dream of a Greater Syria which would incorporate Lebanon?
- A. We are in fact for a unified Arab nation. The Federal Republic of Germany is itself made up of a number of different lands. Is it not the right of every nation to realise its unity? It is our right as Arabs to unite the divided Arab nation. However, what is going on in Lebanon has nothing to do with Arab unity. We did not march into Lebanon in order to set up a Greater Syria, but because the government authorities asked us to. It was solely for humanitarian reasons that we ended the strife in Lebanon.
 - Q. When will Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon?
- A. That does not depend on us, it depends on the legitimate authorities of Lebanon. If they say: "Thank you very much," and the various Lebanese groups come together to get their state going again, then we will withdraw. Our presence in Lebanon is a burden for us, it demands constant sacrifice. Those who are fighting us are not the Lebanese people, not even the Christians, rather they are elements of the Maronite community.
- Q. But Syrian units in one village in North Lebanon killed a number of innocent people. Aren't the fears of the Christians with regard to the Syrian troops justified?
- A. All of the Maronites in North Lebanon are against the Phalangists, as are the Maronites of the Beqa'a valley, the majority of the remainder, the Muslims and other communities. After the incident there the population were of one accord that they would no longer harbour any Phalangists.
- Q. But the Christians view the Phalangists as their protectors.
- A. That is not true. The majority of the Christians consider the Phalangists to be terrorists. If the majority of the Maronites wanted us to go, then we would go. But if everyone is demanding that we stay what are we to do? Recently the Lebanese foreign minister was with me and he asked me in desperation "What can we do?" I said to him: "The decision lies solely in your hands. My troops are under your command. Are you only going to shoot back or are you going to go through the region with a fine comb. You alone must decide." His response was silence.
- Q. Your Foreign Minister was recently in Moscow; how can the Soviets help you?
 - A. The Soviet Union supports the Arabs mil-

itarily and politically. That is nothing new. The Soviet Union is of the opinion that what is occurring at the moment does not serve the cause of peace, and this includes Camp David.

- Q. Can the Soviet Union, in your opinion, bring pressure to bear on Israel, and if they can, how?
- A. The solution of the problem does not depend so heavily on the superpowers. On this point too we differ with Sadat, who maintains that the USA hold 99% of the cards. If this indeed were so, what would we do? In the first instance the solution depends on us, not on others. No doubt the Soviet Union can be of some assistance, and she already is. The Soviet Union plays an important role in the peace process.
- Q, Is it true that the Soviet Union gives you all the weapons that you want.
- A. It is true that the Soviet Union gives Syria military support. It would be more satisfactory if she supported Syria to the degree that we would like and in line with our demands, in other words, if she delivered everything that Syria ordered.
- Q, If the Soviets don't meet your wishes, might you then perhaps buy the arms you lack from the Federal Republic?
- A. [laughs] Does the Federal Republic envisage fulfilling these wishes of mine? In any case I have no intention of bringing up this problem with the West German government, and I can't envisage your government wanting to discuss the subject with me.
- Q. This is your first visit to the Federal Republic. What do you expect from the West German government? Can it play a role in the Middle East?
- A. We will exchange views on the situation in the Near East. We would like West Germany and Europe to play a role in the peace process. Both of them have made declarations on the Near East, but we would like them to play a more important role.
 - Q. In tangible terms, what should this be?
- A. It is not for me to prescribe what other states should do. The Germans and the Europeans have ways and means to accelerate the peace process. What they do, however, is up to them.
 - Q. Mr. President, we thank you for this interview.

271

Statement by President Sadat of Egypt made in an exchange of remarks with Prime Minister Begin and President Carter at the signing of the Camp David agreements¹¹⁸

Washington, September 17, 1978

Dear President Carter, in this historic moment, I would like to express to you my heart-felt congratulations and appreciation. For long days and nights, you devoted your time and energy to the pursuit of peace. You have been most courageous when you took the gigantic step of convening this meeting. The challenge was great, and the risks were high, but so was your determination.

You made a commitment to be a full partner in the peace process. I'm happy to say that you have honored your commitment.

The signing of the framework for the comprehensive peace settlement has a significance far beyond the event. It signals the emergence of a new peace initiative with the American nation in the heart of the entire process.

In the weeks ahead, important decisions have to be made if we are to proceed on the road to peace. We have to reaffirm the faith of the Palestinian people in the ideal of peace.

The continuation of your active role is indispensable. We need your help and the support of the American people. Let me seize this opportunity to thank each and every American for his genuine interest in the cause of people in the Middle East.

Dear friend, we came to Camp David with all the good will and faith we possessed, and we left Camp David a few minutes ago with a renewed sense of hope and inspiration. We are looking forward to the days ahead with an added determination to pursue the noble goal of peace.

Your able assistants spared no effort to bring out this happy conclusion. We appreciate this spirit and dedication. Our hosts at Camp David and the State of Maryland were most generous and hospitable. To each one of them and to all those who are watching this great event, I say thank you.

Let us join in a prayer to God Almighty to guide our path. Let us pledge to make the spirit of Camp David a new chapter in the history of our nations.

272

Letter from President Sadat of Egypt to US President Carter reaffirming Egypt's position on Israeli settlements in the Sinai¹¹⁹ September 17, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements:

- 1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.
- 2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.
- 3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "Framework" shall be void and invalid.

Sincerely, (signed) Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

His Excellency JIMMY CARTER

President of the United States

¹¹⁸ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Summit, September 1978, p. 4. For the statements of President Carter and Prime Minister Begin on the same occasion, see docs. 151 and 152 above. The agreements are published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

¹¹⁹ US Department of State publication 8954, The Camp David Summit, September 1978. This letter is one of ten exchanged by participants to the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs. 155, 156, 164–167, 176, above and 273 and 274 below. For the Camp David agreements see docs. 153 and 154 above.

ARAB WORLD 503

273

Letter from President Sadat of Egypt to US President Carter announcing his intention of assuming the Arab role in the negotiations on the West Bank¹²⁰

September 17, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people.

Sincerely, (signed) Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

His Excellency JIMMY CARTER

President of the United States

274

Letter from President Sadat of Egypt to US President Carter stating his position regarding the status of Jerusalem¹²¹

September 17, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem. 1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the City must be respected and restored.

2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sover-eignty.

- 3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian people in the West Bank.
- 4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the City are null and void and should be rescinded.
- 5. All peoples must have free access to the City and enjoy the free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.
- 6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.
- 7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the City shall be undivided.

Sincerely, (signed) Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

His Excellency JIMMY CARTER

President of the United States

275

Statement by the PLO Executive Committee considering the Camp David agreements as a total surrender on the part of Egypt of Palestinian and Arab rights and calling on the Palestinian people to express their utter rejection of the agreements¹²²

Beirut, September 18, 1978

Masses of the Palestinian people, Masses of the Arab nation,

The Camp David meeting has ended in an agreement that constitutes one of the gravest stages in the hostile conspiracy since 1948; it is what

¹²⁰ US Department of State publication 8954, *The Camp David Summit, September 1978*. This letter is one of ten exchanged by participants to the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs. 155, 156, 164–167, 176, and 272 above, and 274 below. For the Camp David agreements see docs. 153 and 154 above.

¹²¹ US Department of State publication 8954, *The Camp David Summit, September 1978*. This letter is one of ten exchanged by participants to the Camp David conference. The other nine letters are published as docs. 155, 156, 164–167, 272, and 273 above. For the Camp David agreements see docs. 153 and 154 above.

¹²² Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), September 19, 1978, p. 5.

Zionism and American imperialism have been seeking for thirty years.

Sadat has given them this agreement by his acceptance of all their conditions for the liquidation of the cause of Palestine and the Arabs.

After an emergency meeting called by the Executive Committee, which was attended by representatives of all factions of the resistance, the PLO affirms the following:

I. The Camp David agreements amount to full surrender by Sadat to the proposal put forward by Begin in his speech in the Knesset¹²³ during Sadat's treasonable visit, and at the Ismailiya meeting.¹²⁴ In this proposal the Zionist enemy affirms his insistence on consolidating his occupation of the Palestinian territories, the Golan and parts of Sinai, and on the Arabs renouncing Jerusalem, which has always been a sacred symbol for the Arab nation and for all Muslims and Christians in the world.

II. The agreement discloses how fully Sadat is acting in collusion with the Zionists in their determination to ignore all Palestinian national rights and in their preparations for the destruction of the cause of Palestine, its land, its people and its revolution, under the supervision and in accordance with the planning of American imperialism.

III. This agreement is the last step in the advance towards surrender by Sadat's regime, which is now abandoning Egypt's honour and part of her territory and permitting the enemy to raise his flag over her land that is so dear to us. It is an insult to the martyrs of the people and the army of Egypt who laid down their lives so that the Arab flag might fly over Jerusalem, Sinai and the Golan. We call on the great people of Egypt, who have never for a moment renounced their national honour, the independence of their country, the rights of the people of Palestine or Arab national rights, to be animated by their national honour and to resist the conspiracy that threatens their nation.

IV. By concluding this agreement, Sadat is achieving the goals of the old American conspiracy, that failed at the time of the Baghdad Pact and in the 1956 aggressions, and declaring his readiness to join an Egyptian-Israeli-American pact to subject

the area to American hegemony and to liquidate the positions held by the movement for liberation and progress of our nation and of all struggling peoples in Africa and the Middle East.

V. By signing this agreement Sadat's regime is realising imperialism's well-known objective of isolating Egypt completely from the Arab national struggle and invalidating all the Arab resolutions adopted by the Algiers and Rabat summits, the resolutions of the international community as adopted by the UN General Assembly and the resolutions of the conference of the non-aligned, African, Islamic and friendly countries.

VI. Sadat's self-government proposal endorses the Zionist enemy's aims of turning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into a colony under permanent occupation, and tries to bring in Jordan as a party to the scheme and as a security instrument for the repression of the Palestinian people to ensure the permanence of this occupation.

The Camp David agreement clearly discloses Sadat's surrender to the Zionist enemy's stand on Jerusalem and his submission to the plan for its total annexation by the enemy. The talk about suspending the building of new settlements is only a manoeuvre aimed at consolidating the existing settlements and permitting the implementation of Begin's plan for expanding these settlements and increasing the numbers of their inhabitants during the next five years, in preparation for the imposition of a fait accompli and continued occupation.

VII. The PLO affirms the determination of our people to confront and thwart this conspiracy. Our people, who are now united under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative, once again affirm that they cannot bargain over or come to terms with any liquidationist project such as self-government or any other project directed against their firmly established and inalienable right to full national independence, and to return to their homeland and build their independent state. Four million Palestinians, supported by all honourable Arab nationalist forces, cannot agree that the destiny of the Palestinian people and the cause of the Arab nation should be decided within the framework of the Camp David treason, and Sadat and his allies cannot impose their will on our great people and our intrepid nation.

In stating its utter rejection of the consequences of the Camp David agreement, the PLO calls on

¹²³ Doc. 181 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹²⁴ See docs, 199 and 200 in ibid.

the masses of the Palestinian people to declare their anger and their resolute resistance to this conspiracy. We call on our people in the occupied territory and all parts of the diaspora to call a general strike on Wednesday, September 20, 1978, as an expression of their inflexible will and their support for their revolution, and to organise marches and popular demonstrations against the conspiracy and its advocates and the forces that are acting in collusion with it.

The Palestinian revolution warns all suspect parties that are trying to find a place for themselves in the self-government conspiracy and that declare their support for the Camp David conspiracy, that they will have to face the will of our people and their just retaliation.

The nationalist Arab forces and regimes should, in this dangerous situation, pursue a serious and energetic policy of confrontation of the conspiracy. This can only be achieved through the military, economic and political resources and the capabilities of the masses being employed to protect the Arab liberation movement from the plan that is being drawn up by this hostile alliance to destroy and liquidate it. We affirm that the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front will, at its next conference, bear the greatest responsibility in this field, and will be put to the test in the eyes of the Palestinian and Arab masses.

The Palestinian revolution draws attention to the dangers of the Zionist-isolationist plan in Lebanon that will try to exploit the results of the liquidationist Camp David agreement to escalate their aggression against the Lebanese nationalist forces, the Palestinian revolution and Syria. This requires more than ever before the consolidation of unity and solidarity between all the forces opposed to this project and greater determination to coordinate and integrate all resources so as to enable the people of Lebanon to defeat the plan whose target is their destiny and that of the whole of their homeland.

The coming stage is fraught with dangers to the whole of our area, its peoples and its liberation movement. The Palestinian revolution, which has honourably and intrepidly faced up to its responsibilities, hereby calls on all forces concerned for the future and the national honour of this nation to rise up and resist a conspiracy that has seized its soil and all that is most sacred to it, and to confront it unceasingly until the American-Israeli-Sadat scheme is utterly routed.

276

Statement by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine calling on the Egyptian people to overthrow their regime and asserting that a long-term people's war is the only way to liberate the whole of Palestine¹²⁵ September 19, 1978

Masses of the Arab nation, Masses of the Palestinian Arab people, Sons of our revolution,

The Camp David agreements signed by the traitor Sadat with the Zionist enemy prove that the settlement which imperialism, Zionism and reaction are seeking to impose on the area can only be a treasonable settlement that fundamentally prejudices the interests of the Arab masses and the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The results of Camp David are the consequence of the course of settlement that the capitulationists have been pursuing since the end of the October War, under the auspices of resolution 242, as a stage on the road towards the achievement of goals of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary enemies of the Arab nation.

Since the end of the October War, imperialism has been striving, through its reactionary allies, to achieve two principal goals:

To force recognition of the Zionist entity and to consolidate that entity in the area through dealings with it at the official Arab level, and to impose imperialist economic, political and geographical hegemony on the whole area.

The course outlined by the capitulationists under the auspices of resolution 242¹²⁶ was bound to lead to their total submission to the terms of the Zionist-imperialist enemy.

Sadat has committed an abominable crime against the Arab masses in Egypt, Palestine and the greater homeland. It involves:

- 1. The waiving of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people;
- 2. Abject surrender to imperialism and Zionism and submission to their economic and political hegemony;
 - 3. Determination to take part in the destruction

¹²⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Thawra Mustamirra (Beirut), no. 75, September 23, 1978, p. 8.

¹²⁶ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

of the Arab liberation movement in implementation of the imperialist-Zionist schemes for liquidation;

4. An agreement used by imperialism as a tool against liberation movements in the African continent, to suppress the African national liberation movements.

The act of treason committed by Sadat at Camp David constitutes an outstanding stage on the road to surrender that he has travelled since the end of the October War. This can only be confronted by rejection of the settlement through mobilising the energies of the masses in an attempt to redress the balance of forces through a long-term people's war for the liberation of the whole of Palestine. Arab masses.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which has dug the trench of rejecting settlements ever since the end of the October War, calls on you to rise up against treason and surrender.

It calls on the Arab masses of Egypt to revolt and smash the subervient regime that is guilty of high treason against Egypt, Palestine and all the great Arab homeland.

It calls on the Arab masses of Palestine to rise up against any attempt to bargain or withdraw and to make every effort to close their ranks so that they may continue to fight the long-term battle, the battle of Palestine.

It calls on the masses of the Arab nation to declare their rejection of any step involving treason and to eliminate all who are seduced into joining or supporting Sadat, or even into keeping silence about his treachery.

.

277

Press statement by Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon pointing to the necessity for Arab solidarity to confront any developments that might occur as a consequence of the Camp David agreements (excerpt)¹²⁷

Beirut, September 19, 1978

Lebanon's attitude to the Middle East crisis has always been and still is based on her commitment to the principle of maintaining Arab solidarity, in particular as regards the necessity on which all are agreed for full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to their land.

Today, in the light of the results of the Camp David conference, we are faced with many questions: What gains have the Arabs succeeded in achieving or can they now achieve outside the framework of Arab solidarity? What effects can the results of the conference have on the course of Arab solidarity today or in the foreseeable future? Especially as in practice the results of the conference ignore essential forces on the stage of the Middle East conflict. And what benefits can the Arab world, including Lebanon, expect to reap from the results of the conference inasmuch as the conference did not apply itself to the problem of a people who have been evicted from their homeland—the Palestinian people, who will accept no alternative other than to return to their land and their homeland?

We have always called for solidarity between the Lebanese so that we may protect ourselves from the negative aspects of such external developments as may take place in connection with the Middle East crisis. But today, more than ever we need such solidarity for the confrontation of developments that may take place in the Middle East in the wake of the conference. Lebanon will assuredly maintain its contacts at the Arab and international levels with a view to assessing consequences and reactions, and taking the necessary steps and measures.

278

Statement by the Saudi Council of Ministers considering that the Camp David formula will not lead to peace since it ignores certain crucial points of issue¹²⁸

Riyad, September 19, 1978

The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia examined with great care the results of the Camp David conference and followed attentively the international and Arab reactions that ensued.

¹²⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Safir (Beirut), September 20, 1978.

¹²⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Riyad (Riyad), September 20. 1978.

These latter varied from support to rejection. The Saudi government, in conformity with its genuine Islamic and Arab principles and with its commitment to the resolutions of the Arab summits, especially the Algiers and Rabat summits, wishes to clarify to Arab public opinion its stand as regards current events, as follows:

- 1. The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while appreciating the efforts made by US President Jimmy Carter before and during that conference, believes that what has been arrived at in the Camp David meeting cannot be considered a final and acceptable formula for peace. This is because the conference did not make absolutely clear Israel's intention to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied by force, chiefly the holy city of Jerusalem. Nor did it specify the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of their state on the soil of their homeland. Furthermore, it ignored the role of the PLO which Arab summits have specifically designated as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people who were driven into exile by Israel.
- 2. The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, despite the reservations expressed above regarding the results of the Camp David conference, does not permit itself to interfere in the private affairs of any Arab country nor to dispute that country's right to recover its occupied territory through armed conflict or peaceful means, so long as this does not conflict with higher Arab interests.
- 3. The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that the current critical period through which the Arab nation is passing requires, more than ever before, that ranks and views be united and a collective Arab policy be formulated so that higher objectives may be realized. We ask of God that He fulfill the aspirations of the Islamic and Arab nations, guide their footsteps and grant them honour and victory.

279

Statement by the government of Jordan stressing that Jordan has no legal or moral obligations under the Camp David agreements and that any final solution must specify the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (excerpt)¹²⁹

Amman, September 19, 1978

The government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan has conducted a preliminary study of the many documents arising from and issued by the Camp David conference.

The Jordanian government, which was not a party to the said conference, wishes to set forth once again the principles that will determine Jordan's attitude in its assessment of all the results of the Camp David conference and in the decisions and attitudes it takes in the light of that assessment.

I—Jordan, which is mentioned in numerous passages in the Camp David documents, has no legal or moral obligations as regards matters it played no part in discussing, formulating or approving.

II—Jordan believes in a just and comprehensive solution dealing with all aspects of the problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict deriving therefrom. It believes that the withdrawal of any Arab party from its responsibility for collective action to achieve a comprehensive solution that includes the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people over Palestinian territory and unimpaired Arab rights on all fronts, can only weaken the Arab position and reduce the chances of reaching the desired just and comprehensive solution.

III—Any final solution must guarantee Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, including Gaza and the West Bank, and more especially the restoration of Arab sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem which, along with the other Arab territories, was occupied in 1967. Similarly, any just and final settlement must clearly specify the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in full freedom and within the framework of a comprehensive peaceful settlement that ensures the security and peace of all parties.

¹²⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Rai (Amman), September 20, 1978.

IV—The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, which regards the Palestinian people as the principal and undisputed party to a final settlement of the Palestine problem, never relaxes in its efforts or hesitates to exercise its responsibility and to perform its role vis-à-vis the cause of peace in the area and the defence and protection of the rights of the Palestinian people. In conformity with this unvarying policy, Jordan will make extensive and comprehensive contacts at the Arab and foreign levels, to investigate facts and attitudes and to assess the situation in preparation for formulating the best ways and means of serving the Palestinian cause, Arab rights and the cause of a just peace in the coming stages, within the framework of the principles to which Jordan and its people are committed.

280

Statement by Mayor Khalaf of Ramallah attacking the Camp David agreements as being a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and as leaving the future of the Palestinians unresolved 130

September 20, 1978

We base our evaluation and conclusion of the Camp David Agreements on the following:

1) The summit did, in fact, reach a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, while this is what Sadat always insisted on avoiding.

2) The Camp David Agreements left the main issue unresolved—the future of the Palestinians and the participation of the PLO, the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

3) The main issue has become secondary and the less important one has prevailed.

4) Camp David once again proved that the policy of dividing the Arab world and keeping it in disarray is the only method according to the Zionists through which Israel's security can be sustained. It is outdated thinking on the part of those who dream and plot to subjugate the Arabs.

The travesty of Camp David not only dis-

regarded human rights by ignoring the existence of the Palestinians as a people and their right to a state on their land, but it also added insult to injury by excluding the true and only representative of the Palestinians from participating in the determination of the future and destiny of the Palestinian people.

We firmly believe that the only outcome of the summit is that Egypt has been taken away from the sphere of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that Israeli security—according to the two documents—has been protected.

Therefore, we the Palestinians living in our homeland, under the occupation of the Israeli military rule, criticize in the strongest terms the two documents that have been initialed by Sadat and Begin at the behest of Carter.

These two documents represent the thinking of Sadat only—the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular have shown time and again that he has no right to speak on their behalf.

Let me draw your attention to a recent event, the resignation of Sadat's Foreign Minister, Mr. Kamal, in protest and disagreement with these two documents. May I also note that the platform on which we have been elected by our people to run the municipal affairs of the cities and towns in the occupied territories states, in part, that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people and that those who opposed us on a different platform were defeated.

Now the Camp David summit wants to take even this simple right away from our people. Yet we are told it is the framework of future peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen, peace, true peace, can only be achieved by recognizing the Palestinian people, their right to exist in the state on their land, represented by their only representatives, the PLO.

Peace can only be achieved through unconditional withdrawal by Israel.

We address the whole world today and tell them that our people will continue to struggle in the West Bank against Israeli occupation and against the so-called autonomous rule in order to achieve their rights that have been acknowledged through the United Nations and the vast majority of the world.

We appeal to all of you to expose this travesty. We appeal to all who love peace not to be deceived

¹³⁰ Excerpted from the text, Palestine Human Rights Bulletin (Washington), (special issue) no. 11, pp. 5-6.

by these two documents that have given the Zionists all that they want and deprived the Palestinian people of their basic rights.

Camp David was a triumph for Israel and a dire defeat for the Palestinians and the Arab cause. That is why we are against it. We will struggle to defeat it, knowing that we are not alone in our quest.

The future belongs to people, all people, and not to impostors. Jews, Muslims, and Christians must live as equals and at peace in Palestine.

281

Statement by Deputy Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Marzuq of Kuwait affirming his country's commitment to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences and, in reference to the Camp David agreements, that Arab solidarity within the framework of a joint strategy is the only way to recover Arab rights¹³¹

Kuwait, September 20, 1978

The Cabinet has discussed the agreements reached by the parties to the Camp David conference, and the effects of these agreements on the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences and the UN resolutions relative to full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination.

The Cabinet reaffirmed Kuwait's previous attitude of commitment to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, and in particular the Rabat summit, and its full conviction that a just and permanent peace in the area can only be achieved through full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories including Jerusalem, and the recovery by the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO, of all their legitimate national rights.

The government will continue to follow and observe developments in the situation in the area. The Cabinet believes that sincere Arab solidarity within the framework of a single agreed strategy is the only way to recover Arab rights and to confront the danger that threatens us all.

282

Speech made by President Asad of Syria at the opening of the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states (excerpt)¹³² Damascus, September 20, 1978

President Hawari Boumedienne, President Muammar Qadhafi, President Ali Nasir Muhammad, Mr. Arafat, Chairman of the PLC

Mr. Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and President of the people of Palestine, in spite of those who have abandoned the PLO and the people of Palestine,

Brothers

Brothers,

I welcome you in Syria, this Arab country whose people's hearts are filled with pride and joy by every national victory without their becoming arrogant, and whose minds are filled with pain and grief by every national failure and every national setback, without their growing weak and feeble or giving way to despair and fear.

Therefore, like their brethren in Palestine, Jordan, Libya, Yemen and Sudan, and in every Arab country, while feeling the grief and pain of the Arab nation, at the hour of the Arab nation's ordeal they hope that this darkness may be pierced by a spark of light that will grow brighter until it overcomes this darkness and disperses both shadow and injustice. For there can be no doubt, brothers, that the ordeal that confronts us now is an ordeal in the full sense of the word.

Egypt has left the Arab camp, and the enemies of the Arabs can win no greater victory than this.

A short time ago, President Anwar Sadat was affirming his commitment to the liberation of all the occupied territories. He was affirming and reaffirming that he could never accept or even think of any separate solution. He was affirming that he would never agree to recognise Israel, which was up to future generations.

This is what he said in the past, the recent and less recent past. And what has happened? He has signed a separate peace and turned his back on the Arabs and on Egypt's Arab history. How could he relinquish Jerusalem, the cynosure of all Arabs and Muslims?

Yesterday, we all heard him saying in his letter

¹³¹ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Siyasa (Kuwait), September 21, 1978.

¹³² Translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), September 21, 1978.

to the people of Egypt, that Jerusalem was not on the agenda of the Camp David meeting.

How could he abandon the Palestinian cause, he who for months and years never tired of saying that the Palestinian cause was the kernel of the problem, as we said a short time ago. And now, by force majeure, he has made the kernel the shell and is cooperating with Israel to plan and manufacture the hammers they believe necessary and capable of smashing and crushing that shell. Otherwise, what is the meaning of these joint Egyptian-Israeli, and later Egyptian-Israeli-Jordanian committees? Though Jordan did not take part in the negotiations and was not consulted on the formation of these committees.

They have put Jordan on these committees and assigned it obligations, such as the protection of travellers along the Egypt-Eilat-Jordan highway, which it is intended should be built, and such as participating in certain security arrangements, and other matters that the Camp David documents have acquainted us with. For they have seen and drawn the picture of a role for Jordan within the framework of their objectives, regardless of Jordan's views, attitudes and national aspirations. However, yesterday we heard Jordan's views and attitudes in the statement issued by the Jordanian government after a meeting of the Jordanian cabinet chaired by King Husayn. Brothers.

Yesterday Anwar Sadat and I planned for the October War against Israel on behalf of our Arab rights. He said at the time that we were the most honourable fighters. And today he has left these honourable fighters alone in their trenches. I wonder if, under the auspices of his friendship with Begin, that he is always extolling, I wonder if, under the auspices of this friendship, he will confine himself to building up and strengthening economic, cultural, touristic, diplomatic, etc. cooperation with Israel, as stipulated by the documents, or if he will go even further?

Is it possible to imagine that, with the passage of time, Sadat should play his part, along with Menahem Begin, in planning an offensive operation against Syria? I know and we all know that such words are painful and heavy to hear, heavier than lead, as they say. But is the idea far-fetched? Is it impossible after what has happened?

Who could have imagined that we should be

the enemies of Sadat, as he says we are, or that Begin should be Sadat's friend, as he says he is? Who could have imagined that he would establish peace and cooperation with Israel and hostility to Syria, the PLO, Libya, Algeria, Yemen and other Arab states and quarters?

Who could have imagined that he would ever detain hundreds of Syrians, Palestinians and other Arabs in Cairo airport, and deport them from Egypt in batches, while at the same time dozens of Israelis were entering Egypt by the same airport, with every indication of honour and esteem?

All this and more besides was impossible, yet now has become possible. Again I ask: Is it possible that tomorrow, in the near or distant future, is it possible that Sadat should join with Begin in planning an offensive operation against us?

Again I say, there is no need for us to dwell too long on the past or to lament the past. What is important is that we should look to the future and plan for the future, so that we may remain true to the cause of our nation, the aspirations of our nation, the pride of our nation and so that we may affirm the fact that it can never be possible that surrender should vanquish the will for peace, and that the defeatism of individuals should vanquish the will of peoples to struggle.

As we always say, peoples are put to the test by ordeals, and our Arab people are capable of surmounting the ordeal that now confronts us.

Once more, I welcome you all, and I hope that our conference may lead to the consequences we desire, consequences that satisfy both ourselves and the Arabs in our countries, and in all other countres, whose eyes are upon us. Thank you.

283

Speech by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat at the opening of the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states (excerpt)¹³³

Damascus, September 20, 1978

We are meeting, and three days ago Raphael Eytan arrogantly announced that he was mobilising his forces, estimated at three divisions, for manoeuvres in northern Palestine and the occupied Syrian Heights. This means that as soon as the Camp David... [agreements] have been signed, Eytan announces military movements on the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon. Brothers;

It is a coordinated conspiracy.

For some time now the Syrian forces have been confronting an isolationist conspiracy in Lebanon. They want to create in Lebanon a new Israeli entity to perform the same task and follow the same course as those for which the Zionist entity in occupied Palestine was brought into existence, and to deal a blow to Syria, to the Palestinian revolution, to progressive Arab Lebanon, to the progressive Arab liberation movement and to the Arab nation.

What is happening in South Lebanon is indivisible from what is happening in northern Lebanon, where the isolationist forces are operating against the Arab Deterrent Forces. This means that the isolationist conspiracy is continuing and that this is an integral part of Camp David.

I am sorry to say that Jerusalem has been sold, Palestine has been sold, and the national rights of the Palestinian people have been sold for a handful of Sinai sand. Throughout our history no Arab ruler, no Arab leader, no Arab official, has dared to do what Sadat has done, what has happened at Camp David.

What Sadat has done is an aggression against Arab territory, the Arab homeland, Arab honour, against the very existence and future of the Arabs and against their values and all they hold sacred. Brothers;

It is an aggression in which a number of Zionist

and American imperialist forces are participating, along with certain agents who speak the Arabic language. Thus this conference has immense responsibilities. This is because what our brothers in Syria, along with their brothers in the nationalist and progressive movement in Lebanon, and our brothers in Arabism in Lebanon, both Muslims and Christians, are suffering, is also being suffered by our brothers who are taking part in this conference. Their attention has been distracted to irrelevant issues and battles to prevent them participating effectively in resistance to the great conspiracy, the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary conspiracy aimed at bringing the area to its knees and bringing it into subjection.

Brothers, I must point out that we are meeting in revolutionary Syria with the leader of the Algerian revolution, brother Hawari Boumedienne, and with the Libyan and Yemeni revolutions, and this meeting represents the will of the Arab nation to defy, to resist and to endure.

At this conference we say No to the Camp David conference, No to surrender, No to deviation, No to treason, No to abject submission. We say Yes to steadfastness, Yes to resistance, Yes to defiance, Yes to the victory of the will of the Arab nation.

This is the meaning of our meeting here today in Damascus. It is not true what the Arab Pétain said—that he was representing the Arab states and masses when he signed the documents of humiliation and treason at Camp David. We say that it is we who represent the masses of the Arab nation from the Ocean to the Gulf, we who represent the past, the present and the future of our nation, the will to defiance of the Arab nation.

This conference will be the spearhead in the recovery of Jerusalem which was conquered by Omar ibn al-Khattab and liberated from the Crusaders by Saladin—this conference means that we shall liberate Jerusalem from this Zionist invasion.

Brothers, Gouraud came to Arab lands and said: We have returned, O Saladin. And France colonised one part of Arab territory and England another and Italy yet another. But colonialism was driven from Arab territory, the French were driven from Algeria, the English from Aden and the Italians from Libya.

And the new Crusaders will be driven from Palestine. We have come to this conference to

¹³³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), September 21, 1978, (lst bulletin), p. 8.

affirm that we are capable of crushing the conspiracy in all its aspects, military, political, economic and informational.

What the Arab Pétain has signed is very important. But just as Pétain could not commit the French people to surrender, so Sadat cannot commit the Arab nation to the acceptance of humiliation, treason, abject submission and surrender, and what he has done at Camp David. What he has done does not commit the Palestinian people or the Arab nation or the Egyptians or the Egyptian people, who have lost thousands who laid down their lives for Palestine, for Egypt, for Arab territory. The intrepid Egyptian people will courageously resist Sadat and the course he is following and his conspiracies; the Egyptian masses will retort and crush the conspiracy and those who conspire against their destiny, their cause and their future. The Arab nation too will retort to his treachery. The Arab nation is capable of fashioning its future, its civilisation and its free and honourable life.

Peace be with you.

284

Statement by the government of Tunisia reaffirming its position that UN resolution 181 of 1947 and the Rabat Arab summit resolutions are the basis of any Middle East settlement 134

Tunis, September 21, 1978

The Tunisian government has followed the Camp David talks with the closest attention and considers it to be its duty to recall the principles on which the Tunisian attitude to the Palestine problem and the problems of the Middle East are based.

I. Respect for international legality as embodied in the UN resolution of 1947, 135 which provides for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Here it is to be recalled that Tunisia was the first to call for insistence on this principle in dealing with the Palestine problem.

- II. Respect for this legality, which rejects the forcible seizure of the territory of others.
- III. Respect for the unanimous decision of the Rabat summit¹³⁶ to the effect that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Tunisian government is of the opinion that the results of the Camp David talks are not in accord with these principles and do not solve the basic problem, which is to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination and to establish their independent state.

Moreover, these resolutions do not meet the demands as regards Jerusalem of the Islamic peoples in general and the Palestinian people in particular.

While appreciating all efforts to make the Middle East crisis less acute and to avoid all developments that could endanger world peace, the Tunisian government believes that there can be no satisfactory solution of this crisis unless it includes the solving of all its problems, the foremost of which is the problem of the Palestinian people.

For these reasons the Tunisian government believes that the results of the Camp David summit do not ensure the restoration of peace and stability to the area.

In this critical situation the Tunisian government calls on all the Arab states to focus their attention on the Palestine problem and to avoid everything liable to divide Arab ranks.

¹³⁴ Translated from the press release distributed in Arabic by the Tunisian embassy, Beirut.

¹³⁵ Presumably UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947. Published in George J. Tomeh (ed.), United Nations Resolutions and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947–1974 (Beirut: IPS, 1975).

¹³⁶ Doc. 308, International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

285

Statement by the Council of Ministers of the United Arab Emirates expressing the view that the Camp David agreements do not provide for a just and final settlement of the Mideast problem and that the Arab summit meetings of Algiers and Rabat provide the basis of the UAE position¹³⁷

Dubai, September 21, 1978

The UAE has followed with great concern the outcome of the meetings of the Camp David conference. In the light of its feeling of pan-Arab responsibility, the UAE reaffirms that its firm, unwavering and declared attitude to the Palestine question, which is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is based on the resolutions of the Arab summits, in particular those held in Algiers and Rabat.

A just and comprehensive solution can only be achieved on the basis of the recovery of all occupied Arab territories, including Arab Jerusalem, and the restoration to the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights and sovereignty over their land.

In the light of this, the UAE observes that the Camp David agreements do not offer just and final solutions of the crisis, since they do not include a clear commitment by Israel to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories and to restore the rights of the Palestinian people. The agreements also ignore the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The UAE still believes that Arab solidarity offers the only hope of achieving better circumstances for Arab action, and calls on the peoples and governments of the Arab nation to stand together in this critical stage so as to confront the dangers that threaten our security and destiny.

137 Translated from the Arabic text released by the UAE embassy, Beirut. 286

Statement by the Cabinet of the Yemen Arab Republic asserting that the Camp David agreements ignore the basic Arab cause and are not in conformity with UN resolutions¹³⁸

Sanaa, September 21, 1978

On Wednesday, September 21, 1978, the Cabinet of the Yemen Arab Republic reviewed the statements issued by the Camp David conference. In this connection the Cabinet affirmed that the Arab countries have an essential and just cause in Palestine, Sinai and the Golan, and that the statements issued at Camp David ignore these basic causes and display less flexibility than the Egyptian side. Moreover, the results of Camp David are not in conformity with the UN Security Council resolutions, and this makes the chances of peace in the area difficult and more complicated.

In view of all these circumstances, the Yemen Arab Republic calls on the brethren Arab states to liquidate their differences as soon as possible and to achieve the highest possible degree of solidarity for the confrontation of all developments.

287

Message to the nation by President Sarkis of Lebanon on the second anniversary of his taking office (excerpts)¹³⁹

Beirut, September 22, 1978

In connection with this appraisal I also wish to stress the distinction between our view of and attitude to the negative consequences of the Palestinian armed presence in our territory and our total commitment to the just cause of the Palestinian people and their right to return to their land and to self-determination.

In the light of recent international developments, I feel obliged to reaffirm our resolute and categorical rejection of any settlement based on the

¹³⁸ Translated from the press release distributed in Arabic by the YAR embassy, Beirut.

¹³⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Nahar, (Beirut), September 23, 1978.

settling of Palestinians in Lebanon, which would not ensure a just and permanent peace.

If for a time it seemed that our international friendships had lost their strength, this delusion was soon dissipated. The recent Israeli aggression against South Lebanon resulted in a manifestation of international support for Lebanon. The praiseworthy efforts of the UN, in the person of its Secretary General, and the resolutions of the Security Council on this matter, were a new manifestation of the stock of international credit enjoyed by Lebanon, a credit that we must invest so that the problem of the South may be solved as soon as possible. But when we declare our satisfaction with and appreciation of our friends, we realise that it would be a mistake to rely on them too much or to abuse them, and we must be at pains to make use of them at the right time and in the proper way, in a sensible and practical manner.

People of Lebanon,

The final settlement of the Lebanese crisis can only be a political one. Dealing with it through security measures can be no more than a stage through which we shall have to pass on the way to a political solution based on mutual understanding between Lebanese, cooperation between brothers and openness with friends.

Therefore the entry of the Arab forces in the wake of the Syrian initiative was in response to pressing security needs; their role was defined at the Riyadh and Cairo conferences. Although their mission has been impeded by circumstances with which we are familiar by factors beyond our control and theirs, and by considerations outside Lebanon, yet, at the present juncture, it is still essential for the safety of the country and the security of the state that these forces should remain in Lebanon.

As soon as we are capable of maintaining our own security and we have reconstituted our national army—and this, God willing, will be in the near future—I can guarantee that these forces will return to their home countries with our thanks.

288

Declaration of the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states establishing a National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation¹⁴⁰

Damascus, September 23, 1978

On the basis of steadfastness and determination to confront the dangers to which the Arab nation is exposed in its just struggle against the forces of Zionism and colonialism, backwardness and fragmentation; in defence of our existence, our nation and its destiny, rights and independence, its economic and social progress; from determination to achieve the aspirations of the Arab nation to build up a force capable of confronting all dangers, liberating occupied Arab territory, recovering the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people and protecting the cause of Palestine from all conspiracies aimed at liquidating it and consolidating the Zionist presence;

And in the light of the all-Arab character of the struggle the Arab nation is engaged in to build up Arab unity to liberate the Arab homeland, and to achieve progress and to build an Arab society capable of defending its existence and its honour and protecting its culture, and of participating in the building of a human civilisation liberated from all kinds of aggression, colonialism and domination;

And in implementation of paragraph 9 of the Tripoli statement¹⁴¹ issued on December 5, 1977, which provides for the establishment of a national front to unite all efforts and energies for the achievement of the goals of the Arab nation, the following has been agreed:

I. Establishment of the Front

There is hereby established a national front to be called the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation, which shall constitute:

1. A base for national struggle and for the mobilisation of the masses of the Arab people and their energies for the achievement of the

¹⁴⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), September 24, 1978. The member states of the Front held their first summit in Tripoli in December 1977 and their second in Algiers in February 1978. In Damascus, September 1978, the Front officially established itself as the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation (Algeria, South Yemen, Libya and the PLO).

¹⁴¹ Doc. 322 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

national goals of the Arab nation.

- 2. An instrument to be used by the Arab nation in its fight against Zionism and imperialism and for the sake of steadfastness and liberation.
- 3. An Arab force open to all Arab forces that wish to participate in assuming their national responsibilities.

II. GOALS AND TASKS

The Front undertakes to achieve the following essential basic national goals:

- 1. To take action to achieve Arab unity and to support the struggle for unity, to remove all obstacles from the road to Arab unity and to develop unity between the parties to the Front on behalf of their economic and social progress.
- 2. To regard the cause of Palestine as the basic cause of the Arabs. Therefore no Arab party may withdraw from or impair this commitment or take any measure liable to injure the cause of Palestine and the national and historical rights of the Palestinian Arab people.
- 3. The complete liberation of all Palestinian and Arab occupied territories and refusal to cede or waive any part of them or to prejudice national sovereignty over them.
- 4. Commitment to the recovery of the inalienable national rights of the people of Palestine, including their right to return and self-determination and to establish their independent national state in Palestine, and refusal to relinquish or bargain over the cause of Palestine.
- 5. To support the just struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
- 6. To mobilise Arab resources, military, economic, political and cultural, and to utilise them in the struggle against the principal enemy—the Zionist presence, imperialism and colonialism.
- 7. To strengthen and develop relations with Arab and friendly countries, the socialist countries, headed by the USSR, and with the forces that support the liberation struggle of the Arab nation against Zionism and imperialism.
- 8. To support the liberation movements in the African continent and to oppose the racialist regimes that are the natural ally of the Zionist entity.
- III. TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS THE FRONT WILL PERFORM THE FOLLOWING TASKS:
- 1. Establish lines of political action in the Arab field with a view to strengthening the national

position, serving the basic goals of the Front and frustrating capitulationist and defeatist policies.

- 2. Settling questions related to peace and war.
- 3. Organising and directing defence affairs, and drawing up the plans related thereto.
- 4. Taking measures to provide the means of financial, economic and military support for the confrontation.
 - 5. Drafting information policies.
- 6. Collaboration with any party that is the victim of aggression, by all available means, including armed force, aggression against one member of the Front being regarded as aggression against all its members.
- 7. To form the organisations and institutions necessary for the achievement of the goals and for the performance of the tasks mentioned in this declaration.

IV. Organisations and Institutions

The following organisations and institutions shall be set up:

A. The Supreme Command

- 1. The Supreme Command shall consist of the heads of the member states.
- 2. The Command of the Front shall meet regularly every six months in each of the capitals of the member states in rotation, and may meet wherever necessary at the request of one of its members.
- 3. The Command shall take its decisions by a majority vote and such decisions shall be binding on all members.

B. The Political Committee

- 1. The Political Committee shall consist of the Foreign Ministers of the member parties.
- 2. The Political Committee shall perform the following tasks:
- (a) Following up the implementation of the decisions of the Supreme Command.
 - (b) Proposing lines of political action.
- (c) Coordinating the political actions of the member parties of the Front.
- (d) Performing the tasks allotted to it by the Supreme Command.
- 3. The Political Committee shall meet regularly every three months in each of the member countries in rotation, and may meet whenever necessary at the request of one of its members.

C. The Information Committee

- 1. The Information Committee shall consist of the ministers of information of the member parties.
- 2. The Information Committee shall perform the following tasks:
 - (a) Proposing information lines.
- (b) Following up the implementation of the decisions relative to information.
- (c) Coordinating information between the member parties.
- 3. The Information Committee shall meet regularly every six months in each of the member countries in rotation, and may meet whenever necessary at the request of one of its members.

D. The Military Command

A single Military Command shall be constituted at the decision of the Supreme Command of the Front which shall determine its powers, jurisdiction and tasks and its liaison with the armed forces of the parties to the Front.

V. Joining the Front

Every Arab state committed to the principles and goals of the Front and expressing the wish to join the Front may become a member of it.

289

Statement issued by the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states listing some of its decisions and measures¹⁴² Damascus, September 23, 1978

At the invitation of President Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, the third session of the summit conference of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation met in Damascus from Shawwal 18–21, 1398 (September 20–23, 1978). The meeting was attended by: President Hawari Boumedienne, President of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic; President Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic; Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, Secretary-General of the General People's Conference of the Libyan Arab People's Socialist Republic; President Ali Nasir Muhammad, Chairman of the Presidency Council

of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; Mr. Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO.

The conference reviewed the developments that have taken place since the Algiers conference in the Arab and international arenas, including President Anwar Sadat's continued pursuit of his capitulationist policy, and also the proceedings and results of the Camp David conference. The conference conducted an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis of the situation and current developments and established the following facts:

- 1. President Sadat's policy and the results of the Camp David meeting are an extension of the US-Israeli conspiracy against the Arab nation and the cause of Palestine and the rights of its people, and they both disregard the objective facts of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This can only lead to increased tension in the arena and expose international peace and security to the gravest dangers.
- 2. At Camp David, President Sadat, in collusion with the Zionist enemy and imperialism, has conspired against the unity of the Arab cause and the higher interests of the Arab nation. He has violated the Arab League Charter, the Joint Arab Defence Treaty and the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, in an attempt to liquidate the Palestine problem and to sabotage all that the Palestinian people have achieved in the political arena through their struggle and the blood of their martyrs.
- 3. In pursuing this policy, President Sadat has struck a new blow at Arab solidarity by withdrawing Egypt from the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict so that she might become an ally of the enemy to threaten the Arab nation and control its destiny and its national security.
- 4. President Sadat has abandoned the international concept of a just peace in the area, which is based on full withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, in particular their right to return, to self-determination and to establish their independent state on the soil of their homeland under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative.
- 5. The agreements reached at Camp David are part of an overall operation to impose the influence and domination of US imperialism and Zionism

¹⁴² Translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), September 24, 1978.

on Egypt, the Arab nation and the African continent, and to use the Egyptian regime as an instrument to strike at national liberation movements.

- 6. The Camp David agreements constitute President Sadat's endorsement of the Zionist plan to continue the usurpation of the soil of the Palestinian homeland, to keep the West Bank and Gaza as a colony under the control of the forces of Zionist occupation, and to annex Jerusalem so that it may be the capital of Israel. In so doing President Sadat is invalidating the sacrifices of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, prejudicing its heritage and all that it holds sacred, and dissociating himself from the charter of the Islamic conference organisation, the Organisation of African Unity, the resolutions of the nonaligned countries and the desire of the international community for the liberation of the Palestinian and Arab territories, including Jerusalem.
- 7. President Sadat, who has signed the Camp David agreements, is not competent to represent the will of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. In view of this the agreement reached with the Zionist enemy is not binding on the Arab nation and is invalid and illegal.
- 8. The Camp David conference agreements infringe the UN Charter, international law and the UN resolutions that clearly define the rights of the Palestinian people and stress the need for withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab occupied territories as a condition that must be met if a just peace is to be achieved in the area.
- 9. The Arab nation has announced its rejection of these agreements reached at Camp David, the aim of which is to liquidate the Palestine cause and the rights of its people and to renounce the Arab character of Jerusalem and Arab rights. This reaffirms the isolation of President Sadat's regime and the fact that it has dissociated itself from the will and the consensus of the Arab nation.

Having established these facts and their grave consequences to the Arab and international situations, and to the future of the conflict with the Zionist enemy, the conference took a number of decisions and measures aimed at strengthening the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and enabling it to confront this conspiracy in which President Sadat is involved. The following are some of these decisions and

measures;

- 1. To reject and condemn the Camp David agreements and to express determination to oppose them and to make every effort to thwart them, and to continue the struggle against the Zionist enemy and imperialism by all available means.
- 2. To regard these agreements as illegal and invalid because they waive Arab and, in particular, Palestinian rights, and because they were concluded and signed under the auspices of the use of force by the Zionist occupation and of its continuation.
- 3. To issue a declaration of the principles, goals and institutions of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation.
- 4. To define the strategy for the coming stage according to the following basis:
- (a) To refuse to recognise the legality of the Camp David agreements and to reject all their consequences.
- (b) Support for the PLO in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people.
- (c) To make every effort to mobilise the energies of the Arab nation and to achieve Arab solidarity on the basis of combatting the Zionist enemy and the results of Camp David, and to confront this stage with all it involves in the way of immense dangers and grave injury to the basic goals of the Arab nation.
- (d) To call the attention of world public opinion to the dangers posed by the Camp David agreement to the peace and security of the area and of the world.
- (e) To call on the Arab countries to face up to their national responsibilities and to adopt a decisive attitude to the results of Camp David, for the confrontation of the coming critical situation and to join the Steadfastness Front, or to cooperate with it so as to neutralise the results of the US-Zionist-Sadatist conspiracy and to support the line of steadfastness so as to protect the national existence of the Arab nation.
- 5. To sever political and economic relations with the Egyptian regime, including its institutions and companies, and to enforce the resolutions of the Arab boycott against individuals who have dealings with the enemy.
- 6. To take practical measures to support the forces of steadfastness, of which Syria is the essential base, and to make every effort to make available all that is required to redress the strategic

balance in the area now that the Egyptian regime has left the arena of the conflict with the Zionist enemy.

- 7. To condemn the imperialist policy pursued by the US in allying itself with the Zionist enemy and Sadat's regime, and its continued pursuit of a policy opposed to the rights and goals of the Arab nation. This has made the US an enemy that cannot mediate in the efforts that are being made to achieve a just peace in the area, and renders it directly responsible for the present and possible future results of the Camp David agreements.
- 8. The need for efforts to obtain the most extensive possible world support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, and to consolidate cooperation with the socialist countries, headed by the USSR, in protecting the independence of the Arab countries and maintaining their freedom and progress and the gains of the liberation movement.

Within the framework of its review of the situation in the Arab homeland, the conference expresses its profound concern at the fact that a small group in Lebanon is continuing to have dealings with the Israeli enemy, that security in the city of Beirut is deteriorating and that efforts are underway to ensure a recurrence of fighting, the partition of Lebanon and the undermining of the central authorities. The conference affirms its support for the unity, Arab character and national sovereignty of Lebanon. The conference also expresses its satisfaction at and support for the security measures the Arab Deterrent Forces have been taking, and its support for the stand in Lebanon of the Syrian Arab Republic, whose aim is to confront the efforts being made to spark off civil strife as a cover for the conspiracy to liquidate the Palestine cause, to partition Lebanon and to establish confessional statelets that will support the US-Sadatist-Israel alliance. It also affirms its support for all Lebanese forces hostile to the Israeli plan and those who collaborate with it.

The conference salutes with pride the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied Palestinian territories who are holding out against the occupation and struggling for liberation. The conference affirms its continuing national commitment to the cause of Palestine and to support the struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their inalienable

national rights under the leadership of the PLO.

The conference salutes the Arab people of Egypt and is proud to extol the heroism and efforts of the people and the army on behalf of Arab causes. The conference is confident that the Egyptian Arab people, with their national awareness and their patriotism, will adopt the proper decisive attitude to Sadat's regime, which is trying to push them down the slippery slope of subservience to imperialism and to remove them from their natural historical position in the arena of Arab struggle against imperialism and the Zionist enemy.

The conference expresses its profound concern at the denial of the national rights of the Arab people of the Western Sahara, in particular their right to self-determination. It strongly condemns all measures inconsistent with this right and reaffirms the need for the Saharan people to be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination in conformity with the resolutions of the UN and the Organization of African Unity.

The conference studied developments in the Yemeni arena and the dangers involved in the continued state of tension between the two parts of Yemen, and the profound effects the continuation of this tension could have on the inhabitants of the area. The conference therefore stresses the need to resolve differences through dialogue and peaceful means and on the basis of mutual respect for the national sovereignty, independence and common interests of the two parts, and of non-interference in internal affairs. The conference condemns all military or aggressive actions that could draw the two parts into an armed clash, as this would only serve the interests of imperialism and Zionism. The conference is of the opinion that the resolutions adopted by the Arab League Council on the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen infringe the League Charter and are illegal. The conference also expresses its appreciation of the responsible attitude of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, as expressed in statements and the adoption of positions calling for the resolution of disagreements between brothers by peaceful means.

The conference expresses its extreme concern at the foreign military presence in Oman and affirms its support for the people of Oman in their struggle for liberation and national sovereignty. The conference, having reviewed the situation in the African continent, condemns imperialist intervention in the internal affairs of the continent and affirms its opposition to the racialist regimes that are the natural allies of the racialist Zionist regime. It affirms its utmost support for African national liberation movements and its desire to expand the framework of Arab-African dialogue, to consolidate its foundations and to intensify its activities in all fields.

The conference is of the opinion that national duty demands resolute support for Syria and the PLO as being the unyielding base of the struggle to maintain the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the resources and energies of the Arab homeland, and to frustrate all kinds of capitulationist and defeatist settlements that serve the ambitions of Zionism, US imperialism and the Israeli enemy throughout the length and breadth of the Arab homeland.

The conference expresses its confidence that the peace, freedom and justice-loving forces of the world will redouble their support for Syria, the Palestinian people and the Arab nation in their just and legitimate struggle.

The conference promises the Arab nation that it will continue on the course of struggle, stead-fastness and confrontation until the national goals of the Arab nation are achieved.

290

Memorandum submitted by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the third conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states analysing the implications of the Camp David agreements for different Arab forces (excerpt)¹⁴³

Damascus, late September, 1978

At the Arab level, imperialist, colonialist, Zionist and reactionary circles are trying to liquidate the Arab national liberation movement's heritage of struggle and to invalidate its victories and achievements.

The first and second conferences of the heads of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states

were held against the background of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's treacherous initiative, of his visit to Jerusalem and of the subsequent activities, bilateral contacts and meetings at many levels, all of which indicated to what lengths of utter treachery the Egyptian President and his effete regime were prepared to go. Our third conference is meeting after the conclusion of the ill-omened Camp David tripartite meeting. This was a natural extension of American policy in the Middle East and all the agreements resulting from the Camp David meeting are so many more concessions made by the Egyptian President with a view to depriving Egypt of her national role, conspiring against the Palestinian revolution and striking at the Arab and African liberationist, nationalist and progressive forces and regimes.

Our delegation utterly condemns the capitulationist agreements that have resulted from the Camp David meeting, which it regards as a new challenge to our Arab nation, and it believes that our Front must confront this challenge and shoulder its national responsibility for the destiny of the Arab nation.

The Resistance and Syria

At the present stage the Palestinian revolution is being subjected to a ferocious attack and is the target of the most dangerous imperialist, Zionist and reactionary conspiracies aimed at liquidating and prejudicing it. First there was Sadat's initiative, and now there is the Camp David diplomacy; there is the policy of military annihilation and human liquidation; mines have been laid in the very heart of the Palestinian revolution, and efforts made to disperse its effective forces. But in spite of the campaign of liquidation that has been directed against the Palestinian resistance movement, Palestinian political and military action has always been and still is the instrument that can force the Israeli enemy to admit the just and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

We must clearly understand that, at this critical stage, the Palestinian revolution needs our absolute and direct support. Our Front must take a number of political and military measures and provide all other kinds of support to the Palestinian revolution under the leadership of the PLO.

The principal confrontation state, Syria, has also been the target of imperialist, Zionist and reactionary pressures and schemes, both direct

¹⁴³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Safir (Beirut), September 26, 1978.

and indirect, aimed at impeding her national role of frustrating the conspiracy that is now being implemented in the Middle East, and of resisting the capitulationist solutions that are intended to be achieved through the Camp David conference. So that Syria may continue to play this role, we must provide her with the necessary support and resources to enable her to achieve a strategic balance with the enemy.

The Situation in Lebanon

The Lebanese cause is facing an extremely critical and dangerous situation, which is part and parcel of the comprehensive conspiracy against the Arab national liberation movement. The progress of the imperialist and reactionary plan in the Lebanese arena indicates that Lebanon faces a grave situation; the idea of partitioning Lebanon into two states is gaining more weight and the area of land under Israeli occupation is daily increasing. This being the case the general situation in Lebanon is extremely grave, and the member states of our Front must adopt a decisive attitude to ensure that the Palestinian revolution continues and that Lebanon maintains her independence, her Arab character and her territorial integrity.

291

Statement by the National Progressive Unionist Grouping of Egypt analysing the Camp David agreements and outlining various means to combat them (excerpts)¹⁴⁴

Cairo, September 25, 1978

Every Egyptian today has an extremely serious decision to take that will decide the fate of Egypt and the Arab homeland for many generations to come. At the end of the Camp David conference, President Sadat signed two documents, the first called "A framework for peace in the Middle East" 145 and the second "A framework for agreement on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel." The state information media have

informed the Arab people of Egypt that by signing these documents, Egypt has taken a decisive step towards the achievement of a just and comprehensive peace and that the liberation of the occupied Egyptian and Arab territories and the safeguarding of the rights of the Palestinian people within specific periods of time have now become possible for the first time since the 1967 defeat.

If the agreement on the framework of peace between Egypt and Israel promises that Sinai will be restored to Egypt, this is indeed a fundamental demand of all nationalist forces. But in fact Egypt's territory is to be evacuated in accordance with conditions that require examination. These conditions involve infringement of Egypt's national interests and sovereignty; indeed, the document on a "general framework for peace in the Middle East" involves concessions as regards the Palestine problem—the very kernel and essense of the problem—and the national dimensions of the conflict as a whole, that it is impossible to be silent about. These concessions render the goal of peace more remote rather than bringing it closer, and make the area more, rather than less, disturbed and explosive.

I. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT RESTORE EGYPT'S FULL SOVEREIGNTY

The most important point the official information media have been concentrating on is that the Camp David agreements guarantee the withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt's historical frontier in Sinai, so that Egypt has recovered her full sovereignty over all her territory. But this conclusion is not consistent with the facts for many reasons among which are the following:

Regarding security guarantees

If we accept that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai must be accompanied by security guarantees, then these guarantees should be reciprocal, otherwise the security of one party is ensured at the expense of the security and, consequently, the sovereignty of the other. The minimum of this condition was observed in the proposal drawn up by the Egyptian foreign ministry, which was submitted to the Camp David meetings. The proposal provides for the establishment of demilitarised and partially demilitarised zones on both sides of the frontier, the stationing of UN forces on both sides of the frontier, the installation of an early warning system on a reciprocal basis, the

¹⁴⁴ Translated from the Arabic text as published in al-Safir (Beirut), October 11 and 12, 1978.

¹⁴⁵ Doc. 153 above.

¹⁴⁶ Doc. 154 above.

Arab world 521

determining of what kinds of weapons the party states shall obtain and their armaments structures, and the adherence of all parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the Egyptian negotiator at the Camp David talks did not abide by these provisions and, in the statement issued at the close of the talks, agreed that the demilitarised zones and the early warning stations should be in the territory of Sinai only and did not insist that, in return, they should also be in Israeli territory. He also agreed to the stationing of UN forces in Sinai while the UN is only to have observers in Israel. The withdrawal of the UN forces from Sinai is not to be at the sovereign decision of Egypt; they can only be withdrawn with the unanimous approval of all five permanent members of the Security Council. This means that the UN forces will be in Sinai on a permanent basis, with no time limit.

Nor did the Egyptian negotiator insist on its being determined what kind of weapons the party states are to acquire or what their armaments structures are to be, although Israel's conspicuous military superiority is undeniable. Nor did he insist that the parties should adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, although Israel is the only one of the party states to possess atomic bombs.

The extent to which the principle of equality and reciprocity in security guarantees is infringed becomes clearer when we appreciate that Sinai, including the parts recovered by the Egyptian armed forces by force of arms in the glorious battles of the crossing in 1973, will be an area of restricted armaments and diminished sovereignty. It has been decided that the demilitarised zone in which Egypt is to have no military presence at all, shall extend the whole length of Sinai to a breadth of from 20 to 40 kilometres from Egypt's eastern international frontier, after which there is an area comprising most of the territory of Sinai as far as the passes, in which only three battalions of frontier guards can be stationed. Finally, there is a fifty kilometres wide zone east of the Canal and the Gulf of Suez in which only one military division can be stationed. measures restricting armaments are applicable to the Israeli side only in a token strip only three kilometres wide along the frontier with Egypt, and Israel may have a military presence totalling four battalions in this narrow strip adjacent to

Egyptian territory.

The agreement does not specify where the early warning stations are to be installed in Sinai, nor the nationality of those who are to supervise their operation. However, as is well known, there are at present early warning stations in the area of the passes, which are operated by Americans, Israelis and Egyptians.

According to the agreement Israel is to give up the airfields she constructed near el-Arish, Rafah, Ras al-Naqab and Sharm el-Sheikh. These airfields are to be used for civilian purposes only, and this includes the possibility of their being used for commercial purposes by all countries-all countries including Israel; indeed there are not many countries that have the same interests as Israel in using airfields that are sited in the Sinai desert on the frontiers of Israel for civil and commerical purposes. According to informed American sources, these airfields are to be used for navigational training. The US has undertaken to bear the cost of constructing two air bases for Israel in the Negev close to the Egyptian frontier, at a cost of five hundred million dollars each. Thus, although she evacuates her airfields in Sinai, Israel will maintain air control of them, especially as there will be no military airfields in Sinai at all.

It is thus clear that Egypt's military frontier will in fact be the Suez Canal. For the first time in history she is to have separate military frontiers, a long way away from her international political frontier. Nor is this arrangement temporary, for a specific period of time; it is to be permanent. Nor does the agreement stipulate that this arrangement should apply to Israel. It is thus an infringement of Egypt's security in favour of Israel's security. It prejudices Egypt's sovereignty. It amounts, in fact, to the application of Carter's idea that Israel should have two kinds of frontiers—political frontiers and separate defensible military frontiers with the latter extending inside the territories of the adjacent Arab states.

2. REGARDING THE DEADLINES OF THE AGREEMENT Egypt is to sign the peace treaty with Israel within not more than three months. But the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory is to be completed within three years at the most.

The evacuation of Israeli forces is to take place in two stages: the first stage to a line from el-Arish in the north to Ras Muhammad in the south, within from three to nine months from the signing of the peace treaty. After the completion of the first interim withdrawal, Egypt is obliged to establish normal relations with Israel, including full recognition comprising diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, the ending of the economic boycott, the ending of restrictions on the free movement of goods and persons, and mutual protection of citizens according to the provisions of the law.

This means that relations between Egypt and Israel will be completely normalised, and that an Israeli embassy will be opened in Cairo, possibly more than two years before the evacuation of Israeli forces from the whole of Sinai.

It will be recalled that, until the middle of 1977, President Sadat repeatedly stated that the normalisation of relations and the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Israel was quite out of the question. It was a problem that would have to wait for another generation at least, that is, until the accumulated bitterness and resentment of thirty years of calamities and wars passed away. For the international principles on the establishment of peace stipulate the prevention of war and respect for frontiers which is the very essence of sovereignty, but not the establishment of diplomatic, cultural, economic, etc. relations. But Sadat withdrew from this position and, in the presence of Carter and at his insistence, said that the normalisation of relations with Israel might be considered, but not before five years after the evacuation by Israeli forces of all the occupied Arab territories and the recovery by the Palestinian people of their legitimate national rights.

Sadat's initiative of visiting Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, constituted a fundamental change inasmuch as direct dealings with Israel in Israeli territory were an indication that some kind of normalisation of relations was on the cards regardless of how far the peace negotiations had progressed. And now this concept has been acknowledged by the Egyptian government in the Camp David agreements. For the Egyptian negotiator has undertaken to sign a peace treaty with Israel before the withdrawal starts, and diplomatic relations are to be established with Israel while part of Egyptian territory is still occupied, not to mention the other occupied Arab

territories and the rights of the people of Palestine.

In accordance with such an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Egypt can sever her political and diplomatic relations with any country in the world except Israel, as the severance of these relations will abrogate the peace treaty.

This means that Egypt will be diplomatically obliged to congratulate Israel on her National Day—May 15 of each year, even in the years during which Israel is still occupying Egyptian territory, and at a time when Egypt's diplomatic relations with five Arab countries are humiliating to Egypt, in addition to infringing Egyptian sovereignty.

3. The Right of Passage through Egyptian Territory Acquired by Israel

The Camp David agreement stipulates freedom of passage for Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal, and that the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Aqaba shall be international waterways open to all countries for free navigation and land and sea passage through and over them. It also stipulates the building of a fast road linking Sinai with Jordan near to Eilat, with guaranteed free passage for Egypt and Jordan.

Although freedom of passage through the Suez Canal is guaranteed by the 1889 Constantinople Convention, the declaration of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Suez to be international waterways, is a new right acquired by Israel at least as regards the localities in which this right conflicts with Egypt's sovereignty over her territorial waters.

More important, however, are the agreement's provisions for the building of a fast road linking Sinai with Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed peaceful passage for Egypt and Jordan. It may be claimed that this provision was included in response to an Egyptian request that Egypt should be linked with the Arab East. But none of the three Camp David parties has the right to speak on behalf of Jordan. Therefore, the commitment established by the provisions is for the building of a fast road linking Eilat with the Suez Canal across Sinai and running through the Mitla Pass. This leads one to ask what real benefits will accrue to Egypt, her industry, commerce and tourism, from such a road, when there are new indications of its practical advantages to Israel's economy,

commerce and tourism. We also feel constrained to ask what is the significance of this road running through the Mitla Pass, whose strategic importance for the defence of Egypt is so well known?

4. The Adverse Effects of the Normalisation of Relations with Israel on Egyptian Sovereignty

The normalisation of relations with Israel, in a situation where she retains all aspects of her present superiority, is bound to have adverse long-term effects on all aspects of Egyptian life. Since the establishment of the state of Israel, Egyptian strategy has been based on the assumption that Israel is the principal enemy. And now, in the light of the Camp David agreements, and by the mere fact of the signing of the peace treaty, Israel becomes a state with special and privileged relations with Egypt, relations that cannot be infringed without violating the terms of the treaty.

To illustrate the extent of the change that will result from the signing of such a treaty with Israel, it is sufficient to mention the following points:

(a) The political aspect

The signing of the treaty undermines the Joint Arab Defence Agreement—the basis of Arab military solidarity that is based on the assumption that the common enemy is Israel. The signing of this treaty on a separate basis in the face of the opposition of the other Arab states is an infringement of this agreement and of the basic principles of the League and of all aspects of joint Arab action. This means bringing about a radical change in all dimensions of the political map of the area.

(b) The economic aspect

The economic boycott of Israel is being abolished at a time when Egypt is confronted with the danger of being economically isolated by the Arabs. This will impair the very foundations of Egypt's economic development, because development cannot be achieved in isolation from an integrated Arab economy. And there is no longer any chance of Egypt continuing to obtain Arab support in obtaining armaments or for purposes of defence or war, and it is to be observed that all the Arab countries have refrained from declaring their support for the Camp David agreements, including Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Arab Emirates. Indeed most of these countries have given their reasons for not approving the

terms of the Camp David agreements, and opposition to them has not been confined to the rejection forces and the states that constitute the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front.

It should be recalled that more than a million and a half Egyptians are at present working in the Arab countries. If we assume that each of these supports an average of three persons, there are about five million Egyptians depending for livelihood on their income from the Arab countries. This is in addition to Arab loans, investments and aid, and their vital importance to the Egyptian economy as a whole. It is not difficult to imagine the problems that will beset the Egyptian economy if all or even some of the Arab countries impose an economic boycott on Egypt, as they have done in the case of Israel.

It is also to be observed that under the slogans of peace and normal relations in accordance with the agreements with Egypt, Israel is aspiring to play the role she has long dreamed of, the role of general agent for the multi-national monopolies in the Arab economy as a whole, to thwart attempts by the Arab countries to achieve economic integration, and to turn the Arab countries into mere workers and consumers of Israeli production. Israel wants to dominate the Arab economy and to use Egypt as a bridge relying on the international monopolies that supply her with unlimited support. We must realise that it is inconceivable that Israel, with her military superiority and her organic links with the US and the western countries, and the support she enjoys from international world bodies and organisations, should place her experience and resources at the disposal of Egypt and the Egyptians as some people like to imagine. It is more likely and natural that she should use them to safeguard the continued flow of Arab oil to the West, to ensure continued Jewish immigration to Israel, to monopolise technological progress in the area and to use Egypt for the infiltration to all parts of the Arab homeland. In all probability, the interests of a small local group of parasites with no feeling of loyalty to their homeland, who hope to increase their wealth by operations of plunder and robbery carried out locally, will coincide with the desire to expand and dominate of Israel and the international monopolies that are behind her. This will do immense harm to the interests of capitalist groups engaged in industrial and agricultural production, and have the direct consequences for Egyptian craftsmen.

Commenting on the Camp David agreements, Ezer Weizman frankly told the American television network ABC: "It is incumbent on Israel to maintain a strong army so that there may be no turning back from the road to peace. It should also be said that if we succeed in establishing relations with Egypt based on confidence and free from tension, along with economic and touristic links and freedom of passage, that will amount to complete control of the territories necessary for our self-defence."

What Israel wants is to redraft the map of the area under Israeli leadership which is the embodiment of both old and new colonialism, and in practice, the agreement will lead to the acceptance of this situation. The challenge constituted by Zionism is now developing from territorial expansion in Arab territory into economic domination of the Arab economy and its huge natural and human resources.

Under the auspices of economic openness, the Egyptian state is entrusting the destinies of the Egyptian economy to the multi-national companies which have close links with world Zionism. It will not be long before this trend becomes more conspicuous as every effort is made to ensure that it spreads from the Egyptian economy to the Arab economy as a whole.

(c) The cultural aspect

Cairo will be the door through which the racialist Zionist culture of Israel enters the area. a culture that conflicts with Arab, Islamic and Christian culture. Egypt will have to revise the books on history and national culture that are taught to her children in schools and universities. to ensure that Israel, the new friendly state, enters the consciousness of Egyptians, in flagrant defiance of nationalist, Arab and religious sentiments. At the session for the signing of the Camp David agreements, Menahem Begin surprised us by talking of his ancestors who build the pyramids, 147 and we have not forgotten the state of Greater Israel stretching from the Euphrates to the Nile.

(d) The separate solution

The Egyptian negotiator made the signing of the peace treaty with Israel subject to one condition only—that relative to the Israeli settlements

¹⁴⁷ See doc. 152 above.

in Sinai. This is a condition that relates specifically to the territory of Egypt. No other condition was made, whether as regards participation in the negotiations by Jordan, which, in spite of its absence, the Camp David agreement specified as a party whose presence was essential for dealing with the Palestine problem, or with any other aspect of the conflict. (Nothing at all was decided about the issues of Jerusalem and the Golan).

Moreover, the agreement is to be enforced, as regards Egypt, in accordance with a completely separate timetable from that for its enforcement as regards the West Bank and Gaza. The agreement obliges Israel to withdraw completely from Egypt within three years. Three years is also the maximum period specified by the agreement for starting to deal with the problem of the West Bank and Gaza, that is, the establishment of an autonomous authority in the West Bank and Gaza. This means that the issue of Egypt is separated from the other aspects of the conflict, including the problem of Palestine, not only as regards the commitments of the Camp David parties, but also as regards the timetable of the agreement. Thus the agreement is in fact a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel, regardless of the provisions of the document on the general framework for peace in the Middle East.

Finally, this separate solution which some Egyptians may regard as being worth the price we have paid for it, on the pretext that it restores Egypt's sovereignty over Sinai, is in fact no more than a promise to restore Sinai with reduced sovereignty. Actually, indeed, it makes the whole of Egypt a state with diminished sovereignty because from the moment of its signing, it imposes intolerable restrictions on future Egyptian decisions in vital fields of national action, let alone all-Arab action.

It is thus clear that the general framework for peace in the Middle East established by the Camp David agreements has not solved any of the problems that are related to this framework; it offers no solution to the problems of Palestine and Ierusalem and does not even mention the Golan. On the contrary, if the Camp David agreements play any role in outlining a general framework of the settlement, they provide Israel with a precedent for deciding that the settlement provides for full recognition of Israel by the Arab parties,

the abolition of the economic boycott, exploration of the possibilities of joint economic development and assurances that citizens enjoy, under the auspices of the judicial authorities, the protection of legal measures as regards resorting to the law and setting up judicial claims committees for mutual settlement of all financial cases. This means guaranteeing the payment of compensation to Jews who have emigrated to Israel from the Arab countries, though there is no recognition of the right of the Palestinian refugees who were forced to leave Palestine before 1967 to compensation in accordance with the UN resolutions. These are not terms that the Arab peoples in general and many of the Arab states can accept as a basis for a comprehensive and just settlement of the

In the light of this, it was not strange that many international quarters should have reservations about accepting the Camp David agreements. They have been criticized by Romania which participated in the measures taken to prepare the way for President Sadat's initiative in visiting Jerusalem. France and the European Community expressed reservations in view of the fact that they have insisted that the Palestine problem must be settled in a satisfactory manner. Reservations have also been expressed by the Vatican and the World Council of Churches from their concern for an acceptable solution of the problem of Jerusalem.

Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the UN, has expressed reservations because the agreement conflicts with numerous resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, with overwhelming majorities, on the problem of the Palestinian refugees and the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination and to establish their independent national entity.

The agreement does not enjoy a sufficient measure of acceptance in the world to constitute a point of departure for any advance towards dealing with the Middle East crisis in all its complicated dimensions. It does not enjoy such acceptance either in Arab circles or in Islamic, or Christian or European circles, or in international circles in general. It is unreservedly supported only by President Carter, who personally convened the Camp David meeting; nor should we underestimate the importance of the fact that three Egyptian foreign ministers, Messrs. Ismail

Fahmi, Mahmoud Riyad and Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil, have resigned one after another within the space of not more than ten months, from their feeling that it was impossible to adopt the line that resulted from the initiative and the unacceptable concessions as regards Egyptian sovereignty and Egyptian and Arab interests involved in it.

The fact is that the Camp David agreements are the logical result of the policy pursued by the Egyptian government in launching the initiative, the policy of direct separate dealings with Israel, the policy of seeking a settlement without reference to the other Arab parties concerned. It is a policy that is bound to lead to separate solutions being imposed on these parties as a fait accompli, instead of their being relied on and cooperated with as being the sole firm basis for the recovery of Arab rights. It is a policy that our Party has opposed from the start. Warning of its disastrous consequences, from the very first moment, our Party has opposed Egyptian negotiation on this policy, and the Camp David agreements have shown what this policy was bound to lead to.

Moreover, the Camp David agreements involve concessions that go further than was required by the logic of the initiative itself, and by the logic of direct separate negotiation with Israel. In fact, Egypt's isolation from the forces of the Arab confrontation countries has provided Israel with an incentive to be more obstinate and inflexible. Though, even according to the terms of the initiative, Israel's inflexibility did not justify the Egyptian negotiator's conceding numerous points that he had insisted on and placed on record in the original document he submitted to the talks, and these concessions were one of the reasons for the foreign minister's resignation. Many Egyptians, like Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil, had no objection to the Egyptian government's trying to find a starting point for direct dealing with Israel. But they, like him, have rejected what this direct dealing has led to and its results as embodied in the Camp David agreements.

Finally, the Camp David agreements have not succeeded in outlining a framework that can secure a peaceful, just, comprehensive and permanent solution of the Middle East crisis, a solution that the Egyptian and Arab masses had been hoping for, as they had every right to do in view of how

long they have been suffering and the terrible sacrifices they have sustained. It is their right to expect peace and prosperity. But the Camp David agreements will disappoint the Egyptians; indeed, our Party expects these agreements to result in the sparking off in the area of racialist, confessional, tribal, national and religious conflicts, and perhaps even civil and international wars beside which the civil war in Lebanon will pale into insignificance. Our Party believes that the Egyptian government's determination to implement the agreements in the face of the resolute opposition of the Arab peoples, in particular the people of Palestine, and without reference to the Arab governments, foreshadows such developments in the near future.

- Our Party has the following demands:
 1. The commitment of Egypt and the Arab states to the Arab stands, the foremost being the resolutions of the Rabat summit.
 - 2. A halt to separate negotiations with Israel.
- 3. Calling for an urgent meeting of Arab confrontation states and forces which would prepare for the convening of an Arab summit conference.
- 4. Initiating the widest possible dialogue in the Egyptian and Arab arenas and guaranteeing the opportunity for all political trends in Egypt, particularly the opposition forces, to the free expression of their opinion with a view to their factual participation in making the final decision.
- 5. Requesting the Arab national forces, in the framework of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestinian Revolution, to immediately start a dialogue that would lead to the mobilization of the forces of the Arab nation, for the sake of bypassing the negative aspects of the present situation and arriving at a militant working unity with the capacity for initiation and action.
- 6. Requesting Saudi Arabia and the Arab oil states to use the oil weapon against the USA which has bluntly revealed its intentions vis-à-vis Arab causes, and to use this weapon in confronting the US-Israeli alliance, particularly with respect to Jerusalem and the Palestinian cause.
- 7. Facing al-Azhar al-Sharif and the Egyptian church with their religious and national responsibilities in defence of the Arabism of Christian

and Muslim Jerusalem, and in confronting the Zionist project aimed at completely Judaizing it.

8. Inviting the three Egyptian foreign ministers, who resigned in protest against the method of direct negotiations with Israel and the Camp David agreements, to the People's Assembly where they would give, in public sessions, statements and complete information concerning the reasons for their resignation, clarifying their stand before Egyptian and Arab public opinion.

Appealing to the Egyptian people in all their political trends, in such decisive moments, is the only means of making the Egyptian citizen whatever his beliefs may be—historically responsible before the state entangles itself in the final signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel which has drastic consequences for the future of the whole Arab homeland.

292

Statement by Saiqa indicting the Camp David agreements for ignoring Palestinian rights (excerpts)148

Damascus, late September, 1978

Masses of the struggling Palestinian people, Masses of the great Arab people,

September 17, 1978 was a black day in our contemporary history. As that day ended, Sadat consummated his contempt for the cause of Palestine and for the dignity of the Arab nation and all it holds sacred, by signing at Camp David the ignominious document that provides for renunciation, surrender and submission to the historical enemy of our nation who has designs on our land and wants to destroy our culture and to control our destinies.

The General Command of the Vanguards of the People's War of Liberation—the Saiga forces have closely studied the humiliating and treasonable agreements concluded by Anwar Sadat with the Zionist enemy and have found that, from first to last, they violate the truth and deny Arab and Palestinian rights, that as a whole and in detail they serve the goals and plans of the enemy

¹⁴⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Talai (Damascus), no. 406 (September 26, 1978), p. 9.

ARAB WORLD 527

and comply with his ambitions and objectives, and that there was no equality between the parties to the agreement, which is the sort of agreement that is concluded by one who is defeated with his conqueror or by a slave with his master.

The achievement of real and permanent peace in the area requires above all respect for the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homeland, to recover their land, to self-determination and to establish an independent national state. This right is ignored in the preamble to the agreement and disregarded in all its sections; instead, it concentrates on Israel's right to exist, to independence, and to secure frontiers, although in fact, it is Israel that has for thirty years been engaged in invasion, aggression and the usurpation of the land of others, and that possesses the instruments to threaten the security and the interests of the neighbouring Arab countries.

Not content with deviating from the Rabat resolutions, defaming the PLO and preparing for the liquidation of the Palestinian revolution, this treacherous liquidationist deal goes so far as to legitimise the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It not only gives the enemy the right to maintain his armed forces in these areas in a manner that amounts to the reorganisation of the occupation, inasmuch as it ensures that the Egyptian and Jordanian authorities shall be directly responsible for the suppression of the will and the aspirations of the Palestinians on behalf of and under the immediate orders of the Zionist enemy. It is also an attempt to impose a tripartite mandate on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with Egypt and Jordan playing a similar role to that played by Egypt in the Anglo-Egyptian mandate over Sudan before its independence.

As for the problem of the Palestinian refugees who have lived in exile from their homeland for thirty years, the agreement makes its solution subject to what Israel and Egypt may agree on after a number of years, during which the alliance of Sadat's Egypt with the Zionist enemy, and her subjection to his wishes, will continue.

Our people will never accept that their cause should be subject to an agreement between the old enemy, Zionism, and the new enemy, the treacherous regime of Sadat. Such a solution can never be the just solution that they are struggling for, their right to which had been endorsed by the international community.

We reject this insolent domination and arbitrary tutelage.

Under the terms of this contemptible agreement Sadat has not only dissociated himself from his obligations to national causes and put an end to Egypt's connection with the land, people and cause of Palestine. He has given the enemy the right to exercise tutelage over the Palestinian people and the Arab area, while allowing Egypt the role of a secondary and subservient partner who will facilitate the imposition of this tutelage and act as cover for it.

293

Statement by the official spokesman for the foreign ministry of the Sultanate of Oman denying that the results of the Camp David meeting are entirely negative 149

Muscat, September 25, 1978

An official spokesman for the Omani foreign ministry stated this evening that the results of the Camp David meeting cannot be regarded as entirely negative, and that there are aspects of the agreement that constitute a tangible advance in the course of the negotiations to reach a final solution of the Middle East problem.

The spokesman said that it was natural that opinions should differ in the appraisal of the results of Camp David at this particular stage, but that this should not lead to further division and estrangement between the Arab states, especially those states that are directly concerned with the issue. This is because, in any case, the Arab nation has no alternative to solidarity and unity if it is not to lose its ability to influence the course of events.

The Omani spokesman added that every Arab state is entitled to adopt the viewpoint it believes to be right and to try to explain its attitude to the other Arab states, so that viewpoints may be reconciled and that Arab solidarity may remain the framework of all the efforts that are being

¹⁴⁹ Translated from the press release distributed in Arabic by the embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Beirut.

made to réach a just and comprehensive solution.

On behalf of the foreign ministry, the spokesman praised the efforts made by the American president personally to convene the Camp David meeting. He said that however much opinions differ in the appraisal of the results of this meeting, President Carter's efforts deserve the appreciation of all. The spokesman also pointed out that it was the peace initiative launched by President Sadat last November that constituted the real basis of what was achieved at the Camp David meeting.

294

Call by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat to the Arab and Islamic worlds warning of the dangers to Palestine and Jerusalem involved in the Camp David agreements¹⁵⁰

Beirut, September 26, 1978

The struggling Palestinian revolution, which bears the responsibility for Palestine and for the holy city of Jerusalem, considers it to be its duty to address this call, or rather this warning, to all leaders, officials, scholars and thinkers, so that they may see how real are the dangers involved in the Camp David agreements to Palestine and in particular to our holy city of Jerusalem, the place from which the Night Journey and the Ascension were made, the site of the third most holy mosque in Islam, the site of the Night Journey of the Prophet and the cradle of Christ and of many Islamic and Christian holy places. It is their sacred duty, their national duty, their rightful duty to raise their voices and to take immediate practical measures to prevent the implementation of the plots that are being hatched against the Arab city of Jerusalem, which, having been abandoned at Camp David, now faces the danger of falling once and for all into the clutches of Zionism, aided and abetted by world imperialism and colonialism, led by the US.

The city of Jerusalem has always been a focus of the conflict between the Arabs and the Muslims on the one hand and the Zionist movement and colonialism on the other; this is why there have

been constant Zionist conspiracies aimed at winning the battle over this city. The Zionists have made every effort to Judaise it and expel its Muslim and Christian Arab population. Then in 1967, they announced that it has been annexed to the state of Israel and proceeded to violate its holy places. These acts of violation included the crime of the burning of the Aqsa Mosque and the carrying out of excavations beneath the rear wall of the Haram in preparation for demolishing it and building the Temple in its place, and also the employment of all available ways and means to change the character of the city and to Judaise it.

Since the Camp David conference, Sadat has stated that he agreed with Begin that Jerusalem should remain united and Begin has announced that "Jerusalem shall remain united as the capital of Israel for ever" and that only the "Israeli" flag shall fly over it. This means that the signing of the Camp David agreements was a momentous operation that has prejudiced the essentially Arab character of Jerusalem and dealt a cruel blow to its holy places that have been protected by the Arabs and Muslims for century after century. To maintain and protect them they have lost armies of martyrs and made innumerable sacrifices, generation after generation, to maintain them and protect them. For sixty years the Palestinian people have been making immense sacrifices; they have been killed, expelled, they have shed their blood and suffered cruelly for the sake of Jerusalem and Palestine, the sacred homeland.

Is the present generation of Arabs and Muslims to suffer the ultimate and everlasting humiliation than which nothing could be more shameful, of seeing Jerusalem Judaised and established as the capital of Israel, when we have the resources and the capacities to rescue it? I am confident that true believers throughout the Arab and Islamic world, and first and foremost in Egypt, will rise up as one man and condemn any attempt to forsake our holy city, declaring a holy war to rescue it. I am confident that they will condemn the Camp David agreements, clinging until their last breath to our holy Jerusalem of which the freedom fighters of Palestine regard themselves the custodians, and which they will never forsake even though they stand alone, welcoming the honour of martyrdom on behalf of Jerusalem which is so dear to the heart of every believer.

¹⁵⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), September 26, 1978, p. 2.

ARAB WORLD 529

On behalf of the Palestinian people, of their revolutionaries and of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, I call on the faithful masses of the Arab and Islamic worlds, on all scholars and thinkers, on all leaders, officials and rulers, to be aware of the danger that threatens Jerusalem and to raise their voices in declaration of a holy war and to take measures to confront this new major conspiracy against Jerusalem and Palestine, the land of the prophets and their missions. I call on them to declare their rejection of any infringement of the Arab character of Jerusalem, whatever the cost and whatever the sacrifices involved. I call on them to initiate serious, effective and constructive action to rescue Jerusalem, to liberate Palestine and to recover the rights of the struggling people of Palestine in defence of the life of this land and its holy places.

I call on God to witness that I have said my say. This message is for the people, let them believe in it and fight for it.

Revolution until victory.

295

Statements by representatives of social, syndical and commercial organizations in Jerusalem condemning the Camp David agreements as a violation of all Arab summit resolutions and the Arab League Charter (excerpts)¹⁵¹

Jerusalem, September 28, 1978

Accordingly, and in the midst of recent events and developments which followed the Camp David agreements, a large number of inhabitants of Jerusalem and its administrative district (Gaza) held a meeting which included representatives of all professions, Muslim and Christian religious groups, women's organisations, the Chamber of Commerce, charitable institutions and clubs, together with a number of city notables and judges, at the headquarters of the Arab graduates club in Jerusalem, and resolved in majority to issue the following statement:

1. Those attending declare their strong opposi-

¹⁵¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), October 11, 1978, p. 7. tion to the Camp David agreements and all its documents, appendices and interpretations appended by those who put their signature to it.

- 2. The Camp David agreement is in contradiction with the national struggle. In reality, the agreement is a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. Its primary aim is to exclude Egypt from the Arab front and to transform the struggle for the Palestine cause into a struggle over an area of occupied Egyptian lands.
- 3. The Camp David agreement is a flagrant violation of all Arab summit resolutions in general and of the sixth¹⁵² and seventh¹⁵³ (Algiers and Rabat) summits in particular. These resolutions clearly stated their rejection of separate settlements and called upon the confrontation forces to act in concert in all fields. The agreement also violates the Arab League Charter and the Arab Common Defence Pact.
- 4. Furthermore, the Camp David agreement openly violates all successive UN resolutions pertaining to the Palestine question, defies the international will and is a flagrant attack upon the natural rights of the Palestinian people.
- 5. The agreement has undermined Arab solidarity and enshrined a basic Zionist principle, namely the principle of bilateral negotiations with each Arab country separately, with all that this entails by way of imposing a logic of regionalism and regional interests in dealing with the conflict. This is a logic that does immense harm to the Palestinian cause.
- 6. The Camp David agreement denies the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, ignores the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians, and also omits to mention their right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent and free state on their soil.
- 7. The Camp David agreement did not commit Israel to withdrawal from Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the other Arab territories. The self-rule being proposed clearly implies an entrenched occupation with stronger roots, an annexation of land and permanent Israeli guardianship over our people. This is an exact copy of the Begin scheme which all

¹⁵² See docs. 331–333 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

¹⁵⁸ See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

segments of our people in the occupied land have rejected.

- 8. Those attending believe that the struggle of the Palestinian people has been and remains an inseparable part of the struggle of the Arab peoples for unity, freedom and progress, since the region's destiny is common to them all no matter how hard the enemy forces try to picture it otherwise. The Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied land are one and indivisible.
- 9. Those attending affirm that the national and historic rights of our people cannot be tampered with, directly or indirectly, because these rights belong to no one generation, state or leader. The cause of Palestine is an Arab cause and an Arab responsibility. No Arab state is entitled to abandon or compromise it.
- 10. Those attending affirm that there can be no peace without total and real withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories and the granting to the people of Palestine of their right to return, to self-determination and to the creation of their free and independent state on their soil. Likewise, peace cannot be established in the region unless Palestinian Arab sovereignty is exercised over Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the leadership of the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people.
- 11. Those attending believe that the Camp David agreement, because of all its above dangers, requires that the Arab nation, governments, peoples and organisations adopt towards it a bold stand which would constitute an appropriate response to the will of the Arab masses and their national aspirations.
- 12. All citizens in the occupied territory are called upon to stand united against all attempts currently being made to get them to accept the self-rule that is mentioned in the Camp David agreement, and to condemn any cooperation in this regard.

Jerusalem, September 28, 1978

[signed] Shaykh Hilmi al-Muhtasib, Head of the Islamic Authority; Shaykh Sa'd al-Din al-Alami, Judge and Legal Mufti of Jerusalem; Shaykh Akrama Sabri, Director of Preaching and Guidance; Dr. Lutfi Lahham, Deputy Patriarchal Director, Greek Catholic community; Attorney Anwar Nusaybeh; Attorney Sa'id Alauddin; Judge

Taysir Kan'an; Judge Hasan Abu Mayzar; Miss Zalikha Shihabi, President, the Arab Women's Federation; Dr. Amin Khatib, President, Charities Unions and Associations; Dr. Samir Katibeh, representing the Doctors' Syndicate; Attorney Jirvis Khoury, representing the Lawyers' Syndicate: Engineer Ibrahim Daqqaq, representing the Engineers' Syndicate; Dr. Nassib Abd al-Latif, representing the Dentists' Syndicate; Pharmacist Isma'il al-Tazziz, representing the Pharmacists' Syndicate; Mr. Fayiq Barakat, member, Jerusalem municipality; Mr. Muhammad Abu Omar, member, Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Abd al-Ra'uf Abu 'Asab, representing the Syndicate of Restaurant and Café Owners; Mr. Fayiz Abd al-Nur, member, Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Nabil al-'Izza, representing the syndicate and employees of the Electricity Company; Mr. Salah Zahhika, representing the Employees' Club; Engineer Hasan al-Qiq, Engineers' Syndicate; Dr. Amin Khatib, President, the Arab Graduates Club; Dr. Abdullah Biri, member, Executive Committee, Arab Graduates Club; Dr. Victor Batarisa, member, Executive Committee, Arab Graduates Club; Dr. Azmi Shu'aibi, member, Executive Committee, Arab Graduates Club; Dr. Abd al-Muhsin Hamma, member, Executive Committee, Arab Graduates Club; Dr. Hashim Khalil Isa, member, Executive Committee, Arab Graduates Club.

296

Statement by the government of Qatar declaring that the Camp David agreements do not constitute a proper basis for a comprehensive settlement (excerpt)¹⁵⁴

Qatar, September 28, 1978

The Cabinet has studied, with the attention required by concern for higher Arab interests in this situation that is so fateful for the Arab nation, the results of the Camp David conference as contained in the two documents that were signed after the conference.

The Cabinet considers it to be its duty to publish the decision it reached after studying the documents. It is as follows:

¹⁵⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Uruba (Qatar), September 28, 1978, p. 8.

ARAB WORLD 531

In conformity with the unanimous decision of the Arabs which has been supported by the whole international community, a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict must be based on the following:

- 1. The implementation of resolution 242. The enforcement of the principles and provisions of this resolution entail first and foremost the need for Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories she occupied by force of arms in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.
- 2. Recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This requires that this people should recover their homeland and enjoy the right to self-determination in the territory of that homeland.
- 3. Inasmuch as the results of the Camp David conference do not include a clear acknowledgement of these principles by Israel, or an unambiguous undertaking on her part to respect them;

And in view of the fact that these results ignore the PLO which, as stipulated by the resolutions of the summit conferences, is the sole representative of the Palestinian people;

And in the light of the State of Qatar's commitment to the unanimous decision of the Arabs and to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, in particular those held in Algiers and Rabat;

The Cabinet declares that the results set out in the documents of the Camp David conference do not constitute a proper basis for a sound approach to the required just and comprehensive peaceful settlement.

The Cabinet calls on all the Arab states to appreciate the historical responsibility that confronts us all in this extremely critical situation. The most important thing imposed by their responsibility is that wisdom, coupled with devoted action, should prevail over the difficulties, whatever disagreements there may be, to ensure the achievement of that unity of ranks which is essential if, as we hope, our eternal nation is to win final victory.

297

Statement by the government of Bahrain reaffirming its support for the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences (excerpt)¹⁵⁵

Bahrain, late September, 1978

1. The government of the State of Bahrain affirms its commitment to the resolutions of the Algiers¹⁵⁶ and Rabat¹⁵⁷ conferences, in particular those on Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, including the City of Jerusalem, and the right of the Palestinian Arab people to their land and their homeland. It also affirms its commitment to the decision that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

- 2. The government of Bahrain, while supporting the Arab and international efforts that are being made to achieve these goals, and appreciating the efforts that have been made in this field, believes that the results so far achieved do not comprise the necessary resolutions and guarantees for the achievement of all these goals.
- 3. The government of Bahrain believes that the problem is one that concerns all Arabs, so that a just solution of it can only be achieved through Arab solidarity and the surmounting of all disagreements that are not of service to the higher interests of our nation. It therefore believes that the early convening of an Arab summit conference is an urgent national necessity.

¹⁵⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Uruba (Qatar), September 28, 1978, p. 14.

See docs. 331–333 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.
 See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

298

Television interview statements by King Husayn of Jordan discussing the questions which he has put to the US concerning the Camp David accords¹⁵⁸

Amman, late September, 1978

Herman: King Hussein, peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt are scheduled to start on October 10. President Carter says he's assured there's no impediment to a treaty being negotiated, and it may come in a very short time. Do you feel that you, that the Kingdom of Jordan, must make a final decision to join the process or reject it before that treaty is written?

A. I believe that we will act to do by our own consciences in the very near future, and in particular we are awaiting, obviously, the answers of Washington regarding some questions we have put forward to Washington regarding the Camp David agreements and their details.

Herman: King Hussein, you have said that you will make your decision on joining or not joining the peace process when you get the answers to some questions, and we want to ask you about those, obviously, in a moment; but first, Pd like to ask you what risks you see if you should decide not to join the peace process—what risks for Jordan?

A. I believe the risks are great in any event. What is involved is not only the future of Jordan as such, or others in the area, but the future of all the people of this area for many, many years to come. That's why we are very interested in answers that would clarify the position as far as we are concerned. We have been involved with this problem since 1967. Security Council Resolution 242159 was adopted then. We were involved in its formulation. We were associated with the United States in even the language, and we understood that the United States government at the time had a certain interpretation for 242. We would like to know now if this interpretation stands, if it has eroded, if there are any changes. We would like to have these answers; we would like to consult our people; and certainly, since it is a Palestinian problem, we would like to get the

Randal: Your Majesty, both President Sadat and President Carter seem to be suggesting that if you don't come into the negotiations as outlined in Camp David, that Egypt will negotiate in your stead. Does this seem like a real risk to you, since, to many people, it seems odd and almost impossible to find any Palestinians on the West Bank who would dare go ahead and negotiate the future of the West Bank in the face of the combined opposition of Jordan and also of the PLO?

A. What we feel is very odd, but it is a fact is that we've been invited to join in specific areas to implement an agreement which has been formulated without our participation. We feel, ourselves, that there is no moral or legal obligation for us to be involved in such an agreement. There are two agreements that emanated from Camp David, 160 and we don't think that they are balanced in terms of, for example, the issues being perfectly clear on the Egyptian-Israeli issue, and yet in terms of the other occupied territories, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan—there doesn't seem to exist a balance between these two, and we will have to wait and see. We will not just rush into any process without knowing exactly where it's going to lead us to. We are very interested in peace. Peace is the dearest objective that we've always had, and when we spoke of peace-a just and durable peace in this area—we were alone, almost eleven years ago. Peace is a dear objective to us, but we would like to know that-how we're going to achieve it and it's going to be durable, and the people after us are going to accept it and live with it.

Tunnell: Your Majesty, the Camp David framework, as it applies to the West Bank, mentions the legitimate rights of the Palestinians; it provides for an Israeli troop withdrawal, and provides for a major change in the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a whole. Yet still you say that it's not specific enough, and that you need further clarification; it's unacceptable as it is. What sort of clarification are you asking for?

A. The questions that we are posing are the

Palestinian people as a whole involved in making the decisions on where we go from here. That's why we are very aware of the implication of any substitute, not only for now but for a long, long time to come, and we want to be sure that we do the right thing.

¹⁵⁸ Interview conducted by George Herman, Jon Randal and Doug Tunnell and broadcast on CBS; transcript supplied, on request, by CBS News.

¹⁵⁹ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹⁶⁰ Docs. 153 and 154 above.

following. Does the United States intend to be a full partner in any negotiations regarding the West Bank and Gaza, and of the Palestinian question in general? At what stage of the negotiations will the United States participate, and in what role?

We are asking, why has the duration of five years been chosen for the transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza. And any reference I might make, incidentally, to the five-year transitional period following this particular question is just for convenience. We do not necessarily accept five years as being a necessity, really.

What is the geographical definition of the West Bank, and of Gaza, in the view of the United States government? Is Arab Jerusalem and the surrounding Arab areas incorporated into Israel after June, 1967 included in the definition of the West Bank? As you know, the so-called Greater Jerusalem now almost occupies one-fifth of the occupied West Bank.

At the end of the five years of transitional arrangements, what would be the status of the West Bank and of Gaza from the point of view of sovereignty? There is a clear reference to sovereignty in the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, but this is most unclear in terms of the framework for the rest of the occupied territories.

Will any Israeli forces remain in any part of the West Bank and of Gaza after the transitional period of five years? If so, by what right and with what justification? During the transitional period of self-government in the West Bank and Gaza, under what higher authority, supervisory authority, would the self-governing authority operate? Would it be a United Nations or a similar mutual international supervisory authority? What source would provide the budgetary needs of the self-governing authority? What would be the extent of its powers? What would constitute the limitations on its powers?

And then again, where the document refers to the self-governing authority which is to be constituted in the West Bank and Gaza area, does the jurisdiction of this authority extend to the part of Jerusalem which had been part of the West Bank when it fell under occupation in 1967, as well as other annexed areas around it, both in terms of territory and people?

At the end of the five-year transitional period, what would be the status of occupied Arab Jeru-

salem? What would happen to the Israeli settlements—and they are very numerous and extend throughout the area—in the occupied areas during and after the transitional period? What will be the Israeli obligation during the coming period, until the end of the transitional period, regarding the policy of settlements?

Will the Israeli citizens who reside at present in the settlements be eligible for participation in the establishment of the self-governing authority and its subsequent activities? What will be the status of the Israeli citizens residing in the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional period? And will there be any, and if so, what would their status be after the end of the transitional period?

At the end of the five-year transitional period, or whatever transitional period may be discussed or agreed upon, will the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza exercise in freedom the right of self-determination in order to decide their political future? What solution does the framework agreement envisage for the problem of the Palestinians living outside the occupied areas as refugees, and for the restoration of their rights?

What is the definition of Palestinians, in the view of Washington?

What does the framework agreement envisage for the future of the rest of the occupied Arab territories? In the definition of the security requirements in the area, does the United States government endorse the principle of reciprocity on these requirements, or does the United States government regard these requirements to be one-sided only?

And then, as Security Council Resolution 242 is stated to be the basis of any negotiations for the settlement of the West Bank, Gaza and other aspects of the conflict, what would the United States government do in the event of conflicting interpretations of the United—of the—between the negotiating parties, particularly in view of the United States government's previous interpretation—interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242, and commitments based thereon which were the basis of acceptance by Jordan of the said resolution?

Herman: Since you have these questions in writing before you, I presume that these are questions which you have already sent to the American government?

A. These questions have been incorporated into a list of questions that we have sent to the—

Herman: Were any of these questions asked of Ambassador Atherton or anybody else when you met with them?

A. We discussed the questions, or some of them, with Secretary Vance, when he came here. We covered more of them with Ambassador Atherton when he visited with us, and we have submitted them in writing, and we'd like to have answers in writing, so that we can start the process of discussion with our own people and with others in the area, and in particular, with the Palestinians everywhere.

Herman: Could you characterize those answers that you got? Could you characterize them as being satisfactory or unsatisfactory, or—?

A. I can't say at this stage that they covered every aspect of the problem and every area that I mentioned.

Randal: Sir, what you're really asking for, are you not, is a public commitment by the United States government to become a full partner in any negotiations on the West Bank, just the way that the United States was a full partner at Camp David?

A. Well, obviously, this is a very important issue, and we would like to know what the United States position is on—

Randal: I understand that, sir, but is it an obligation? For you to go into any West Bank negotiations, must the United States be a full negotiating partner?

A. We will certainly welcome that.

Randal: Welcome, but is it necessary?

A. I think it is very necessary.

Randal: It is necessary. How about—now, in this long list of questions, would I be right in thinking that every question must be answered to your entire satisfaction, or are there some points on which you would accept, let's put it, a certain vagueness?

A. We would like to move away from the area of vagueness. We have been living with it for eleven years now, following an agreement and an interpretation which we accepted, and as it resulted, accepted Security Council Resolution 242. The majority of problems in this area lie within the West Bank and Gaza and Jerusalem, in particular, and the Golan, and we would like to know exactly what we are invited to be involved

in, in terms of its possible outcome. We would like to know that we will, at the end of any exercise, contribute to the establishment of a just and durable peace.

Tunnell: But don't these questions, your majesty, almost constitute the whole basis for another entirely different round of negotiations?

A. They might, but if there is to be a solution, then these questions obviously have to be answered.

Tunnell: If they are answered to your satisfaction, publicly or in a written statement by the State Department, would you then be willing to go into the negotiations?

A. We will examine the answers here in Jordan, and we will discuss the options, with Palestinians in particular. I believe they must be involved in a process leading to a solution of the Palestinian problem, and with the Arabs in the area, and with friends all over the world, and we will decide what to do from then on.

Herman: Let me draw your attention to the possibility that not all of these questions will be answered to your satisfaction. Then what? I notice that the Mayor of Bethlehem, which is formerly—I guess you'd call it occupied territories—said that once the treaty is signed between Egypt and Israel, our chances of getting anything will be almost nil. Are you not up against a very hard place in this, if the treaty is signed?

A. That is why I have been taken aback by recent developments in that particular regard. I would have thought that no Egyptian-Israeli solution would be completed until solutions would have been worked out elsewhere as well.

Herman: What do you see as the scenario if the treaty is signed and these questions are not answered to your satisfaction? What is going to happen in your country and this area of the Middle East?

A. I believe that very serious problems will remain with us. The Palestinian problem would not have been resolved fully; the establishment of a just and durable peace would not been have accomplished and I think that the repercussions would be very serious in the entire area.

Herman: Pm not a diplomat, Your Majesty. When you say very serious problems are you talking about fighting, terrorism—what do you have in mind?

A. I believe that the majority of the Arab people will feel more and more that this important part of the world is not treated fairly, that this tremen-

dous area in terms of its natural resources, human resources, the human element is humiliated, and there is no balance between Israel and the rest of the Arabs in terms of the way we are looked upon by our friends and particularly in the United States, let alone the rest of the world.

Herman: That sounds like, for example, the possibility of another oil embargo?

A. I'm not talking necessarily of another oil embargo, but I'm saying that many eruptions could occur in this area and the future of the entire area could be in jeopardy.

Randal: Your Majesty, in December last year you went on record as predicting that if there was a separate peace between Israel and Egypt, there would be a series of upheavals, revolutions, cataclysms, etcetera. Now it looks as if that separate peace is at hand. Do you think in more definite terms what form this kind of upheaval might take?

A. There is a feeling, sir, throughout this area that after all this Arab world is contributing so much to the rest of the world, and particularly to the United States, in terms of the energy it produces, in terms of stabilizing even the world monetary system, in terms of this and that and the other, yet the reality is out of balance, looking at both sides of a tragedy and trying to bring people together—I think great progress has been made, but on the other hand there are questions that need to be answered. We in Jordan have not closed the doors to the possibility of being involved in a process that is clear in terms of its end result, and for the establishment of a just and durable peace, but if that doesn't happen, and all that happens is an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the rest of the Palestinian problem and the Palestinian tragedy, and that of its people and their suffering is ignored, I feel that there will be upheavals in this area that might not be limited in terms of their threat—they might threaten the very existence of an Arab nation in the long run.

Randal: It sounds as if it might be easier and wiser for you simply to stay out—what do you risk if you stay out? Do you risk having funds cut off by the United States? You seem to be at loggerheads with America now?

A. I hope I'm not, but I will do whatever my conscience dictates on me, and regardless of any outcome, and if there is a glimmer of hope, if

there is light at the end of the tunnel, if there is an idea where we are getting at, we will not hesitate to do what we can—any meaningful process for the establishment of a just and durable peace has been our objective all along, but if it is unclear and we don't know where we are going, and we are thinking too much for granted, then I'm afraid this is not an acceptable situation as far as you are concerned.

Randal: Am I right in thinking that the relations between your kingdom and the United States are at an all-time low? Certain things you said in recent days suggest it.

A. I wouldn't say that, but I'd say we are at a rather critical junction.

Tunnell: In what way, Your Majesty?

A. Well, we are being invited to join in a process without our being involved in defining the framework which we are meant to contribute so much—in fact, even if you come to think of it, our role as suggested in the framework is rather limited, and therefore exaggerated in that regard. And we do not—we resent in fact being portrayed as obstructionists in terms of the establishment of a just and durable peace; it's a very dear objective as far as we're concerned.

Tunnell: Do you feel that the United States is trying to portray you as an obstructionist?

A. I don't think so, I don't think the United States in particular—there are other parties involved in this issue, but these are the facts as things stand. I hope that this will be dispelled in fact.

Herman: How about President Sadat's remark on the 22nd that the negotiations on the West Bank will begin whenever King Hussein agrees to resume his responsibilities, as we have resumed ours in the Gaza Strip? Do you regard that as an insulting remark?

A. I wouldn't say insulting, but I have been taken aback because I was in touch with President Sadat before he went to Camp David, I was in touch with President Carter. I received a letter from President Sadat and he spoke of a comprehensive peace settlement, and against the background of Egypt's involvement with this problem, the Arab responsibility in '67 and what happened, I sort of tried to make sure that a comprehensive settlement was possible on the basis of total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied

Arab territories, return of Arab sovereignty over the Arab part of the city of Jerusalem, and recognition of the rights of Palestinians to self-determination under conditions of total freedom. This was the basis repeatedly mentioned by Egypt throughout the past period, and hence I was surprised by these developments.

Randal: Do you feel that basically the United States was in favor of a separate peace all along at Camp David and you are now being asked to accept the fig leaf? It certainly seems to me that that list of questions you put to the United States is almost impossible for Washington to answer without getting the Israelis up in arms. I don't blame you, but I get that impression; it is as if you were being put before a fait accompli on one hand, and you're doing the same to the Americans.

A. I don't mean to put anyone in a position of difficulty at all, but they are honest questions and we hope we receive honest answers to them.

Herman: Do you have the impression that the Rabat annointment of the PLO is the only legitimate statement for the Palestinian people is beginning to evaporate [sic]—do you get that impression when you talk to your fellow Arabs—

A. Certainly not.

Herman: Do you feel that the Arab countries still feel that the PLO rather than Jordan is the spokesman?

A. I think it's immaterial—PLO, other Palestinians, but the Palestinian people as a whole must be involved in any process leading to the establishment of peace.

Herman: You said not too long ago, a few weeks ago I guess, in an interview on ABC talking about Camp David, that you had tremendous faith in President Carter—that I believe in him, you said. Has that faith somewhat been weakened perhaps?

A. No, I still believe in his sincerity and his determination to contribute his utmost for the establishment of a just and durable peace in this area.

299

Press interview statements by DFLP Secretary-general Hawatmah calling for the protection of the right of the PLO to represent the Palestinian people and an alliance with the Soviet Union to confront the Camp David agreements¹⁶¹

Beirut, late September, 1978

Q. What courses of action are open to you in the wake of the Camp David accords?

A. Egypt has moved from confrontation with Israel to an alliance with her. As a consequence of its "wait-and-see" attitude and its policy of "open bridges," in spite of everything, with the United States, the Steadfastness Front is for the time being in a corner. We are absolutely powerless to do anything about the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement over the Sinai. We have to face up to this. But we do have the means to block the agreement designed to liquidate the Palestinian cause: our resistance will end up by having repercussions on the internal situation in Egypt and bringing about the collapse of the régime.

Q, If you manage to block the Camp David agreement on the Palestinian problem, Sadat will be very happy to have washed his hands of it and to have got back his Sinai. That would also suit Israel.

A. Not at all. The price to be paid for the separate agreement is not only a peace treaty with Israel and the demilitarisation of the Sinai. Sadat is committed to carrying out Begin's plan for autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and to sanctify the abandonment of Jerusalem and the rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the text of the Camp David accords states quite clearly that the process will go forward with Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian representatives and Jordan—if she agrees to join. However, Jordan's refusal had already been predicted as Husayn has been offered nothing. Sadat took responsibility in advance for the whole operation.

Following Camp David, the US carrot and stick policy towards Arab nationalist regimes such as Syria has re-evolved. From now on, Arab op-

¹⁶¹ Translated from the French text of the interview conducted by Bechir Zarak, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), no. 724 (September 25–October 1, 1978), p. 47.

ARAB WORLD 537

position must be crushed. Lebanon will be turned into a bloodbath for Syria, and above all the PLO, to drown in. Besides, each of the states of the Steadfastness Front is flanked by a watchdog: Algeria has Morocco, Libya has Egypt, South Yemen has Saudi Arabia, Syria and the PLO have Israel. Israel is going to take direct responsibility for the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon.

Faced with these imperialist policies, the Steadfastness Front must set itself three objectives:

- 1. Protect the PLO against the claims of Sadat or Husayn to represent the Palestinian people;
- 2. Transform the Steadfastness Front into a strategic, military and politically structured organism;
- 3. Move, in the sphere of relations with the USSR, from the status of friendship to that of an alliance on the same level as that between Egypt, Israel and the United States so as to assure Syria and the PLO the same Soviet guarantees which Cuba enjoyed in Angola and Ethiopia.
 - Q. Are you satisfied with the Saudi declaration?
- A. In my opinion it indicates Saudi complicity in the Camp David conspiracy because there is a clearly enunciated "yes" to Sadat's right to conclude a separate peace. In calling for an Arab summit, Saudi Arabia is seeking the reintegration of Sadat. After which the curtain would fall. Believe me, Saudi support for Sadat will grow more and more apparent in the days to come.

300

Communiqué issued by West Bank and Gaza leaders rejecting the Camp David agreement and reaffirming their commitment to the PLO¹⁶²

Jerusalem, October 1, 1978

In support of the stand of our people under occupation, and after reviewing the published documents of the Camp David Summit, we wish to stress that the results of the latter were an escalation of Sadat's capitulationist scheme against the achievements of the Palestinian people gained through struggle and bitter sacrifices, and confirmed at the Algiers and Rabat Summits and at the UN. These results also aim to strike at the Arab liberation movement in general and the Palestinian liberation movement in particular, and to drive them away from their strategic allies in the world liberation movement in order to restore the policy of imperialist pacts—a policy which has been rejected by our Arab masses. This policy will also lead to an increase in tension in the region and to a return to the Cold War policy. This outcome will be blamed on the failure of Camp David.

The self-rule scheme for the West Bank and Gaza, which was a major part of the agreement, is meant to give a cover of legitimacy to the occupation of our land, and to consolidate it. We therefore consider it a blatant plot to ignore our people's aspirations and their right to self-determination and to establish their independent state under the PLO leadership.

Our people have warned several times against this capitulationist scheme which will only lead to a separate peace and to the diffusion of Arab strength, in preparation for the liquidation of the Palestine cause to the advantage of our enemies.

The Palestinian people under occupation, being aware of these facts, and out of a feeling of historic responsibility on the Palestinian, Arab and international levels, wish to stress the following:—

- 1. That the Palestinian Arab people inside and outside the occupied territories are one and the same historically, and in their struggle and destiny.
- 2. Our people assert that the PLO is their sole legitimate representative and reject any tutelage or substitute leadership, whatever its form or role.
- 3. The self-rule project is rejected in form and substance, and we consider it a consolidation of the occupation, a continuation of the oppression of this people and of the usurpation of their legitimate rights.
- 4. We only see the possibility of a just and lasting peace in the area through the exercise by our people of their right to self-determination and to national independence following a total withdrawal from all territories, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

¹⁶² The communiqué was signed by 82 West Bank and Gaza leaders including the mayors of Ramallah, Nablus, al-Bira, Hebron, Halhul, Tulkarm, Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Bir Zeit. English text, Wafa (Beirut), October 2, 1978, pp. 6–7.

5. The return of Arab Palestinian sovereignty on Jerusalem, which is an inseparable part of the West Bank, is a historic and spiritual question on which there can be no compromise.

301

Memorandum submitted to President Sadat of Egypt by the members of the Revolutionary Council of July 23 criticizing the Camp David agreements as an attack on Arab unity, UN and Arab summit resolutions and the Arab League Charter (excerpts)¹⁶³

Cairo, October 1, 1978

To the President of the Republic;

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings.

What is happening during this period of the life of Egypt and the Arab nation will have serious effects on the present and future of both. We, the surviving members of the 23 July revolutionary council whose principles, it is declared, still guide the steps of national action, believe it to be our duty as Egyptians and Arabs to give our views on what has happened. This is something that concerns us as much as it concerns every zealous and loyal Egyptian. If the different parties of the enemy, who is the aggressor and in the wrong those for and those against-have discussed the matter, that is all the more reason why we, whose rights have been usurped and robbed, should be ready to listen to the constructive views of those who try to warn against the consequences of Camp David.

Firstly, Mr. President, you and all Egyptians should realise that we, like the rest of our people, seek peace, and that our dearest wish is that our land should be liberated from the pollution of Israeli occupation. But at the same time, we know that there is a difference between a true peace that is based on justice and security, that maintains national sovereignty and restores their rights to those to whom they belong and ensures their security, and a false peace that neither restores rights nor establishes security, but rather invalidates the struggle of the past and destroys hopes for the future. So as not to incriminate ourselves or

Your words and undertakings may be summed up as follows:

- 1. Not to cede an inch of the Arab territories that were occupied in June 1967, and the necessity for Israel's withdrawal from all those territories, which are: Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai.
- 2. That to attain permanent peace the Palestine problem must be solved on the basis of the legitimate rights of the Arabs of Palestine, including their right to self-determination, that a just solution must be found for the refugee problem, and that this is the natural prelude to the solution of the Middle East problem, it is the crux of the problem.
- 3. That the PLO should be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. You stressed this a few days before you went to Jerusalem in the presence of Yasir Arafat in the People's Assembly. 164
- 4. That it is impossible to sign a separate peace treaty with Israel because of the disasters this would bring on the Arab nation.
- 5. That the principal basis of the confrontation of our enemy and the recovery of our rights, both now and in the future, is the unity of Arab ranks, and the principal breach through which the enemy can penetrate is the smashing of this unity.

The Camp David agreements have absolutely amazed us because they conflict with the above. The signing has been announced of two agreements:

The first is called a Framework for Peace in the Middle East, ¹⁶⁵ and the second, a Framework

anyone else, we wish to remind ourselves and you of the words you spoke, the statements you made and the commitments you entered into on so many occasions both at home and abroad, when you addressed the citizens of Egypt here at public meetings or in the People's Assembly or in the Central Committee, or to the leaders of the Arab nation at the summit conferences, or in your letters to them or your talks with them, or at the meetings of international, African and European organisations, or the Organisation of Non-aligned Countries at the UN or at the Security Council, where all were convinced of the veracity of our claims, and the justice of our cause.

¹⁶³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Safir (Beirut), October 8, 1978.

¹⁶⁴ See doc. 283 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.165 Doc. 153 above.

ARAB WORLD 539

for a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. 166

- IV. The provisions of the agreement conflict with the Charter of the Arab League and its stipulations regarding joint defence agreements, cultural and economic agreements and plans for the economic integration of the member states. This raises a number of questions which we find it difficult to answer, such as:
- (a) What would be Egypt's attitude to the Arab nation if Israel attacked one of its states?
- (b) What ideas can Egypt have in common with the Arab nation when she has cooperated with and befriended the Zionist idea that is now being promoted, even though Israel still occupies our territory?
- (c) How great will be the confusion of the ideas of Egyptian youth when an attempt is made to explain the nature of the new friendly relations with Israel, and how can these relations be reconciled with our relations with the rest of the Arab nation?
- (d) What economic cooperation or integration can we accomplish or construct with the Arab nation when the Egyptian and Israeli economies have become interlocked in the manner prescribed by the agreement; what will happen to the Arab boycott of Israel, and will those states enforce this boycott against Egypt too?
- (e) What will happen to the Arab support now provided to Egypt by the Arab countries? and what is the alternative?
- (f) What will be the position of the more than one million Egyptians now working in the Arab countries, their moral position vis-à-vis their brother Arabs who will accuse them of having abandoned them? What will be their economic position and that of Egypt if their opportunities of working in these countries are restricted?

These are a few of the many forms of estrangement, problems, losses and fragmentation that will arise when Egypt is separated and isolated from the Arab entity.

These are the dangers we have become aware of after our analysis of the agreement, and it is doubtless these same dangers that have led all the Arab countries to refuse to support or accept it, just as they led the Egyptian foreign minister to submit his resignation in protest against it.

We believe that this agreement can be summed up as follows:

- 1. Arab fragmentation that will deprive the Arab nation of its most important weapon.
- 2. The isolation of Egypt from the Arab nation with the aim of weakening Egypt and the Arab nation, so that both may fall into the clutches of Israeli colonisation of the area.
- 3. The legitimisation of everything that is illegitimate about Israel and of her plans for the area, in particular as the Arab cause will be withdrawn from the sphere of international institutions and world public opinion.
- 4. Egypt and the rest of the Arab nation will lack security and have their sovereignty diminished in the face of Israel's increasing military strength, supported by the US.
- 5. The liquidation of the Palestine problem and the Palestinian Arab people to Israel's advantage.

All this is in addition to the efforts that are now being made to direct public opinion so that the Egyptians are persuaded to deny their Arabism and believe that their Arab links are the cause of their tribulations, and pin their hopes on the delusive mirage of progress and revival once this agreement is concluded, and on the reduction of military burdens that they imagine will follow the peace treaty. In fact this expenditure has not been greatly reduced because now that the agreement has been concluded, Israel will be trying to conclude deals with the U.S., involving the most modern armaments and military equipment at a cost of 13.7 billion dollars. And this is in addition to the armaments already in their arsenals that were given them after the second Sinai disengagement agreement.

Obviously, whatever peace treaties are concluded, we cannot allow ourselves to be unarmed and unprepared.

Furthermore, our economy can only be set to rights if we set ourselves to rights. And much more money is being wasted in all sorts of ways in Egypt than can be saved by cutting down the cost of armaments.

Today, Mr. President, we believe that it is still possible to realise the higher national interests of the Arab nation. This can be done by uniting Arab ranks so that the Arab leaders may agree on a unified attitude for the confrontation of the dangers that threaten the future of the Arab nation. And this must be done before any other

¹⁶⁶ Doc. 154 above.

steps are taken towards the implementation of this agreement.

May God guide the steps of all of us towards the welfare of our country and our nation and towards peace.

[Signed:] Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Zakariya Muhi al-Din, Husain al-Shaf'i, Kamal al-Din Husayn.

302

Statement by the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq submitting certain proposals for consideration by Arab forces opposed to the Camp David agreements¹⁶⁷

Baghdad, October 1, 1978

Great people of Iraq, Struggling masses of the Arab nation,

Since the results of the Camp David conference were published the Arab masses have been feeling the profoundest concern as regards both their present and their future, because of the gravity of the criminal and treasonable conspiracy that the conference has laid bare. The Revolutionary Command Council, meeting both by itself and at joint meetings with the Party's National and Regional Commands, has been following the course of events and the reaction to them in the Arab homeland.

In spite of the pain expressed by the Arab masses everywhere, and their condemnation of the treasonable conspiracy, official and popular opposition to these dangerous and treasonable agreements has not arisen to the historic level of resolute energetic rejection of this conspiracy which prejudices the destiny, the rights and the honour of the Arab nation. It has been clear that the Arab arena is awaiting a tried champion capable of confronting the challenges and dispersing the terrible darkness and putting an end to the disappointment that has nearly overwhelmed extensive circles of the Arab masses.

The eyes of the Arab people everywhere have been on your great revolution in this region, and on your valiant Party that has borne the honourable trust and the responsibility for Arab struggle for more than thirty years. It was thus inevitable that your Party should take a courageous historic stand, and that your revolution, which embodies our historical responsibility in the full sense of the word and the burden of Iraq's history, both ancient and modern, should come to the defence of the honour of the nation, as it has always done in the remote and more recent past. After exhaustive study of the situation and of possible developments at the Arab and international levels, and guided by the instructions of the Party's National and Regional Commands, the Revolutionary Command Council has resolved the following:

1. To regard Iraq as being, as it has always been, part of the northern military front in confrontation with the Zionist enemy and of any front contiguous with the Zionist entity that can be activated against the enemy in the future. Iraq declares its readiness to send effective military forces to the Syrian theatre immediately so as to ensure that there is an Arab force capable of confronting the enemy and frustrating the plans of colonialism aimed at bringing the Arab nation to its knees and imposing solutions and settlements that are humiliating to its honour and prejudicial of its historical rights. We call on the Syrian government to respond fully to this historic national move and to take the necessary measures to facilitate the stationing of units of the Iraqi army on the front line of the front with the enemy.

II. The grave dangers that will result from Egypt's withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli conflict in the event of the Camp David agreements being implemented, demand that all the Arab governments take a serious and responsible stand to prevent their implementation. Iraq calls for consultations with a view to the convening of an Arab summit conference to study the Arab situation and to reach agreement on serious joint Arab steps to prevent any Arab party accepting a solution that prejudices national rights and issues of destiny, and exposes the Arab nation to the dangers of division and fragmentation. Iraq hereby expresses its readiness to act as host to this conference.

III. Iraq appreciates the paralysing economic situation that Egypt has suffered from for many years and, inasmuch as the Arabs' success in preventing the implementation of the Camp David agreements and bringing Egypt back to the fold of joint Arab action will involve Egypt in

¹⁶⁷ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Thawra (Baghdad), October 1, 1978.

ARAB WORLD 541

economic burdens that she cannot bear on her own, and should the Egyptian government be prepared to relinquish the Camp David agreements, Iraq calls on the financially strong Arab states to set up a national fund to aid Egypt and ensure that her financial requirements are met, and also to meet the financial requirements of the western, northern and eastern confrontation fronts and those of the PLO and of the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied territory to enable them to hold out. This fund should be established under the terms of an agreement signed by and adhered to by all the parties concerned, under the supervision of the whole Arab family of nations. Iraq proposes that this fund should total not less than nine billion dollars per year, which total could be increased in the light of the requirements of the battle, for a period of ten years.

Iraq also proposes that contributions to this fund should be as follows:

- 1. Iraq—one billion dollars;
- 2. Libya—one and a half billion dollars;
- 3. Algeria—half a billion dollars;
- 4. Saudi Arabia—three billion dollars;
- 5. Kuwait—one and a half billion dollars;
- 6. Qatar—half a billion dollars;
- 7. The Arab Emirates—one billion dollars.

Of this total, five billion dollars per annum should be allocated to Egypt and the remainder to the confrontation fronts to cover their military requirements on the road to steadfastness and liberation.

Struggling masses of the Arab nation, Great Iraqi people,

At times of severe trial, principles and resolutions are put to the test, as are the extent of patriotism and attachment to the Arab nation. By the historic stand we are taking we shall surmount, through a spirit of lofty nationalism, the attempts of certain parties to denigrate the Baath Party and the revolution of the Iraqi region, in an attempt to weaken its revolutionary enthusiasm for the cause of Palestine and the Arab struggle against the schemes of colonialism and Zionism. These parties have failed to realise that Iraq has always played a conspicuous part in the struggle against Zionism for the liberation of Palestine. since the time of the Assyrians and Babylonians, at the time of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, then in the 1948 war and the war of October 1973. The Baath Party has maintained the honour of the

national struggle for more than thirty years, and has been known in the theatres of that struggle for its inflexible faith in national principles and for its sublime readiness to make sacrifices on their behalf. In this critical situation the honour of maintaining these principles and the values of the struggle once again require that its members perform the task of entering into difficult arenas, as valiant champions, to protect the honour of the nation and its historical rights.

Arab masses everywhere,

When we fight the battle of honour, whatever the sacrifices involved in it, we depend on your lofty preparedness for sacrifice and to give the conspiracy the answer it deserves, so that the Arab nation may take its proper place, in freedom and dignity, and perform its great role of building civilisation in the service of mankind, on a basis of justice, right and peace. For history has once again chosen the Iraqi people as it chose their ancestors before them, for the honourable defence of the nation and usurped Palestine. We call on all friends and all who are struggling for right and freedom everywhere in the world, to support the Arabs in their just struggle for liberation and the recovery of their legitimate rights.

303

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt to the People's Assembly explaining the results of the Camp David agreements (excerpts)¹⁶⁸

Cairo, October 2, 1978

Brothers and Sisters.

I know that you are eager to hear me talk about the results of the Camp David discussions. I will start by saying that the results of the Camp David talks are the fruit of two momentous events in the history of the Arab nation: the first was the Ramadan War and the second was the Egyptian peace initiative. Had it not been for the Ramadan-October War there would have been no peace initiative, since my trip to Jerusalem was not based on a position of weakness and shakiness—

¹⁶⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), October 3, 1978, pp. 10, 17.

it was crowned with the honour of the heroes who gave their lives, and their courage as fighters so that there might be peace on earth.

In my speech to the Knesset on November 20,¹⁶⁹ I told the whole world that our nation does not take action from a position of weakness or shakiness. On the contrary, it possesses the competence of strength and stability which give it wisdom deriving from a sincere desire for peace, arising from a civilised awareness that to avoid inevitable disaster we and you and the whole world have no alternative to establish a permanent and just peace unshaken by storms and unmoved by doubt and unimpaired by evil designs or distorted intentions.

In the same speech I told the people of Israel: There was a huge high wall between us, which you tried to build over a quarter of a century. But it was smashed in 1973. I went on to tell them: There was a wall of continuously blazing and escalating psychological war. There was a wall of intimidation with the forces capable of sweeping away the Arab nation from one end to the other. It was a wall spreading the rumour that we are a nation that has become a motionless corpse. Indeed, some of you said that even after the passage of fifty years the Arab nation would not be able to rise again.

I told them all this in the Knesset, using these very words. I also said: It was a wall that threatened us with annihilation and death if we tried to use our legitimate rights to liberate our occupied territory. I also said: We should recognise together that this wall fell down and collapsed in 1973. This is precisely what I said to the Israeli Knesset and millions of people throughout the world followed what I said intently with a hope that had been impossible, the hope for peace.

So the peace initiative, brothers and sisters, was

So the peace initiative, brothers and sisters, was not a television show to arouse superficial emotions, as some adolescents alleged, nor was it a show of surrender, as some of those who indulge in overbidding maintain.

Nor was the peace initiative a deceitful torch that glowed for a time only to be extinguished and to disappear into darkness. As the leaders and peoples of the world have admitted, the peace initiative was a unique historical event, which challenged by its sudden impetus the terrible

barrier of hatred, bitterness and black feelings that had accumulated and increased over thirty years. It was natural that this barrier built by bodies and blood should be shaken and there arise in its place a new harbinger of good news announcing to the whole world a message of joy and hope which the whole world echoes in the hope that the October War will be the last war.

All forces influencing the course of the whole world supported the Egyptian initiative and the will for peace was victorious. I therefore tell you that but for the peace initiative there would have been no Camp David conference, but for the peace initiative the President of the strongest and richest country in the world would not have decided to devote all his efforts to the cause of peace for nearly two weeks, setting aside all his responsibilities except that for establishing peace. This is something that has never happened in American history and has never been done before by the head of a major state either in ancient or modern times.

As I told the American people, President Carter has devised a new system to deal with the most dangerous international problems, a system that is worth following if the leaders of the world want to spare the people of the world the miseries of acute disagreements, constant tension and cold wars.

However, brothers and sisters, the Camp David peace discussions were not easy or tractable. Violent storms nearly destroyed them until the early hours of the last day. I expect you have heard that on Friday, only two days before the end of the conference, I decided to leave Camp David for Washington. Had it not been for the intervention of President Carter and his wisdom, persistence and truthful and honest words, we should not have been able to set our feet firmly on the right road which, God willing and through good will, will lead to a genuine and permanent peace.

When I was in Washington I told the American people that they should be proud of their President. From this podium I say to our people: Our history and the history of human struggle will place President Carter in the forefront of the world leaders who have changed the face of history from hatred to love, from war to peace.

On your behalf and on behalf of our people I addressed an invitation from this podium to Presi-

¹⁶⁹ Doc. 301 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

dent Carter to visit Egypt to sign the peace agreement. I do not doubt for a moment that every Egyptian man and woman will look forward to this visit so that they may express great appreciation to a great man.

Brothers and sisters, at Camp David we had our Egyptian proposal which has been published and broadcast. There was also an Israeli proposal which we could not accept at all. Then there was an American position between the two sides which sought, with immense and continuous efforts, to ensure that the conference should achieve positive steps that would pave the way towards the establishment of peace. Our position was based on incontrovertible facts that we have not deviated from. The first fact was that we went to Camp David committed to all the Arab and international pacts—complete liberation of the land, insistence on the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and a firm belief in a permanent, just and stable peace that cannot be shaken by storms or tempests. The second fact was that we did not go to Camp David to seek to conclude a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. The problem is not only Egypt and Israel, and any separate peace between Egypt and Israel, or between any of the Arab confrontation countries and Israel will not establish permanent and just peace in the whole area. Indeed, I said more than that to you, and in my speech to the Knesset I said that even if peace was achieved between all the Arab confrontation states and Israel without a just solution of the Palestine problem, that would not achieve the permanent peace that the whole world insists on.

The third fact was that we did not accept the invitation to Camp David to seek a partial solution in the sense that we would end the state of war at this stage and postpone the whole problem to a later stage. This is not the radical solution that will take us to permanent peace.

The fourth fact was that we did not go to Camp David to agree on another disengagement in Sinai, or the Golan, or the West Bank. That would only delay the lighting of the fuse to some time in the future.

Thus, brothers and sisters, the talks followed two parallel lines. The first line was agreement on a framework for peace that could form a basis for talks towards a comprehensive and just solution with all the Arab parties—Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Palestine. The second line was agreement on a framework for peace that could serve as the basis for talks towards a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

The document of the first framework¹⁷⁰ invites all the Arab confrontation states—Syria, Jordan and Lebanon—to take part in the negotiations and conclude peace treaties on the same basis that decided the framework of the negotiations towards the just and comprehensive solution in its general outlines, and the framework for negotiations towards the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Moreover, this document, the document of the comprehensive solution, contained more detailed guidelines on the Palestine problem, although it left it to the negotiations to discuss other points that have to be dealt with by the parties concerned.

We agreed that the basis for the negotiations between Egypt and Israel, which are to end before three months, as regards withdrawal from Sinai, should be the same as the basis for the negotiations between Syria and Israel on withdrawal from the Golan. This is because the problem as regards Sinai is of the same kind as the problem as regards the Golan. This was our first plan, which I mentioned to you at the beginning of my speech. It will then be up to the Syrian authorities to choose and decide what they want and they will have to face their people and history, as we have drawn up the bases for the comprehensive settlement, and what applies to Sinai automatically applies to the Golan.

As for Jordan, it was invited to take part in the negotiations that will decide the future of the West Bank and Gaza, in the presence of the representatives of the Palestinian people, the owners of the land and of sovereignty. As for Lebanon, it was invited to take part in the negotiations that will decide the future of its peace relationship with Israel.

This was the general line that we adhered to at Camp David in accordance with the general bases that will lead us to the road of the comprehensive solution and the achievement of permanent and just peace.

If we deal with the matter in accordance with the details that have been decided on, this is the situation: Under the first framework—the agree-

¹⁷⁰ Doc. 153 above.

ment on the framework for peace, which lays down the basis of negotiations towards the comprehensive solution—there are two points as regards the Palestine issue, which is the essence of the problem. The first point has to do with what must be achieved by negotiations after only three months. It determines the principles that must govern the rights of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza in a five-year transitional period.

The second point is related to negotiations that are to take place two years later and three years before the end of the transitional period. It has to do with deciding the future of the Palestinian people inside and outside the West Bank and Gaza. Jordan has been invited to these negotiations, that could start immediately; and also to those that take place during the transitional period with the representatives of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as other Palestinians, in addition to Egypt and Israel.

The negotiations of the transitional period, which could start at once, are based on the establishment of the following new conditions:

- 1. Complete self-government for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, based on free elections.
- 2. The immediate termination of Israeli military and civil rule as soon as the Palestinian self-governing authority is elected.
- 3. The complete rule of the Palestinian self-governing authority will take the place of the Israeli military and civil government in all matters that come within the competence of the latter.
- 4. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to specific positions beyond which they will not go, these positions being for Israel's security.
- 5. A strong local police force will be formed immediately from the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It has been provided for that this force can include Jordanians, in view of the fact that a large number of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have acquired Jordanian nationality.
- 6. Joint patrols of Jordanian and Israeli forces will form observation posts to safeguard the security of the frontier during the transitional period.

The ending of Israeli military rule and the establishment of Palestinian rule will mean the immediate release of thousands of young Pal-

estinians—prisoners and detainees.

Turning to the negotiations that are to take place in two years, which is the second stage of the transitional period, representatives of the Palestinian people, Jordan, Egypt and Israel will take part in these negotiations, which will be held on the following bases as laid down in the agreement:

- 1. Negotiations to solve all aspects of the Palestine problem as stipulated in the agreement—its political aspect and its humanitarian aspect related to the problem of the refugees, the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—and their relations with their neighbours—that is to say, self-determination, will be decided.
- 2. The solution resulting from the negotiations must recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements must be stated precisely.
- 3. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions of Security Council resolution 242.¹⁷¹
- 4. A joint committee of representatives of the Palestinians, Egypt, Jordan and Israel shall be formed to decide on the Palestinians who left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip being permitted to return.
- 5. The formation of a committee from Egypt, Israel and the other parties to prepare for the rapid, just and permanent implementation of measures to solve the problem of the refugees.

Then another extremely important principle was stipulated; it is that an agreement on the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be submitted to the Palestinians of those areas to vote on. That is to say, the Palestinian people have the right to veto this agreement and to reject it if they find that it does not realise their legitimate aspirations.

This is clearly set out in the first document we signed at Camp David. This means that nothing will be and nothing can be imposed on the Palestinian people.

Brothers and sisters, these are the advantages achieved by the first agreement on the framework for a comprehensive solution. But there are two matters that were not defined by the framework for a peace agreement. The first was the question of sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I shall not be revealing a

¹⁷¹ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

Arab world 545

secret, brothers and sisters, if I say that the matter of Jerusalem was provided for in the agreement until the last day of the discussions. But I found that the provision did not clearly express the historic Arab right to Jerusalem, a right which is in accord with the aspirations of 700 million Arabs and Muslims throughout the world.

Nor am I revealing a secret when I say that the American attitude as regards Jerusalem is completely identical with ours. I therefore requested that the provision on Jerusalem should be removed from the agreement and that the matter should be left to negotiations, but that the attitude of the various parties should be defined at once. It was decided that we should exchange letters with the US President on the views of Egypt, Israel and the US on the American President's reply to our letter and to that of Israel. These letters have been published. In his letter to me and his letter to the Prime Minister of Israel. the American President admits that America's attitude to the problem of Jerusalem, which I told you is identical with ours, is the same attitude it announced at the UN General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and the attitude that America later reaffirmed at the Security Council on July 1, 1969. This American attitude, to be exact, is that Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank, and that any changes made by Israel in Arab Jerusalem to change its status are null and void and illegal.

At the same time President Carter received a letter from me affirming Egypt's attitude on Jerusalem, which is as follows—and we submitted it in the Camp David talks:

Firstly, Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank, and the legitimate and historic Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored.

Secondly, Arab Jerusalem must be under Arab sovereignty.

Thirdly, the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem have the right to exercise all their legitimate national rights, as being an integral part of the Palestinian people of the West Bank.

Fourthly, the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, in particular resolutions 252 and 267, must be applied as regards Jerusalem, and all measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city must be considered null and void and their effects must be cancelled.

Fifthly, all people must have free access to Jerusalem, to practice religious rites and the right to visit the holy places without any discrimination.

Sixthly, each of the holy places of the three religions could be placed under the control and supervision of representatives of that religion.

Seventhly, essential functions in the city must not be divided. A joint municipal council, comprising equal numbers of Arabs and Israelis, could be set up to supervise the exercise of these functions.

In this way the city will not be divided.

This, in detail was Egypt's attitude both at the Camp David negotiations and in the exchange of letters between me and the American President, as you have read before.

As regards sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the transitional period, the agreement provided for the matter to be left to negotiations after the establishment of autonomy and the participation of the Palestinians in selfdetermination and their right to veto any decision by taking a free vote.

Our view on this was not concealed or crooked or hidden at the talks. In fact, at one of the tripartite meetings between me, President Carter and Mr. Begin, I said to Mr. Begin with President Carter as witness: Israel cannot claim for herself the right to sovereignty over this Palestinian territory—the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Neither Egypt nor Jordan have any right to claim sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the sovereignty over the territory of the West Bank and Gaza belongs to those who reside in that territory—the Palestinian people. I am announcing this clearly and unambiguously so that those who have not wanted to understand may understand.

Brothers and sisters, these are the results of the Camp David talks which specify autonomous independence for the Palestinians so that they may be ruled by themselves for themselves in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; they end Israeli military and civilian rule, and specify the withdrawal of Israeli military forces to positions decided in the light of security considerations; they recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and allow those who left the land to return to it and give the Palestinians the right to self-determination; they specify future situations after the transitional period through negotiations and give the Palestinians the right to object to these

results by free vote.

In our view these are the first positive steps to be decided since Israel occupied the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They set the advance towards a comprehensive solution on the right road. We are sure that it is the responsibility of every Arab who is concerned for the liberation of the land and the assertion of the Palestinian people's right to their land—I say, it is the responsibility of every Arab to participate in these steps that will lead us all to the realisation of our hope.

Negative attitudes are of no use in dealing with our contemporary world when it comes to solving problems that have been building up for dozens of years. An attitude that does not move forward finds itself going backward. This has been our experience over the last thirty years. We have not been moving, but at the same time we have been protesting. The other parties to this intractable crisis may differ among each other, but they will agree completely once they move.

Upsetting the status quo is the only way to prevent it freezing and becoming more firmly established. More slogans and cries of rejection do not achieve anything or offer an alternative. They let the status quo put down roots and grow stronger until, with the passage of time we are no longer capable of shaking and removing it. This is Egypt's view. I really pity our people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who suffer from these Arab outbiddings that surround them. It was the wives of these people who met me in the Dome of the Rock during the last Id al-Adha, after I had performed the Id prayer in the Agsa Mosque. They cried out: Where are the Arab officials? They have abandoned us for ten years. Our sons are in internment camps. Our husbands are in detention camps, our brothers are in detention camps, and they are exploiting our situation for their own ends.

This is what I heard from our people and our women in the Dome of the Rock last Id al-Adha. Every Arab has the right to say No. We have said No more than once. But it is the right of Arab land and of the Palestinian people to ask every rejectionist to provide him with an alternative solution, or to cooperate in the liberation or to engage in the most difficult of battles.

Nothing is easier than to compete in choosing inflamed expressions in resounding speeches.

Nothing is easier than to wear the garb of heroism through words and cries and then find that it is our shoulders and not the shoulders of others that are bearing the burdens of stagnation and retreat, that we are moving backwards and doubling the burdens on our Arab people, generation after generation, while disagreements increase and fragmentation brings us to collapse. Those who are paying the exorbitant and bitter price are our sons and brothers, the men, women and children of the occupied territory. They are the people of Palestine who have been suffering the miseries of occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 1967. They are the young men who have been cast into prisons and detention camps without hope of ever seeing the light of day again. If today we can end the rule of Israeli military occupation and obtain the right of the Palestinian people to rule themselves by themselves, and decide their own future, are we to say No? Who is saving this? Those who are suffering the bitterness of military occupation, of being cast into prisons and detention camps? No it is those who are fighting each other with the weapons of assassination and with mutual charges of treason. This is what led them to the massacres in which Palestinian and Arab blood was shed—these are the people who are saying No....

Shall we say no to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to specific positions they will not go beyond? Are we to say No to negotiations to determine the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to decide the status of Jerusalem and the destiny of the Palestinian people on the basis of the UN resolutions? Are we to say No to the return of the displaced Palestinians to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Are we to say No to a sound beginning that will prepare the right road to a complete and comprehensive solution of the problem?

Brothers and sisters, from this people's podium, from the podium of the Egyptian people who are an integral part of the Arab people, I sincerely call on all of them to listen with pure hearts, as I listened during my visit to Jerusalem when I performed my Id duties in the Aqsa Mosque. I call on them to listen to the moans and cries of mothers, wives and sisters, as they call on all Arabs outside the occupied territory to feel their pains and the hardship of their life. I call on them

to hasten to take positive action to put an end to our people's bitter suffering such as is known only to those who are living under military occupation and in the darkness of prisons and detention camps. I call on King Husayn to fulfill his responsibility. I call on the authorities in Syria to take part in the negotiations for withdrawal from the Golan. This is something that has been completely arranged, because what applies to Sinai will certainly and definitely apply to the Golan. I call on the Palestinian leaderships in the PLO, and others, to put an end to their disagreements and come to full agreement. It is of no service to the cause of the people of Palestine that one organisation should issue statements attacking another, or that the world should read a statement by one Palestinian organisation accusing Yasir Arafat and saying that he does not represent anyone, that he only represents himself.

Brothers and sisters, permit me to say, with great bitterness and regret, that this is a piece of frivolity at a serious time. Today we are taking the Arab area to a new history, a new present and a new future. Therefore we must behave in a new way. I call on the rest of our Arab brothers, who have played positive roles in supporting Arab struggle, to understand, along with us, the facts of this historic new stage and to take part in views and action, and to listen with open hearts to the correct description of all we did at the Camp David conference.

We do not make claims or mislead people or quibble with words. We do not claim that we have reached a comprehensive solution, for Camp David was not the place for a comprehensive solution. The Camp David conference was intended to achieve a framework for the sound course towards the achievement of a complete and comprehensive solution through negotiations between the parties. What we can say is that we paved the way to this comprehensive solution, and stood on new thresholds with real advantages that are the fruit of struggle and previous continuing moves. At the Camp David summit we established an ever-renewed driving force that can achieve confidence and eliminate the fears of thirty years of blood and hatred, to prepare the way for a sound move towards peace based on justice. At Camp David we smashed a stagnation that might have continued and become a fait accompli. We smashed this stagnation without shedding a drop of blood. Why do they want this stagnation to return through the continuation of Arab quarrels?

While addressing this sincere appeal to her Arab brothers, Egypt assures them that the Camp David resolutions do not violate the Rabat resolutions. The first secret provision of the Rabat resolutions was that efforts should be made to liberate the Arab territory that was occupied in 1967, and I believe that we have reached the principles of the sound course. We have made some strides in the right direction towards concluding agreements concerning not only Egypt, but Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians. This is the road that will lead to the liberation of the Arab territory occupied in 1967 and mentioned in the first secret decision of the Rabat resolutions.

The Rabat resolutions stipulated that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. What has happened since 1974, when these resolutions were adopted? Since that resolution was adopted the leadership of the PLO has had several international opportunities, to which Egypt and a number of Arab states contributed, of following the course of peace and achieving Palestinian rights by relying on a united Arab viewpoint and an international stage to the formation of which Egypt has contributed all possible efforts. This international support for the Palestinian cause was the result of Egypt's open call for all this in the most important international gatherings at the UN.

But time has been wasted in quarrels, and they have refrained from confrontation for the sake of overbiddings.... However, I repeat my call to them for unity of views, and I do not believe that they can object to the sufferings of the people of Palestine in the occupied territory being ended. This is my view, as it is the view of every man of sense in the world.

I do not believe that they will object to a genuine contribution towards paving the way towards a comprehensive solution, unless there are other intentions that are not known to us, which could explain much of what has been done. Egypt has sought to protect the fate of disagreements and accusations which the leaderships have been exchanging ever since the Palestine problem came

¹⁷² Doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974, and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

into existence, This was why Egypt launched the peace initiative. Egypt fought before she spoke, Egypt did not indulge in biddings, but destroyed the barriers and impediments. No one has ever imposed surrender on Egypt but Egypt has imposed the will for peace. Egypt has given what she could, and more, and is calling for solidarity while building the right road.

Egypt has not lost her patience and wisdom. Egypt has not complained about her sacrifices and responsibilities to unify the more difficult struggle, the struggle for peace. Both before and since this Egypt has never entered the war of words.

Today they are weeping for Arab solidarity. Radio Moscow is composing slogans for them and the Russian leader is crying that the Camp David agreement is treason to the Arabs, so that the parrots may repeat what he says. Here in your presence, and from your podium, I put a question to Mr. Brezhnev: How would he have described the situation if, when we were defeated, before the October battle, if I had accepted the Soviet proposal to sit down with Golda Meir in Tashkent? What would his description have been? A little diffidence and humility, but they know nothing of diffidence or humility. To my great regret some of my sons are repeating what they say like parrots...

Regarding the second part of the agreement¹⁷³ -the framework of a solution-between Egypt and Israel.

The talks at Camp David, brothers and sisters, were not about a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in isolation from the peace treaties with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. We were laying down general lines defining the principles on which the steps towards a permanent peace and a comprehensive settlement could be based. The principles of the second agreement on permanent peace between Egypt and Israel provided that the peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel should not take more than three months, after which the implementation of the peace treaty would start immediately.

Mr. Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister, said in the White House, at the ceremony held for the

I also take this opportunity to express, from the podium of this House, my profoundest thanks and gratitude to the members and President of Congress, who overwhelmed me with their unimaginably great appreciation. I do not consider this appreciation as a greeting to myself so much as an immense greeting to the people of Egypt who have surrounded me with such great love and encouraged my steps in their name and for their sake so that there may be peace on earth. My thanks and gratitude to the members of the American Congress are a true expression of the gratitude of the people of Egypt to those men who performed a creative role in the cause of peace.

Brothers and sisters, the peace treaty negotiations between Egypt and Israel will start, God willing, at an early date in this month, and the aim of these negotiations will be to decide on the steps for the implementation of the following principles:

- 1. The total withdrawal of Israeli forces from every inch of the territory of the homeland in Sinai.
- 2. Full recognition of full Egyptian sovereignty up to the international frontier between Egypt and Palestine as it was during the mandate.
- 3. The return to Egypt of all the military airfields, including the huge air bases built by the Israelis during the years of occupation. These airfields will be turned into civilian airfields owned by Egypt. They are located near El-Arish, Ras al-Naqab and Sharm el-Sheikh. The withdrawal of Israeli forces will be carried out in two stages. The first stage will be within three to nine months from the signing of the treaty to a line running from a point east of El-Arish through Sinai to Ras Muhammad. This area, from which the first withdrawal will start in less than five months, amounts to about 60 percent of Sinai. The second and last stage of total withdrawal to the international frontier will start within a period to be specified in the negotiations; in the framework we said

signing of the agreements on a framework for peace by President Carter, Mr. Begin and myself, that he will try to ensure that the negotiations end in two months only. President Carter also announced this in his historic speech to Congress when he told the whole world that the Middle East is on the threshold of peace and that what had been an impossible dream a few weeks before had become an actual fact.

¹⁷³ Doc. 154 above.

that it would be not more than two to three years, but the exact day and hour will be determined in the treaty. However, the withdrawal can be carried out in a shorter period with the agreement of the two sides.

After the completion of the first stage of the withdrawal, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations.

While this is the timetable for the withdrawal according to the agreement, I can tell you of the good intentions on both sides, the stability of the situation through the establishment of Palestinian rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the elimination of factors that give rise to fear and doubt while we are taking the first constructive step towards peace after thirty years of war and destruction. I can tell you that, with a sincere wish for peace on both sides, we can achieve total withdrawal in a shorter time than is provided for, God willing. Peace, brothers and sisters, is not merely provisions on paper. Peace, first and last, is sincerity and determination to achieve it. In this we are absolutely sincere, and we do not and shall not lack determination to achieve a just and permanent peace.

This is why we accepted the establishment of normal relations between the people of Egypt and Israel after the completion of the first withdrawal, so as to strengthen confidence in good intentions and so that normal dealings may strengthen the advance towards peace on its proper course, completely dissipating all causes of fear and suspicion. This is how we have dealt with our cause, brothers and sisters, the cause of peace, since the first call for peace came from Egypt in February 1971,174 when I announced on your behalf that I was prepared to sign a peace agreement with Israel. This was the first such declaration made by an Arab official since the Arab-Israeli conflict started. Then I made my declaration, also from this podium and for your honourable assembly, on October 16, 1973, 175 calling for an international conference at which a just permanent peace could be decided. I was not in the position of someone begging for peace or asking for a ceasefire. From the same faith in the sacred message of peace, we signed the first disengagement 176

agreement then the second disengagement agreement.177 Then there was the historic peace initiative with my visit to Jerusalem¹⁷⁸ to demolish the wall of suspicion and fear of deception and to break the barrier that made every move, action or decision suspect. Then came my speech to the Israeli people in the Knesset, 179 when I said to them, with a heart open to all hopes of peace, I said: Why should we not agree, in all truth, sincerity and faith to eliminate all suspicions of fear, treachery, tortuous ideas and concealment of true intentions? Why should we not apply ourselves, with courage and daring, to the erection of a lofty edifice of peace that protects rather than threatens, that radiates to our future generations the light of the human message of building, development and the prosperity of mankind. Why should we bequeath to these generations the consequences of bloodshed, killing, orphaned children, widowed wives, shattered families and the moaning of victims? I thank Almighty God who enabled me, with the support of the people, with His support, with the encouragement of the peoples of the world who believe in peace, after the Camp David agreements to reach the first signs of mutual confidence.

As I said, the negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel will start shortly, so that we may mark on maps the security conditions we have accepted and which I have already announced that we are prepared to accept. Our first and last goal is peace, without ceding a single inch of our land or a single grain of our sacred soil. On the basis of these conditions, as you have read in the agreement, a full division of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed in the passes, and UN forces will be stationed in a demilitarised zone on the frontier together with the Egyptian police, and in Sharm el-Sheikh area to safeguard freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran. These are the main outlines which will determine the details of future negotiations.

Some of us may feel that Israel is displaying an exaggerated concern for her security. That is true; Israel is displaying an exaggerated concern for her security against any aggressions, although she possesses a large military force. But I say

¹⁷⁴ Doc. 277 in International Documents on Palestine 1971.

¹⁷⁵ Doc. 292 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.

¹⁷⁶ See docs. 50 and 115 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

¹⁷⁷ See docs. 148, 164, 166 and 167 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

¹⁷⁸ See docs. 180-184, 301, 303-305 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹⁷⁹ Doc. 301 in ibid.

to you and declare it openly, our Egyptian armed forces do not lack modern equipment, they do not lack the highest standards of training and experience of the latest technological developments of the age. However, I hope we can all appreciate the psychological effects of the superiority of the Egyptian fighting man in the October war and the amazing control he achieved of his modern weapons in the first electronic and missile war, which even the great powers who produced these weapons have not engaged in. As I told you at the beginning of my speech, but for the October War there would have been no peace initiative.

Brothers and sisters, there is one subject that was not covered by the text of the agreement. You have heard about it, and the whole world, from one end to the other, has heard about itit is the evacuation of the settlements that Israel has established in Sinai. As the Speaker of your honourable Assembly said in his opening speech, before I left Egypt I laid down two basic principles for action at Camp David. These two principles are: No cession of land and no cession of sovereignty. Anything but that could be the subject of negotiations. For this reason our views on the subject of the settlements were clear, unambiguous and precise. The solution proposed by President Carter was that the question of total evacuation of the settlements should be put to the Knesset for decision within two weeks of the signing of the Camp David agreement, because the Israeli government was committed to the Knesset to pursue a policy of maintaining these settlements. I was unambiguous in my talks and in my negotiations and in the principle I have told you about. I said to President Carter; The evacuation of the settlements is a basic condition for the implementation of this agreement, otherwise it will be invalid; if the Israeli Knesset does not approve of the evacuation of these settlements it will automatically be invalid and Egypt will not be bound by it. Carter, who is a man of morals and principles, declared this at the joint session of Congress and at the signing of the agreement. I expect you recently followed the decision of the Israeli Cabinet, and then the decision of the Israeli Knesset, after they had decided that they preferred peace to land and sovereignty, just as I had demanded. The settlements will be evacuated during the second stage of withdrawal. As I told

you, the agreement stipulates that the first stage of the withdrawal will be to a line from east of El-Arish in Sinai to Ras Muhammad, and the second stage of the withdrawal will be to the international frontier between Egypt and Palestine as it was in the time of the mandate. In the second stage the settlements will be evacuated and every civilian and military man will be evacuated from the soil and territory of Sinai. I must put on record that Mr. Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister, during the last hours of the Camp David conference, showed a true understanding of the subject of the settlements.

There is one more point in the agreement which is in accord with the Constantinople Convention concluded in 1888. This is the question of freedom of passage for shipping through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal. According to this Convention shipping is denied passage when there is a state of war with the country concerned. Inasmuch as the state of war will come to an end with the peace agreement, they will have the right of passage through the Suez Canal.

Brothers and sisters, I repeat that these bases stipulated by the agreement on withdrawal from Sinai are the same bases that will govern the negotiations between Syria and Israel on the Golan. This is why the Camp David agreement called on the confrontation countries to take part in establishing the steps towards peace.

I want to declare to you four facts: The first fact is that the Camp David documents stipulate that the peace negotiations shall be held under the UN flag and in accordance with resolution 242.

The second fact is that the Security Council will endorse the peace treaties and guarantee that their provisions are not violated. Moreover, the permanent members of the Security Council will be asked to sign these treaties and guarantee respect for their provisions. The permanent members will also be asked to make their policy and conduct and conform to the undertakings contained in the agreement.

The third fact is that the US will take part in all future negotiations. All this is provided for in the agreement on the framework.

Now we come to the fourth fact. I do not think that you need to hear it from me, but I state it so that it may be heard by everyone in our Arab territory from the Ocean to the Gulf. The fourth fact is that no secret agreements were concluded at Camp David or after Camp David, nor will such agreements ever be concluded. Egypt works in the light of day. We do not, and never shall do anything we are ashamed to announce so that we have to conceal it. We shall never have a genuine democracy ruling the people by the will of the people if our people are not fully aware of all the issues of their destiny and the destiny of the Arab nation. You know that I will not permit myself to stay in office for an hour if the reply to the people's confidence is to conceal facts from them, whatever such facts may be.

I thank Almighty God for guiding me in every decision I have taken since I assumed the trust of the highest responsibility.

I thank God for enabling me to make my decision the embodiment of the will of the people and their profound perception and their authentic cultural awareness.

304

Statement by Fatah's Central Committee declaring its total rejection of the Camp David agreements and calling for the implementation of all Steadfastness Front resolutions and alliances with the socialist countries to combat the agreements (excerpts)¹⁸⁰
Beirut, October 4, 1978

1. The Central Committee of Fatah reaffirms its declared and inflexible attitude to the Camp David conference and its outcome; it absolutely rejects this conference and the plans made to impose a capitulationist solution on the Arab nation and our people through the results of the conference.

5. The Central Committee calls on all the Arab states to adopt an unambiguous and decisive attitude to the results of the Camp David conference. For it is no longer permissible to keep silent or to adopt a neutral attitude. We appreciate the attitudes of all Arab states that have declared

their support for our people and opposed the consequences of the American-Zionist conference. But the situation at this stage is very grave. It has gone beyond theatrical initiatives and has now assumed the form of a scheme for the liquidation of the cause, its people and its revolution, disregarding all the Arab summit conferences, including those of Algiers and Rabat.

- 6. The Central Committee of Fatah, while appreciating the role played by the Steadfastness and Confrontation countries, as declared in the resolutions of the Tripoli, Algiers and Damascus conferences, and as manifested in their unambiguous political attitudes to all the conspiracies, starting with Sadat's visit to the occupied territory and ending with his total surrender at the Camp David conference, affirms that in playing this role they need to take further positive steps in order to support Syria and the PLO to the extent required by the challenge that confronts this front, and to encourage all the Arab states to join this front and support it with all their material, political and military resources.
- 7. The Central Committee has studied all the possible consequences of the Camp David scheme, the results of which have given prominence to the flagrant and unambiguous role that is being played by America—inasmuch as Carter himself has declared war on the PLO, which he described as being odiously racialist, terrorist and Nazi. The American role also ignores the most elementary principles of a just and permanent peace, and has shamelessly adopted the Israeli attitude to our national cause.

In the light of this American attitude, we call on all the Arab countries to conduct a serious and tangible reappraisal of their relations with the US. This will allow all those who are putting their money on the American policy to reconsider their attitudes. It also calls on all the Arab countries to establish the widest possible alliances with the socialist countries, headed by the USSR, in appreciation of their attitude to our cause, our revolution and to their absolute faith in the right of our people to self-determination and to establish their independent state in their land and to regard the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine.

8. The Central Committee of Fatah will make every effort in the political and diplomatic fields, in cooperation with all our friends in the world,

¹⁸⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), October 4, 1978, p. 2.

to prevent any attempt within the framework of the UN to obtain UN and Security Council sanction for the alleged peace agreements. It calls on the Secretary-General of the UN and all member states of the General Assembly and the Security Council, not to submit to the wishes of the American imperialists to ensure acceptance of these agreements which are incompatible with the UN Charter and human rights, and also with the UN resolutions on the Palestine problem.

9. The Central Committee of Fatah affirms its firm attitude to the question of settlement, the combatting and frustration of which is a kingpin of its political and military struggle. The Central Committee calls on all groups, especially in Lebanon, to unite with the Palestinian people who reject this conspiracy and will resist it with all the means at their disposal.

The credibility of any party's opposition to the principle of settlement depends on the extent to which it supports the Palestinian revolution, and also on its adopting an unambiguous attitude to the results of Camp David.

The Central Committee calls the attention of all to the conspiracy that is being directed against Lebanon and the unity of her territory and people and to the escalating activity of the forces of fascist isolationism and Israel at the present moment in their aggressions against the Arab Deterrent Forces.

305

Statement by the National Command of the Baath Party of Syria describing the October war as the beginning of the defeat of Zionist strategy and both the war in Lebanon and the Camp David agreements as attempts to halt the process of defeat (excerpts)¹⁸¹

Damascus, October 5, 1978

Masses of the Arab people,

The anniversary of the October War of liberation is being celebrated at a difficult stage in which the Arab homeland is being subjected to a major Zionist-imperialist attack aimed at imposing surrender on the Arabs, dispossessing them of their land and their rights, thwarting their aspirations for the future and liquidating their cause in Palestine. Therefore our most pressing need is that we should revive the spirit of the October War and the undying qualities it inspired and escalate the conflict so as to increase our capacity for sound confrontation with a view to the frustration of all hostile schemes.

The glorious October War destroyed a whole series of negative phenomena that had accumulated in Arab society, and surmounted the complex of weakness and fear that beset the individual Arab as a result of the series of past defeats, by thwarting the Zionist plan based on continuing escalation of Israeli strength and on the maintenance of absolute qualitative superiority. This shook the foundations of the enemy's expansionist security theory which was the basis of his military, ideological and psychological structure. The October War was thus the start of a real retreat to Zionist strategy which had been nurtured by vast delusions of constant expansion at the expense of Arab territory.

In the October War the Arab nation went on to the offensive as regards decisions, planning and implementation, and displayed a combat capacity and an ability to cope with modern armaments that amazed the world. This amounted to recreation of the Arab individual and was, in its essence, a true start on the moulding of the future of the Arab nation and the realisation of its aspirations. Our valiant armed forces, in cooperation with those of Egypt and the other Arab forces that took part, succeeded in fighting the most sublime battle in contemporary Arab history. Syrian capability and performance was a miracle wrought by Syria through her people, her Party and her army, and thanks to the courageous leadership of the people and the army by the Party's Secretary General. Victory would have been total had it not been for the dilatoriness of the Egyptian command and the orders it gave to the Egyptian army to halt on the Canal after crossing it, contrary to all plans agreed on with Syria. History will disclose the details of this affair, and our people will not fail to call to account all who were responsible for the immense damage it did to the Arab cause as a whole.

The vital significance of the October victory,

¹⁸¹ Issued on the fifth anniversary of the October War. Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), October 6, 1978.

continued affirmation of that significance and its permanent embodiment in the consciousness of the Arab nation, is in itself something that makes our nation more invulnerable in its assessment of the extent of the dangers and in the confrontation of difficulties and more powerful in its defiance of our enemies' attempts to turn the victory into total defeat.

We must therefore bear in mind that to the extent that the glorious October War was a step forward and a mighty achievement in contemporary Arab history, the situation that has arisen as a result of the Camp David agreements constitutes a direct threat to the present and the future of the Arab homeland, by exposing it to political, economic and military domination by Zionism.

From the start the Baath Party and its revolution in the Syrian Arab region has drawn attention to the dangers of the partial solutions by which America and Israel have hoped to contain the results of the October War and to render its positive aspects devoid of all practical value. Therefore the Party and the region have combatted partial solutions because their aim is to impair the principle of the all-Arab character of the battle and of the unity of the Arab cause, to distort the essential character of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to change it from a comprehensive all-Arab conflict against the opponents of the Arab nation represented by Israel, the mainstay of imperialism, into a mere disagreement over frontiers. Syria has suffered much as a result of her constant and unvarying attitude which is based on a sound understanding of the facts about American-Israeli-Egyptian moves since the signing of the first Sinai agreement, and has been subjected to great pressures and conspiracies aimed at reducing her capabilities and rendering her incapable of positive movement in confrontation of the conspiracy against the Arab nation. The sparking off of the civil war in Lebanon was one aspect of this conspiracy, and it is not difficult for an observer to perceive that what has been happening in Lebanon has been linked to the implementation of every new move in the American-Sadatist-Israeli scheme. In view of this, the stage of the Camp David agreements means, among other things, the continued aggravation of the situation in Lebanon through the employment of tools whose subservience to and cooperation

with the Zionist enemy can be proved, and have nothing whatever to do with the interests of Lebanon and the soil of the homeland except the name....

The Camp David agreements have not only withdrawn Egypt from the battle, they have transformed her, in practice and in law, into an ally of Israel, with which she has common political and economic projects and plans for action. This has imposed a new situation in which Israel, the ally of Egypt, may become the liaison between the eastern and western parts of the Arab homeland, which threatens the very basis of Arab nationalist thinking and falsifies its fundamental principles.

Israeli domination of the Arab area will make it easier to impose American control as well, which will have negative repercussions not only on the Arab homeland but on the whole world. For increased tension in the Arab area exposes international peace and security to the gravest dangers. Such domination will also strengthen imperialist and Zionist influence in many parts of the world while making Egypt a tool to be employed to strike at national liberation movements, especially in Africa.

Furthermore, the Camp David agreements are essentially and fundamentally an unambiguous violation of all international conventions, a flagrant affront to UN resolutions and a contradiction of all the concepts adopted by the international community as regards the conditions for a just and permanent peace in the area.

These grave consequences of the Camp David agreements require that the Arab nation perform specific tasks as regards the drafting of a practical and effective programme for the most extensive possible mobilisation of Arab resources for the creation of a new situation, a programme that eschews every kind of impromptu action and improvisation and rules out methods of confrontation that amount to no more than the issuing of rhetorical statements of condemnation.

Certainly one of the stipulations of this programme must be the provision of full support to Syria and the Palestinian revolution to strengthen both of them, so as to meet the requirements of the strategic balance between the Arabs and the Zionist enemy and ensure the victory of the Arab cause. Therefore the third conference of the National Front for Steadfastness and Confronta-

tion¹⁸² should have developed its methods of action qualitatively with a view to establishing the Front's institutions more firmly and to increasing the effectiveness of the steadfastness countries, so that instead of merely adopting political and moral attitudes they might become genuine material forces to lead the steadfastness of the Arab nation and activate its popular masses in the struggle of serious resistance.

Struggling Arab masses,

The next few months will certainly witness numerous events involving immense challenges. Zionism and imperialism will certainly employ all means to impose on our homeland their capitulationist plans and the provisions of their domination by taking advantage of the attitude of the President of Egypt and his readiness to meet all the requirements of the scheme.

Zionism and imperialism will try to take advantage of the current contradictions in the Arab arena to spark off troubles again and to propagate differences between the Arabs. They may well exert every kind of pressure on certain Arab regions to force them to declare their support for the Camp David agreements. The attempts to escalate the fighting and to sabotage attempts to restore security in Lebanon fall within this framework.

Among the most important tasks the Syrian Arab region and the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front intend to perform are the following:

- 1. Steadfast confrontation of all dangers and all possible developments through the strengthening of our home front and mobilising the energies of our region.
- 2. Attempts to render the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front more effective so that it may advance from the stage of steadfastness to that of active resistance to all hostile schemes.
- 3. Increasing cooperation and friendship with the USSR and the countries of the socialist bloc in particular, and with the countries of the non-aligned movement and all forces of liberation and progress in the world, with a view to reinforcing the world front of support for our rights and our struggle, and with a view to liberation and the recovery of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.
 - 4. Continued Arab cooperation and solidarity

in the service of the battle and the exploitation of any further efforts that can be made in the confrontation with the enemy, and the frustration of attempts to exert pressure on certain Arab quarters to win them over to the ranks of the supporters of the results of the Camp David agreements.

5. Efforts to stiffen the attitude of the Arab masses and to spark off their energies, and attempts to induce certain parties to abandon their hesitant attitudes for an unequivocal stand whereby they place their resources at the disposal of the confrontation of the scheme and its tools.

Masses of the Arab homeland,

There can be no doubt that the sole criterion of Arab nationalism and progressiveness lies in the extent of the support afforded to Syria, and also in the extent to which serious efforts are made to reinforce resistance to the current dangers. There is no middle way between such an attitude and one of submission and surrender.

Syria, for her part, welcomes all Arab efforts to confront the dangers of the present stage, and will be glad to accept any positive Arab participation. This is why our determination to mobilise Arab energies has outweighed all other considerations. This is also the reason for the intense activity there has been on the part of the Secretary General of the Party, President Hafiz al-Asad, in making contacts with other Arabs and with friends. For the information of the people, mention must be made of the fact that on July 30, President Hafiz al-Asad sent a letter to President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the President of the Iraqi Republic, calling on him to surmount all difficulties and to set aside everything that stands in the way of the coming together of the sister regions, with a view to unifying their resources and mobilising their efforts to ensure success in the confrontation of the ferocious Zionist-imperialist attack.

The present stage is a stage of comprehensive confrontation with the enemies and opponents of our nation. If Syria, under the leadership of the Secretary General of the Party, has chosen the course of steadfastness and confrontation, she is aware of the extent of the difficulties and sacrifices that face her as she defends the future and the very existence of the Arab nation.

Any further effort in support of Syria which strengthens her steadfastness makes her more capable of resisting and intensifying the struggle, and Syria's attitude will ever be that firm and

¹⁸² See doc. 289 above for the resolutions of the conference.

unvarying attitude that our nation has witnessed throughout Syrian history and struggle.

Ancient and modern history tell us of the experience of small countries that have succeeded in holding out and confronting the schemes of their stronger enemies, because they had the will to endure and to reject surrender and because they were strong in their peoples and their fighters for freedom. This fact indicates the importance of abandoning traditional methods in the building of the homeland and in the struggle to activate the masses of our people and to consolidate our home front.

Arabs everywhere are called on to defend their future and their nation with all their might and will, with all their love for their homeland and their attachment to their nation's heritage of struggle.

The blood of thousands of martyrs that has been shed on the land of Palestine, the Golan and Sinai, so that the national cause might not be lost, so that their nation might remain free, calls on us all to mobilise our efforts and our resources and to give concrete form to our awareness and our love of our homeland, for now is the time when the destiny of the homeland is being decided.

We salute the glorious October War and the martyrs of the Arab struggle everywhere and in all arenas.

We salute the masses of our people and our nation who have always proved their unlimited capacity for sacrifice.

We salute the Secretary General of the Party, the President of the Republic, Hafiz al-Asad, who is leading the march of confrontation of plans aimed at imposing surrender on the Arab nation.

We salute all friendly peoples and countries and liberation movements throughout the world that support the Arab struggle. 306

Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya, expressing confidence that the Arab nation can overthrow the Camp David agreements, since only one Arab president has signed them (excerpts)¹⁸³

Tripoli, October 7, 1978

A correct and scientific assessment of this treasonable move [the Camp David agreements] is that Egypt, having been defeated by force of arms, has regrettably signed the document in Camp David, recognising the enemy from a position of defeat and submission.

Changing the Ministry of War into a Ministry of Defence, demobilising half the Egyptian army and ending the war with the enemy—all these are the terms of the surrender.

The battle of Ramadan was a real disaster. For the first time in history the Zionist army crossed to the West Bank of the Suez Canal by force, and the Egyptian forces were almost completely surrounded.

It is a question of strength. Egypt was unable to defeat the Zionists, and America embraced this outcome based on force of arms, and has sponsored the talks between the vanquished and the victor, between the Egyptian President, the head of the Zionist gangs and the President of America.

This is a dangerous precedent which means that all who have arms and win victory by force of arms can reap the fruits of that victory, because America, the greatest state, has recognised the consequences of armed force and talks deriving from the use of arms.

What the Egyptian President has done is a disaster for the whole Arab nation. He has withdrawn Egypt from the fold of Arabism, withdrawn her from the battle, and affirmed—and this is the first time this has been done—that he recognises an enemy who is in occupation of territories that are not his—the territory of Palestine.

The Israeli inhabitants of occupied Palestine are refugees from Europe, Russia and America.

¹⁸³ Colonel Qadhafi delivered this speech on the anniversary of the evacuation of the Italians from Libya. Translated from the Arabic text, al-Fajr al-Jadid (Tripoli), October 8, 1978.

How can we accept that these people are inhabitants of the Middle East, the Arab East and that this is their land?

No one can accept this situation unless it is imposed on him by force of arms.

If the defeated Egyptian President has conceded that people from Europe and America are the inhabitants of Arab Palestine, we do not accept this, because we are surrounded by an ocean of armed masses and we cannot be forced to surrender. We should not surrender even if our last man falls for we are free men, we have arms, we possess the most modern planes, tanks, missiles and guns—we have them here in the hands of our masses, just as we have them in Syria, in Iraq and in Algeria.

The fact that we possess thousands of planes, tanks and guns means that we shall absolutely never surrender, and no one can force us to do

It would be foolish for America and the Zionist enemy to try to force us to surrender or to tell Syria to recognise the Zionists in return for promises of withdrawal from the Golan. Syria will never surrender, for she has the most modern tanks, planes and missiles and can mobilise millions.

The present situation in the Arab homeland is that there are some who have surrendered because they are defeated. The rest, who have not been defeated, will never surrender, and they cannot be forced to surrender. The Arab nation can surmount this disaster that has befallen it because the disaster has been signed by one President only.

The Arab nation is confident that the Egyptian army and the Egyptian people will be able to burn the Camp David papers in the fire.

307

Communiqué issued by the PLO Executive Committee rejecting self-rule proposals for the West Bank and Gaza and calling for national unity¹⁸⁴

Damascus, October 9, 1978

The PLO Executive Committee held a meeting on Tuesday, October 9, attended by the Secretary-

¹⁸⁴ English text, Wafa (Beirut), October 11, 1978, pp. 1-3.

General and representatives of all Palestinian factions, as well as members of the Palestinian Central Council, which is currently following up the question of Palestinian national unity.

The meeting completed discussion of the joint political and organizational program for unity between all Palestinian factions and the other national and popular forces within the PLO, in preparation for the upcoming meeting of the Palestinian National Congress.

All the participants in yesterday's meeting agreed that this session of the National Congress must consecrate this unity, and be a starting point for effective steps within the framework of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, wherever it is located. The meeting produced positive results which mark a step forward in approval of the principal points in the political program, and there was agreement on a later meeting to continue discussion of organizational relations, and the speedy preparation for the meeting of the Palestinian National Congress.

In the context of their discussion of recent political developments, the meeting came to the following conclusions:—

First:—

The meeting acknowledged the growing role played by the Palestinian people within the occupied territories against the American-Israeli-Egyptian proposals. The participants called upon the Palestinian people to continue their struggle against the Camp David accords, especially the proposal for "self-rule" which is mounted by hostile forces.

The Executive Committee and Palestinian factions expressed their appreciation for the great role played by the different national forces in occupied Palestine and for both the Jerusalem and Beit Hanina meetings, which expressed their rejection of such a settlement, and their commitment to the unity of the Palestinian people in exile and under occupation under the leadership of the PLO, and finally their insistence on the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, particularly their right of return and to self-determination and to establish an independent national state with Jerusalem as its capital.

Second:—

The meeting also stressed the importance of

this stand against the proposal for self-rule, and against any participation in such a plan, for such participation could only lead to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, and the committing of high treason against the Palestinian people and their struggle, placing those doing so in the same trench with the enemy, and inviting the severe punishment of the people.

Third:—

The participants agreed that on the basis of the unity of our people, their consciousness, and their support for the PLO, all liquidationist schemes will be defeated. The meeting furthermore called for support for the building of the National Front in occupied Palestine and the extension of all forms of political and material support to it.

Fourth:-

On the Arab level, the meeting reviewed the efforts being exerted to hold an Arab Summit conference on the basis of the suggestion of the Revolutionary Command Council in Iraq. The meeting welcomed every effort which leads to the strengthening of steadfastness and confrontation of the conspiracy embodied in the Camp David accords, supports the PLO and Syria and continues the isolation of the Sadat regime from the Arab bloc and its institutions, as well as from any official Arab meeting or conference. The meeting also affirmed the importance of efforts to reinforce the national struggle against U.S. imperialism and the Zionist-Sadat enemy which plots against our people and cause and against the fate and future of the Arab nation.

It was also affirmed that now, more than ever, it is vital to strengthen the relations of friendship and alliance with the Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union, in maintenance of the independence of the Arab countries and their national aims against the Imperialist-Zionist enemy. Similarly, it is important to fortify relations with all friendly and non-aligned countries as well as Islamic and African countries.

Fifth:—

The meeting noted with deep concern the recent developments in Lebanon and the Zionist-isolationist conspiracy supported by the U.S.A. with the collaboration of Sadat's regime, to continue the explosion of the situation. This is in execution of the Camp David plot especially against Syria,

the Palestinian Revolution and the national forces in Lebanon. The actions of the Zionist-isolationist alliance against the presence of the ADF and the legitimate forces in Lebanon, have indicated the secret aims of this hostile alliance.

The meeting also observed with appreciation the consensus of all the different national forces against isolationist policies, and the importance of the unity of all these efforts. Thus can the conspiracy be defeated and the role of the ADF throughout Lebanon be maintained, preventing the use of this country as an arena for the achievement of the aims of Camp David conspiracy.

308

Statement by King Husayn of Jordan deploring the fact that if talks between Israel and Egypt on the West Bank and Gaza are inconclusive, the Camp David agreements still allow for a peace treaty to be signed (excerpts)¹⁸⁵

Amman, October 10, 1978

The signing of the Camp David agreements has given rise to a new situation with the gravest of consequences for Jordan. The evidence indicates that the two Camp David agreements are not interdependent. This means that if no progress is made in the talks on the future of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem and the other occupied territories, the steps towards peace between Egypt and Israel will not stop or be suspended. This means that Egypt's military and political weight at the Arab and international levels would in such a case be withdrawn from the field of full participation with the Arab countries that are in confrontation with Israel, and that the Palestinian cause would lose an essential element that is indissolubly welded to it by a common destiny and a common struggle. For many years we have worked with Egypt as our elder sister in the struggle for justice and an honourable peace. We have supported each other, cooperated with each other, and sustained shocks and sufferings together; we have worked together for a just solution and a reason-

¹⁸⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Rai (Amman), October 11, 1978.

able peace. And the majority of the Arabs still hope that Egypt will not reach the point of no return and isolate herself from her history, from her Arabism-and from herself. This change means a grave strategic change in the situation of our area. It means that the situation in the Arab East will have to be modified to bring it in line with this grave development. It also means that Arab political thought as a whole will have to acquire the maturity and responsibility required by the new stage. The Arab nation must now forgo emotional or merely verbal reactions that do not result in action or responsibility. It must confront developments and events with patience, resolution and foresight. No Arab party must allow itself to make verbal enthusiasm, vagueness and general expressions of nationalism a substitute for facing up to joint national responsibility, confronting the reality of the situation in the area and taking difficult measures required by the Arab situation and Arab duty. In this situation I say that the whole world today is amazed that a nation which possesses such immense resources, such vast wealth and such a unique strategic position has so far not been able to place these vast resources and great capacities at the service of its intrinsic strength, and to prove its capacity for endurance, the confrontation of threats and the building of the future on a sound basis.

Jordan, which stands in the vanguard of Arab struggle for legitimate Arab rights and a just peace, expects the other Arab countries to stand by her, to share her great responsibilities and to bear their share of the duties imposed by the Palestinian cause, which concerns all Arabs, and not only some of them.

In this context, I want to reaffirm, on behalf of all of you, our attitude to the conflict that is in progress in our area and to the cause of peace and its responsibilities.

Jordan is in favour of a just peace. Jordan is in favour of a just settlement of the Palestine problem and of the conflict that has arisen from it and is continuing because of it. Jordan has never in the past been a mere spectator of the question of Palestinian rights or as regards the occupation that has been such an incubus on the Arab territory occupied in 1967, or as regards the international efforts expended to establish peace on the basis of a just settlement. We took part in

the issuing of Security Council resolution 242186 in November 1967. We accepted and cooperated with all international efforts made on its basis to ensure its implementation. In doing this Jordan's aim was the achievement of a just and comprehensive settlement leading to the Israeli evacuation of all the occupied territories, ensuring the Palestinian people the exercise of their right to self-determination in full freedom, and forming the basis of a permanent and acceptable peace. All Arabs know that we have never for a moment abandoned our responsibilities vis-à-vis our brothers in the occupied territory. The whole world knows that we have never abandoned our responsibility vis-à-vis peace in our area. But everyone also knows that, in our efforts to rescue the people, Arab territory and the cause of peace, we have never sacrificed our principles, the honour of our nation, our heritage or the commitments that we cherish and hold so dear.

This attitude is well-known to the US and the rest of the countries of the world. When American President Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, he rapidly grasped the facts of the situation in the area, and showed great understanding of our unchanging policies and the attitudes we adopt. We in Jordan have welcomed the good intentions expressed by the American president, since he came to power, as regards the problem of a just peace in our area and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Along with him we have built bridges of confidence and interaction based on mutual respect. We have never concealed from him, or from the whole world, our concept of a just peace and of what is required for its achievement. We have left no room for ambiguity as regards our insistence on full withdrawal, Arab sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem, the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the just and comprehensive solution of all aspects of the conflict on all Arab fronts. When the American president invited Egypt and Israel to meet at Camp David, I sent President Carter and President Muhammad Anwar Sadat detailed clarifications of these matters, so as to avoid ambiguity and to make our attitude perfectly clear once again. In these letters I warned that Israel's obstinate rejection of legitimate Arab demands could lead to the collapse of the sincere efforts

¹⁸⁶ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

Arab world 559

being made on behalf of peace, and that the most dangerous pitfall in these efforts was to try to cover up the essential difference between the Arab position and the inflexible attitude of Israel with obscure statements and outlines that do not deal with the problem clearly but provide Israel with propaganda and diplomatic cover that she does not deserve and has no right to obtain.

Hence our reaction to the results of the Camp David conference. As I said, we are in favour of a just settlement and an honourable peace. But there are two important gaps in the Camp David resolutions: the first is that they do not make the required link between the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the other aspects of the Arab-Israeli problem on the other fronts. The second is that they do not make it clear how things are to end as regards the future of the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza or Palestinian self-determination. Within the framework of this obscurity the Camp David agreement calls on Jordan to take part in the dispositions of the proposed transitional stage and to share in the responsibility for security and the establishment of a self-government authority without her being sure or confident that the transitional stage, many aspects of which are obscure and that Jordan is invited to take part in by the agreement, will lead to Israeli evacuation and to self-determination for the people of Palestine.

There is a manifest difference, as we are well aware, between positive attitudes and the love of peace on the one hand and the sacrifice of nationalist attitudes and Jordanian interests and historical rights on the other. We are for the former and against the latter. From our resolution to meet our responsibilities to the full and to keep the door open to every chance of peace and a just solution we have not adopted an emotional or impulsive attitude to the latest developments. We have declared that we are not a party to the Camp David resolutions and that we do not regard ourselves as being bound by any of the obligations incumbent on those who are associated with them. At the same time we have tried to initiate a serious dialogue with the US with the aim of discovering every aspect of the American attitude to a comprehensive solution and at connecting the foundations upon which are based the efforts that are being made to achieve a settlement and permanent peace. We

have declared that we will not close any door that could lead to the rescue of the people who are living under occupation, the liberation of Arab territory and the achievement of a just peace that is acceptable to the Arab conscience.

This is the attitude that we believe is of greatest service to the legitimate national goals of our people and our nation and is closest to realism, responsibility and commitment to the interests of our brothers under the occupation and of those Arab regions that are the victims of the occupiers' aggression. We have also made this attitude known to our sister Arab countries, so that they may understand it and support us as we adopt it and make it known to the world.

We have heard an international view to the effect that the Arabs should be patient and realistic, and that the Arab parties' acceptance of selfgovernment for the people of the occupied territory would make it possible to sow the seeds of a growing Palestinian entity that Israel would not be able to stand up to when it matures and grows strong in the course of the coming years, and that this would inevitably lead to self-determination and Israeli evacuation. Jordan, as a state committed to known national goals, and in the light of her realisation of what the Israeli enemy is planning and implementing, affirms that such thinking is faulty so long as it is not accompanied by an unambiguous commitment that the end of the road will safeguard the principles of a just settlement on which the world is unanimously agreed. Israel is planting settlements and Israeli settlers in the occupied territory every day and changing its material and demographic character. The Israeli leaders state that negotiations with the Arab side will not prevent their insisting on sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza during the negotiations and after the transitional stage. They daily repeat that Arab Jerusalem is part of their capital for ever. To this I say that Arab Jerusalem has been an Arab and Islamic trust since the time of the Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab and that no one in the Arab or Islamic worlds has the right to dispose of it or cede it. And neither Israel nor anyone else can change this fact, though it may seem possible to do so for a time.

Jordan calls on the world to understand these facts and to exert pressure on the occupiers to call a halt to their arbitrary and invalid measures

in the occupied territory. She also calls on the international community to maintain peace efforts within the compass of commitment to full withdrawal and self-determination for the Palestinians as the basis of all talks aimed at a just peaceful settlement. This is enjoined by international law and conventions and this is essential at the practical level for the achievement of a permanent and stable peace based on justice.

309

Questions submitted by the government of Jordan to the US government regarding certain detailed aspects of its policy to establish peace in the Middle East as laid down in the Camp David agreements¹⁸⁷

Amman, October 16, 1978

- 1. Does the US government intend to be a full partner in the talks relating to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Palestine question in general? At what stage of the negotiations will the US join and in what capacity?
- 2. What does paragraph 1 in the agreement mean when it refers to representatives of the Palestinian people?
- 3. Why was a period of five years chosen as an interim period in the West Bank and Gaza?
- 4. (a) What is the geographical definition of the West Bank and Gaza in the view of the US government?

Do Arab Jerusalem and its Arab suburbs, annexed to Israel after June 1967, fall under the "West Bank?"

- (b) After the end of the five-year interim period, what will be the status of the West Bank and Gaza as regards sovereignty?
- (c) What is the attitude of the US government towards these questions?
- (d) Will Israeli forces be stationed in the West Bank and Gaza after the end of the five-year interim period?

If yes, then by what right and for what reason?

(e) What is the attitude of the US government

towards these questions?

- 5. During the self-rule in the interim period in the West Bank and Gaza, under which higher supervisory authority will self-rule operate? Will it be under UN or some similarly neutral supervision? What sources will finance self-rule? What are the limits of its authority and what will delimit that authority?
- 6. (a) When the document refers to self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza, will its authority extend to that part of Jerusalem and its environs which was part of the West Bank when it fell under occupation, as well as to territories and people?
- (b) What is the US Government's attitude to these questions?
- 7. (a) After the end of the five-year interim period, what will be the status of occupied Arab Jerusalem?
- (b) What is the US Government's policy on this issue?
- 8. (a) What is the policy towards the Israeli settlements established in the occupied territories during and after the interim period?

What is the policy towards the properties and construction work therein? What will be their status?

- (b) What will Israeli policy and responsibility be towards the settlements in the interim period?
- (c) What is US policy as regards the two questions above?
- 9. (a) Will the Israelis living in settlements that exist at present be entitled to join in establishing the self-rule authority and in the actions that it will take?
- (b) What is the status of Israeli citizens living in the West Bank and Gaza in the interim period? Will there be any Israelis? If yes, then what will be their status after the end of the interim period?
- 10. (a) Following the end of the five year interim period, will citizens of the West Bank and Gaza be entitled to determine their destiny freely in order to decide their political future?
- (b) What is the attitude of the US to this question?
- 11. (a) What is the solution proposed in the framework of the agreement for Palestinian refugees living outside the occupied territories and in relation to the recovery of their rights?
- (b) What does the US believe to be the basis for a settlement of this question? How does the

¹⁸⁷ Prime Minister Badran of Jordan made this text public before a meeting of the National Consultative Assembly; translated from the Arabic text, al-Rai (Amman), October 17, 1978.

US define their rights?

- 12. How does the "Framework of Agreement" envision the future of other Arab territories? What is the attitude of the US Government towards this question?
- 13. In defining security needs in the region, does the US Government recognize the principle of reciprocity or does it consider these needs to pertain to one side only?
- 14. Since Security Council resolution 242 is the basis for any settlement negotiations in the West Bank and Gaza and as regards all other aspects of the problem, what will the US do if conflict in interpretation arises during these talks, especially in view of previous US Government interpretations of resolution 242¹⁸⁸ and of its commitment to these interpretations, which was the basis on which the Jordanian Government accepted that resolution.

310

Closing statement issued by the Beit al-Din conference of Arab foreign ministers discussing the composition and financing of the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon¹⁸⁹

Beit al-Din, October 17, 1978

At the invitation of His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic, Mr. Elias Sarkis, a conference of the Arab states contributing to the Arab Deterrent Forces was held in Beit al-Din, under the auspices of His Excellency, from October 15–17, 1978. Those who attended the conference conducted a profound and careful study of the difficult situation that confronts Lebanon. They studied all aspects of the Lebanese crisis, including the security problem, as being the most important of the problems that require urgent treatment, and they were informed of some of the measures which, at the request of His Excellency the President of the Republic, the ADF leadership decided on in order to deal with the security situation.

After exhaustive discussions conducted in a spirit of responsibility, profound fraternal sentiments and appreciation of the need to make every effort to assist Lebanon in surmounting the tribula-

tions it has been subjected to for several years, those attending the conference concluded that it is essential to deal comprehensively with the Lebanese crisis on the basis of the following principles:

- 1. The unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon within the framework of its democratic system, and the exercise by the state of its authority over all Lebanese territory and the elimination of all impediments to the establishment of a strong central authority capable of reconstructing the institutions of the state that have been impaired by the events that have taken place, within the framework of consolidating the unity of the territory and the people of Lebanon.
- 2. A halt to armed manifestations, and the bearing of arms outside the limits set down by the law to be prohibited.
- 3. The total and rigorous enforcement of the resolutions of the Riyadh and Cairo summits.
- 4. The halting of information campaigns, the enforcement of the Printed Matter Law and the banning of all illegal information media, whether visual, oral or intended to be read, with a view to maintaining the unity of the country.
- 5. The drawing up of a time schedule for the reconstruction of the army on a balanced national basis, to enable it to perform its role of ensuring national security and to carry out the tasks now being performed by the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanese territory.
- 6. The exerting of efforts to achieve national entente between the conflicting parties and groups to ensure the unity of the country and the introduction of reforms designed to consolidate national unity and help to eliminate the causes of the explosive situation in the Lebanese arena.
- 7. The enforcement of the law against those who have dealings with the Israeli enemy, and condemnation of such dealings in any form, inasmuch as Lebanon is part of the Arab nation.
- 8. The formation of a follow-up committee consisting of representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Kuwait, to be placed at the disposal of the President of the Republic and to perform such tasks as His Excellency may request it to undertake, within the framework of the above principles.

The conference expressed its appreciation of the delicate and difficult circumstances in which

¹⁸⁸ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

¹⁸⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Nahar (Beirut), October 18, 1978.

the Arab Deterrent Forces are performing their tasks in Lebanon and of the burdens they have to bear in these circumstances.

The conference also affirmed that, in the light of the resolutions of the Riyadh and Cairo conferences, the Arab governments represented at the conference will not hesitate to provide Lebanon with aid and assistance in restoring the situation to normal, including aid in the field of the reconstruction of the country, and the conference requested the other Arab governments to perform their role in this field.

311

Resolutions of the municipal and village councils and social economic organisations of the Gaza Strip listing the reasons for their rejection of the Camp David agreements¹⁹⁰

Gaza, October 16-18, 1978

The municipalities, village councils, charitable and professional associations, chambers of commerce and industry and economic establishments of the Gaza Strip met on October 16–18, 1978 to discuss the Camp David agreements and the annexed documents.

While stressing the determination of the Palestinian Arab people of the Gaza Strip that a just peace should prevail in the Middle East and their desire that all occasions for and results of wars should be eliminated, so that all the peoples of the area may live in permanent peace, through the realisation of the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people in a truly constructive and positive manner, they are of the opinion:

- 1. That the Camp David agreements disregard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to freedom and self-determination and to establish their independent national state in their land, and are incompatible with the UN Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of international law.
- 2. That the Camp David agreements contradict the unanimous decisions reached by the Arab states at the various Arab summit conferences,

- in particular those of the Algiers¹⁹¹ and Rabat¹⁹² summits.
- 3. That the Camp David agreements are incompatible with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the UN, in particular resolutions 3236¹⁹³ of November 22, 1974 and 3375¹⁹⁴ of November 10, 1975.
- 4. That the agreements entrench the Israeli occupation for an unspecified period and legitimise it, while sundering the unity of the Palestinian Arab people inside and outside Palestine and creating a new situation and new facts that are essentially and fundamentally incompatible with the interests of the Palestinian Arab people, not to mention the fact that they do not provide for the dismantling of the existing settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.
- 5. The agreements ignore the future of Arab Jerusalem. This deliberate omission constitutes a great danger to its Islamic and Christian holy places and to the rights of its Palestinian Arab inhabitants.
- 6. A just solution of the problem can only be achieved through respect for the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their territory and their homeland, through the exercise of their natural right to freedom, justice and self-determination and through the immediate and total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories.
- 7. Those attending the meeting affirm that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people and that its participation on an equal footing with all the other parties is essential if a just solution of the Palestine problem is to be found, and that the deliberate ignoring of this fact does not serve the cause of peace in the Middle East.
- 8. Self-government on the basis of the Camp David agreements is meaningless, as it does not meet the minimum demands and rights of the Palestinian Arab people and is not the correct way to ensure that the Palestinian Arab people exercise their right to freedom and self-determination. This is because it is so obscure, ambiguous and complicated and contains no real specific

¹⁹⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Ittihad (Haifa), October 24, 1978.

See docs. 331-333 in International Documents on Palestine 1973.
 See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

¹⁹³ Doc. 22 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

¹⁹⁴ Doc. 13 in International Documents on Palestine 1975.

safeguards of their freedom and self-determination in their territory and their homeland.

9. Those attending the meeting therefore condemn the Camp David agreements and call on all justice and peace-loving forces in the world, the Arab and Islamic worlds, world public opinion and the UN, to assist the Palestinian Arab people to obtain their just rights and to put an end to its continuing tragedy. Those attending the meeting affirm their total support for a just peace, and stress that the Palestinian Arab people eagerly desire such a just peace. Of all the peoples of the world they need and desire it most so that they may be delivered from their sufferings and from this cruel ordeal that has been imposed upon them against their will, for they have always been the victims of continual wars and have been deprived of their natural right to freedom and a life of dignity in their territory and their homeland.

312

Statement by the Presidency of Sudan expressing its support for a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and its unwillingness to criticize the Egyptian initiative. 195

Khartum, October 20, 1978

Sudan has examined the Camp David agreements in the light of the following considerations:

I. There is a special and peculiar relationship between the two peoples of the Nile Valley, whose strength and dimensions derive from historical links. The two countries have vital interests in common, and neither Sudan nor Egypt have the right to put these close links at risk or to allow any development to impair what has been planned by the hand of history and enjoined by interests. Sudan's historical links with Egypt make it incumbent on her to understand fully Egypt's attitudes at critical moments and at times of hard and difficult choices.

II. Without belittling the role of the other Arab countries, Sudan fully appreciates the tremendous sacrifices and immense burdens that the people of Egypt and the army of Egypt have sustained in support of the Arabs. Sudan sees no wisdom in the call to boycott, isolate and provoke Egypt. This call can only result in further divisions and fragmentation in the Arab nation, and it is not right that the Arab cause should become involved in the ideological quarrels and the complications of the conflict between the great powers and in regional controversies of secondary importance.

III. Sudan fully supports the efforts that are being made to resolve the Middle East conflict by peaceful means and by direct negotiations between the parties concerned, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. And certainly the peace efforts will be more positive and effective if the Arab parties take part in them on a collective basis and within the framework of Arab concord and solidarity. However, the complexities of the Arab situation have so far made it impossible to realise this hope. In the light of the above considerations we do not believe that we are entitled to criticise Egypt for her efforts to achieve a peace agreement that will lead to the withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt's historical international frontiers and to the liquidation of the Israeli settlements in Sinai within the framework of dispositions to ensure security and peace and of general principles for a comprehensive settlement in the area. We realise that a settlement by peaceful means is by its very nature a difficult operation, and in the light of the complications arising from four wars in the area in thirty years, it is not reasonable to expect that final and comprehensive solutions of all aspects of the conflict should be reached all at once. For a start, it is essential to outline that the general frameworks laid down at Camp David are unclear and ambiguous as regards a number of essential questions, or else disregard them altogether, and the result of this has been that the finding of unambiguous answers to these questions has been postponed to later stages. Therefore the reaching of a final, just and comprehensive solution in the area depends on the achievement of a just solution of the problems that have been disregarded for the present, such as the problem of Jerusalem, or those that have been postponed for subsequent negotiations, such as sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza and the Israeli settlements there, or those that have been obscurely and ambiguously framed, such as the problem

¹⁹⁵ Distributed by the Sudanese embassy, Beirut.

of the Palestinian refugees. If the steps towards peace are to be successful, adequate clarifications of these problems must be provided so as to induce the other parties to participate in the operation of building peace and reaching a comprehensive and final settlement. In spite of the obscurity and negligence that disclose Israel's intransigence, it is to be observed that what the Camp David agreement has to say as regards the framework for a peaceful settlement is to the effect that the negotiations must be based on all the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242, and that the solution arrived at as a result of the negotiations must involve recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just demands. These are the two essential bases of any comprehensive peaceful settlement in the area, and Israel has always rejected them outright. The US which shoulders the burden of responsibility for sharing in outlining the general framework for the settlement must shoulder the burden of greater responsibility for participating in settling the problems that have been disregarded or postponed or left obscure in the light of this important stipulation. Sudan once again declares that Arab solidarity and joint Arab action constitute the indispensable basis for the protection of vital Arab interests and for the building of a just peace in the area, and that Sudan will shoulder her responsibilities in this connection to the full.

313

Radio interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat reiterating his rejection of Security Council resolution 242 but his acceptance of the US-Soviet communiqué of October 1977¹⁹⁶

October 24, 1978

Q. Mr. President, all three Steadfastness and Confrontation Summits failed to stop President Sadat's initiative, and to prevent Egyptian negotiatiors from heading for Washington to sign the peace treaty. And Washington is now openly seeking to convince the Pal-

estinians and Arabs to accept the second Camp David agreement, 197 i.e. to accept the "self-rule" plan. Meanwhile, PLO supporters have announced their rejection of this plan in various conferences, mainly at Beit Hanina and Gaza. But, will all these efforts, activities and conferences succeed in foiling the Camp David accords related to "self-rule," and how will you, Mr. President, confront this issue which directly affects the PLO?

A. First of all, I object to the title "President." I always prefer being addressed as "brother Abu Ammar." Second, the self-rule plan, which is one of the most dangerous results of Camp David, harms not only the PLO and the Palestinian people, but also the whole Arab nation.

We are now at a historic turning-point, the implication of which is that this Arab nation will be or will not be; that this Arab nation, which includes 150 million people, will impose its own will and future, or accept a new colonialism and containment, and a US-imperialist-Zionist hegemony over the Arab region.

We are now entering the 14th year of our struggle; and our people are entering the 62nd year of their struggle. Our people have struggled and continue to struggle, generation after generation. There is not one single family that does not have a martyr, a prisoner or an injured person among its members. Our people are known for their heroism and victories. A few days ago, Menahem Begin said something important; that the most dangerous thing facing the Zionist movement is the PLO, and that he wants to defeat it.

Let Begin understand that he will not be able to defeat the Palestinian Revolution. Let him learn from the facts, for when he moved a third of his army, on the orders of Brzezinski (who at the beginning of this year said "Bye bye PLO"), he thought that he could destroy the Palestinian Revolution in the space of six hours. But after eight days he was the one who asked for a cease-fire, not me. Gur admitted that, and when he was asked about his losses, said: "What could I do if I had before me people who want to die?"

It is important that we should understand all these things well, before you ask me whether the Steadfastness and Confrontation conference is able to stop Camp David or not, for the historic turningpoint which the Arab nation is facing cannot be looked at in the short run.

¹⁹⁶ Broadcast on Monte Carlo radio; English translation as published in *Palestine* (Beirut), IV, 19 (November 1, 1978), pp. 7–9. Resolution 242 is published as doc. 268 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967* and the US-Soviet joint communiqué as doc. 160 in *International Documents on Palestine 1977*.

¹⁹⁷ Doc. 154 above.

I would like to tell you that a few days ago they announced that they would undertake to rearrange matters for the "self-rule" plan. Faced with the massive outcry against "self-rule" they began trying to bribe our people, for they realized that this people are daily showing more firmness and more attachment to their goals. The Americans will retreat again against their own will.

For this reason, we are creating new equations; whether they like it or not, our steadfastness will create them and the Steadfastness and Confrontation conference will create them. For that conference is not merely a grouping of five parties, but a sweeping current in this Arab Nation, represented by the Egyptian Nasserite deputy, Kamal Ahmad, by the members of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council, by the Nationalist Progressive Unionist grouping, and by the Egyptian army and people.

- Q. Among the equations you mentioned is the one regarding the occupied territories. Western observers divide the West Bank and Gaza population into three groups: PLO supporters, King Hussein supporters and independents. But those who rejected the "self-rule" and other proposals went beyond these three groups. What if some of these groups should support "self-rule"?
- A. First, I would like to tell those who invent these divisions that our people inside and outside form one tightly-knit bloc, and that these divisions which Carter, Begin and other lackeys of imperialism put forth are only meant to realize their objectives, mainly the objective of settler-colonialism which represents the last stage of colonialism, and which will be ended by our militants in this Arab region.

Most of the Western press serves the interests of world Zionism and imperialism, and does not transmit the true picture. It in fact imposed a black-out on the great uprising which took place in the occupied territories against Camp David. The answer of our people—who they thought would accept the "bone" thrown their way—was a clear expression of their rejection of Camp David and its participants, who conspire against our cause. Our people teach their leadership and cadres about struggle against imperialism, Zionism and agents and traitors. Therefore, these people, whether they are in the West Bank, in Gaza, in the U.S.A., Australia, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria or Egypt, utter one single unified word.

This people who have lost everything, have succeeded in creating the greatest Revolution, after the Vietnamese Revolution. In 1973, in Berlin, the Vietnamese handed me the flag of International Revolution, and our Revolution is loyal to it. When I went to the UN in 1974, 198 I said that I was not talking in the name of the Palestinian Revolution and people only, but in the name of revolutionaries the world over and in the name of all oppressed peoples.

- Q, It is now obvious that the USA is stressing that the PLO should accept Security Council resolution 242 in order to participate in negotiations. Saunders even hinted that the USA would accept that the PLO should say "we accept 242 but we have reservations." What is your stand on these suggestions?
- A. The US asking the PLO to accept 242 proves that they cannot ignore the PLO. This request was put to me a while ago, but does this resolution mention the rights and cause of the Palestinian people? It only refers to them as "refugees," and the USA is actively trying to have the UN pass resolutions that are in harmony with its policies, without giving any consideration to the rights of this people.

In this context, I wonder why they do not hold to resolution 3236 or 3237? Instead they repeat Kissinger's record: "It is only possible to talk with the PLO if it recognizes 242." This only means American commitment to supporting Israel, and its lack of commitment to international resolutions since 1947.

- Q, What can you say about Palestinian commando action?
- A. We in the PLO stand with international legitimacy, and we entered the United Nations with the support of this legitimacy. After our victory in South Lebanon, when they attempted to put a distance between us and international legitimacy, I declared the Revolution's acceptance of the U.S.- Soviet communiqué, 199 issued in October 1977. We have never been nihilistic, and we never will be, for nihilism means defeatism. The Revolution deals with reality, and the Palestinian National Council resolved that it is the right of the P.L.O. to establish its independent state on any part of Palestinian land liberated, or

¹⁹⁸ Doc. 9 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

¹⁹⁹ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

from which the enemy withdraws.²⁰⁰ The Council also resolved that it is the right to participate in all international conferences which deal with an overall and just solution of the Palestinian question, enabling the Palestinian people to practise their national rights in complete freedom in their homeland.

- Q, I recently detected signs of the beginning of the unification of the Palestinian Revolution, which some have described as the practical answer to the Camp David accords. What about this?
- A. The question is not one of unification or integration; what is important is unification within the context of specific goals of the entire Palestinian people and all its institutions, all of whom say "Yes to the PLO and to the National Charter." Thus there is a certain unity which constitutes the basis we agree on. What we want from the current meetings is that they lead to agreement on a programme for the coming phase, which we call the post-Camp David phase. Last Friday, the Palestinian leadership agreed on this programme, which will be laid before the next session of the Palestinian National Council and before our entire people, wherever they are found, for their approval.

There exists something else: organizational unity, such as that represented in the National Council, the Central Council, the Executive Committee and military command. As is known, all Palestinian military forces are responsible to a single military command. This unity exists in spite of small differences and difficulties, which are to be expected in view of the situation.

- Q. What can you say about your visit to Jordan, which was described as a failure, and what about relations with Iraq?
- A. The visit to Jordan was a success and its results were excellent. We will be forming a committee to continue the Palestinian-Jordanian dialogue, and I hope that this committee will be successful. All of this has been discussed by the Palestinian leadership and the Executive Committee, and we hope it will bear fruit soon.

Iraq is a different matter, and unfortunately what happened between them and us was something painful, but I hope that the Baghdad Summit²⁰¹ will be an occasion for a reassessment of what they did to us. I have heard indirectly that they have this intention, and I hope that this will develop to the point of actions and not just words.

As for the Baghdad summit, I have grown accustomed to being neither pessimistic nor optimistic regarding Arab Summit conferences. The results will be commensurate with out efforts and our struggle in any conference. Rabat, for example, I consider a success, in spite of the unseen presence of Kissinger, which permeated the conference, even though, of course, he was not there.

- Q. What can you say about Lebanon?
- A. First, I would like to express my pleasure at the results of the Beiteddine conference.²⁰² I consider it to have had positive results on the Lebanese and Arab levels. The meaning of Beiteddine is that it said no to international interference in an Arab country. This is an important and indeed cirtical point. You know of these unnatural voices which called for internationalization and other things. I declare: Beiteddine means one thing, which is that there is an Arab decision regarding an internal Arab matter.
- Q, What can you say about Iranian accusations against the PLO?
- A. What I can say is that I am with the Iranian people and support their struggle for their rights, this people who march with banners saying in Arabic "Revolution Until Victory." Whose slogan is this? It is the slogan of the PLO and of Fateh. This certainly should be an answer to Brzezinski and others who said "Bye-bye PLO".... In any case we are not behind these demonstrations; what is "behind" them is the oppression from which the Iranian people are suffering.

²⁰¹ See docs. 321-326 below.

²⁰² See doc. 310 above.

²⁰⁰ See doc. 246 in International Documents on Palestine 1974.

314

Charter for joint national action between Syria and $Iraq^{203}$

Baghdad, October 26, 1978

At the invitation of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and President of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Hafiz Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, paid a friendly visit to Baghdad at the head of an official delegation in the period between October 24 and 26, 1978. During this visit, a comprehensive and detailed review of the current Arab scene and of relations between the two fraternal regions was carried out.

The two sides succeeded in concluding a pact for joint national action between the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. Following is the text:

A joint national action pact between the Syrian and Iraqi regions.

Responding to the national and historic responsibility which falls upon the shoulders of the leaderships of the two struggling Arab regions of Iraq and Syria, and in conformity with their deep faith in the principles of Arab nationalism and Arab unity; aware of the great dangers threatening the Arab nation, especially at this stage, which emanate from an imperialist-Zionist alliance and that have grown far graver with the signature of the agreements of treachery between the Egyptian regime and the Zionist enemy; conscious of the necessity to furnish the effective requirements of struggle to confront these dangers that threaten the destiny, dignity, sovereignty and future of the Arab nation; determined to accomplish a qualitative change in relations between the two fraternal regions, the leaderships of the two regions held meetings in Baghdad between October 24 and 26, 1978, in an atmosphere of deep consciousness of historic responsibility, profound mutual understanding and firm determination to respond to the national aspirations of the Arab masses.

The two leaderships agreed to a pact for joint action between the two regions in the various political, military, economic, cultural and infor-

mational fields. This embodies a determination to strive, within an unfolding and scientific plan, to achieve the closest possible form of unitary relations between the two Arab regions of Iraq and Syria.

The resolutions adopted by the two leaderships in their historic meeting in October, 1978, represent a prominent qualitative change in relations between the two regions on the path towards Arab unity, the noblest aim of the Arab masses.

The two leaderships stress especially the deep and comprehensive nature of the struggle embodied in their historic agreement as regards the just struggle waged by the Arab nation against the usurping Zionist enemy, for the sake of liberating the land and recovering the legitimate rights of the Arab nation.

The leadership delegations included, on the Syrian side, President Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, Jamil Shayya, Deputy Premier for Economic Affairs, Fahmi al-Yusufi, Deputy Premier for Services and Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, Minister of Information; and on the Iraqi side, President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and President of the Iraqi Republic; Saddam Husayn, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council; Taha Yasin Ramadan, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Minister of Housing and Reconstruction; Adnan Husayn, member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and Minister of Planning; Adnan Khairallah, member of the RCC and Minister of Defense; Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, Foreign Minister.

The two delegations resolved the following:

I. To create a higher joint political authority made up of the two leaderships which would take charge of all bilateral relations in the political, military, economic, cultural, educational, informational and other fields and to achieve coordination and complementarity between the two regions in the direction of the unitary objectives specified by this pact.

II. This authority is to be made up of:

The Iraqi side:

- 1. President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Chairman of the RCC and President of the Republic.
- 2. Mr. Saddam Husayn, Deputy Chairman of the RCC.

²⁰³ The Charter was signed by President Asad and President Bakr. Translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), October 27, 1978.

- 3. Mr. Izzat Ibrahim, member of the RCC and Minister of the Interior.
- 4. Mr. Taha Yasin Ramadan, member of the RCC and Minister of Housing and Reconstruction.
 - 5. Mr. Tariq Aziz, member of the RCC.
- 6. Mr. Adnan Husayn, member of the RCC and Minister of Planning.
- 7. Major General (Air Force) Adnan Khairallah, member of the RCC and Minister of Defense. The Syrian side:
 - 1. President Hafiz Asad
 - 2. Mr. Muhammad Ali Halabi, Prime Minister
- 3. Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister
- 4. Mr. Jamil Shayya, Deputy Premier for Economic Affairs
- 5. Mr. Fahmi Yusufi, Deputy Premier for Services
 - 6. Marshal Mustafa Tlas, Minister of Defense
- 7. Mr. Zuhair Mashariqa, Minister of Education.
- III. The authority meets periodically every three months and whenever the need arises, in the two capitals of the regions on an alternate basis.
- IV. From this authority, a number of central committees will be formed as follows:
- 1. A Committee for Political, Informational and Cultural Affairs headed, on the Iraqi side, by Mr. Tariq Aziz, member of the RCC and, on the Syrian side, by Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister.

This Committee will propose joint policies and supervise coordination and cooperation between the two regions in the political, informational and cultural fields.

2. A Committee for Economic Affairs and Technical Cooperation headed, on the Iraqi side, by Mr. Adnan Husayn, member of the RCC and Minister of Planning and, on the Syrian side, by Mr. Jamil Shayya, Deputy Premier for Economic Affairs.

This Committee will undertake to effect coordination and cooperation between the two regions in all economic and technical fields and to enhance and develop relations in the fields of agriculture, industry, irrigation, commerce, planning, transport and all other economic and technical spheres.

3. A Committee for Military Cooperation. This, on the Iraqi side, will be composed of:

- 1. Major General (Air Force) Adnan Khairallah, Minister of Defense.
 - 2. Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, Foreign Minister
- 3. Major General Abd al-Jabbar Shanshal, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and on the Syrian side:
- 1. Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, deputy Premier and Foreign Minister
 - 2. Marshal Mustafa Tlas, Minister of Defense
- 3. Marshal Hikmat al-Shihabi, Chief of Staff of the Army and Armed Forces.

This committee will undertake to prepare a draft for a common defense agreement to act as a base for a total military union between the two regions.

4. A committee for education, higher learning and scientific research to be headed on the Iraqi side by Mr. Izzat Ibrahim, member of the RCC and Minister of the Interior and, on the Syrian side, by Mr. Zuhair Mashariqa, Minister of Education.

This committee will be in charge of working to achieve a unification of curricula in the fields of education and learning and coordination in the sphere of scientific research.

Each committee shall add to its membership a number of specialists as the need arises.

The schedule of central committee meetings shall be set with the agreement of the chairmen. Each committee shall submit a report of its activities to the higher political authority at least two weeks before that authority is scheduled to meet.

Committee resolutions are subject to confirmation by the higher authority. The authority can delegate to the committees the power of taking such decisions as they deem unnecessary to submit to it.

315

Speech by President Asad of Syria following the signing of the charter for joint national action between his country and Iraq²⁰⁴

Baghdad, October 26, 1978

President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Mr Vice-President, brothers, I offer my profound gratitude

²⁰⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), October 27, 1978. The charter is published as the document above.

to the President, the Vice-President and all of you for all we have experienced during the many meetings we have held during these two days.

The Syrian delegation and I feel glad and happy at what has been achieved during this meeting. We are also happy because we have all been what we should be and what the Arab citizens of Iraq and Syria and every Arab country expect us to be. I believe we have shown that appreciation of our responsibilities that all Arab citizens desire, wherever they may be.

This was the starting point of our serious and responsible search for everything that will strengthen our potential and our capabilities for the confrontation of this ferocious Zionist attack on the Arab nation. Our determination to resist and check this imperialist-Zionist advance directed against the interests, hopes and legitimate aspirations of the Arab nation is very clear. Throughout history our two countries have achieved much for the Arab homeland and the Arab nation, especially when they have been faced with cruel ordeals. History is full of clear and conspicuous examples of this. As the President said, we must not be of less importance or less responsibility than our ancestors, who performed glorious services to successive generations of our nation. We are all now aware that no Arab difference can affect the struggle of destiny that is in progress between the Arab nation on the one hand and Zionism and its allies and supporters in the world on the other.

We have evaluated the situation in the same way, and our understanding of it has been identical. Our common concern has been the importance of strengthening trust between the two countries, between the two leaderships, in response to the wish of the Arab citizens of Iraq, Syria and every honourable Arab struggler in the Arab homeland. It is our joint view that we are expected by the Arab masses to strengthen capabilities, mobilise resources and increase trust so that we may confront this ferocious enemy. We are optimistic and confident of the inevitability of victory, because we are stronger and more determined and because our cause is just.

Undoubtedly the great Iraqi people, whom we in Syria and in the Arab homeland—in every part of the Arab homeland—look upon with the greatest love and hope—we look upon those great people with the deepest love, the deepest

respect and the strongest hope.

This people, and the Arab masses in every Arab country, wish to know what we have achieved, and this will be made known today. But we are aware, I am aware, the President is aware and all of us in Syria and Iraq are aware, that what we have achieved is but the first step.

This is our understanding of our mission, and we hope to convey it to our citizens as it is. We are aware that a hard task lies before us and that there is a long road ahead of us. But we have the intention and the determination. We have also jointly affirmed that we shall struggle against obstacles, that we shall struggle to remove the obstacles so that we may reach the position to which we and the Arab masses aspire. Our ultimate and highest ambition is to achieve complete Arab unity by starting with unity between the two sister countries, Iraq and Syria, because the many things they have in common place them in the forefront of the process of unification. But, as I said, the road is long, and we did not wish to jump over the barriers and obstacles. We said that we will face up to these obstacles and remove them from the road as we advance along

Once again I thank President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Vice-President Saddam Husayn and all the members of the Iraqi delegation, and I also extend my thanks and heart-felt greetings to all the citizens of our beloved Iraq. Peace be with you.

316

Television interview statements by President Asad of Syria describing his country's agreement with Iraq as a defence agreement and the proposed autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza as an attempt to incorporate the territories into Israel (excerpts)²⁰⁵

Damascus, October 28, 1978

Q, Your Excellency, you have achieved an exciting reconciliation with Iraq, with whom Syria has been in violent disagreement for years. Was it the Camp David

²⁰⁵ Interview granted to French television; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), October 31, 1978.

talks and the subsequent Washington talks that led to a change of attitude in both countries?

- A. When nations are in danger they try to strengthen themselves. We are in a situation where we are exposed to immense dangers, so it is natural that we should seek sources of strength that we may have overlooked to some extent in the past. If what we have done is exciting—I mean our meetings in Syria and Iraq, and the outcome of these meetings—it would be surprising if we had not done what we did, which was to make every effort to bring about these meetings and to unify the efforts of the two countries in a real confrontation with an enemy whose target is our interests, our hopes and our legitimate Arab aspirations.
- Q. Does Your Excellency think that the danger is greater than it was a few weeks ago?
- A. Certainly, because an important part of Arab strength has left the arena of confrontation. More than that, in a way it has moved from one trench to another, from the Arab trench to the Israeli trench.
- Q. At the military level, do you think that your agreement with Iraq will lead to your being militarily stronger, and in what way?
- A. It is quite clear. Our strength and that of Iraq, along with that of the other Arab forces, will constitute a single force and a single front. The advantages of this to us Arabs are quite clear.
- Q. Meaning that you will be able to ask for Iraqi forces to be stationed with Syrian forces on the front of confrontation with Israel?
- A. During our meetings we set up a number of committees, including a military committee consisting of the Ministers of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. This committee is authorized to redeploy the armed forces of the two countries, Syria and Iraq, according to the defence requirements of Syria, Iraq and the rest of the Arab front.
- Q, Israel has concluded that this agreement is a hostile one directed against her, and that it will constitute a danger to her. What do you say?
- A. From this point of view there is nothing new. The whole Arab nation is in one trench and Israel is in another.

What is new is the effort to reorganise things in a more effective manner.

Israel and all the countries of the world know that Iraq is part of the Arab nation, and that the Iraqi armed forces are part of the Arab armed forces, and it is natural that they should be directly concerned with any Arab battle against their enemies.

- Q, Do you think that Syria and Iraq could handle Israel at the military level without Egypt?
- A. At present we are not interested in deciding things at the military level. We are interested in rearranging our defence situation so that we may be capable of efficient defence against any new aggression.
- Q. Then your agreement with Iraq is a defensive, not an offensive agreement.
- A. We Arabs have been aggressed against and our territory has been usurped, and part of our people rendered homeless, and we are organising our affairs for defence against these aggressions.
- Q. Does Your Excellency think that the future of Israel must be decided or can be decided at present by military means?
- A. This is not being discussed at present. We are not at present discussing the deciding of the Arab-Israeli conflict by military means during the present stage. We are discussing the best way to confront Israeli aggression and the repeated Israeli attacks on our Arab territory.

In this field the meeting of Syria and Iraq was something fundamental, and enables us to meet the essential requirements necessary for us to defend ourselves against Israeli attacks.

- Q. Since Sadat's initiative of visiting Jerusalem a change has taken place in world public opinion in favour of Sadat, seeing what he did as a great development that has opened new horizons for peace. This is how the world interprets the visit. If Sadat succeeds in Washington in recovering all the occupied Egyptian territories, will this be regarded as a success?
- A. Separate agreements are one thing, peace is another.

What Sadat has done could lead to a separate agreement, as happened at Camp David. But it cannot lead to peace, because those who are discussing and conferring are not the parties concerned. They are only some of the parties concerned, and peace can only be achieved as the result of a comprehensive solution that satisfies

all the parties without exception.

And now, as you see, a separate agreement is about to be signed in a few days, so we hear, though the area is in a state of war.

What Sadat has done has made things more complicated, not made the road to peace easier.

It should be noted that what Sadat has done is in some ways similar to what Pétain did in France. As you know you condemned Pétain in France, although we in the Arab homeland believe that what Pétain did was different and less irresponsible than what Sadat has done to the Arabs.

- Q. Assuming that Sadat, with US help, has obtained from Israel a real internal autonomous entity for the Palestinians of the West Bank, along with elections of Arab representatives, would this change your attitude, according to this hypothesis?
- A. That is what Israel wants, not the Arabs. Sadat's insistence on it means that he insists on giving Israel what she wants in return for whatever area of land he recovers in Sinai. Both the Arabs and the Palestinians reject this autonomy, believing that it is an Israeli, not an Arab or Palestinian demand.
- Q, That means that the actual autonomy that is granted will not be a step forward?
- A. We see this as another victory for Israel, because she has obliged one of the Arab parties to approve this solution, which we believe to be radically incompatible with Arab aspirations and with the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people. For the Palestinian people demand a homeland, a national identity, not an autonomous entity within the framework of another state, especially when that state is Israel which is occupying their land and expelling them from their homeland.
- Q. You mean that you regard internal autonomy in the West Bank as incorporation in the state of Israel, not the creation of a Palestinian homeland?
- A. That is what is proposed; that is what autonomous independence means. It means a canton within Israel. It means that the Palestinian people and the Palestinian homeland will remain a part of the state of Greater Israel, and no one can imagine that this meets the aspirations and ambitions of the Palestinian people.
 - Q. A year ago, before Sadat's visit to Jerusalem,

you received him and discussed things with him, adducing arguments to persuade him to abandon the visit.²⁰⁶ Now that a year has passed do you think that the views you held then were correct and sound?

A. Yes, the passage of time has proved their force, and that he was making a huge mistake. That is why I stressed to him that by going to Jerusalem he would not help the peace process, but rather impede it. I told him that he would destroy the peace process, and now we see what has happened.

The whole world was anticipating an international peace conference, and was in favour of it. And it was well on the way to being achieved, with all the parties concerned attending it. At such a conference, under the auspices of the UN and with the help of the two superpowers, it would have been possible to provide a solid basis for the establishment of a just peace. But as we can now see, the problem has been fragmented. Sadat has gone his way and the others have gone theirs. The balance has changed, and this requires a completely different course from that which was followed in the past.

- Q, During his talks with you here a year ago, Sadat said that this was his policy,²⁰⁷ and this was what he was going to do. A year later is he still making the same mistakes, or have there been unseen developments?
- A. I cannot say that he provided me with convincing justifications for his trip to Jerusalem. He did no more than provide a recital of the circumstances in which his idea of going to Jerusalem came to him. And that he was going there and going to pray in the Aqsa Mosque, and then going to the Knesset to state his views. He anticipated no difficulties as regards the Egyptian and Syrian territories, but he did think that the question of Palestinian rights would present difficulties.

It was an exposition rather than an analysis or an explanation. So that I heard nothing to convince me of the advantages and the importance of his going to Jerusalem. On the contrary, I realised all the pitfalls implicit in such a visit, and I told him so.

²⁰⁶ For President Asad's position at that time see doc. 293 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²⁰⁷ See doc. 294 in Ibid.

- Q, If Egypt now concludes a peace treaty with Israel, Syria will become the principal confrontation state. Would you explain simply to French viewers if there is any condition for your taking part in the negotiations other than the recovery of the Golan and also, for example, the conceding of the principle of the recognition of the Palestinian right to a homeland? Or is there something else?
- A. We have no intention of taking part in these negotiations, because we believe that they are incompatible with the UN resolutions. These resolutions lay down the basic principles on which peace can be established, and also the formula that can lead to the creation of such foundations.

They stated that there would be a peace conference under the auspices of the UN, chaired by the two superpowers and with all the parties attending. This is the formula stated by the UN resolutions. They also stipulated complete withdrawal from the territory occupied in 1967 and acknowledgement of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

This is the substance, and this is the form as defined by the UN resolutions. Does what has happened correspond to the form and substance of these resolutions? Of course not.

What happened at Camp David and the results of Camp David are incompatible in both form and substance with the goals and stipulations of the UN resolutions.

- Q. Therefore you, for your part, will continue to adhere to the course outlined by the UN, and, within this framework, you would still agree to negotiations under UN auspices and to recognise the existence of Israel?
- A. We Arabs want peace, and in our action on behalf of peace we are guided by the decision of the world—the resolutions that proceed from the conscience of the whole world.
 - Q. Iraq too?
- A. I say the Arabs. This question should be put to Iraq. But I can say that, throughout their history, the Arabs have been in favour of peace, never of war. To advocate self-defence is one thing, to advocate war is another.

But to continue, I stress that what has happened and is happening now is totally incompatible with the UN resolutions.

We want all the territories that were occupied in 1967, we want all the rights of the Palestinian

Arab people, and we believe that these things are the constituents of a just peace in the area.

But, frankly, the conditions required for the achievement of such a peace have not been met; they have been destroyed by Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, by the subsequent Camp David meetings and by the results of Camp David, and by what is to be signed soon, so we have heard, namely a capitulationist peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

- Q. But you do not want to accept the idea that, before she eventually makes a positive response to the Arabs' demands, Israel must protect her existence and ensure the conditions for her survival in this area?
- A. If we refer to history we find that, ever since the establishment of Israel, it is she that has always been the aggressor, not the Arabs. Every time Israel has occupied new Arab territories, and expelled a new section of the Arab people.
- Q. But is not this a rewriting of history? Is not the existence of Israel in this area a fact?
 - A. What?
- Q. The fact of her existence, that has so far not been recognised by most of the Arab countries, with the exception of Egypt?
- A. She exists, otherwise how could she commit aggression against us. Is the aggression against us carried out by ghosts, or by something that really exists? Israel commits aggression against us, so she exists, but it is an aggressive existence.

317

Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf (Abu Iyyad) discussing the visit of PLO Central Committee Chairman Arafat to the Soviet Union²⁰⁸

Late October, 1978

Q. The PLO has welcomed the Beiteddin resolutions. ²⁰⁹ Does this mean that you have absolutely no reservations about the implementation of the Riyadh and Cairo summit resolutions? Was this subject discussed in your meetings this week (October 24, 25) with Prime Minister Selim

²⁰⁹ See doc. 310 above.

²⁰⁸ Interview conducted by Claude Khoury, *Monday Morning* (Beirut) VII, 332 (October 30–November 5, 1978), pp. 17–23.

Hoss and President Elias Sarkis?

A. The PLO, in all its members, has welcomed the Beiteddin resolutions and considers them the key to the settlement of the Lebanese crisis.

The PLO has never had any reservations about the implementation of the Riyadh and Cairo summit resolutions, ²¹⁰ but the question is this: Is the PLO alone to be required to make concessions—in other words, to implement resolutions—when it is a well-known fact that the Lebanese crisis is not limited to the Palestinian implementation or non-implementation of resolutions? The crisis is a Lebanese political crisis. If the Lebanese agreed on a political solution, we would automatically have to implement the agreements, whether there were any Riyadh and Cairo resolutions or not.

The Palestinian Revolution is prepared to do everything that is asked of it to contribute toward the termination of the Lebanese crisis. Lebanon has had enough destruction over the past four years. The various Lebanese factions must come together around a political settlement from which can spring a strong political government truly capable of solving all the problems facing the people of Lebanon—especially those relating to the Cairo agreements and the Riyadh resolutions.

The Palestinian Resistance has no reservations whatsoever. Yesterday, Brother Abu Ammar and I visited Premier Hoss. We told him that the Palestinian Resistance is committed to the implementation of any decision which is agreed upon by the legitimate authorities.

And today, in a meeting with President Sarkis, I reaffirmed our commitment to all agreements and resolutions—those of Cairo and Riyadh and Beiteddin. I told the President that we would like to see Lebanon's three top officials—the President of the Republic, the Speaker of Parliament and the prime minister—reach an agreement, rallying the Lebanese people around them, and we would guarantee that not one Palestinian would remain uncommitted to the agreements and resolutions.

Q. At one time in the past, there was a disagreement on whether the Lebanese militias should be disarmed before or after the Lebanese-Palestinian agreements are applied. Do you see the same disagreement approaching nores?

A. The whole matter is linked with a political settlement on the Lebanese level. The Lebanese must agree among themselves on the various issues facing them—the carrying of arms, the militias, the future of Lebanon, Lebanon's system of government. We will not interfere in this process.

However, we cannot help but feel a certain apprehension when the Palestinians are asked to surrender their arms, and when so much stress is placed on the implementation of the Cairo Agreement,²¹¹ at a time when every Lebanese remains armed. The Palestinians are afraid—more so than anyone else. The Palestinians' minds would be set at ease in the presence of a strong Lebanese government which is capable of protecting them from internal and external attack. When such a government emerges, there will be no more problems as far as Palestinian arms are concerned.

I say it would be wrong to try to implement the Cairo agreements and the Riyadh resolutions before gathering up the arms of all the militias. This would be a negative approach. I say a unified Lebanon must agree on a political settlement of its problems and then turn to us and ask us to implement the agreements and the resolutions. I believe this would bolster the position of the State.

There are some conditions that are being placed for no other reason but to create trouble. This demand that the Palestinians implement the agreements first, before the Lebanese solve their problems and gather up their arms, is just a plan aimed at perpetuating the Lebanese crisis.

I repeat: there must first be an inter-Lebanese settlement. The Lebanese can then ask the Palestinians to implement the agreements and resolutions, and I am certain that the Palestinians will honor all their commitments without exception.

An inter-Lebanese settlement is the basic solution. After such a settlement, Lebanon can ask all parties—the Palestinians, the Arab Deterrent Forces—to honor their commitments.

But if the Lebanese cannot reach an agreement among themselves, it will be difficult to ask any party to honor its commitments, and it will be difficult for any such request to be met.

²¹⁰ See docs. 267, 268, 313 and 314, in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

²¹¹ For an alleged text of the Cairo agreement, see doc. 449 in International Documents on Palestine 1969; see also footnote 74, p. 469 above.

- Q. You had a meeting recently with Sheikh Amin Gemayel. What impressions did you come out with? And can we expect more meetings between you and other members of the Lebanese front?
- A. It is said that as much courage is needed for peace-making as for war. Those who are fighting for a cause—those are the people who can make peace.

I have known Sheikh Amin since 1973, when there used to be meetings between us and members of the Phalangist Party. I remember I used to admire his candor. His candor did not, perhaps, impress some members of the Palestinian team, but it did impress me. Since that time, there has been a relationship of mutual respect between us. We have fought each other fiercely, but after war, there must be peace.

Mutual friends arranged a meeting between us, and I must say that I was happy to meet him and pleased with what he told me about what is happening in Lebanon. I don't have the right to reveal what we agreed on at this time, but I believe that we were in agreement on most of the points we discussed. It was a fruitful meeting, and it will have results in the near future.

It is in our interests, as Palestinians, to have good relations with the Christians (although we are non-sectarian and reject this kind of language). We want them to understand us, to understand that we do not want to settle in Lebanon permanently or to violate Lebanese sovereignty. We want them to know that we have no ambition to participate, directly or indirectly, in the government of Lebanon, or to back one side against the other. But we also want them to understand that when we hear one group demanding our annihilation, demanding that we be thrown into the sea, we cannot but defend ourselves.

I made all this clear to Sheikh Amin Gemayel. There were many things he agreed with me on, and some which he didn't, but in general, it was a good, fruitful meeting. We extend our hand to everyone, in respect and cooperation.

One point I would like to comment on:

Sheikh Amin, in his recent statements, expressed the true Christian position regarding Israel. That is a positive point, which is to be added to others.

The Lebanese problem is very clear in Sheikh Amin's mind. He fully understands Lebanon's relationship with the Arab countries. He fully understands the truth about the Lebanese problem, on the party level and on the sectarian level.

Perhaps my praise of him will harm him, but I must say, in all honesty, that the voice of Sheikh Amin is a voice that must be heard.

I cannot bring myself to meet with anyone who cooperates with Israel, regardless of the arguments justifying that cooperation, and regardless of the circumstances in which those dealings are said to have started. I cannot deal with anyone who deals with Israel.

But there are no closed doors. Whoever wishes to cooperate with us or reach an understanding with us need only sever his relations with Israel. Our hand is extended to everyone.

The Lebanese Front or any of its members is not more important or dearer to us than Egypt. And yet, when Sadat visited Israel, we severed all relations with him (though not with the Egyptian people). That was a sign from us to anyone who would throw himself into Israel's lap.

The clarity of Sheikh Amin Gemayel's position prompted us to meet with him, and we are ready to meet with anyone who has no relations with Israel, or who severs those relations, to discuss with him our mutual interests.

- Q. Is it possible that a meeting will take place between you and Camille Chamoun, for instance?
- A. I think my answer was clear. We will not deal with anyone who deals with Israel and are ready to meet with anyone who severs his relations with Israel, should such relations exist. Regardless of who is involved, be it President Chamoun or anyone else, we are open to all people. We are people with a cause. We have principles that guide us, and those principles dictate our actions.
- Q, About PLO chief Yasser Arafat's visit to Moscow on the eve of the Baghdad summit: 212 Are Moscow and the PLO coordinating their positions on the Camp David agreements? Is there any chance that the Geneva conference will be reconvened, as the Soviet Union is demanding?
- A. Regarding Abu Ammar's visit to Moscow, it is a continuation of past contacts. The Soviet Union is our friend and has never changed its attitude toward the Palestinian people. Even some Arab countries have changed their attitude

²¹² See doc. 192 above for the joint PLO-Soviet communiqué issued on the occasion of Yasir Arafat's visit to Moscow. For the Baghdad summit, see docs. 321–326 below.

to our people and our cause, but not the Soviet Union. An exchange of visits between us is only natural, to confer on the Arab and international situations and our own situation as a revolutionary people.

The visit takes on particular importance in the light of the Camp David agreements, the Baghdad summit and the moves our people are making inside the occupied territories. All these matters must be discussed with our brothers the Soviets, and the visit is bound to be fruitful on all levels.

The Soviet Union's position on the Camp David agreements is clear. Brother Abu Ammar has received a letter from the Soviet Union confirming its rejection of those agreements, because they do not represent a just solution of the Middle East problem, because they ignore Palestinian rights and cannot lead to a just peace. The results of the Camp David meetings will be the major subject of discussion between Brother Abu Ammar and the Soviet leaders.

As for the Geneva conference: Moscow's demand aside, that conference has been destroyed by Sadat and the United States. Geneva is no longer the proper setting for a discussion of the Middle East problem. Sadat has destroyed everything.

Moscow, of course, is free to demand that the Geneva conference be reconvened, but the truth is that the conference has been destroyed by Sadat, Carter and Israel. The entire region must now be reconsidered. We ourselves were ready to adopt any positive position to achieve peace in the Middle East. For that reason, we asked for a Palestinian state in part of Palestine's territory, to solve the problem of a people which has been suffering for 70 years.

But now we ask, is there any international intention to recognize the Palestinian people and their Organization? Is there such an intention in the United States specially?

Once this intention exists, there will be no differences on frameworks, whether in Geneva or elsewhere.

Q, Do you think there is any chance that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty will not be signed? And if it is signed, how do you visualize the situation in the region later?

A. Of course, one cannot help but be saddened by Egypt's position. Charges of "treason" and "collaboration" are useless. "Sorrow" is the

word. Not sorrow for Sadat, who has betrayed his people, his country, the Arab nation and the Palestinian cause, but sorrow—deep sorrow—for the people of Egypt. The people of Egypt have made great sacrifices and have a rich history. Now Sadat proposes to isolate them.

How do I visualize the situation in the region after the peace treaty? There are many ways to visualize it.

For instance, I can see Egyptian-Israeli action, under American supervision, to forge new alliances in the region, to strike at anyone hostile to the United States. I can imagine the Egyptian Army being used to crush any popular revolution in Africa. I can visualize Sadat using all his material and moral capabilities in an attempt to bring the Palestinians to their knees in Lebanon, to strike at Syria, and to silence any dissident voice in the Arab region.

I do not consider any of this far-fetched. A man who dares to sign a separate peace treaty with Israel, a man who tries to draw from the Arabs the strength to regain Sinai, the man who tries to strengthen Egypt at the expense of the Arab people and their rights—such a man, I imagine, is capable of anything.

He is capable, for instance, of trying to bring Egypt into the European Economic Community, because he has a feeling of contempt for the Arabs and prefers to belong to the West.

This, of course, is pure speculation. As for what will actually happen, that's another thing—because I have confidence in the Egyptian people, and I believe that they are not pleased with what Sadat is doing.

So much for Sadat. What is Syria likely to do? The Baghdad summit is approaching, and it is bound to produce new Arab strength to restore the balance of the Arab region.

The Iraqi Army will enter Syria, and there will be a unified front composed of the Syrian Army, the Iraqi Army and the Palestine Liberation Army, in addition to the armies of the member countries of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. Add to that the Soviet factor, and you will have an entirely new situation: the region will be divided into two camps—an Arab camp linked with the Soviet Union and a Sadat camp linked with the United States. The Egyptian alliance, including Numayri's Sudan, will, of course, include Israel, which will play a leadership role.

There are bound to be wars in the region after the peace treaty. The situation will be a difficult one indeed. However, surprise developments might occur which would change the equation. I believe the Egyptian people will reject the treaty, and that Sadat cannot remain in power on the basis of this treaty.

What makes me think so? History does. The Egyptian people have been through four wars for the people of Palestine. They cannot possibly abandon the Palestinian cause overnight, whatever repression Sadat uses. They will not leave their President to do whatever he wishes.

I am optimistic about the Egyptian people. Perhaps my optimism is unjustified, but I'm optimistic nevertheless.

- Q. Is there any specific plan, or are there any special resolutions which the PLO intends to have approved at the Baghdad summit? In other words, what does the PLO expect from the Baghdad summit?
- A. We will carry with us three things to the Baghdad summit:

First: Total rejection of the Camp David summit and the need to translate this rejection into practical steps.

Second: The need to confirm the Rabat summit resolutions, which include recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and recognition of the Palestinians' right to return to their homeland, determine their own fate and establish their own state. The Rabat resolutions also state that no Arab leader has the right to seek a unilateral solution of the Palestinian problem.

The third matter relates to the other Arab countries' position toward Egypt. There are some leaders who are going along with Egypt. Numayri is one. Numayri reminds me of a broken cannon. He can't fire more than one shot at a time. He fires off a statement and then goes out of order. Anyway, Numayri won't last long, and the important thing is Egypt. Soon, Egypt and Israel will exchange ambassadors. When that happens, will the headquarters of the Arab League remain in Cairo? Will any Arab leader agree to go to Cairo and be met by a diplomatic corps which includes an Israeli ambassador?

The Arab League has a military charter of joint defense. Egypt has announced that there will be no more war. What are we going to do

about that?

The Arab League has two sections—military and political. The military section has been destroyed by Sadat's "no war" declaration. The political section has been blocked by his agreements with Israel.

The question now is: Why is the Arab League headquarters still in Cairo? The Baghdad summit must take a position against Sadat's Egypt.

These are the three main subjects we expect to raise at the Baghdad summit.

- Q. Now that King Hussein has taken a position against the Camp David agreements, is there any chance that Jordanian-Palestinian relations will go back to what they were before 1970?
- A. Jordanian-Palestinian estrangement started in 1971. After the Rabat resolutions, a quadripartite (Jordanian-Palestinian-Syrian-Egyptian) committee was formed which attempted to restore relations between us and Jordan. Jordan, however, did not welcome these efforts. Last year, we launched a direct dialogue with some Jordanian officials, but that attempt failed too.

We are interested in restoring our relations with Jordan, especially since King Hussein has totally rejected the Camp David summit resolutions, and despite the fact that many believe his rejection to be transitional.

The fact is that I myself have been opposed to dialogue with Jordan and any attempt to improve Jordanian-Palestinian relations, because I consider it a waste of time. I hope I'm wrong. I hope King Hussein's position (on the Camp David agreements) is a firm one.

At any rate, I will be among the first to seek strong relations of mutual respect with Jordan, for many reasons, most important of which is the fact that our people and the people of Jordan are one. In the future, we will have a state—it is inevitable—and Jordan will be our neighbor. We must have good relations with our neighbor. Good relations are also dictated by the current Arab situation, which, regrettably, is likely to explode at any time. I sincerely hope that Jordan will maintain its present attitude toward the Camp David agreements, and that we will have good relations with it.

Our relationship with Jordan will be built on King Hussein's opposition to the Camp David agreements, his recognition of the PLO as the legal representative of the Palestinian people, his acceptance of the Palestinians' right to determine their own fate, his agreement to treat us as he treats any other Arab country, and the release of Palestinian prisoners in Jordanian jails.

On these bases, we extend our hand to Jordan, ready to forget past differences and bloodshed.

- Q. Why exactly did the PLO reject the results of the Camp David summit, especially the provision for self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza?
- A. It would take me many hours to give you a detailed answer to this question, but I will only mention a few pertinent points:

The Camp David agreements violate the American-Soviet agreement, ²¹³ in which the Palestinians' legitimate rights were recognized. Any settlement in the Middle East which does not have the approval of both superpowers cannot possibly succeed.

The agreements also violate international law, in the sense that they ignore all U.N. resolutions. The U.S. itself recognized Israel on the basis of the partition resolutions of 1947, which provide for the establishment of an Israeli state and a Palestinian state. The United States has now turned its back on these resolutions, and on the international resolutions relating to Jerusalem, and on the 1974 General Assembly resolutions, numbers 3236 and 3238.

In other words, what has happened here is this: a country has taken over other countries' land by force; the U.N. has adopted resolutions against that country; and now three countries have come along and reached an agreement that defies the U.N. and ignores the interests of the occupied countries. Under the terms of this agreement, Egypt takes the lion's share and the Arabs stay out of the game. That, in my view, is a very serious development on the international level.

Consider the matter on the Arab level. There are Arab countries which support the United States. These have been deceived by Washington, which has given Egypt a separate settlement and left the Palestinians and the Golan Heights out.

In the Camp David agreements, Sadat denied us.

Our story with Sadat is a long one. We stood

by him from the day he took office till the day he went to Jerusalem. We stood by him before the (1973) war, during the war, and after the war. We supported him in everything. And now he has betrayed us, our people and our cause.

He will say that he has betrayed no one, and that this is all he has been able to secure. This is nonsense. It is not permissible for Egypt to break ranks with the Arabs, do what it pleases and then say to the Arab countries: "This is what I have been able to get. Go get more if you can." That is rubbish. Egypt, Syria and the PLO were in agreement during the October war. After the war, Sadat broke away and went to surrender, caring nothing about the countries which fought with him in the same trench. He sold Syria out. He sold the PLO out. He embarrassed the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia.

The Arabs cannot forget Jerusalem. They cannot forget the Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Sepulchre Church. We the Arabs have a heritage, and Jerusalem is an important part of it. In one of his speeches, Sadat admitted that there were differences between him and Israel over Jerusalem and that the Holy City was the subject of letters exchanged. How can Jerusalem be reduced to an exchange of letters?

So much for the Arab level.

Consider the Palestinian angle:

Never in our history has any leader dared ask for a part of Palestine on which to build a Palestinian state.

In Lebanon, for instance, they rose up against us. Why? Because, they said, we were violating Lebanese sovereignty. How did we do that? By living in the Shatila camp, the Bourj Barajneh camp, the Sabra camp and a few camps in South? They waged a four-year war against us, on the grounds that we have violated Lebanese sovereignty, at a time when we and the Lebanese were bound together by our Arab identity and brotherhood.

They said we violated Lebanese sovereignty, but the fact is that the Lebanese themselves gave away their sovereignty. They burned and destroyed their country.

The area of the Sabra, Shatila and Bourj Barajneh camps is no more than one square kilometer, and the West Bank represents 22 percent of the total area of Palestine. Yet, we rejected the settlement that would give us Gaza and the

²¹³ Doc. 160 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

West Bank, because, we said, where is the remaining 78 percent of Palestine?

Now, Sadat comes to us with a settlement that would give us "self-rule" in the West Bank and Gaza. 214 Self-rule, in this context, means that the Palestinians, Jordanians and Egyptians will form a police force to protect Israeli security and establish Israel's occupation (of the West Bank and Gaza). The plan involves the reduction of Israeli residents from, say, 11,000 to 6,000 people. Instead of having them spread out in various areas, they will be gathered in one place. Then the Israeli governor will rule the area with the help of a Palestinian assistant, a Jordanian assistant and an Egyptian assistant, and he will have the power of veto.

That is the self-rule that Sadat has brought us. It is supposed to last for five years. After that, will there be Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza? Of course not. And where does Jerusalem figure in all this? It does not. It has not been even mentioned, except by Begin, who has said that Jerusalem would be Israeli forever. When one reporter asked him why Israel doesn't fly its flag in Jerusalem, Begin said the flags of the 22 Arab countries would be raised in the Holy City, when the Arabs establish embassies in Israel. The man really has total contempt for the Arabs and Arab intelligence.

As I said, there is no mention in the agreements of any Palestinian state after the five-year period.

Furthermore, the Camp David agreements deal with one-fifth of the Palestinian problem, one-fifth of the Palestinian people. There are 3.5 million Palestinians. Only one million of them are in the West Bank and Gaza. What do we do with the remaining 2.5 million who are outside?

This is where Lebanon comes in. How can Lebanon accept half a million armed Palestinians? Would the Lebanese accept the settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon? We reject it.

The greatest dangers posed by the Camp David agreements are posed to the Palestinians and the Lebanese. That is why we say to our brothers the Christians of Lebanon, let us join hands, because the conspiracy is against Lebanon and Palestine.

I was happy to hear Sheikh Amin Gemayel announce that the Camp David agreements would

turn Lebanon into a scapegoat. Lebanon will indeed become a scapegoat if we and the Christians do not reach an agreement. If we don't agree, we will continue to be manipulated, and so will they. The Lebanese people, all of them, should stand by us and reject the Camp David agreements, because they imply the permanent settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon.

Even if we were to assume that all the Lebanese and the Palestinians are disarmed, what are they going to do with the half-million unarmed Palestinians in Lebanon? What will they consider them? Moslems, Christians, Druze, or Shiites?

The Lebanese must stand by us and confront the conspiracy, because the Camp David agreements are damaging to the Palestinians and the Lebanese alike.

In short, the results of the Camp David summit are unacceptable on the international, Arab and Palestinian levels.

Q. Some accuse you of being moderate, others of being extremist, and still others of being flexible to the point of capitulation. How would you evaluate yourself?

A. All these adjectives are meaningless.

Yes, we are flexible. No one has been as flexible as we have been—without relinquishing our rights.

We the Palestinians, whose land is occupied and whose people are scattered and upon whom great pressures have been applied, have accepted settlements no other scattered people would accept. We have agreed to go back to part of Palestine. We have agreed to coexist with the Jews in all of Palestine, in a model country such as Lebanon once was.

We are treading the right path and refusing to capitulate. As such, all the adjectives in your question are unacceptable.

Q, There are reports that the United States intends to initiate contacts with the PLO. Is there anything to them?

Have any such contacts been made? Is there any chance of a U.S.-PLO dialogue after the Camp David summit?

A. You should put this question to the United States. The United States stands by Israel, and Israel does what the United States wants. Israel, of course, is independent, and its rulers have their own views, but if the United States wants something, it can impose it on Israel.

The United States took a stand against us when

²¹⁴ See doc. 153 above.

ARAB WORLD 579

it began to pour military, economic and financial aid into Israel while our people were scattered, homeless, suffering from lack of food and medical treatment. For 18 years we went through sufferings such as no other people in the world has had to bear.

After 1967, collective Palestinian action gained strength. So the Americans tried to cripple us. The first blow fell in Jordan. King Hussein would never have dared to strike at us had he not had American backing. They thought that by striking at us in Jordan, they would end the Palestinian Revolution. We fought in Jordan from September 17, 1970 until July, 1971. For eleven months we resisted—in Amman, in Jarash, everywhere in Jordan. But the conspiracy was too much for us, and we lost.

That was the first blow the United States aimed at us. Thousands of Palestinian martyrs fell, but the Revolution did not die. It survived in Syria and Lebanon.

Now they are trying to hit us in Lebanon.

No one in his right mind can believe that the four years of war in Lebanon were caused by a few minor Palestinian violations.

What happened was this: After the Rabat resolutions were adopted, (former U.S. Secretary of State Henry) Kissinger decided to hit the Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon.

Many groups were duped in the conspiracy in Lebanon.

Suleiman Franjieh is a true Arab, despite the fact that he tried to strike at us. We, too, made many mistakes in our dealings with him. Had we facilitated some matters for him, the conspiracy would not have developed in such a dangerous way.

Many in Lebanon were taken in by the conspiracy. We were dragged into the battles in Lebanon.

Who planned all this? The former American secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, planned it, and the plan is still being implemented. The plan is in the drawers of the U.S. State Department; it is still in the CIA's possession. The United States is responsible for the Lebanese war, as evidenced by the statements of Harold Brown and others. The United States was behind the Lebanese civil war. It was also behind the war with the Arab Deterrent Forces.

I'm telling you what the United States has done. You ask me if there have been contacts between us and Washington. The answer is no, and the reason is a simple one: the United States does not want to have relations with us.

The Arabic saying goes: the victim agreed, but the murderer didn't. We are the victims, and the murderer is the United States.

At long last, the United States condescended and agreed to start a dialogue with us, on condition that we recognize Israel and Resolution 242.

We know that if we were to sit with the Americans (on that basis), the first question they would ask us would be how we would like our people to be distributed, and they would expect us to answer that we would like to have, say, 100,000 in Lebanon, 500,000 in Syria, 300,000 in Jordan...

We are convinced that the Americans don't want to discuss a just settlement of the Palestinian problem with us.

Many are blaming us for refusing to recognize Resolution 242. They're saying it's our fault that there is no PLO-American dialogue. But how can I recognize 242,²¹⁵ and start a dialogue with the United States leading to a dialogue with Begin, without eliminating half of my people? Begin does not recognize the existence of anything called Palestine or Palestinians.

The United States is intransigent. It believes that its interests in Israel are more important than its interests in the Arab world. I say, frankly, that the Arabs are to blame for this American attitude. Israel is an economic burden for the United States, while the Arabs are giving America oil and capital. The Arabs can pressure the United States. Are they doing so? On the contrary: America gives the orders and they implement. The Arabs are dominated by the United States. They give it oil and funds, and they obey its orders.

The United States has not yet realized where its interests lie, but the day is bound to come when it will, and it will recognize the existence of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. This is likely to happen any time.

We have not rejected dialogue with America. We are ready to start such a dialogue at any time, but America does not want to talk to the PLO. It took out anything relating to the PLO at Camp David. It did not allow Sadat to even mention the PLO. It wants to create Palestinian

²¹⁵ Doc. 268 in International Documents on Palestine 1967.

representatives in the West Bank and Gaza to replace the PLO.

But the Americans will fail. The West Bank has declared that it is with the PLO, as has Gaza. They will not be able to find an alternative to the PLO. In the final analysis, they will have to recognize the PLO as the legal representative of the Palestinian people.

If they continue to withhold that recognition, their interests in this region will be jeopardized. They say a cornered cat will scratch. This is no threat. I'm not attacking the American people. I'm sure that the American people, when they find their interests in danger, will reconsider their position.

Q. After 14 years of Palestinian struggle on the military, political and diplomatic fronts, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the Palestinian people?

A. If any of us were to submit to optimism for one second, he would no longer be a revolutionary; he would no longer be able to take up his rifle and seek death for the sake of Palestine.

Still, I cannot help but be optimistic about our cause.

They massacred the Palestinians in Jordan, in Lebanon and in the occupied lands, but we have a just cause which has the support of world public opinion.

The Chinese say it is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness. We are that candle...

We, the members of the PLO, were content in our work and happy in our lives before we started this organization on January 1, 1965, but our people were being trampled. We could have contented ourselves with writing poems, shouting slogans for Palestine and weeping for our lost homeland. That way, we would not have lost one man—but that way, we would have had no hope of ever recovering our homes or ending the injustice under which our people are laboring. With all due respect to the Armenians, the same thing would have happened to us as has happened to them. Their cause has ended, but we have preserved ours.

True, we have lost many people, and we have labored hard, but we have also succeeded in imposing our cause, taking it all the way to the United Nations. Even those who curse us have recognized our existence. In Lebanon they're praying to God that the Palestinians will succeed,

so they will go back to their own homes and Lebanon can be rid of them.

Most of the fedayeen who are mounting our commando operations are 16-20 years old. They have never seen Palestine, since we have been scattered for 30 years. I know Haifa and Yafa and all of the towns and villages of Palestine, but the fedayeen who are sacrificing their lives have never seen Palestinian soil, and yet they are more enthusiastic than I am. That is why I am optimistic, although I know that the road ahead is strewn not with flowers but with thorns.

Let me, in conclusion, repeat my reminder to my brothers the Lebanese, my brothers the Christians: if we join hands, we will be able to block the conspiracy to which Lebanon is being subjected.

We hope to be able to cooperate with a single Lebanon, united under a strong constitutional umbrella.

The past two weeks—my meetings with Premier Hoss, Sheikh Amin Gemayel and His Excellency President Sarkis—have made me optimistic.

318

Statement by Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon at the opening session of the Arab foreign ministers summit conference (excerpts)²¹⁶

Baghdad, October 30, 1978

In these difficult circumstances through which we Arabs are living, in this delicate phase of our history in which we confront our very destiny, at this precise moment when challenges are accumulating before us, the welcome Iraqi initiative has intervened to unite us, clarify our views and unify our attitudes. To this fraternal and courageous country, to her President, Government and people we express our gratitude for her historic initiative.

There is no need to remind anyone here of the crisis which Lebanon has been living through for three years, which has brought so much human tragedy, caused so much grievous bloodshed and destruction, turning the country upside down and

²¹⁶ Translated from the French text as released by the Lebanese government and published in *L'Orient-Le Jour* (Beirut), October 31, 1978, p. 10.

ARAB WORLD 581

damaging its vital installations and its means of production—no need to remind anyone of what Lebanon is going through on account of this bloody crisis. You are well aware of all this, and the image of Lebanon's tragedy is engraved on your hearts and in your memory. We, for our part, know well that you reserve a special place in your hearts for Lebanon, given its cultural, political and economic role in the Arab world, a role which expresses the vitality of this country and characterises its people who have put their capacities in the service of the Arabs.

This is the Lebanon of the Arabs. A Lebanon whose goods have never been reserved for herself alone, but have been shared out among all the Arabs. The beauty of her historical sites, her coast, her mountains, the quality of her port, airport, means of communication, banks, medical facilities and educational establishments, these are things that the Arabs will never be able to forget.

Lebanon's cause cannot be other than their cause as well, Lebanon's tragedy, their tragedy too, Lebanon's suffering, their suffering. It is consequently superfluous to repeat here what you know already and to elaborate for you what you have no doubt seen and heard before.

Suffice us then to outline four points for you in the hope that they will be accorded the attention they deserve from you and this honourable conference:

- 1. The Camp David accords have caused us deep concern and have aroused in us serious reservations on more than one score, in particular as regards the negative consequences of these accords on Arab solidarity, above all in the accords' ignoring the rights of the Palestinian people on their land with all that this implies, namely the continued dispersion of this people and their resettlement outside their homeland. That is something that the Palestinians have rejected, as we and all the Arabs have rejected it.
- 2. The Israeli factor is one of the gravest elements of the crisis, inasmuch as it has manifested itself in a flagrant manner and has appeared to be one of the active causes of the continuation of this crisis.

In the light of this, we reaffirm that the Lebanese question involves the responsibility of all the Arabs together. This Israeli factor in the Lebanese crisis is even more evidently rooted in the tragedy

of South Lebanon. This problem is concentrated now in the border strip along the demarcation line with Israel where the latter has established its supremacy, giving assistance to local armed gangs, preventing the United Nations emergency forces from deploying in this area, blocking the advance of a unit of the regular Lebanese army into the sector, thus preventing the Lebanese state from re-establishing its authority in the border zone and at the same time defying the will of the international community as represented in UN Security Council Resolutions 425²¹⁷ and 426.

And so we allow ourselves to call on our Arab brethren to assist us in constraining Israel to abide by the demands of the international community and to permit the Lebanese state to exercise its sovereignty once more over the South.

- 3. The summit conferences held two years ago in Cairo²¹⁸ and Riyadh²¹⁹ adopted a positive and practical attitude as regards the Lebanese crisis, notably in providing a suitable framework for drawing up a solution to the Lebanese crisis. But the resolutions of Cairo and Riyadh have, for a number of reasons, not been applied in full. Recently the conference of foreign ministers of the Arab countries involved in the Arab Deterrent Force, held in Beit al-Din,²²⁰ recommended that efforts be made to implement in full the resolutions of Cairo and Riyadh. We expect from this present conference total and effective support in the implementation of these resolutions.
- 4. After the terrible destruction which has occurred in Lebanon, affecting homes, factories, hotels, public installations, the reconstruction of the country has become a question requiring means greater than those within the capacities of Lebanon.

²¹⁷ Doc. 32 above.

²¹⁸ For speeches and resolutions of the 8th Arab summit conference in Cairo see docs. 309-314 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1076

²¹⁹ See docs. 267 and 268 in ibid.

²²⁰ See doc. 310 above.

319

Working paper submitted by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi to the Arab foreign ministers' summit conference²²¹

Baghdad, October 30, 1978

Mr. Chairman, Brothers,

1. To isolate the Sadat regime, boycott it and drive it out of all Arab official organizations. These measures, Mr. Chairman, are the minimum acceptable at this stage. Without them, the Egyptian regime, that has abandoned all rights belonging to the Arab nation and our Palestinian people, will, in coordination with the US-Zionist alliance, continue in its steps and schemes. We would thereby have permitted the Camp David agreements to be imposed on our region and nation.

Arab history will not spare those who hesitate, nor allow the one who sold Jerusalem—compromised its sacred sites and undermined the noble values of our culture and our national honour built up over centuries of struggle by our ancestors and past generations—to trample the dignity of the Arab nation in the dirt, without meeting the response he deserves and without letting the entire world and the noble Arab people of Egypt know that this apostate does not represent the Arab nation and that this nation will not allow him to force through his own defeatism and surrender in its name.

2. Arab solidarity becomes really meaningful when it carefully specifies who our friends and enemies really are. Over long years, our experience, our ordeals and our struggle against the Zionist enemy have all shown that the USA stands in the ranks of the enemy that occupies our lands, supporting him and furthering all his expansionist schemes. Without a decisive stand that is implemented politically and economically against US interests in the Arab region, this inimical policy will continue to increase in its actions against our national interests and to plunder our wealth.

The attempts made to impose total US hegemony over the region are undoubtedly reaching a grave stage. Total mobilization of all resources is required to confront this scheme on the part of our nation and friends on the world level. Our nation is not alone in this struggle. Alongside it stand the non-aligned and socialist states, led by the Soviet Union, as well as the Islamic and African states and other friendly states.

The USA intends to permit the Zionist enemy to fragment the Arab region and to subject it to US-Zionist hegemony. This requires that our solidarity be directed against all these schemes whose clear and palpable expression was the Camp David agreements.

3. The Arab nation ought to reaffirm the Rabat, Algiers, Riyad and Cairo resolutions and to adhere to and implement them in practice as a basis for any genuine Arab solidarity. It is evident that the step taken by Sadat at Camp David has struck a blow against these resolutions and torn up the Arab consensus. Sadat removed Egypt from the Arab fold and isolated it as part of the US-Zionist scheme.

These Arab resolutions constitute the decisive answer to the attempts being made to impose settlements of surrender on our nation and our Palestinian people. Among the most important of these resolutions, which our present conference must reaffirm, are the following:

- a. Total withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, whose Arab character is to be safeguarded.
- b. Guaranteeing the fulfilment of the inalienable national rights of our Palestinian people, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the creation of their independent state on their national soil.
- c. Rejecting partial or separate settlements; working to foil them; condemnation of the policy of surrender which, by relying on the US role, seeks to compromise Arab rights as signed away at Camp David.
- d. Supporting the PLO to enable it to fulfil its national and patriotic responsibilities; affirming its full role of participation on an equal footing in the arena of political action, Arab and international, like any other confrontation state.
- 4. In order to support the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territories and to confront schemes of judaization, settlement, land sequestration and eviction, the Arab nation is required to allocate part of its resources to face this danger

²²¹ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), October 31, 1978.

which will affect other areas of this great homeland if the collapse of the Arab position continues.

Financial and material aid supplied to our people inside is the minimal duty required in the present circumstances and especially after the Camp David agreements. It is self-evident that all aid should be channelled through the PLO.

5. Support for the parties presently on the confrontation line now that Egypt has left the arena of conflict. Syria and the PLO are now undoubtedly the base of this confrontation. This requires creation of strategic balance between the confrontation parties and the Zionist enemy on all levels, especially economic and military.

6. Fraternal Lebanon still suffers the effects of the US-Israeli scheme to fragment it, undermine its national unity and independence, and to weaken the Palestinian revolution and the Arab confrontation forces by stirring up discord and conspiracies in this sister country.

The Beit al-Din conference, with its positive resolutions, ²²² was a serious attempt to put an end to this state of affairs. This deserves aid and support. We in the PLO reaffirm once more our fixed policy of facilitating any Arab settlement that safeguards Lebanon's unity and independence, closing the door to "Israeli" or any other kind of interference.

Brothers,

Arab struggle today stands at a momentous crossroad, which will have repercussions on the quality of Arab life itself. Accordingly, the Baghdad meetings must constitute the decisive Arab response which comprehends all the challenges faced by our nation these days. If we do not rise to our responsibilities, which we have come to feel more acutely than ever before, this can mean one thing only: an entrenchment of the policy that Carter-Sadat-Begin are trying to force upon our nation. Brothers.

Camp David is not an end but a beginning: a rearrangement of the state of affairs in our Arab region, it is an end to the Arab will to action. Do we give them this opportunity or shall we take practical steps to confront them before it is too

late?

Finally, the Palestinian revolution today is working to close its ranks in order to face the

inimical scheme. A few days ago, agreement was reached among all groups and forces within the framework of the PLO with regards to a single political and organisational programme which would achieve the national unity we have been asking for so long. Neither the enemy nor those who cast doubt on the struggle of our people have any way by which they can infiltrate us. All representatives of our people have rallied around common objectives, foremost among which are the right to return, to self-determination and the creation of the independent Palestinian state, as well as organisational programmes to entrench unity of revolutionary ranks. I am concerned to announce this to your conference as being one of the achievements of the PLO, made in order to close its ranks and to mobilize its full resources to face the Carter-Begin-Sadat scheme.

320

Speech by Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal of Saudi Arabia at the Arab foreign ministers' summit conference²²³

Baghdad, October 31, 1978

Brothers.

Saudi Arabia has welcomed this meeting and has taken part in it and, hopefully, will take part in the summit meeting that will ensue. It is happy to put forward its own understanding of the objectives of this meeting and believes that this is also the collective understanding of those participating. First, this is a meeting to unite Arab ranks and mobilize Arab power in a practical and constructive manner. Second, this meeting reaffirms the commitment to the resolutions of the Rabat summit conference,224 which took into consideration the political changes on the Arab and world scenes. Third, the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that it is important for our conference to devote itself to what can be accomplished in a positive manner to face the challenges to our Arab nation. This no

²²² See doc. 310 above.

²²³ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Siyasa (Kuwait), November 1, 1978.

²²⁴ See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

doubt requires that we transcend the bounds of reacting to events and concern ourselves with uniting the views and resources of our nation in order to consolidate Arab steadfastness and to build an independent power capable of movement, confrontation and action for the sake of achieving our national objectives. Fourth, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has always proceeded from its awareness of its responsibility and its unshakeable faith that unity, not fragmentation, and understanding, not vituperation, is what benefits the Arab nation. Accordingly, it hopes and desires that this conference will achieve objective and practical results which are consonant with the requirements of higher Arab interests. Proceeding from these principles, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made known its attitude to the results of Camp David, an attitude which holds that the results of Camp David cannot be considered an acceptable formula for a comprehensive and just peace. This is because it is not made clear that Israel intends to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories on the one hand and, on the other, because Israel refuses to deal with the subject of Jerusalem in a way that would restore it to Arab sovereignty. In addition, there is no specific reference to the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in their homeland, and the PLO, as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, is ignored.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, having adopted this frank and clear position, and proceeding from an objective manner in dealing with reality, finds that our main cause cannot benefit from the expending of Arab energy on blaming one state or another, one international policy or another. We all know very well that international policies are determined by the self-interest of these countries and by their own strategies which are adopted on the international level, not by pure friendships or noble idealism. Therefore, it is all to the good of our Arab nation and our main causes that this conference should refrain from blaming others and concentrate our efforts in a constructive manner upon our cause and upon the strategy that is required, with the aim that Israel might be foiled in its dreams of expansionism. What Israel has achieved in this regard was made possible only because there was no unity of Arab ranks, and because it sprang from a carefully formulated strategy. Therefore, in order to confront these challenges and to put an end to these ambitions, our nation must collect its forces and formulate a carefully laid out plan on the basis of realism, objectivity and seriousness.

May God guide our steps and help us to the good of the Arab and Islamic nation.

321

Speech by President Bakr of Iraq at the opening of the ninth Arab summit conference²²⁵

Baghdad, November 2, 1978

Brother Presidents and members of the conference; I offer you my Arab greetings and express to you the profoundest gratitude, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Iraqi government and the people of Iraq, for responding to the call to hold this conference and for accepting our invitation to meet in Baghdad.

By so generously agreeing to meet, brothers, on this high level, you are giving expression to your profound feeling of the great national responsibility that falls to the leaders and authorities of the Arab nation in this grave situation, and of your genuine anxiety to ensure the required level of unity of Arab attitude to confront this situation, inasmuch as during the last few weeks, the Arab nation has been in a state of disquiet and anxiety it has rarely experienced before.

Brothers.

It is at all times necessary and important that the leaders and rulers of our nation should meet to study its situation. But our meeting today is particularly important because it is being held at a time when the historical struggle between the Arab nation and the Zionist enemy is entering on an entirely new stage and assuming dangerous forms that make it a significant turning point, not only in the conflict with the Zionist enemy, but also in the relations between all the members of the Arab family of nations.

In spite of their disagreements, until a few months ago the Arab regimes often succeeded in reaching a common denominator of agreement on many aspects of the conflict between us and the Zionist enemy.

²²⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Thowra (Baghdad), November 3, 1978.

ARAB WORLD 585

of this conflict. Nor would it have had to make

such sacrifices throughout its thirty years of bitter

conflict with the enemy. The problem is greater

than this: the conflict between the Arab nation

and the Zionist enemy is a political, military,

economic and cultural conflict, in addition to

being a conflict over territory and national sov-

There is no need for me to say that this new and dangerous development started after the visit of President Sadat to the occupied territory, and it has become much more serious since the agreements were concluded in Washington with the Zionist enemy last September, and because of the talks that are taking place now between a delegation representing the Egyptian government and another representing the Zionist enemy, with a view to preparing agreements whose trend and significance are known to us all,

These agreements, with the provisions they contain and the consequences they have led and are still leading to, differ radically from the general principles unanimously laid down by the Arabs at the Rabat and Algiers summit conferences as an interim goal for the Arab nation. Indeed, they have jettisoned the historical rights of the Arab nation and made a major breach in its ramparts to the advantage of the Zionist enemy and his allies.

The Arab states reached a lowest common denominator of agreement at the Algiers²²⁶ and Rabat²²⁷ summits in spite of their differing views and ideas. But the Camp David agreements are as remote and different as they could be from this minimum consensus; indeed they are in flagrant contradiction to it. This was done at the individual decision of the head of state of Egypt, without reference to the Arab nation or to the parties directly concerned with the conflict.

We have no wish to contest the right of every ruler to take action within the framework of sovereignty over his territory. But in no circumstances can we regard the action taken by the head of state of Egypt as amounting to no more than an exercise of sovereignty, nor can we disregard the important fact that the conflict between the Arabs and the Zionist enemy is not a territorial conflict that concerns only the Arab countries whose territory was occupied in 1967. Nor is it merely a conflict over land and frontiers, or in defense of national sovereignty. Were this the case, what happened in 1967 would never have taken place and the Arab nation would not have become preoccupied militarily, politically, diplomatically and emotionally with the affairs

Therefore, without prejudicing the powers of any ruler in the Arab countries, we cannot accept that he should assign and arrogate to himself the right to decide the affairs of this conflict and to end it by his individual will, because by doing so he inflicts great harm on the Arab nation and stabs it to the heart—this nation that has engaged in the conflict by all available means for more than thirty years, and made immense sacrifices on the way. And the matter becomes even more serious when a single ruler, without any legal backing, takes action to decide the cause of Palestine, the cause that for dozens of years we have regarded as the first and central cause in this conflict. Regardless of all other considerations, the Arabs have regarded any Arab who fails to participate seriously and to an extent commensurate with his abilities in the Arab nation's conflict with the Zionist enemy as falling short of what is required of him and as deserving censure. How much more so if it is a case not only of dereliction of duty but of taking action that is injurious to the Arab nation and cooperating with its mortal enemy, who has usurped its land and all that it holds sacred. What makes matters more complicated and harmful is that the agreements concluded by the President of Egypt with the enemy provide for the establishment of political, economic, cultural, touristic and other kinds of relations with the Zionist enemy, thereby creating an entirely new situation in one of the greatest and most important of the Arab countries and fundamentally chang-

ing the situation as regards dealings between it and its brother Arabs.

The consequences of these agreements, brothers, constitute a new danger that did not exist before and it is quite out of the question to disregard this danger or to underestimate its potentially harmful effects on the Arab nation. It is also out of the question for us to tolerate anything less than the Egyptian President expressing his readiness to take effective action to forswear this dangerous course and to return to the fold of the Arab nation.

²²⁶ See docs. 331-333 in International Documents on Palestine 1973. ²²⁷ See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and

Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

Dear brothers,

The agreements concluded by the President of the Republic of Egypt with the enemy have brought a profound split in the views and attitudes of the Arab countries.

I tell you frankly that the ruler of Egypt's determination to implement the agreements he has concluded with the enemy will not halt the efforts of certain Arab countries, including Iraq, to continue the struggle against the Zionist enemy by all honourable means, until Arab rights are fully recovered. In this situation the Arab nation is for the first time in its modern history divided into two parties—a party that has come to terms with the enemy and is cooperating with him, and a party that is continuing the struggle against him. And permit me to say, too, in all frankness and from profound concern for the unity of Arab ranks, that the other Arab states cannot long maintain their ambiguous attitudes: they are bound to be divided up into two parties-one party supporting this side, and one supporting the other. In our view there will be little scope for neutrality or for putting both parties on an equal footing. For the nature both of the conflict we are waging against Zionism and of the relations between the members of the Arab nation, makes it impossible to adopt such an attitude which may suit certain foreign countries but does not suit the Arab countries.

Moreover, the Arab world, despite the political differences between its various regimes, despite the relations that link some of its countries to one or other international party, and despite the important international influences on the parties to the conflict between it and its enemy, the Arab world had achieved a minimum agreement that made it capable of coping with the conflict with the Zionist enemy as being an Arab cause first and foremost. But now, since the agreements that the Egyptian government has concluded with the Zionist enemy, and since the dangerous intervention in these agreements by the US, if, which God forbid, the Arab world does not succeed during this meeting in reaching a serious and reasonable solution of the situation, it will have to deal with the problem of the conflict in a different way-it will be confronted with a state of acute division such as neither it nor the area has ever witnessed before.

Nor is it a matter of concern for the Arab coun-

tries only, for a conflict of this kind cannot be contained within territorial frontiers—it is bound to assume dangerous international and regional dimensions.

We have assembled, brothers, to confront this critical situation and these dangerous possibilities, and we believe that if we fail to adopt a minimum attitude unanimously agreed on by the Arab will, with a view to rectifying the dangerous situation that has arisen since the Egyptian government signed these agreements with the enemy, we shall create a situation more difficult and complicated than any previous one. Without being pessimistic I say that if, God forbid, we do not succeed in this, we may not be given the opportunity of repeating this historic meeting for a long time to come.

Each of us has his own view and interpretation, and each of us has his own relations at the Arab and international levels. I do not wish to deny that we disagree on many matters. These are objective facts. But, as I said before, until a short time ago we did agree on many things, and our dealings were based on the fraternal relations and the national links that unite us.

Our history demands that we maintain this level of relations; this is our responsibility to both our own generation and generations to come, and to our history and our ancient heritage. But we shall not achieve this by keeping silent on what has happened, or pretending not to notice it, or underestimating it. What has happened is grave and serious, and our nation can never he in a sound condition unless the situation that has arisen from these agreements is rectified and unless a unanimous Arab attitude is adopted to these agreements and to the Egyptian government in such a way as to maintain the nation's honour and its legitimate rights and to protect it from the dangers of Zionist penetration of the Arab body.

We are not trying to isolate Egypt. For Egypt is dear to the heart of every Arab, and her people are the authentic Arab people who have made such sacrifices for the Arab nation to which they belong and for the Palestinian cause, and have given so much. We appreciate the great national role they have played and, in the position we have been obliged to adopt, we must not allow ourselves to give way to emotional reactions and adopt a negative attitude to the Egyptian people. It is

ARAB WORLD 587

the President of Egypt who bears the responsibility; it is not the Arabs, but he who has withdrawn from the Arab nation, its will and its consensus.

We must assume an historical and all-Arab attitude. We must express our view with complete frankness, and if we believe that one of the reasons that induced the ruler of Egypt to conclude these agreements or to use it for a cover for what he had done, was his critical economic situation, we, who have ample funds, must meet his economic requirements, to ensure that he has all that is necessary for him to hold out against the Zionist enemy and that he is in a position to observe national interests to the full, should he abandon these agreements. This is the proposal we make to your conference, and we hope that it may be studied in a spirit of national responsibility.

Things can never be right in our nation, brothers, if these agreements are implemented, or if we accept them or keep silence about them, and if they are pushed through in this way without our adopting a unified Arab attitude rejecting them. We must decide on a minimum expression of the will of the Arab nation vis-à-vis its legitimate rights. In this way we can protect its honour and sovereignty and ensure that the minimum conditions are met for its defence against the Zionist peril. In this way we can meet the requirements for its protection against the dangers of internecine strife, fragmentation and division into two camps, and against a dangerous and acute international polarisation.

It is true, brothers, that our goal at this meeting is to find means of ensuring that we are unanimous in our confrontation of our common enemy and that we achieve a unified attitude to the Camp David agreements and the course that Sadat has followed since his visit to Jerusalem. However, in inviting you here we did not regard the adoption of an attitude to the ruler of Egypt and his action as the principal aim of the invitation and the meeting. But it is also true that agreement on assessing the ruler of Egypt and on a unified attitude to him is one of the principal keys required for opening the door to a minimum of joint action and that our action amounts to no more than an attempt to right a wrong through words only, which is the least that is required of us. In all this we have not chosen the course of injuring others, whatever they have done. We have chosen the course of taking the minimum action necessary

to protect ourselves from injury and to defend the Arab nation. I do not think that this is an illegitimate action that can be rendered invalid by fine words at the expense of the right or any other considerations.

On this basis we must not be less enthusiastic or efficient, as we follow the course of the truth and right action, than those who have left that course.

I will not conceal from you brothers the fact that what we in Iraq believe about many things differs in both kind and extent from the proposals we are putting to you. We have our own views, which are known to all, on how the conflict with the Zionist enemy should be conducted and on how to deal with the colonialist forces that support him, and these views are in no way expressed in what we have put to you at this meeting. In the proposals we have submitted to this meeting we have taken into account differences of attitude and interpretation on many problems. In the present circumstances, and within the framework of this meeting, what we hope to achieve is a unified Arab attitude to the minimum that is required by the grave problems that confront us. After that it is up to each country to adopt the attitude it thinks best, so long as this does not fall short of the level decided on by this conference.

Brothers,

Once again I offer you my Arab greetings and pray that the Almighty may inspire us to follow the correct course and adopt the right attitude, and light our way along the true road so that we may rescue our nation from the terrible danger that threatens it and from the perilous destiny that lies in wait for it.

The many centuries of the history of the Arab nation and of the Muslims are looking down on us today and urgently calling on us to face up to our responsibilities so that we may rise above minor problems and disagreements of secondary importance and adopt a great and historical attitude. This will rehabilitate joint Arab action and ensure that all the Arab states follow the same course and thereby meet the requirements for the defence of the interests and rights of the nation so that the dissension sown by Zionism and colonialism may not succeed in fragmenting the Arabs and destroy their unity for a long time to come.

I am confident, brothers, of your wisdom and of your zeal for the Arab cause, and I pray that

the Almighty may grant us success and guide our steps for it is He who hears and answers prayers.

322

Speech by King Husayn of Jordan at the ninth Arab summit conference (excerpts)²²⁸ Baghdad, November 3, 1978

...We have submitted to you a proposed programme for joint action as well as other proposals to organize Arab efforts and build up joint institutions. In the Jordanian working paper²²⁹ you will find that we defined a general goal and a direct objective. The general goal is to achieve protection and security for Arab lands against an expansionist Israeli aggression as a primary aim. Thereafter, we propose action to end Israeli occupation of Arab territories, which took place in 1967, and the achievement of a just peace that Arabs can accept in the light of their international and human principles and duties.

The direct objective is the creation of an autonomous Arab collective power in the various fields so that a direct effect can be felt on the balance of power between the Arab states and Israel and in a manner whereby the current balance of power can shift in favour of the Arab states, enabling them to safeguard the national security of all their territories and to deal with the question of occupation effectively and from a position of strength.

...The creation of an autonomous power in a manner that changes the balance of power in the region can be achieved only on the basis of a long term project that seeks to mobilize all resources and energies and to subordinate all emotionalism and hasty reactions to the objectives of long-range common action. According to this project, responsibilities are shared among Arab states, energies and resources are mobilized and everyone works in a responsible, quiet and patient manner. There is no other alternative. There are no short cuts. This road, which appears

long, is in fact the shortest road, indeed the only road... In 1964, the Arabs took one step in this direction at their summit conference... The Arab nation is indeed passing through a momentous period of change, a time of critical crisis. Irrespective of the pain we all feel because of the unilateral behaviour of the Egyptian government which has pursued a path that does not conform with our common national aspirations and demands, yet we must realize that the problems and crises of the Arab nation did not begin with the signature of the Camp David agreements nor will they end with it. The fact that the Egyptian leader-ship chose the path of Camp David and indeed fell into an *international trap* is an expression of the reality of the Arab nation, its sense of loss, of fragmentation, of confusion and dissipation of effort....

The Arab nation is faced with many dangers but the most direct danger is our conflict with Zionism as it expands its aggression step by step into the very heart of the Arab world, swallowing up Arab land, evicting its inhabitants and moving from one objective to the next according to a carefully laid out plan. In Israel, the Arabs face a violent, well organized enemy that has specific schemes and objectives...

Israel's present objectives are the following:

- 1. To tighten control over the occupied territories under its rule and to annex them through settlement, eviction of population and placing Israeli settlers in them.
- 2. To fragment the Arab scene around it by using diverse means such as military pressure, terrorism and psychological and political warfare whereby the homogeneous states around it would fragment and the human and national wall around Israel would collapse.
- 3. To impose military, political and economic hegemony on the Middle East region to the point where Israel becomes the foremost state in the region, the homogeneous Arab identity in the region would be eaten a way and the states of the region would become feeble entities falling within the Israeli sphere of influence....

There are two central points as regards common Arab action and a just Arab peace.

1. The programme of Arab action requires a total mobilization of resources and capabilities. This mobilization in turn requires the participation of all capable Arab states. In order to confront

²²⁸ Al-Rai (Amman), November 4, 1978, did not publish the complete text of this speech. Excerpts were made from the text as published.

²²⁹ Although the working paper was presented to the conference, a text of it could not be located.

ARAB WORLD 589

the enemy, protect our lands and stem the tide of Israeli expansion, we must place all the available Arab resources in the service of defensive efforts and national steadfastness

2. We need to explain our cause to the world in a convincing and humane manner, the more we further our military and political capabilities. The world today responds to the language of humanism which uses the logic of international law and love of peace. It does not respond to the calls to war nor to angry emotions. Accordingly, we must leave this conference with resolutions, among other things, explaining our commitment to a just peace and our respect for our international responsibilities and for world peace.

Jordan is for a just peace. Jordan supports the achievement of a just settlement of the Palestinian problem and of the conflict it has engendered and still engenders. Jordan in the past has not been a passive spectator with regard to the question of Palestinian rights, the occupation of Arab territories since 1967 and the international efforts made to secure a peace based on a just settlement,... We participated in the issuing of Security Council resolution 242 in November, 1967. We accepted it and cooperated with all international efforts made on its basis and for the sake of implementing it. Jordan's sole desire thereby was to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement by which Israeli withdrawal would be completed from all occupied Arab territories, chiefly Arab Jerusalem, and the Palestinian people would exercise their right to self-determination in total freedom, as a result of which a permanent and acceptable peace might come about.

We support the implementation of a programme to consolidate the presence of Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories on their land and to fortify their steadfastness, seeking to foil Israel's attempt to evict, demoralize and fragment them and to destroy their economic and cultural existence. We support any activity which aims at protecting the national unity of the struggling people of Palestine and at saving them from dissipation and eviction. We are in favour of removing Palestinian national activity from the arena of Arab conflicts of all kinds by preventing this conflict from penetrating into its institutions and by encouraging an atmosphere of solidarity, fraternity and positivism, thus incorporating it into the higher Arab political and military strategy. We are in favour of a unified Arab political and diplomatic programme, supported by the Arab states, which seeks to present the Arab cause on the international level in a modern, humane and convincing logic, for which our material and human resources are to be mobilized. We favour the mobilization of Arab financial resources within the context of a carefully formulated programme to enhance Arab power, especially among the confrontation states, and to consolidate steadfastness among our people under occupation.

323

Speech by Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan armed forces Colonel Jabir at the ninth Arab summit conference²³⁰

Baghdad, November 4, 1978

Presidents, Kings and heads of delegations,

I thank President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the leaders of Iraq and the fraternal Iraqi people for their generous hospitality.

My brothers, the Arab Libyan Popular Socialist Jamahiriya and our brother, the leader of the revolution, emphasise that the meeting of the Iraqi and Syrian leaderships is the appropriate and effective response to the agreement of treachery²³¹ signed by the ruler of Egypt and the terrorist Begin at David's Stable [Camp David], with the participation of US imperialism.

This agreement is in truth a real surrender and an abandonment of the cause of the Arab nation as well as the Palestinian cause. A meeting which includes all regions of the Arab homeland has the historic responsibility of adopting the decisions commensurate with the blow that has been struck by the ruler of Egypt against the aspirations of the Arab nation as regards liberation and return. My brothers, we do not speak here of the Egyptian people and their role towards their nation. Rather, we are speaking of a ruler and a regime whose will has been broken and to whom the enemy has dictated his terms. Accordingly, the issue is far greater than one where we

²³⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Fajr al-Jadid (Tripoli), November 5, 1978.

²³¹ The Camp David agreements, published as docs. 153 and 154 above.

can wait and hope and pray. Rather, we must face with courage the results that ensue from Zionist ambitions to undermine the Arab nation and its civilization. In other words, the Zionist-Arab conflict is a cultural and national one. My brothers, the Syrian-Iraqi pact for national action, if it is put into effect, and I am convinced that the leaderships are up to this task, will restore balance in the battles against Zionism. We in the Jamahiriya assure you that we shall support with all our resources the consolidation of this pact. The Steadfastness conferences in Damascus. Tripoli and Algiers were not conferences that sought to polarize. These countries called for a meeting out of a sense of national duty in order to find the means and lay down plans for confrontation, in coordination with Syria and the Palestinian resistance. All the resolutions and recommendations of these conferences are directed against the enemy and against imperialist schemes which work in earnest to attack the Arab nation, exterminate the Palestinian presence and impose Zionist hegemony over the Arab region. My brothers, as a result of his defeat, the ruler of Egypt has surrendered his defeated will to the enemy. He has deliberately and consciously chosen this path. Anyone who thinks otherwise is deluding himself. Since the October war, the Egyptian regime has pursued a policy of surrender. Let us follow the progress of events. First, there was the "kilometre 101" talks, then the first and second disengagements, then the secret talks, then Kissinger's trips, then the shameful trip to Jerusalem and finally the David's Stable agreement. Therefore, it is not a question of a sudden or accidental event that can be put right. Rather, the Egyptian regime is pursuing its plan consciously and deliberately in execution of the enemy's strategy and with the aim of humiliating the Arab nation and cowing it into submission by setting a trap for it so that it would fall into the net of world Zionism and imperialism.

My brothers, the present situation demands that we stand in seriousness and firmness against the ruler of Egypt to deter him so as to prevent a recurrence of unilateral action harmful to national interests, for to remain silent about treacherous acts is itself an act of treachery. Thus, it is said that he who remains silent about the truth is a dumb devil.

As for those who find a pretext and an excuse

in Egypt's size, we must differentiate between the people and the regime in Egypt, The people of Egypt are an inseparable part of the national struggle of this nation. Their destiny is bound inevitably with the destiny of their nation. The regime, on the other hand, has freely chosen to follow a path inimical to national interests, preferring Begin, Weizmann, Ben Gurion airport and the King David Hotel. Finally, it has succumbed to American hegemony at David's Stable. Therefore any talk of "perhaps" or "maybe" is merely a way of dissipating efforts by preventing us from taking the right historical decisions.

My brothers, we must have a clear political attitude towards the policy of surrender. In other words, we must adopt a specific political position from the agreement of David's Stable by condemning it, rejecting it and adopting practical measures against the Egyptian regime that has surrendered to the enemy. These measures are as follows:

- 1. To move the Arab League headquarters, even if temporarily, from the Egyptian capital to another Arab capital such as Damascus or Baghdad.
- 2. To expel the Egyptian regime from the Arab League until the time when the people of Egypt amend the present policies.
- 3. To put an end to any economic dealings or any meetings with the Egyptian regime.
- 4. To sever political relations with the Egyptian regime because the exchange of embassies for political representation between the Egyptian capital and the enemy precludes any political representation between Egypt and the rest of the Arab countries.

The Jamahiriya, being a part of the Arab nation, affirms its loyalty and support to Syria, the PLO and Jordan, in the context of the conference of the Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation recently held in Damascus.

The basic popular congresses in the Jamahiriya are at present assessing the size of this aid. I wish this conference all success. Peace and the mercy of God upon you.

324

Speech by President Sarkis of Lebanon at the ninth Arab summit conference (excerpts)²³²

Baghdad, November 4, 1978

The Arabs have had and continue to have a collective cause over the importance, gravity and sacredness of which they have never differed; the cause of Palestine. It pains Lebanon as a member of the Arab community to open a new chapter in the record of (Arab) causes, a chapter about the Lebanese tragedy caused by a multiplicity of means among which is the exploitation of what might seem interconnected in certain areas between the Palestinian cause and its influence on the Lebanese crisis.

There is no doubt that the contrived focusing on linking the Palestinian and Lebanese questions becomes unequivocally evident from the continuous bloody events in Lebanon, now in their fourth year. Among the objectives that underlie the unnatural determination to link the Lebanese and Palestinian questions, there exist two basic ones:

The first objective is to attenuate the Palestinian cause and divert the attention and concern of international, and even Arab, public opinion away from it. This diversion has in fact occurred, even though in varying degrees.

The second objective is to utilize the Lebanese crisis to expend Arab capabilities in all fields. The partial exposition of the real situation and use of contrived slogans is nothing but a distortion of the facts, and what is being circulated about resettlement is a part of this. What resettlement do they mean and where is this resettlement to take place? Where are the rights of people to self-determination? What part will the Palestinian state have in resettlement projects?

Or is the aim behind the insinuations of resettlement to divert attention away from the establishment of such a state and thereby deal the Palestinian cause a severe blow?

Acting on the principle of frankness to which I adhere, especially when addressing an audience

of this caliber and high position, of honoured and dear brothers, I cannot but admit in all simplicity: it is impossible for resettlement of any kind to take place in Lebanon, and it is not by creating a Lebanese problem that the Palestinian problem or any other Arab problem can be solved. It is imperative to expedite bringing an end to the tragedy from which Lebanon is suffering and to resolve it by the most efficacious ways and means. One of the basic conditions for such an effort is that the Lebanese state must regain complete sovereignty over every part of its territory, from the extreme north to the extreme south and from east to west.

When speaking about our insistence on regaining the sovereignty of the state over all Lebanese territory, we cannot but point to the problem that has been and continues to be of primary concern to you as to us, and that is the question of South Lebanon. It is in this exact context that it becomes an imperative necessity to respect the resolutions of both the Riyadh and Cairo conferences and implement their articles completely and properly.

Any remission in the execution of these resolutions is a denial of the principle of state sovereignty in Lebanon, an obstruction in the way of a return to normalcy and an impairment of the prestige of every resolution emanating from the Arab kings and heads of state. The damage caused will not be restricted to Lebanon alone, but will go far beyond it and will definitely affect the very heart of the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, it is an imperative necessity to implement what was agreed upon at the recent Beit al-Din conference of the foreign ministers of those countries participating in the Arab Deterrent Force. . . .

²³² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Safir (Beirut), November 5, 1978.

325

Letter from President Bakr of Iraq to President Sadat of Egypt calling on him to abandon the Camp David agreements²³³

Baghdad, November 4, 1978

To President Anwar Sadat, Greetings,

The Arab summit conference which met in Baghdad on November 2, 1978²³⁴ was attended by their Majesties, Excellencies and Highnesses the Kings, Presidents and Amirs of the Arab states and their representatives, and the discussions at the conference centred on the agreements you have concluded and are resolved to sign with the Zionist enemy, which have been called the Camp David and Blair House agreements.

Those who attended the conference have decided that these agreements are not in the interests of the Arab nation or its rights in Palestine, Jerusalem, Sinai and the Golan, nor of the other issues affecting the Egyptian people, if a comprehensive view is taken of their cause, and in the light of its fundamental and practical links with the all-Arab cause. On the contrary, they inflict the gravest injury on the Arab nation and on the interests of the Egyptian people within the framework of the ideas and principles we have referred to. Therefore, on behalf of the interests of the Arab nation and of the principles that unite us to the struggling Egyptian people, those principles which constitute the fundamental law that has to be obeyed both now and in the future, if we are to maintain our honour and independence and achieve progress, we call on you to withdraw once and for all from these agreements, immediately and openly. We call on you to return to the ranks of Arab consensus along with your brothers who have been associated with you, for better and for worse, in the cruellest of trials, and have made sacrifices alongside the Egyptian people and their valiant army, shedding their blood on the field of battle with the Zionist enemy and sacrificing all they had to recover our sacred Arab territories that have been usurped by the Zionist enemy.

By withdrawing from these agreements you will be performing a great service to the Arab

nation and to the future of our Arab people in Egypt, and warding off a great danger from the Arab nation. You will find the Arab nation determined and able to protect itself and to recover its territories, by following the course of joint action and maintaining the basic principles which are the foundations of the Arab nation and of its thirty-year struggle against Zionism.

In the light of the decisions taken by the Kings, Presidents and Amirs of the Arab states, the Arab nation is ready to provide Egypt with all that is required to enable her to continue the struggle alongside her Arab brothers and to protect the honour of the Egyptian people. The plan submitted to the summit meeting contains guarantees of this commitment—indeed, may God be my witness, we have done our duty, and He knows our real intentions.

326

Final statement issued by the ninth Arab summit conference reaffirming the responsibilities of the Arab nation in the struggle for the recovery of Arab rights, in the light of the signing of the Camp David agreements²³⁵

Baghdad, November 5, 1978

On the initiative of the government of the Iraqi Republic, and at the invitation of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the ninth Arab summit conference was held in Baghdad from November 2–5, 1978.

The conference studied the situation in a lofty spirit of national responsibility and common concern for a united Arab attitude in confrontation of the perils and challenge that threaten the Arab nation, especially in the light of the developments that have resulted from the signing by the Egyptian government of the Camp David agreements, and of their effect on the Arab struggle to confront Zionist aggression against the nation.

In the light of the principles in which the Arab nation believes and of the unity of Arab destiny, and of the commitment to the traditions of joint Arab action, the conference affirmed the following basic principles:

1. The cause of Palestine is a cause involving

²³³ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Thawra (Baghdad), November 5, 1978.

²³⁴ See docs. 321-324 above and 326 below.

²³⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), November 6, 1978.

ARAB WORLD 593

the destiny of the Arabs; it is the essence of the conflict with the Zionist enemy, and all the peoples and countries of the Arab nation are concerned with it and committed to struggle for it and to make every sacrifice, material and moral, required by it.

The struggle for the recovery of Arab rights in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories is a general national responsibility, and it is the duty of all Arabs to participate in it, each according to his situation and to the military, economic, political and other resources at his disposal. The conflict with the Zionist enemy transcends the framework of the struggle against him on the part of the countries whose territories were occupied in 1967, and is the concern of the whole Arab nation, because the Zionist enemy is a military, political, economic and cultural danger to the whole Arab nation and to its essential national interests and to its civilization and its future. This means that all the countries of the Arab nation have a responsibility for participating in this conflict with all the resources at their disposal.

II. It is the duty of all the Arab countries to provide all kinds of aid, support and facilities to the struggle of the Palestinian resistance in all its forms through the PLO, as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territory, for the purpose of liberation and the recovery of the people's legitimate rights, including their right to return, to self-determination and to establish their independent state on the soil of their homeland. The Arab countries are committed to the maintenance of Palestinian national unity and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestinian action.

III. Affirmation of commitment to the resolutions of the summits, especially those of the sixth and seventh conferences, held in Algiers and Rabat.

IV. In the light of the above, one of the principles that must never be infringed or neglected is that it is inadmissible for any Arab party to take individual action to reach a solution of the Palestine problem in particular and the Arab-Zionist conflict in general.

V. No solution is acceptable unless it is accompanied by a resolution adopted by an Arab summit conference convened for that purpose.

The conference discussed the agreements signed by the Egyptian government at Camp David, and adjudged that they prejudice the rights of the Palestinian people and the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, and that they were concluded outside the framework of collective Arab responsibility and conflict with the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, especially those of Algiers and Rabat, the Charter of the Arab League and the UN resolutions on the Palestine problem, and that they cannot lead to the just peace that the Arab nation is seeking.

The conference therefore resolved not to give its approval to these agreements, to have nothing to do with their results and to reject all their political, economic, legal and other consequences.

The conference resolved to call on the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to withdraw from these agreements and not to sign any peace treaty with the enemy. The conference hopes that the Egyptian government will return to the fold of joint Arab action and not take individual action as regards matters related to the Arab-Zionist conflict. In this connection the conference adopted a number of resolutions for the confrontation of the new stage and the protection of the goals and interests of the Arab nation, from its belief that the Arab nation, through its moral and material resources, is capable of confronting this difficult situation and all challenges just as it has done throughout history, because it is defending right and justice and its national existence.

The conference stressed the need to unify all Arab efforts so as to cope with the strategic imbalance that has resulted from Egypt's leaving the arena of confrontation.

The conference resolved that there should be coordination between those states that are prepared and able to make an effective contribution. It also stressed the need to adhere to the regulations of the Arab boycott and the rules for the enforcement of its provisions. The conference studied means of developing Arab information directed at the outside world in such a manner as to serve the just cause of the Arabs.

The conference resolved that there should be annual meetings of the Arab summit conference in November of every year.

Having studied the Arab and international situations, the conference affirmed the Arab nation's commitment to a just peace based on complete Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Arab Je-

rusalem, the safeguarding of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and the establishment of their independent state on the soil of their homeland.

The conference resolved to engage in the most extensive activity at the international level with a view to explaining the just rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. It expressed the sincerest gratitude and esteem for all countries that have supported the just rights of the Arabs.

The conference expressed its appreciation to the Syrian Arab Republic for the steadfastness of its valiant army and to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and its valiant army. It expressed its pride in the struggle and steadfastness of the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territory, under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The conference gave its blessing to the pact of joint national action²³⁶ recently signed by Syria and Iraq, regarding it as an important achievement on the road to Arab solidarity.

The conference also expressed the highest appreciation of the initiative of the Iraqi government under the leadership of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, in calling for a meeting of the Arab summit conference in Baghdad, with a view to uniting Arab ranks and organising joint Arab efforts for the confrontation of the dangers to which the Arab nation is exposed at the present stage.

It also expressed its appreciation to President al-Bakr for the valuable efforts he made to ensure the success of the conference.

The conference took a number of decisions and measures for the confrontation of the coming stage and the defense of the goals and interests of the Arab nation, from its belief that through its moral and material resources, and on the basis of its solidarity, the Arab nation is capable of confronting difficult circumstances and all challenges, as it has done throughout history, because it is defending right and justice and its national existence.

Press conference statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat commenting on the Soviet-PLO joint communiqué and expressing satisfaction with the results of the ninth Arab summit conference (excerpts)²³⁷

Baghdad, November 7, 1978

This is the first joint communiqué²³⁸ issued by the PLO and the Soviet Union. In the past, press releases used to be issued. Now, and for the first time, a joint communiqué has been issued between the Soviet Union and the PLO, with all that this implies on the various local, Arab and international levels, as well as on the level of the profound and developing Palestinian-Soviet relations. As is known, the communiqué stressed the fraternal relations of struggle between the Palestinian and Soviet peoples. This phrase has deep significance. Secondly, the communiqué specifically mentions for the first time the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories and an unconditional withdrawal from the lands occupied. The last thing that the communiqué mentions, also very important, is coordination between the two sides.

Q. [On the PLO's attitude to resolution 242 and resolutions 425 and 426 relating to Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory].

A. When Waldheim's representative came over in the wake of the Palestinian-Israeli war in South Lebanon, I said to him: I do not accept resolutions 425²³⁹ and 426 regarding withdrawal from Lebanese territory. The Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, and I speak for them both, are not concerned with these resolutions. I also told him that the Palestinian revolution has not recognized resolution 242. Therefore this issue need not be raised at all.

Q, [as to whether Arafat is satisfied with the summit resolutions].

³²⁷

²³⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), November 7, 1978, p. 9.

²³⁸ A reference to the communiqué released in early November in Moscow rejecting the Camp David agreements and published as doc. 192 above.

²³⁹ Doc. 32 above.

²³⁶ Doc. 314 above.

- A. I am very satisfied because these resolutions were commensurate with the event and with the challenge facing our Arab nation. These resolutions were a decisive response to the attempt that was made at Camp David to bypass the rights of the Palestinian people. The Baghdad summit resolutions²⁴⁰ have unambiguously reaffirmed the Rabat summit resolutions²⁴¹ pertaining to the PLO and the Palestinian people. The importance of the Baghdad summit resolutions is that they have redressed the strategic imbalance caused by Egypt's exit from the arena of conflict. Iraq has now entered the arena to take its rightful place with all its great resources and capabilities, and this in addition to the other resources of our Arab nation, all of which have been thoroughly examined and on all levels. What has taken place at the conference has made it unambiguously clear that it is not Sadat that makes peace for the Arab nation but rather the Palestinian cause. He who is loyal to the Palestinian cause and fights for it is the true peace maker in the region.
- Q, [regarding the PLO joining the front for national action between Syria and Iraq].
- A. This is subject to the charter of the pact for national action, ²⁴² i.e., to the Syrian and Iraqi brothers. Naturally, they know and we know that even if the PLO and the Palestinian revolution do not officially announce their membership of this pact, they are members in practice and by nature. The PLO, according to the aims of this pact, considers itself a natural extension of this strategic alliance that was born through this national pact which joins together our brothers in Syria and Iraq.
 - Q. [On Arafat's meeting with the Iraqi leadership].
- A. The meeting held with Vice-chairman Saddam Husayn and other meetings held back-stage during the conference with President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr were, in our view, among the most successful meetings held on the sidelines during the conference. This was motivated by the status, policy and role of the PLO as regards the Syrian-Palestinian-Iraqi alliance, a strategic alliance that has a direct bearing on the strategic

balance in the Arab region and on the Arab-Zionist conflict.

Q, [on the meeting between Arafat and King Husayn].

- A. I would say, in brief, that the meeting was fruitful, successful and positive, defining clearly the interests of the Palestinian and Jordanian people in the face of these critical changes that our Arab nation is now confronting.
- Q, [On relations between the Palestinian revolution and the People's Republic of China].
- A. Our relations with the People's Republic of China have not changed. Before my recent trip to the Soviet Union, I sent a special envoy to the officials in China and North Korea, Vietnam and Laos and another envoy to Sri Lanka and India. I sent letters with these envoys which revolve around the attitude of the PLO towards Camp David and asked all these friends to stand by the PLO in the face of this conspiracy.

328

Message sent by three West Bank Mayors to the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding (CAABU) explaining their rejection of the Camp David agreements (excerpt)²⁴³

November 7, 1978

- (1) The treaty between Israel and Egypt does not rise or fall depending on the establishment of a final agreement regarding the Palestinians. The summit does in fact reach a separate treaty between Israel and Egypt, thus taking Egypt away from the sphere of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- (2) The Camp David Agreements left the main issue, the issue of the Palestinians, unresolved.
- (3) The treaty specifies that negotiations will be conducted amongst Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians living in the occupied territories and is to be concluded, amongst other things, with a treaty between Israel and Jordan. In the Rabat Summit four years ago and later in the United Nations, the PLO was acknowledged as the sole

²⁴⁰ Doc. 326 above.

²⁴¹ Doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²⁴² Doc. 314 above.

²⁴³ Partial text as published in *Middle East International* (London), no. 90, December 1978, p. 15.

legal representative of the Palestinians. No mention whatsoever was made of the PLO in the Camp David Agreements.

- (4) In the framework of a peace in the Middle East—
- (a) No Israeli commitment is given to end its occupation within a fixed period of time. In fact the agreement avoids the question of whether Israel will surrender its claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza.
- (b) The Agreement is silent on the question of settlements. While President Carter has said that there would be a freeze of new settlements during the period of negotiation, he has also said that there would be no prohibition on the expansion of existing West Bank settlements, though Israel had undertaken this in the past to avoid the appearance of new settlements being established. It now has proceeded with the establishment of new settlements
- (c) According to the Agreement Israel is permitted to maintain a military presence at specific locations in the occupied territories during the transition period. Provision is furthermore made for demilitarized zones.
- (d) No mention is made of Palestinians who were displaced in 1948.
- (e) No mention is made concerning the status of East Jerusalem.
- (f) The concept of self-determination for the Palestinians is not provided for in the Agreements.

The words of significance which run all the way through the document are "by agreement of all the parties concerned," meaning primarily Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian administrative council. Other than excluding the PLO from such agreements, it gives Israel the right of veto over matters such as

- (1) which Palestinians other than those from the West Bank and Gaza may be included in the Egyptian and Jordanian delegations?
- (2) the nature of the so-called self-governing authority to be exercised in Gaza and the West Bank;
- (3) which refugees displaced by the 1967 war can return to the West Bank and Gaza;
- (4) any decision made by Palestinians on the grounds of security for Israel, which provision eliminates the little that was left of the label self-rule;
 - (5) the final status following the five-year interim

period of the West Bank and Gaza specifically—and this is the most important point. Israel can veto a Palestinian decision establishing an independent Palestinian state. Secretary Vance is reported to have told some Palestinians that Israel not only could veto such a state but very likely would exercise such a veto to prevent a Palestinian state from coming into existence.

[Signed] Bassam Al Shaqa, Mayor of Nablus Fahd Qawasmi, Mayor of Hebron Karim Khalaf, Mayor of Ramallah

329

Statement by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia asserting that the basic issues to be discussed at the ninth Arab summit conference were those of Jerusalem and of the Arabs of Palestine²⁴⁴

Riyad, November 7, 1978

Meetings between the leaders and rulers of the Arab nation in order to study its affairs and problems are necessary and useful at all times. Such meetings become even more urgent when fateful Arab issues are endangered. You know that the Baghdad Arab summit²⁴⁵ was convened to examine the results of Camp David. Those attending decided not to accept these results because they do not add up to an acceptable settlement which can lead to the just peace that the Arab and Islamic nation desires for the region. Since these results lack any emphasis on total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the legitimate and widely accepted rights of the Arab Palestinian people, including their right to return, to self-determination (independently and in free will) and to the creation of their state on their soil. Above and beyond all this, Camp David's results ignored the subject of holy Jerusalem, the first direction of Muslim prayer and the third holiest shrine in Islam. Nor did it stress that Israel must withdraw from it and that Arab sovereignty must be returned to it. This is something no Muslim and no Islamic state can possibly accept. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which refuses to tolerate any harm done to any cause that affects

²⁴⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, al-Riyad (Riyad), November 6, 1978.

²⁴⁵ See docs. 321-326 above.

Muslims anywhere on earth cannot possibly abandon or compromise a cause that affects the destiny of Islam like holy Jerusalem to which the heart and emotions of Muslims everywhere are drawn. We in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia consider the question of holy Jerusalem to be our own special trust, one which we are honoured to bear and to which we have a historic commitment. We cannot and we do not want to evade this trust.

From the early days of its founder, the late king Abd al-Aziz, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has stood by the cause of Palestine, not solely because it is an Arab cause but also because it involves a Muslim people evicted by Israel from their homes. Their rights have been violated. Our Islamic holy shrines have been desecrated and no regard has been paid to Muslim sentiment, no respect has been shown to principles of morality, international laws, UN resolutions or human rights. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has chosen, in pride and joy, to be a Muslim state in its constitution, policy, ideology and practice, cannot forget the wish of its late King Faysal to pray in holy Ierusalem. This wish has become the hope of King Khalid Bin Abd al-Aziz and every Saudi citizen.

Furthermore, the kingdom cannot forget under any circumstances that it is the Islamic state which calls for and works to achieve Islamic solidarity and the pact of the organization of the Islamic conference which stipulates Jerusalem as the capital of the organization. This is a noble objective that all Islamic states seek to achieve. The pact also specifies that the liberation of Jerusalem is an Islamic objective of Islamic states, indeed of every Muslim individual.

Accordingly, it is evident that the basic issue to be discussed at the Baghdad Arab summit is the question of holy Jerusalem and of the Muslim people of Palestine. These are issues that concern not only the Arabs but all Muslims. So the Baghdad summit may be considered an Islamic conference with respect to its agenda and its objectives.

- Q. [The conference also discussed the question of the Arab Republic of Egypt].
- A. It reviewed certain ideas and viewpoints in this regard. But the most notable issue under discussion was the consensus of those attending that no harm should come to the Egyptian people and that no measures are to be taken which may

adversely affect their interests, for this people and their brave army have sacrificed so much for the causes of the Arab nation. The Egyptian people, an Arab and Muslim people, derives from its belonging to the Arab and Islamic nation a momentum which moves it to act in the interests of Egypt and of the Arab and Islamic nation.

- Q. [As to whether the rejection of the Camp David results means an Arab abandonment of peaceful settlements].
- A. We must not confuse the two issues. Matters were examined at the conference in a spirit of objectivity, seriousness and of a scientific and comprehensive analysis of developments. When the participants rejected the results of Camp David, they explained the objective reasons which led them to this and which may be summarized in the fact that these results did not include the necessity of withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, and the negligence of the question of holy Jerusalem and the return of Arab sovereignty to it, and did not stress recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, primarily their right to return to their homeland and their right to self-determination.

As for peace, the Arab nation has always and will always want peace and seek to achieve it through a just and comprehensive settlement which fulfils these legitimate demands and restores these rights to their possessors. For these are demands and rights acknowledged by the UN and other international organizations and supported by states and by world public opinion in the East and in the West. But it is Israel which, with obduracy and obstinacy, is pursuing a path contrary to international law, world public opinion and the just peace which the Arab and Islamic nations desire, indeed which the whole world desires.

330

Speech by President Sadat of Egypt asserting that the Baghdad Arab summit will in no way affect Egypt's negotiations with Israel despite current difficulties in the talks (excerpts)²⁴⁶

Cairo, November 16, 1978

Let me now briefly tell you how matters stand. With regard to the conclusion or the establishment of peace in the region, you know how totally we are all concerned to achieve peace. To date, we have progressed a very long way on the road to peace. You have heard me say before that there are no difficulties properly so called with regard to Sinai. However, in Israel, they like from time to time to raise difficulties but I assure you that there are no difficulties in the real sense of the word. This is because the issue is clear in Sinai. Sinai is Egyptian and there can be no question about security of land or sovereignty as agreed before and as matters now stand. This is why we maintain that we have come a long way.

As you know, there were two documents at Camp David.247 The first dealt with a comprehensive settlement while the second dealt with an Egyptian-Israeli accord. As regards the comprehensive settlement, there are clear and specific texts regarding a settlement of the Palestinian problem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This is made clear in the Camp David agreement. The difficulty lies only in the fact that we say to Israel that the issue for Egypt is not primarily Sinai.... The basic issue is not Sinai but the establishment of peace. Peace cannot come about without a settlement of the Palestinian problem in an atmosphere free from emotionalism. We follow a correct policy, fulfilling our duty towards our conscience, our history, the status of Egypt, Egypt's position of leadership and future generations.

Without a settlement of the Palestinian problem no peace can arise. In this battle, we want peace—not just Sinai. In any agreement we might reach, we must take this into account, and so must Israel. Peace does not depend upon withdrawal from Sinai

but upon a settlement of the Palestinian problem. Accordingly, the state of affairs in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and a settlement of the Palestinian problem from all its aspects is our primary concern. Sinai is only second in importance. Why? Because, as I said, we are after peace, not after our land in Sinai. We want a restoration of Arab rights with regard to the Palestinians, and a recovery of the Arab lands by their possessors, including Sinai.

My noble brothers, if after this long road that we have travelled, after all these initiatives, beginning with my initiative last November, after two full weeks in Camp David, if this peace is not accepted or understood by Israel, then perhaps Israel should reassess her position. We are not emotional or hysterical. All we are saying is that, at this stage, we want to build a permanent peace. We do not want only our land in Sinai. We are merely clarifying to them Egypt's position. As I said, Sinai is not a substitute for a permanent and just peace in the region, which is what we seek. Complications may arise in the coming stage but I say quite simply to those who met in Baghdad that your rally show will not affect us in any way. The proof is that today we are going ahead with our talks with Israel, passing through the stage which I described yesterday as a turning point characterized by complete clarity. Why? Because after this great effort and after we have, with our own free will, traversed more than 90% of the road, we shall go on to the end of the road, fully conscious of our final aim so that peace can be established. And this is not in order to recover Sinai only, as they said in Baghdad. No, indeed. It is because this has always been Egypt's line, years before they ever met in Baghdad, and will continue to be so for thousands of years to come. Egypt is a free country. Egypt decides for itself. Îts decision derives from its status, its position of responsible leadership, its historical and cultural responsibility, its destiny, its faithful sons, those who have always pursued their aims in solidarity, quite unlike those others who manifest in every action their duplicity, vengeance, ignorance and childishness.

Today, I declare to the whole world that the negotiations between us and Israel are becoming critical, yes critical. This is what led me to send my vice-president to US President Carter. For, as I said, we have covered 90% of the road. We did so out of concern for and faith in the policy

²⁴⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), November 15, 1978. The speech was made before the faculty and students of Cairo university.

²⁴⁷ Docs. 153 and 154 above.

we have always chosen for ourselves, which is peace and a settlement of the problem of the Arab nation through loyalty and sacrifice. This crisis was not created by Baghdad but arose because we in Egypt feel that we always fulfill our promise. We promised that our work would be for peace and that it would be a sincere Egyptian act, as is the custom with Egypt. We are working for a genuine peace, not for a commercial deal, nor for one-upmanship nor in order to recover Sinai and abandon the rest. No. As promised, we act without reference to those ignorant, vengeful, bankrupt people. There is a crisis and I might add a serious crisis. Why? Because, as I said, we have covered 90% of the road. Now what about the remaining 10%? Egypt has said and will continue to say that it will fulfil its promise. Egypt shoulders its responsibility honourably and faithfully, without deception or false pretence. It will remain so until these people learn or until their people teach them how to understand Egypt, I refer to those who met in Baghdad. If this crisis can be evaded, we shall use all efforts to do so as we did before and as the whole world witnessed. If this crisis forces negotiations to a stop, then the various parties might re-examine their positions, and when I speak of the parties I am referring to Egypt, Israel and the USA. We go back and reassess our positions and then resume negotiations. I would like to emphasize that Egypt's commitment is a question of honour and dignity throughout its history as regards its Arab nation and the whole world. This is a cultural standpoint. But we shall not forsake Egypt's commitment to remain true to its trust. I say this so that those who met in Baghdad might come to know that neither their conference, nor their hysteria and their cheap bargaining will ever influence Egypt's policy, leadership, power, honour or its glorious history in any way whatsoever....

331

Press interview statements by Prime Minister Huss of Lebanon affirming that the ninth Arab summit conference had adopted all Lebanon's demands and describing the abortive joint Arab delegation's mission to Cairo (excerpts)²⁴⁸

Beirut, mid-November, 1978

- Q, What took place with regard to Lebanon at the Baghdad conference?
- A. The subject of Lebanon was not debated at the Arab summit, but it was discussed with the various Arab delegations at the conference of foreign ministers which preceded it. When I say that it was not a subject for debate, I mean that everybody expressed total understanding of the Lebanese problem and all had complete sympathy for it. They were also absolutely responsive to Lebanon's demands. Therefore, when we raised the subject of Lebanon at private meetings, we always found complete readiness to accept what we had to say. Consequently, the subject of Lebanon was not placed on the agenda of the summit by the foreign ministers after we had reached an understanding with the participants that they would adopt any resolution Lebanon proposed at the summit.

And this is what actually took place. After the summit conference had conducted its debate on Camp David, its implications and the Arab position towards it, President Sarkis made a statement after which we tabled a draft resolution which was unanimously adopted by the conference. This resolution comprises the points I had raised in the speech I had sent to the conference of foreign ministers and which was read on my behalf at the opening session.

- Q, But did the conference actually adopt all your demands?
- A. All of them without referring to them in one resolution. In my address I had requested the conference to adopt four points:
- 1. Reaffirmation of the Riyadh and Cairo resolutions.²⁴⁹
 - 2. Reaffirmation of our reservations in respect to

²⁴⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Nahar al-Arabi wa al-Dawli (Paris), November 13, 1978. For the Baghdad summit see docs. 321–326 above.

²⁴⁹ Docs. 267, 268, 313 and 314 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

the Camp David agreements because they disregard the rights of the Palestinian people to their land with all that this entails in leading to the resettlement of the Palestinians outside their country.

- 3. Support the Lebanese state in regaining its sovereignty over all Lebanese territory, particularly the South.
- 4. Material support for reconstruction and development. All these points were in fact included in the resolution adopted by the conference with the exception of the point relating to resettlement which was considered by the conference to be related to the Arab cause as a whole and not only to Lebanon. It was therefore mentioned in a separate resolution which paid tribute to the steadfastness of the Syrian, Palestinian and Jordanian people, supported the Palestinian people's rejection of self-rule and all projects relating to their resettlement outside Palestinian land.
- Q, There was much talk about secret resolutions at the Baghdad summit! Did any of these deal with Lebanon?
- A. Actually there were no secret resolutions regarding Lebanon.
- Q. How did you receive the decision of your appointment to head the delegation of the summit to Cairo?
- A. The decision was made at a closed session attended only by the kings and heads of state which, of course, included President Sarkis. As to how I received the decision, in reality there was no choice. It was very difficult for me to refuse the appointment after a unanimous decision by the heads of state to nominate me to head the delegation to Cairo, especially since the mission did not relate to me personally or to Lebanon, but was a general one, representing the conference. I can say that the step was very necessary, in the sense that it was inevitable as part of the deliberations of the conference. I regard the appointment of the Lebanese Prime Minister to undertake a collective Arab mission as evidence that Lebanon has not lost its role in Arab affairs, despite all that has happened. As to President Sadat's refusal to receive us, it was one of the possibilities which we had considered and it must not be viewed from its angle of formalities. It must be seen as the expression of a position, and must not be considered as being aimed at the members of the delegation or at the countries they represent, but it is a position taken about the summit conference.

- Q. Why don't you relate, through the pages of al-Nahar al-Arabi wa al-Dawli, the story of the "impossible mission" and the three hours you spent in Cairo?
 - A. This is an honest exposé of the events:

Before the plane taking us from Baghdad landed, the captain announced that the Egyptian authorities had given permission for it to land at Cairo airport. Iraq had informed its envoy in the Egyptian capital that a delegation headed by myself and charged to do so by the Arab kings and heads of state, would arrive in the Egyptian capital to meet with Sadat. On landing we were received by a protocol official from the presidential palace, the Lebanese ambassador to Cairo and the representative of Iraqi interests.

We went in a minibus accompanied by those who were there to welcome us, to the VIP lounge where a host of Arab and foreign correspondents were awaiting us. There could have been Israeli journalists among them.

The delegation gave an extemporaneous press conference—half in Arabic, half in English. We then went in presidential palace cars through the streets of Cairo to the Sheraton Hotel where we were given the presidential wing comprising several elegant rooms overlooking the Nile.

Some of us had heard over Cairo broadcasting station on the protocol car radio, the decision of the Egyptian President not to receive the Arab delegation. Those who heard the news informed us on our arrival at the hotel.

President Sadat was still delivering his speech at the People's Assembly²⁵⁰ when we went up to the wing and we were seen on the television screen. We were then informed by the protocol official that the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs would convey to us the Egyptian President's position as soon as he finished speaking.

²⁵⁰ The following is the extract from the speech pertaining to the delegation: "Before I came to you, brothers and sisters, we were surprised by foreign news agency reports that those meeting in Baghdad have dispatched a delegation, and this delegation is actually on its way to Cairo. They have not asked for permission. They knew that we are today celebrating the opening of the third People's Assembly session, and that we are engaged with the issue of peace and domestic development and the issue of democracy and the issue of freedoms.

We will reply to their message, or whatever they have sent, by welcoming them but they will not meet me or any official. My message across the whole world and what they are hearing now is that all the billions in the world cannot buy Egypt's will." (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/5961/A/4).

Arab world 601

In fact, shortly after President Sadat's helicopter overflew the hotel and while his motorcade was passing through the street on which the hotel stands, the Egyptian minister arrived and conveyed to us the official position of President Sadat, the gist of which was:

First: That Sadat had no previous knowledge of the visit and was surprised by it.

Second: That he had already sent leters to all the Arab kings and heads of state, except the heads of the Steadfastness Front, explaining the position in respect of the two Camp David agreements and that he had received no comments on his letters from any of them.

Third: That he is ready to answer any question posed by any Arab king or head of state. We understood from the talks that he was not prepared to receive us, as we had already realised from the speech. Naturally, there was nothing for us to do except leave the hotel and return, accompanied by the protocol official to the airport, to the plane and to Baghdad....

332

Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Sabah of Kuwait reaffirming that no one Arab country is entitled to take individual decisions concerning the Palestinian cause and expressing the hope that Egypt will return to Arab ranks²⁵¹

Kuwait, mid-November, 1978

- Q. What is your appraisal of the Arab summit conference held in Baghdad²⁵² and what do you think were its most significant results?
- A. The situation we are passing through requires Arab unanimity more than anything else. We had hopes that 22 Arab countries would attend the Baghdad conference, rather than 21, and we regret the absence of the 22nd, Egypt, which we are proud of. Egypt was absent from this meeting, and it pained us that Egypt's seat at the Baghdad conference should be empty and that Egypt should not have been at the summit with her sister countries. I wish to place on record my appreciation

of and gratitude to the Iraqi government and to President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and his Vicepresident Saddam Husayn, for their call for the conference to be held, and at this juncture in particular. As regards what we achieved, the most significant thing was that all appreciated the extent of the responsibility they had to shoulder and their realisation that the success of this conference was a success for all of us Arabs in our confrontation of the challenges of the current stage and the critical situation through which we are passing. We made every possible effort to ensure the success of the conference, and the others did the same. This is why the conference was successful. Without going into details I can say that the unanimity of the Arab nation at Baghdad was in itself a success for the conference.

- Q. But the Baghdad conference led to results, some of which have been published while others have not. What do you think were the most significant results of the conference?
- A. I believe that the most important result was the meeting of 21 Arab states in Baghdad. Frankly, before the summit met, we did not anticipate that 21 Arab states would take part in the conference. In Baghdad we discussed all aspects of the Arab situation and those present reached agreement on a unified strategy whose bases and principles derive from the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summits. At the same time, the Baghdad conference declared that the Palestinian cause is not a purely Palestinian responsibility but a collective Arab responsibility that no one is entitled to deal with or take decisions for on an individual basis. and that action in this connection must be within the framework of unified Arab action as defined and approved by the summit conferences.
- Q. Do you think that there is still hope of Egypt returning to Arab ranks or that there is a possibility that the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations may be halted? And what will happen if Egypt signs a peace treaty with Israel?
- A. In the first place, we must look at the actions of our enemy and pass judgement on them. Our enemy does not give others any chance of finding a true and just solution of the problem. The Arab countries take action with a view to peace, not war. We in the Arab world have no desire for war and bloodshed; what we really want is to achieve a just and comprehensive peace. This is different from what the Zionist entity wants and is striving

²⁵¹ Excerpted and translated from al-Nahar al-Arabi wa al-Dawli (Paris), November 20, 1978, p. 5.

²⁵² See docs. 321-326 above.

for in fact. The whole state of affairs in Israel rests on military institutions, and I do not think that Israel really wants peace, because peace would threaten Israel's existence, because she is an entity that was established and has grown on a military basis. Therefore, I do not think that President Anwar Sadat will reach any results in the negotiations with Israel. Israel does not want peace, and this is something that the whole world must realise. What about Egypt? The Arab nation will continue to offer its hand to the government and people of Egypt, because Egypt is part of this Arab world and no one can exclude Egypt from the Arab nation. Therefore we and Egypt are always on one line, even though we disagree politically and we hope that one day the Egyptians will once again find themselves alongside their Arab brethren in a single rank.

Q, If Egypt signs a peace treaty with Israel, what will the Arab attitude be?

A. This question was discussed at the Baghdad conference and the following decision was taken: In the event of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty being signed, the Arab foreign ministers will meet and reach understanding on the measures that have to be taken or implemented. Such measures will include, for example, where the meetings of the Arab League are to be held. I prefer not to go into details at present. I deem it unlikely that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty will be signed and I have great hopes that Egypt will return to the Arab ranks. In any case, we must not rush things. Everything will be decided at the proper time.

Q. All the same, at its latest meeting held after the Baghdad summit with Amir Jabir al-Ahmad in the chair, the Kuwaiti Cabinet called on the circles and bodies concerned to study the resolutions adopted at Baghdad so as to prepare for their implementation. What did this mean?

A. If any Egyptian-Israeli agreement is signed a meeting of the Arab foreign ministers will be held immediately. Preparations have to be made for such a meeting and an appropriate working paper for discussion has to be drawn up. In the event of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement being signed, it will be necessary to study what decisions, measures and steps have to be taken. For example, it will be necessary to take constitutional and legal steps, and others related to the Arab League Charter, the Joint Arab Defence Pact concluded between the Arab states, and other matters. Preparations

have to be made for all this. At the economic level, for example, Israel will be more dangerous in peace than in war, and the Arab world must be prepared for this. We must be prepared for this. We must prepare ourselves and be ready so that we may know exactly how dangerous Israeli economic penetration of the Arab world will be in the event of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement being signed. This is why the appropriate quarters in Kuwait have been instructed to prepare the necessary studies for the confrontation of all eventualities.

333

Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt stressing that the main difference between Israel and Egypt is the question of linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza (excerpts)²⁵³

Cairo, mid-November 1978

Q, Are you disappointed that a treaty has not been concluded?

A. You can say that I am disappointed, yes. It is not a feeling of frustration. It is disappointment because peace could have been achieved long before this, during the past year. As you know, I tried my best to sign the treaty on Mount Sinai on Nov. 19, the anniversary date, but the Israelis didn't respect my wish.

Q. Why has a treaty not been reached sooner?

A. Let me tell you this. The difficulty is not among the Israeli people at all... The difficulty is among certain elements in the political parties and in the Israeli Cabinet. Until Camp David, Prime Minister Begin was still holding some of these old ideas and complexes. But after Camp David, I can say he has dropped a lot of them. Not all of them, but a lot of them, so that the man is working for peace, really.

Q, How serious are the difficulties?

A. There are some difficulties in the treaty between Egypt and Israel that are surmountable.

²⁵³ Interview conducted by William E. Schmidt, Newsweek (New York-international edition), November 27, 1978, pp. 24–25.

We can overcome them very easily. But the serious point of difference is this question of linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and autonomy in Gaza and on the West Bank.

- Q, Egypt has suggested separating the timetable on Gaza from the West Bank as a solution to the linkage problem. Why?
- A. First, let me tell you it is not a separation at all. As a principle, we are for a permanent peace and a comprehensive settlement...I am trying to make it easier for both of us. What we are asking now is this: let us resume immediately our responsibility in the Gaza Strip. Namely, let us fix the date of the start of the autonomy in Gaza and give some time to King Hussein to join us in the West Bank... But if he is not ready, and says he is 100 per cent against and will not join, I have already declared that at that moment Egypt will continue with the process in the West Bank.
 - Q. What contacts have you had with the Palestinians?
- A. I am in contact with the Gazans. In Gaza, they are in a condition to continue, though they have not yet declared it...But on the West Bank, I have received one of the mayors and he told me the whole thing there: King Hussein (and the Palestine Liberation Organization) are frightening the people there in the West Bank, especially the mayors.
- Q. Are you surprised by King Hussein's attitude toward peace talks?
- A. Not at all. This is King Hussein: one moment he is extreme left, the next... extreme right. This is the way it is in the Arab world. Only we are stable.
- Q. Are you concerned over President Carter's apparent impatience with the pace of the Washington talks?
- A. When Carter called me and said he was frustrated, really, I was astonished. Why? Because you know all the efforts this man has made. He has already completed 90 per cent of the whole thing, something which could never have been imagined by anyone before. He has the right to feel frustrated. But since he has already completed 90 per cent, we should have some patience for the other 10 per cent.
- Q. Would another three-way summit meeting be helpful in resolving the current deadlock in the negotiations?
 - A. I have no objection to sit in a tripartite meet-

ing, or a bilateral meeting with Begin. I won't exclude any outside meetings, though I prefer a tripartite one. I should like to have Carter with us always.

- Q, Are you disappointed that Saudi Arabia has not given you the kind of support you would like to have?
- A. The disappointment among my people toward the Saudis is that there has been a change in the Saudi policy since King Faisal. For a long time they were not supporting us openly, but they were supporting the Arab cause. Now they are dragged by the emotionalists and the auctioneers in the Arab world like [Libya], Syria and Iraq.
- Q. Once peace is achieved, do you expect the U.S. to supply you with arms?
- A. You have given me the F-5E's, but these are not the latest. So I am now agreeing with the French for the latest version of the Mirage. I shall not be asking you for arms as a first priority, but instead for the Carter plan. You can choose to help with arms also, but I don't think you can give further, because Israel will be shouting.

334

Press interview statements by King Hasan II of Morocco stressing that President Sadat of Egypt is not seeking a separate peace with Israel and declaring his support for the Camp David agreements in terms of their final aims (excerpts)²⁵⁴

Washington, mid-November 1978

- Q. How important is the U.S. role in the Middle East negotiations?
- A. I personally think President Carter has accomplished a lot, with great courage and an acute sense of fairness. He has based his policy in the Middle East on human rights, legality and justice. But you cannot ask President Carter to solve the problem by himself; after all, there are two other parties that also have to act.
- Q. How do you assess President Sadat's role in the current negotiations, and do you support his actions?
 - A. President Sadat went to Jerusalem and took

²⁵⁴ Interview conducted by Lars-Erik Nelson, Newsweek (New York-international edition), November 27, 1978, p. 72.

part in the Camp David talks. I could not follow him; I could only warn him that he must be faithful to the decisions of the Rabat summit.²⁵⁵ He thought—and I regard this as a judicious decision—that he had to create a framework that would meet the conditions imposed by the summit: not a separate peace, but evacuation of the occupied territories, recognition of the Palestinian people's rights and, in time, their right to a homeland.

- Q. Why do you think the current negotiations have been so difficult?
- A. Precisely because President Sadat does not want to solve the problems of Egypt alone. If he had wanted to reach a separate peace, there would have been no problem. It would all be finished. It is precisely because President Sadat has been unwilling to compromise the decisions taken at the Rabat summit. He negotiated the principle that the Israelis must evacuate the occupied territory and that there must be a Palestinian state created there.
 - Q. Why haven't you endorsed the Camp David accords?
- A. Because the Camp David accords must be judged on the basis of the end results. The Camp David accords are not an agreement just between Egypt and Israel. They affect all the countries bordering Israel. I have supported Camp David with regard to its final aims. But I cannot approve it piece by piece. It's like a puzzle. I can appreciate the entire tableau, but not a detached piece.
- Q. Doesn't that reluctance to approve Camp David weaken Sadat?
- A. The fact that President Sadat does not enjoy the support of the other Arab countries is not the fault of the Arab countries. It is the fault of Menachem Begin. It would be a historic crime on Begin's part if he ruined President Sadat politically. If this continues, there is a real risk of that.
- Q. You were quoted this week as saying that President Sadat told you he had guarantees from President Carter that East Jerusalem and the West Bank would be returned to the Arabs. Was that correct?
- A. President Sadat gave me those assurances. If this were not the case, Camp David could not have succeeded. But I did not personally examine them with a magnifying glass.
- 255 See doc. 308 in International Documents on Palestine 1974 and Appendix A in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

- Q. Do you feel that President Sadat is now in serious difficulty with other Arab countries? There appears to be a particular dispute with Saudi Arabia.
- A. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have many interests in common. It is entirely normal that little disputes arise between them from time to time. It is really a sign of friendship between the countries. It is a minor domestic dispute between brothers.
- Q, What lies behind the difficulties confronting the Shah of Iran?
- A. It is apparent that the demonstrators in the streets simply create confusion. To this very moment, we do not know what steps they are demanding. Do they want constitutional freedoms, a return to fundamental Islamic law, a complete radical change of the Iranian regime? I think that they themselves don't know. And they don't because when there is a mass of people on the streets, every political leader points to them and says, "Those are my people." We don't know to whom the Shah will turn, nor who the people on the streets are, nor the proportion of Communists, liberals, rightists or ultrarightists.
- Q, What are the consequences of instability in Iran?
 A. I don't [think] the existence of a Marxist regime in Iran would create a more peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. It could lead to moves in other Arab states to wage war on Israel, not to destroy Israel but simply to create disorder.
- Q. You were once reported to think that President Carter was weak in foreign policy. Has that view changed?
- A. Yes. Everybody changes. In the first days of this Administration, he was naturally concerned with domestic affairs and had many things on his mind. But once he turned to foreign affairs, he looked at the problems through different glasses.

335

Statement by Prime Minister Khalil of Egypt to the People's Assembly asserting that his country will not sign a separate peace with Israel (excerpts)²⁵⁶

Cairo, November 25, 1978

As for Israel, our position has been firm and clear ever since it was affirmed by our leader in the Knesset²⁵⁷ and in full view of world public opinion. He then said that we are not after a separate solution or another disengagement agreement but a comprehensive settlement for all parties to the conflict in the region, that the Palestine question and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are the crux of the Middle East question, that the Middle East question is not an Egyptian-Israeli one but is in core and essence an Arab-Israeli problem and that without a settlement of the Palestine problem, there can be no stable peace in the Middle East. Therefore, Egypt will not respond to any Israeli attempts made to achieve a separate agreement. Israel must face up to the facts that constitute the basic elements of permanent peace in the Middle East and face her responsibility to herself, her people and the whole world.

As regards fellow Arabs, Egypt is the core of the Arab world and no one can isolate it. Egypt's position may be defined in its bearing the main responsibility for recovering Arab lands, achieving Israeli withdrawal and laying down the foundations that would permit self-determination for the people of Palestine.

This commitment is Arab Egypt's destiny. It is a responsibility borne before the Arab people in general and the people of Palestine in particular. For this reason, Egypt entered four wars, sacrificing the blood of thousands of its children, and achieved the great October victory which paved the road to the peace negotiations from a position of honour.

As for the position adopted by the rulers of the Rejection Front, this will not change the historical or practical reality of Egypt as the heart, the sword and shield of its Arab nation. The Arab people shall judge them guilty of their error once the dust of their verbal battles has settled. At the same

time, we offer our sincere thanks to our Arab brothers who understand our position.

As for the Lebanese tragedy, Egypt condemns all foreign interference within the Lebanese factions and supports the territorial integrity of Lebanon...

336

Press interview statements by President Sarkis of Lebanon discussing the role of UNIFIL, defining coexistence between the communities as a solution for Lebanon, and asserting that there is now more equilibrium in the army than there was two years ago²⁵⁸

Beirut, November 27, 1978

Q, Mr. President, what do you expect from your working visit to France? More generally, what role can France play, in your opinion, in restoring peace in Lebanon?

A. An exchange of views is very useful when it comes within the framework of a friendship such as that which unites France and Lebanon. And if it is true that one of the conditions for the effectiveness of talks is frankness, we can be sure that this condition will be completely fulfilled in the Franco-Lebanese talks.

Certainly, the interest with which France has followed the Lebanese crisis from the beginning, coupled with her long experience in the affairs of our country, will pare down the mass of details which one would normally have to deal with. However, these details are so numerous, the problems of the Middle East have such ramifications, that it is always very useful for them to be explained by people who have experienced them directly. The discussions which I will have concerning these various problems will of necessity reflect a particular interest.

On the other hand, when we think of the role traditionally played by France in Lebanon and in the Middle East, and when we take into consideration the prestige which France enjoys on both the Arab and international levels, this leads us to view talks between France and Lebanon on the highest level as being in the normal course of the policies of the two countries.

²⁵⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Ahram (Cairo), November 26, 1978.

²⁵⁷ Doc. 301 in International Documents on Palestine 1977.

²⁵⁸ Translated from the French text as published in Le Monde (Paris), November 28, 1978, pp. 1, 10.

As for the precise point of what role France could play, that is up to the French authorities to say. As far as we are concerned, we consider that this role is clear in a number of different fields, political, economic, cultural, and in the domain of military assistance. The presence of economic enterprises and cultural establishments, the presence of a significant French contingent in UNIFIL, all this gives eloquent testimony to the interest which France takes in Lebanon.

- Q. You have just mentioned the presence of this French contingent. Do you think that at a later stage UNIFIL could help keep the peace in Beirut itself?
- A. This problem is very complicated, very complex. In fact, until now UNIFIL has not been able to accomplish the mission with which it was entrusted by the United Nations, namely, to help the Lebanese state assert its authority in South Lebanon.

There are pockets of Palestinian resistance on one side and pockets of Christian resistance on the other.

A report to this effect has been presented to the Security Council by the UN Secretary-General.

For sure there are faults in the present organisation of UNIFIL which prevent it from fulfilling its task.

Let us first start by remedying the present state of affairs.

- Q, The recent statements by M. de Guiringaud on the Christian militias aroused a great deal of emotion. Do you think that these statements could help induce the Christian community to undergo a thorough examination of its conscience, or failing that, do you think that they could reinforce the position of the Lebanese government in the face of the various factions?
- A. I would say first that the word 'emotion' is appropriate. Besides, the adoption of a stand by a responsible French official could not be greeted with indifference in Lebanon. If we add the fact that M. de Guiringaud made these statements at the height of the battle, the intensity of the reactions becomes all the more understandable.

Without wanting to analyse these reactions and their causes, I will content myself with stressing that one of the predominant characteristics of the reactions was the shock which they produced. But no one can deny that shock is often the characteristic of an examination of conscience. At the present juncture an examination of conscience, even if it

means different things for different people, constitutes in my opinion positive factor which can contribute to reinforcing the position of the state.

- Q. More generally, how do you see the future of the Christian community of Lebanon and its relations in the future with the other components of the national community?
- A. To speak of the future of the Christian community of Lebanon could give the impression that this future is compromised or that the presence of the Christian community in Lebanon is an accident which could be rectified in the course of events. No, the Christian community, like all the other spiritual communities in Lebanon, is an integral part of this country's make-up. Without the Christian community, and likewise without the Muslim community, Lebanon would no longer be Lebanon. All these communities which have lived together over the centuries cannot but continue to live together in Lebanon—each one of them by fundamental, not accidental, title.

Of course, this coexistence is not without its conflicts; whenever the equilibrium in Lebanon is disrupted—and this has often occurred through the effects of sudden upheavals in the Arab world and the region as a whole—the existence of Lebanon has been threatened. The jolts are perhaps inevitable, but I am determined to continue to pursue the goal of coexistence.

- Q. Can a solution be found in conformity with the terms—improved perhaps—of the national pact of 1943, or does something else have to be envisaged?
- A. It would be necessary to find a more flexible form for this pact, perhaps through a bias towards decentralisation. There have, moreover, already been a number of proposals along these lines. The most important thing is that the communities live together. We will seek the most effective way to avoid conflict. I do not believe in the possibility of an accord based on a federal formula. I am thinking more in terms of a decentralisation on the levels of administration and development, a bit like the system of regionalisation in France, with the central government continuing to determine the general policies of the country.
- $Q.\ Which$ excludes the formula of 'cantonisation' which people are talking about...
 - A. I would not go that far.
- Q. To organise this coexistence among the Lebanese you must have the material and political means to do so.

Do you think that you possess these means?

A. I am coming more and more to believe that I do. In the present circumstances I find factors that are conducive to this. There can be no doubt that among all the parties concerned in Lebanon there is a will to be done with the present situation. This is becoming more and more evident in both the Christian and Muslim communities. This will is being expressed every day and in public much more easily than was the case even a few months ago. Everyone is agreed on resuming a life lived in common. This desire for coexistence is becoming generalised, concrete, it is spreading through different, even opposed, tendencies.

The problem, as you know, is far from being purely Lebanese. But we enjoy total support from the Arab family, which is seeking to help us emerge from the tribulations which we have been suffering for nearly four years. On the international level too we do not lack sources of support. Although it does not possess all the material means necessary, the state is nevertheless bringing its influence to bear on events.

- Q. Where in all this does the restructuring of your army stand?
- A. If the road ahead of us is still long, what we have achieved is far from negligible. We have formed a coherent and multiconfessional nucleus. The experience has been encouraging. The four thousand new troops have been well trained. Last week I passed out three hundred and thirty-eight officers, half of whom were Christian and the other half Muslim. The cohesion in their ranks, which is becoming more and more evident, is far more advanced than in the rest of the population. The contingents deployed in the South are mixed, as is the case here in the port area of Beirut. The equilibrium is almost assured. In this palace the officer who received you is Sunni. This would have been impossible two years ago.
- Q. What has happened to the unit which went to the South last July and was blocked by the Christian militias supported by the Israelis?
- A. It should not be forgotten that this unit went as a result of a political decision—in fact at the express demand of the United Nations. It had to stop because it was both too small, with only five hundred men, and too ill-equipped to fight. To give it the order to advance would have been suicidal. If it failed, under the circumstances,

neither the army nor the government are to blame. But, I repeat, for the army, time is on its side.

- Q, What effective responsibility does your function as head of the Arab Deterrent Force entail? How have you acted in this capacity in periods of grave crisis, in particular at the time of the recent bombardments of East Beirut by Syrian artillery? Could that drama have been avoided?
- A. When the participants at the Riyadh Conference decided that this force should be placed at the disposal of the Lebanese head of state they were intending to create a juridical and institutional link which would not amount to effective military command. In the periods of grave crisis I judged that it was my duty to try to soften the contradictions which had appeared: this is what led me to express my position in an address to the nation at the beginning of October, and to undertake my trips to Syria and other Arab countries. I telephoned President Asad on numerous occasions. We ended up arriving at an acceptable solution, but it is no use telling you that what happened profoundly shocked us. We must learn our lesson so that such events do not repeat themselves.
- Q, In this context what can we expect from the resolutions of the conference held in Beit al-Din²⁵⁹ in October by the countries involved in the Arab Deterrent Force?
- A. The presence of these sister Arab countries at Beit al-Din was a definite source of moral support for us. They made every effort to help us. At the root of the Lebanese crisis, and as a consequence of this crisis, are to be found a host of political and paramilitary organisations endowed with such military, financial and informational means that they have been able, to a certain extent, to replace the state. In order to reconstruct the state, these anomalies must be eliminated. This is precisely what was decided at Beit al-Din, and the participants in the conference had a good grasp of the situation in its entirety. The population must be disarmed and paramilitary demonstrations must be abolished.

Logically of course the first task should be to round up the weapons, but the problem is such that it seems to me more wise to proceed with the easier task, namely banning paramilitary demonstrations in the country and putting a stop to illegal propaganda. I cannot conceive of a

²⁵⁹ See doc. 310 above.

situation where one radio station openly combats the notion of coexistence between the Lebanese, while drawing the retorts of an opposing station. We must put a stop to anything which might alienate the Lebanese from each other, but we must do this without touching the freedom of the press, on which, in the present circumstances, the law imposes certain indispensable limitations.

- Q. What are the prospects of future relations between Syria and Lebanon? Has the action of the Syrians within the ADF, in this context, created a new situation adversely affecting relations between the two countries.
- A. In qualifying the relations between Lebanon and Syria as privileged, we are only expressing a historical human and geographical reality which imposes itself equally on both countries.

I don't see how these historical and geographical constants could be compromised in the future.

As far as I am concerned, I consider that we must strive to reinforce these relations, especially in the light of recent experience, and clearly in the interest of Lebanon. Each time that relations with Syria have been hit there have been repercussions on the Lebanese scene, and neither Syria nor Lebanon has reaped any advantage from this.

- Q. How is it that, in 1978, there are still no diplomatic relations between the two countries?
- A. This is because of historical reasons. It was a decision taken by common assent at the dawn of the independence of the two countries. This does not signify in the slightest that our independence is contested. President Hafiz Asad on the 22nd of this month even sent me a telegram of congratulations on the occasion of the celebration of the independence of Lebanon. The Syrian head of state has on numerous occasions declared himself in favour of an independent and sovereign Lebanon. There are no problems surrounding this issue.
- Q. The peace, to which steps are being made between Israel and Egypt, has profoundly divided the Arab world. What will the consequences be for Lebanon? What position is your country intending to adopt with regard to the other Arab countries and their neighbours?
- A. We took part in the Baghdad conference and we subscribed to all its resolutions.²⁶⁰ These signify not a desire for war, but the search for an equitable, just and lasting peace.

We stand by the reservations which we expressed after Camp David, whose results, in our opinion, do not assure the realisation of such a peace since they do not deal with the Palestinian question and as such they run counter to the interests of Lebanon. The only valid solution consists in the creation of a Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel.

- Q, So a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East seems to you to be the sine qua non of a definitive peace in Lebanon?
- A. In the world we live in it is becoming more and more difficult to isolate any problem from its regional, even international, context. And so it is impossible to deny the effects of the regional and Middle Eastern givens on the purely Lebanese givens. But it would be going too far to conclude that any solution of the present crisis in Lebanon is conditional on the prior solution of all the problems in the region.

A moment ago we were just talking about the disputes tearing apart the Middle East and their repercussions on Lebanon. But this does not mean that the settlement of the Lebanese crisis is entirely conditioned by these repercussions.

- Q, In the Lebanon of tomorrow, what place do you envisage in particular for the Palestinians who, most probably, will continue for a long time to make up a sizeable community in your country?
- A. There exists, to be sure, a Palestinian problem; this is certainly not the first time it has arisen, nor will it be the last.

Since 1948 there have been several waves of Palestinian refugees who have been welcomed in Lebanon following Israeli aggression. Renouncing their own identity in order to integrate into another national identity has always been out of the question for these refugees. Likewise, there can been no question of Lebanon being able to absorb any influx from outside, whoever they may be.

That said, there can be no diminishing the odiousness of seeing a whole people condemned to dispersal for thirty years without anyone being able to find any reason or just basis for this condemnation.

It is high time that a just and practicable solution be found, a definitive solution to the Palestinian problem. But, whatever the case may be, this solution cannot consist in opening a new chapter of the tragedy, as if to obliterate the traces of the

²⁶⁰ See doc. 326 above.

ARAB WORLD 609

original issue: it is not through creating a problem in Lebanon that the Palestinian problem will be solved.

- Q. Some of your fellow citizens, Mr. President, consider that you are assuming your historical role with too much "discretion" for a period of such drama. How would you reply to this reproach?
- A. Making judgements of oneself can only be presumptuous or complaisant. I am one of those people who believe in the virtue of a certain discretion. Is making a lot of noise going to help us overcome the problems we face? There are moments when one must adopt a firm tone, and I have done this whenever it has been necessary. To go on doing so incessantly would only produce a meaningless din.
- Q. What is your general appraisal of the present phase of the Lebanese crisis? Is it possible to speak of a glimmer at the end of the tunnel?
- A. I have told you that I am more confident now than I have been for some time. The process of pacification and normalisation set in motion by the Beit al-Din conference is continuing. We have hopes of strengthening the material means at our disposal both for the army and the other sectors. Even if it does not possess all the means necessary, the state is still on its feet. We hope that with the support of the sister Arab countries and other friendly states we shall be able to reconstruct the institutions and rebuild all that has to be rebuilt.

We are going to have recourse, to help us, to the international organisations and all our friends who want to assist us in this colossal enterprise. I am persuaded that France will be at the head of the bunch.

337

Joint communiqué issued following talks between Prime Minister Badran of Jordan and Palestine National Council Chairman Fahum²⁶¹

Amman, November 29, 1978

The two sides, the Palestinian headed by Mr. Khalid Fahum, chairman of the PNC, and the

Jordanian headed by Mr. Mudar Badran, prime minister of Jordan, held the final session of their talks at the prime minister's office in Amman on November 28, 1978. This was done in the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue which began on November 25, 1978.

In the light of the concern displayed by both sides for the gravity of the stage through which the Palestine problem is passing and the importance of Palestinian-Jordanian cooperation within the context of the Arab struggle against Israeli aggression and expansionist schemes;

Concerned to achieve a just peace which ensures total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and to recover the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the creation of their independent state on their national soil;

The two sides succeeded in establishing a basis for joint cooperation in the political and information fields and in consolidating the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the occupied lands in accordance with the resolutions of the Rabat and Baghdad summits.

The talks were held in a friendly and fraternal atmosphere. They included a comprehensive review of the developments in the Palestinian cause, an objective and realistic assessment of the stage that this issue is passing through in the Arab context and with a special concentration upon the conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied land, and upon ways and means of consolidating their steadfastness in the face of enemy schemes and arbitrary measures, and of enhancing their splendid national unity as manifested in confronting the enemy's plans to do away with their national and cultural identity.

The two sides, concerned for the safety and efficacy of common cooperation and in the light of the experience and lessons of the past, agreed upon the adoption of a number of principles which would constitute a wall protecting and developing this cooperation. Foremost among these principles is full awareness and respect for state sovereignty over land and people where citizens are equal before the law, and the principles of independence for Palestinian action within the framework of the PLO, being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The PLO and the Jordanian government, having commenced this stage of cooperation and realism

²⁶¹ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), November 29, 1978, p. 4.

in the service of the cause and people of Palestine, express their appreciation for the struggle and steadfastness of our people in the occupied territory and reaffirm their rejection of the Camp David agreements and their consequences as well as their determination to confront the self-rule scheme which enshrines the occupation.

Taking part in the talks on the Palestinian side were Khalid al-Hasan and Mahmud Abbas, members of the Central Committee of Fatah and Zuhayr Muhsin, member of the Executive Committee of the PLO and, on the Jordanian side, by Dr. Abd al-Salam Majali, Minister of State for Prime Ministerial Affairs and Minister of Education; Mr. Adnan Abu-Audeh, Minister of Information; Mr. Hasan Ibrahim, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Sulayman Arar, Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Mahmud Shawkat, Director General of the Executive Department for Occupied Land Affairs.

338

Speech by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria at the opening of the fourth session of the Euro-Arab dialogue (excerpt)²⁶²

Damascus, December 9, 1978

There can be no solidarity unless the European community understands the justice of the Arab cause and supports it because it is the cause of a people who have been forcibly expelled from their homeland to become homeless refugees far from their land and their possessions, or subject to the brutal colonisation of the Zionist enemy or suffering under his evil racialist settler occupation. For this is the cause of the whole Arab nation, the territories of three of whose fully sovereign states have been occupied in an age when the UN Charter has outlawed the acquisition of territory by force, invalidated the philosophy of invasion and the fait accompli, declared racial discrimination a crime against the whole of humanity and, apart from a few exceptions, eliminated the last vestiges of colonialism.

Also it is a question of the Palestinian people's

right to self-determination and of the recognition of the PLO as its sole legitimate representative, and its being supplied with material and moral support in accordance with the provisions of the UN resolutions; and furthermore it is a question of refraining from supplying the aggressor and preventing him from culling the fruits of his aggression.

The European community is capable of forcefully demanding that the search for a just peace based on the safeguarding of the national rights of the Palestinian people and the full withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied territories should be under the supervision of the UN within the framework laid down by its resolutions to this end. A search that does not involve all the parties concerned will be useless, and although Arab ranks are fragmented in many ways, the Arab nation will reject individual and partial solutions and will reinforce its capacity to hold out against all the conspiracies that are being hatched to impair its rights and sovereignty. If the Camp David agreements have done anything, it is to create a new focus of tension in the area. They have not promoted the advance towards a just and comprehensive solution, nor have they served the cause of peace. On the contrary, they have placed additional obstacles on the road to a just solution and a permanent peace.

The conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front held in this capital in September and the joint national action pact concluded between Syria and Iraq, and the subsequent Baghdad conference held in November, all provided clear evidence of the vigilance of the Arab nation, of its steadfastness, its insistence on its full rights and its ability to surmount every setback that befalls its ranks.

²⁶² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Baath (Damascus), December 10, 1978.

Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat describing the Camp David agreements as offering a new slavery to the Palestinian people, citing the UN resolutions as a basis for negotiation and discussing a possible reconciliation with Jordan²⁶³

Beirut, December 3, 1978

- Q. Chairman Arafat, in the roughly two years that President Carter has been President of the United States, you have said some praise about him, and you have said some angry words about him. Where do you stand right today? How do you evaluate President Carter and his relations with the PLO?
- A. You see, I am very sorry to say that President Carter had complete retreat from the first slogans he has said about the PLO and our government the Palestinian people. You remember that in the beginning he mentioned some very good phrases about homeland for the Palestinians, and selfdetermination or something about self-determination. But you see after Camp David what he has offered to my people-new slavery, self-rule. Would you accept, if you are in my place, would you accept self-rule for your people? So, in my opinion, in the opinion of my people, and among the Arab nation, and all other nations and even the United Nations, there is dissatisfaction of what President Carter has offered to my people. In our opinion, it is new slavery, this is what is offered to
- Q. Mr. Chairman, in your first answer, you expressed dissatisfaction and some disappointment with President Carter's change from the early days. Do you have some theory as to what happened to make him change his stand on the aspirations of the Palestinian people?
- A. I don't know, but I am looking for the results. We have to remember that he has retreat completely from this communiqué which had been signed between you and other superpower, with the Soviet Union. You remember this communiqué had been signed in '77, October '77. You have

completely retreated. Beside, what he has mentioned before about homeland and about self-determination for the Palestinian people. I don't know why, you have to ask him his—

- Q, You seem, Mr. Chairman, to be pessimistic about what Mr. Carter has done, but I notice now that President Sadat has said he will not go to Oslo to get his Nobel Prize, and he has not yet signed the peace treaty with Israel—do you think that maybe President Sadat, and maybe the Americans who might still be working to try and get the Palestinians their homeland in their own way?
- A. Definitely, they are not working for the Palestinians. If they're putting the Palestinian in their consideration, definitely they would not accept what has been done in Camp David before consulting us, at least. But what happened? They signed and they threw this agreement which had been done in Camp David in our face and said this is what you can have, and nothing is more—new slavery, self-rule.

Q. The President-

- A. Do you know what the meaning of self-rule in the international view—the lowest case of autonomy; the lowest case.
- Q. But very recently, President Sadat, in the last few weeks, has been very clear that he is not going to sign any treaty unless it is linked to some sort of solution to the Palestinian problem. Are you saying that he is not serious about that linkage?
 - A. Who? President Sadat?
 - Q. President Sadat.
- A. No. He is mentioning something for a link between the Egyptian agreement and the West Bank and the start of the self-rule. In my opinion, it makes no difference, because either we are against it. Because definitely, our people will not accept this new slavery which you are offering to them. Not to forget, I will give you a very important example. You have refused from Ian Smith something more than this self-rule for the black Rhodesians. At the same time, and maybe it has come by chance, but you have-you, the Americans, your presidency, your administration had refused what Ian Smith had offered, which was more than self-rule for the black Rhodesians, and at the same time, you are offering to us self-rule. So, you have not to accept-

²⁶³ Interview conducted by George Herman, Tony Clifton and Doug Tunnell for CBS's "Face the Nation"; unedited transcript supplied, on request, by CBS. Copyright © CBS Incorporated 1978. The text has been printed without editional amendment for the sake of fidelity to the original document.

Interpreter: Internal settlement.

- A. You have not to accept that any Palestinian will accept this self-rule. Not to forget, that we, the Palestinian, have the highest percentage of education all over this area. Including the Israelis. Do you know that? And, in spite of all these important cases and realities, you are offering to us self-rule and without any vision of the future for us.
- Q. What is your vision, Mr. Arafat? If self-rule is not adequate, what sort of alternative is the PLO proposing?
- A. We have to follow what United Nations decision had mentioned. We have the right for self-determination and we have the right to return to our homeland. And we have the right to establish our independent states. And you have to remember also, that our national congress, the Palestinian National Congress, had mentioned and had accepted that the Palestinian will accept to establish the independent state on any part from which the Israelis withdrew or to be liberated. It had been mentioned six years ago. This means that the Palestinian will accept any part from their homeland to start their homeland—their state, but you are refusing it.
- Q. You have specifically proposed in conversations with Congressman Findley that you establish a state in the West Bank, and in Gaza, with a corridor between.
- A. You see, what I told Mr. Findley, that we are ready to establish our state in any part, not only in the Gaza region or West Bank, any part of Palestine which we liberated or from which the Israeli withdrew—will withdraw. I was very specified in this.
- Q. Now, as part of that, you said that you would be willing to have de facto recognition of the Israeli government, is that correct?
- A. You see, I am not dealing with ghosts. And the Israeli have not been dealing with ghosts. They have said that they don't recognize the PLO—the Palestinians. But we have to remember that the Eight Days War—it was the fifth war which happened in the south of Lebanon between the Israeli army and our military troops. I am not dealing in this Eight-Days War with ghosts—I am dealing with the Israeli army.
- Q. Let me just explain to the American people who don't know what is meant by the Eight Days War. You are referring to the Israeli incursion into Southern Lebanon?

A. Yes, it was between the Palestinians and some groups from the Lebanese national forces and the Palestinian [Israeli?] troops. And you remember that in that war, they used all this up-to-date and very sophisticated weapons against us, including all your American weapons—F-15, laser rays, and cluster bombs, even this forbidden bombs, cluster bombs and napalm and so on. And you remember that the push was for their military forces to annihilate the PLO according to Knesset decision had been taken—after Brzezinski praise, which he had mentioned by—to PLO. So I have to make a link—

Q. Yes.

- A. —between what Brzezinski had mentioned by—to PLO and this raid—or this campaign against us in the south.
- Q. Mr. Arafat, Pm just trying to understand what I understood that you had said to Congressman Findley, which was that if you could return to a Palestinian state in some part of that land, that you would agree to de facto recognition of Israel and to no violence against Israel.
- A. You see, it is very important that I need recognition—recognition from your President when he—and not to forget that he called me that I am Ku Klux Klan—
 - Q. The Ku Klux Klan, Yes.
- A.—Nazi, and fascist, and communist—not to forget. So he has to recognize me. You have to recognize the PLO, which has been recognized by more than 105 member in the United Nation. And in spite of all that, you are putting your head in the sand, and refusing to recognize the Palestinian and the Palestinian representative.
- Q. Then let me ask you another question before my colleagues take it away from me. Usually, when a government in exile, or whatever you want to call yourself—an underground government—wishes to change the opinion of another country, it has some kind of indirect or underground communication or context. There have been reports in the press here that you are in contact with the United States, or the United States with you, through, say, the Saudi Arabians, or some indirect fashion.
- A. You see, it's true that I—between now and then I used to meet some congressmen or senators, but not more than that, because you are insisting—your own administration are insisting to put its head in the sand.

- Q. Have you had any indication from the State Department that they are willing to at least discuss the possibility?
 - A. No, I—say no.
 - Q, None at all.
 - A. No.
- Q, Do you think that America has any role at all to play in the Middle East, or do you think that this peace should be settled only by the Arabs and the Israelis?
- A. You see, no, this peace in this area has to be settled by United Nation, and especially by this two superpowers.
- Q. So the Americans and the Russians do have a role—
- A. They have, and not the Americans only; they have to parti—two, very important, with the Soviet Union, this second superpower, and without this you shall not have this complete peace in this area. Without the Palestinian you shall not have any peace in this area, but without the Soviet Union you will have—you shall not have also this peace.

So to look for this story from all its views and angles, you have to put it plain, through the recognition, through recognition, resolutions and decisions and attitudes.

- Q, Mr. Arafat, recently you have said bye-bye to American interests in the Middle East. Could you elaborate on that a little bit?
 - A. It is not me who said bye-bye, first of all.
 - Q. But you have said that as well, recently.
- A. I replied Mr Brzezinski when he told byebye PLO. Definite he has to find an answer for his bye-bye.
- Q. But what does that mean? What are American interests?
- A. Definite, if you are going to put me in the angle, put my people in the angle, in the corner, we will defense by ourself. We will defend ourself, definitely.
- Q, Does that mean if American policy continues to press you into the corner as you say, that you will attack American installations, for example?
- A. You see, I'm not definite, I'm not saying how I will deal, but definite. If you are, if you put a cat in the corner, it will defend itself. So, what about you put our four billion, four millions, Palestinians in the corner, and you are putting this millions in the corner, four million Palestinians in this

corner. And you are insisting to put them in the corner and this very crucial and fatal corners.

- Q. Do you think there will be an election in the near future on the West Bank?
 - A. What for?
 - Q. To elect a new administrative body.
 - A. What for? For the self-rule?
 - Q. Yes.
- A. Would you accept it if you are in my position to accept this self-rule for your nation?
- Q. But will the election take place; will it happen in the coming months?
 - A. Why? I am asking you why. Here are—
- Q. For example, because the Israelis might want it to take place.
- A. Well, okay, first of all, we, the Palestinian, are against this self-rule, and all its steps. It's clear. Definite they can, they can, make some—

Interpreter: Some show business, some show of strength.

- A. Show of strength, in the West Bank and Gaza region. They have tanks, F-15's, your F-15, and they have between 12 and 15 atomic bomb; they can make a lot against my people but they can't have our acceptance.
- Q. There's been a good deal—Excuse me, I didn't mean to interrupt you. There's been a good deal of talk about the improvement of relations between the PLO and Jordan, who have, which countries have not always been on, which peoples, I should say, have not always been on good terms. What is the status of the reconciliation between the PLO and Jordan, King Hussein?
- A. You know that our, our dedication after he came back from Amman after he had done very successful talks now with the King—
 - Q. Successful enough so that you will be going?
 - A. I will go.
 - Q. When?
 - A. Maybe in a suitable time but I, but I'll go.
- Q. I mean, are we talking about weeks, a matter of several weeks.
 - A. Yes, maybe weeks I'll go.
- Q. And what is the eventual product of this reconciliation. What will the world hear from it?
 - A. We have agreed to continue the spirit of

Baghdad and Rabat summit conference resolutions, which had established the whole points, the whole points of the basis between us, the basis of relations between us and the Jordanian government.

- Q, And then will that thereby pretty well rule out the possibility of King Hussein taking part in anything that has to do with the Camp David framework?
- A. I think definite King Hussein will not accept Camp David because he had refused in Baghdad summit conference. You know that in Baghdad all who had participated in this conference had accepted the views Camp David resolution except Oman.
- Q, There seem to be quite a lot of unity between most of the Arabs at Baghdad, and I know you had lots of background talks with most of the leaders. Do you think the unity which you've formed in Baghdad is going to lead to a, to peaceful settlement in the Middle East or do you think it must inevitably lead to a war following Camp David?
- A. You see, it is very important to know what happened in Baghdad. We're obliged after your plan, your administration government, your administration plan, in Camp David—

Interpreter: To impose.

- A. To impose, to try to impose this peace which I, we don't accept peace, it is surrendering. It is a forced peace in this area because peace cannot be imposed in this area through some agreements done in Camp David. You have to find a solution, a just solution for the whole problem in this area including, and the major item in this whole problem, the Palestinian cause, it is the core of the whole problem which you are still ignoring and still not to recognize it. So, in Baghdad, we found ourselves that you are—the Americans—you are pushing Sadat to withdraw from this strategic balance between the Arabs and the Israelis and the Israelis, behind them, the Americans with all their support, economic support, military support, all kinds of support, you know that.
- Q. What happens if we succeed, Mr. Chairman? What happens if Mr. Sadat, President Sadat pulls back and there is an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, then what happens to your cause?
- A. No, for us we will continue. Not to forget the Nazis had arrived beside the, in the gates of Moscow, but you don't lose the war. And don't forget that the Nazis occupied all Europe, did they

succeed to win the war? No.

- Q, You can win without Egypt?
- A. Definite. We can, we can, and what had happened in Baghdad is very important, that we consider that we have to gather all our potentials and the potentials of all our allies and friends. The Arab potentials and our friend's potentials and our allies potential do balance this, to return the damage which had happened in the strategic balance and we succeeded.
- Q. You succeeded for the moment, but so many times in history the Arabs have talked about unity, they've talked about support for the Palestinian cause and then it's fallen apart over some other event. Do you, do you feel confident that's not going to happen now, with the Baghdad agreement?
- A. You see, you always, I am sorry to you, the Americans are always looking from this very narrow angles to our nation. Not to forget that we are a very old nation; we have a very strong, we had in the past a very strong civilization and you have to remember the Crusade, the Crusaders and the Tartarians, they came to this land but what was the result; they left and our nation stayed in this area with Arab, with all our potential, all our capabilities, and not to forget this then remains an Arab land in spite of all these campaigns and past campaigns: Crusaders, Tartarians, Roumanians, and so on.
- Q. Mr. Chairman, you point out you and the Israelis, the Palestinians and the Israelis are the most educated groups in this part of the world. Is there any—
 - A. In the world?
- Q. In this part of the world. In this part of the world; I believe that was your statement. Is there any chance that these two educated groups can make peace together by themselves?
- A. I offered, you remember, I offered secular states, democratic secular states, but they, you began to say, you wanted to demolish and destroy Israel. Okay. We put it aside, and we said we will establish our independent state in any part of Palestine but I, in, I am saying that the only solution is this secular, democratic state which you are refusing, and the Israelis are refusing.
 - Q. The only solution—
- A. And not to forget that 65% of the Jews in Israel are Arab Jews.

- Q, That is the only solution you will accept, the secular state.
- A. No. No. I am giving you, I am giving you some options but you refused the first option, so I, I offer another option. But no peace, between slaves and conquerors.
- Q. On that note, Chairman Arafat, thank you very much for being our guest today on Face the Nation.
- A. I say thank you very much to give me this opportunity.

340

Statement by the Palestinian trade union movement in the occupied territories rejecting the Camp David agreements and calling for practical steps to be implemented against them²⁶⁴

December 12, 1978

The Palestinian trade union movement in the occupied territories held a trade union meeting which included all trade unions in the West Bank, including the Jerusalem unions, under the auspices of the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank. This meeting took place at the headquarters of the Union of Construction Workers and Public Departments in the Ramallah and Bireh districts. The participants discussed the results and objectives of the Camp David resolutions which embody a scheme of administrative autonomy and the effect of all this on the fate of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian and Arab liberation movements. The participants, in affirming their condemnation of the Camp David agreements and of the US role, declare their commitment to the following principles:

- 1. Reaffirming the statement issued by the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank.
- 2. Reaffirming the resolutions of the General National Conference of Jerusalem and of all other popular conferences held in Bir Zeit, Bethlehem and Gaza.
- 3. Reaffirming the unity and position of the working class in the occupied territories as a

vanguard of struggle for our Palestinian people in their national struggle for the sake of their right to return, to self-determination and to the creation of their independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO.

- 4. The working class in the occupied territories abolutely rejects the autonomy scheme which merely enshrines Israeli occupation, helps maintain it and conflicts with the hopes and aspirations of the Palestinian people and with their legitimate rights.
- 5. The participants affirm their rejection of all those suspect voices that give currency to the autonomy scheme, considering them to be real enemies of the Palestinian people. The participants believe that the League of Hebron Villages is one example of the attempt to create an alternative leadership for our people and must be resisted.
- 6. The participants affirm that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of our Palestinian people wherever they may be.
- 7. The conference supports the resolutions of the Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and the Charter that grew out of the Syrian-Iraqi meeting. 265 It calls upon Iraq to join the Front at once and urges the Front to enhance their relations and develop them to the point where they become a strategic alliance with forces of liberation in the world and the socialist camp, led by the Soviet Union.
- 8. We salute the names of the fraternal people of Egypt, their working class and their progressive national movement in their struggle against the treacherous Sadat regime.
- 9. We call upon the Baghdad conference²⁶⁶ to take practical steps against the policy of surrender in the Arab world, led by the Sadat regime.

²⁸⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, Wafa (Beirut), December 4, 1978, p. 8.

²⁶⁵ See doc. 314 above.

²⁶⁶ See docs. 321-326 above.

Resolutions and recommendations of the Popular Congresses as formulated by the General Popular Congress of Libya at its fourth regular session (excerpts)²⁶⁷

Tripoli, December 12, 1978

III. Foreign policy

The Popular Congresses reaffirm the fixed principles and foundations that govern our foreign policy on the Arab, Islamic, African and international levels. They resolve the following:

Confirming the national and leading role undertaken by the great September 1 revolution and in order to entrench the will to stand firm and to liberate; and in order to mobilise the resources of the Arab nation and to employ them in the interests of the battle for liberation and honour, the Popular Congresses have resolved the following:

- A. To support Syria and Jordan with money and arms on the basis of:
- 1. Open borders for the fighters of the Palestinian resistance.
- 2. No negotiations with the enemy, direct or indirect.
- 3. Commitment to the resolutions of the Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and the Baghdad Arab summit.
- B. To support the Palestinian resistance with money and arms on the basis of:
- 1. Working to unite the groups that constitute the Palestinian resistance
- 2. Continuing and escalating the fight against the Zionist enemy
- 3. Adherence to the resolutions of the Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation and the Baghdad Arab summit.

342

Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi pointing out that many European states expressed reservations regarding the Camp David agreements and that the Baghdad summit has shown the world that the Arabs reject Camp David²⁶⁸

Beirut, December 13, 1978

Q, What can you say about the UN sponsored International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people?

A. The Palestine cause daily acquires more support, because it is the essence of the conflict in the region, and because there can be no Middle East settlement without solving the Palestine question. We have moreover often repeated that the Camp David accords are a call for war and not for peace.

World public opinion was generally responsive to us, while several West European states had their reservations as regards the Camp David accords, saying they were incomplete. The other states condemned the accords, finding no scope in them for a peaceful settlement, and considering any bilateral solution as leading to further tension.

In spite of all the efforts exerted by the USA and Israel to produce the Camp David agreements in the name of peace, world public opinion was not fooled, and a great majority of the states voted for us and confirmed that such agreements have no legal basis and are null and void because they harm Palestinian rights.

At the UN, we met representatives of several states who expressed support for our cause. All speeches made in the General Assembly on the Palestine cause without exception supported Palestinian rights.

Moreover the whole world celebrated the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people on November 29th, by attending the UN celebrations or by sending letters of congratulations, and by organizing solidarity rallies all over the world.

Q. After the Baghdad Summit you said that more

²⁶⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, al-Fajr al-Jadid (Tripoli), December 21, 1978.

²⁶⁸ Interview conducted by "Voice of Palestine" (clandestine); English text, Wafa (Beirut), December 13, 1978, pp. 4-7. The Baghdad summit resolutions are published as doc. 326 above.

ARAB WORLD 617

important than the resolutions are their implementation. Where are we now, especially as regards joint Arab action?

A. The Baghdad Summit had a great impact on world public opinion, and there is no doubt that its resolutions have shown the world that Camp David is unacceptable to the Arabs, that it represents an isolated policy and that the parties to it are also isolated.

It also stated that the Arabs will confront anyone dealing with these agreements with counteractions. These accords have moreover shed light on the US stand, with the latter in a situation of crisis because the Arabs did not approve of the accords and considered them to be hostile to Palestinian and Arab rights. Therefore, we can say that the Baghdad resolutions were the first flame to light the way before public opinion, stressing that Camp David is a failure and does not serve peace, but will lead to war. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that these resolutions were moderate and that no war drums were beaten at Baghdad.

There is no doubt that the implementation of these resolutions is an essential factor and that the concerned parties, starting with the Confrontation forces, must implement them in practice. We are trying, together with the other concerned parties, to let the resolutions take their full course in practice, because the Baghdad resolutions are the most important ones adopted in confronting the new challenge facing the Arab Nation.

- Q, Earlier, there were attempts to highlight the existence of major differences between Egypt and Israel over certain clauses of the agreements, while the tone has now changed to one of optimism regarding the signing of a treaty in the very near future. What is your assessment regarding the course of Israeli-Egyptian negotiations now, particularly regarding the seriousness and usefulness of what the two parties may reach regarding the question of regional war and peace?
- A. The policy of the USA is to consolidate its hold in the Arab region; and this can only be brought about through the consolidation of the Zionist occupation of Arab land, leaving the Palestine cause hanging. Israel was established in order to expand and in order to carry out acts of aggression against the Palestinian people and against neighboring Arab states. The USA is going ahead with this policy.

We consider these so-called differences to be

artificial ones, although there are minor obstacles in the attempt to link the agreements on Sinai, with those regarding the West Bank and Gaza. We have rejected the Camp David accords, and they therefore wish to impress public opinion with the fact that they have achieved progress in the Camp David accords. In reality, however, these agreements are a violation of Palestinian rights and do not offer any guarantee that the Palestinians will be granted sovereignty over their own land, or that Israel will withdraw from the Arab territories in five years, or give up its settlements.

Also, there is no mention of Jerusalem, of its return to the Palestinians or Arabs, nor any mention of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, nor of establishing an independent Palestinian state, and of the right of self-determination, nor of the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland. These are our reasons for rejecting Camp David.

Peace can only be achieved in the Middle East through the USSR's active participation, because we consider the US our enemy and not a mediator. Otherwise, no agreement with Israel will be achieved, because it will not give any concessions to Arabs.

- Q, What can you say to our people in the occupied territories on the 14th anniversary of the Revolution?
- A. I admire their heroic struggle, and specifically their immediate rejection of the Camp David accords as expressed through their public meetings, and their messages to the US envoys who were sent to the occupied territories and who were informed that the PLO will remain the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that the "self-rule" project is completely rejected because it does not meet any Palestinian demands. Our people have foiled the Camp David conspiracy, and will be able, through their firm allegiance to the PLO, to foil all other conspiracies.

Palestinian rights are now firmly established and we have the right to our homeland and our sovereignty over it, which we will achieve.

343

Statement by the Conference of Communist Workers' Parties of the Arab Countries stressing that the danger of the Camp David agreements lies in the establishment of an Israeli-US-Egyptian alliance against Arab and African liberation movements (excerpts)²⁶⁹

Mid-December 1978

The communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries held a conference in the second half of December 1978, at which they exchanged views on events in the international arena and in the Arab world in the period since their previous meeting. They unanimously approved a number of political conclusions and defined practical positions designed to strengthen cooperation and to coordinate the activities of the communist parties, to invigorate the struggle of the Arabs against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and to enhance these parties' contribution to the common struggle for peace, national liberation, democracy and socialism.

Regarding the recent events in the Arab East, the conference participants noted that imperialism's onslaught against the Arab national-liberation movement is mounting, that events fraught with grave consequences are taking place, pushing the confrontation between this movement and the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction to a new level, intensifying the struggle and differentiation, and setting new tasks for the progressive and patriotic forces of the Arab countries.

The participants emphasized that Anwar Sadat's treachery in signing the Camp David accords was the natural result of the course he has followed from the first days of his rule, the consequence of renouncing the progressive changes that had been implemented in Egypt, complete alignment with imperialism, through the so-called "open door" policy and "diversification of sources of arma-

ments," to say nothing of his total renunciation of the line of developing Arab-Soviet friendship and, more, going over to the road of anti-Sovietism, hostility toward the popular masses, liquidation of democratic freedoms, suppression of the Egyptian progressive patriotic forces.

All our parties have already denounced the traitorous agreements Sadat had concluded with Begin and Carter. Our parties actively helped to mobilize the broadest forces, called for the expansion of various official initiatives with the aim of countering the course that led to the signing of these treaties, and to completely nullify their dangerous consequences.

The communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries declare in common that the dangerous situation that has emerged as a consequence of the Camp David agreements is not only due to the fact that these agreements amount to a rejection of the central issue in the struggle between the Arabs and Zionism—the Palestine problem, rejection of the national rights of the Arab peoples in general and the Egyptian people, in particular, infringing its independence and sovereignty. The Camp David agreements represent a threat also because they marked the formation of an Egyptian-Israeli-US alliance aimed against the Arab and African national-liberation movement. In this alliance, the Egyptian regime is assigned the role of an outpost of imperialism in the region, of safeguarding the "security" of imperialism and Israel. The concentration of Egyptian troops on the Libyan border, increase of the Egyptian contingents in Sudan in aid of the Nimeiri regime, who supported the Camp David agreements, serve as the best proof of this.

The Camp David agreements are designed to draw Jordan into the capitulatory settlement, deal a blow at the Palestine Liberation Movement or to subjugate it, to strike the Palestine problem off the agenda, subjugate Syria, once again aggravate the situation in Lebanon, deal a blow at all the Arab forces of steadfastness, and thus open the way to the expansion of the US political, economic and military domination over the entire region, ensure its control over the oil riches of the Arab countries, liquidate the Arab national-liberation movement and its gains, and to use this region to conduct imperialist policies aimed at subverting international détente.

These treacherous agreements have virtually

Excerpted from the English translation, World Marxist Review Information Bulletin (Toronto), no. 4 (February 28, 1979), pp. 5-15. The signatories were: Jordanian Communist Party, National Liberation Front of Bahrain, Tunisian Communist Party, Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria, Sudanese Communist Party, Syrian Communist Party, Iraqi Communist Party, Lebanese Communist Party, Egyptian Communist Party, Progress and Socialist Party of Morocco.

ARAB WORLD 619

resulted in Israel's behaving even more aggressively, to intensified repressions in the occupied territories, expansion of the Israeli settlements, Israel's growing interference on the side of the fascist forces in Lebanon, activization of its military encroachment on Lebanese territory. sequently, instead of bringing nearer the possibility of establishing a just peace in the region, as their authors claim, it has, in fact, led to its postponement, to aggravation of the explosive situation in the region. Though one of the main goals of the imperialists' plan was reached by signing the Camp David accords, we are witnessing a vigorous upsurge of popular struggle in the Arab region against the policy of treachery as well as an official positive response to it in diverse forms and at various levels. It is essential to continue promoting and strengthening these steps and positions both on the popular and the state level.

Although the diverse forms of opposition to Sadat's treachery by the Arab masses and their governments vary in importance, the communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries seek to use all these forms, without counterposing them or substituting one for the other. They do not consider that the reaction of the popular masses and that of the official standpoint exclude each other. It is necessary to pool the efforts of one and the other, to step up their activities, raise them to a higher level and to radicalize them.

There is growing indignation among the popular masses stemming from the position adopted by various progressive national parties, political and trade union organizations, popular and professional unions in each Arab country and the Arab arena as a whole. A case in point are the actions of the popular masses on the West Bank and the Gaza strip against the Camp David accords and their consequences, above all the plan of administrative autonomy contained in them. These actions showed that the popular masses are steadfastly following their national goals, and showed the cohesion of the Arab people of Palestine round the Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole legitimate representative.

This popular indignation was also reflected in the broad mass actions in Lebanon, which strengthened the steadfastness of the Lebanese patriotic movement and the Palestine resistance movement in the face of the isolationist-confessionalist plans aimed at creating a racist confessional state on Lebanese soil. These actions helped to strengthen relations of cooperation between Syria, the Lebanese patriotic movement and the Palestine resistance.

The Camp David deal and the liquidationist plan of administrative autonomy stimulated all contingents of the Palestine resistance and Palestine patriotic forces to strengthen national unity in the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization. They drew up a plan of national unity, including a political program which confirms the right of the Palestine people to return to their native land, to self-determination and to set up an independent national state on Palestine soil.

This popular upsurge and indignation led to consolidation of the Egyptian patriotic movement's positions, to broad mass actions in Egypt, the like of which have not been seen since Sadat declared his treacherous "initiative," to intensification of the Egyptian patriotic forces' opposition to the treacherous course and the increasing isolation of Sadat and his regime.

Popular reaction to the treacherous course was reflected on a high political level in the clear anti-imperialist resolutions of the Arab National Congress held in Damascus. They point to the dangerous consequences of the Camp David accords and the course that led to it. They boldly advance the slogan of struggle against the interests of US imperialism in the Arab world, the slogan of strengthening the principled, strategic alliance with the Soviet Union. The militant program advanced in them reaffirms the importance and need to expand political democracy, mobilize the masses and ensure unity of the revolutionary forces. All the patriotic, progressive forces which took part in elaborating it, should continue to fight for its implementation.

At the state level, the Arab countries' reaction to the capitulatory policy was reflected in a number of initiatives, the most important of which was the summit conference of the Front of steadfastness and confrontation held in Damascus.²⁷⁰ It clearly and emphatically reaffirmed the opposition of a number of Arab states to the policy of capitulation and treachery. It defined the United States as an enemy, and not a mediator, and reaffirmed the need for a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union. This was warmly approved and supported by the

²⁷⁰ See doc. 231 above.

popular masses, who seek to expand and radicalize the charted course.

The Syrian-Iraqi meeting, which resulted in the adoption of a joint national action charter,²⁷¹ marked an important step on the road to frustrating the capitulationist plan, provided a support base for the creation of a northeastern front. This step responds to the will of the broad Arab popular masses, accords with the appeals of the allied, friendly forces. The will of the popular masses demands that this step be combined with other measures to rebuff the treachery, that it should be a factor of general opposition to the imperialist-Sadat-Zionist alliance at both the popular and state level.

Each of these initiatives—the summit Damascus conference of the front of steadfastness and confrontation and the Syrian-Iraqi meeting—facilitated the convening of the Baghdad summit. Leaning on the favorable climate among the Arab popular masses, each of them facilitated the adoption at the Baghdad summit of resolutions²⁷² which, though minimal, reflected to a certain degree the unanimous opinion of the Arabs in rejecting the Camp David results.

Though the communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries realize that the Arab reactionaries—being forced to acknowledge the decisions of the Baghdad summit—are acting and will continue to act contrary to these decisions with the aim of nullifying them, they however hold that this does not detract from their value. They bear in mind the importance of the atmosphere of popular indignation against Sadat's betrayal which impelled these forces to agree with the adopted decisions.

Our parties reaffirm that the masses' readiness to rebuff the capitulatory course remains the linkpin of successful opposition to this course, a firm base of successful struggle against the onslaught of imperialism and the treacherous plans. It is essential to assure every possible condition for it.

The communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries hold that a key condition in ensuring this readiness of the masses is mobilization of all their potentialities, realization of democratic freedoms, pooling of their efforts, creation of a favorable democratic climate for the activity of the pro-

gressive, patriotic political parties, trade unions, the mass and professional organizations.

The communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries consider that both in the Arab world and in the international arena there are objective conditions, as well as a subjective factor-the masses' preparedness to counter the onslaught of imperialism and the treacherous course. To win a speedy victory in this battle at present, it is essential to set up a general progressive Arab front that would include the Communists, Baathists, Nasserites, Socialists, Nationalists and other progressive elements, as well as all the Arab revolutionary forces, based on respect for the organization, political and ideological independence of each of these forces, and abidance by a common program. This program should clearly formulate the objectives of the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction, explicitly determine who are allies and who are enemies, demand adherence to the national objectives of the struggle, define common viewpoints, and ensure that all sides fighting for its implementation resolve differences solely through a democratic dialogue.

However, in this connection the communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries regretfully note the existence of negative phenomena in relations between front participants, which certainly do not make for a stronger rebuff to the bloc of imperialism, Sadat and Zionism, formed by the Camp David accords, for the mobilization of the popular masses for struggle, establishment of a required atmosphere of confidence among the political forces allied in the Front, and among the popular masses. These phenomena lead to the emergence of a dangerous split in the ranks of the patriotic forces, to their disarray, distracting them from the struggle against the real enemy. An example are the repressions against the fraternal Iraqi Communist Party. These repressions, we are convinced, do not make for an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between the allied forces fighting against a common and dangerous enemy, which has managed to reach one of its key goals. The progressive, patriotic forces must do everything to strengthen their unity and step up efforts to counter the onslaught and to restore lost posi-

The campaign against the fraternal Iraqi Communist Party, should it continue, will create a real obstacle to uniting the Arab progressive, patriotic

²⁷¹ Doc. 314 above.

³⁷² Doc. 326 above.

forces. And if the communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries condemn this method of dealing with the revolutionary forces, it is not only because they seek comradely solidarity with the fraternal Iraqi Communist Party, not only because we highly assess its many years' struggle both in and outside its country, and in the inter-Arab arena, but also because we want just as much to see unity and cohesion in the ranks of the Iraqi national front, to see fraternal Iraq fully play its natural role in the general Arab struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and to safeguard its gains.

ARAB WORLD

The conference participants, discussing the events in the Arab world since their previous meeting, noted with satisfaction the important victory won by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The defeat of the counter-revolutionary adventuristic left-opportunist coup, creation of the vanguard party—the Socialist Party of Yemen, a party of the working class, peasantry, revolutionary intelligentsia and all working people that is guided by a scientific theory of socialism, is an important qualitative gain of the Arab liberation movement and a practical response to imperialism's onslaught. This is clear evidence of the opportunities for frustrating imperialist plans and the reactionary conspiracy, of the broad prospects for the various contingents of the Arab liberation movement.

Our parties also reiterated their complete solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian masses in the occupied territories against the measures of repression and terror practised by the Israeli occupation authorities.

The communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries hold that at present, in view of the dangerous developments in the inter-Arab arena. the question of democratic freedoms has acquired increasing importance, becoming an imperative condition of steadfastness in the face of the imperialist onslaught and liquidation of the consequences of the Camp David accords. Granting of democratic freedoms to the masses, respect for the right to express their viewpoint, to independent political party, trade union and professional organizations is an imperative demand of all Arab national and progressive forces, a slogan of struggle serving to rally the broadest political forces and masses. They see the infringement of democratic freedoms as a primary goal of the imperialist onslaught, which can be frustrated and defeated only through the mobilization and organization of the masses, unity of the national and progressive forces, granting of broad democratic freedoms.

Our parties are convinced that the Arab peoples and the Arab national-liberation movement have the potentialities to surmount the difficulties and obstacles facing them, to defeat the plans of imperialism, Zionism and reaction and the criminal Camp David agreements and their consequences. The way to realize this great aim is by mobilizing all the energies and consolidating the ranks of the national progressive forces and their heroic struggle, coupled with the support of the world revolutionary movement, with the friendly Soviet Union in the van, and the other countries of the socialist world system.

Appendices

. .

APPENDIX A

Egypt's Cabinet in 1978

Head of State

Prime Minister

Deputy Prime Minister, Financial and Economic Affairs,

Minister of Planning

Deputy Prime Minister, War and War Production

Deputy Prime Minister, Production and Energy

Foreign Affairs

Labour and Vocational Training

Social Affairs

Education and Scientific Research

Oil, Industry and Mineral Resources

Irrigation and Land Improvement

Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
Tourism and Civil Aviation

Trade and Supplies

Health Fustice

Waqfs and Al-Azhar Affairs Communications and Transport

Interior

Information and Culture

Finance

People's Assembly Affairs Housing and Reconstruction

State for Youth and Local Administration

State for Foreign Affairs

State

State

Muhammad Anwar Sadat

Mamduh Salim

Abd al-Muhsin Qaysuni

General Muhammad Abd al-Ghani Gamasi

Ahmad Sultan

Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil Saad Muhammad Ahmad

Amal Uthman

Mustafa Kamal Hilmi Ahmad Izz al-Din Hilal Abd al-Azim Abu al-Ata

Ibrahim Shukri Muhibb Ramzi Stino

Zakariyya Tawfiq Abd al-Fattah

Ibrahim Gamil Badran Ahmad Samih Talaat

Muhammad Mitwalli Sharawi Abd al-Sultan Mugahid Muhammad Nabawi Ismail

Abd al-Munim Sawi

Muhammad Salah al-Din Hamid

Ahmad Fuad Mohiaddin

Hasaballa Qafrawi

Muhammad Hamid Mahmud

Butros Butros-Ghali

Ali Salem

Naim Abu Taleb

Changes: May 7

Deputy Prime Minister, Financial and Economic Affairs

Housing

Justice Planning

Agriculture

Post abolished

Ahmad Talaat Tawfiq Ahmad Mamduh Attiya Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Majid

Mahmud Muhammad Daoud

Land Improvement

Foreign Affairs of Sudan

Supply

State for Cabinet Affairs

State for Military Production

Communications and Transport

Ibrahim Shukri

Abd al-Aziz al-Ata

Nassif Tahoun

Issa Shaheen

Abd al-Sattar Mujahid

Naim Talah

New Cabinet: October 4

Prime Minister

Deputy Prime Minister, People's Assembly Affairs

Defense and Military Production

Oil

Economy, Foreign Trade and Economic

Cooperation

Interior

Tourism and Civil Aviation

Social Affairs

Planning

Reconstruction and New Agglomerations

Labour and Vocational Training

Agriculture

Supplies and Domestic Trade

Education, Culture and Scientific Research

Fustice

Land Improvement

Irrigation, State for Sudan Affairs

Transport, Communication and Maritime Transport

Housing

Industry and Mining Resources

Electricity and Energy

Waqfs, State for Al-Azhar Affairs

Health

Finance

State for Foreign Affairs

State for Control and Supervision

State for Cabinet Affairs and Local Administration

State for People's Assembly Affairs

State for Economic Cooperation

State for Housing

State for Military Production

State

Mustafa Khalil

Fikri Makram Ubayd

General Kamal Hasan Ali

Ahmad Izz al-Din Hilal

Hamid Abd al-Latif Sayih

Muhammad Nabawi Ismail

Mahmud Amin Abd al-Hafiz

Amal Uthman

Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Majid

Hasaballah Qafrawi

Saad Muhammad Ahmad

Mahmud Muhammad Daud

Nassif Tahun

Hassan Mahmud Ismail

Ahmad Ali Musa

Tawfiq Ahmad Sharara

Muhammad Abd al-Hadi Samaha

Ali Fahmi Daghistani

Mustafa Mitwalli Hafnawi

Ibrahim Abd al-Rahman Atallah

Mustafa Kamal Sabri

Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Bissar

Mamduh Jabr

Ali Lutfi

Butros Butros-Ghali

Ali Muhammad Salmi

Sulayman Mitwalli

Abd al-Akhar Muhammad Abd al-Akhar

Ali Jamal Nazir

Husni Muhammad Sayyid Ali

Kamal Tawfiq Ahmad Nassar

Muhammad Ukayli

APPENDIX B

Israel's Cabinet in 1978

Head of State

Ephraim Katzir

Prime Minister

Deputy Prime Minister

Defense

Foreign Affairs Interior and Police

Finance

Industry and Commerce

Agriculture Fustice

Education and Culture

Construction and Environment

Energy and Infrastructure

Religious Affairs

Immigrant Absorption

Health

Transport and Communications Labour and Social Betterment

Without Portfolio

Yitzhak Navon (25.5.78)

Menahem Begin (Likud-Herut)

Yigael Yadin (DMC)

Ezer Weizmann (Likud-Herut) Moshe Dayan (Independent)

Yosef Burg (NRP)

Simha Erlich (Likud-Liberal) Yigael Horowitz (Likud-Laam) Ariel Sharon (Likud-Shlom Zion)

Shmuel Tamir (DMC) Zevulum Hammer (NRP) Gideon Patt (Likud-Liberal) Yitzhak Moda'i (Likud-Liberal) Aharon Abu-Hatzeira (NRP) David Levi (Likud-Herut)

Meir Amit (DMC) Yisrael Katz (DMC)

Moshe Nissim (Likud-Liberal)

Eliezer Shostak (Likud-Laam)

CHANGES: JANUARY 10, 1978

Without Portfolio

Haim Landau (Likud-Herut)

September 30, 1978

Resignation of Yigael Horowitz

September 30, 1978

Resignation of Meir Amit

APPENDIX C

Jordan's Cabinet in 1978

Head of State

Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense

Education, State for Cabinet Affairs

Information

Tourism

Fustice

Agriculture

Reconstruction and Development and State for Foreign

Affairs

Labour

Islamic Affairs

Supplies

Interior

Communications and Health

Municipal and Rural Affairs

Culture Finance

Trade and Industry

Public Works

King Husayn ibn Talal

Mudar Badran

Abd al-Salam Majali

Adnan Abu Awda Ghalib Barakat

Ahmad Abd al-Karim

Salah Jumaa

Hasan Ibrahim Issam Ajluni

Kamil Sharif

Marwan Qasim Sulayman Arar

Abd al-Rauf Rawabida

Ibrahim Ayyub

Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf

Muhammad Dabbas Najm al-Din Dajani

Said Binu

APPENDICES 629

APPENDIX D

Syria's Cabinet in 1978

Head of State

Prime Minister

Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs Deputy Prime Minister, Public Services

Defense Interior

Local Administration
Public Works and Water

Euphrates Dam Education

Culture and National Guidance

Justice

Communications

Supply and International Trade Economy and Foreign Trade Social Affairs and Labour

Health Tourism

Higher Education
Housing and Utilities

Industry
Transport
Power
Finance
Information
Agriculture

Oil and Mineral Resources

Wagfs

State for Presidential Affairs State for Cabinet Affairs State for Foreign Affairs State for Planning Affairs

State State State

State

Hafiz Asad

Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi Abd al-Halim Khaddam

Jamil Shaya
Fahmi Yusufi
Mustafa Tlas
Adnan Dabbagh
Taha Khayrat
Nazim Qaddur
Subhi Kahhala
Shakir Fahham
Najah Attar
Adib Nahawi
Umar Sibai

Muhammad Ghubash Muhammad Imadi Anwar Hamada Madani Khiyami Ghassan Dhalhub

Muhammad Ali Hashim Muharram Tayyara Shutaywi Sayfawi Numan Zayn

Ahmad Umar Yusufi

Sadiq Ayyubi

Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad

Ahmad Qabalan Isa Darwish

Abd al-Sattar Sayyid

Adib Milhim

Husayn Ahmad Kuwaydir

Abd al-Karim Aadi George Huraniyya Sharif Qush

Sharif Qush Diya Malluhi

Zuhayr Abd al-Samad

Yusuf Juaydani

New Cabinet: March 30

Prime Minister

Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs Deputy Prime Minister, Public Services

Defense Interior

Local Administration

Supply and International Trade

Euphrates Dam Higher Education

Justice Education Communications

Agriculture and Agrarian Reform

Waqfs

Economy and Foreign Trade

Health
Industry
Information
Finance
Electricity

Culture and National Orientation

Oil and Mineral Resources

Tourism

Housing and Public Services

Public Works and Hydraulic Resources

Transport

Labour and Social Affairs
State for Foreign Affairs
State for Presidential Affairs
State for Cabinet Affairs
State for Planning

State State State

State

Muhammad Ali Halabi Abd al-Halim Khaddam

Jamil Shaya Fahmi Yusufi Mustafa Tlas Adnan Dabbagh Taha Khayrat

Muhammad Ghubash

Subhi Kahhala
Shakir al-Fahham
Adib Nahlawi
Zuhayr Masharqa
Umar Sibai
Ahmad Qabalan
Abd al-Sattar Sayyid
Muhammad Imadi
Madani Khiyami
Shutaywi Sayfawi

Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad

Sadiq Ayyubi

Ahmad Umar Yusufi

Najah Attar Isa Darwish

Ghassan Shalhoub Muharram Tayyara Nazim Qaddur Salim Yassin Yusuf Juwaydini Abd al-Karim Aadi

Adib Milhim Anwar Hamadah George Huraniyya Safwan Qudsi Sharif Qush

Zuhayr Abd al-Samad

Diya Malluhi

APPENDICES 631

APPENDIX E

Palestine Liberation Organization

Executive Committee in 1978

Yasir Arafat (Fatah)

Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah)

Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)

Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar (West Bank)

Adib Abd Rabbu (DFLP)

Abd al-Rahim Ahmad (ALF)

Talal Naji (PFLP-General Command)

Majdi Abu Ramadan (Independent)

Muhammad Nashashibi (Independent)

Ahmad Sidqi Dajani (Independent)

Hamid Abu Sitta (Independent)

Abd al-Jawwad Salih (Independent)

Alfred Tubasi (Independent)

Habib Qahwaji (Independent)

Walid Qamhawi (West Bank)

APPENDIX F

CHRONOLOGY

January

- 1 King Husayn of Jordan and US President Carter hold talks in Tehran; Carter states there is no need for Jordan to join the peace talks at this stage.
- 3–4 Carter visits Saudi Arabia for talks on oil and the Mideast situation; then moves on to Egypt.
- 4 Presidents Sadat and Carter meet in Aswan.
- 4 The PLO's London representative, Said Hamami, is assassinated.
- 11-13 The Egyptian-Israeli Military Commission holds talks in Cairo, but, due to disagreement on Israeli settlements in Sinai and self-determination for Palestinians, these are broken off.
- An American compromise wording on the Political Commission's agenda is accepted by Egypt and Israel.
- 16 US Secretary of State Vance visits Israel and meets Prime Minister Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan.
- 16-17 The Egyptian-Israeli Political Commission meets.
- President Sadat withdraws his delegation from the Egyptian-Israeli Political Commission, leaving the door open for the resumption of negotiations.
- The Israeli cabinet decides to freeze its country's participation in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Commission.
- The Egyptian-Israeli Military Commission resumes talks in Cairo after Israel's cabinet decides it will participate again.

February

- 2-5 The second summit of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front meets in Algiers.
- 3-8 President Sadat of Egypt flies to the US for talks with President Carter.
- 8–11 Sadat visits London, Hamburg and Austria, in which latter city he meets Shimon Peres and Chancellor Kreisky.
- 8-17 Israel's Foreign Minister Dayan visits the United States.
- President Carter agrees to sell \$4.8 billions worth of military planes to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
- Israeli troops and Lebanese rightist militia are reported to be pushing into South Lebanon.
- US Secretary of State for Mideast Affairs and Southern Asia Atherton arrives in the Middle East to discuss a joint declaration of principles with Egypt and Israel; begins his shuttle back and forth between Cairo and Tel Aviv.
- 26-28 British Foreign Minister Owen visits Israel.

March

- 6-9 PLO Chairman Arafat visits Moscow.
- 8 US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton ends his Mideast tour and meets Prince Saud al-Faisal in Geneva.
- Fatah commandos carry out an operation on the Haifa-Tel Aviv highway; in the resulting battle 35 Israelis and 9 fidayin are killed; Weizman interrupts his visit to the US and Prime Minister Begin postpones his visit set for March 12.
- 14–21 Israel invades South Lebanon shelling refugee camps and occupying most of the country south of the Litani river.
- The UN Security Council passes resolution 425 calling for Israel's withdrawal and the installation of UN forces in South Lebanon.
- 19-23 Israel's Prime Minister Begin goes to Washington.
- 25 Egypt's National Security Council meets and decides to continue Sadat's initiative.
- The Arab League Council meeting in Cairo decides to extend the mandate of the ADF in Lebanon.
- 30 UN peacekeeping troops take up positions in South Lebanon.
- 30-31 Weizman meets President Sadat of Egypt in Cairo.

April

- US Secretary of State Vance sends a letter to Congress saying the Israelis may have violated the 1952 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, but that he is not recommending further action.
- President Ceausescu of Rumania visits the United States to try and unblock the Mideast dialogue.
- 11 Israeli troops begin initial stage of a partial withdrawal from Lebanon.
- Lebanon charges that Israeli troops are not withdrawing totally from the South.
- 17 UN Secretary-General Waldheim meets Lebanese President Sarkis and PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat in Beirut, then leaves for Israel to discuss the question of withdrawal from Lebanon.
- US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton arrives in Cairo for talks with Egyptian leaders.
- 25 Atherton returns to the US with a message from President Sadat to President Carter.
- 30 Israel's Prime Minister Begin visits the US.

May

- The UN Security Council votes to increase the UNIFIL contingent from 4,000 to 6,000.
- 9 US Secretary of State Vance offers Israel 20 additional F-15's in an attempt to get agreement on the joint arms sale.
- 10-14 PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat makes a tour of the Arab Gulf countries.
- The US Senate passes the project for the sale of 200 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.
- 20-21 The PLO Central Council meets in Damascus.

- The mayor of Bethlehem announces he has been officially informed that 80,000 acres of Arab land belonging to Palestinians living abroad will be confiscated.
- The Israeli Supreme Court orders a temporary halt to work on a new Jewish settlement in the West Bank in order to consider an appeal by Arabs that this land was illegally expropriated by the military for settlement purposes. [The settlement was later constructed at another site].

June

- Dayan submits his document on the future of the West Bank involving Jordan in its administration.
- The Israeli cabinet meets to discuss a questionnaire submitted by the US on Israel's position on the West Bank.
- 7 Gush Emunim calls for the confiscation of more Arab land for settlement.
- 13 Israeli forces withdraw from South Lebanon handing over some positions to UN forces and the rest to Saad Haddad's forces.
- 14 UN Secretary-General Waldheim criticizes Israel for turning over evacuated areas in South Lebanon to rightist militia groups.
- The Israeli government's reply to the American questionnaire says that after 5 years of administrative autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza the nature of future relations will be considered.
- Egypt rejects Israel's negative reply.

 West Bank notables state: The Israeli reply offers no solution to the Palestinian problem.
- 25 Israel rejects the Egyptian proposals concerning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- 29 Israel's Prime Minister Begin calls on Sadat to resume direct negotiations.
- 30 US Vice President Mondale visits Israel and asserts: "The United States will never abandon Israel."

July

- 3 US Vice President Mondale and President Sadat meet in Alexandria.
- 9 A Sadat-Kreisky-Brandt-Peres meeting takes place in Vienna.
- 7–15 The 31st meeting of the OAU's Council of Ministers is held in Khartum to be followed on July 18–22 by the 16th Regular Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.
- 10-13 Sadat meets twice with UN Secretary-General Waldheim at Fuschl Castle, near Salzburg.
- 18–19 A tripartite conference is held at Leeds castle with the participation of the foreign ministers of Egypt, Israel and the US.
- 22-30 US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton visits Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt.
- 23 Israel refuses to return al-Arish to Egypt.
- 25-30 The conference of foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries meets in Belgrade.
- 26 The Israeli Military Commission is expelled from Cairo.
- 30-31 Saudi Crown Prince Fahd visits Egypt and Syria respectively.

APPENDICES 635

August

- 1-2 Saudi Crown Prince Fahd visits Iraq and Jordan.
- 2 US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton leaves Cairo for Tel Aviv.
- The PLO's Paris representative, Izzadin Qalaq, is assassinated.
- 5-7 US Secretary of State Vance visits Israel and Egypt for talks on the Middle East situation.
- 8 US President Carter announces a tripartite Egypt-Israel-US meeting to take place at Camp David on September 5.
- 10 Atherton meets Fahd in Saudi Arabia.
- 11 Saudi Arabia announces its support for the Camp David summit.
- A series of operations is initiated in Israel. In two weeks, 16 bomb attacks or attempted attacks take place.
- 12 Atherton meets King Husayn in Amman.
- 19-21 PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat visits Syria and Saudi Arabia.
- The Palestine Central Council holds an open session in Damascus on the theme: National Unity.
- For the first time since June '76 a PFLP delegation visits Damascus.
- 29-31 Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam visits Moscow.

September

- 5 The Camp David summit opens.
- Two bomb attacks in Jerusalem are claimed by the PLO, with more attacks on the 8th, 9th and 16th.
- President Sadat telephones King Husayn, presumably to discuss the negotiations.
- At the White House, US President Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egypt's President Sadat sign two accords agreed upon at Camp David, the first covering the future of the West Bank and Gaza and the second covering the Sinai and bilateral relations and calling for the conclusion of a treaty within 3 months.
- 18–25 Reaction to the Camp David accords: rejection by PLO, Syria (18), Libya, Iraq, Algeria (19), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, North Yemen (20), Saudi Arabia (19), support from Morocco (19).
- 19 Egypt's cabinet approves the Camp David agreements.
- Strikes and demonstrations break out in the West Bank and Gaza against the Camp David agreements.
- 20–23 The third summit conference of the Confrontation Front (Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and the PLO) is held in Damascus: condemnation of the Camp David agreements; measures against Egypt; institutionalization of the Front.
- The US publishes 9 letters signed by the parties to the Camp David agreements which are considered as accompanying them. A tenth letter from US Defence Secretary Brown to Israeli Defence Minister Weizman is published later.
- 20-24 US Secretary of State Vance makes a Mideast tour to clarify the agreements to Arab heads of state: Amman (20), Riyadh and Dahran (21-23), Damascus (24).

- US Assistant Secretary of State Atherton visits Kuwait.
 King Husayn calls for "basic changes" to the Camp David agreements.
- 24 The Israeli cabinet votes by 11 to 2 (3 absent) to approve the Camp David accords.
- 26 Atherton visits Amman.
- 28 The Knesset approves the Camp David agreements (84 to 19 with 17 abstentions).
- Atherton visits Tel Aviv; the majority of the West Bank mayors boycott a meeting with him.
- 30 Atherton visits Cairo.

October

- 2 Iraq's Prime Minister Saddam Husayn goes to Saudi Arabia.
- 5-6 President Asad of Syria visits Moscow.
- 8 Damascus agrees to a summit conference in Baghdad.
- 12 Egyptian-Israeli negotiations begin at Blair House, Washington.
- 16-22 US Assistant Secretary of State Saunders on a tour of the Middle East arrives in Amman with US clarifications to a questionnaire on Camp David submitted by King Husayn.
- Presidents Asad of Syria and Bakr of Iraq sign a "Charter for Joint National Action" in Baghdad.
- 27 US President Carter and Saudi King Khalid hold talks in Washington.
- The Arab foreign ministers' conference opens in Baghdad.

November

- 2-5 The Arab summit conference opens in Baghdad (20 states and the PLO) to discuss Arab unity and a policy to confront Camp David.
- 2 US President Carter and Israel's Prime Minister Begin meet in New York.
- 4 President Sadat of Egypt refuses to receive a delegation from the Arab summit.
- 5 The Arab summit in Baghdad rejects the Camp David agreements.
- 6 The Arab League decides not to hold meetings in Cairo because of Sadat's initiative.
- US officials deny that Carter had given Sadat any guarantees on the future of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza.
- 21 Sadat recalls his delegate at Blair House to Cairo due to difficulties in the talks.
- 29 Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil goes to Washington with a message to Carter and Begin from Sadat.

December

- An Israel-US agreement is signed under which Israel will receive \$785 m to help rebuild foreign exchange reserves and reduce short term indebtedness.
- 10-14 US Secretary of State Vance shuttles between Cairo and Jerusalem but fails in his task due to Israel's rejection of Egypt's peace proposals.

APPENDICES 637

- Prime Minister Begin recalls the Israeli Military Commission from the Blair House negotiations.
- 20 Israeli air attacks are directed at Palestinian refugee camps around Tyre.
- Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil meets with Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan and Secretary Vance in Brussels, with no positive results.
- 27 Algerian President Boumedienne dies.
- Begin pledges that new settlements will continue to be established in the West Bank.



f = following page
ff = following two pages
n = footnote
pass. (passim) = intermittent references
italicized page numbers in personal entries
indicate quoted statements.

447f, 471

Abbas, Mahmoud, 323 Abd al-Assali, 69, 71, 76 Abe, Mr. 340f Abin, Maj. Gen. Rais, 4 Abna al-Balad, 450–453 Abourezk, Sen. James, 243f Abu Ammar, see Arafat, Yasir Abu Ayyad, see Khalaf, Salah "Abu Daoud affair", 233 Abu Lutf, see Qaddumi, Faruq ADF, see Arab Deterrent Forces "administrative autonomy" plan as seen in Camp David accords, 329, 330, 333f, 337-340 pass. viewed by: Allon, 402f; Arafat, 407, 565, 611f; Asad, 417, 571; Avneri, 364; Begin, 185, 253ff, 284, 400f; Dayan, 276f, 372; Eban, 205ff; Egypt, 473, 503, 544f, 549; Goldmann, 320; Husayn (King), 410ff, 533; Israel, 139f, 298f, 372f, 382ff, 396; Israeli Communist Party, 187ff; Israeli Labour Alignment, 348f; Jordan, 557f, 560f; Khalaf (Karim), 508f; Khalaf (Salah), 577f; PLO, 504, 556, 617; Rognoni, 224; Sadat, 603; Saunders, 355f; UK, 231; USA, 191, 250, 373, 375ff, 396; West Bank Mayors, 537, 596; West Bank trade unionists, 615 "administrative detention", 270ff Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of, policy towards: Palestine question, 141f, 391; peace settlement, 142, 391; PLO, 142, 391 Ahmad, Ahmad Iskandar, 428f, 476f, 567 Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of, 9, 114, 181, 196, 197, 422, 433, 454 joint communiqués with: Libya, 47lf; USSR, 198ff, 377f policy towards: Camp David accords, 378; Egypt, 199, 378, 446ff, 472; Horn of Africa, 199; Lebanon, 471; oil, 448; Palestinian rights, 199, 378, 447f, 471; peace settlement, 199, 378; southern Africa, 199; Steadfastness

Algiers Sixth Arab Summit Conference, 421, 423, 448, 531, 537, 551, 592, 593 Algiers, see also under Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front Allon, Yigael, 402ff Allon Plan, 276, 403f Amnesty International, report on "administrative detention", 270ff Angola, 181, 537 Agaba, Gulf of, 335, 385, 386, 522 Arab communist and workers' parties, political statements by, 458ff, 618-621 Arab (Joint) Defence Agreement, 523, 576, 602 Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon, 327, 362, 492, 573, 591 extension of mandate, 449, 461 viewed by, Beit al-Din conference, 561f; Fatah, 552; Huss, 488; Lebanon, 581; PLO, 556; Sarkis, 473ff, 607f; Syria, 429, 476f; USA, 362 "Arabistan", 434 Arab-Italian Friendship League, 223 Arab Liberation Front, 466n "Arab reaction", 466f Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front Algiers summit/ministerial conferences, 323, 369, 422ff, 433, 435, 437, 444, 455ff, 469, 471 Damascus summit/ministerial conferences, 369, 370, 388, 430, 444f, 448, 509-512, 514-520, 553f, 620 policy of, towards: Camp David accords, 516f; Lebanon, 444f, 456, 518; Palestinian cause, 422ff, 444f, 456, 515, 516-519; Sadat initiative, 422ff, 444f, 456, 516f; Syria, 424, 456, 518f; USSR, 423, 457, 515; Western Sahara,

Front, 199, 447f; UN peacekeeping forces

in Lebanon, 471; Western Sahara, 199,

proposed contribution of, to Egypt fund, 541

Socialist Vanguard Party of, 460

456

Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (cont'd) Tripoli summit conference, 361, 407, 411, 417, 422, 423, 427, 430, 435, 437, 444 viewed by: Algeria, 447f; Arab CP's/workers' parties, 459f, 620; Arafat, 407, 561; Asad, 417; Bikdash, 435; Fatah, 551; GDR, 369; Hawatmeh, 537; Husayn (King), 411; Palestinian resistance groups, 467; PLO, 381, 427, 469; Qadhafi, 430; Syria, 369, 370, 428ff, 443, 472, 553f, 610; USSR, 370, 381 Arab summit conferences, see under Algiers, Baghdad, Cairo, Rabat, Riyadh Arabs in Israel, conditions of, 450–453 Arafat, Yasir, 13, 14, 136, 180, 268, 284, 319, 387, 407f, 422, 424, 449f, 455, 471, 491ff, 511f, 538, 547, 564ff, 573, 574, 575, 594f, 611-615 meetings with: Iraqi leadership, 595; King Husayn, 595 message from, to Carter, 217f viewed by: Avneri, 365f; Findley, 215-218, 390f; Goldmann, 320; Husayn (King), 410; Qadhafi, 432f visits of, to: GDR, 238f; Jordan, 566; USSR, 235-238, 381f al-Arish, 335, 482, 483 al-Arish-Ras Muhammad Line, 336, 521f, 548, 550 Armenian cause, 580 Asad, Hafiz, 138, 191, 225, 292, 322, 374, 414-418, 422, 434f, 453, 454, 475, 485, 487, 497– 501, 509ff, 568f, 569–572 letter from, to al-Bakr, 554 tour by, of Arab Gulf states, 428 visits by, to: FRG, 326ff, 497-501; GDR, 368f; Iraq, 567ff; USSR, 370f, 429, 434f Aswan, 187, 190, 192, 197, 479 Atherton, Alfred (Roy), 206, 213, 222, 236, 260-266, 300, 534 Australia, 101 policy towards Middle East settlement, 343ff Austria, 101, 476 policy towards Middle East settlement, 235f, 301f. See also Kreisky initiative Avneri, Uri, 363–368 Aziz, Tariq, 568 Badran, Mudar, 275, 609

Balfour declaration, 128, 141 "Bantustan", autonomy plan likened to, 407 Barnawi, Fatima 44, 69, 70f Basque problem, 360 Begin, Menahem, 47, 50, 75, 114, 124, 130, 184ff, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 196, 197, 200, 201ff, 204, 207, 209, 210, 224, 250, 251, 253-256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 280-285, 302, 319, 320, 321, 322, *325f*, 329, *330f*, 338, 340, *342f*, *374*, *398–402*, 418, 430, 457, 463 letters from, to Carter, attached to Camp David accords, 336, 337 viewed by: Allon, 403f; Arafat, 407, 564; Avneri, 363f, 367f; Brzezinski, 195; Hassan II, 473, 604; Husayn (King), 409-412 pass; Khalaf (Salah), 470, 578; PLO, 462; Sadat, 477–483 pass., 602f Begin plan, see "administrative autonomy" plan Beit al-Din conference, 591f viewed by: Arafat, 566; PLO, 573, 583; Sarkis, 607f, 610 Belgium, 223 Benin, 6, 17 Benyahya, Muhammad, 198 Bernadotte, Count, 117 Bhutan, 164 Bikdash, Khalid, 435ff Blair House talks, 373f, 384f Blum, Yehuda, 133–141 Bohte, Borut, 77 Bolivia, 7, 10, 13, 14 Botswana, 164 Boumedienne, Hawari, 173, 196, 422, 446ff, 457 visits of, to USSR, 198ff, 377f "Boumedienne Doctrine", viewed by Socialist International, 473 Bouteflika, Abdel Aziz, 198 Baghdad summit/ministerial conferences, 381, 386, Brandt, Willy, 478, 479 388, 575, 580–584, 584–594 draft documents on Middle East prepared by, delegation from, to Sadat, 600f

resolution of, 592ff

Syria, 610

letter from, to Sadat, 592

Bahamas, 164

594

viewed by: Arab CP's/workers' parties, 620;

Arafat, 566, 595, 614; FRG, 389; Huss,

599ff; Jordan, 610; Khalaf (Salah), 576; Kuwait, 601f; Lebanon, 608; PLO, 123f,

610, 617; Sadat, 598f; Saudi Arabia, 596f;

Bahrain, policy towards Middle East conflict, 531

al-Bakr, Ahmad Hasan, 554, 567, 568, 584–588,

with Kreisky, 302f, 358f
Brazil, policy towards Middle East settlement, 350
Brezhnev, Leonid, 189, 196, 225ff, 237, 323, 382, 548
Brookings Report, 367
Brown, Harold, 273f
letter from, to Weizman, 354
Bulgaria, 385
Butrus, Fuad, 478f, 487
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 189, 192–196, 210f
"bye-bye PLO" statement by, 193f, 491, 564,

CAABU, see Council for the Advancement...

agreement, viewed by: Khalaf (Salah), 573; Lebanese National Movement, 470f; de Murville, 379; Sarkis, 474. *See also* Palestinian presence in Lebanon, Shtura agreement Arab summit conference (1976), 473, 514

viewed by: Beit al-Din, 561f; Lebanon, 581, 591; PLO, 572f

Callaghan, James, 197f, 201, 341

Camp David accords

566, 612

A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 332-335

Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, 335f letters attached to, 336, 337, 345, 346, 354, 502, 503

viewed by: Algeria, 378; Allon, 403f; Arab CP's/workers' parties, 618ff; Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, 514-518 pass.; Arafat, 564ff, 595, 611, 614; Australia, 343ff; Baghdad summit, 592ff; Begin, 325f, 330f, 342f; Brazil, 350; Bulgaria, 386; Canada, 350f; Carter, 321f, 329f, 337-340, 373; Czechoslovakia, 386; Dayan, 371; DFLP, 536; Egypt, see Sadat below; Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping, 520–526; Egyptian Revolutionary Council, 538ff; EEC, 144f, 341; Fatah, 551f; Findley, 390; France, 342, 381; FRG, 351f, 388f; GDR, 369, 386, 388; Ghali, 493ff; Hassan II, 604; Hungary, 386; Huss, 599, 601; India, 353, 370; Iraq, 540f, 585ff, 592; Israel, 139f, 396, 398–402 pass.; Israeli Labour Alignment, 347–350; Japan, 341; Jordan, 507f, 532– 536, 557ff, 560f, 588f, 610; Khalaf (Salah),

575-580; Kuwait, 509; Lebanon, 487, 506, 581; Libya, 555f, 589f; de Murville, 381; Netherlands, 391; Oman, 527f; Palestinians under occupation, 508f, 529f, 537f, 562f, 595f, 615; PFLP, 505f; PLO, 120–125, 381f, 490, 491, 502ff, 511f, 528, 556f, 582f, 610, 616f; Poland, 386; Qatar, 530f; Rumania, 145; Sadat, 502, 541–551, 598f, 602f; Saiqa, 526f; Sarkis, 608; Saudi Arabia, 489, 506f, 584, 596f; Saunders, 354-358; Sudan, 563f; Sweden, 352f; Syria, 369, 370, 497-501 pass.; 510, 552f, 570ff, 610; Tunisia, 512; UAE, 513; UK, 341; UN Secretary-General, 114; USA, 375ff; USSR, 346, 352, 370, 378, 381f; Vance, 396f; West Bank/Gaza bodies, see Palestinians... above; Yadin, 382ff; Yemen Arab Republic, 513; Yemen Democratic Republic, 519f

Canada, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 101 policy towards Middle East settlement, 350f Capucci, Archbishop Hilarion, 19 Carter, Hodding, 242

Carter, Jimmy, 121, 122, 185, 186, 187, 190f, 192, 200, 201, 202, 203, 207f, 209, 235, 239f, 245, 252, 259f, 262, 263, 265, 269, 279, 280, 285, 299f, 303, 304, 320, 321f, 325, 329f, 330, 331, 336, 337–340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 348, 350, 352, 353, 354, 355, 358, 361, 370, 373f, 389, 442, 443, 457, 493, 551

letters from, to Sadat/Begin attached to Camp David accords, 345f

viewed by: Arafat, 450, 491, 611; Avneri, 367; Hassan II, 603f; Oman, 528; PLO, 462; Sadat, 480ff, 495, 502, 542, 603

visits of, to Middle East, 187, 190f, 192, 460f Castro, Fidel, 274

CBU's, see cluster bombs below

Ceausescu, Nicolai, 127, 266ff, 319, 320, 387

Chamoun, Camille, 430, 579

China, People's Republic of, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 286, 492

policy statements by, 142–144, 228

relations with PLO, 595

viewed by: Egypt, 495; PLO, 420 Churchill White Paper on Palestine, 319

cluster bombs, used by Israel in South Lebanon, 243f, 245, 273, 612

Colombia, 120

Congo, 269

Council for the Advancement of Arab British Understanding, 595f

joint committees with Israel, 114, 200, Egyptian Cuba, 181, 274 condemns Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, withdrawal from, 418, 480f. Viewed by: Israel, 201ff; USA, 203 July 23 Revolutionary Council of military involvement of, in Africa, viewed by: Hawatmeh, 537; Qadhafi, 433; Ribicoff, 287 memorandum from, to Sadat on Camp David, 538ff Cyprus, 3, 18, 273 viewed by Arafat 565 Czechoslovakia, 7, 11, 14 joint communiqué with Yugoslavia on Middle National Progressive Unionist Grouping of analysis by, of Camp David accords, 520-526 East, 245 viewed by Arafat, 565 policy statement by, 386 People's Assembly of, 413, 419, 439, 538 Sadat's post-Camp David address to, 541–551 Day of the Land, 256f, 450 Dayan, 47, 75, 130, 191, 206f, 209, 213, 221, policy, see next two main entries proposals by, for peace treaty with Israel, 266, *276f*, *307f*, *371ff*, 418 viewed by: Israel, 395f; Sadat, 602f demilitarized zones/demilitarization, see under Sinai, relations with USSR, viewed by Socialist Inter-West Bank/Gaza national, 183 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, scholarships given by, for Palestinian refugees, 137, 466n statements by Secretary-general of, 536f sovereignty of, over Sinai, see under Sinai Desai, Morarji, 370 DFLP, see Democratic Front... above workers from, in other Arab countries, 523 Egypt, policy towards Dhofar, 269 administrative autonomy plan, 473, 503, 544f, disengagement agreements: (Egyptian-Israeli), 110f viewed by: Ghali, 493; Hawatmeh, 536; (Syrian-549, 603 Israeli), 101, 110f, 415, 416. See also, UNDOF, Baghdad summit conference, 598f Camp David summit/accords, 493ff, 502, 541-UNEF, UNTSO 551, 602f Dir Yasin, 320 EEC, 414 Djibuti, 164 Geneva Conference, 464, 485 Djuranovic, Veselin, 275 Doronjski, Stevan, 205 Israel, 425, 478, 602f Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, 439f Draia, Ahmad, 198 Israeli settlements, 18, 426, 473, 502 Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, East Germany, see Germany, Democratic Republic 413, 418f, 426, 464, 473, 484f, 493, 542-551 pass. Eban, Abba ,205f ECWA, see United Nations Economic Commission Jerusalem, 503 joint political committee with Israel, 418f for Western Asia Jordan, 426, 473, 503, 544 EEC, see European Economic Community Palestinian rights, 413f, 418f, 426, 440f, 462, Egypt 464, 473, 479, 485, 503, 544, 546f, 598 arms sales to, by USA, viewed by: Begin, Palestinian state, 426, 494 280ff; Bikdash, 435f; Brzezinski, 211; Carter, peace settlement, 413f, 418f, 425f, 440ff, 462ff, 207; Sadat, 603; Syria, 428; US House 473, 478f, 480ff, 493ff, 542-551 pass. International Relations Committee members, PLO, 414, 547 235; Vance, 211f; 218-223, 277f Rabat summit resolutions, 547 Communist Party of, 437f, 460, 618f Sinai, 480ff, 484, 493, 502, 548, 598 economic situation in, viewed by: Iraq, 540; UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, 440ff July 23 Revolutionary Council, 539 UN Security Council Resolution 242, 413, 418, food riots (January 1977) in, 437 425, 484, 544 fund proposed for, by Iraq, 541 USA, 414, 426f, 484, 493, 495, 550 invited by Baghdad summit to renounce Camp USSR, 548 David accords, 593

House International Relations Committee

West Bank/Gaza Strip, 473, 479, 484, 503, 544, 546, 598, 603 Egypt, policy viewed by: Algeria, 199, 378, 472; Arab CP's/workers' parties, 459f, 618ff; Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, 422ff, 456, 514-518 pass.; Avneri, 361f; Baghdad summit, 592f; Bikdash, 436; Egyptian Communist Party, 436f; Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping, 520–526 pass.; Egyptian Revolutionary Council, Hassan II, 604; Israel, 139f, 201, 202f, 204, 206f, 254f, 280–284, 299, 325f, 330f; Israeli Communist Party, 188f; Italian Communist Party, 324; Jordan, 409f, 507f, 532ff; Khalaf (Salah), 575-580 pass.; Libya, 472; Nigeria, 132; Palestinian resistance organizations, 466f; PLO, 120–125, 237, 407, 475f, 490, 502ff, 528, 557, 582f; Qadhafi, 430-433 pass.; Rognoni, 223f; Rumania, 266f; Socialist International, 174; Sudan, 563; Syria, 370, 414-417, 497f, 510, 552f, 570ff; Tito, 234; UK, 197f, 229ff; USA, 190, 200, 203, 210f, 219f, 241, 260-266 pass., 288, 321f, 329f, 337ff, 373; USSR, 196, 199, 226, 237, 240, 323, 370, 378. See also main entry Sadat initiative Eliav, Lova, 365f Equatorial Guinea, 164 Erskine, Maj. Gen. Emmanuel, 12, 13 Ethiopia, 197, 199, 208, 274, 287, 433, 537 Euro-Arab Dialogue, 327, 392–396, 610 European Economic Community policy towards: Camp David accords, 144f, 351; Israel, 144, 327; Lebanon, 272, 351; Palestinian rights, 144f; 351, 392; peace settlement, 144f, 272, 327, 351f, 392; UNIFIL, 272, 353; UN Security Council Resolution 242, 144, 327, 351, 392 policy viewed by: Egypt, 414, 495; Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping, 525; Mitterand, 324; Socialist International, 183 trade relations with Arab countries, 327 Eytan, Rafael, 511 F-5E American combat plane sale of, to Egypt, 207f, 218ff, 277f

viewed by: Sadat, 603; Syria, 428

sale of, to Saudi Arabia, viewed by: Begin,

281f; Brzezinski, 211; Ribicoff, 287f; US

F-15 American combat plane

sale of, to Israel, 235, 277f

members, 235; Vance, 218f, 251, 277f use of, by Israel in South Lebanon, 244, 449, F-16 American combat plane, sale of, to Israel, 218, 235, 278f, 428 Fahd Bin Abdel Aziz (Crown Prince), 460ff, 489, 596f Fahmi, Ismail, 457f resignation of, 525 Fahum, Khalid, 490 meets Badran, 609f al-Fajr, 71 Fall, Medoune, 115 FAO, see UN Food and Agriculture Organisation Fatah, 300, 365, 366 joint communiqué with USSR, 323 policy statement on Camp David accords, 551f policy viewed by: Arafat, 492; Israel, 136f; other Palestinian resistance organizations, 466f; Socialist International, 179f Faysal, King, 597 al-Faysal, Saud, 583f Fiji, contribution to UNIFIL, 13f Findley, Sen. Paul, 361, 612 views on PLO/Palestine question, 215-218, 390f Forum, 366 France, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14 Foreign Trade Company of, 234 policy towards: Camp David accords, 342, 381; Lebanon, 379ff; Middle East peace settlement, 342, 379ff policy viewed by: Egypt, 495; Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping, 525; Mitterand, 233f; Rognoni, 223; Sarkis, 605f, 609 Socialist Party of, Middle East policy, 233f Franco-Arab Solidarity Association, 233 Franco-Israeli Friendship Society, 233 Franjieh, Sulayman, 139, 579 Franjieh, Tony, murder of, by Phalangists, 492 Fraser, Malcolm, 343ff FRG, see Germany, Federal Republic of Fukuda, 328, 341

Gabon, 7, 10, 14
Gamasi, Muhammad Abd al-Ghani, 480
Gaza/Gaza Strip, see under occupied territories,
West Bank/Gaza
GDR, see German Democratic Republic

Hammad, Adnan, assassination of, 490

Hammadi, Sa'dun, 567f Gemayel, Amin, 574, 578, 580 Hammami, Said Geneva Conventions (1949), 16, 36, 75f, 104, assassination of, 189, 218, 476, 490 105, 150ff, 220, 310, 311, 315 meeting with Avneri, 365 Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East Hammer, Zevulun, 48 viewed by: Arafat, 216; Atherton, 264; Brze-Harriman, Mr. 129-132 zinski, 210f; Egypt, 464, 485; Fahmi, 457f; Hassan II, King of Morocco, 178, 435, 472f, 603f Husayn, (King), 409, 411, 413; Israeli Communist Party, 188f; Khalaf (Salah), 575; Qad-Hawatmeh, Nayef, 536f Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation dumi, 216; Saunders, 496; Socialist International, 182; Syria, 414-417 pass., 499; UN in Europe, 208 Holy See, 164 Secretary-General, 3, 109ff; USSR, 196f, 205, Honecker, Erich, 238, 386f 210, 226, 237, 240, 352; Yugoslavia, 209 Genscher, Hans Dietrich, 291f, 388f Hormuz Straits, 286 Horn of Africa, 197, 199, 245, 275 German Democratic Republic joint communiqués with: PLO, 238f; Syria, Hua Guo-feng, 228 Hungary, 386 368f policy towards Middle East settlement/Palestine Husayn, Adnan, 627f Husayn Bin Talal, King of Jordan, 178, 206, 229, question, 238f, 369, 387 Germany, Federal Republic of, 7, 10, 14, 233, 322, 375, 382, 409-413, 532-536, 557-560,588f 476, 501 meeting with Arafat, 595 economic ties with Syria, 327 viewed by: Arafat, 491f; Carter, 191; Israel, policy statements on Middle East, 291f, 326f, 371f; Khalaf (Salah), 576f; Qadhafi, 433; 388f scholarships donated by, for Palestinian refugees, Sadat, 547, 603 Husayn, Rashid, 450f Husayn, Saddam, 567, 568, 569, 595 statement by, at UN Gen. Assembly for EEC, Husayn, Sherif of Mecca, 141 144f Huss, Salim, 455, 470, 485-489, 506, 573, 580, Ghali, Butrus, 493ff 599ff Gidi pass, 231 heads Baghdad summit delegation to Sadat, 600f Gierek, Edvard, 277 meetings with: Arafat, 471; Asad, 485, 487 Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry, 196, 342, 414 Golan Heights, 6, 48, 50, 410 Ibrahim, Izzat, 568 viewed by Asad, 498 Ibrahimi, Ahmad Talib, 198 see also under occupied territories ICRC, see International Committee of the Red Gonzalez, Felipe, 360 Cross Goldmann, Nahum, 472 IDF, see Israel Defence Forces views on Palestine question, 319f ILO, see International Labour Organization Gromyko, 176, 198, 236 India, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 595 Grueneberg, Gerhard, 238 policy statements on Middle East conflict/ de Guiringaud, Louis, 379, 606 Gulf, security of oil routes in, viewed by Ribicoff, Palestine question, 127ff, 353, 370 Indonesia, joint communiqué with Yugoslavia on 285f Middle East, 205 Gur, Gen. Mordecai, 118, 241f, 564 Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Orga-Gush Emunim, 46, 48, 50, 209 nization, 95 Guyer, Roberto, 14, 110, 112, 470 Inter-Parliamentary Union, resolution on Middle East conflict, 328f Haaretz, 70, 79 International Atomic Energy Agency, 95 Habash, Dr. George, 180 International Committee of the Red Cross, reports Haddad, Saad, 470, 497 of activities in the occupied territories, 68, 69, 76 Hamengkubovono, 205

International Labour Organization, 95

Gaza, 254, 329, 333, 334, 343, 355, 412, 473,

International Telecommunications Union, 95 Iran, 101, 211, 286 contribution of, to UNIFIL, 12ff Sattar League (opposition movement) of, 269 viewed by: Arafat, 566; Hassan II, 604; Qadhafi, 434 Iraq, 10, 11, 18, 128, 196 Baath Party of, 541 calls for Arab summit conference in Baghdad, 540f Charter of Joint National Action with Syria, 567ff, 590, 610, 620 invites Egypt to withdraw from Camp David accords, 540f, 585, 592 involvement in Lebanon clashes, 492 military capabilities of, viewed by: Brzezinski, 211; Israel, 214; Ribicoff, 286f PLO memorandum to, over assassinations, 476 policy towards: Camp David accords, 540f, 585ff, 592; Egypt, 540f, 585ff, 592; Palestinian rights, 541, 585; Syria, 540, 567f policy viewed by: Arab CP's/workers' parties, 459; Arafat, 492, 595; Bikdash, 453f; Carter, 191; PLO, 470, 476, 490; Socialist International, 173, 181; Syria, 429, 543f proposes Arab fund for Egypt, 541 rapprochement with Syria, viewed by: Arab CP's/workers' parties, 620; Arafat, 595; Asad, 564, 570; Khaddam, 610; Khalaf (Salah), 575; Libya, 590; Syrian Baath Party National Command, 554 relations with PLO, 492, 566, 595 terrorism practised by, condemned by PLO, 490 Ireland, 101 contribution to UNIFIL, 13f Islamabad, PLO officials assassinated in, 490 Ismail, Abd al-Fattah, 422 Israel arms sales to, by US 218ff, 235, 277ff, 428 Communist Party of, 450 policy statement, 187–190, conditions of Arab citizens of, 450-453 Defence Forces, 241 internal political scene, viewed by Avneri, 363 - 368invasion by, of South Lebanon, see main entry Israeli invasion... Labour Alignment of, 173ff, 184, 301 policy statements by, 205f, 347–350

military presence/government in West Bank/

Likud, 186, 363

484f, 596 policy, see next two main entries settlements established by, in occupied territory, see main entry Israeli settlements use of U.S. weapons in South Lebanon, 243f, 245, 259f, 273f, 612 withdrawal by, from: Lebanon; occupied territories; Sinai, see under individual entries US commitment to security of, 308f, 355f Israel, policy towards "administrative autonomy", 139f, 185, 253ff, 284, 298f, 372f, 400f Camp David accords/summit, 139f, 325f, 398ff, 402 Egypt, 201ff exchange of ambassadors with Egypt, 400 ICRC, 69 Jerusalem, 202, 276, 337 Jordan, 185, 206, 372f Lebanon, 241f, 246ff, 371f Palestinian rights, 184ff, 204, 214, 255, 280f, peace settlement, 131-140 pass., 201, 254f, 325f peace treaty with Egypt, 395f, 398f PLO, 133–139, 186, 372 settlements, 186, 202, 214, 254, 326, 336 Syria, 186 U.S. arms sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 281f West Bank/Gaza, 139f, 185, 204, 206, 254ff, 276f, 283, 299, 326, 372f, 400f Israel, policy viewed by: Abna al-Balad, 450-453; Afghanistan, 142; Algeria, 446f; Arafat, 449f, 612ff; Avneri, 363ff; Bahrein, 531; China, 142ff; Egypt, 418, 425f, 440f, 462, 464, 473, 478ff, 484f, 492, 494, 548, 605; Egyptian Communist Party, 437f; Fahmi, 457f; Fatah, 323; GDR, 369; Goldmann, 319f; Hawatmeh, 537; Husayn (King), 410f; ICRC, 69; Israeli Communist Party, 187f; Israeli Labour Alignment, 257f, 347ff; Italian Communist Party, 323f; Jordan, 588f; Kreisky, 302; Lebanon, 496f, 581; Morocco, 473; Nigeria, 129ff; Non-aligned movement,

289, 310–315; OAU, 303; PLO, 407f, 427, 460ff, 491ff, 556; Rumania, 126; Saudi

Arabia, 438, 461, 584; Socialist International,

178; Spanish Socialist Party, 359f; Sweden, 132; Syria, 369, 370f, 434, 497ff, 572, 610;

Tlass, 453ff; UNESCO, 167ff; UN Gen.

Israel, policy viewed by: (cont'd)

Assembly, 148, 154, 159f; UN Palestinian rights committee, 115–120; UNRWA, 80f; UN Secretary-General, 103; UN Special Committee, 37-78 pass.; USA, 265; USSR, 323, 352, 370f. See also next main entry.

Israeli invasion of South Lebanon (March, 1978), viewed by: Abourezk, 243f; Algeria, 471; Arab CP's/workers' parties, 458; Arab Steadfastness Front, 444f, 456; Arafat, 449f, 492f, 564f, 594, 612; Butrus, 438f; China, 143, 228; Cuba, 249, 279; Czechoslovakia, 245; EEC, 272; Egypt, 439–442; Ethiopia, 274; Fatah, 323; GDR, 239; Gur, 241f; IDF, 241; Iranian Sattar League, 269; Jordan, 275; Lebanese National Movement, 443f, 470; Lebanon, 471, 496; Libya, 471; McCloskey, 245; Non-aligned Movement, 289, 311; OAU, 303; PLO, 239, 468, 470, 471, 472, 505, 511; Sarkis, 445, 474f, 514; Saudi Arabia, 438; Syria, 227, 442f; Tlass, 453ff; UN Palestinian rights committee, 116f; UN Secretary-General, 3, 102f; UN Security Council, 10–14, 156; UNTSO, 6–9; USA, 242, 259, 260, 265f, 273f, 361f; USSR, 227, 243, 323; Weizman, 246ff; West Bank Mayors, 445f; Yugoslavia, 245, 275, 301. See also Lebanon, Israeli withdrawal from, and UNIFIL

Israeli settlements in Sinai, see under Sinai Israeli settlements in West Bank/Gaza/Golan

budgets for, 49 map of, 72f

viewed by: Begin, 185, 203, 326; Dayan, 372; Egypt, 426, 463, 484, 494; GDR, 239; Israeli Cabinet, 214f; Israeli Communist Party, 190; Jordan, 412, 533, 560f, 588; Non-aligned movement, 310ff; OAU, 303; Peres, 347; PLO, 427; Sweden, 353; Syria, 415; UN Special Committee, 37-50 pass.; USA, 207, 209, 213, 375

Italy

Communist Party of, analysis of Middle East situation, 323f

Middle East policy of, described by Rognoni, 223f

al-Ittihad, 70

Jabir, Col., *589f* Japan dependence on Middle East oil, 286 joint communiqué with Saudi Arabia, 328 policy statements on Middle East settlement, 328, 340f

Jarring, Gunnar, 108

Jerusalem

letters containing signatories' position on, attached to Camp David accords, 337, 345f, 503

Palestinian organizations in, issue anti-Camp

David communiqué, 529f

viewed by: Begin 202; Brzezinski, 195; Egypt, 503, 545; Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping, 526; Goldmann, 320; Israel, 201, 337, 372; Japan, 328; Jordan, 410f, 507, 533, 588; Khalaf (Salah), 577f; PLO, 528f; Saudi Arabia, 328, 461, 584, 596f; Socialist International, 174; Sudan, 563; UNESCO, 167ff; USA, 200f, 305, 345f; West Bank Mayors, 537, 596

Jerusalem Post, 71, 75

Jewish Agency, 45, 46

Jewish National Fund, 75

Jews, American, influence of on U.S. Middle East policy, 367f, 463

Jordan

joint communiqués with: PLO, 609f; Yugoslavia, 275

policy towards: Camp David, 507f, 532, 535, 558, 560f, 588, 609f; Jerusalem, 410f, 507, 533, 588; Lebanon, 275; Palestine question, 275, 409-413 pass., 507f, 533ff, 557ff, 588f, 609f; PLO, 410, 536, 609f; West Bank/ Gaza, 409–413 pass., 507, 533ff, 557f

relations with PLO, 566, 576f, 609f

relations with Syria, 429

role in peace settlement, viewed by: Arafat, 491; Australia, 343; Begin, 185; Brzezinski, 192ff, 197, 211; Camp David accords, 330, 333, 334, 335, 355; Ceausescu, 266ff; Dayan, 207; Eban, 205f; Egypt, 473, 503, 545f; Israel, 214; Jordan, 533ff; Khalaf (Salah), 576f; Socialist International, 177f, 358; Syria, 416; UK, 232, 241; USA, 206, 259

September 1970 clashes in, 179, 579

submits questions on Camp David accords to US, 534f, 560f; US replies, 357ff

Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue, 609

Kalak, Izzaddin, assassination of, 490 Kampuchea, 208

Kamil, Muhammad Ibrahim, 202, 308, 418, 439-442, 484f

recall of, by Sadat from Jerusalem talks, 480-483 443, 470f; Lebanon, 471, 496f; PLO, 455, resignation of, 525 469, 471; UNIFIL, 15; USA, 259, 260, 273f Khaddam, Abd al-Halim, 291n, 394, 567, 568, Palestinian armed presence in, viewed by: 610 Butrus, 439; Khalaf, 573–581 pass.; Lebanese Khairallah, Adnan, 567, 568 National Movement, 470; Palestinian resis-Khalaf, Karim, 450, 508f, 596 tance organizations, 467; PLO, 490; Sarkis, Khalaf, Salah, 232, 419f, 573-580 474f; Syria, 476f Khalid Bin Abd al-Aziz, 461, 462, 597 Palestinian resettlement in, viewed by: Khalaf, Khalil, Mustafa, 605 420; Lebanese National Movement, 443f; Khoury, Claude, 360n, 572n Parker, 361; Sarkis, 591; USA, 374 King David Hotel, 320 policy statements by, 439f, 473ff, 580f Kirchschlager, 235f situation in, viewed by: Arafat, 408, 492f; Kiwan, Muhammad, 450–453 Beit al-Din conference, 561f; Brazil, 350; van der Klaauw, 392 f EEC, 351f; Fatah, 323, 552; France, 379ff; Korea (North), 595 FRG, 326; Huss, 485-489; Inter-parliamen-Korea (South), 286 tary Conference, 328f; Israel, 139f; Khalaf, Kosygin, Alexei, 196f, 198, 210, 240 573-581; PLO, 382, 428, 464f, 469, 490, Kreisky, Bruno, 173n, 301f 557, 585; Sarkis, 473ff, 591; Sweden, 352; initiative on Middle East, in Socialist Inter-Syria, 429f, 476f, 500f, 553; USA, 212, national framework, 302f, 358, 359; viewed 340, 361ff, 374ff; USSR, 323, 382; Yemen, by: Avneri, 364; Sadat, 478f, 482 Democratic Republic of, 520 Kurdish question, 269 Syrian role in, viewed by: France, 380; FRG, Kuwait, 7, 10, 11, 181, 523 327; Huss, 485, 488, 580f; Sarkis, 475; Syria, attends Beit al-Din conference, 561 429f, 476f, 500f. See also ADF policy statement by, 601f UN peacekeeping forces in, viewed by: Algeria, proposed contribution to Egypt fund, 541 471; Arafat, 449, 455; Egypt, 440f; Lebanon, scholarships granted by, for Palestinian refugees, 470, 581; Libya, 471; Sarkis, 445, 475; Syria, 442f. See also UNIFIL, UN Security Council Resolutions 425, 426 Langer, Felicia, 70, 71 Leeds Castle talks, 114, 344, 484 Laos, 595 viewed by: Vance, 303-308 Lebanese army, attempted deployment in South, Levy, Haim, 70 viewed by: Arafat, 492f; Butrus, 439; Huss, Libya, Arab Jamahiriyyeh of, 5, 6, 9, 10, 16, 486f; Parker, 362; Sarkis, 606 17, 104, 114, 422 Lebanese Front joint communiqué with Algeria, 471f clashes between, and ADF, 362 policy statements by, 430-434, 589f, 616 viewed by: Arafat, 492; Khalaf (Salah), 574; policy viewed by: Carter, 191; Socialist Inter-Lebanese National Movement, 470f; Syria, national, 173; USSR, 196 476f, 500f Liechtenstein, 164

Lebanese National Movement, 323, 324, 449,

Beit al-Din conference on, 561f

Murville, 379f; Sarkis, 474

Israeli invasion of, see main entry above

Communist Party of, 460n

policy statements by, 443f, 470f, 485–489, 496

Christians in, viewed by: Arafat, 492; Asad,

Israeli withdrawal from South, viewed by:

Egypt, 440f; Lebanese National Movement,

501; Dayan, 371f; Khalaf (Salah), 574; de

467, 477, 594

Lebanon

Maariv, 118
Maldives, 164
Marinescu, 125ff
Mauritius, 6, 10, 13, 14, 17
McCloskey, Paul, N. 245
Meir, Golda, 173, 548
Mengistu Haile Mariam, 274
Minic, Milos, 208
Mirage combat planes, 281, 287, 603
Mitla Pass, 203, 231, 522f

Litani River, 449

OAU, see Organization of African Unity

exploitation by Israel of natural resources in,

occupied territories

310f

Mitterand, Francois, 233f health situation in, viewed by WHO, 169f; Mondale, Walter, F. 482 Mongolia, 10, 15 Morocco policy statements by, 472f, 603f policy viewed by: Bikdash, 435f; Egypt, 494; settlements Egyptian Nationalist Progressive Unionist Grouping, 523; Palestinian resistance organizations, 466 Socialism and Progress Party of, 460 de Murville, Couve, views on Lebanon, 379ff Nahal, 326 Namibia, 161, 162, 197, 199, 275 Nasir, Gamal Abd al-, 210, 447 National Geographic, 183 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naura, 164 Negev, proposed Israeli airbases in, 354f Nepal, 101 contribution to UNIFIL, 11 violent incidents in, 51-67 Netherlands, policy statements, 392ff See also Sinai, West Bank/Gaza *Newsweek*, 138, 454 New York Times, 137 462, 463, 478, 541, 542 Nigeria, 7, 10 contribution to UNIFIL, 12ff policy on Middle East conflict, 129-132 Nimr, Salah, 323 tion and Development Nixon, Richard, 367 Non-aligned countries, 17, 208 294f, 461, 469, 526, 535 Belgrade Foreign Ministers Conference, 309-319; viewed by: Ghali, 494 policy statement by, 527 political declarations on Middle East, 288– 291, 309-313 Egypt, 494 resolutions on: Middle East, 316–319; Palestine question, 313ff; resources of occupied ter-Countries ritories, 316 normalization of relations between Egypt and resolution on Middle East, 303 Israel as stipulated in Camp David accords, 334 effects of, viewed by Egyptian National Progresvelopment, 183, 286 sive Unionist Grouping, 523ff North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 293 communiqué on Middle East, 393 Norway, contribution to UNIFIL, 11 Owen, Dr. David, 228-233 nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Middle East, 149 Numayri, Ja'far, 435, 448, 575, 576 Pahlavi, Shah Reza, 191, 192, 274 viewed by: Hassan II, 604; Qadhafi, 434;

Israeli practices in, viewed by: UN Commission on Human Rights, 158ff; UNESCO, 163–168 pass.; UN Special Committee, 37–77 Israeli settlements in, see main entry Israeli Israeli withdrawal from, called for by: Baghdad summit, 593f; Bahrain, 531; Bikdash, 436; China, 228; EEC, 144f, 272, 327, 351f, 392; Egypt, 201, 418f, 441, 463, 464, 473, 476ff, 493, 542-551 pass., 605; GDR, 239, 369; Goldmann, 320; Indonesia, 205; Inter-parliamentary Conference, 328; PLO, 239; Rognoni, 224; Rumania, 127, 266f, 389; Syria, 369, 371, 434, 497ff, 572, 610; UN General Assembly, 148; USA, 190f, 207f, 212, 363; USSR, 226, 371; Yugoslavia, 389 reports on, by: UN Secretary-General, 95–98, 103ff; UN Special Committee, 37-77 treatment of prisoners from, 30, 68-74, 270ff October 1973 war, 235, 425, 427, 446, 453, 461, viewed by: Qadhafi, 555; Syrian Baath Party, OECD, see Organization for Economic Coordinaoil, role of, in Middle East conflict, 183, 186, policy viewed by: Arafat, 614; Bikdash, 435; OPEC, see Organization of Petroleum Exporting Organization of African Unity, 118, 164, 165 Organization of Economic Coordination and De-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries aid from, to developing countries, 183, 295 financial powers of, viewed by US, 295

Sattar League (Iran), 269

Palestine Liberation Army, 575

Palestine Liberation Front, 466n

Pakistan, 6, 10, 11

Sadat, 421, 475f, 582

Palestine Liberation Organization contacts with Israelis, viewed by Avneri, 365f contacts with "reactionary regimes", viewed by: Palestinian resistance organizations, 466f decision-making in, viewed by: Palestinian resistance organizations, 467f joint communiqués with: GDR, 238f; USSR, 236ff, 381f, 594f memorandum from, to Iraq over assassinations, 476 policy, see next main entry relations with: China, 595; Iraq, 492, 566, 595; Jordan, 566, 476f, 609f; Lebanon, 471; Syria, 551, 595 viewed by: Abna al-Balad, 451; Afghanistan, 142; Algeria, 378; Arab CP's/workers' parties, 459f; Arab Steadfastness Front, 423, 444f, 456, 515, 517f; Asad, 416; Avneri, 365f; Baghdad summit, 593f; Begin, 186; Bahrain, 531; Bulgaria, 387, Brzezinski, 193f; Czechoslovakia, 387; Egypt, 414, 494, 547; Fatah, 551; Findley, 215–218, 390f; GDR, 369, 382; Husayn (King), 410, 412, 536; India, 370; Israel, 133–139; 254, 372f; Italian Communist Party, 323f; Jordan, 609f; Nigeria, 131; non-aligned countries, 309–312 pass.; OAU, 303; Palestinian resistance organizations, 466ff; Qadhafi, 433; Sadat, 603; Sarkis, 474; Socialist International, 179ff; Spanish Socialist Workers Party, 359f; Syria, 369, 370f, 416, 500, 610; Tunisia, 512; UN Gen. Assembly, 148; UN Palestinian rights committee, 116, 118; UN Secretary-General, 12, 14, 15, 112; USA, 264, 300, 361; US House of Reps. 240f; USSR, 210, 347, 370f, 378; West Bank Mayors, 446, 537, 595f; Yugoslavia, 387 Palestine Liberation Organization, policy towards: Baghdad summit, 381, 583 Beit al-Din conference, 583 Camp David accords, 120–125, 381f, 490, 491, 502ff, 511f, 528, 556f, 582f, 610, 616f Horn of Africa, 239 Iran, 566 Iraqi terrorism, 476, 490 Jerusalem, 528f Lebanon, 382, 471, 476, 492f, 557 Middle East settlement, 237f, 239, 382, 582, 617 Palestinian national unity, 475, 490, 556f Palestinian rights, 120–125, 237f, 381f, 421,

462, 556, 582

Soviet-American communiqué, 121, 565, 611 Syria, 583 UN Gen. Assembly Resolutions 3236/7, 120f, 565 UNIFIL, 471, 492 UNRWA, 472 UN Security Council Resolutions 425/6, 594 USA, 582 USSR, 238, 382, 420, 557 West Bank/Gaza, 421, 476, 556 Palestine, UN Conciliation Commission for, 36 Palestine National Council, 15, 120f, 175, 216ff, 468, 469, 556, 565f President, meets with Badran, 609f Palestine National Liberation Movement, see Fatah Palestine National Movement in Israel, 256f

Palestine News Agency (WAFA), 137 Palestine Popular Struggle Front, 466n Palestinian commando operation on Tel Aviv-Haifa Road (March 11), viewed by: Arafat, 449; Asad, 442; Egypt, 440; Tlass, 454; USA, 242; US House of Reps. 240f; Weizman, 248 Palestinian guerrilla activity, viewed by: Asad, 500; Atherton, 300; Carter, 259; Findley, 216; Italian Communist Party, 344; Qadhafi, 434; Rognoni, 223 Palestinian "moderates", viewed by: Brzezinski, 192ff, 211; Rognoni, 223 Palestinian national unity, viewed by: Arafat, 492, 566; PLO, 475, 490, 556f Palestinian presence in Lebanon, see under Lebanon Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, 30, 159 case histories of examples of maltreatment of, 71, 74, 270ff reports on, by: Amnesty International, 270ff; UN Special Committee, 68–74 Palestinian prisoners in Jordanian jails, 576 Palestinian refugees health/nutritional levels of, 87ff (tabulated) reports on, by: UN Palestinian rights committee, 32; UNRWA, 19–25; UN Secretary-General, 78ff, 80ff, 82-95 scholarships for, 95 viewed by: Brzezinski, 194; PLO, 472; UN Gen. Assembly, 149f; UN Secretary-General, Palestinian resistance organizations, address memorandum to Fatah, 466ff Palestinian rights, viewed by: Abna al-Balad, 451; Afghanistan, 141f; Algeria, 378, 447f,

Palestinian rights, viewed by: (cont'd) 471; Arab CP's/workers' parties, 458ff, 618ff; Arab Steadfastness Front, 422f, 456, 515ff; Arafat, 408, 491; Australia, 344; Austria, 236; Baghdad summit, 593f; Bahrain, 531; Begin, 184ff, 342; Bikdash, 435f; Brazil, 350; Brzezinski, 193ff; Bulgaria, 387; Camp David, 329, 333, 338, 339; Carter, 187, 191; Cuba, 274; Czechoslovakia, 245; EEC, 144f, 351, 392f; Egypt, 413f, 418f, 426, 440f, 462, 464, 473, 482, 484, 494, 503, 545f, 598f; Ethiopia, 274; Fatah, 323, 551; GDR, 369; Goldmann, 319f; India, 129, 353, 370; Indonesia, 353, 370; Interparliamentary Union, 328; Israeli Communist Party, 188ff; Japan, 328, 341; Jordan, 275, 409ff; 507f, 533ff, 557ff, 588f, 609f; Lebanon, 513f; Libya, 471; Nigeria, 130f; Non-aligned countries, 310-319 pass.; OAU, 303; Owen, 228; Peres, 348; PLO, 120–125, 237f, 381f, 421, 462, 556, 582; Qadhafi, 432f; Rognoni, 224f; Rumania, 125ff, 267, 387; Saudi Arabia, 328; Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, 359f; Sweden, 132, 353; Syria, 227, 369, 370f, 414-417, 434f, 497ff, 610; UN General Assembly, 158-162; UN Palestinian rights committee, 34ff, 116ff; UN Secretary-General, 106ff; USA, 338, 339, 356f, 374, 375ff; USSR, 226, 227, 236ff, 323, 346, 352, 370, 381f; Vance, 200, 213; Vienna document, 303; West Bank/Gaza Mayors, 537, 596; Yugoslavia, 209, 245, 387 Palestinian state, viewed by: Arafat, 215f, 614f; Begin, 280ff; Cuba, 274; Czechoslovakia, 245; Eban, 205; Ethiopia, 275; Goldmann, 319f; Husayn (King), 411f; Israel, 214, 372; Israeli Communist Party 188f; Italian Communist Party, 324; Mitterand, 234; de Murville, 381; Non-aligned countries, 310-319 pass.; PLO, 462; Qadhafi, 432; Sadat, 426; Socialist International, 174ff, 179; West Bank Mayors, 595; Yugoslavia, 245 Palestinians living in Arab countries, viewed by Socialist International, 178f Panama, 17, 101 Parker, Mr. 360–363 Patt, Gideon, 48 "Peace Now Movement", 363 Peres, Shimon, 257, 301, 347-350 meeting of, with Sadat, 358, 478f viewed by Avneri, 364 Peru, 101

Pétain, Sadat likened to, 571

PFLP, see Popular Front.... Pi, Mr. 142ff Poland, 95, 101 policy statements by, 277, 386 Ponomaryov, Boris, 205, 323 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 300, 466n Qabus, Sultan, 435 Qaddumi, Faruq, 120-125, 216, 582, 616f statements by, viewed by Blum, 138 Qadhafi, Col. Muammar, 223, 422, 430-435, 472, 555f Qatar, 10, 11 proposed contribution by, to Egypt fund, 541 Qawasmeh, Fahd, 450, 596 al-Qibla, 141 Qunaitra, 159 Rabat Arab Summit Conference, 215, 448, 526, 531, 537, 573, 576, 583, 592, 593 viewed by: Arafat, 566; Husayn (King), 409, 410, 536; Jordan, 610; PLO, 421, 551, 610 Rai, Mr. 128f Rakah, see Israel, Communist Party of Ramadan, Taha Yasin, 567, 568 Red Sea, 286 Rhodesia, internal settlement for, compared to autonomy plan, 612 Riad, Mahmud, 525 Ribicoff, Sen., 285–286 Riyad Arab summit conference, 473, 514, 561f, 581, 591 Rogers plan, 367 Rognoni, Mr. 223ff Rosh Hashanah, 285 Rumania, 6, 17 joint communiqué with Yugoslavia, 387 policy statements on Middle East, 125ff, 387 policy viewed by Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping, 525 Russell, Bertrand, 129

Sadat, Muhammad Anwar, 3, 113, 114, 173, 182, 187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 200, 201, 202, 203, 207, 210–214 pass., 221, 229, 256, 260, 266, 274, 282, 284, 286, 297, 321, 322, 329–332 pass., 424–427, 462ff, 477–480, 480–483, 502, 541–551, 598f, 602f letter to, from al-Bakr, inviting him to withdraw from Camp David accords, 592

meeting with Peres, 358, 478f al-Shaab, 70, 71 memorandum to, from Egyptian Revolutionary al-Shak'a, Bassam, 450, 596 Council, 538ff Shanshal, Maj.—Gen. Abd al-Jabir, 568 peace initiative of, see next main entry Sharabi, Hisham, 366 refuses to meet Baghdad summit delegation, 600 Sharon, views on settlements in West Bank/Gaza, Sadat initiative, viewed by: Arab Steadfastness $45-50 \ pass.$ Front, 422ff, 444, 517; Arafat, 449f; Asad, SHELI, 363 414–417, 434, 479ff, 511; Atherton, 261ff, Shihabi, Marshall Hikmat, 568 264; Avneri, 364; Begin, 280, 325, 377; Bikdash, Shtura agreement, 439 435ff; Boumedienne, 446f; Callaghan, 197f; viewed by: PLO, 469; Sarkis, 474 Carter, 191, 239; Ceausescu, 266ff; Fahmi, Siddig, Mr. 141f 457f; Fatah, 323; Ghali, 493f; Hasan, 472f; Siilasvuo, Lieut.-Gen. Ensio, 4, 13, 102, 109, Husayn, 409-413; Italian Communist Party, 114, 257, 496 324; Kamil 484f; Khalaf (Salah), 419f, 575de Silveira, Mr. 350 580 pass.; Nigeria, 132; PLO, 121ff, 407, 421, Sinai, 110, 329, 335, 336, 355, 389, 446, 482, 484, 427, 469, 475ff, 490; Qaddumi, 216; Qadhafi, 493, 498 430-433 pass.; Sadat, 424f, 462f; Tlass, 453ff; airbases in, 354, 355, 385f, 521, 548 USSR, 196f, 323 Israeli settlements in, viewed by: Avneri, 364; Saiqa, 180 Begin, 207; Egypt, 502; Israel, 336; Owen, policy statement, 526f 230f; Sweden, 352; USA, 209, 345; Yadin, Samoa, Western, 164 385 Sao Tomé and Principe, 164 Israeli withdrawal from, as stipulated in Camp Sarkis, Elias, 242, 374, 444, 445, 455, 473ff, David accords, 335f 487, 513f, 573, 580, 591, 599, 605–609 Sinai-Jordan highway Sartre, Jean-Paul, 494 construction of, called for in Camp David ac-Sattar League of Iran, political statement by, 269 cords, 335 viewed by Begin, 343 Saudi Arabia, 113, 178, 181, 191, 192, 207, 214 Smith, Ian, 611 contingent from, in ADF, 461 joint communiqué with Japan, 328 Socialist International called on to invite PLO to conference, 358f policy towards: Baghdad summit, 596f; Camp David accords, 489, 506f, 584, 596f; Jerusalem, report on Middle East, 173-184 328, 461, 584, 596f; Lebanon, 438, 561; USA, viewed by Ghali, 495 See also Kreisky, Vienna document 489 Somalia, 199, 208, 287, 433 policy viewed by: Egypt, 494, 603; Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping, 523, policy viewed by: Egypt, 494; USSR, 197 "Sons of the Village", see Abna al-Balad 526; Hawatmeh, 537; Husayn (King), 413; Palestinian resistance organizations, 466 South Africa, 16, 162, 182, 197, 199, 213 US arms sales to, viewed by: Begin, 280ff; South West Africa People's Organization, 199 Brzezinski, 211; Carter, 207; Ribicoff, 285ff; Soviet-American communiqué (Oct. Syria, 428; US House International Relations viewed by: Arafat, 218, 491, 565f, 611; Avneri, Committee members, 235; Vance, 218-223, 367f; Egypt, 413, 464; PLO, 121f; USSR, 205 277ff Spain, Socialist Workers Party of, calls on Socialist Saunders, Harold, 382 International to invite PLO to conference, testimonies to House and Senate on US Middle 358ff East policy, 292–298, 354–358 Sri Lanka, 17, 18, 595 **SAVAK**, 269 Sudan, 10, 11, 18, 95 Communist Party of, 460n Scheel, Walter, 326ff Schmidt, Helmut, 414 policy statement by, 563f Scranton, Gov. William, 135 policy viewed by: Bikdash; 435; Egypt, 494; Senegal, 17, 101 Khalaf (Salah), 575f contribution to UNIFIL, 12f Suez, 335, 385, 420, 498, 521, 522, 549, 550

Sunday Times, The, 18, 71, 462 Suslov, Mikhail, 198 SWAPO, see South West Africa People's Organiza-UAE, see United Arab Emirates Sweden, 101 policy statements on Middle East, 132f, 352 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 453 Syria, 6, 9, 10, 18, 19, 44, 83, 84, 85, 96, 109ff, 128, 208, 214, 234, 286, Baath Party of, 180, 223, 552-555 Communist Party of, 226, 435, 460n joint communiqués with: GDR, 368f; USSR, 227f, 361f military capability of, viewed by: Arab Steadfastness Front, 456; Qadhafi, 433, 556 opens borders for Palestinian volunteers, 443 Palestinian commando operations from, 416, policy towards: Arab Steadfastness Front, 369, 428ff, 443, 472, 610; Baghdad Summit, 610; Camp David, 369, 370, 497ff, 510, 570ff, 610; Geneva conference, 414ff, 499; Lebanon, 369, 429f, 476f, 500; occupied territories; 369, 371, 434, 497ff, 572, 610; Palestinian rights, 227, 369, 370f, 414-417, 434f, 497ff, 610; US arms sales to Egypt, 428 policy viewed by: Begin, 186; FRG, 326f; Israel, 138, PLO, 123; USSR, 196, 226 relations with: FRG, 292, 327; Iraq, see under Iraq; Jordan, 429; PLO, 428, 490 role in Lebanon, see under Lebanon role in peace settlement, viewed by: Camp David accords, 334; Carter, 329; Socialist International, 358 Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), 429 Taiwan, 286 Tal, Wasfi, 138

Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 391 Tawil, Raymonda, 71 Thunborg, Mr. 132f Tiran, Straits of, 189, 335, 385, 386, 425, 522, 549 Tishrin, 138 Tito, Josip Broz, 208, 234, 275, 301 Tlass, Gen. Mustafa, 138, 453ff, 568 Tonga, 164 Tripoli agreement, 466, 468, see also under Arab Steadfastness Front Troyanovsky, 243 Tsemel, Lea, 70

Tueni, Ghassan, 495f

Tunisia, policy statement by, 436 Tzippori, Mordecai, 45

UK, see United Kingdom UN see United Nations UNDOF, see United Nations, Disengagement Observer Force

UNEF, see United Nations, Emergency Force UNESCO, see United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNIFIL, see United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 6, 7, 10, 14, 16, 17, 48, 95, 109, 110, 111, 113, 189 arms sales from, to Syria, 501

joint communiqués with: Algeria, 198ff, 377f; Fatah, 323; PLO, 236ff, 381f; Syria, 227f, 370f

policy towards: Arab Steadfastness Front, 370, 381; Camp David accords, 346, 352, 370, 378, 381f; Egypt, 196, 199, 226, 237, 240, 323, 370, 378; Geneva conference, 196f, 205, 210, 226, 237, 240, 352; Horn of Africa, 196, 199; Lebanon, 227, 243, 323, 382; Middle East peace settlement, 196f, 205, 226f, 237, 240, 346, 352, 370, 381; Palestinian rights, 226, 227, 236ff, 323, 346, 352, 370, 381f; Syria, 226f; Yemen, Democratic Republic of, 210

policy towards Arabian Gulf, viewed by Ribicoff, 285 - 288

viewed by: Arab Steadfastness Front, 423, 457; Brzezinski, 211; Fatah, 551; Hawatmeh, 537; Khalaf, 575; PLO, 420, 428, 470, 617; Sadat, 482, 548; Socialist International, 176f, 183; Syria, 417f, 435, 501, 554

statement with USA on Middle East (Oct. 1977), see Soviet-American communiqué

United Arab Emirates policy statement, 513

policy viewed by Egypt, 494

proposed contribution by, to Egypt fund, 541 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14

Middle East policy, 197f, 228-233, 341

United Nations

Commission on Human Rights, Resolutions 2, 3, (XXXIV), 161f

Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 107, 108,

146, 147 list of member states, 27 mandate, 26f members of task force, 27 report to UN Gen. Assembly, 26-36 statement by Chairman to UN Gen. Assembly, 115 - 119statements to UN Security Council, 15ff viewed by: Afghanistan, 142; India, 129, Israel, 134; Nigeria, 130; PLO, 120 Conciliation Commission on Palestine, 36 Disengagement Observer Force, 6, 7, 12, 101f, 111, 157 Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1978/ 24, 158 Economic Commission for Western Asia, 96f, 150 Resolutions: 53 (V), 162; 58 (V), 163 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 24f, 95; Decisions 104 EX/5.1.5/6.3/ 7.1.2/7.1.6, 163ff; Resolutions 20 C/1.4/14.1/ 7.6, 165–169 Emergency Force, 4, 5, 12, 100f, 109, 111, 157 renewal of mandate, viewed by Egypt, 485 Food and Agriculture Organization, 83, 95, 150 Fund for Population Activities, 163 General Assembly, see next main entry Interim Force in Lebanon, see main entry Relief and Works Agency, see main entry Secretary-General, see main entry Security Council, see main entry Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, 98, 158ff list of member states, 39 mandate of, 43f report to UN Gen. Assembly, 37–78 Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, 116 Truce Supervision Organization, 7, 8, 12, 100, 101 United Nations General Assembly debate on Palestine question, statements by: Afghanistan, 141f; China, 142ff; FRG (for EEC), 144f; India, 128f; Israel, 133–141; Nigeria, 129–132; PLO, 120–125; Rumania, 125ff; Sweden, 132f; UN Palestinian rights committee chairman, 115–119 reports submitted to, 3–98 Resolutions of 33rd session: 33/28, 146f; 33/29,

148; 33/64, 149; 33/81, 149f; 33/110, 150;

33/112, 150-153; 33/113, 153-156; 33/147, 156

United Nations Interim Force in South Lebanon contingents in, 11–14, 102

establishment of, 102f, 156

exchanges of fire with *de facto* forces/ Palestinian elements, 14, 492

reports on, by Secretary-General, 11–15, 102f viewed by: EEC, 272, 352; Huss, 486f, Lebanese National Movement, 470; Lebanon, 471, 495ff; PLO, 471; USA, 362

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

budget for 1979, 22

financial situation of, 21f

problems of, viewed by Gen. Assembly, 150–153 reports by, 19–25, 78–98 pass.

transfer of HQ, viewed by PLO, 464f, 472; UNRWA, 22-25

United Nations Secretary-General

reports on: Middle East situation, 3, 99-114; Palestine refugees, 78-98 pass.; UNDOF, 5ff, 101f; UNIFIL, 11-15, 102f

United Nations Security Council report of, to Gen. Assembly, 4–16 reports submitted to, 99–114

Resolutions: (242/338), included in annex to Camp David accords, 334f; (425) (text), 10f, 156 (425/426, viewed by: Huss, 486; Lebanese National Movement, 470f; Lebanon, 496f, 581; PLO, 449, 594; Sarkis, (445), (429), 157; (438), 157; (441), 157

United States of America

arms provided by, used in Israel's South Lebanon invasion, see under Israel

arms sales to Egypt/Israel/Saudi Arabia, viewed by: Begin, 280ff; Bikdash, 435f; Brzezinski, 211; Carter, 207; Ribicoff, 285ff; Sadat, 603; Syria, 428; US House International Relations Committee members, 235; Vance, 211f, 218–223, 227f

assistance (financial/military) to Israel, 389f, 449, 454, 457f, 539, 579

memorandum of agreement (1975) with Israel, 390

policy, see next two main entries

proposes UN force for South Lebanon, 242, 442 replies to questions submitted by Jordan on Camp David accords, 375ff

role in peace settlement, viewed by: Begin, 325; Brzezinski, 210f; Carter, 190f, 207f, 239f; Ghali, 493; Sadat, 426f, 502; Vance, 211f, 220f, 278
United States of America, policy towards

United States of America (cont'd)

United States of America, policy towards Camp David accords, 354–358, 375ff, 396f Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations, 191f, 201, 203, 207, 211f, 219ff, 239f

Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, 242, 259, 260, 265f, 273f, 361f

Israeli settlements, 207, 209, 213, 345, 375 Jerusalem, 200f, 305, 345f

Lebanon, 212, 339f, 361ff, 374f

Leeds Castle talks, 303f

Palestinian rights, 187, 191, 200, 213, 338, 356f, 374, 375ff

PLO, 264, 300, 361

UNIFIL 362

West Bank/Gaza, 191, 250, 354–358, 373, 357ff, 396

United States of America, policy viewed by: Abourezk, 243f; Algeria, 447; Arab Steadfastness Front, 423; Arafat, 449f, 491, 611–615 pass.; Avneri, 363–368 pass.; EEC, 393; Egypt, 463, 484, 495; Egyptian Communist Party, 437; Fatah, 551; France, 360; GDR, 369; Hawatmeh, 536f; Huss, 487; Husayn, 410, 413; Iraq, 586; Israel, 214f; Kreisky, 302; NATO, 394; Netherlands, 369; Non-aligned countries, 310f; OAU, 303; PLO, 462, 490f, 556, 582, 616f; Qadhafi, 431; Rognoni, 223; Saudi Arabia, 460f, 489; Saunders, 354–358; Sudan, 564; Syria, 369, 370, 417, 476, 553; UN Secretary-General, 109–114 pass.; US House of Reps. sub-committee... 292–298; Yadin, 382ff

UNRWA, see United Nations Relief and Works Agency

UNTSO, see United Nations, Truce Supervision Organization

USA, see United States of America USSR, see Union of Soviet Socialist Republics US-USSR joint communiqué (Oct. 1975), see Soviet-American communiqué

Vancouver conference (Socialist International), 359

Vance, Cyrus, 191, 200f, 211ff, 218–232, 235, 277f, 290, 303–308, 344, 370, 396ff, 495, 534, 596

Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 353, 370

Venezuela, 6, 7, 11, 14, 17

Vienna document (Socialist International), 302f Vietnam, 10, 208, 565, 595

Waldheim, Dr. Kurt, see UN Secretary-General Washington Post, 196

von Wechmar, Mr. 144f

Weitz, Raanan, 45, 46

Weizman, Ezer, 45, 246ff, 354, 420, 480, 524 viewed by: Asad, 499; Avneri, 364; Sadat, 481ff

West Bank/Gaza Strip

"administrative autonomy plan" for, see main entry

Arab financial assistance to, 579

mayors issue anti-Camp David statement, 537f; send memorandum to CAABU

trade unionists issue anti-Camp David statement, 615

See also Israeli settlements, occupied territories Western Sahara, viewed by: Algeria, 199, 447; Arab Steadfastness Front, 456; Yugoslavia, 208 WHO/WHA, see World Health Assembly/Organi-

zation
World Conference for Action against *apartheid*, 161
World Health Assembly/Organization, 24, 25, 82f, 150

World Jewish Congress, 319f Resolution 31.38, 169f

Yadin, Yigael, 382ff

Yasin, Ali Nasser, assassination of, 476, 490 Yemen Arab Republic, policy statement, 513 Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of, 114, 181, 422

policy statement by, 519f

viewed by: Ribicoff, 286; USSR, 196, 210, 286

Yugoslavia

joint communiqués on Middle East with: Czechoslovakia, 245; Indonesia, 205; Jordan, 275

Middle East policy, 205, 208f, 234, 245, 275, 301

Zhivkov, Todor, 387 Zimbabwe, 161, 162, 197, 199, 275, 432, 434 Zionism, viewed by: Avneri, 366f; OAU, 303 Zu Haderekh, 71